1. Introduction
1. On becoming a member of the Council of Europe on
24 April 2002, Bosnia and Herzegovina accepted to honour the obligations
placed on all member states under Article 3 of the Organisation’s
Statute, together with a number of specific undertakings set out
in
Opinion 234 (2002) on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for membership
of the Council of Europe. With a view to ensuring compliance with
these commitments, the Parliamentary Assembly decided, pursuant
to
Resolution 1115 (1997), to closely monitor the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
as from its accession.
2. The first monitoring report was presented to the Assembly
in June 2004 and led to the adoption of
Resolution 1383 (2004) and
Recommendation
1664 (2004) on 23 June 2004. Following the failure of the constitutional
reform in April 2006, the Assembly also decided in June 2006 to
hold a debate under urgent procedure on the constitutional reform
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and adopted
Resolution 1513 (2006). The second full monitoring report was debated in September
2008 and led to the adoption of
Resolution 1626 (2008).
3. On 22 December 2009, the European Court of Human Rights delivered
its judgment in the case of Sejdić and
Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which it found a
violation of Protocol No. 12 (general prohibition of discrimination)
to the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5, hereafter
“the Convention”) and a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1
in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention (right to free
elections and prohibition of discrimination in relation to other
Convention-protected rights). Both Mr Finci (a Jew) and Mr Sejdić
(a Roma) belong to the constitutional category of “Others” and as
such cannot stand for election to the presidency of the country
or be elected to the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
4. According to the constitution (Annexe 4 of the Dayton Peace
Accords), the tripartite presidency of the State is directly elected
every four years: one member must be a Serb elected from the territory
of Republika Srpska, one of the two entities, and the other two
must be respectively a Croat and a Bosniak (Muslim) elected from
the territory of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the other
entity, composed of 10 cantons. Again, according to the constitution,
the House of Peoples must be composed of five Serbs (appointed by
the Republika Srpska National Assembly) and by five Croats and five
Bosniaks appointed by the House of Peoples of the federation. This
system excludes everybody who does not declare himself or herself
as belonging to a “constituent people”, either because they are
members of the 17 recognised minorities or because they do not wish
to declare themselves, from participating in the political life
of the country.
5. In January 2010, the Assembly adopted
Resolution 1701 (2010) on the functioning of democratic institutions in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, urging the authorities to make the necessary constitutional
and legislative amendments to the election law in order to abide
by the
Sejdić and Finci judgment
before the next general elections scheduled for 3 October 2010.
The Assembly also suggested holding a multilateral conference with
key local and international stakeholders (notably the countries
represented on the Peace Implementation Council, the European Union,
the Council of Europe and the neighbouring countries) to discuss ways
of overcoming the institutional and political deadlock in Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
6. Neither the constitution nor the election law were amended
in due time before the elections.
In
Resolution 1725 (2010) on the urgent need for a constitutional reform, the
Assembly therefore expressed its disappointment that the next elections
were likely to be held on the basis of rules which were in violation
of the convention and its protocols and called on the authorities
not to waste the remaining time before the elections and to launch
immediately a serious institutionalised process for preparing a
comprehensive package of constitutional amendments right after the
elections. This was not done either, since the members of the mixed Sejdić
and Finci working group (three ministers and nine MPs) could not
agree on the mandate and composition of this constitutional reform
commission and, in particular, whether it should be set up by a
law or by a decision of parliament. Thus, on 26 August 2010, the
Council of Ministers had to take note of the working group’s failure
and agreed to its proposal to resume work only after the elections.
7. Elections were held at all levels, except municipal, on 3
October 2010. At state level, voters had to elect the three-member
presidency of the state and the 42 members of the House of Representatives.
Voters in Republika Srpska elected the President of Republika Srpska
(and two vice-presidents) and the 83 members of the National Assembly
of Republika Srpska. Voters in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
elected the 98 members of the House of Representatives of the federation.
Finally,
voters in the federation also had to elect the members of the 10
cantonal assemblies.
8. These elections were observed as usual by an ad hoc committee
of the Bureau of the Assembly, which formed part of the international
observation mission and which also included election observers from
the NATO and OSCE parliamentary assemblies and the OSCE/ODIHR.
9. The international election observation mission concluded that
the general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 3 October 2010
“represented further progress and, except for legal restrictions
of voting rights, were generally conducted in line with OSCE and
Council of Europe commitments”. However, Mr Tiny Kox, Head of the
Assembly delegation, added that “the elections were once again conducted
with ethnicity and residence-based limitations to active and passive
suffrage rights imposed by the Dayton Accords. As such, the existent
legal framework continues to violate the European Convention on
Human Rights”.
10. As in 2006, it was widely expected that negotiations for government
formation would take around three to four months, maximum six months.
Instead, to date, there is no government at state level, more than
one year after the elections. Extremely concerned about this situation
and the resulting institutional paralysis, we carried out a fact-finding
visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina from 20 to 23 September 2011, visiting, inter alia, leaders of the main
political parties in Sarajevo and Mostar, in order to get a better
understanding of the reasons behind this continued deadlock.
11. At its meeting during the October 2011 part-session of the
Assembly, when we orally reported on the situation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, expressing our grave concerns, the Monitoring Committee
decided to ask the Bureau of the Assembly to include on the agenda
for the January 2012 part-session a debate on the “Functioning of
democratic institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina”.
12. Bosnia and Herzegovina, as we all know, is a very complex
state, with an extremely high degree of decentralisation and very
weak central institutions. It consists of two entities: Republika
Srpska (covering 49% of the territory) and the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, which is divided into 10 cantons by virtue of the 1994
Washington agreement. There is also the autonomous Brcko District
whose status is the result of international arbitration (the 1999
Brcko Final Arbitration Award).
13. Given this complex structure, when dealing with any issue,
one has to deal with five presidents, 13 prime ministers, around
180 ministers at the state, entity and cantonal level, and with
14 elected parliaments or assemblies (including Brcko, but excluding
the municipal level). There is a very serious lack of co-ordination and
co-operation, even of communication, between the various levels
of government and the decision-making process is hampered by a high
number of complex mechanisms designed to prevent outvoting by any
of the three “constituent” peoples: the Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats.
State laws do not apply automatically throughout the country, legislation
in many areas is not harmonised and can vastly differ, and there
is no mechanism at the disposal of the state to force sub-state
levels to comply with laws or policy decisions.
14. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina has been backsliding in its
reform process approximately since 2006, despite some positive news
such as the signing of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement
(SAA) with the European Union in June 2008 and an invitation by
NATO in April 2010 to a Membership Action Plan, the current impasse
represents the most serious crisis for the country since the end
of the war in 1995. The fundamental question at the root of this
crisis is whether power should be shared between representatives
of constituent peoples or between representatives from constituent
peoples, and whether it should be shared on a proportional basis
or on
the basis of total equality between the three constituent peoples.
15. There is no magic recipe to end this crisis. As the Assembly
has pointed out many times, a solution requires trust, a common
vision of the future of the country and the political will of all
the local political stakeholders. All these seem to be in short
supply at the moment. We will try to explain why below.
2. Results of the 2010
elections
16. In all, the general elections were contested by 32
political parties, 10 coalitions and 7 independent candidates. With
the exception of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) which officially
claims to be multi-ethnic, the other major parties remain essentially
ethnic parties. For the Serbs, the main parties are the SNSD (Alliance of
Independent Social Democrats), the SDS (Serbian Democratic Party)
and the PDP (Party for Democratic Progress). On the Croat side,
the main parties are the HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia
and Herzegovina) and the HDZ 1990 (Croatian Democratic Union 1990
).
For the Bosniaks, the main parties are the SDA (Party for Democratic
Action), the SBiH (Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the newly
created SBB (Party for a better future of Bosnia and Herzegovina).
17. A total of 8 242 candidates were included in 562 separate
lists standing for the general elections, including 4 259 Bosniaks,
1 926 Serbs, 1 713 Croats and 299 “Others”. Forty-four candidates
did not declare their national identity. A total of 3 126 599 electors
were registered on the electoral lists.
On election day, the turnout
was 56.28%, which is an increase of some 3% over 2006.
2.1. Election of the tripartite
state presidency
18. Voters registered in Republika Srpska, whether Serb,
Croat or Bosniak, could only vote for the Serb member of the presidency.
Incumbent Nebojsa Radmanovic, from the SNSD, was re-elected with
295 629 votes, namely 48.92%. This was a close race because Mladen
Ivanic, a former minister of foreign affairs and the leader of the
PDP, a party in opposition in Republika Srpska, received 285 951
votes, namely 47.31%.
19. Voters in the federation, again independently of their own
ethnic affiliation, could only vote either for the Croat member
of the presidency or for the Bosniak one. For the Bosniak seat,
the winner was Bakir Izetbegovic who received 162 831 votes, namely
34.86%. Again, the race was close because Fahrudin Radoncic, a media tycoon
and the leader of the newly created SBB, received 142 387 votes
(30.79%). Incumbent Haris Silajdzic from the SBiH, was relegated
to third place with barely 25.10% of the votes. The most popular
politician in the federation,
with
the highest number of votes throughout the country, is undoubtedly
the Croat member of the presidency, Zeljko Komsic, from the SDP.
He was re-elected for a second term with 337 065 votes, namely 60.61%.
The candidates from the biggest Croat parties, Borjana Kristo of
the HDZ and Martin Raguz of HDZ 1990, only received 19.74% and 10.84%
of the votes respectively.
20. Given the relatively small size of the Croat ethnic community
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (they were around 760 000, namely 17%
of the population according to the pre-war 1991 census, and, according
to Cardinal Puljic, the number today is approximately 400 000 people),
it is clear that a vast number of Bosniaks, instead of voting for
their ethnic Bosniak candidates, voted instead for Mr Komsic. As
in 2006, we see this as a positive sign that politics in Bosnia
and Herzegovina can move away from the ethnic divide.
21. The mainstream Croat parties, HDZ and HDZ 1990, however, consider
that Mr Komsic is not a “real” Croat because he was elected with
Muslim votes. They do not question his ethnicity per se,
but
deny him the right to represent the Croat people in the presidency.
For them, there is a major difference between being a representative
of the Croat people, elected by Croats, and being a representative
from the Croat people, elected with votes cast by others than Croats.
22. We completely disagree with this view. We think that it has
no constitutional and legal basis whatsoever and that it shows complete
disrespect for the democratically expressed will of the people.
What is even more surprising is that both the HDZ and the HDZ 1990
do not use the same line of argument with regard to the ethnic Croats
in Republika Srpska, where ethnic Croats such as Republika Srpska
Vice-President Emil Vlajki, for example, was elected with Serb votes.
2.2. Elections to the various parliaments,
at state and entity levels
2.2.1. At state level
23. The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina provides
that the House of Representatives is composed of 42 delegates, of
whom 28 are elected from the territory of the federation and 14
from the territory of Republika Srpska. This time the biggest election
winner for the 28 MPs to be elected to the House of Representatives
from the territory of the federation was Zlatko Lagumdzija’s SDP.
This multi-ethnic party, which has been in opposition since 2002,
won 26.07% of the votes and now has eight MPs in the House of Representatives.
The main Bosniak parties, Suleyman Tihic’s SDA, Fahrudin Radoncic’s
SBB and Haris Silajdzic’s SBiH won seven, four and two seats respectively.
The main Croat parties, HDZ and HDZ 1990 won three seats and one
seat respectively. The rest of the seats are spread between smaller
Croat parties: the HSP (Croatian Party of Rights) and the NSRzB
(People’s Party for Betterment through Work) got one seat each. One
seat went to a small mainly Bosniak party, the DNZ.
24. Following the elections, the SDP, the SDA, and two small Croat
parties (HSP and NSRzB) agreed to go into a coalition based on a
commonly agreed platform for government. Together, they now command
17 seats out of 42. This is of course not a majority, but the platformists,
as they are called, will probably, at least on issues of major importance,
also be able to count on the four votes of the SBB and the two votes
of the SBiH, which both decided to stay in opposition.
25. The seats allocated to the 14 delegates elected from the territory
of Republika Srpska are as follows: 8 for Milorad Dodik’s SNSD,
4 for Mladen Bosic’s SDS, 1 for Mladen Ivanic’s PDP and 1 for the
DNS (Democratic People’s League). For the first time, all 14 MPs
from Republika Srpska are ethnic Serbs. SNSD and SDS have decided
to go into coalition at state level, but the SDS remains in opposition
at the entity level in Republika Srpska.
26. The newly elected MPs met in an inaugural session on 30 November
2010, but only to take the oath. Due to the ongoing negotiations
on government formation, there was no agreement on who should become speaker
and vice-speakers of the house. Finally, thanks to an initiative
by the president of the SDS, the house elected a speaker (from SDP)
and two vice-speakers (from SNSD and HDZ 1990) on 20 May 2011 and
started working.
However, since all
legislation also needs to be adopted by the House of Peoples, which
was not constituted until 4 June 2011, in effect there was no legislative
work carried out at all for eight months after the elections
27. The House of Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina comprises 15
delegates, two thirds of whom must be coming, according to the constitution,
from the federation (five Croats and five Bosniaks) and one third
from Republika Srpska (five Serbs). It is the Republika Srpska National
Assembly which appoints its five delegates to the House of Peoples:
this was done in January 2011. For the federation delegates, matters
were unacceptably delayed because the 10 delegates had to be appointed
by the House of Peoples of the Federation.
28. The House of Peoples of the Federation has 58 delegates (17
Bosniaks, 17 Serbs, 17 Croats and 7 “Others”) who are appointed
by the 10 cantonal assemblies. According to the Federation’s Constitution
(Article 10), the cantonal assemblies should have sent their delegates
to the Federation House of Peoples no later than 20 days after the
elections. This constitutional deadline was ignored by a number
of cantons with a Croat majority
until 30 May 2011. The House
of Peoples was thus inaugurated only on 4 June 2011. We strongly urge
the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina to adopt as soon as possible
the required legislation in order to avoid this kind of unconstitutional
delay in the future.
2.2.2. At entity level
29. In Republika Srpska
, although
Milora d Dodik’s SNSD lost four seats compared with 2006, the SNSD remains
the strongest party
in the National
Assembly with 37 seats out of 83. In coalition with the Socialist Party
and the DNS, the SNSD thus has a comfortable majority of 47 seats.
In these circumstances, government formation was not a problem:
the Republika Srpska government which consists of 16 ministers was
approved on 29 December 2010, and Prime Minister Aleksandar Dzombic
took office on 1 February 2011, following a 31 January ruling of
the Vital National Interest (VNI) Panel of the Republika Srpska
Constitutional Court that his appointment did not violate Bosniaks’
vital national interest.
30. Things were much more complicated in the federation. The Federation
House of Representatives has 98 seats: 28 were won by the SDP, 23
by the SDA, and 5 by the NSRzB. The Platform parties thus command 56
seats and have a clear majority. The HDZ gained 12 seats and the
HDZ 1990, 5 seats.
According
to the election law,
however,
the government could not be formed until the composition of House
of Peoples of the Federation was completed, that is until all 10
cantonal assemblies had sent their delegates (see supra paragraph
28).
31. In order to keep a strong bargaining chip for the negotiations
over government formation at state level, three cantons with a Croat
HDZ/HDZ 1990 majority did not send their delegates to the Federation
House of Peoples. On 17 March 2011, the Platform parties, who had
a majority of 33 cantonal delegates in the House of Peoples, convened
a session, took the oath and elected the president
and vice-presidents of the federation and
the speaker and vice-speakers of the House of Peoples.
32. The House of Peoples then immediately proceeded with the appointment
of a government, which was confirmed by the House of Representatives.
The Federation Government comprises 16 ministers, with Nermin Nikšic
(SDP) as prime minister, and Jerko Ivankovic Lijanovic (NSRzB) and
Desnica Radivojevic (SDA) as deputy prime ministers. The two HDZ
parties do not hold any ministerial post.
33. On 24 March, these two decisions were annulled by the Central
Election Commission
and on 28 March,
the High Representative, Valentin Inzko, suspended them until further
notice. This suspension has not been lifted to date.
34. The High Representative was very much criticised for interfering
in the Federation Government’s formation process. But a solution
had to be found urgently: on 26 January, the High Representative
had to issue a decision on temporary financing for the period January-March,
expiring 31 March, without which salaries, pensions and allowances
could no longer be paid by the federation authorities to budget
beneficiaries. A budget for 2011 was adopted by the new government
on 26 March.
35. The HDZ and HDZ 1990, with the support of Dodik’s SNSD, consider
the formation of the House of Peoples and the subsequent formation
of the government in the federation to be unconstitutional, illegal
and illegitimate. Previous HDZ ministers refused to vacate their
offices, the former HDZ President of the Federation, Borjana Kristo,
who withdrew her constitutional appeal after the suspension order
of the High Representative, put her mandate at his disposal. Because
they consider themselves as the only legitimate representatives
of the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, both HDZ and HDZ 1990 feel
sidelined and excluded. They are now forcefully calling for the
creation of a third entity and have revived the Croat National Council,
a body grouping all cantons with a Croat majority.
36. With just four elected MPs (out of 42) in the state-level
House of Representatives and with 17 MPs (out of 98) in the Federation
House of Representatives, we believe the two HDZs simply need to
accept the election results. In a democratic state, the voters'
will has to be respected. Both HDZ and the HDZ 1990 have a majority in
a number of cantons and should concentrate on working there over
the next four years. Given their election results, they cannot claim
an acquired right to a reserved number of ministerial posts, either
at state or federation level. There is nothing wrong with being
in opposition for a while. As politicians, we have all experienced
this.
3. The ongoing stalemate with
regard to government formation at state level
37. The Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina
comprises nine ministers and a chair. The Constitution of Bosnia
and Herzegovina provides that no more than two thirds of all ministers
may be appointed from the territory of the federation and that the
chair may appoint deputy ministers who shall not be of the same constituent
people as their ministers. In total, there are thus 19 positions
to be shared. There is an unwritten gentlemen’s agreement that the
position of chair should rotate between the constituent peoples.
The current chair, Nikola Spiric, is a Serb, the previous one, Adnan
Terzic, was a Bosniak. The chair to be appointed for the 2010-2014
term should thus be a Croat.
38. The presidency forwards to the House of Representatives, no
later than 15 days after its inaugural session, its proposal for
the position of chair of the Council of Ministers. If the House
of Representatives confirms the nomination, the chair then appoints
ministers and deputy ministers, who again need to be confirmed by
the House of Representatives. If the candidate proposed by the presidency
fails to be confirmed by the House of Representatives, the presidency
should come up with a new nomination within eight days.
39. Given its election results, the SDP originally claimed the
position of chair of the Council of Ministers, preferably for the
SDP President
himself.
This was strongly opposed by the two HDZ parties and by the Serb parties,
because of the above-mentioned informal rotation rule. As the biggest
Croat parties, the two HDZs consider the post to be theirs by right.
They also claim two other ministerial posts.
40. The SDP, as a multi-ethnic party, then proposed a non-partisan
Croat professor from Mostar, Slavo Kukic. The HDZ proposed Borjana
Kristo, former Federation President and the NSRzB, another of the
Platform parties, proposed Mladen Ivankoviv Lijanovic. On 14 June
2011, the presidency examined these candidatures and decided to
send the nomination of Slavo Kukic to the House of Representatives
for confirmation. However, on 29 June, Mr Kukic’s nomination, although
it obtained a majority of 22 votes, was not confirmed, because the majority
needed to include one third of positive votes from Republika Srpska,
and it did not. According to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
in the second round of voting, it was required that votes from the
14 Republika Srpska delegates should not include two thirds or more
of votes against the nomination. On 14 July, the nomination of Mr
Kukic was thus finally rejected, as more than two thirds of Republika
Srpska delegates voted against.
41. According to the law on the Council of Ministers, the presidency
should have forwarded another nomination to the House of Representatives
within the next eight days. It did not, but instead wrote a letter
to the main political parties requesting them to nominate a candidate
who would have the support of at least 22 delegates in the House
of Representatives. To date, this has not happened.
42. The six main party leaders (SDP, SDA, HDZ, HDZ 1990, SNSD
and SDS) have held a number of meetings since then but no agreement
is in sight: Republika Srpska claims four ministries, including
foreign affairs,
the two HDZs insist on having the chair
and two other ministries, the SDP still wants at least the foreign
affairs ministry. There are battles also with regard to the distribution
of the positions of deputy minister: the platform parties at some
point agreed on the attribution of posts to the HDZs, including
the chair, but requested that at least one deputy minister be appointed
from the Croat platform parties. This was refused. The SDA suggested
taking into account not only the 19 positions in the Council of
Ministers, but more globally the 63 to 70 positions in all state
institutions and to distribute them according to the ethnic repartition
key provided by the 1991 census. This was rejected as well, because
the HDZs were claiming complete equality, namely a third of all
posts. In order to show some flexibility, Republika Srpska accepted
at some point that one of the ministers appointed from the territory
of Republika Srpska could be either a Bosniak or a Croat.
It would be too long to detail here all
the various proposals made. We consider that this kind of political
bargaining needs to stop and we call on all political stakeholders
to finally agree on a government that is professional and competent,
independently of the ethnic affiliation of its members. Unfortunately,
this seems to be wishful thinking for the time being.
4. Consequences of the absence
of a state-level government
43. We heard on a number of occasions during our visit
that the situation as regards government formation was no worse
than in Belgium, a member state of the European Union. But Belgium
is not Bosnia and Herzegovina and an agreement on government formation
was finally reached in Brussels on 1 December 2011. The political
establishment in Bosnia and Herzegovina should understand that the
constant bargaining over posts and the ethnic petty quarrelling
about almost everything is not conducive to further European integration.
44. We also do not agree with statements to the effect that Bosnia
and Herzegovina is a special country, with an institutional straitjacket
imposed on it by foreigners in Dayton after a long and bloody war,
and that it therefore deserves special treatment. In our view, the
Dayton straitjacket has been considerably tightened by the local
politicians themselves since the war, for example through the abuse
of the double qualified majority, called entity voting. This majority
applies to everything in parliamentary procedure: setting the agenda,
taking note of annual reports, tabling motions or elections, such
as the chair of the Council of Ministers. Nor has any attempt been
made to limit the use of the vital national interest to specific
issues that indeed affect the vital national interest of the three
main ethnic groups. Common institutions at state level are constantly
contested, criticised or systematically weakened, particularly by
Republika Srpska. As a state, Bosnia and Herzegovina functions with
a budget of only around €500 million
per
year, and 22 000 employees.
45. Acting chair Nikola Spiric has been quoted as saying he did
not understand the international community’s hysteria with regard
to government formation. In his view, the Council of Ministers is
not a real government anyway, ministers are political appointees,
and decisions are made elsewhere. There is, for example, no guarantee
that a draft law adopted by the Council of Ministers will also be
accepted by both houses of parliament.
46. We would agree with Mr Spiric that the Council of Ministers
is not a real government in the meaning we usually give to it and
we would welcome its strengthening, as recommended by the European
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) in 2005.
In the current institutional set-up however, the absence of a functioning
government has made itself felt already: parliament rejected the
presidency’s budget proposal for 2011 on 14 July 2011, again by
means of the entity voting. Republika Srpska wants the state budget
to be reduced and its delegates therefore voted against. The country
has been functioning on temporary financing since January 2011 and
can only pay the salaries of its employees and service its debts.
The Fiscal Council has still not agreed on the global fiscal balance
and policies for the period 2011-2013. Without this global fiscal framework,
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) will be unable to disburse
the second tranche of its standby agreement of €1.2 billion and
the European Union’s macro-financial assistance of around €100 million.
Bosnia and Herzegovina almost lost €96 million of already agreed
2011 Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) funds in September,
because Republika Srpska suddenly opposed €8 million worth of funds
to be spent on strengthening or creating state-level institutions,
such as a state register of companies.
47. Given the political stalemate, foreign direct investment was
only 65 million convertible marka (BAM)
(around
€32.5 million) in the first half of 2011, down almost 20% compared
with the first half of 2010. Unemployment continues to be shockingly
high, at 43% of the workforce. On 16 May 2011, Moody’s lowered the
country’s credit rating outlook from stable to negative. This will
lead to the downgrading of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s current credit
rating of B2.
48. For over a year now, the performance, both at state and entity
level, of government and parliaments has been poor: the best performing
parliament, the Republika Srpska National Assembly, adopted only
36 laws out of a planned 68. At state level, the parliamentary assembly
has adopted only 10 laws, amending existing legislation. This is
due to the fact that the caretaker Council of Ministers, although
it met regularly, did not forward bills to parliamentary procedure.
49. No progress has been made in addressing the European partnership
priorities such as the adoption of a law on state aid, a law on
census and the necessary adoption of amendments to the constitution
and election law to abide by the Sejdić and Finci judgment. The
Stabilisation and Association Agreement, albeit having been ratified
by all 27 European Union member states, has not been put into force
by the European Council, because Bosnia and Herzegovina would have
to be immediately suspended as it is in violation of the agreement,
notably on the three points mentioned above.
50. Most international partners of Bosnia and Herzegovina are
running short of patience, all the more so because there would appear
to be no way out of the current situation. Either one of the quarrelling
factions relents and realises that its maximalist demands and constant
obstruction to finding a solution risk making it completely irrelevant
in the future, or all of them come to a compromise, where everybody
needs to give and lose something. It should be noted in this regard
that snap elections are not possible under the current constitutional
and legal set-up.
5. Implementation of the Sejdić
and Finci judgment
51. Needless to say, the current political stalemate
has also impacted on the constitutional reform. The joint interim
committee of both houses of parliament was finally set up in early
October 2011, namely one full year without any work being done on
constitutional reform since the elections. It was given excessively
short deadlines: 30 November to propose constitutional amendments
and 31 December for amendments to the election law. The committee
held 10 meetings, listening, inter alia,
also to representatives of civil society and minorities but, on
1 December, it was officially announced that no consensus could
be reached for constitutional amendments.
52. The reason no consensus could be reached would appear to be
that views on both the scope and content of the amendments differ
widely and cannot be reconciled. Republika Srpska will only accept
minimal amendments and only those necessary to abide by the judgment.
For election to the presidency, Republika Srpska wishes to maintain
its system of direct election of the Serb member, whereas the Croat
parties want indirect elections by parliament for the Croat and
Bosniak member, in order to be sure that their candidate is elected.
Failing this, they call for a third entity so that Croats would
have their own electoral constituency. No agreement was found on
how to guarantee the right of “Others” to stand for the presidency.
On the other hand, a consensus seems to have emerged with regard
to the Council of Peoples: a number of “Others” would be added.
How this would function in practice is not clear, but the entity
constitutions foresee a similar solution.
53. We are perfectly aware that, in such a difficult political
climate, with an evident lack of trust and with repeated strident
calls for secession of one part of the country, even politicians
with the best intentions will have a hard time fulfilling the country’s
essential international obligations. But the options available are
scarce: either Bosnia and Herzegovina abides by the judgment of
the European Court of Human Rights or it will ultimately have to
leave the Council of Europe. Respect for the European Convention
on Human Rights is the primary condition for membership of the Council
of Europe and it would be unthinkable to have the next elections,
in 2014, conducted under the same discriminatory regime.
54. Mr Thorbjørn Jagland, Secretary General of the Council of
Europe, recently stated the following: “Some people say that Dayton
is a delicate power-sharing agreement which is the guarantor of
peace in BiH. They say that this consociational federalism is a
carefully balanced construction which cannot bear too much tinkering.
What does the 'Dayton Peace' require? It requires ethnic accommodation
in order to avoid any one group or 'constituent people' being able
to dominate the State level institutions. It requires Entity accommodation
in order to avoid any one Entity to be able to dominate State level
institutions or policies. These guarantees are completely compatible
with the requirements of the Sejdić and Finci judgment. The judgment was
a precedent for the enforcement of Protocol No. 12 and its general
prohibition of discrimination, it was a vindication for two persistent
gentlemen, and it may just save democracy also for Bosniaks, Serbs
and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Why? Because, it requires
the Constitution to recognise the primacy of the individual citizen
as the holder of rights and as the source of the sovereign power
'of the people'. This does not negate, deny or diminish the meaningfulness
of the ethnic community [of] which that citizen may be a member. It
does, however, mean that the existence of ethnic communities, even
those of 'constitutive' importance, may neither limit the participation
of non-members, nor limit an individual member’s right to multiple
identities. The implementation of this judgment is an invitation
to BiH to be a country which is more than just the sum of its parts.”
55. Just like Mr Jagland, we believe that the implementation of
the Sejdić and Finci ruling is just the first step forward towards
a truly European state which values both the individual citizen
and the specificities of the ethnic communities.
56. For our part, we cannot understand why a single president
of the country would be anathema to all three main ethnic groups,
while some even propose to add a fourth one to remove the discrimination
of “Others”. A tripartite member presidency, furthermore rotating
every eight months, is unheard of in the European Union member states.
It damages the country’s reputation and prevents it from playing
a role in international fora: Bosnia and Herzegovina is the only
country in the region (with Serbia) not to recognise Kosovo.
Bosnia
and Herzegovina, one of the United Nations Security Council's non-permanent
members, will also have to abstain in the United Nations Security
Council or vote against the Palestinian bid for full membership
because of a lack of consensus between the three presidency members.
57. We believe that the Dayton Constitution will ultimately need
to be completely rewritten. With hindsight, it was probably a mistake
to append a constitution to a peace treaty. The Dayton straitjacket
has been abused in the last sixteen years to a point where obstruction
and stagnation have become the norm and not the exception. Republika
Srpska’s repeated calls for a peaceful separation or secession are
a bluff that needs to be called. Both entities’ constitutions also
need to be revised (the Republika Srpska Constitution still provides for
the death penalty, for example, and the Federation Constitution
still mentions an entity ombudsman institution that no longer exists).
6. Conclusions
58. We would like to warn that the current crisis risks
having serious consequences not only for Bosnia and Herzegovina
itself, but also with regard to its membership of international
organisations. Let us recall that 2012 will mark tenyears
of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s membership of the Council of Europe.
59. On 24 April 2002, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Council of Europe
membership began full of hopes for a more secure life of democracy,
human rights and rule of law for the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and brought with it the promise of further European integration
towards the European Union and NATO. We regret to say that, as a
member state of the Council of Europe, despite some progress, Bosnia
and Herzegovina has not lived up to the Organisation’s expectations
and has not sufficiently used its membership to learn from the experiences
and best practices of other members. Due to the ongoing disagreement
over the ethnic distribution of posts, including in international
organisations, the presidency still has to appoint or nominate candidates
for fundamental positions in the Council of Europe, such as the
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), the Venice Commission,
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), in the
bodies of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities and others. The judge (a Serb) sitting on the European
Court of Human Rights on behalf of Bosnia and Herzegovina also resigned
recently, well before the end of her term (May 2013). The Bosnia
and Herzegovina Delegation to the Assembly, which was finally appointed,
at least partly, in time for the Assembly's June 2011 part-session,
has still not elected its chair.
60. We therefore call on the presidency to finally take the necessary
steps to make the nominations to Council of Europe bodies and we
will make other recommendations to the authorities in the appended
draft resolution.