1. Introduction
1. The Parliamentary Assembly last debated the functioning
of democratic institutions in Ukraine in the wake of the presidential
election of January 2010 – and the subsequent change of power –
when it adopted, on 20 October 2010,
Resolution 1755 (2010). Since then,
we have been visiting the country regularly to keep abreast of political
developments in Ukraine, with the initial intention of producing
a full report on the honouring of commitments and obligations by
Ukraine early in 2011.
2. However, since the adoption of
Resolution 1755 (2010), there have
been ongoing reports and allegations that personal freedoms and
democratic rights are increasingly being flouted in the country. Regrettably,
this seems to be a continuation of a trend we already commented
upon in our last report when we expressed our concerns about reports
and allegations that democratic freedoms and rights had come under pressure
in Ukraine.
3. The allegations of a diminishing respect for personal rights
and democratic freedoms in Ukraine have been compounded by the trials
against a number of former government officials, including former
prime minister Yulia Timoshenko. These trials have been branded
as politically motivated and as revanchist prosecution by opposition
supporters and raise a number of questions about selective justice
and the criminalisation of political decisions.
4. The trials against former government members were observed
by several national and international observers. Their findings
clearly showed that these trials were marred by numerous serious
shortcomings resulting from deficiencies in the criminal justice
system. The problems with the judiciary and with the justice system
in Ukraine have been highlighted in several monitoring reports of
the Assembly and resolving these deficiencies is part of Ukraine’s
accession commitments to the Council of Europe. However, to date,
none of the country’s successive governments have made any serious
progress in addressing these shortcomings.
5. On 4 October 2011, the Monitoring Committee discussed the
situation in Ukraine in relation to the trials against former government
members. At this meeting, the committee expressed its concerns about
the apparent deficiencies in Ukraine’s legal system and the resulting
questions about respect for the rule of law in the country. In addition,
the committee expressed its disquiet about the negative impact these
trials – and their outcome – were having on Ukraine’s relations
with the rest of Europe and in particular the European Union. The
committee therefore decided to ask the Bureau of the Assembly to
put an item on the functioning of democratic institutions in Ukraine
on the agenda for the Assembly's January 2012 part-session.
6. In this report, we will outline the trials against former
government members, as well as the shortcomings – some of them systemic
– that these trials have brought to light. In addition, given the
impact that these trials could have on the upcoming parliamentary
elections,
we will touch upon
the ongoing electoral reform in the country.
2. The prosecution of former government
members
7. Following the change of power in Ukraine after the
presidential election in 2010, criminal investigations were initiated
against a number of members and officials in the previous government.
The most prominent cases are those against the former minister of
the interior, Mr Yurij Lutsenko, the former acting minister of defence,
Mr Valeriy Ivashchenko, the former first deputy minister of justice,
Mr Yevhen Kornychuk, as well as the former prime minister, Ms Yulia
Timoshenko.
8. A criminal investigation was started against Mr Lutsenko on
2 November 2010. On 13 December 2010, he was charged under Articles
191 (misappropriation of state property) and 365 (exceeding/misuse
of official powers) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. The grounds
given for the charges were that Mr Lutsenko had illegally promoted
his driver to the rank of police officer, allowed expenses for the
annual Militia Day festivities in violation of a government decision
and exceeded his powers as minister when ordering the police monitoring of
a security service driver suspected of complicity in the alleged
poisoning of former President Yushenko.
On 26
December 2010, Mr Lutsenko was arrested for failing to co-operate
with the prosecution. He has been in detention on remand ever since.
9. Investigations started against Mr Ivashchenko on 20 August
2010 and he was charged, on 27 August 2010, under Articles 364 (abuse
of office) and 365 (exceeding/misuse of official powers) of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine for having signed a document authorising
the reorganisation of a shipyard that allegedly allowed for the
unlawful sale of state property. He was arrested on 21 August 2010
and has been in detention on remand since that date.
10. Mr Kornychuk is the son-in-law of Supreme Court President,
Mr Vasyl Onopenko, who is considered to be a close ally of Ms Timoshenko.
He was first deputy minister of justice from 2007 to 2010. Mr Kornychuk
was charged under Article 365 (exceeding/misuse of official powers)
of the Criminal Code for having given a legal opinion, as deputy
justice minister, that allowed the Ministry of Economy to give a
contract, without tender, to a law firm in which he had been a partner.
In addition, he was charged under Article 366 (forgery by a state official)
for not properly filing this legal opinion. He was arrested on 22
December 2010 and remained in detention until 14 February 2011,
when he was released following a meeting between President Yanukovich and
his father-in-law. His trial is ongoing.
11. Ms Timoshenko was initially charged under Articles 364 (abuse
of office) and 365 (exceeding/misuse of official powers) of the
Criminal Code of Ukraine for having ordered the conversion of the
proceeds of the greenhouse gas quota to the general state budget,
for having caused the delay of custom payments for 1 000 ambulances
that were ordered by her administration and for having illegally
signed the agreement between Naftogaz and Gazprom on the sale of
Russian gas to Ukraine which ended the energy crisis between these two
countries in 2009. The recent court proceeding against Ms Timoshenko
dealt with the charges relating to the gas deal. Ms Timoshenko was
arrested and put in detention on remand for contempt of court on
5 August 2010.
12. On 11 October 2011, the court sentenced Ms Timoshenko to seven
years imprisonment and banned her from holding official office for
three years, for the gas deal. In addition, she was ordered to pay
150 million euros to cover the presumed losses of the Ukrainian
state as a result of this deal. Her conviction was widely condemned
by European leaders as being politically motivated.
13. Ms Timoshenko has appealed against her conviction and her
case will now be heard by the Kyiv Appeal Court. During her appeal,
she will remain in detention.
14. Following the concerns expressed by several European leaders
with regard to Ms Timoshenko’s conviction, President Yanukovich
initially indicated that he understood the criticism and called
the case against Ms Timoshenko regrettable. President Yanukovich
added that he was sure that the verdict would be appealed and that
“what decision it [the appellate court] will take and under which
legislation has great importance”. This was seen by many as an indication
that the authorities were willing to amend the Criminal Code with
a view to removing or otherwise decriminalising Articles 364 and
365. Amendments to the Criminal Code to this effect were tabled
and reportedly endorsed in the Legal Affairs Committee of the Verkhovna
Rada, but their adoption in second reading was postponed to a later
date. They were subsequently rejected in second reading on 15 November
2011.
15. To the surprise of many, especially in the light of the indications
that the authorities were willing to decriminalise Articles 364
and 365, new charges were brought against Ms Timoshenko for alleged embezzlement.
These charges relate to the period when Ms Timoshenko was the president
and co-owner of the company United Energy Systems of Ukraine (UESU),
which was a major player in the gas trade between Russia and Ukraine,
as well as in the transit of Russian gas via Ukraine to the rest
of Europe. According to the charges that were brought against her
under Articles 19, paragraph 2 (misappropriation, embezzlement or transfer
of property by abuse of official position) and 15, paragraph 2 (criminal
attempt), Ms Timoshenko, in criminal conspiracy with then Deputy
Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko,
allegedly
arranged for an official state guarantee for the payment, in supplies
and services, to Russia of the gas delivered, while in reality transferring the
money to cover the cost of these supplies and services to the bank
account of Mr Lazarenko.
16. On 14 November 2011, new charges were brought against her
relating to her role as president of UESU, this time for tax evasion,
theft and concealing foreign currency revenues. In addition, investigations
were re-opened in a series of cases that were formally closed in
2005. Reportedly, she is also being investigated for possible complicity
in the murder of businessman and MP Mr Yevhen Shcherban. A number
of questions have been raised with regard to these new charges,
which we will return to below.
17. We would like from the outset to emphasise that the trials
should not be seen from the perspective of opposition versus ruling
majority but from that of the rule of law and the guarantee of a
fair trial for all persons in Ukraine. We are not in a position
to judge the merits of the case or the question of guilt or otherwise.
No one, including, or especially, leading politicians should be
beyond the law for common crimes. However, the trials against these
former government members raise important questions with regard
to the criminalisation of normal political decision making and,
as a consequence, politically motivated charges. In addition, these
cases have brought to the forefront a number of systemic shortcomings
and deficiencies in Ukraine’s legal system that undermine the right
to a fair trial and the rule of law in Ukraine.
18. Articles 364 (abuse of office) and 365 (exceeding/misuse of
official powers) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine are a remnant from
the Soviet Criminal Code, where these articles were introduced under
Josef Stalin. Articles 364
and 365
allow for an overly
broad interpretation and considerable discretion by the prosecutor. In
effect, as is apparent from the cases against the former government
members, these articles allow for the post facto criminalisation
of normal political decisions by government officials that, with
hindsight, can be questioned or that were opposed by the then opposition,
now government. Criminalising normal political decision making is
a violation of the rule of law and paves the way for politically
motivated charges. This is unacceptable in a democratic society.
In addition, the assessment of political decisions and their effects
is the prerogative of parliaments and, ultimately, of the electorate,
and not of the courts. Given the calls in many countries for the
prosecution of politicians
for
their macro-economic decisions that led to the current financial crisis,
we would like to recommend that strict international standards delimitating
political and criminal responsibility be developed by the Assembly.
19. The court proceedings in the case against Ms Timoshenko, as
well as in those against other former government officials, have
reportedly been chaotic and marred by procedural errors. They underscore
the existing problem of bias towards the prosecution in the legal
system in Ukraine. Ukraine has an acquittal rate of less than 1%,
which means that a person brought before a court has virtually no
chance of being acquitted. In addition, strong functional links
exist between the prosecution and the judiciary. Observers of court
cases have commented on the fact that judges in general seem to
side with the prosecution against the defence issues brought before
the court. This raises important questions with regard to the independence
of the judiciary, as well as the equality of arms between prosecution
and defence.
20. The bias in favour of the prosecution was also evident from
the use of detention on remand in these cases. In all cases outlined
above, the judges agreed with the request of the prosecution for
detention on remand, often without providing any legal reasoning
for their decisions and in a situation where there was little apparent
risk that the defendants would flee or obstruct the course of justice.
Allegations that the use of detention on remand, as well as the
nearly unlimited powers of the prosecution to summon the defendants, were
used to harass these persons and to make their position as political
leaders impossible, are credible and of serious concern.
21. A key issue of concern is the fact that, under Ukrainian legislation,
a person convicted of a serious crime is prohibited from standing
in local and national elections, unless his or her criminal record
is erased by a court. In the view of many observers, the current
cases are also, if not exclusively, aimed at preventing these persons from
participating in the upcoming parliamentary elections that are scheduled
to take place in October 2012. The problematic and controversial
nature of the charges against these persons, as well as the manner
in which the trials took place and the deficiencies noted, lends
credence to these accusations. It is clear that Ukraine’s democratic
credentials and relations with the Assembly would be severely damaged
if any of these persons would be prevented from participating in
the upcoming elections on the basis of a conviction on alleged politically
motivated charges in a trial of questionable fairness.
22. As mentioned, a number of questions have been raised with
regard to the nature of the new charges that were filed against
Ms Timoshenko by the prosecutors. With regard to the embezzlement
case, there is a lack of clarity as to when the crime was actually
committed, either in 1996, when the state guarantee for the gas procurements
was given, or in 2000, when the contract was discontinued due to
the failure of repayment of the debts by UESU. This is relevant
in the context of the statute of limitations for embezzlement. The
current Criminal Code provides for a 15-year statute of limitations
for the embezzlement of which Ms Timoshenko has been charged. This
Criminal Code was adopted in 2001. In the previous Criminal Code,
which was in force when the state guarantee was given, the statute
of limitations was 10 years. As a result, some interlocutors have
argued that the crimes for which Ms Timoshenko is now charged are
time-barred. This is a complex legal question, which no doubt will
become an important legal argument during her trial. This underscores
the importance that she should obtain a fair trial that fully respects
the principle of equality of arms between prosecution and defence.
23. A number of previously closed investigations have been re-opened
by the prosecution. These investigations relate to alleged tax evasion,
concealment of revenues, embezzlement of state property and forgery
by Ms Timoshenko, as well as by her husband and father-in-law. Most
of these cases had been closed by the Prosecutor’s Office in 2005,
when Ms Timoshenko was prime minister. The decision to close these cases
was subsequently confirmed by the Supreme Court of Ukraine. Ukrainian
law, as in other countries, allows for the re-opening of investigations
in the event that important new evidence comes to light. Several interlocutors
have expressed doubts that the Prosecutor’s Office had the required
new evidence when it re-opened the cases against Ms Timoshenko.
For their part, the authorities have argued that the closure of
the cases by the Prosecutor General at that time was politically
motivated and that therefore these cases were illegally closed.
24. We do not wish to comment or speculate on the merits of the
subject matter of the new charges that have been brought against
Ms Timoshenko. We emphasise, however, that the questions regarding
these charges raise serious legal issues that need to be examined.
That, in turn, underscores the need for a fully transparent legal
process which respects all the requirements for a fair trial as
guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights.
25. In addition to the concerns already mentioned about the criminalisation
of normal political decision making, the ongoing trials against
former government members have brought to the forefront a series
of systemic deficiencies in Ukraine’s legal system. These legal
deficiencies have been longstanding points of concern for the Assembly
which, in its many resolutions on Ukraine, has exhorted successive
governments of the country to address them and to bring the justice
system into line with European standards. We can only regret that
none of the successive governments of the country, as well as successive
convocations of the Verkhovna Rada, have shown the commensurate
political will, or made the necessary efforts, to satisfactorily address
these deficiencies in the country’s legal system.
3. Legal issues
3.1. Lack of independence of the judiciary
26. The independence of the judiciary in Ukraine continues
to be a principal concern. The judiciary is widely seen as being
dependent on, and – to an extent – serving, political interests.
This is compounded by the fact that the justice system is grossly
underfunded in Ukraine, which strengthens the dependency of the
judiciary on public and private interests and creates a potential
fertile ground for corruption.
In
Resolution 1755 (2010), we
therefore called upon the current authorities to ensure that the
justice system is sufficiently funded from the state budget.
27. A systemic problem undermining the independence of the judiciary
is the manner in which the judges are appointed. As outlined in
our last report to the Assembly, judges are appointed by the president,
on a recommendation of the High Council of Justice, based on a proposal
by the High Qualifications Commission for Justice, for an initial
period of five years. After this five-year probation period, judges
can be elected by the Verkhovna Rada, on proposal of the High Qualifications
Commission, to a lifetime position.
28. The five-year probation period is of concern as it opens up
the possibility for undue influence on the decision making of judges
in their probation period. This is compounded by the fact that the
decision to grant a lifetime position is made by the Verkhovna Rada
in plenary sitting. As stated by the European Commission for Democracy
through Law (Venice Commission): “The Parliament [Verkhovna Rada]
is undoubtedly more engrossed in political games and the appointments
of judges could result in political bargaining in parliament in
which every member of Parliament coming from one district or another
will want to have his or her own judge.”
Unfortunately, both the role of
the Verkhovna Rada in the appointment of judges, as well as the
five-year probation period, are provided for in the constitution.
The Assembly, in
Resolution
1755 (2010), already reiterated its position that, without
changing the constitution itself, it is impossible to reform the
judiciary and justice system in Ukraine in line with European standards
and norms.
29. Given the vulnerability of judges in their probation period,
the appointment of these judges to preside over politically sensitive
cases is questionable.
The fact that the majority
of the judges in the above-mentioned cases, including in the case
against Ms Timoshenko, are still in their five-year probationary
period, has given rise to questions about the independence of these
courts and proceedings from the political interests of the ruling
majority.
30. It is not only the excessive length of the probation period
and the role of the Verkhovna Rada in the appointment process that
undermines the independence of the Judiciary, but also the role
and composition of the High Council of Justice and High Qualifications
Commission.
31. The minister of justice, contrary to the principle of separation
of powers, is represented on the High Qualifications Commission
which has, inter alia, considerable
influence on the appointment of, as well as on disciplinary procedures
against, judges. In addition, the procedure for the appointment
of judges to permanent judicial positions prescribes that the High
Qualifications Commission de facto submits
the candidate judge’s performance to public scrutiny. It is clear
that this affects the independence of judges during the probation period
and risks politicising the appointment process.
32. According to Article 5 of the Law of Ukraine on the High Council
of Justice, the High Council of Justice is composed of 20 members
as follows: “The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine,
the Congress of Judges of Ukraine, the Congress of Advocates of
Ukraine, the Congress of Representatives of Higher Legal Educational
Establishments and Scientific Institutions shall each appoint three
members, and the All-Ukrainian Conference of Employees of the Public
Prosecutors’ Office shall appoint two members of the High Council
of Justice. The Chairman of the Supreme Court of Ukraine, the Minister
of Justice of Ukraine, and the Procurator-General of Ukraine are
ex officio members of the High Council of Justice”. This composition
clearly violates the principle of separation of powers as well as
the European norm that, on bodies of judicial self-administration,
judges elected by their peers should have a dominant position, if
not the majority of the votes.
33. The inclusion of representatives of the prosecution, including
the Prosecutor General,
on
the High Council of Justice not only defies the principle of separation
of powers, but also highlights the close functional relationship
between the judiciary and prosecution. It explains to a large extent
the bias towards the prosecution in court proceedings, as already
mentioned. In this context, we are extremely concerned about the many
substantiated reports, including from the Association of Ukrainian
Judges, that disciplinary actions were initiated, and judges removed
from office by the High Council of Justice on the basis of complaints
of the Prosecutor’s Office due to the fact that the judge in question
had decided against the prosecution in a court case. This is unacceptable
in a state under the rule of law.
3.2. Excessive use and length of detention on remand
34. Detention on remand, according to European norms,
should only be used as a measure of last resort, when there exists
a risk of subversion of justice. The current Criminal Procedure
Code in Ukraine confers considerable discretion on the prosecutor
to request detention on remand, and does not require that he justifies that
request. As mentioned, courts commonly follow the request of the
prosecutors, without judging the merits of the request, including
with regard to detention on remand.
35. The issue of unlawful and excessive length of detention on
remand is one of the major issues in judgments of the European Court
of Human Rights against Ukraine, with more than 50 judgments on
this issue having been delivered against Ukraine since 2005. The
Court has noted the fact that the judicial authorities are under
no legal obligation to state the grounds when authorising the detention
on remand or to set a time limit for such detention. In addition,
a clear procedure for the review of the lawfulness or length of
detention on remand is lacking in Ukrainian law and judicial decisions
authorising detention at the trial stage of judicial proceedings
cannot be appealed.
36. The concerns regarding the excessive use and length of detention
on remand have already been underscored in previous reports and
resolutions. In addition, the trials against former government members also
demonstrate the potential for abuse of detention on remand. The
recourse to lengthy detention on remand of public figures, when
there is no risk of flight or subversion of the investigations,
cannot be legally justified. Credible allegations have been made
that these persons were detained pending the investigations and
trial in order to render their functioning as politicians and party
leaders impossible.
37. Recourse to detention on remand without sufficient legal justification
also raises issues of a humanitarian nature. Reportedly, both Mr Lutsenko
and Mr Ivashchenko have severe health conditions and are in need
of urgent medical attention that cannot be provided, at the level
of quality required, by the prison health services. In the absence
of proper medical care, their health is reportedly rapidly deteriorating
with a realistic prospect that they may not survive their ordeal.
Given the lack of legal justification for their detention on remand,
in combination with the very low risk that they could abscond, these
persons should be released on humanitarian grounds without any further
delay. In addition, Ms Timoshenko has also developed severe health
problems in prison, after a fall in which she hurt her back. According
to the Ukrainian Ombudsperson, Ms Nina Karpacheva, who visited her
in prison, Ms Timoshenko would need medical examinations and treatment
outside the prison system. She strongly condemned the fact that,
as a result of her medical condition, the investigators had started
to interrogate Ms Timoshenko in her prison cell in relation to the
new charges brought against her. In response, President Yanukovich
announced, on 22 November 2011, that Ms Timoshenko would be allowed
to undergo treatment outside the prison. Following a medical examination
in a Hospital in Kyiv, she was transferred, on 29 November 2011,
to the prison hospital ward to receive the treatment that was recommended. On
30 November, Ms Timoshenko was visited by a delegation of the European
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CPT).
3.3. Lack of equality of arms between prosecution and
defence
38. Equality of arms between prosecution and defence
is essential for a fair trial and respect for the rule of law. Regrettably,
the trials against the former government leaders clearly demonstrated
that such equality is not guaranteed by the legal system in Ukraine.
39. Bias towards the prosecution is not only prevalent in the
judiciary, but is also engrained in the justice system itself. The
defence is not given a copy of the case file and can only access
it at the Prosecutor’s Office on days and hours prescribed by the
prosecutor. The prosecutor is free to set the days and times as
he sees fit and at short notice. Defendants and their lawyers are
obliged to come on the days and at the times set by the prosecutor,
which means that the latter can de facto summon
the defendants and their lawyers without restriction. It is not
allowed to make copies of documents in the case file. This procedure
also allows the prosecutor to interfere directly in the quality
of the defence by ordering an unrealistically short time for the defence
to familiarise themselves with the case file. In the case against
Mr Lutsenko, the Prosecutor General ordered his arrest after 13
days on the grounds that Mr Lutsenko was not familiarising himself
quickly enough with the more than 6 000 pages of his case file.
40. The manner in which the prosecutor presents a case file to
the defence and his prerogative to decide on the timetable for the
defence to familiarise themselves with its contents, clearly undermine
the principle of equality of arms and, as a result, of a fair trial.
In addition, the fact that the prosecutor can summon the defendants
and their lawyers at will, often at short notice and without any
recourse for the defendants, opens up the possibility of abuse and
harassment by the prosecution. In our meetings with defence lawyers,
we received several reports that indicate that such harassment was
indeed taking place also with a view to hindering the defendants
in executing their tasks as politicians and party officials. The
above-mentioned arrest of Mr Lutsenko seems to be a point in case
in this respect.
3.4. Inadequate legal reasoning and justification in
indictments
41. In previous reports, we have already expressed our
concerns about the insufficient or inadequate legal reasoning in
indictments and other trial documents. Interlocutors have indicated
that indictments often lack clear descriptions of the criminal acts
that the defendants are alleged to have committed, as well as the
articles of the law they are supposed to have violated by that act.
Without such clarity
in the indictment, proper defence is difficult, if not impossible,
and the fairness of the court proceedings is affected. This was
also the case in the indictments issued against the four former
government members mentioned in this report.
4. Constitutional reform
42. It should be emphasised that the above-mentioned
deficiencies and shortcomings in the justice system have been long-standing
concerns. Successive governments in Ukraine have repeatedly acknowledged
the deficiencies in the justice system and expressed their intention
to address them. However, to date, this has been to no avail. The
developments in relation to the recent trials underscore the need
for the authorities to urgently reform the justice system in line
with European norms and standards, in accordance with the accession
commitments undertaken nearly 17 years ago.
43. The current authorities, for their part, have indicated that
a number of the shortcomings mentioned in this report will be resolved
by the new Criminal Procedure Code which they hope parliament will
adopt in early 2012. A draft Criminal Procedure Code has been prepared
by the presidential administration and sent to the Council of Europe
for opinion and advice. The opinion is expected to be published
early 2012. We intend to discuss its findings in a future report.
44. As we argued in our previous report, it will not be possible
to reform Ukraine’s judiciary and justice system in conformity with
European norms and standards without substantially amending the
constitution. Our arguments remain valid, also after the Constitutional
Court declared the 2004 constitutional amendments null and void
on 1 October 2010. For example, the role of the Verkhovna Rada in
the appointment of judges and the five-year probation period for
new judges – both of which are problematic – are enshrined in the constitution.
In addition, constitutional provisions prevent the altering of the
composition of the High Council of Justice in such a manner as to
avoid its politicisation and dependency on the political interests
of the governing majority.
45. In the view of the Assembly, as expressed in
Resolution 1755 (2010),
the Constitutional Court decision of 1 October 2010 should now be
the starting point for a constitutional reform process. This is
more than ever necessary. Profound constitutional reforms are necessary
for the country to be able to meet its accession commitments and
obligations to the Council of Europe. President Yanukovich, as well
as several ministers of his administration, have expressed their
willingness to initiate a comprehensive reform of the constitution,
and promised that such reform would be implemented in close consultation
and co-operation with the Venice Commission.
46. In January 2011, President Yanukovich issued decree 224/2011,
in which he asked the Scientific Group on Constitutional Assembly
Preparation, led by former President Kravchuk, to prepare an outline
for the constitutional reform process. In addition, he appointed
former Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration in charge
of constitutional reforms under President Yushenko, Ms Marina Stavniychuk,
to the same position – and with the same responsibilities – in his
administration. Ms Stavniychuck is also a member of the Venice Commission,
which should facilitate the co-operation with the presidential administration
on the forthcoming reforms.
47. The Ukrainian Commission for the Strengthening of Democracy,
set up by President Yanukovich to advise him on the reforms needed
to honour the country's commitments to the Council of Europe, drew
up a proposal for a constitutional assembly upon the request of
the president. The proposal for a constitutional assembly – which
would have a consultative role in the drafting process of the constitutional
amendments – was warmly welcomed in the Venice Commission’s opinion
requested
by the authorities.
48. That said, the efforts of the authorities to reform the constitutional
framework seem to have run out of steam. We were informed that constitutional
reforms will only be initiated after the next parliamentary elections scheduled
for October 2012. The authorities ostensibly hope that the ruling
coalition will have a constitutional majority after those elections,
which would allow them to adopt a constitution without the need
for negotiations with the opposition.
49. Given that the overall reform process is effectively impaired
by the current constitution, we urge the authorities not to wait
until after the parliamentary elections before drafting the new
constitution. In addition, we wish to emphasise that constitutional
reform should be based on as broad a consensus as possible between all
political forces in Ukraine and should not be based on a diktat
of the ruling majority, even if it were to have a constitutional
majority.
5. Electoral reform
50. The upcoming parliamentary elections, scheduled for
October 2012, will be crucial for Ukraine’s democratic development.
While the ruling coalition hopes to strengthen its mandate and to
gain the constitutional majority necessary to implement constitutional
reform, the main opposition parties intend to prove that they are
still a viable political alternative to the ruling coalition and
have recovered from their defeat in the 2010 presidential elections.
In addition, a number of new political parties – albeit often with
already familiar figureheads – have sprung up in the hope of entering
parliament after the elections. These new parties have started party
organisation-building all over the country. Their election into
parliament could result in a welcome widening of pluralism in Ukraine’s
currently polarised political environment.
51. One of the main achievements of Ukraine after the Orange Revolution
was the fact that it repeatedly conducted elections that were globally
in line with European norms and standards for democratic elections. This
was confirmed in the 2010 presidential election which brought President
Yanukovich to power. Any regression on this achievement would be
an unacceptable development.
52. Unfortunately, during the October 2010 local elections, serious
shortcomings were noted which represented a step backwards in comparison
to the presidential election and were at odds with the positive trend
since 2004. The conduct of the upcoming parliamentary elections
will therefore be a litmus test for the current administration’s
commitment to democratic values and standards.
53. A number of shortcomings noted resulted from last-minute changes
to the electoral legislation. There is an indication that the old
habit of playing with the rules instead of playing by the rules
has not disappeared. This, in turn, underscores the importance that
electoral legislation for the upcoming elections should be adopted
in time and be based on a consensus between all electoral stakeholders
54. As mentioned in our previous report to the Assembly,
in 2009, the Verkhovna Rada established
a special working group to draft a new and unified electoral code.
This cross-party working group, which was composed of representatives
of most political forces as well as experts and representatives
of civil society, collaborated closely with the Venice Commission,
as well as other international actors, such as the OSCE/ODIHR. Regrettably,
the Party of Regions declined to participate in the work of this
group. The working group tabled a draft unified electoral code at
the end of 2010. However, this draft has not been placed on the
agenda of the Verkhovna Rada. Instead, President Yanukovich announced
that his administration would prepare a completely new proposal
for an electoral code and submit it to the Verkhovna Rada. He subsequently established
a special presidential working group for electoral reform, headed
by the minister of justice and composed of a wide range of representatives
and experts, to draft his administration’s proposal for a new electoral
code.
55. This presidential working group was initially given support
by the international community. However, its working methods began
to raise serious concerns. Several organisations that participated
in this working group complained about the lack of transparency
and accountability in the group and were left with the clear impression
that the real drafting of the new electoral code – and all relevant
decision making on the matter – was taking place behind closed doors,
outside the framework of the working group. In addition, a balance between
the different political forces in this group was lacking. This is
all the more regrettable as a wide consensus on, and trust in, the
new electoral code is essential for the conduct of genuinely democratic parliamentary
elections in Ukraine in 2012.
56. The adoption of an adequate legal framework for the conduct
of elections in Ukraine has been a long-standing demand of the Assembly.
The recommendations of the Assembly for such a code have consistently emphasised
two key issues, namely the need to adopt a Unified Election Code
that would govern all elections in Ukraine and the need to adopt
an election system, based on a wide consensus between all electoral stakeholders,
that can provide for democratic elections and that would result
in a representative and accountable parliament.
57. The Assembly and the Venice Commission have been consistently
recommending the adoption of a Unified Election Code to replace
the current legal framework in which each type of election is governed
by its own separate law. The provisions of these different laws
are often incompatible and in contradiction with each other. Initially,
the authorities fully and publicly supported the Assembly’s recommendation.
However, to our regret, during our visit in April 2011, we were
informed by the minister of justice that the work of the working group
was limited to the drafting of a new electoral code for the parliamentary
elections. We would recall that the current code for parliamentary
elections has been considered to be the least problematic among
the different laws governing elections in Ukraine.
58. Before 1998, all members of the Verkhovna Rada were elected
in single-mandate majoritarian constituencies. In 1998, a mixed
system was introduced by which half of the members were elected
on the basis of a proportional election system with closed party
lists in a single national constituency and the other half in single-mandate
majoritarian constituencies. None of the elections that were organised
in the 1998-2004 period were considered to be fully in line with
European standards and a number of shortcomings were noted that
were directly related to the election system in use.
59. Following the 2004 constitutional amendments, a fully proportional
system based on closed party lists with a 3% threshold in a single
national constituency was introduced. This system was used in both
the 2006 and the 2007 early elections. Both these elections were
considered overall as democratic by international observers. However,
the closed party list system has hindered the consolidation of democracy
in Ukraine as it, de facto,
allows for the concentration of political power in the hands of
a few individuals and limits intra-party democracy and transparency.
60. In principle, each country has the right to choose the election
system that suit its needs and national particularities best, as
long as the system is in line with European standards and on condition
that it produces democratic results. As the majoritarian, the fully
proportional, as well as the mixed system have all failed to produce
the desired democratic results, the Assembly has recommended the
adoption of a regional proportional system based on open lists and
multiple regional constituencies. In the view of the Assembly, such a
system would ensure intra-party democracy and voter transparency,
as well as strengthen regional representation and increase accountability.
61. The decision of the Constitutional Court to invalidate the
2004 constitutional amendments has meant that the election system
has reverted to the pre-2004 mixed election system. The minister
of justice informed us, during our visit in April 2011, that the
authorities intend to maintain this mixed system for the next parliamentary
elections in 2012. In addition, the choice of the election system
was not to be part of the mandate of the presidential working group
on electoral reform. We regret the fact that the pre-2004 mixed
system is to be maintained, despite the fact that the regional proportional
system is supported by most international organisations, the Venice
Commission, as well as, most importantly, by most political parties
in Ukraine.
62. On 23 January 2011, the Minister of Justice of Ukraine asked
the Venice Commission for an opinion on the draft Law of Ukraine
on the Election of the People’s Deputies of Ukraine. In its joint
opinion
with
the OSCE/ODIHR, the Venice Commission regrets that its long-standing
recommendation for a unified electoral code has not been implemented,
especially as a draft unified electoral code had already been tabled
in the Verkhovna Rada and was readily available to the presidential
working group on electoral reform.
63. The Venice Commission emphasised that, as a rule, election
legislation should be adopted on the basis of consensus between
the main electoral stakeholders in order to ensure trust and confidence
in the electoral process and its outcome. The lack of transparency
of the drafting process was regretted, as was the fact that numerous
decisions on key electoral issues, such as choice of electoral system,
the increased 5% threshold for entering parliament, as well as the
banning of electoral blocs, were taken unilaterally, without much discussion,
by the ruling majority, against the wish of the opposition parties.
64. The opinion welcomed a number of positive changes in the law
in line with previous recommendations of the Venice Commission,
such as:
- the fact that individual
candidatures are now possible in the majoritarian races;
- the fact that voters can no longer be added to the voters’
list on election day by the election commissions themselves but
only by court order;
- the removal of the provisions that allowed parties to
change their representatives on the elections commissions without
cause up until election day;
- the streamlined complaint procedures.
At the same time, the opinion noted with regret that a number
of shortcomings noted in previous opinions and election observation
reports, some of them serious, had not been properly addressed,
such as:
- the provisions that
limit or abolish the passive voting rights of persons convicted
of a crime regardless of the severity of the crime committed. This
is especially relevant in the context of the ongoing trials against
former government members;
- the lack of criteria and deadlines for the definition
of constituency boundaries;
- the prohibition for parties to form electoral blocs;
- the fact that the provisions on the basis of which the
Precinct Election Commissions can invalidate the election results
are arbitrary and establish a high level of permissible fraud.
65. The draft election code has raised the threshold
to enter parliament from 3% to 5%. The combination of the increased
threshold with the prohibition for political parties to form party
blocs or joint lists seriously limits the possibilities for smaller
or new parties to enter parliament. This, in turn, can reduce political
pluralism in the new parliament and could potentially exacerbate
the polarisation in the Verkhovna Rada. This is a matter of serious
concern.
66. It should be noted that the authorities have argued that the
provisions that limit, or abolish, the passive voting rights of
persons convicted of a crime, cannot be removed from the electoral
code without a constitutional amendment.
67. The president has the right to demand that draft laws proposed
by him be put on the agenda of the Verkhovna Rada. However, he sent
his draft to the Verkhovna Rada with the request to reconcile his
draft with other alternatives before it was put on the agenda. This
was done to ensure that all alternatives for an electoral code would
be heard in the Verkhovna Rada. This initiative is to be welcomed.
68. On 3 September 2011, the Verkhovna Rada decided to set up
a committee, consisting of representatives of all parties and factions
in the Verkhovna Rada, to reconcile the different draft laws and
to come up with a common draft. On 17 November 2010, the Verkhovna
Rada adopted the new electoral code for the parliamentary elections,
reportedly with the support of the main opposition factions in parliament.
To our regret, most of our – as well as the Venice Commission’s
– points of concern, such as the mixed election system, the increase
in the threshold from 3% to 5%, as well as the prohibition of party
blocs, were maintained.
69. The newly adopted electoral code will have an important effect
on the pre-electoral environment. Special care should be taken to
ensure that its provisions regarding the threshold and prohibition
of party blocs will not be to the detriment of smaller or newly
emerging political forces. We would recommend that the Assembly observe
the upcoming parliamentary elections in Ukraine with a large delegation.
70. On 30 November 2011, the Council of Europe Group of States
against Corruption (GRECO) adopted its third report on Ukraine,
in which it emphasised, inter alia,
that determined action was required in the field of campaign financing
with a view to reducing dependence of parties and MPs on powerful
economic interest groups.
6. Concluding remarks
71. The trials against the former government leaders
have strained Ukraine’s relations with its European partners and
undermined its European aspirations. While the reactions of the
European Union and some of its member states are understandable,
it is important to keep an eye on the larger strategic picture and
to ensure that Ukraine’s further integration into the European family
is not derailed. Only integration into the European family will
ensure the consolidation of democracy and respect for human rights
and the rule of law in the long run. This was also the essence of
the message of Ms Timoshenko in her recent letter to European leaders, urging
them not to cancel the deep and comprehensive free trade agreement.
72. At the same time, it is also clear that the abuse of the justice
system for political purposes cannot be tolerated from a member
of the Council of Europe. While the country has the full right to
prosecute anybody for ordinary crimes, it also has the obligation
to ensure that each person obtains a fair trial and that the legal processes,
including charges and convictions, are free from political influence
and considerations. This is especially important when pursuing charges
against leading politicians from the opposition.
73. We therefore call on the Ukrainian authorities, without further
delay, to decriminalise ordinary political decision making and to
ensure that no one will be, or remain, convicted for such charges.
In addition, the Ukrainian authorities should ensure that all trials,
and especially those against leading politicians, are in full compliance
with the highest standards for a fair trial and that the principle
of presumption of innocence should be respected. Detention on remand,
especially when there is no risk of absconding or perversion of
justice, is unjustified and unacceptable. Those former government
members who are currently in detention on remand should be released
immediately pending their trial. Implementing these measures would
be a clear signal of the commitment of the current authorities to
the norms and values of the Council of Europe. Conversely, failing to
do so within a reasonable time frame, would raise serious doubts
regarding the commitment of the authorities to the principles of
democracy and the rule of law. In such an event, we would recommend
that the Assembly consider appropriate sanctions.
74. In our previous report, we outlined the ambitious reform programme
that was initiated by the current authorities and which was welcomed
by the Assembly. Initially, several important results were achieved, including
in the area of a closer integration of the Ukrainian economy into
the European economic space. This underscores the importance given
by the authorities to the closer European integration of the country. Regrettably,
there are some indications that the reform process is running out
of steam as only a few substantial developments have taken place
with regard to the reform programme announced by the authorities. Implementing
those reforms would have addressed, inter
alia, a number of long-standing deficiencies and shortcomings
that are at the origin of the criticism of the ongoing trials of
former government members. Amendments promised to address concerns
about the Law on the Judiciary and the Status of Judges, especially
with regard to the independence of the judiciary, have not yet been
put on the agenda of the Verkhovna Rada. We therefore call on the
authorities to pursue their reform programme without hesitation
or delay and to put constitutional reform as the top priority of
this programme.
75. Since 2004, Ukraine has been holding elections that were globally
in line with European standards. Unfortunately, the 2010 local elections
deviated from that trend. Should the parliamentary elections in
2012 not be conducted in full compliance with European standards,
this would be a serious regression in the country’s democratic development.
That would be unacceptable. The upcoming parliamentary elections
are therefore a litmus test for Ukraine’s commitment to democratic
principles.
76. Ukraine joined the Council of Europe in 1995 with the commitment
to reform its democratic institutions in line with Council of Europe
standards. The successive governments of the country have, to date,
not honoured the accession commitments that were formulated to achieve
that goal. All political forces, as well as the Verkhovna Rada as
an institution, share responsibility for that. The current authorities,
as well as all political forces in the country, should now make
serious efforts finally to fulfil the remaining accession commitments
and to build a robust democracy in the country.