1. Introduction
1. In April 2007, the Assembly
held a first debate on the state of human rights and democracy in
Europe. This was a landmark event in the ongoing efforts of the
Assembly to consider the significance and development of the application
of the fundamental values upheld by the Council of Europe, and of
the challenges faced in the 21st century.
2. Subsequently, the Assembly decided to hold such debates on
a biennial basis: in 2008, the focus was on “Specific challenges
facing European democracies: the case of diversity and migration”,
while the 2010 debate dealt with “Democracy in Europe: crisis and
perspectives”.
3. Over the past two years, it has become increasingly clear
that the current global financial and economic crisis not only has
an effect on economies and people’s daily lives, but also – and
this is of great concern – has a serious adverse impact on the functioning
of democratic institutions and dramatically undermines public trust in
them, revealing the limits of States’ capacities to counter, let
alone prevent, such crises. It thus entails a systemic threat to
the sustainability of democracy as such.
4. This is why I tabled two motions, one on “How much and what
kind of State is needed in a democratic and just society?” and the
other on “The erosion of confidence in democracy and possible responses”,
which the committee decided to deal with jointly in a single report
on “The crisis of democracy and the role of the State in today’s
Europe”.
5. In the framework of preparation of this report, the committee
held two hearings. The first took place in Paris on 15 November
2011 with the participation of: Dr Felix Roth, Research Fellow,
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels, and Dr Petra
Dobner, Professor of Political Science, expert on governance, Institute
of Political Science at the University of Hamburg. The second took
place in Paris on 14 March 2012 with Dr Theo Schiller, Professor
of Political Science, Institute of Political Science at Philipps-Universität Marburg,
Dr Martin Schaffner, Professor emeritus, History Department of the
University of Basel, and Mr Adam Krzemiński, Editor of the news
magazine Polityka (Poland).
I wish to thank these experts for their input in the committee’s
debate.
6. I am particularly grateful to Professor Schiller, who took
part in the second hearing and provided a much-appreciated written
contribution on which the present report has been based.
7. I also wish to thank our colleague Luca Volontè for tabling
a motion for a resolution on “The impact of global financial power
on democracies” (
Doc. 12859), which adds further considerations relating to the
dangers that global financial networks entail for the stability
of nation States and governments.
8. The three main purposes of the report are:
- to illustrate how much legitimacy
and strength our traditional democracies have lost since Europe
was struck by deep financial crisis. Indeed, people in several European
States have today lost a great part of their “popular sovereignty”
– the only source of legitimate political power since our democracy
was first conceptualised by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose 300th birthday
is being commemorated this summer;
- to explore how democracy might be strengthened again,
how the primary role of politics could be restored and whether this
popular sovereignty should not be constituted instead at transnational
level in order to gain more respect from those with economic power;
- to show that strong democracies need sound States and
that States can only be sound when their powers are controlled by
citizens. One of the reasons why our democracies have become so
weak is that, for far too long, the importance of building sound
States to protect people and act in their general interest has been
overlooked.
9. This report should be seen as part of our ongoing efforts
mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 above and as a continuation of the
analysis of the problems of contemporary democracy that we started
in previous reports on “The state of human rights and democracy
in Europe” (2007),
“The state of democracy in Europe. Specific
challenges facing European democracies: the case of diversity and
migration” (2008)
and “Democracy in Europe: crisis
and perspectives” (2010).
In addition, a brief summary of
the previous reports is included in section 2 below.
2. Summary of previous debates on the
state of democracy in Europe
10. We have all agreed that it
is impossible to identify a perfect model of democracy. While there
is general consensus on the main principles of democracy, there
is no agreement on a single perfect way of implementing them. There
are too many variables, including geography, history, tradition,
culture, the state of development of the country, the way in which
values and beliefs have shaped democracy and the way in which democracy has
come about.
11. There is no single democracy amongst our member States which
has been spared by the crisis. The paradox of today’s democracies
is that, although never before have so many people lived in democracies, never
before have so many people been disappointed with the quality of
the democracy they live in and experience on a daily basis. I regard
this as a crisis situation in our contemporary democracies necessitating greater
understanding and more action, with a view to investigating every
means of strengthening, developing and improving our democracies.
12. Democracy also offers real promise in terms of fair distribution
of life chances and opportunities for all. The way in which democracy
is exercised at present does not allow it to deliver on these promises.
This is one of the main reasons why so many citizens in today’s
Europe are turning their backs on institutionalised politics by
not taking part in elections or, if they do vote, by showing populist,
nationalistic and even xenophobic tendencies, a phenomenon we have
witnessed in every part of Europe, eastern, central and western.
13. As a result of the imbalance of power between economics and
democracy, important decisions are increasingly being taken outside
parliaments and outside the democratic process as a whole. More
and more decisions, on the other hand, are being prompted by non-democratic
holders of power and decision-making authority. People have doubts
about democracy because they feel unable to influence the political
decision-making process on issues of the utmost importance to their
daily lives.
14. Furthermore, if we want to overcome the crisis of democracy
we must give thought to how to stop identifying democracy with mere
representation and how to build democracy at transnational level,
including the level of the European Union. At the same time, when
it comes to enriching representative democracy with elements of
direct democracy, we have seen some examples showing us how to design
such processes in such a way that majorities can never call into
question the fundamental rights of minorities.
15. The virtual impossibility of putting forward an ideal model
of democracy and the fact that democracy is an ongoing and never-ending
process make it even more important to draw up criteria for evaluating
the state of democracy. In my 2007 report in particular, I proposed
the establishment of sets of criteria which could be used to classify
and improve four different stages of democracy: basic, developed,
stable and strong.
16. I also proposed, for the purpose of evaluating the quality
of democracy, a definition of its five constituent dimensions, and
the three levels at which the validity of these principles was to
be tested: the micro-level of the individual citizen, the medium-level
of social groups and political organisations, and the macro-level
of governmental institutions and governance. This allowed specific
achievements and shortcomings of democracies in Europe to be assessed
and the four stages of democracy, identified on the basis of the
sets of criteria, to be defined as the basis for more effective
programmes and efforts to make our democracies more democratic.
17. In my 2008 report, I further developed my arguments, considering
as well another context, that of one of the most important challenges
that our democratic systems face at present, namely the considerable
increase in migration. Indeed, the standards and stages of democratic
systems that I identified in the 2007 report were viewed in the
light of practice and experience in our countries in my 2008 report.
In the latter report, I put forward, in particular, an improved
table for the purpose of evaluating the quality of democracy in
our countries, adding another two constituent dimensions: diversity
and integration, and culture of citizenship. This resulted in 21
fields in which the substance of the respective principles was outlined
for each level, for example “freedom of association” and “protection
of minorities” as the expression of the first principle (“fundamental
human rights”) for all parties at the medium-level, that is groups
and organisations.
18. As the 2008 debate focused on the diversity and migration
issue as one of the challenges currently facing European democracy,
the report demonstrated the extent to which migrants, who make up
a large proportion of our societies, may enjoy the rights deriving
from the requirements (criteria) for basic democracy (the first
of the four stages of democracy that I described). This question
is also linked to the assessment of the quality of democracy in
our countries, as it implies representation and participation in
the political decision-making process. As our societies will continue
to diversify as they modernise, we will, if we turn a blind eye
to this process and do not endeavour to include the large groups
of migrants and people of migrant origin in our democratic systems,
jeopardise the very principle and future of democracy in our countries.
19. The 2010 debate took place against a background of global
economic crisis accentuating the symptoms of a crisis of democracy,
including the lack of necessary regulation and control of financial
interests and the growing public disinterest in the existing institutionalised
procedures of democracy. The report was intended to verify the relevance
of the quality of democratic criteria in the light of the new situation,
and to present the prospects for the “democratisation of democracy”.
20. The 2010 report took stock of developments in various parts
of Europe, including a number of central and eastern European countries
where some worrying signs of “democratic fatigue” were perceptible
20 years after the fall of their regimes, and some western European
countries where the limitations and shortcomings of applying direct
democracy and the dangers of unlimited collection of personal data
were emerging.
21. The 2010 report concluded that the crisis in representation
required a different approach to the political relationship between
society and the authorities, in addition to the traditional forms
of mandate and delegation. Without questioning representative democracy,
it argued that representation could no longer be the only expression
of democracy. Democracy needed to be developed beyond representation,
through the introduction of more sustained forms of interaction
between people and the authorities in order to include direct democratic elements
in the decision-making process. Participatory democracy should be
enhanced as a process in which all persons, not just nationals,
are involved in the conduct of public affairs at local, regional
and national levels.
22. Democracy should be understood not just as a system or as
the sum of individual rights, but as a form of society which requires
rules for social justice and redistribution and implies not only
delegating and taking decisions, but also discussing issues and
living together in dignity, respect and solidarity. The renewal
of politics also requires the development of a new culture of political
responsibility, to be considered in terms of responsiveness and
accountability, as well as transparency, on the part of those who
govern.
23. The right to participate in the conduct of public affairs,
be it at local, regional or national level, is a human right and
a fundamental political freedom and should therefore be embodied
as such in the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5).
24. The 2010 report also called for the humanisation and democratisation
of the process of globalisation. The Council of Europe’s contribution
could entail the development, along with other players, of guidelines
to regulate globalisation in a way that fully respects human rights,
including social rights, ecological imperatives and the rule of
law.
25. The three reports end with a number of proposals for overcoming
democratic deficits in Europe. The 2007 report suggested measures
to extend and enlarge rights of participation: the participatory
rights of the citizens of Europe should no longer be linked to citizenship,
but to length of residence, and they should be extended through
forms of participatory democracy. The 2008 report presented possible
measures to increase and encourage the participation of migrants
in political life and to remedy the situation in countries where
a large part of the population was excluded from the democratic
process, the main ones being naturalisation and the granting of
political rights to non-citizens. The 2010 report called for the
establishment of participatory and deliberative structures open
to all who live in the country, the strengthening of independent
supervisory institutions so as to enhance political responsibility
and accountability, and the consolidation of the Council of Europe’s
democracy pillar through, inter alia,
the setting up of a Strasbourg World Forum for Democracy.
3. Perceptions
of the ongoing crisis of democracy
26. Democracy was at the centre
of European public debate in 2011. Those who focused on the “Arab Spring”
were delighted by several strong peoples’ movements for freedom,
democracy and the respect of human rights and dignity in regions
where many Europeans would not have expected them. The director
of the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo,
Gamad Abdel Gawad Soltan, compared this with what happened in 1848
in Europe: “It was at that time in Europe that peoples became politicised
and started to play a role in politics, paving the way for great
change. That is what is now happening in the Arab world. Thanks
to modern technologies, mobilisation opportunities today are greater
and more efficient. That is why things are moving faster in the
21st century than they did in the 19th, and why the change will
not take as long as it did back then in Europe”.
Early in 2012, at a public debate
in St Paul’s Church in Frankfurt, which had hosted the first German
parliamentary assembly in 1848, Soltan said that, for him, 2011
was clearly “the year of democracy”.
27. Those European democrats who focused on Europe itself were
less happy. The well-known German philosopher Jürgen Habermas wrote
an appeal to all Europeans headed “Save the dignity of democracy”.
He opposed the transfer of budgetary powers from national parliaments
to an unelected European body and the European Council (Heads of
State), saying that: “A democratic Europe must look different.”
28. Another famous philosopher, Indian economist and Nobel Prize
winner Amartya Sen, also reminded his readers that “It isn’t just
the Euro. Europe’s democracy itself is at stake”.
29. Sen’s thoughts and conclusions are remarkable:
“Europe
has led the world in the practice of democracy. It is therefore
worrying that the dangers to democratic governance today, coming
through the back door of financial priority, are not receiving the attention
they should. There are profound issues to be faced about how Europe’s
democratic governance could be undermined by the hugely heightened
role of financial institutions and rating agencies...
Two distinct issues need to
be separated. The first concerns the place of democratic priorities, including...
the need for ‘governance by discussion’. Suppose we accept that
the powerful financial bosses have a realistic understanding of
what needs to be done. This would strengthen the case for paying
attention to their voices in a democratic dialogue. But that is
not the same thing as allowing the international financial institutions
and rating agencies the unilateral power to command democratically elected
governments.
Second, it is quite hard to
see that the sacrifices that the financial commanders have been
demanding from precarious countries would deliver the ultimate viability
of these countries … The diagnosis of economic problems by rating
agencies is not the voice of verity that they pretend. …
Since much of Europe is now
engaged in achieving the quick reduction of public deficits through
drastic reduction of public expenditure, it is crucial to realistically
scrutinise what the likely impact of the chosen policies may be,
both on people and the generating of public revenue through economic
growth. The high morals of ‘sacrifice’ do, of course, have an intoxicating
effect. …
In addition to a bigger political
vision, there is a need for clearer economic thinking. …
The fear of a threat to democracy
does not, of course, apply to Britain, since these policies have
been chosen by a government empowered by democratic elections. …
How did some of the euro countries
get into this mess? The oddity of going for a united currency without more
political and economic integration has certainly played a part,
even after taking note of financial transgressions that have undoubtedly
been committed in the past by countries such as Greece or Portugal
(and even after noting Mario Monti’s important point that a culture
of ‘excessive deference’ in the European Union has allowed these
transgressions to go unchecked). …
Rearranging the eurozone now
would pose many problems, but difficult issues have to be intelligently discussed,
rather than allowing Europe to drift in financial winds fed by narrow-minded
thinking with a terrible track record. The process has to begin
with some immediate restraint of the unopposed power of rating agencies
to issue unilateral commands. These agencies are hard to discipline
despite their abysmal record, but a well-reflected voice of legitimate
governments can make a big difference to financial confidence while
solutions are worked out. … Stopping the marginalisation of the
democratic tradition of Europe has an urgency that is hard to exaggerate.
European democracy is important for Europe – and for the world.”
30. Sen’s analysis was taken further by an article in the Neue
Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ), in the light of a report issued by the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), under a headline
that was a statement rather than a question: “Democracy as a victim
of the crisis. Growing sympathies for alternative political systems
in the east European EU member States”.
The
EBRD report shows that the “mood turned further against democracy
and the market in advanced transformation States (like Slovakia,
Slovenia, Romania, Latvia and Lithuania) because these countries
were hit after 2006 by steeper economic downturns than during previous
recessions in the early and mid-1990s”.
31. This raises some fundamental issues addressed in several articles
by German sociologist Wolfgang Streeck, Director of the Max Planck
Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne.
32. Last autumn he wrote: “In the years immediately after the
Second World War there was a widely shared assumption that for capitalism
to be compatible with democracy, it would have to be subjected to
extensive political control … in order to protect democracy itself
from being restrained in the name of free markets.”
33. This assumption is no more. After experiencing market forces
without any kind of political containment, many people are looking
for a new balance. But there is no consensus as to how such a balance
can be struck and what it should look like.
34. At the end of his article Streeck writes: “More than ever,
economic power seems today to have become political power, while
citizens appear to be almost entirely stripped of their democratic
defences and their capacity to impress upon the political economy
interests and demands that are incommensurable with those of capital
owners. In fact, looking back at the democratic-capitalist crises
sequence since the 1970s, there seems a real possibility of a new,
if temporary, settlement of social conflict in advanced capitalism,
this time entirely in favour of the propertied classes now firmly
entrenched in their politically unassailable stronghold, the international
financial industry.”
35. The French newspaper
Le Monde has
reported that the powerful democratic protest against the devastating
social effects of the financial crisis in Spain stems from people’s
disappointment with the existing democratic system: “The lesson
of the Indignados: the same feeling unites them, that of not being
heard by politicians, of being kept out of a system that has become
deaf and blind to the concerns of citizens 'on the street'.”
36. German political scientist Hans Vorländer has the impression
that European politics is a kind of “game that citizens can’t play”.
He summed up a major article in the following terms: “The legitimacy
of democracy is existentially endangered, because it is founded
on more than just proper implementation of decisions. A democratic
order can be regarded as legitimate only if citizens have the impression
and belief that they can play an adequate part in democratic life
and that good and fair political decisions are made. This is not
the case at present.”
37. Hardly anybody challenges the hypothesis that democracy is
in crisis today. It is not the need for democracy – as the way of
organising public affairs for the people’s greatest benefit – which
is cast into doubt. The problem of today’s democratically organised
States is not the normative power of democracy. The problem is that
in their actual day-to-day existence today’s democracies find it
very difficult to deliver what most people expect of them.
38. Peter Wilby wrote in
The Guardian:
“The unravelling of the euro is not just an economic and financial crisis,
it is also a crisis of democracy. The peoples of Europe are losing
the capacity to determine their own futures. From Antwerp to Athens,
they are told that there is no alternative.”
39. “Democracy is rubbish” was the title of an article by one
of the chief editors of a leading daily newspaper in Germany, which
has since been quoted often. Frank Schirrmacher wrote the article
last autumn, after the announcement by Georgios Papandreou that
a referendum would take place in Greece about the country’s future
membership of the euro: “Anyone who asks the people becomes a threat
to Europe. That’s the message of the markets, and for the past day
it has also become that of politics. The currency of ‘republicanism’
is collapsing. … We are watching the dramatic degeneration of those
values and convictions that once seemed to be embodied in the idea
of Europe. … It is becoming ever clearer that what Europe is going
through at the moment is not just an episode, but a power struggle
between the primacy of economics and the primacy of politics.”
40. The nation State has a limited capacity to cope with problems
that lie beyond its control. It is “too small for the big things”.
National
sovereignty is too weak to produce strong transnational institutions
which are capable of “mediating conflicting political interests
across nations”.
That is why we need transnational democracy
to create the strong legitimacy which the new transnational institutions
need to intervene in the markets in order to defend the general
interest and the public good.
3.1. The
concept of democracy in this report and its different dimensions
41. “Democracy” belongs to the
most “essentially contested concepts” of our time,
although
nobody challenges its universal importance in order to organise
polities “in a reasonable way”.
The
intensity of the contest around the substance and scope of the concept,
not least in our Assembly, can be explained by at least three aspects:
the concept is in normative terms almost overloaded or overburdened;
this “normative load” is very different historically, culturally
and regionally, there being no universal consent on its own fundamentals; and
these different priorities and burdens are realised in different
forms (polities).
This is why the “crisis of democracy”
is also seen and perceived in many different ways.
42. Following in the footsteps of Thomas Christiano, two German
political scientists, Ingo Take and Dirk Jörke of the University
of Greifswald, take democracy to mean political equality: “Political
equality is the core of the idea of democracy and means an equal
participation of all citizens in the political decision-making process”.
Although
citizens are not all equally powerful and may use different sources
of influence, every citizen in any democratic election or referendum
has only one vote. This fundamental equality in the democratic polity
is in danger if global and supranational power structures undermine
it. This is why British political scientist Colin Crouch coined
the term “post-democracy” to characterise today’s European democracies.
German philosopher Jürgen Habermas called for a new reconciliation
between the idea of democracy and what he calls the “post-national
constellation” of our time. Habermas can clearly see what this reconciliation
entails: he thinks that the European Union needs a real constitution,
which has to be accepted by a majority of European citizens and
by the European member States.
43. Others, such as Andrew Moravcsik, deny that there are “democratic
deficits” in the European Union context. He says that States are
still the “masters of the treaties”, and that those “masters” are
the winners of democratic national elections. Others, amongst them
David Held, Daniele Archibugi and Otfried Höffe, do not deny the
deficits of the traditional structures of today’s global and European
governance, and are endeavouring to develop some kind of strategy
intended to transform the democratic polities of the nation State
at a transnational level, in order to build a kind of multi-level
“cosmopolitan democracy”.
44. A third group, while not denying the democratic deficits of
today’s global and transnational governance, tries to overcome these
shortcomings through a new definition of the concept of democracy.
Its members try to “transform” the concept of democracy by including
– for the transnational level – international NGOs (INGOs) such
as Amnesty International, Greenpeace and Human Rights Watch instead
of citizens, and giving them a role in global institutions.
45. Another kind of transformation and adaption of democracy to
the transnationalisation and globalisation of politics is proposed
by those who – with John S. Dryzek
–
argue that deliberations can produce the legitimacy needed by democratic
politics and hitherto provided by democratically elected national representative
institutions. They all subscribe to Jürgen Habermas’ well-known
view that “democratic procedures gain legitimising power not just
through participation but also through the general openness to all of
the deliberative process which fosters the reasonable outcomes so
keenly expected by all”.
46. At any event, there seems to be broad agreement about at least
some of the basic elements of democracy:
- freedom and equality as fundamental human rights;
- popular sovereignty (government and government policies
dependent on the will of the people);
- a set of political institutions whereby governmental decision-making
depends on the will of the people, particularly a system of political
representation by regularly elected parliaments; political parties constitute
a core element of representation as they actively transform political
preferences and interests into governmental programmes and provide
candidates for the offices responsible for carrying them out. Possible
additional institutions include presidents, constitutional courts,
etc., and there are as well, of course, the elements of direct democracy,
such as forms of legislative initiative and referendum;
- an informal pattern of civil society initiatives, groups
and organisations (pluralism) which formulate, aggregate and express
a wide range of preferences, wishes and interests of the people
and fuel public deliberations on the problems and issues of everyday
life.
47. My earlier reports on the state of democracy in Europe presented
a more specific concept of fundamental value dimensions of democracy
which can help to analyse the forms, qualities and problems of democratic
orders (see table in the Appendix).
These
must not be understood as absolute values but rather as minimum
standards which make it possible to define democracies’ degrees
of quality and also to identify more clearly specific deficiencies
of democratic systems.
48. And we should never forget that democracy is an ongoing, never-ending
process. Wherever the starting point is, this process will never
lead to a perfect democratic system. Democracy can also be understood
as a set
of more than a hundred essential
components, each in a dynamic and, it is to be hoped, progressive movement.
But some of them might also shift to a regressive dynamic and thus
contribute to a loss of democracy and a decline in its quality.
49. Instead of focusing on a static or idealised concept of democracy,
I would like to take a look at Dr Martin Schaffner’s efforts to
conceptualise it during our committee’s hearing in Paris:
“I argue
for a conceptualisation of democracy which stresses the dynamics
inherent in democratic political systems, i.e. their capacity to
adapt themselves to the changing conditions of history (as for example
in France in the transition from the political system of the Fourth
to the Fifth Republic). We should focus on the change which democracies
are undergoing, their change in the past, and the change through
which they will be transformed in the future.
The best evidence of the dynamics
in question are the three basic transformations democracy went through
in the course of its history. First, it
grew out of a purely local into a national institution (as in North
America). Secondly, it evolved to include all male citizens irrespective
of their wealth or class (as in France and Switzerland in the first
half of the 19th century). Thirdly, in another decisive step, democracy
enhanced its legitimacy as well as its functional capacity, when
women succeeded in obtaining the right to vote during the first
decades of the 20th century.
To think about democracy as
a dynamic system links it to the historical processes shaping the
various forms of democracy. This has three major advantages. First,
it broadens our perspective so as to take into account the variety
of democratic systems that, for historical reasons, coexisted in
Europe in the past and still do so in the present. There are good
reasons to maintain, that local and national traditions matter a
lot for whoever aims at further developing democracy in Europe.
Secondly, it enables us to base our judgment on the actual state
of democracy by distinguishing between “more” and “less” democratic systems
(as Amartya Sen writing about justice recently recommended us to
do). It is
the relative achievements of democracies that count, their degree
of respect for the will of their citizens by providing just and
efficient political participation.”
50. A short list of such essentials of democracy will suffice
here. For illustrative purposes, I shall also mention some of the
deficiencies which, in the current crisis, strongly endanger democratic
values:
- basic human rights
and fundamental freedoms, the complement of a limited State, the
rule of law as an institutional and judicial guarantee;
- political equality means at least universal suffrage and
other opportunities for equal participation;
- openness of the structures of political power, including
the separation of powers, opportunities to form organisations and
political parties, fair competition offering a chance to gain governmental
power;
- diversity and integration imply the protection of minorities
and reduction of social inequalities;
- transparency and public deliberation require independent
sources of information and an informed understanding of issues;
- effective governance needs resources, governance capacities
and substantial output of public goods;
- civic culture includes a sense of democratic community,
support for institutions and citizens’ motivation to participate
in political life in many ways. Optimum quality of these values
corresponds closely to a “strong democracy” as defined by Benjamin
Barber.
51. The current critical situation of European democracies can
be illustrated by some major deficiencies and threats which affect
one or more of the basic values mentioned.
52. Human rights and the rule of law are still not guaranteed
in several countries. A concentration of power in the hands of the
executive and a weakening of the position of parliaments both puts
at risk the separation of powers which is the cornerstone of an
open political power structure and increases authoritarian tendencies. This
process also reflects the growing domination of the global financial
industry. The lack of resources in States overburdened by sovereign
debt seriously endangers the effectiveness of State governance and undermines
social integration and output legitimacy.
53. Populist parties have grown stronger in several countries,
including Austria, Belgium, France, Hungary and the Netherlands,
and represent a latent threat in other States. Their confrontation
with migrant, Islamic or other minority groups and/or stance against
European integration gives nationalistic isolation the upper hand over
transnational co-operation, social disintegration over diversity
and an irrational simplification of social and political complexity
over reasonable public deliberation.
54. Political equality is being reduced by social and political
exclusion and decreasingly effective representation. Forms of more
active participation are under attack for implying bias against
groups in less powerful positions in society. Technocratic patterns
of decision-making and concentrated media structures are thwarting
the transparency principle. Many factors are at work against a civic
culture of participation and confidence in institutions. A dominant
position for executive authority combined with weak governance capacities
undermines political efficacy, motivation to participate and the
sense of “republican community”.
4. Main
developments since 2010: democracies and States in deeper crisis
55. Before 2010, signs of crisis
in Europe’s financial and economic systems and democracies could
already be clearly observed. Since 2010, the crisis has brought
European countries up against even greater challenges, the various
elements of which not only represent severe dangers to the basic
values and institutional stability of democratic systems, but are
also strongly interlinked with structural weaknesses of the State
and reveal a problematic shift in the relationship between economic
forces and democratic politics. The underlying problems of the functions
and capacities of the State should therefore play a major role in
this analysis of the state of democracy in 2012. Although not all
European countries have been affected by these problems to the same
degree, there is no doubt that all countries are subject to a similar
trend in terms of those critical factors which tend to weaken States
and democracy.
56. Democracy has experienced extreme forms of crisis in three
countries of Europe: in Iceland, Hungary and Greece governments
have suffered from a dramatic breakdown in citizens’ political trust.
In Iceland, in 2008, the banking system – the key branch of the
economy – broke down after the demise of Lehman Brothers in New
York, making the nationalisation of banks necessary; an election
swept the opposition parties into office. In Hungary, an excessive
budget deficit and public disappointment about planned cuts caused
political uproar, a citizen-initiated referendum and, in 2010, a
landslide victory for the Fidesz opposition, which even gained a qualified
majority for constitutional amendments. Greece has for several years
been facing a most serious and dramatic crisis, caused by an extremely
high level of budget deficit and sovereign debt, and the country
has subsequently been fighting to remain inside the euro currency
system while being saved from insolvency by the European Union,
eurozone member States and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Whilst the two main parties had been competing for power for decades
in systems based on patronage and used to spend public money irresponsibly,
their turnaround, under external pressure, towards heavy budget
cuts led to a total polarisation of Greek political forces, a non-partisan
government and, in May 2012, election results which have prevented
the formation of a government. In all these cases, a substantial
crisis of democracy can be identified.
57. Several other countries came under similar kinds of pressure
and had to take serious decisions in order to avoid the disastrous
economic consequences of failing financial institutions or of exhausted
State funds. In Ireland, the 2008 banking crisis was followed swiftly
by an election which changed the governing majority. In Italy, the
Berlusconi government’s majority more or less imploded in 2011 and
was replaced by a “government of experts” led by Mario Monti. In
Portugal and Spain, also in 2011, government majorities, under severe pressure
because of State debts, structural budget cuts and the need to remain
in the euro system, have been replaced by opposition parties in
elections which formally seemed to follow a “normal” pattern. In
the Netherlands, in spring 2012, a minority government (Rutte) was
deprived of parliamentary support by Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom
when it objected to a budget stabilisation policy. In the Slovak
Republic, the government lost its majority for supporting euro stabilisation
policies and was ousted in the ensuing election. In Slovenia this
year, major cutbacks in welfare programmes have been challenged
by popular referenda and also led to new elections, the results
of which have made the formation of new government coalitions very complicated.
58. Some of these electoral changes seemed to follow “normal”
party competition patterns, as in Portugal or Spain, and others
have been influenced by additional factors such as corruption scandals
(Slovak Republic). Related policy decisions on budgetary cuts in
many eurozone countries have been forced by external players in
exchange for support for euro stabilisation (protective “umbrellas”),
so under restricted conditions in terms of democratic decision-making.
They have, generally speaking, very much been driven by financial
and economic crisis pressure and reflect the weaknesses of State
structures in these countries.
59. These developments show that, during the period of financial
and economic crisis, democracies in many countries have come under
severe pressure. Yet, at the same time, the functions, structures
and resources of the State have displayed serious weaknesses. It
therefore seems necessary to take a closer look at difficulties in
terms of State effectiveness where these are relevant to the problems
of democracy. As States are losing their capacity to solve economic
and social problems and influence the development of society, democratic decision-making
cannot offer alternative options to citizens and representative
office-holders.
60. Is this the expression of a “deep crisis of democracy”, or
even more of “a systematic crisis of democracy”, or how can the
present state of democracy best be described?
61. In order to answer these questions, it helps to remember an
essential functional aspect of democracy:
“Democracy
must organise mediation through politics” (to quote Pierre Hassner).
The French author stresses that
democracies are designed to mediate in conflicts that arise out
of and/or between free citizens, social antagonisms and competing
claims for power. Democratic mediation entails conflict resolution
by political means, through law and on the basis of an overall consensus
that excludes violence and civil war. In doing so, it relies on
and strengthens the legal equality of citizens (however much they
may vary in social status or economic wealth). To put the mediating
function of democracy at the centre of the analysis is important because
it provides us with a tool to evaluate the performance of democracies,
that is to say their success or failure to mediate between conflicting
interests, whether they be economic, political or cultural.
62. Does this mean that we are witnessing more than just a crisis
of democracy, perhaps its “death” (John Keane),
its “failure” or its “erosion”?
63. The presidential elections in Russia and France have provided
evidence that democracy is very much alive in those countries, as
in many others, even if it is not perfect and may need much improvement.
It is worth looking back just a few decades and remembering what
elections were like in the Soviet Union or in Third Republic France,
where women did not have the right to vote. Comparing the present
day to those times, even the most sceptical observer must acknowledge
that there is now “more democracy”.
64. Where “failure” of democracy is concerned, there is no doubt
that democracies can and do fail, even in Europe, by not carrying
out their mediating function successfully, as happened in Germany
after the First World War. But there are obvious examples of successful
democratic governments in Europe after the Second World War and
after the end of the Cold War, and these disprove the diagnosis
of failure. If we adopt a longer-term view, rather than limiting
our perspective to the present, there is no reason to declare a
“failure” of democracy in Europe.
65. It is true that the history of democracy in Europe cannot
be recounted as a story of pure progress, as it is one full of setbacks,
some of which had catastrophic consequences, but there is a case
for arguing that democracy has been a success story in 19th and
20th century Europe.
66. Where an “erosion” of democracy is concerned, the word “erosion”
suggests a steady decline of democracy in Europe. Perhaps it is
the polysemic vagueness of the metaphor that makes it attractive
to some commentators. But anyone who uses it should ask him or herself
what model of democracy is being used as a basis for his or her
judgment. Moreover, what precisely is meant to be eroding? Is it
the mediating capacity of democracy? Or citizens’ faith in democratic
values and procedures?
67. Nevertheless, we should take seriously the concept of the
“erosion of democracy”, because behind it seems to lurk another,
equally pessimistic, judgment, the notion that the modern State
and its sovereign power, that is to say its capacity to deal with
the challenges of the globalisation of markets and communications,
are being “eroded”.
4.1. The
three main challenges facing all European democracies today
68. The first is citizens’ diminishing
trust in political parties, organisations that were crucial to the
introduction of democracy in mid-19th century Europe and have been
vital to its functioning ever since. They provided fora for political
debate, encouraged political socialisation, served as reservoirs
of talent leading to political careers, etc. In the last few decades,
however, they have been falling into disrepute, as is clear from
the rise of populist movements in nearly all European countries.
Whereas it is in their parties that citizens in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and
even Morocco place their political hopes, there is a tendency among
European citizens to turn away from political parties. This is more
of a problem than it seems at first sight, for, without intermediary
institutions, democracies in countries whose population comes increasingly
from a wide range of social, religious and cultural backgrounds
will not be able to mediate between opposing interests or rivalries
in the fight for political power. In other words, without a fabric
of political associations or networks, the system of checks and
balances which European democracies have established in the course
of their long history cannot work properly.
69. The second challenge is the migration of millions of people
within or into Europe. Their political and legal status is a question
of utmost importance for the future of democracies in Europe. The
granting of citizenship is an act of social recognition, whereas
the exclusion of immigrants, even those from second and third generations,
from political participation severely impedes democracies’ mediating
capacity. Growing social tensions over religious issues between
the established electorate and groups of immigrants in many European countries
are a sign of this.
70. The third challenge is the need to consider the nation State’s
limited capacity to cope with problems beyond its control. There
is no need to list all the problems arising: protection of the environment,
regulation of financial markets, security issues, conflict management,
and so on. Solutions to these problems require both a strong State
and new forms of transnational democracy. The two requirements are
linked, since it is unlikely, in Europe, that a strong State and
efficient transnational government will succeed unless they have
democratic legitimacy. Such is the heritage of the long and complicated
history of democracy in Europe since the French Revolution. The
challenge is thus to create and implement institutional means of
mediating between conflicting political interests, not within nations,
but across borders.
71. Even eminent French historian and philosopher Pierre Rosanvallon
drew conclusions from the two rounds of the French presidential
election in May 2012 reflecting the extent to which democracy itself
is central to the changes undergone by our societies. Rosanvallon
observed “a confusion of the idea of democracy with the omnipotence
of the majority in power”.
He stressed that “a really democratic
republic is one which has not only universal suffrage, but also
impartial institutions, an independent justice system, opposition
forces”. Rosanvallon comes back to his old hypothesis that there
is still a “crisis of political representation”: “There is genuine
difficulty bringing social realities into the public debate. Ultimately,
being represented means having the feeling that the political world
puts into words what people actually experience.”
72. But citizens’ expectations of democracy also change. Rosanvallon
observed that “citizens today want to get involved. It is no longer
enough for them to be passive observers … Every citizen wants to
be respected, wants to have his or her say, and no longer has any
intention of giving a blank cheque to a representative who would
work for his or her benefit”.
73. Populism, for Rosanvallon, is the current expression of the
“pathologies of democracy”. Its common ingredient is a “culture
of rejection based on a kind of social protectionism … It offers
as solutions national borders, stigmatisation of immigrants and
an anti-system policy whereby elites and immigrants are the scapegoats
for every one of society’s ills”. Essentially, the only way to combat
populism, in Rosanvallon’s view, is “to work to solve the social
question and to create a new framework for democratic life”.
5. Strong
democracy and the State that it needs
74. A strong democracy requires
various fundamental elements: adequate institutional arrangements;
a basis in a civic political culture and a State structure which
corresponds to democratic features. A strong democracy can contribute
a great deal to the input going into the political process and to
the resulting input legitimacy. A stable and dynamic democracy,
however, also needs to bring about political outputs, namely to deliver
goods and serve social needs, making politics a meaningful process
and potentially leading to “output legitimacy”.
The process
of transforming political goals into governmental decisions, policy
programmes and implementation depends to a large degree on the State
apparatus and its specific resources, such as finances, laws, regulatory
power and administrative capacities. If the State is weak, democratic
performance cannot be strong.
75. In this report, when referring to a State which has a strong
democracy, we will use terms such as “sound State”, “effective State”
or “high quality State”, rather than “strong State”. The term “strong
State” would have some rather misleading and contradictory connotations.
In most European countries and languages, the term “strong State”
would be associated with authoritarian patterns whereby citizens
are restricted in their autonomy and freedom and entailing control
of its citizens by the State rather than control of the State by
its citizens. Particularly in central/eastern Europe this would
be reminiscent of the State control exerted under communist rule.
Sound or effective States will, on the contrary, be defined by reference
not to such negative features, but instead to positive objectives
and the prospects of serving the common good of citizens and society.
5.1. Sound
as opposed to weak States
76. The soundness and quality of
a State give it the capacities to perform its main functions, particularly
to define citizenship, provide external and internal peace and security,
resolve social conflicts, protect minorities, regulate social relations
by law, regulate the economic system, generate public finances (taxes)
and other public resources, provide public infrastructure (education,
communications, social services, transport facilities and utilities,
etc.), organise social security (welfare State) and support social
integration. These functions imply the operation of fair and effective
institutions of justice, police, security and administration.
77. Good performance in these main functions is also crucial to
securing the vital preconditions for State and democracy: citizens’
trust in representatives and State office-holders, support for political
parties, citizens’ participation in and compliance with policy making,
acceptance of political decisions and legitimacy of majority rule.
78. The “soundness” of a State may be endangered by several general
factors which reduce the capacity to realise political goals in
line with the public good. The most detrimental factor would be
arbitrary and unfair use of political, administrative or judicial
power. Often such practices are a result of corruption. A closely
related factor would be open or hidden pressure from private power
monopolies (oligopolies): oligarchs, corporate monopolies or communication
monopolies in the form of private television/radio/newspaper monopolies
or State media centres. A third factor may be a strong dependency
on external sources, such as neighbouring States, for the supply
of basic goods such as energy or food. Heavy dependency on foreign
finance can have similar effects.
79. The financial crisis (2008-12) dramatically revealed the major
weaknesses of States, with the main features being extreme levels
of budget deficit and of accumulated public debt, a rapid economic
downturn, soaring unemployment rates and severe cuts to vital services,
coupled with an inability to refinance State debts. Background structural
causes included imbalance in national economies and lack of competitiveness,
lack of capacity to raise taxes, growing social inequality and increasing
dependency on global economic players. In consequence, most countries
were incapable of developing policies to stimulate economic growth.
All these negative features clustered together in the case of Greece.
An extreme case of structural imbalances was Iceland, but Ireland
and the United Kingdom showed heavy reliance on the financial industry.
Spain suffered from a strong dependency on its construction boom,
whereas Italy and Portugal displayed rather general problems of
weak competitiveness. In central and eastern Europe, some States
were strongly dependent on external energy supplies from Russia
(Ukraine, for example). In general, most countries in the area suffered from
the massive low-wage competition of China.
80. The financial crisis of 2008 was sparked, in part, by extremely
risky operations by financial institutions and the need to prevent
their collapse through the provision of massive State support. The
lack of regulation of banks and insurance companies, one of the
main causes of the crisis, should have been addressed as a matter
of top priority, but States have been basically incapable of realising
this regulatory function through national policy decisions. Despite
some international activity (G8, G20), the hope of international
co-operative regulations has been disappointed. Attempts by the
European Union or Eurogroup have also failed to produce the expected
results. Thus one of the most dangerous factors of financial instability
in the world still awaits a solution. All other efforts by States
to cope with the situation of multiple crisis will be jeopardised
if no effective global regulation of banks, insurance companies
and hedge funds can be achieved. Some new rules in the framework
of Basel III which particularly increased banks’ requirements in
terms of core capital are important, but not yet sufficient to regulate
and limit the high potential risks of the global banking industry.
The efforts of some States, like France and Germany, to introduce
a joint tax on financial transactions have, unfortunately, not been
successful so far. This approach should be supported by as many
States and European institutions as possible.
81. High levels of accumulated State debt and of budget deficit
are the other most dramatic problem of the current fiscal crisis,
which was exacerbated by the banking crisis of 2008, as illustrated
by Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy.
82. European stabilisation programmes (European Stability Mechanism,
European Financial Stability Facility), despite their huge financial
guarantees, can only help to contain massive increases in the costs
of refinancing debt levels. Only the Fiscal Compact of the eurozone
States to reduce the further accumulation of State debts can have
a long-term impact on States’ dependency on the financial markets.
83. Massive budget cuts, however, particularly in public services
and in social protection, have had an ambivalent and rather counterproductive
impact, since demand levels are being curtailed and economic growth halted,
and social inequality and poverty are worsening rapidly.
84. Current levels of sovereign debt and enforced budget reductions
have prevented the stimulation of economic growth in the conventional
way through additional State expenditure. The resource base has
been seriously reduced, and clearly the increasing of State income
has not been an option either in many States. This may be attributable
to neo-liberal ideologies, international competition to lower tax
levels or the failure of the State to collect adequate amounts of
taxes. Sound States should have the requisite technical means of collecting
taxes, such as tax assessment methods and legal means of preventing
tax evasion. They should also be politically capable of raising
taxes from corporations and wealthier social categories, and of
retrieving the assets that they have quite often transferred to
foreign countries. This requires the possibility for governing majorities
to gain political support from a majority of citizens, including
the lower income groups, for progressive income taxes and property
taxes.
85. Sound States should develop strategies and capacities for
complex, long-term approaches to achieving economic growth, which
would at the same time create employment and serve urgent social
needs. An example might, for instance, be a strategy of investment
in energy saving and new energies, for example building insulation,
renewable energies and improvement of the technologies relating
to energy distribution and consumption. This approach will be suited
to most European countries, particularly countries in eastern and central
Europe which so sorely need new impetus for employment and innovation.
Similar long-term concepts may be applicable to sustainable development
in other areas of society.
86. While policy making has been confronted with a growing tendency
towards volatile conditions, in many policy areas it will be crucial
to develop and pursue long-term strategies. Problems of the environment
and of climate change, social protection and social services in
ageing societies, the setting up of modern infrastructure in the
fields of communications and mobility, among others, can only be
tackled by applying the principle of sustainability. In particular,
the education system at every level needs a stable and innovative
concept of long-term programmes and institutions.
87. Many developments in contemporary societies make social integration
more difficult, due to factors like economic instability and change,
migration, increasing mobility of persons, social differentiation,
minority problems, etc. Sound States should therefore develop adequate
capacities for social integration, which is also an essential prerequisite
of democratic politics. States such as Hungary, “the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia” and Romania have shown a serious lack of
ability to integrate minority groups appropriately. In all European
countries inequality of income and social status has increased substantially
in recent years, and quite often the economic crisis has caused
dramatic degrees of social polarisation. Developments like this
may erode the support base for democratic values and institutions.
88. In many areas, there is a need for States’ public policies
to entail more co-operation, both with other States and in the framework
of regional or international organisations. Economic and political
globalisation and, in Europe, the increasing role of the European
Union make this requirement more urgent. This applies to EU member
States, and even more so to European countries still outside the
EU. Economic developments have become more and more interrelated
and integrated, and there are also many other social, environmental
and security issues that tend to affect more than one State. Co-operative
States will be more effective than others.
6. Sound
States and the strong democracy that they need
89. Developments of recent years
have revealed how vulnerable States and democracies have become
in the conditions created by economic globalisation, particularly
that of financial markets, and have shown their potential for crisis.
Under such conditions, the greatest temptation faced by economic
and political elites is to resort to technocratic policy making,
which might well lead to authoritarian rule rather than democratic
politics. A strong democracy, however, will give priority to citizens’
participation and to allowing them freedom to express their interests
and preferences, to choose and support policy decisions, and to
control political decision-making through their elected representatives.
Institutions and elites must strive to restore citizens’ political
trust. The democratic process should be guided by the idea of justice
and the spirit of community. The recent tendency towards inequality
and polarisation in society should be redressed, and we should aim
for equal life chances within all the structures of society.
90. Democracy can be strong only if politics are based on input
legitimacy and achieve output legitimacy, which would include acceptance
of policy decisions by a broad range of citizens and support for
political institutions as servants of every sector of society and
every social group.
91. A fundamental principle of any democracy must be the rule
of law, which guarantees individual rights as well as the rights
that ensure freedom of political participation, such as freedom
of expression, freedom to communicate and associate with fellow
citizens, sign petitions, take part in demonstrations and elections,
stand for elected office, etc. In the event of any violation of
such rights, there must also be a guarantee of the availability
of a remedy within an independent judicial system that includes
administrative and constitutional courts. There are still several
member States of the Council of Europe which do not fully apply
these principles and which are subject to the relevant monitoring
procedures.
In
a democracy it is unacceptable that individual citizens or civil
society groups fear repression if they want to use their basic democratic
rights.
92. The separation of powers as a means of safeguarding individual
freedoms and democratic procedures can also be endangered by technocratic
powers claimed by governments over parliaments. In the process of stabilising
failing banks, State finances or euro system support mechanisms,
parliaments have quite often been subjected to strong pressure to
accept government decisions by unduly short deadlines, and without
any possibility of adequate deliberation. Parliaments must safeguard
their right to have the final say in decision making and defend
their power to control governments.
93. The worst transgression where an open, transparent and rational
process of policy decisions is concerned is political corruption.
This has not only been true for Greece where, for a long time, corruption
has been part and parcel of politics and social life. Cases of corruption
have also been reported recently in several countries of central
and eastern Europe, including the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic,
Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine. These cases involved corrupt
means of influencing specific policy decisions as well as corruption
for the purpose of political party financing.
94. Corruption relating to the finances of political parties or
party leaders has been a major problem in a number of countries
in both eastern and western Europe, for example Austria, the Czech
Republic, Italy, the Slovak Republic and others. In Austria, an
inquiry is being conducted by a parliamentary commission which recently
provided a list of recommendations that might be helpful for other
countries as well. In particular, it defined tight transparency
requirements, starting from very low levels of donations to parties
and party leaders. In Italy, serious misuse of State party finances
by leaders, for instance those of the Lega Nord, should also lead to
new rules and a tight system of accounting and control. In general,
according to the experience of Germany and some other European States,
the provision of a certain amount of State financial support for
political parties may help those parties to protect their independence
and steer clear of corruption, provided that proper controls are
in place.
95. Transparency in policy-making processes is widely regarded
as a precondition of citizens’ participation, of the existence of
an informed public and of accountability and control in representative
and directly democratic politics. Some countries, such as the United
States of America and Sweden, stand out as models guaranteeing by
law citizens’ access to the information available at administrative
and government institutions. Some other European countries have
similar legislation covering specific policy areas, partly stemming
from relevant European Union law. All European countries should
establish general access to information rules which include the
option of enforcing this right through court action.
96. The media
play an indispensable
role in democracies: carrying out research and providing information to
the public, playing an active part in public debates and inviting
wide audiences also to participate in public reflection, and providing
a critical means of exercising control over governmental representatives.
It is crucial for this important function to be performed by a variety
of media, and for there to be no monopolies or quasi-monopolies
in this area. In some European countries, however, there are State
monopolies, particularly in television, which violate the principle
of plurality. In Italy, during the Berlusconi government, control
of private and State television was in the same hands. In Hungary,
the Fidesz government in 2011 introduced very restrictive rules
putting the government in control of public and private media, even
newspapers, which stirred up a great controversy throughout Europe
about political intrusion into the function of democratic media.
In the United Kingdom, the highly concentrated media power of the
Murdoch News Corporation and its pursuit of illegal practices to
obtain and misuse information for commercial and political purposes,
as well as its close relations with people holding political power,
added yet another dimension to the ways in which the media can play
a disruptive role in a democracy. It seems obvious that an independent
agency for supervising the democratic nature of media systems should
be established in every State.
97. Despite the long-standing consensus that the principle of
political equality must prevail in a democracy and that every citizen
should have an equal and equally effective vote in elections, electoral
systems differ substantially in how they convert votes into mandates.
The principle of proportional representation offers the best way
of translating the diversity of votes into party mandates. Closed
party lists, however, do not give voters the option of voting for
individual candidates. Other systems have the disadvantage of producing
results diverging widely from proportionality. Under the United
Kingdom’s “first past the post” system, it is quite often the case
that a majority of seats is won with only 35% to 40% of the vote
(in a referendum in 2011 a move towards greater proportionality
was rejected). In other countries the requirement for a minimum
percentage of votes (in Germany and Russia 5%, in Liechtenstein
9%, in Turkey 10%) eliminates a substantial number of votes, which
are not counted at all. In Greece, the party with the highest number
of votes (even if these only total around 20% of the votes cast)
receives an additional 50 seats in parliament in order to make it
possible to form a governing majority. Rules like these, which grossly
deform the results of the popular vote, should at least be amended
and made more compatible with the principle of political equality.
Mixed systems entailing proportional voting with a choice between
individual candidates on open lists may offer advantages over other systems.
98. Anyone who thinks that citizens should be offered more genuine
opportunities to participate in the decision-making process at all
levels – which implies that democracy should be understood as going
beyond the level of elections and expanded to include elements of
direct democracy – should be aware that such expansion would need
to be designed with care.
99. The way in which such an expansion was implemented and the
interface organised between the essential representative institutions
and additional elements of direct democracy would be decisive to
the outcome: either better democracy and more representative politics
or, on the contrary, democracy that is hampered and citizens who
are even more frustrated.
100. There are at least eight elements which are decisive to the
design and quality of the democratic polity, and which should therefore
be considered carefully:
- First,
care should be taken to determine who is allowed to initiate a popular
referendum. If we really want to open up the political system, get
more citizens involved and overcome the alienation that many citizens
feel from today’s democratic institutions, we need to give this
power to a small proportion of all citizens;
- Direct democracy means a better sharing of political power.
In consequence the numbers of signatures required for referenda
and legislative initiatives should not exceed 2% or 3% of the electorate,
in order to make these arrangements citizen-friendly and so as not
to create obstacles insurmountable to all but the powerful organisations
which are already well represented in institutions;
- It should be understood that citizen-initiated proposals
need time. The more time is available, the more dialogue, interaction
and positive effects are possible;
- The core of direct democracy is deliberation; it was John
Stuart Mill who described democracy as “government by discussion”.
Discussion needs informed and educated citizens, hundreds of gatherings large
and small at which it is possible, broad access for as many people
as possible: sound States’ authorities should pursue all these aims
and make use of all these democratic tools;
- Direct democracy should be so designed that it interacts
with indirect democracy, especially through parliament, which has
to discuss every initiative and should be allowed to put forward
counter-proposals;
- No issues should be excluded from citizen participation.
Any proposals admissible in parliament should be also open to citizen-initiated
processes;
- Supermajority requirements in order for referenda results
to be validated have a counter-productive effect: many examples
in Italy in recent years have shown that this often allows the majority
in power to avoid a debate, a fact that democrats find disheartening
and entails no strengthening of democracy;
- In a direct democracy, voters need to be particularly
well informed, for example through the distribution of official
information leaflets, and the process during the run-up to a referendum
must be fair, balanced and transparent in terms of the amounts of
money invested.
101. Such carefully designed direct democratic polities produce
the attitudes, relationships and elements of political culture needed
by modern societies, political entities and structures, which are
very helpful to them. For instance:
- They promote the integration of diverse and multicultural
societies by giving as many people as possible, in a way that is
both smooth and non-coercive, an opportunity to participate;
- They make possible collective learning about social issues
and further the political learning process within society;
- They increase the legitimacy of both institutions and
political decisions;
- They enable citizens to identify more closely with politics
and the main institutions and their players, as well as reducing
the distance between them;
- They make the system more open to non-conventional and
non-mainstream players and proposals and increase institutions’
responsiveness to citizens;
- The public sphere becomes richer and more substantial,
and its content is enriched by contributions from many more parts
of society, no longer just from persons in power and office-holders;
- Public deliberations become more intense and more contributory,
with many more people listening and speaking to each other.
102. In many countries, participation rates in conventional politics,
for example through election turnout and party membership, have
declined significantly over recent years. In a strong democracy,
however, citizens’ participation should be enhanced and should become
more intense. One helpful condition would be the development of
patterns of civil society encompassing many kinds of informal participation,
including public deliberation, protest, self-organisation, etc.
Participatory budgeting, particularly at the levels of local and regional
politics, is another way of attracting the interest of many citizens
and adding to their experience.
103. In a changing environment where communication technologies
are concerned, the potential offered by the Internet and many new
forms of “e-democracy” can play an important role in developing
closer relations between citizens and groups, as well as between
citizens and representative players. Many examples of productive
use of digital tools and interactive potential are available, for
example via Facebook and Twitter. In Germany, for example, citizens
can present their petitions to the Bundestag using an online platform.
In Switzerland, online voting in various kinds of ballots has been
tried successfully in some cantons. In the European Union, the European
Commission set up a website in April 2012 to register proposals
for the new European Citizens’ Initiative (Article 11.4 of the Treaty
of Lisbon). New ways of organising policy discussions online have
been developed as “liquid democracy” by “pirate” political groups.
If this sort of Internet communication concept can attract more
young people, in particular, and get them involved in political
debates and decision making, this would be of great value to the
stabilisation and future development of democracy.
104. In many European States without federal structures, national
administrative structures are too strongly centralised. Decentralisation
and the strengthening of local self-government through the attribution
of real governing and administrative powers, as well as the necessary
financial resources, will also support democracy. Local responsibility
for common affairs, greater involvement of citizens in local politics,
including initiatives and referenda, and a focus on the local public
sphere can greatly contribute to an active democratic life for the
country as a whole.
105. In our age of globalisation, most economic and environmental
issues and many other problem areas have moved beyond the scope
of most nation States. The current financial crisis offers another
demonstration of this, and a dramatic one, and it has also shown
that even the European Union has insufficient control over events.
States’ co-operation and integration are therefore of the utmost
importance. And democracy can only prevail if States develop the
potential to co-operate in policy making in relation to common affairs.
106. The 47 States in the Council of Europe community actually
constitute two Europes: 20 States basically act as nation States
and 27 States are members of the European Union, 17 of which are
members of the euro system. The non-EU Council of Europe States
are bound to have a strong interest in developments within the European
Union and/or the eurozone and in their members, with whom they want
to co-operate in order to solve problems and get their own democratic
systems securely established.
107. The European Union has an even greater problem than its member
States where democratic qualities are concerned. The democratic
deficit of governance in the EU institutions is well known: only
the European Parliament has legitimacy through the direct election
of its members, whereas the most powerful institutions – the European
Commission and the Council of the European Union – draw only limited
legitimacy from their national electorates. As has long been obvious,
the citizens of EU member States are rather remote from the functions
and institutions of the Union, and even more so from the euro system.
There are certainly different views among some groups of countries,
particularly the States of eastern and central Europe, which to
a great extent link their hopes of effective freedom and successful
economic development with the European Union (I refer here to Mr Krzemiński’s
presentation to our committee on 14 March 2012).
108. Thus, European institutions still need substantial democratic
reform. Representative institutions with direct legitimacy should
carry more weight than national governments’ delegates. Interaction
between European legislative players and national parliaments should
also be stepped up. The Treaty of Lisbon proclaims that citizens’
participation should play a greater role in the Union, but not many
provisions for this were included. The European Citizens’ Initiative,
as set out in Article 11.4 of the Treaty, can be regarded as an important
step enabling citizens to express their political wishes and proposals
under a transnational procedure. Should the rules on using this
tool prove too restrictive, practical amendments should be considered in
due course. Looking beyond this new instrument, the idea of a fully
fledged initiative leading to a referendum for all European citizens
may also be an idea which comes up for discussion.
109. If the European Union is to cope with the huge tasks of transnational
policy making, which are beyond the scope of nation States, it will
need to develop better “sound State” qualities and broader democratic
support among European citizens. On the one hand, this will necessitate
a fuller definition of jurisdictions and obligations, combined with
more substantial financial and other resources, while on the other
hand, political representation and direct participation will need
stronger institutions, including more effective ways of ensuring responsibility
and accountability. Such a qualitative step forward in terms of
functional and democratic reform may well require a new round of
political debate in a move towards a proper European constitution,
whereby the people are the masters of their own constitution.
7. Strong
democracy, sound States, and the strong and sound Europe that they
need
110. A more powerful, stronger democracy
needs Europe, because the nation State alone can no longer fulfil the
great promises that democracy offers. A sound State cannot meet
its citizens’ expectations unless there is a well-established, fair
and balanced system of European, at least, co-operation and effective
institutions. Thus Europe is the main focus of many, if not all,
expectations. At the same time, rarely has there been so much criticism
in Europe of the European institutions. For too many people, Europe
has turned into more a source of problems than a way to solve them.
111. According to French writer Jacques Julliard, “Europe is at
a crossroads between being and non-being, and the longer we wait
the greater the risk that we will opt by default for non-being”.
112. British columnist Martin Kettle, expressing disappointment
as someone who has always supported Europe, says that clearly “The
nationalists have won – Europe’s dream is over”.
113. German journalist Evelyn Finger writes: “The European Union
and euro project might be in danger, but parliamentary government
is not. At most it could be said that the political and economic
spheres have drifted too far apart, which is what first made the
financial crisis possible. But many people … are now calling for
more political influence in the economic decision-making process,
so they know their democratic rights.”
114. “Papandreou not only did the right thing, when he opted to
ask the people for their decision on their future”, in the view
of FAZ Editor Frank Schirrmacher, “He also showed Europe the way
to go. Because in this situation Europe should explain to the Greeks
why its action is right. If it tried to do so, Europe would have
to convince itself. … This would be a process of self-reassurance
by equally heavily indebted European States which really need to
determine what price they are prepared to pay for the intangible
values of a united Europe”.
115. “Not since the Second World War had democratic principles
and institutions been the subject of as much fundamental misjudgment,
questioning and marginalisation as they are today. This could backfire.
Without democracy, the State loses support within the population
and therefore its legitimacy. Without democracy in its own legal
system, the European Union could break up against the democratic
order of its member States. If there is open conflict between financial
constraints and the people’s sovereignty, forces might emerge both inside
and outside the State which respect neither democracy nor liberalism.”
116. “Does the euro crisis offer us an opportunity to found a democratic
Europe? Or should we do the opposite and be motivated by the crisis
to turn back and favour national methods?” For the German philosopher Jürgen
Habermas, the constitution-making moment for Europe has come. “The
European Union has to be reshaped into a supranational democratic
Union on the basis of a European constitution on which European citizens
and European peoples all agree. The EU institutions should be redesigned
in a way that gives the European Union the requisite legitimacy
and the means that it needs to steer the markets.”