1. Introduction
1. On 17 December 2010 in Tunisia, a young street vendor,
Mohammed Bouazizi, was devastated when the police once again confiscated
his cart, his only source of livelihood by which to survive and
meet his family's needs. This act of humiliation is not unique;
similar acts take place every day in various parts of the world
as an example of the relentless tyranny of governments that deny
their citizens dignity. Only this time, something different happened:
after local officials refused to listen to his complaints, this
young man, who had never been particularly active in politics, went
to the headquarters of the regional government, doused himself in
petrol and set fire to himself.
2. “There are times in the course of history when the actions
of ordinary citizens spark movements for change because they speak
to a longing for freedom that has been building up for years; examples
are the American revolutionaries and Rosa Parks in the civil rights
movement. This is what took place in Tunisia, where that young vendor’s
act of desperation tapped into the frustration that had built up
throughout the country and a sincere thirst for liberty and brought
onto the streets hundreds then thousands of protesters, who, despite
the bullets and the baton blows, refused to go home, day after day,
week after week, until a dictator of more than two decades finally
left power.” And so it was that in early January 2011, the unrest
that followed, fuelled by poor social and economic conditions, along
with the people’s desire for more liberty and for honest and independent
justice, evolved into a nationwide protest movement, ultimately
forcing President Ben Ali to resign and flee to Saudi Arabia.
3. At its January 2011 part-session the Parliamentary Assembly
held an urgent debate on the situation in Tunisia, following which
it adopted
Resolution
1791 (2011).
On that
occasion the Assembly expressed the hope that the political transformation
initiated by the population would lead to lasting democratic changes
not only in Tunisia but also in other countries in the region, and
it noted that the developments in Tunisia had already triggered
a domino effect in Egypt.
4. Indeed, still in January, popular protest movements broke
out in Egypt, forcing President Mubarak to resign, too. Since then,
these protests have spread like wildfire in a number of Arab countries.
In Yemen, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, the
protesters have managed to secure some reforms, or occasionally
only promises of reform, in some cases at the cost of human lives
and police violence.
5. In Libya, protests against the regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi,
the government’s intransigence and the bombing of the population
have led to full-scale armed conflict between the rebels and the
forces of Colonel Gaddafi, prompting the intervention of a NATO-led
coalition with a United Nations mandate to protect the civilian
population. Several thousand people have been killed, and several
thousand more have been injured in battles between the two sides.
Hundreds of thousands of refugees have fled to neighbouring countries
or directly to the Mediterranean Sea, where some 1 500 have lost
their lives.
6. In Syria, unrest started in mid-March. At the beginning, the
regime of Mr Bashar al-Assad responded with promises but soon reverted
to brutal repression, attacking unarmed demonstrators with troops
and tanks. Human rights groups say that more than 1 100 people have
been killed since March and 10 000 arrested. Officials dispute these
numbers and say that 100 soldiers have died. As in Libya, the government
says it is “fighting terrorists”.
7. In Bahrain, one third of the population (300 000 people) took
part in the anti-government protests, which were harshly suppressed
by the ruling monarchy, with military support from Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Emirates. According to cautious official estimates,
by the end of March 2011, 24 protesters had been killed. One of
the major demands of the protest movement was a constitutional reform
to allow the elected parliament to have exclusive legislative prerogatives.
The Bahraini opposition expressed strong hopes for international support
for its struggle for constitutional reform.
8. On 8 March 2011, the Sub-Committee on the Middle East of the
Political Affairs Committee held an exchange of views on the situation
in Egypt with Mr Nasser Kamel, Ambassador of Egypt to France, and Mr Tewfik
Aclimandos, historian and expert on Egypt, and decided to monitor
the situation closely.
9. On 9 March 2011, the Political Affairs Committee held a discussion
on the situation in Tunisia, attended by Ms Bochra Bel Haj Hmida,
member of the National Fact-Finding Commission on Abuses committed
during recent events in Tunisia; Ms Sihem Bensedrine, spokesperson
for the National Council for Liberties in Tunisia; and Mr Anwar
Kousri, Vice-President of the Tunisian League for Human Rights.
The committee also decided to ask the Assembly's Bureau for the
question of “The situation in Tunisia” to be referred to it for
report with a view to an Assembly debate during the June 2011 part-session. The debate was held on 21 June
2011 and led to the adoption of Resolution 1819.
10. On 11 March 2011, the Standing Committee held a current affairs
debate on “Co-operation between the Council of Europe and the emerging
democracies in the Arab world”, introduced by Mr Tiny Kox (Netherlands, UEL),
and with the participation of Mr Dominique Baudis, President of
the Arab World Institute and Vice-Chair of the European Parliament’s
Committee on Foreign Affairs. On that occasion, the Standing Committee referred
the matter to the Political Affairs Committee for report at the
June part-session.
11. During the April 2011 part-session the Assembly held a current
affairs debate on the situation in Northern Africa, introduced by
Mr Andreas Gross (Switzerland, SOC).
12. The Political Affairs Committee appointed me as rapporteur
at the April part-session, asking me to draft a report for the committee
meeting on 30-31 May 2011. Because time was so short, I was not
able to observe the situation on the spot, as I would have wished.
The report is therefore based on indirect observations. In accordance
with the Bureau’s reference decision of 15 April 2011, I have taken
account also of the motion for a resolution on “The pacification
of the Mediterranean region” (
Doc.
12550), tabled by Ms Fiamma Nirenstein (Italy, EPP/CD)
and others.
13. The committee held a first exchange of views on this issue
on 30 May 2011, based on a first draft report, and asked me to redraft
the text in the light of that exchange of views. The present report
is the result of that process, and I take this opportunity to thank
all colleagues who have sent me their views and their amendments,
which I duly took into account. In particular, I have taken the
country-by-country analysis out of the explanatory memorandum.
14. The situation in the Arab world keeps changing, and the outcome
of popular unrest is far from clear. The present report should therefore
be seen as a first attempt by the Assembly to give its unequivocal
support to those who are drawing their inspiration from the values
upheld by the Council of Europe – democracy, human rights and the
rule of law – and its clear condemnation of the use of violence
against the population. It also serves the purpose of presenting
some of the instruments that the Council of Europe could make available
to the emerging democracies in the Arab world. It is obvious that
the situation will change between now and October, and the committee
will have to adopt an addendum to this report with a view to its
presentation to the plenary during the October part-session.
15. The Assembly should continue to focus its attention on the
region, and a specific report on the situation in Egypt, in the
light of those on the situation in Tunisia, should be the next step,
in particular since presidential and general elections are to be
held there before the end of the year. It is up to the Assembly
to decide to have other reports prepared for other countries of
the region.
2. Overall analysis
16. Admittedly, it was not reasonably possible to foresee
the scale of the outbursts that have rocked the Arab world in the
past few months, but there were a number of factors that made them
likely, namely:
- abusive police
behaviour, human rights violations and widespread corruption;
- a population enduring economic hardship and high food
prices;
- easy access to information technology and the widespread
use of social networks.
17. A further catalyst here is the fact that people are no longer
afraid: what we are seeing is a growing awareness among the people
– particularly amongst the young, who are the majority of the population
groups concerned – who no longer fear their governments and leaders,
making protest possible.
18. This awareness is developing in a climate of responsibility
on the part of those protesting: they are acting responsibly, resolutely
and with maturity. This is the people’s victory, not that of a political
or religious group.
19. It is no coincidence that these popular protest movements
first made themselves felt in Tunisia and Egypt. Indeed, those two
countries achieved significant economic growth but without making
any parallel social changes. The evolving situation there has provided
young people, lacking any hopes for the future, with access to the
new communication technologies.
20. Young people, especially highly educated urban youth, are
frustrated primarily in their economic and political aspirations.
Their frustrations are not motivated by religion, anti-colonialism
or nationalism.
21. Some commentators may compare these events to those that ushered
in democracy in southern Europe in the 1970s and central and eastern
Europe in the 1990s, but in reality they are different in nature:
- they are truly popular movements,
that is to say, they do not stem from organised opposition, and
they have no formal leaders;
- the regimes that collapsed (Tunisia and Egypt) were surprisingly
fragile, but their fall did not bring down neighbouring, less fragile
regimes;
- it is clear that social networks played a major part here,
to the point where CNN suggested that these revolutions be named
“Facebook Revolutions”;
- the rebellions were nationwide, and, generally speaking,
the populations turned to Europe and the United States for help,
not to criticise.
22. There is no guarantee that the successor regimes to the fallen
tyrants will be paragons of democracy; it is quite possible that
other tyrants may seize power, that military or theocratic regimes
may emerge or that a protracted power vacuum may lead to chaos.
It is necessary to avoid not only retrograde steps but also extremes
such as those of Iran or Somalia.
23. But one thing is certain and makes the role and responsibility
of the Council of Europe more important – these young protesters
espouse the values upheld by the Council of Europe: democracy, human
rights and the rule of law.
24. Europe, for its part, did not see these revolutions coming
and was not prepared for them.
25. As the Assembly commented during its debate on Tunisia in
January 2011, Europe must accept some blame for having preferred
to cultivate ties with the dictators, out of a desire for stability
(Ben Ali and Mubarak were members of Socialist International), instead
of anticipating the popular uprisings, and for not supporting them
right from the start. “Societies held together by fear and repression
may offer the illusion of stability for a time, but they are built
upon fault lines that will eventually tear asunder”.
Europe must now
do all it can to help bring about a peaceful transition to democracy
and to ensure respect for human rights in neighbouring countries,
with humility, as part of a commitment based on reciprocal interests
and mutual respect. It must also, once and for all, opt for truth
and not “political correctness” because the interests of Europe
(and the United States) lie not only in the stability of the Arab
nations but also in the self-determination of individuals.
26. Europe is the Arab world’s nearest neighbour, its natural
market and its obvious partner.
3. The challenges
27. The challenges are both political and socio-economic.
3.1. A political challenge
28. The priority is to ensure the success of the transition
towards democracy, enabling the voice of the people to be heard,
which necessarily entails a process of learning about democracy
and its associated best practices.
29. Each country’s situation in unique; there is no single, universally
applicable model. Some countries have embarked on radical democratic
reform (Morocco), and it remains to be seen whether this will succeed.
Others have chosen the path of violence against their populations,
who are paying the price with their blood (Libya, Syria), and this
automatically means that their leaders are unfit to steer their
countries towards a new political future because they have forfeited
all legitimacy. Others again are playing for time (Yemen), without
realising that the only solution lies in democratic dialogue and
heeding the legitimate expectations of their people.
3.2. A socio-economic challenge
30. The socio-economic challenge is at least as important
as the political one. It is essential to create without delay an
area of stability and prosperity on the southern and eastern shores
of the Mediterranean and offer prospects to young people and help
people emerge from poverty. If this is not done, they will be tempted
by extremes, and there is a danger they will turn to the radical
elements of every kind. This is a particularly difficult task in
today’s budgetary climate.
31. Aid is taking shape under the European Union’s neighbourhood
policy and the policy decided on by the United States, but there
are complaints that it is slow in arriving.
32. Working with the Arab world to bring about an area of peace,
stability and exchanges in the Mediterranean is a challenge that
is just as significant for the countries in the region as for Europe
itself.
4. Europe’s role
4.1. At political level
33. At political level, Europe’s action needs to be fourfold.
34. First, we must guarantee respect for human rights. We should
be mindful of the new principle adopted by the United Nations in
2005 on the responsibility to protect: “governments have the responsibility
of protecting their peoples against war crimes, crimes against humanity
and genocides. And if they do not, the international community recognises
its right to do so in their place.”
The
violence of dictatorial regimes in the region and the clampdown
on the civilian population must be roundly condemned, and those
responsible must be brought before the competent courts, including
international courts, and be punished.
35. We need to encourage respect for freedom of expression, assembly
and religion, equality between men and women and the right to the
free choice of one’s leaders. “Such tolerance is particularly important
when it comes to religion. In Tahrir Square, we heard Egyptians
from all walks of life chant, 'Muslims, Christians, we are one'”
. It is therefore
essential to ensure that all religions are respected and that bridges
are built between them. In a region that was the birthplace of three
world religions, intolerance can lead only to suffering and stagnation.
If the democratic change desired by the Arab revolutionaries is
to come about, Coptic Christians must have the right to worship
freely in Cairo, just as Shi’a must never have their mosques destroyed
in Bahrain. What is true for religious minorities is also true when
it comes to the rights of women. History shows that countries are
more prosperous and more peaceful when women are empowered. That
is why it is imperative to help women, in the fields of health and
education – including training in how to start up a business – and
in general to ensure that their voice can be heard and that they
can run for office.
36. Second, we must support the countries on the southern shore
of the Mediterranean in their transition to democracy. In particular,
we can share with them our experience and expertise in constitutional
law, political systems, public freedoms and press freedom.
In this context,
it is also important to assist the countries concerned in developing
genuine local democracy; for example, it is not right for a city
such as Alexandria, with a population of some 5 million, to be headed
by a governor appointed by the president of the country and not have
a mayor elected by the local inhabitants.
37. We must also change the way we look at the Arab world. Arab
countries are often judged in terms of hostage taking, violent rhetoric
and terrorist attacks claiming numerous victims. Furthermore, by
virtue of their colonial history, many European countries thought
they understood Arab societies well, but we are now finding that
we lack knowledge and understanding of many aspects of those societies,
especially matters of culture, and this occasionally gives rise
to real resentment on the southern shore of the Mediterranean. For
example, we need to use the concept of secularism with care, so
as to present it as something aiming to achieve equality, rather
than as something that could be perceived as a means of discrimination.
Today we need to take on board what Arab civil society, which we
must help to be powerful and plural, is saying: let us listen to
what we are being told by business leaders, associations, artists,
students and young people whose involvement in political life makes
use of social networks. We have to talk to everyone who respects
the democratic rules, upholds the law and rejects violence, even
if we do not necessarily share their ideas, because democracy depends
not only on elections but also on strong and stable institutions
and respect for the rights of minorities. Consequently, we must
also talk to Islamist groups who respect these rules.
38. Lastly, we must find “a solution to the main conflicts persisting
in the region”: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with a democratic
Palestinian state; the situation in Lebanon, with a “sovereign Lebanon,
free to choose her destiny”; the Iranian issue, with the Iranian
government guaranteeing its people respect for human rights, resolving
the nuclear issue in line with what the international community
is asking and developing a positive influence throughout the region.”
4.2. At socio-economic level
39. Europe must focus on three priority socio-economic
objectives in the Arab world: support for growth that will ensure
job creation; assistance in dealing with social change; and the
preservation of the Mediterranean, while taking full account of
the constraints that affect European countries, especially migration
policies.
40. Successful democratic transitions in the Arab countries depend
upon the expansion of growth and broad-based prosperity which these
countries will be able to generate. Just as European Union membership served
as an incentive for reform in Europe, so should the vision of a
modern and prosperous economy create a powerful force for democracy
in the Arab world. Accordingly, while initially it is imperative
to help the countries concerned meet their financial obligations
and recover from the disruptions to their economy as a result of
their democratic upheaval, it is also necessary to bring together
the European countries and the international organisations, especially
those of a financial nature, to put in place a stabilisation and
modernisation plan for the economies in the region. In particular,
it is important to encourage and facilitate investment in these countries,
ease their access to the markets, foster trade, give impetus to
the establishment of businesses and finance the creation of infrastructure
and jobs. To this end, it is essential to create investment funds
that can channel capital to the countries in the region, as happened
at the time of the democratisation of the countries in the former
Soviet bloc.
41. The aid that is so essential to economic recovery in the countries
in transition, particularly in the southern Mediterranean, under
the European Union’s neighbourhood policy and the policy set out
by the United States, must be made available promptly to the countries
concerned. While it is natural for such aid to be conditional on
the practical application of democratic standards, it should nonetheless
take account of the direction chosen and the genuine commitment
to reform so as to give precedence to countries honouring their
commitments in the fields of governance and human rights.
42. The economic recovery and expansion of these countries, and
consequently their transition to democracy, will not be sustainable
unless there are resolute efforts to combat corruption at all levels
in society, to remove red tape, which stifles energy, and to halt
the distribution of advantages based on tribal or religious affiliations.
European
countries have a responsibility to help, in whatever way they can,
the Arab countries to achieve these objectives. The new Arab governments
must also face up to their responsibilities and be accountable for
the consequences.
43. Moreover, it is essential to create
de
facto solidarity between the two shores of the Mediterranean
and to meet
the need of young people of the south to share in a collective destiny,
the need to belong to a community outside the borders of their country
and the need to communicate with the outside world, by facilitating
a greater number of exchanges between young people in the north
and south, as well as by enhancing mobility, through the granting
of visas and work permits for students who have demonstrated their skills
in their own countries, so as to increase the sharing of academic
experience and to enable them to acquire competences and skills
in one or more countries on the other shore.
45. We must also reach out beyond elites to those “who will shape
the future – particularly young people”.
46. As Mr Juppé said in his speech to the Arab World Institute
on 16 April 2011: “If we are unable to reduce the gap in development
between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean which
we share, all our fine words will be in vain, both at political
level and in terms of bringing migration under control. The aim
is indeed to enable the men and women of the south to remain in
their countries, find employment there and to enjoy fundamental
freedoms and a good quality of life.”
5. What we can offer
47. Europe experienced the transition towards democracy
in its southern countries during the 1970s and its eastern countries
during the 1990s. The Council of Europe played a significant part
in these changes and can make its experience available to any of
the Arab countries that may wish to make use of it.
48. The processes of transition in southern Europe and in central
and eastern Europe showed that each situation is unique, that each
nation has its own specific characteristics. The same is true of
the Arab world. So each nation must create its own model, building
on existing foundations.
49. The Council of Europe also has a number of potentially useful
structures and instruments: the partnership for democracy, parliamentary
co-operation, the Venice Commission, the North-South Centre, the Pompidou
Group, GRECO, MONEYVAL, the Council for Penological Co-operation,
the Strasbourg International Forum for Democracy, intergovernmental
co-operation programmes, particularly as part of the new Neighbourhood
Policy, support programmes for local bodies and civil society, the
Council of Europe Development Bank and the human rights institutions
and monitoring mechanisms, which, although they may not be open
to non-member states of the Council of Europe, can offer their experience
and case law for the benefit of the Arab countries.
5.1. Partnership for democracy
50. “Partner for democracy” status, established by the
Assembly in 2009, allows parliamentary delegations from countries
in the Council of Europe’s neighbouring regions to take part in
the Assembly’s activities, subject to a number of undertakings,
for example, that they will apply the values upheld by the Council
of Europe, hold free and fair elections or work to abolish the death
penalty. The Moroccan Parliament was granted this status on 12 June
2011, and a request from the Palestinian National Council is currently
under consideration.
5.2. Parliamentary co-operation
51. As part of the Assembly’s parliamentary co-operation
activities, specific programmes for the national parliaments of
countries with Partner for Democracy status can be developed to
meet their priority needs in the context of ongoing reforms.
52. These co-operation programmes, which should be funded as joint
programmes with the European Union and by voluntary contributions
from member states, have two main focuses, though their precise
content is decided in consultation with each parliament concerned.
First, they aim to strengthen the democratic functioning and technical
and administrative capabilities of the parliamentary secretariat;
second, to familiarise parliamentarians as well as the civil servants
working with these parliaments with the reference texts and standards
of the Council of Europe in its core areas of activity, through
specific activities such as seminars, study visits, traineeships
and special subject workshops.
5.3. Venice Commission
53. The European Commission for Democracy through Law
(Venice Commission) is the Council of Europe’s advisory body on
constitutional matters. Established in 1990, the Venice Commission
has played a leading role in the adoption of constitutions that
conform to the standards of Europe’s constitutional heritage. Initially conceived
as a tool for urgently needed constitutional revision and design
in a context of transition to democracy, the Venice Commission has
become an internationally recognised independent legal think tank.
54. The Venice Commission helps to disseminate Europe’s constitutional
heritage, based on the continent’s fundamental legal values, while
continuing to provide “constitutional first aid” to individual states.
The Venice Commission also plays a unique and unrivalled role in
crisis management and conflict prevention through constitution building
and advice.
55. Membership of the Venice Commission is also open to countries
that are not members of the Council of Europe. Algeria, Morocco
and Tunisia are members. From the very beginning of the people’s
uprising in Tunisia, the Venice Commission quickly took steps to
offer its assistance to the transitional authorities, as regards
electoral reform and preparation of elections, on the one hand,
and constitutional reform, on the other. The Political Affairs Committee
facilitated contacts by inviting the President of the Venice Commission
to a hearing in Paris in March 2011 attended by representatives
of Tunisian civil society. Co-operation has also been stepped up
with Morocco, including as part of our committee’s examination of
the request for Partner for Democracy status submitted by the Moroccan
parliament.
5.4. North-South Centre
56. Created in November 1989, the European Centre for
Global Interdependence and Solidarity (North-South Centre) was set
up in Lisbon. Its objective is to provide a framework for European
co-operation designed to heighten public awareness of global interdependence
issues and to promote policies of solidarity consistent with the
Council of Europe’s aims and principles (respect for human rights,
democracy and the rule of law).
57. Membership of the Centre is also open to countries that are
not members of the Council of Europe. To date, Morocco and Cape
Verde are the only “southern” states to have joined. The Centre
could play a key role in the context of the “Arab Spring” and develop
its relations with the countries to the south of the Mediterranean if
it were given additional resources.
5.5. Pompidou Group
58. The Pompidou Group’s core mission is to contribute
to the development of multidisciplinary, innovative, effective and
evidence-based drug policies in its member states. It seeks to link
policy, practice and science, and it also focuses on the realities
of implementation at the local level of drug-related programmes.
59. The Pompidou Group also acts as a bridge linking member states
of the European Union and non-member states and neighbouring countries
in the Mediterranean region. In this context, it has established
the MedNET network for co-operation in the Mediterranean region
on drugs and addictions. Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco
and Tunisia participate in a number of the network’s initiatives.
5.6. Support programmes for local bodies and civil
society
60. Local Democracy Agencies (LDAs) were created by the
Council of Europe’s Congress of Local and Regional Authorities to
provide assistance to municipalities ravaged by the war in former
Yugoslavia, through partnerships with cities in western Europe.
The experience acquired by LDAs could be made available to emerging
democracies in the Arab world that may wish to make use of it.
61. The Council of Europe also has a Centre of Expertise for Local
Government Reform.
62. In the words of its President, “The Conference of INGOs of
the Council of Europe, a genuine hub of European NGO networks, has
contacts and strong links with NGO members in several of the countries concerned
(Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya). It has discussion
skills and tools capable of helping population groups as they strive
to facilitate this shift, this regime change. It can and will complement
the action of states and international organisations in support
of the desire for a better future expressed by women and men”.
5.7. Strasbourg International Forum for Democracy
63. The Parliamentary Assembly has suggested that a number
of activities be grouped together in a “Strasbourg International
Forum for Democracy” in order to strengthen the democracy pillar
of the Council of Europe; the activities in question are the Forum
for the Future of Democracy, the Schools of Political Studies and
the Summer University for Democracy. If this idea takes off, the
Strasbourg International Forum for Democracy may include countries
from outside Europe in its work, and in particular the countries
of the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean basin.
64. The Forum for the Future of Democracy was established at the
Third Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Council of
Europe, held in Warsaw in May 2005. Its aim is to strengthen democracy,
political freedoms and citizens’ participation through the exchange
of ideas, information and examples of best practice. The proposals
resulting from its discussions about possible future action help
to enhance the Council of Europe’s work in the field of democracy.
There are plans to invite representatives of states on the southern shores
of the Mediterranean basin to attend the 2011 Forum, to be held
in Cyprus in October.
65. The Council of Europe Schools of Political Studies were established
to train future generations of political, economic, social and cultural
leaders in countries in transition. They run annual courses of seminars and
lectures on topics such as European integration, democracy, human
rights and the rule of law, with the participation of national and
international experts.
66. Over the years, the Council of Europe’s Summer University
for Democracy has become a major fixture in the calendar of young
democratic leaders of the new Europe, wherein they can debate issues,
exchange ideas and seek to respond to the major challenges of our
era. The Summer University for Democracy is also an ideal forum
for regional and bilateral meetings of the schools in the network.
These meetings have become an integral part of the Summer University’s
programme, offering opportunities for informal and in-depth dialogue.
5.8. Council of Europe Development Bank
67. The Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) is a
multilateral development bank with a social vocation. Established
in 1956 to bring solutions to the problems of refugees, its scope
of action has progressively widened to other endeavors directly
contributing to strengthening social cohesion in Europe.
68. The CEB represents a major instrument of the policy of solidarity
in Europe, in order to help its 40 member states achieve sustainable
and equitable growth. Accordingly, it participates in financing
social projects, responds to emergency situations and, in so doing,
contributes to improving the living conditions of the most disadvantaged
population groups.
69. The Bank is willing to do what it can to help emerging democracies
in the Arab world. Under its Articles of Agreement, the Bank can
give direct aid only to its member states, but it is currently drawing
up proposals for concrete means of action.
5.9. Council of Europe Neighbourhood Policy
70. In February 2011, the Secretary General of the Council
of Europe prepared an initial “Analytical Background Document for
the Ministers’ Deputies’ thematic debate of 2 March 2011” entitled
“A neighbourhood policy for the Council of Europe?”.
In
a second document, published in April 2011, entitled “Council of
Europe Neighbourhood Policy”,
the Secretary General set
out the broad lines of a new Council of Europe Neighbourhood Policy,
with three objectives:
- to facilitate
democratic political transition (constitutional process, electoral
legislation, organisation and observation of elections);
- to help to promote good governance in the countries in
the Council of Europe neighbourhood, on the basis of the relevant
Council of Europe standards, mechanisms and instruments (independence
and functioning of the judiciary, fight against corruption, money
laundering, etc.);
- to reinforce and enlarge the Council of Europe regional
action in combating trans-border and global threats such as trafficking
in human beings, cybercrime, organised crime and terrorism.
71. In his presentation, the Secretary General said that the new
Neighbourhood Policy had to be focused and relevant and had to respond
not only to a clearly existing need but also to the existence of
clearly expressed interest and concrete commitments from the beneficiary
countries.
72. This topic was of course included on the agenda of the 121st
session of the Committee of Ministers, which took place in Istanbul
on 11 May 2011. The Ministers took note of the proposals made by
the Secretary General regarding “a Council of Europe policy towards
its immediate neighbourhood” aimed at promoting dialogue and co-operation
with the countries and regions in the vicinity of Europe that request
Council of Europe assistance, based on the common values of human
rights, democracy and the rule of law. The Ministers also invited
the Secretary General to develop action plans for the implementation
of this policy, with a view to their approval by the Committee of
Ministers, and agreed to conduct an initial review of this new policy at
their next session.
73. Finally, the Assembly could, for its part, initiate reflection
on the desirability of convening a summit of heads of state and
government of the democracies of Europe and the southern Mediterranean
to have a high-level political discussion on co-operation between
the Council of Europe and the emerging democracies in the Arab world.
6. Conclusions
74. Europe cannot stand idly by and watch as history
is made by this spectacular push for freedom in the countries of
the southern Mediterranean.
75. Europe, which prides itself on having done so much for civilisation
and on having developed universal models of democracy, which seeks
to combat discrimination, intolerance and xenophobia, which speaks
up for minorities and which defends the ideal of a multicultural
society, must rise to the occasion and appreciate the scale of the
changes now unfolding and the importance of its historic responsibility.
It must now reach out to the Arab countries moving towards democracy,
and first and foremost to those that are its neighbours. The latter
should consider the possibility of applying the above-mentioned
principles themselves, using the same mechanisms to ensure that
they are upheld.
76. The time when large political groupings were shaped by geography
alone has gone. We need, collectively, to appreciate that we are
now in a new era. If the peoples of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and elsewhere have
made the effort to throw off the yoke of dictatorship, and perhaps
that of religious extremism, too, we must help them – not like a
teacher helping a student but as partners in a new and shared political
world project for democracy, justice and freedom.
77. It is time to create a “common democratic home”. The Council
of Europe is the body that has done the most to bring together the
peoples of its 47 member states, that possesses acknowledged experience
and that helped the countries of Eastern Europe in their transition
to democracy. It has instruments and mechanisms that make it possible
not only to develop standards for establishing a common legal area
that upholds the principle of the rule of law and human rights and
for deepening the democratic character of reforms but also to provide
a system for monitoring and scrutinising those standards.
78. The Council of Europe now needs the political will to impart
a new historical impetus to its work. The countries of Europe must
be ready to put their values to the test, beyond the immediate frontiers
of their continent, and tie their destiny more closely to that of
other countries that aspire to democracy and are willing to accept
the same standards and scrutiny. An undertaking of this kind presupposes
that the men and women currently in charge in the southern Mediterranean
countries and responsible for leading their countries along a new
path without falling into the mistakes of the past will want something
other than just economic aid from Europe and will embrace our common
values of tolerance and respect for freedoms. The Council of Europe can
then make its facilities available to them, to address as closely
as possible the concerns of the people and respond together to the
main political challenges facing our societies.
79. As the President of the Assembly said in Istanbul on 11 May
2011, serious consideration should be given to the idea of convening
a summit of heads of state and government from the democracies of
Europe and the southern Mediterranean to lay the foundations of
a process to discuss co-operation between the Council of Europe
and the emerging democracies of the Arab world. The Parliamentary
Assembly, with its Partner for Democracy status, has opened the
way for this, but further action is necessary.
80. It is for the Arab states to make their own choices, but Europe
must be ready to step up to the mark. If it now fails to show ambition
and a clear, democratic and optimistic political vision for the
future, it will bequeath to future generations an environment still
driven by political, cultural and religious dissent, which could
become insurmountable and which sooner or later will present it
with a major problem.