1. Introduction
1. On 27 January 2011, the Parliamentary Assembly adopted
Resolution 1790 (2011) on the situation in Belarus in the aftermath of the
presidential elections condemning the violent repression of the
post-electoral political protests. In this resolution, the Assembly
urged the Belarusian authorities,
inter
alia, to release immediately all persons detained on
political grounds, to stop the repression against political opponents,
civil society and independent media and to conduct a transparent
investigation into the abuse of force by the riot police. The Assembly
also asked the Belarusian authorities to reform the electoral law,
to declare a moratorium on the death penalty and to reconsider their
decision to close the office of the Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE) in Minsk.
2. On 12 April 2011, the Political Affairs Committee organised
a hearing with the participation of Elena Tonkacheva, human rights
defender Foundation for Legal Technologies Development; Ales Bialiatski, President
of the Human Rights Centre “Viasna” and Vice-President of the International
Federation for Human Rights (FIDH); Andrey Yurov, head of the International
Observation Mission of the Committee on International Control over
the situation with human rights in Belarus (CICHR-Belarus); and
Michael Hamilton, chair of the group of experts from OSCE countries
on freedom of assembly and police response measures of the CICHR-Belarus.
Since April, Mr Bialiatski has been the subject of a smear campaign,
in which he was presented as public enemy No. 1 in Belarus. This
culminated in his arrest on 4 August 2011 and his being sentenced
to four and a half years of imprisonment on alleged income tax evasion
charges, on 24 November 2011. His arrest and sentence provoked a
major international public outcry.
3. At the end of its meeting on 12 April 2011, the committee
made public an information note on developments since 27 January
2011, prepared by the former rapporteur, Ms Sinikka Hurskainen (Finland, Socialist
Group).
A new information note, including
developments between April and the end of May, was made public by
the committee at its meeting on 31 May 2011.
4. Following the departure of Ms Hurskainen from the Finnish
Parliament and thus from our Assembly too, I was appointed rapporteur
on 20 June 2011. I have since monitored developments in the country
and regularly informed my colleagues on the committee, and I have
issued seven statements over recent months.
5. On the day of my appointment as rapporteur, a further exchange
of views was organised with the participation of Dimitri Makarov,
Co-ordinator of the Committee on International Control over the
situation with human rights in Belarus; Aleh Hulak, Chair of the
Belarusian Helsinki Committee; Stanislav Bogdankevich, Honorary
Chair of the United Civic Party; and Gianni Buquicchio, President
of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission).
6. Moreover, during the Assembly's June and October 2011 part-sessions,
I had the opportunity to meet several independent representatives
of Belarusian civil society, opposition personalities and human
rights defenders, who are traditionally invited by the Council of
Europe Secretariat during the Assembly's part-sessions.
7. From 6 to 10 July 2011, I attended the Annual Session of the
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Belgrade and participated in a meeting
of the Belarus working group. I wish to thank my counterpart in
the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Uta Zapf, with whom I had fruitful
discussions.
8. During the October part-session, on 4 October 2011, I participated
in a round table discussion on the human rights situation in Belarus
organised by the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)
of the Parliamentary Assembly, together with Anne Brasseur, Chairperson
of the ALDE group; Uladzimir Labkovich, Viasna’s lawyer; Tatsiana
Reviaka, President of the Belarusian Human Rights House in Vilnius;
and Thomas Hammarberg, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human
Rights. The event took place against the backdrop of escalating
repression in the country since December's presidential election,
the release of several political prisoners and concern surrounding
the arrest of Ales Bialiatski.
9. On 5 October 2011, I met the representative of the Mission
of the Republic of Belarus to the Council of Europe and expressed
my concerns and my wish to visit Belarus in order to assess directly
and objectively the human rights situation and engage in a constructive
dialogue with the authorities, as well as my wish, on that occasion,
to meet political prisoners, including former presidential candidates
and Mr Bialiatski, following reports of physical and psychological
ill-treatment. On the same day, the committee backed my intention
to pay a fact-finding visit to Minsk. I immediately contacted the
representative of the Mission of the Republic of Belarus to inform
his authorities of my intentions. To date, I have not received any
response from Minsk regarding a possible visit.
10. In this report, I shall outline the latest developments in
Belarus and give a preliminary assessment of the situation, including
any “substantial, tangible and verifiable progress in Belarus in
terms of respect for the democratic values and principles upheld
by the Council of Europe”, as requested by the Assembly in January 2011.
2. Human
rights and political freedoms after the 2010 presidential election
2.1. Trials and convictions
in the aftermath of the December 2010 events
11. Following the wave of repression in the aftermath
of the presidential election, the situation of human rights and
civil and political liberties has deteriorated dramatically in Belarus.
Hundreds of activists across Belarus were detained, beaten up and
intimidated. Dozens of them, including several presidential candidates, were
sentenced to lengthy terms in high-security prisons.
12. About 60 opposition leaders, activists and independent journalists
received prison sentences, many of them charged under Article 293
(“organisation of mass disorder”) of the Criminal Code. A number
of lawyers lost their licences when defending persons suspected
in connection with the events of 19 December 2010. Several defendants
claim that they were subjected to torture and other forms of physical
and psychological pressure and threats.
13. On 10 March 2011, the Bureau of the Assembly set up an ad
hoc committee on recent detentions, prosecutions and convictions
of members of the opposition in Belarus covering the period from
19 December 2010 to 1 October 2011. A report was published on 7
October 2011 calling for the release of those imprisoned in the
aftermath of the 2010 presidential election.
The
ad hoc committee deplored the fact that six people, including two
candidates for the presidency in 2010, remained in prison. It was
also concerned by alleged threats – including death threats – against
the persons remaining in detention and urged the authorities of Belarus
to release these people immediately and ensure that all convictions
are erased from the criminal records of the persons concerned. The
ad hoc committee condemned the wave of violence against peaceful protesters,
journalists, independent media, opposition activists and human rights
defenders, the excessive use of force by law enforcement personnel
and the fact that sentences were handed down for demonstrators.
It also considered the arrest of Ales Bialatski yet another provocation
that the Assembly could not tolerate.
14. Fourteen OSCE participating states invoked the OSCE so-called
Moscow Mechanism in April 2011. The Mechanism, agreed by consensus
by all 56 OSCE states, allows for an investigation to be launched
without consensus and independently of the OSCE chairmanship, institutions
and decision-making bodies if one state, supported by at least nine
others, considers that a particularly serious threat to the fulfilment
of the provisions of the OSCE human dimension has arisen in another
participating state.
15. On 10 November 2011, the OSCE/ODIHR published a report on
trial monitoring in Belarus, presenting the findings of the monitoring
of trials of individuals who were criminally charged in the aftermath
of the events in Minsk following the elections. The report pointed,
inter alia, to a number of problematic
issues in relation to compliance of those trials and relevant domestic
law with international fair trial standards, identified a number of
shortcomings in the criminal justice system and also presented the
Belarusian authorities with recommendations aimed at improving the
administration of criminal justice.
16. Under pressure from the international community, including
serious sanctions imposed by the European Union and the United States,
and as a result of the difficult economic situation in Belarus,
President Alexander Lukashenko gradually started to release political
prisoners. Some prisoners alleged that they were pressured into
appealing for clemency and admitting their guilt in order to secure
release. In many cases, the released political prisoners claimed
that they were subjected to torture, given inadequate medical attention
and denied proper access to legal representation. Former presidential
candidates Andrei Sannikov and Mikalai Statkevich, as well as Zmitser
Bandarenka, “Young Front” leader Zmitser Dashkevich, businessman
Mikalai Autukhovich and other persons remain in prison on political
grounds.
17. I have continued monitoring the situation of these prisoners
over the past few months. On 16 November 2011, following reports
of the disappearance of Mr Sannikov from a Belarusian penitentiary,
I issued a statement
expressing
deep concern about his plight and urging the Belarusian authorities
promptly to inform the family and the lawyers of Mr Sannikov about
his whereabouts and to grant access to him. My colleague, Marieluise
Beck, rapporteur for opinion on the situation in Belarus for the
Committee of Legal Affairs and Human Rights, issued a similar statement
in the German Bundestag. Once again, I contacted the Mission of the
Republic of Belarus to the Council of Europe via the secretariat
to request additional information on this case; to date, I have
not received any relevant information. I was only able to receive
an update via the Belarus news agency BelaPAN. On 17 November 2011,
Mr Sannikov's attorney, Maria Kovalevskaia, reported that he had
been sent from Babruisk penal colony to Mahiliou colony, which is
considered a transit prison. She was not allowed to meet her client
despite a law guaranteeing that a client may count on legal assistance
at any time, regardless of whether he or she is detained in a transit
or a regular prison. As pointed out by Amnesty International in
May 2011, being held incommunicado put Mr Sannikov, and other prisoners,
at serious risk of torture and other forms of ill-treatment.
2.2. Harassment of independent
media
18. On 11 April 2011, Minsk Kastrychnitskaya central
metro station was rocked by a powerful blast, claiming 13 lives
and causing injuries to more than 200 people. The explosion was
characterised by the authorities as an act of terrorism.
19. On 12 April 2011, Belarus official media condemned the hearing
held that day by the Political Affairs Committee in Strasbourg,
following a decision taken by the committee at its March meeting
in Paris, and labelled the human rights defenders attending the
hearing as the “fifth column” and their action as “dancing on bones”.
The state-run media failed to mention that the Assembly had stood
for a minute of silence at the opening of the April part-session
in memory of the victims of the terrorist attack.
20. A few days after the bomb explosion, the authorities declared
that four suspects had been detained, all Belarusian citizens. According
to investigators, the same group of suspects could have been involved
in organising a series of bombings in 2005 in Vitebsk and in 2008
in Minsk. Two of them were sentenced to death by the Supreme Court
on 30 November 2011.
21. Although no connection whatsoever was established between
the perpetrators of the 11 April terrorist attack and representatives
of the civil society, the opposition or the independent media, the
attack was immediately followed by an escalation of police harassment
against the latter, with prosecution and executive authorities addressing
warnings to individual journalists and the editorial boards of several
media outlets. State-run media launched a campaign to discredit
independent media. Under these circumstances, the Belarusian Association
of Journalists (BAJ) issued a statement entitled “Stop Persecution
of Our Colleagues!”.
22. On 27 April 2011, the Ministry of Information announced that
a case had been filed with the Supreme Economic Court to shut down
the newspapers Narodnaya Volya and Nasha Niva for alleged improper coverage
of the terrorist attack, charges that were subsequently withdrawn.
Civic activists continued campaigning for the release of Gazeta Wyborcza journalist Andrzej
Poczobut, arrested on 6 April 2011 on charges of libelling the president.
The Polish journalist, a resident of Grodno, was imprisoned on charges
of “insulting and slandering the President” and then released with
a suspended three-year prison sentence. Newspapers and other independent
media organisations continue to be targeted through the use of fines
and intimidation of potential advertisers.
23. In September 2011, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation
of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including Belarus,
Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, expressed
concern over social networks and declared that they would “monitor”
them closely to prevent mass riots like the ones that occurred in
the Arab world. Belarus’s former prosecutor general, Ryhor Vasilevich,
called for an international agreement that could potentially introduce
Internet censorship.
24. According to the BAJ, a new wave of sanctions against journalists
who report from Belarus without press credentials was launched at
the end of October 2011. A Russian correspondent was deported from Belarus, and
three local independent TV journalists were summoned to the prosecutor
general’s office in Minsk. One of them received an official warning.
During meetings at factories in Barysau,
managers were banned by the authorities from communicating with
independent journalists. The list of independent newspapers banned
from communication included
Barysau News,
Homan Barysaushchyny, the nationwide
newspapers
Nasha Niva and
Narodnaya Volya, and also Russian
holdings in Belarus,
Komsomolskaya Pravda
v Belarusi and
Arguments and
Facts in Belarus(AiF).
25. On 16 November 2011, Iryna Khalip, a journalist and Mr Sannikov’s
wife, received a warning from the Correctional Department of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs after she invited her colleagues to
cover the issue of the sudden transfer of her husband.
26. At the request of our committee, the Venice Commission has
expressed itself twice on the “warnings” issued by the Belarusian
authorities against journalists and human rights organisations.
It considered the grounds invoked in the case of the warning addressed
by the Ministry of Justice of Belarus to the Belarusian Association
of Journalists (13 January 2010) and to the Belarusian Helsinki
Committee (12 January 2011) to be disproportionate and the reasons
adduced neither relevant nor sufficient. Both warnings constitute
a violation of Articles 19 (freedom of expression) and 22 (freedom
of association) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and Articles 10 (freedom of expression) and 11 (freedom
of peaceful assembly and freedom of association) of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5).
2.3. Continued pressure
against human rights defenders: the case of Ales Bialiatski
27. A pattern of harassment and intimidation towards
civil society culminated in August 2011 with the arrest of Ales
Bialiatski, head of the non-governmental organisation (NGO) Viasna
and Vice-President of the International Federation for Human Rights,
accused of “concealment of profits on an especially large scale
in pursuance of prior agreements” under Article 243, part 2, of
the Belarus Criminal Code.
28. The tax evasion charge stems from Mr Bialiatski's reported
use of personal bank accounts in Lithuania and Poland to receive
funding from international donors for human rights activities in
Belarus. Viasna is one of the only remaining organisations in Belarus
openly speaking out about human rights violations in the country. Since
April 2011, Mr Bialiatski has been the subject of a smear campaign,
in which he is presented as public enemy No. 1 in Belarus.
29. During the October 2011 part-session, I initiated a written
declaration in support of Mr Bialiatski, which was signed by 63
parliamentarians from all political groups and from many member
states. In this text, we condemned his arrest and stated that we
would monitor the proceedings against Mr Bialiatski and other opponents
of the regime with special interest, while at the same time demanding
the release of all political prisoners in Belarus.
The European Parliament, at its
session on 12-15 September 2011, also adopted a resolution calling
for Mr Bialiatski’s immediate and unconditional release from custody
and asking that all charges against him be dropped.
30. On 24 November 2011, Mr Bialiatski was sentenced to four and
a half years imprisonment under strict regime conditions, the confiscation
of property and a fine. This prompted a wave of condemnations from
the international community.
31. I issued a joint statement,
together
with Ms Beck, rapporteur for opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs
and Human Rights, in which we deplored the sentencing and considered
it tantamount to judicial harassment of a human rights defender
for carrying out legitimate human rights activities, protected under
all international human rights instruments. The same day the Bureau
of the Assembly also expressed consternation
and
considered that this sentence “confirms a worrying trend that the
authorities in Minsk are deliberately turning their back on Europe
and the values it upholds”.
The
Council of Europe Secretary General said that “Mr Bialiatski's treatment
is a clear example of the authorities' persistent harassment of
the work of civil society organisations”. On 23 November 2011, the
day before the verdict, European Union High Representative Catherine
Ashton and Commissioner Štefan Füle issued a joint statement on
the trial of Mr Bialiatski, considering the charges against him
to be a “politically motivated pretext to target his important work to
the benefit of victims of repression” and called for his immediate
and unconditional release. On 24 November 2011, they deplored this
harsh sentence and considered it to be a symbol of the ever-intensifying
crackdown on civil society.
32. The Belarus Ministry of Foreign Affairs press secretary, Andrey
Savinykh, claimed that the international reactions to this sentence
were “an example of the most hypocritical use of the double standards”
regarding the issue of tax evasion and blamed the “campaign launched
by the West … defined by undisguised political pressure on the judicial
authorities of Belarus”.
33. The information on the financial operations and bank accounts
of Mr Bialiatski was officially received by the Belarusian authorities
from the Ministries of Justice of Lithuania and Poland in the framework
of legal information exchange programmes. Showing that Lithuania
and Poland actually supervised the activities of NGOs in Belarus
and, at the same time, “betrayed” the activists of those organisations,
Belarusian authorities sought to soften the criticism of their own
activities and, at the same time, discredit their opponents. The
Polish and Lithuanian authorities, once they realised Belarus’s
real intentions, immediately deplored the fact that bilateral and
international mechanisms had been misused, recalled the information
they had previously submitted and requested that this should not
be used as evidence in the court case.
34. A number of international human rights defenders were denied
entry visas to Belarus, preventing them from monitoring the trial
proceedings and their fairness.
Financial documents were
reportedly not translated or verified as authentic, and witnesses
for the prosecution allegedly did not understand their content. Individuals
wanting to attend the court hearings had their clothes checked,
and those wearing T-shirts with Mr Bialiatski’s photo on them were
denied entry or forced to take the T-shirts off before gaining access.
35. It has to be noted that the severe restrictions on freedom
of association in Belarus and the impossibility for independent
organisations to register and to receive funds from abroad, under
Article 193-1 of the Criminal Code, seriously impede the work of
Viasna and jeopardise its efforts to assist victims of political
repression. On 31 May 2011, the Political Affairs Committee, taking
into account the situation of non-registered organisations in Belarus,
decided to ask the Venice Commission to provide an assessment of
the compatibility with universal human rights standards of Article
193-1 vis-à-vis the rights of non-registered associations in Belarus.
36. In the opinion of the Venice Commission, adopted on 14-15
October 2011, “penalising actions connected with the organisation
or management of an association on the sole ground that the association concerned
has not passed the state registration, as Article 193-1 of the Criminal
Code does, does not meet the strict criteria provided for under
Articles 22.2 I and 19.2 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and 11.2 and 10.2 of the European Convention
on Human Rights. This would make the activities of a non-registered
association in fact impossible and, consequently, restrict the right
to freedom of association in its essence”.
37. According to the Venice Commission, “criminalising the legitimate
social mobilisation of freedom of association, activities of human
rights defenders albeit members of un-registered associations and
social protest or criticism of political authorities with fines
or imprisonment … is incompatible with a democratic society in which
persons have the right to express their opinion as individuals and
in association with others”. The Venice Commission goes on to say
that Article 193-1 can serve the purpose of “criminalising social
protest and legalising government response to social unrest” and
that “[a]n arbitrary use of the existing legal framework to criminalise
civil society efforts in trying to have an impact on its own conditions
and future is unacceptable from the standpoint of democratic principles
and human rights”.
2.4. Further restrictions
of human rights and political freedoms
38. The Assembly has repeatedly called for freedom of
assembly to be respected in Belarus, particularly with regard to the
excessive use of force by the police against demonstrators.
39. A series of so-called silent protests that took place throughout
the summer of 2011 in approximately 50 towns in Belarus were met
with considerable resistance from the authorities, who responded
by detaining citizens suspected of being engaged in the protest
and sentenced hundreds of them to up to 15 days in prison. On 3
July 2011, Belarus Independence Day, a peaceful demonstration was
brutally dispersed in Minsk and other cities, with hundreds of protesters
being beaten and detained merely for clapping hands.
40. One of the opposition parties, the Belarus National Front
(BNF), was evicted from its headquarters in July 2011 and subsequently
from its new offices on 1 October 2011. Three BNF activists also
appeared in court recently on what many consider trumped-up charges
of hooliganism. In a similar case, in December 2010, two Young Front
activists, Zmitser Dashkevich and Eduard Lobau, were sentenced to
two and a half and three years in prison, respectively. This makes
it increasingly difficult for opposition groups legally to hold
a meeting or public event in Belarus.
41. There are also continuing instances of harassment and persecution
of lawyers in Belarus. At least five lawyers have been disbarred
and had their licences revoked in a deliberate attempt to hamper
trials. Four of these lawyers were defending people charged in connection
with the December protests. Extraordinary qualification exams were
also introduced during the summer of 2011 for already qualified
lawyers. Such mechanisms may pose a serious threat to lawyers, who
risk losing their ability to perform their professional duties for
political reasons, despite possessing the necessary academic and
professional qualifications. In August 2011, 11 European ministers
of justice signed an open letter to the Belarus Minister of Justice expressing
serious concern about ongoing reports of harassment and persecution
of lawyers in Belarus.
42. In October 2011, the Belarus Parliament adopted a set of restrictive
amendments to a number of legislative acts, including the Law on
Public Associations, the Law on Political Parties, the Electoral
Code, the Code of Administrative Offences, the Criminal Code and
the Criminal Procedure Code and the Law on Mass Events. According
to several human rights organisations, the amendments were voted
on in an atmosphere of almost complete secrecy. The text of the
proposed legislative changes was not made available to the public, thus
eliminating any possible input from civil society groups.
43. The new legislation further restricts freedom of assembly
and association, bringing the work of Belarusian NGOs under even
more intensive government scrutiny, and allows for significant expansion
of the powers of KGB. Under the new measures, political and civil
society groups are banned from receiving foreign assistance and
from keeping money in foreign banks. A separate legal amendment
expands the definition of treason to include "assisting a foreign
state, a foreign organisation or its representative to the detriment
of Belarus' national security," which is punishable by a prison
sentence of between seven and fifteen years.
44. Simply calling for an anti-government protest can send a person
to prison for three years. The police have been given formal justification
for clamping down on those taking part in protests and public demonstrations.
Gatherings for “active inaction” (such as silent protests) are henceforth
banned under the amended “Law on mass events”, which entered into
force on 27 November 2011. The law significantly tightens the rules
on opposition rallies and provides virtually unlimited opportunities
for intelligence and law enforcement agencies. It details all types
of events, such as rallies, flash mobs, picketings, marches, and
expands the list of places where these actions are forbidden. The
organisation of events over the Internet is now regulated for the
first time; the initiators do not have the right to gather people
through a global network without consulting the local authorities
beforehand for a permit to initiate the action. It is now prohibited
to announce the date, time and place of the action beforehand on
media and information networks.
45. I find such an unprecedented restriction of the freedom of
assembly totally unacceptable, and I propose that the committee
seize the Venice Commission for an opinion on the issue.
2.5. Death penalty:
renewed executions
46. No tangible steps have been taken by the Belarusian
authorities towards abolishing the death penalty or introducing
a moratorium on it, as repeatedly requested by the Assembly, most
recently in its January 2011 resolution.
47. On the contrary, two executions were carried out in the summer
of 2011. Aleh Hryshkautsou and Andrei Burdyka, sentenced to death
by firing squad on 14 May 2010 for crimes committed during an armed
attack on an apartment in Grodno in October 2009, were shot in mid-July.
Their families found out through the media and were not informed
officially. The execution was carried out despite a specific request
for a stay of execution from the United Nations Human Rights Committee
pending a review of the condemned men’s appeals to the committee.
This is the second time executions have been carried out in Belarus
when cases are pending before the United Nations Human Rights Committee.
In March 2010, Andrei Zhuk and Vasily Yuzepchuk were executed despite
the United Nations Committee’s request for interim measures of protection.
48. On 21 July 2011, I issued a statement condemning the execution
of Aleh Hryshkautsou and Andrei Burdyka and recourse to capital
punishment in general. On the same day, the Secretary General of
the Council of Europe, Thorbjørn Jagland, also firmly condemned
these executions and stressed that the
ongoing policy of self-isolation, harassment of peaceful protesters,
imprisonment of political opponents and renewed executions underlined
the unwillingness of the Belarus authorities to heed the aspirations
of the Belarusian people to become a full part of the European family.
49. Since Belarus gained its independence in 1991, it is estimated
that 400 people have been executed there – the exact figure is unknown
owing to the secrecy surrounding executions. Relatives of condemned prisoners
do not know either the place of burial of those executed nor the
time of the shooting; the bodies of those shot are not given to
families for burial, and the "cause of death" field on the death
certificate is left blank.
50. On 10 October 2011, the International Day against the Death
Penalty, EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and Mr Jagland
issued a joint statement, reaffirming their united opposition to
the death penalty and their commitment to its worldwide abolition,
and they urged Belarus to introduce a moratorium on the use of the
death penalty, with a view to its complete abolition.
51. On 30 November 2011, the Belarusian Supreme Court handed down
a death sentence against Dmitry Konovalov and Vladislav Kovalev,
who were found guilty of the fatal bombing in the Minsk metro on
11 April 2011. In a joint statement,
issued
together with Renate Wohlwend, the Assembly's former rapporteur
on the death penalty, we expressed our dismay and stressed that
such an irreversible, cruel and inhuman penalty was unacceptable
in any civilised society, however heinous the crimes of the perpetrators.
We also deeply regretted that the work of the death penalty study
group of the National Assembly of Belarus, initiated some time ago, had
not borne any fruit and that parliamentarians in Belarus did not
dare to speak up against the death penalty.
52. On 1 December 2011, the press secretary at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Andrei Savinykh, declared that “the position on
the death penalty is well known – it is a national position, and
no additional comments are required”.
3. Upcoming parliamentary
elections
53. On 2 March 2011, Ms Nina Mazai, Chair of the Permanent
Commission for International Affairs and National Security of the
Council of the Republic, declared that Belarus intended to invite
international observers, including the OSCE and other parliamentary
organisations, for the upcoming parliamentary elections to be held
not later than 26 September 2012, as recently declared by Lidia
Yermoshina, Chair of the Central Election Commission.
54. The National Coordinating Council of the Democratic Forces
of Belarus, representing opposition forces, issued a statement on
11 April 2011 regarding the conditions for the participation of
the Belarusian democratic forces in the upcoming parliamentary election
campaign. The Council asked the authorities to release all political
prisoners, to cease political repression in the country, to respect
constitutional rights and freedoms and to reform the electoral system.
It also underlined that the democratic opposition reserved its right
to boycott the upcoming election campaign if the demands put forward
were not fulfilled.
55. On 21 April 2011, Mr Lukashenko delivered his annual address
to the National Assembly, announcing that Belarus would not change
the electoral system to a proportional one prior to the 2012 parliamentary elections.
56. On 25 April 2011, the Movement for Freedom, led by Alaksandr
Milinkievic, launched a new phase of the campaign “The People’s
Programme” to open a broad public discussion on “the vexed problems
of the Belarusian society”. A few days later, on 29 April 2011,
the United Civic Party launched a nationwide campaign on “Building
new, preserving the best”, to elaborate political and economic development
programmes for Belarus; it planned to engage in a dialogue with
the authorities.
57. On 18 October 2011, Mr Lukashenko said he would not consider
radical changes, which he deemed to be “unacceptable in the run-up
to a political campaign”, to the electoral legislation. He stressed
that a lot had been done in recent years to streamline the legislation,
taking into consideration the demands of some international organisations,
including the OSCE.
58. On 9 November 2011, the Russian newspaper Kommersant spread rumours about
early elections in April 2012. Seemingly, the main purpose of the
information leak was to clarify the position of opposition parties with
regard to a possible boycott of the elections.
59. The reaction of the leaders of the United Civic Party and
the Left Party “Fair World”, Anatol Lyabedzka and Sergey Kalyakin,
respectively, suggested that some well-known registered opposition
parties are willing to participate in the parliamentary elections.
60. The non-registered Belarusian Christian Democracy party and
one of its leaders, Vitaly Rymashevsky, along with the “Tell the
Truth!” social movement and its leader, Uladzimir Niakliaeu, made
strong statements against participation in the elections prior to
the release and rehabilitation of all political prisoners. Movement for
Freedom Deputy Chair Yuras Hubarevich said that the movement had
not yet taken a decision.
61. It is rumoured that the Belarusian authorities will use this
campaign as a stake in the next round of bargaining with western
European countries and in their negotiations for a new International
Monetary Fund (IMF) loan.
62. On 8 and 12 November 2011, a number of opposition groups gathered
in several cities in Belarus for the so-called All People’s Assembly.
The majority of the meetings reportedly gathered only a few dozen
people; some were prevented by the police or were cancelled by the
organisers. The main reason for this failure was said to be the
lack of unity among the opposition forces, as well as the unwillingness
of Belarusian citizens to participate in political protests for
fear of reprisals.
4. Foreign relations
in a harsh economic context
63. Belarus’s relations with Western countries remain
tense. On 16 June 2011, Emmanuel Decaux, OSCE Moscow Mechanism
rapporteur, presented his report
to the OSCE Permanent Council on the human rights situation and
implementation of OSCE commitments in Belarus since the December
2010 presidential election. Belarus decided not to co-operate, thus
violating its OSCE commitments. The Belarusian authorities neither appointed
their own rapporteur as a member of the mission nor granted the
necessary assistance and access to Professor Decaux. The report
highlighted serious, gross and systematic human rights violations
since the events of 19 December, which also concern a system of
social control, by fear and harassment, torture and blackmail, phone
tapping, false evidence and forced confessions. That said, the rapporteur
remained convinced of the need for dialogue and engagement with
Belarus on the implementation of OSCE commitments.
64. Shortly after, on 9 July 2011, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
adopted a resolution on Belarus during its 20th annual session in
Belgrade, which I attended, calling on the Belarusian authorities, inter alia, to allow independent
experts appointed under the Moscow Mechanism into the country.
65. During the course of 2011, a serious depreciation of the Belarusian
rouble has hit the economy hard. Belarus had already borrowed a
total US$3.4 billion from the IMF in 2009 and 2010. In June 2011,
the country received the first US$800 million tranche from a US$3
billion bailout from the anti-crisis fund of the EurAsian Economic
Community, a post-Soviet economic bloc led by Russia. In November
2011, the IMF stressed that Belarus needs to show its commitment
to market reforms and prove it with concrete steps in order to get
a bailout from the Fund. On 1 December 2011, the IMF decided not
to enter into talks with Belarus on a loan deal, as a result of
the authorities' failure to commit to reforms.
66. The Belarusian authorities seem unwilling to assume responsibility
for the implementation of a coherent financial policy and economic
reforms. Some commentators stress the growing interest of some members
of the government to benefit financially from the crisis.
67. At the Eastern Partnership
Summit held in Warsaw from 29 to
30 September 2011, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk proposed to
provide financial assistance of US$9 billion to Belarus if the country
meets European Union conditions, namely, releasing and rehabilitating
political prisoners, organising a dialogue with the opposition and
conducting the next parliamentary elections in compliance with OSCE
standards. Poland put a symbolic empty chair in a room full of leaders
of European Union and post-Soviet countries after Belarus refused
to send its foreign minister, who was invited to represent Mr Lukashenko,
as the latter is included on the European Union visa ban list.
68. As long as the country has political prisoners, permanently
violates human rights and refuses to co-operate constructively with
international organisations, Belarus has little chance of successfully
attracting financial resources.
69. On 10 October 2011, the European Union extended sanctions
against Belarus until 31 October 2012, imposing asset freezes and
travel bans on 16 officials in order to increase the pressure on
the government to free political prisoners. The new measures extend
the list of people targeted by the European Union to 208 officials.
The European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy,
Štefan Füle, said that the European Union would continue to apply
sanctions against those violating human rights but that it was looking for
new ways and opportunities to support democracy in Belarus.
70. On 4 November 2011, four countries having EU candidate status
– Croatia, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Montenegro
and Iceland – plus Serbia, as a country participating in the EU Stabilisation
and Association Process and having potential candidate status, as
well as the European Free Trade Association countries Liechtenstein
and Norway, which are members of the European Economic Area, declared
that they shared the objectives of the European Council decision
concerning restrictive measures against Belarus.
71. In August 2011, the United States also imposed additional
economic sanctions against four state-owned enterprises in Belarus,
in response to the continued incarceration of political prisoners
and the crackdown on political activists, journalists and civil
society representatives. Belarus responded by suspending a joint
project with the United States for exchanging highly enriched nuclear
fuel.
72. The Belarusian Foreign Ministry immediately called the sanctions
“irrelevant in themselves”. According to the Ministry’s spokesperson,
Andrei Savinykh, “It is well known that the coercive measures yield
the opposite result".
Belarus has put in place measures meant
to reciprocate the EU and US sanctions and has drafted a list of
persons banned from entering the country. Tighter control was introduced
over the funding of political activities in the territory of Belarus
through foreign public and political associations and trusts, as
well as their branches.
73. Some European banks, such as the British state-owned bank
RBS, were doing business with the Belarusian government until a
joint campaign by Index on Censorship and Free Belarus Now shamed
them. It is estimated that 30% of the bonds were bought by institutions
based in the City of London.
74. On 18 November 2011 in Moscow, the Presidents of Russia, Belarus
and Kazakhstan signed a package of documents on the Common Economic
Space, an economic integration plan that does not require a liberalisation
of the political system by Belarus. Some commentators believe that
the potential benefits of the integration are negated by significant
differences between the countries in their level of development,
economy and economic interests. Mr Lukashenko said that his country
would actively engage in shaping the new structure. On 21 November
2011, the Prime Minister of Belarus, Mikhail Miasnikovich, announced
that Sberbank of Russia would provide Belarus with $5 billion for
new projects. Agreements signed in Moscow in November 2011 on the
sale of pipeline company Beltransgaz, gas supply and the construction
of a nuclear power plant will allow the government to continue implementing
its existing economic policies without major reforms. According
to observers, ongoing problems are expected to return by the summer
of 2012.
75. On 28 November 2011, at the EU-US Summit in Washington, the
leaders of the European Union and the United States declared in
a joint statement that “[w]ith regard to the European Union’s Eastern
neighbours, we are working together to support democracy, resolve
protracted conflicts, foster economic modernisation, and advance
their political association and economic integration with the European
Union, recognising in this regard the importance of the European
Union’s Eastern Partnership. We insist that the Government of Belarus immediately
release and rehabilitate its political prisoners, and make progress
towards respect for the principles of democracy, the rule of law,
and human rights”.
76. The European Union remains committed to maintaining a close
dialogue with the political opposition and civil society in Belarus
and will re-engage with the official authorities in Minsk only when
all political prisoners have been released and rehabilitated. This
was reaffirmed on 29 November 2011 by Commissioner Füle meeting
representatives of the seven major opposition parties and movements
in Brussels.
77. That said, it is evident that a policy of complete isolation
does not necessarily result in Belarus’s expulsion from inter-state
relations,
especially when it comes to
diplomatic relations and economic ties with some eastern European
partner countries, the Middle East and other states in the Arab
world, which have been quite dynamic over the past few months.
5. Belarus and the
Council of Europe
78. Following the 19 December 2010 events, the request
by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to the Belarus
authorities to provide further information was followed by a letter
from Foreign Minister Sergei Martynov dated 18 January 2011 and
the Secretary General’s reply dated 31 January 2011. Mr Jagland stressed
that the development of co-operation between the Belarusian authorities
and the Council of Europe depended upon positive developments concerning
respect for European values and principles, and he expressed the
hope that the arrested persons would be released without delay and
their fundamental rights fully respected while in prison.
79. On 30 March 2011, the Committee of Ministers approved a document
entitled “Strengthening civil society and independent media in Belarus”.
The objective of the proposed activities was to strengthen the capacity
of civil society organisations and the independent media in Belarus
to bring about substantial and sustainable progress in the fields
of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Whilst there was
some level of progress for all activities, about half of the planned
activities were funded, through voluntary contributions, and were
fully implemented throughout 2011.
80. The mandate of the Council of Europe Information Point in
Minsk has been extended for one year, until June 2012; it is currently
conducting awareness-raising activities and preparing a series of
lectures on key Council of Europe topics with the involvement of
international and national experts.
81. On 6 December 2011, the Rapporteur Group on Democracy of the
Committee of Ministers examined a request by the Republic of Belarus
to be invited to accede to the Council of Europe Convention on action against
trafficking in human beings (CETS No. 197). In the absence of any
objection by the member states, the request was forwarded to the
Committee of Ministers for decision on 11 January 2012.
82. The European Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg,
has maintained regular contacts with civil society representatives
and human rights defenders from Belarus. The Commissioner published
an op-ed and two “Human Rights Comments” in May and September 2011,
where he expressed his concern regarding the deterioration of the
human rights situation in Belarus and the increasingly restrictive
and difficult working environment for human rights defenders.
83. As far as its own relations with Belarus are concerned, in
January 2011, the Assembly reaffirmed its decision to put on hold
its activities involving high-level contacts with the Belarusian
authorities. It further called on the Bureau of the Assembly not
to lift the suspension of the special guest status for the Parliament
of Belarus until a moratorium on the execution of the death penalty
has been decreed by the competent Belarusian authorities and until
there is substantial, tangible and verifiable progress in terms
of respect for the democratic values and principles upheld by the
Council of Europe.
84. Meanwhile, the Political Affairs Committee has stepped up
co-operation with civil society representatives and human rights
defenders throughout 2011 and organised no less than four hearings
on the situation in Belarus with representatives of international
and Belarusian NGOs, as well as of the European Parliament, the OSCE
and the Venice Commission. The committee has also tried to reach
out to the Belarusian authorities and requested a visit to the country
with a view to directly assessing the situation on the ground, including
the situation of those detained on political grounds. I hope that,
despite the criticism received from the domestic opposition and
the international community, the authorities in Minsk will open
up new channels of communication with the committee in 2012.
6. Concluding remarks
85. With human rights being seriously violated, political
freedoms still being restricted and harassment and political trials
of civil society and political opponents still ongoing, the human
rights situation in the country has dramatically deteriorated.
86. The Belarusian authorities still refuse to grant legal status
to independent human rights organisations in the country and have
strengthened penalties for accepting, storing or transferring unregistered
foreign aid.
87. A set of amendments to a number of Belarusian legislative
acts further restricts freedom of assembly and association, bringing
the work of Belarusian NGOs under even more intensive government
scrutiny, and allows for significant expansion of the powers of
the police.
88. No tangible steps have been taken by the Belarusian authorities
towards abolishing the death penalty or even introducing a moratorium
on it. New executions were carried out in 2011, and two new death
sentences were recently handed down.
89. The Belarusian authorities continue to fail to respond positively
to the calls of the Assembly with respect to Council of Europe standards
of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
90. The wave of repression does not therefore allow the Council
of Europe member states to engage with the top leadership of Belarus,
who are responsible for arrests and harassment of the opposition.
We must remain firm and uncompromising in the demand for the release
of all political prisoners.
91. Unless the Belarusian government puts an end to the repression
and adopts a course that allows for political and economic reforms,
there is little hope that relations between Belarus and the Council
of Europe, as well as the European Union, can be restored to pre-December
2010 levels.
92. I take the view that the Assembly could only re-engage in
dialogue with the Belarusian authorities if, as a first move, the
authorities allowed the rapporteurs from OSCE, European Union and
United Nations bodies, as well as our Assembly, access to the country
and to the prisoners they wish to meet .
93. Independently of relations with the authorities, engagement
with the people of Belarus should be broad, deep, and long-term
in nature. Both the Council of Europe, including the Assembly’s
political groups, and its member states should continue to engage
with representatives of civil society, independent media and opposition
forces, as well as independent professional associations, to increase
the support for their development and to invite them to attend round
tables, seminars and hearings so as to ensure that as many channels
of communication and co-operation as possible remain open. Openness,
dialogue and multiple contacts can maximise Europe’s power of attraction
and are also essential in order to reach out to Belarusian citizens.
94. Member states should also consider reducing or eliminating
entry visa fees for Belarusian citizens, open universities and offer
scholarship programmes to young Belarusian students and establish
links with the European Humanities University in exile in Vilnius.
I recall that the Council of Europe School of Political Studies is
also in exile in Kiev.
95. Finally, I believe the Assembly should encourage all political
forces and activists engaged in the forthcoming parliamentary elections
campaign to focus on the many challenges facing the citizens, rather
than just on ending the current regime, and to put forward concrete
programmes of policy change for improving people’s lives, focused
on political and economic reforms and growth.
96. At its meeting on 14 December 2011, the Political Affairs
Committee, for its part, decided to invite representatives of opposition
forces from Belarus to an exchange of views with members during
the January 2012 part-session, in view of the forthcoming parliamentary
elections.
97. The committee also decided to ask the Venice Commission to
provide an assessment of the compatibility with universal human
rights standards of the amended
“Law on mass events in the Republic of Belarus”, which entered into
force on 27 November 2011.