1. Introduction
1. In June 2011, the Parliamentary Assembly decided
on certain reforms of its structures and a new division of labour.
The new terms of reference of the Committee on Political Affairs
and Democracy state that “the committee shall prepare reports on
the activities of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD). For the preparation of the reports and the debates in the
Assembly, the committee maintains relations with the OECD and the
EBRD …”.
2. Before the reforms, it was the Committee on Economic Affairs
and Development which had the task of preparing these reports on
an annual, and then biennial, basis. I was appointed rapporteur
for that committee and kept that function within the Committee on
Political Affairs and Democracy. An outline for a report had been prepared
in November 2011. However, given the workload of this committee,
it was not feasible to prepare the report for an Assembly debate
in 2012 and I agreed to have it debated in 2013. As in the past,
the Assembly debate should follow a presentation by the President
of the EBRD.
3. In the debate on the reform of the Assembly, some members
of the Committee on Economic Affairs and Development proposed that
the reports on the activities of the OECD and of EBRD should be
prepared by the Committee on Social Affairs, Health and Sustainable
Development (which inherited other competencies of that committee)
and not by the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy, to
which Mr Walter replied: “The logic in putting this with the Political
Affairs Committee is that the work of these two institutions is
basically political. It is the scrutiny of these institutions that
we are talking about … and this fits very logically with the Political Affairs
Committee.”
4. Within the framework of preparations for my report, I attended
the EBRD Annual Meeting and Business Forum on 18 and 19 May 2012
in London. I attended, in particular, sessions of the Bank’s Board
of Governors, the discussion panel on “Transition under pressure:
change in the face of economic turbulence” and several networking
activities. I also had exchanges of views with Mr Oleg Levitin and
Mr Stefano Bertozzi, EBRD staff members, and with several representatives
of civil society. In this context, I also wish to thank Mr Luca Marcolin,
who
assisted me in the preparation of the more technical aspects of
this report.
5. The EBRD Board of Governors elected Sir Suma Chakrabarti,
a British senior civil servant, as the new President of the Bank,
who succeeds Mr Thomas Mirow. One of the issues most discussed was
the extension of the Bank’s activities to the Southern and Eastern
Mediterranean (SEMED) following the Arab Spring. Egypt, Jordan,
Morocco and Tunisia are already shareholders of the EBRD.
6. As was pointed out by the EBRD’s Chief economist in one of
the discussion panels, the EBRD is the only financial institution
with democracy in its mandate. Indeed, Article 1 of the Agreement
Establishing the Bank states that the EBRD seeks to assist only
those countries that are “committed to and applying the principles
of multi-party democracy [and] pluralism”. It is therefore surprising
to find countries such as Belarus or Turkmenistan among the Bank’s
countries of operations. On the other hand, it does not seem necessary
for a country to be democratic to become a shareholder of the EBRD,
which explains why Egypt and Morocco could be among the founding
countries of the Bank in 1991.
7. On 5 September 2012, an Ad hoc Sub-Committee on Relations
with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
(of the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy) met in London at
the EBRD headquarters, where it exchanged views with: Sir Suma Chakrabarti,
President of the EBRD, on the strategic vision of the EBRD; Ms Piroska
Nagy, Office of the Chief Economist of the EBRD, on global economic
trends and the impact of the situation in the eurozone on the countries
of operations; Mr Hans Peter Lankes, Managing Director, Institutional
strategy, and Acting Vice-President of the EBRD, Operational Polices, on
EBRD’s expansion to the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean (SEMED);
Mr Joseph Eichenberger, Chief Evaluator of the EBRD, on evaluating
the progress and impact of the EBRD’s projects; and Mr Joachim Schwarzer,
Vice-Chairperson of the Steering Group of the Board of the EBRD,
on the role of the Board of Directors of the EBRD in the governance
of the institution.
8. The President of the Bank confirmed the importance of co-operation
with the Parliamentary Assembly and agreed to take part in the Assembly
debate on the activities of the EBRD during the January 2013 part-session.
2. Background
9. The Council of Europe and the EBRD signed a co-operation
agreement in 1992, whereby the two organisations agreed to exchange
information, particularly regarding the monitoring and assessment
of the development of democracy in central and eastern Europe. Since
then, the Parliamentary Assembly has provided a forum enabling parliamentarians
from different European countries to monitor the activities of the Bank
in support of transition to market economy, democracy and the rule
of law.
10. The EBRD has 65 shareholders, split between 63 countries and
two European institutions (the European Union and the European Investment
Bank). It is the largest single investor in the transition region
covering central and eastern Europe and central Asia, officially
operating in 29 countries in September 2012. Four additional countries
(Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia) are soon to become countries
of operations, although technical co-operation already began in
2012. While Egypt and Morocco were among the founding countries
of the Bank in 1991, Jordan and Tunisia requested and obtained access
to the Bank’s ownership only in 2011. On 16 November 2012, it was
announced that Kosovo
was to become
a member of the EBRD as a recipient country.
11. Over the last twenty years, the EBRD’s mission in central
and eastern Europe has largely been accomplished, the region having
made a more or less successful transition towards a multi-party
democracy and a market-based economy, in which the activities and
technical co-operation of the EBRD have played a substantial role.
In response to the accomplishments in eastern Europe and central
Asia, the Bank is developing “graduation” and “post-graduation”
policies to phase out its operations in countries that are furthest advanced
in this transition. According to the Bank’s Third Capital Resources
Review medium-term strategy,
the
eight countries which joined the European Union in May 2004 were
expected to graduate by 2010. This, in turn, fuelled the discussion
over the long-term appeal of the Bank’s operations. Events between
2008 and 2012 halted the discussion: the economic crisis strongly
affected the economies of the transition region, restricting the
availability of funding for private investments, reducing trade
and growth, and pushing up unemployment. Of the eight countries
mentioned above, only the Czech Republic graduated in 2007, while
in the remaining seven the Bank has stepped up its support to minimise
the impact of the economic crisis. The deadline for graduation was
postponed to 2015, and the Bank has maintained a central role in
promoting the private sector in the transition region.
12. Furthermore, the geographical mandate of the Bank’s operations
was enlarged in 2011 to include the southern and eastern Mediterranean
(SEMED) countries (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia). Following
the Arab Spring, the Deauville Partnership called for the intervention
of the EBRD in this region in recognition of the Bank’s previous
results with the transition towards democracy and a market-oriented
economy. The Partnership recognised that the financial strength
of the Bank and its expertise in the promotion of private sector
investments would be fundamental for the improvement of the region’s
business climate and ultimately its growth perspectives. The EBRD,
while acknowledging the challenges posed by the new scope of its
activity, already started the operations in the second half of 2012
by using a dedicated investment fund amounting to 1 billion euros.
The Bank cannot use its own resources until all its shareholders
have completed ratification of the amended Articles 1 and 18 of
the Agreement Establishing the Bank (AEB).
13. The EBRD’s interventions have been focusing in particular
on three sectors: i) the financial sector, so as to lessen credit
constraints and capital outflows hitting the region as a consequence
of the 2008 financial collapse and the 2010-2012 euro crisis; ii)
the infrastructure sector, where the scope of intervention is great and
so is the multiplier effect of efficient and sustainable infrastructure
onto other sectors of the countries’ economies; iii) agribusiness,
in response to the food crisis and the peaks in prices of soya beans
and grains registered in 2008, 2010 and 2012. In several cases,
the EBRD has operated together with other international financial
institutions (IFIs) as well as with the European Commission in areas
of common interest. The EBRD contributes to such co-ordinated initiatives
with its extensive expertise in supporting the private sector towards greater
efficiency, competitiveness and sustainability.
14. At the same time, the crisis has impacted on the perception
of the people on democracy and the free market in the transition
region. In countries where the crisis hit most strongly, public
support for institutional change substantially declined, which in
turn tended to slow down the pace of reforms. More restrictions
to free media access, political participation and business competition
were also imposed in some of the countries of operations. The EBRD
addressed these concerns by adapting its methodology for the evaluation
of the transition impact of its projects. In the new Scoreboard
for Transition impact evaluation, institutional changes imputable
to the Bank’s activity are now as important as financial performance.
The new Scoreboard provides a clearer picture of the institutional
changes that occurred in the countries and periods of reference,
in the belief that a market economy cannot function properly without
appropriate supporting institutions.
3. Economic and political
developments between 2010 and 2012
3.1. The unfolding of
the second wave of the economic crisis
15. The time period covered by the current report on
the activities of the EBRD (2010-2012) witnessed the unfolding of
the second wave of the economic crisis, which has hit Europe and
the world hard.
16. The first wave of the crisis (2008-2009) left Europe with
double digit unemployment in several countries, and a highly indebted
public sector (over 80% of gross domestic product (GDP) on average
for the euro area). Serious concerns have emerged about the sustainability
of debt levels of some countries in a stagnating economic scenario,
which is unlikely to witness the correction of fiscal and competitive
imbalances. Since 2010, European Union member States have worked
on elaborating bailout packages to support Greece, Ireland and Portugal,
while growing fears are mounting with regard to Spain and Italy.
In order to restore confidence of financial markets in the economic
fundamentals of those countries, austerity programmes have been implemented
since 2010. These measures included the “Euro Plus Pact” consisting
of a package of political reforms to restructure fiscal and competitive
performance of the countries, as well as the “Six Pack” and its complementary
“Fiscal Compact”, requesting member States to include a balanced
budget amendment in their constitutions, among other provisions.
17. As a consequence, the deflationary effect on both public and
private expenditures of fiscal contraction has had an adverse impact
on private investment due to increased uncertainty of the macroeconomic
scenario in the eurozone. The expansionary monetary policy of the
European Central Bank (ECB) has not yet proved sufficient to support
credit expansion and growth. The balance sheets of European Union
banks are still suffering from the sharp decline in value of their
assets and investments. The moderately optimistic economic forecasts
for the European economy in 2009 were hence disproved by the surge
of the second wave of the crisis – what is known as the European
sovereign debt crisis.
18. The slowdown in the euro area and western Europe in general
impacted on the countries of the transition region as well, like
the first wave of the crisis.
EBRD countries of operations witnessed
the beginning of the recovery from the 2008-2009 economic downturn
and its reversal from 2010 onwards. What is more, while it appears
that a mechanism of resolution for the euro area’s fiscal imbalances
has been put in place, the economic outlook remains today clouded
with substantial uncertainty, which makes the “muddle-through” scenario
the baseline for the EBRD operations. The probability of a second
shock to the transition region due to new negative developments
in the euro area crisis remains persistently high.
3.2. Economic highlights
in eastern European countries from 2010 to 2012
19. EBRD countries of operations started to recover at
various speeds in 2009, although growth still remained below the
2005-2008 average almost everywhere. According to EBRD analysis,
three factors contributed to recovery: the rebound in demand for
local goods from abroad and, in particular, western Europe thanks
to improved global economic conditions; the phasing out of capital
outflows from the transition region due to the less stringent liquidity
needs of western banks investing in the region; the attentive use
of fiscal and monetary policies in the transition countries.
A contraction in real GDP was instead experienced
in Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania (in South-East Europe (SEE)) until
mid-2010, as well as in the Kyrgyz Republic, Ukraine and Lithuania.
The deeper recession in SEE and the lagged recovery in the Baltic
countries translated into persistent high levels of unemployment
and low growth of domestic demand.
20. A major economic change that emerged as a result of the crisis
was in fact the switch from internal to external demand as the main
driver of the economy. In the pre-crisis period, the transition
was accompanied by structural economic changes that caused substantial
re-evaluations of property prices and a dramatic increase of purchasing
power of consumers and inflows of foreign capital. The crisis stopped
these developments, while increasing unemployment and reducing inflows
of capital in particular.
Exports,
on the contrary, surged once again starting from 2009 after the
great trade collapse of 2008, picking up from the remarkable performance
between 2000 and 2007 (the region’s share of world export doubled
from 2000 to 2007 – from 5% to 10%). According to the EBRD Transition
Report 2010, this switch towards a new growth model has had three
main determinants: a) the surge in real imports of trading partners
(doubling in almost all countries of central and eastern Europe
and of the Community of Independent States (CIS)); b) the average decrease
in trading tariffs, especially in certain sectors, thanks to the
accession of some transition countries to the European Union between
2004 and 2007 and the signing of Free Trade Agreements between the
European Union and several countries in SEE and southern and eastern
Mediterranean (SEMED) regions; c) the low unit labour costs in the
transition region, at least at the beginning of the new century.
21. By the second quarter of 2011, almost all countries of the
transition region had returned to positive growth and pre-crisis
levels of real output, although were still underperforming with
respect to Latin America and emerging Asia. If countries in the
region followed different growth trajectories, on average, growth
was driven by external demand until mid-2010, while high commodity
prices and a revived credit growth due to easy monetary policies
in the region fuelled domestic demand in 2011.
However, the free trade
model that helped the region to profit from external boost factors
became a boomerang when its main trading partner, the euro area,
entered into a new phase of uncertainty over its macroeconomic stability.
This depressed expectations of growth in the region and worldwide.
As a consequence, both demand for exports from the transition region and
prices of raw materials declined substantially, the latter impacting
on the export revenues of several of the EBRD countries of operations
(in particular Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, Mongolia).
The beneficial effects of the one-off reduction of tariffs from
Free Trade Agreements are also bound to diminish over time, while
competitive cost advantages have already expired especially in the
central and eastern European and Baltic countries.
22. At the same time, government fiscal consolidation, persisting
high levels of unemployment, the acute drop of both wages and remittance
flows further constrained domestic demand. This has proved especially problematic
in the SEMED region, where high youth and general unemployment are
forecast to persist. Persistent cross border bank deleveraging,
especially in the CEB and SEE regions, and stagnant credit supply from
western Europe, have further limited domestic demand in this region.
23. Growth is projected to fall from 4.6% in 2011 to 2.7% in 2012
over all countries of operations.
This
of course hides substantial divergences from region to region: a
slowdown is expected in eastern European countries due to the decreasing
stimulus of exports towards western Europe, and especially in Croatia
and Hungary, which are projected to enter a recession. The Baltic
countries, Poland and the Slovak Republic would on the contrary
represent exceptions, with annual growth exceeding 2.5% thanks to
the resilience of their manufacturing production to the negative
economic cycle in western Europe. Growth in central Asia is also expected
to abate somewhat essentially due to declines in commodity prices,
but it will still remain firmly in positive territory. Forecasts
for the SEMED region displayed moderately positive growth rates
(1.8%-2.7%) for 2012, but they were threatened by high levels of
political uncertainty, which weakens investors’ confidence. The
reduction in tourism, foreign direct investments (FDI) inflows and
trade are expected to depress employment further (-2.5% in Egypt
and -5% in Tunisia since mid-2010 with respect to 2004-2007 averages). The
forecasts for performance of the world economy and in particular
the eurozone economy have deteriorated since the above figures have
been produced by the EBRD. Therefore it is likely that most figures
are still too optimistic even.
24. The baseline scenario for these forecasts is a slow resolution
of the euro area sovereign crisis which assumes long-lasting fiscal
contraction and low credit growth. Hence it cannot be excluded that
a worsening of the sovereign crisis, together with the long-lasting
economic challenges of the euro area (aging, migration and switch
to a greener economy) would have longer lasting and deeper negative
consequences on the transition region.
3.3. The political consequences
of the crisis: pace of reform and democratisation
25. Article 1 of the EBRD’s mandate states that the Bank
can only support the transition process in countries committed to
developing a democratic and plural political system, as well as
an open-market economy. As a consequence, the evolution of the political
reality in the countries of operations is continuously monitored
by the Bank, and a country-by-country assessment is produced every
three years. It is not clear to the rapporteur to what extent such
an assessment indicates that the country involved is indeed sufficiently
democratic and/or enhancing its level of democracy.
26. The analysis of data collected by the EBRD in the 2010 Life
in Transition Survey highlights that the economic difficulties experienced
in the transition region have significantly changed the perception
of market economy and of democracy among the people in the countries
of reference with respect to the previous survey in 2006. Households
were asked several questions on the impact of the crisis on their
lives and their perception of democracy, and in particular: i) if
they perceived the economy and the political system to be in a better condition
than before the crisis; ii) if they voted in the last elections;
iii) what their degree of trust in their presidency and different
governmental levels was; and iv) to choose whether in some circumstances
a planned economy may be preferable to a market economy or if it
does not matter, and if an authoritarian regime can be preferable
to democracy in some circumstances or if this does not matter either.
The survey also investigated how much households had been affected
by the crisis and through which channel (job loss, job loss of the partner,
reduction of working hours, bankruptcy of family business, etc.).
27. In this survey, much as in the last one, Albania, Mongolia,
Montenegro, Tajikistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan remained among the
strongest supporters of democracy in the region, while democracy’s
appeal increased the most in Armenia, Belarus, Georgia and Kazakhstan.
Armenia scored the highest increase in the transition region, attaining
comparable levels of support for democracy to the average western
country. Support substantially declined in all the new European
Union countries except Bulgaria, although support was already low
in 2006 in the latter. The decline in support of democracy is especially
clear for Hungary, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, which were
important supporters in the last survey. On the other hand, in some
CIS countries approval of democracy increased. The general level
of trust in government institutions in the transition region varied
greatly by country, while in only two countries (Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan) people reported an improvement in the political climate
in the period 2006-2010. In most other countries of the region, people
perceived a deterioration of the political situation, in particular
in Croatia and Romania.
28. A more thorough statistical analysis of this evidence showed
that economic performance was positively correlated with changes
in the perception of market institutions and democracy from 2006
to 2010. In particular, it was shown that being hit extraordinarily
hard by the crisis decreased by 10% the probability of favouring democracy
and markets over any alternative. Another result suggested that
support for political and economic institutions was stronger if
the pre-crisis conditions in the countries were worse. In other
words, what also seemed to matter for support for democratic and
market institutions was the relative change imposed on the population
by the crisis with respect to the pre-crisis condition. This could
possibly explain why support did not substantially decrease in CIS
countries, where the consequences of the crisis might have seemed
less severe compared to the difficulties imposed by the transition
process from the soviet system.
29. The mixed but somewhat negative perspective on democratic
and market-oriented reforms registered by the Life in Transition
Survey was reflected also in the EBRD’s indicators of market reform
in both 2010 and 2011. Major reversals of reform were avoided, but
the more severe economic conditions and the implemented austerity
programmes increased social tensions in the countries of operations.
On the one hand, this resulted in the “Arab Spring”. On the other
hand, the worsened living conditions in the transition region produced
a shift towards more nationalistic and authoritarian governments
in several countries. Special attention was devoted by the Bank
to the involutions in Hungary, Russia and Ukraine, and no considerable
improvement was registered in the South Caucasus and the central
Asian Republics, which remain characterised by strong presidencies
and weak parliaments. Corruption worsened in almost all countries
of operations, while changes in the freedom of the media scored
a somewhat mixed result, with greater access to social media being balanced
out by stricter controls imposed on the same media and on journalism
in some countries of the region.
4. The response of
the EBRD: facing the challenges
4.1. More resources
and new facilities
30. The ultimate goal of the EBRD is the creation of
prosperity and stability in the countries of operations. In order
to do so, the Bank facilitates the transition towards market economies,
promotes private and entrepreneurial initiative, and assists institutional
reform both at the economic and political level. The dire consequences
of the global crisis, as well as the Arab Spring and the food crisis,
provided EBRD with both demand and opportunities for new activities.
A breakdown of the bank investments is contained in the table below.
|
2009
|
2010
|
2011
|
Annual investment
forecast
2013-2015 (average)
|
7.86 billion
|
9.00 billion
|
9.05 billion
8.5
billion
|
Additional co-financing
|
10.35 billion
|
13.17 billion
|
20.8 billion
|
Number of operations
|
311
|
386
|
380
|
Private business operation
(% of total annual investment)
|
83%
|
74%
|
77%
|
Available capital
|
20 billion
|
20 billion
|
30 billion
|
Annual
investment by sector:
|
Financial sector
|
3.1 billion
|
3 billion
|
2.9 billion
|
Industry, commerce, agribusiness
|
1.56 billion
|
2.3 billion
|
2.7 billion
|
Natural resources
|
671 million
|
693 million
|
571 million
|
Infrastructure
|
479 million
|
486 million
|
596 million
|
Transport
|
1.2 billion
|
1.3 billion
|
1 billion
|
Power and energy
|
836 million
|
1.2 billion
|
1.2 billion
|
31. The year 2010 in particular exhibited an important
increase in the number of new projects financed (from 311 to 386)
with a rise in their value from 7.8 billion euros in 2009 to 9 billion
in 2010. This remarkable effort follows the steep 50% rise in available
funding which took place between 2008 and 2009. Annual investment figures
then remained more or less unchanged until 2011, although their
multiplier effect on private complementary funding substantially
increased: each euro the EBRD invested in new projects was met by
2.3 euros of external donors’ financing in 2011, up from 1.3 euros
per invested euro in 2009. These figures suggest an improvement
of the Bank’s operations in both quality and quantity of invested
capital. In order to overcome the challenges imposed by the economic
crisis in eastern Europe and central Asia, as well as to extend
the Bank’s operations to the SEMED area, the Bank’s shareholders
approved a request for capital increase from 20 billion to 30 billion
euros in May 2010. This should permit the Bank to commit to an annual
average of 8.5 billion euros in new business projects from 2013
to 2015.
32. The increase in new investments per year was especially concentrated
in four areas of great expertise of the Bank, namely the financial
sector, infrastructure, transportation and energy production. This
is coherent with the Bank’s strategy aimed at developing the “backbone”
of the production sector, so as to facilitate a further autonomous
development of private entrepreneurial initiatives in the countries.
Investments in these areas address some of the constraints imposed
by the crisis.
33. First, the mismatch between internal vs external finance.
The transition region experienced massive outflows of non-FDI capital
in the first phase of the crisis, due to the increased uncertainty
over the economic outlook of the region and the global liquidity
scarcity following the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
As a consequence of most macroeconomic
developments in the euro area, a wave of cross-border bank deleveraging
hit the transition region in 2011 and 2012. Faced with liquidity
constraints in the home countries of operations, as well as with
higher capital requirements to increase credibility vis-à-vis the
markets, western banks have been withdrawing substantial amounts
of funding from their local subsidiaries in the transition region.
The effects have been especially dire in the CEB and SEE regions,
where the degree of foreign ownership was large. To counter this
phenomenon, in 2009 the EBRD entered the “European Bank Co-ordination
(“Vienna”) Initiative” which gathers IFIs, the ECB, the European
Commission, regulators of countries hosting major banking groups,
and exponents of the same banking groups. The first phase of the
Initiative, which expired at the beginning of 2011, was successful
in providing secure capital and liquidity to the affiliates of western
banking groups in the transition region.
The extension of
the initiative (“Vienna 2.0”) has refocused interventions from stopping
deleveraging of western banks’ affiliates in the region to making
sure that this process is not harmful for the local economies. The
initiative also aims at promoting policy dialogue among bank supervisors
in western Europe and the transition countries so as to limit systemic
consequences of economic and financial shocks in the regions.
34. Second, borrowing in foreign currency. In the period considered,
the EBRD launched the “Local Currency and Local Capital Markets
Development Initiative” in co-ordination with other international
financial institutions. The goal of the initiative is to develop
funding of activities in the currency of the country of operations,
so as to free the recipients from the exchange risk imposed by lending
in hard currencies. Local currency lending also increases the transparency
of the project, and ultimately spurs the development of the local
financial market. The Bank thus created a Local Currency Lending
Facility in 2011 with which it financed 18 loans to financial intermediaries
in Armenia, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Moldova
and Tajikistan, as well as 30 loans to the production sector in
Russian, Kazakh, Turkish and Polish currencies.
35. Third, energy and infrastructure efficiency. The diffusion
of public–private partnerships (PPPs) in the period of reference
managed to attract considerable resources to the transition region
for the development of the infrastructure sector. The EBRD doubled
its investment volume with respect to the pre-crisis years by investing
more than 3.3 billion in infrastructure and transportation between
2010 and 2011; projects were concentrated especially on water supply,
wastewater treatment, solid waste management and the development
of railways. Special attention was devoted to energy efficiency
and the fight against climate change, while promoting the competitiveness
of the production sector in the transition region. The Bank thus developed
the Sustainable Energy Initiative, aimed at reducing CO2 emissions
by up to 35 million tons per year through direct investment in the
energy sector and indirectly through support to local partner banks
involved in energy-related projects. 2.1 billion were invested in
2010 and 2.6 billion in 2011 under this initiative. In addition, in
2010, the first Environmental Sustainability Bonds of the EBRD were
launched. They were designed to finance environmental projects and
ultimately reduce CO2 emissions in the countries
of operations: the collected capital was invested exclusively in
projects promoting clean technologies for the improvement of energy
efficiency and water distribution, environmental services, public
transportation and waste management.
36. In this sectoral perspective of the EBRD investments one cannot
forget the resources devoted to the fight against food price volatility,
especially through support for agribusiness. We refer to the specific
paragraph addressing the subject in section 5 below.
4.2. A new perspective
on institutions and transition
37. A more attentive reflection on the consequences of
the crisis in the EBRD countries of operations has highlighted a
disenchantment of the population towards democracy and market institutions.
The results of reforms in the transition region were mixed in geographical
terms but pointed at a generalised slowdown in the reform process.
The crisis has thus revealed a weakness in the institutional setting
and policy commitments to democracy and free market in the EBRD
countries of operations. The Bank has tried to overcome these setbacks
by improving the assessment of the transition impact of its projects,
and by increasing collaboration with other international institutions.
4.2.1. A new scoreboard
38. The EBRD 2010 Transition Report presented a new methodology
to evaluate the improvement of countries towards a market economy
and democratic institutional setting. The Bank’s traditional transition indicators,
which were introduced in 1994 and amended several times since, enjoyed
great success in the academic and policy-making environments, but
proved to be insufficient in assessing the sustainability of projects
and reforms after the crisis. On some occasions, the evaluation
of financial soundness included in the transition indicator proved
to be completely wrong in the light of events. Moreover, the previous
scoreboard design implicitly assumed that a higher score in transition
could be achieved by removing State support to the economy in favour
of private initiative and market development. In the previous transition
scoreboard, the importance attached to the privatisation process
and private investment inflows in the country of reference exaggerated
the country’s progress towards a free market economy. In particular,
it belittled the importance of regulation and law enforcement for
the development of a competitive and efficient business environment.
39. The new transition scoreboard assigns almost equal weight
to market-based information and the quality of institutions in the
country. Furthermore, these weights are now derived more transparently
from public data available and the country’s market and institutional
characteristics. Thirdly, the score is attributed on the basis of
outcome indicators (changes to market structure or market-enhancing
institutions in the period considered), and no longer on the basis
of input variables (the amount of money invested). Finally, from
the original five infrastructure and two financial sector indicators,
the new scoreboard switched to 16 indicators grouped by sector (corporate,
energy, infrastructure and financial). Financial sector classification
distinguishes now between bank and non-bank (already existing) activities,
insurance, private equity, capital markets, micro-, small and medium
enterprise finance and other financial services. As a result of
these changes in the scoreboard, the evaluation of the transition
impact of the financial sector changed with the new methodology. What
is more, the picture of the country emerging from the scoreboard
is now more articulated. Policy makers might be able to rely more
closely on the power of the scoreboard to match the country’s reality.
4.2.2. Strengthened institutional
co-operation
40. In 2011, the Bank signed a new Memorandum of Understanding
with the European Commission and the European Investment Bank (EIB),
which replaced the pre-existing 2006 Memorandum. The Memorandum stresses
the need for further close collaboration between the signatory institutions,
based on the common interest in accompanying the countries of operations
in their transition towards a market-based economy. The institutions
share a number of areas in which co-operation can be enhanced: strengthening
of market and democratic reforms, energy efficiency and green technological
upgrade, infrastructure development, and support to small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs). In projects where both the EBRD and the EIB
are operative, each Bank uses the output of the other institution
while carrying out independent credit and project evaluation. The
co-operation between the EBRD, the EIB and the European Commission
has concretised in particular in the areas of financial and corporate
development. A recent example is the establishment of the Western
Balkan Enterprise Development and Innovation Facility, which should
collect 141.2 million euros in capital from the three institutions
and be able to lend about 300 million to SMEs in the Western Balkans
over the years 2011-2015. The Facility was created within the Western
Balkan Investment Framework, which was launched in 2009 by the three
institutions to favour investment in energy, environment, transport,
social infrastructure and private sector development.
41. In 2009, the EBRD also partnered with the EIB and the World
Bank to create the Joint IFI Action Plan to support financial intermediaries
in Eastern Europe during the second wave of the crisis. The three
institutions provided 33 billion euros (up from the initially forecasted
25 billion) in funding to both the financial and corporate sector.
They thus contributed to restoring market confidence in the region
and ensured that important western private financial institutions
did not withdraw their engagements from the region despite the tight
conditions of the liquidity market.
42. A partnership between the EBRD and other IFIs (African Development
Bank, Asian Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, World
Bank) was created to support the fight against global warming. In particular,
under the partnership, the IFIs committed to invest 8.4 billion
euros annually to support cities in adapting to and mitigating climate
change.
5. Special issues
in the EBRD’s activities
5.1. The extension of
EBRD operations to the SEMED
43. The democratic uprising in North Africa and the Middle
East, which is identified as “Arab Spring”, was first backed by
the G8 through the Deauville Declaration in May 2011. The Declaration
launched the multilateral Deauville Partnership aiming at supporting
democratic and economic transition in the Arab Spring countries. The
Declaration also called for the “extension to the geographic scope
of the EBRD’s mandate, in order to support the transition in countries
of the region which embrace multiparty democracy, pluralism and
market economics”, in view of the parallels between the transition
experience of eastern European and central Asian countries and that
of North African countries, and the years of cumulated experience
of the EBRD in the development of the private sector and entrepreneurship.
44. The EBRD was thus asked to intervene thanks to its demonstrated
capacity to deliver support to countries in transition to democracy
and stronger market economy. The Bank would be key to the fast mobilisation
of financial resources both directly and indirectly, providing funding
and expertise to cash constrained financial intermediaries and guarantees
to other western corporations willing to invest in the region. Sectors
of priority investment are energy production, municipal services
for water treatment and delivery, infrastructure and support to
SMEs.
45. The EBRD started operations in Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and
Tunisia in 2012. The first two countries were already shareholders
of the Bank and expressed the interest to become countries of operations.
Jordan and Tunisia requested both membership and access to operations.
Amendments to the EBRD statutes (Articles 1 and 18) allowing the
Bank to extend its mandate were approved in September 2011 by the
Board of Governors of the Bank, but full operational capacity was
granted only in September 2012. In the meantime, the Bank started
technical co-operation with the SEMED countries thanks to the 59
million Transactional Facility established in Deauville with the
contribution of Australia, Finland, Germany, France, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Further resources
of 1 billion euros were obtained using the Bank’s net 2011 income
in May 2012. At full capacity, the Bank is expected to commit 2.5
billion euros per year in the SEMED region alone, thus potentially
raising a total of 7-8 billion euros of funding per year, thanks
to private investors’ contributions.
46. Further support to the transition process in Northern Africa
is provided by the Bank through its T2T Initiative, that is a framework
for exchange of knowledge between old and new countries of operations,
as well as through the Bank partnership with other international
financial institutions in the region. The EBRD signed a Memorandum
of Understanding with the African Development Bank and the Islamic
Development Bank in September 2011. The Memorandum recognises the
expertise of the EBRD in trade finance, support to SMEs, privatisation
programmes, management and evaluation of projects. The African and
Islamic Development Banks will contribute to the partnership by
sharing their networks of relations with local institutions and
their knowledge of the countries of operations. The institutions
will co-ordinate investment and due diligence, so as to avoid duplications
of efforts.
47. Transition from authoritarian regimes to democratic ones in
Tunisia and Egypt, as well as from economic systems based on heavy
political economic intervention to market-oriented economies poses
numerous challenges. The first of them is the capacity for the countries
to involve the private sector in the economy, making sure the economic
system keeps on being operational as State interventions would be
reduced. This is especially difficult because of high levels of
uncertainty on political and economic stability. In countries where the
private sector had a marginal role in economic development, a priority
of the EBRD has been capacity building for SMEs (accounting and
management skills, business contacts, trade partnerships, etc.).
At the same time, the Bank has concentrated its attention on the
improvement of economic institutions which favour both internal
and international competition, as well as a transparent privatisation
process, so as to avoid the creation (or help the dismantling) of
collusive and inefficient centres of economic power.
48. The EBRD’s focus on privatisation should be handled with care.
Its former chief economist, Willem Buiter, had already noted, in
2003, regulatory challenges resulting from privatisations in eastern
Europe, mostly due to the fact that, in contrast to western Europe,
regulatory agencies were not in place before privatisation.
In more general terms, privatisation
policy meets with much more criticism at present, both from a scientific point
of view as well as from a societal point of view. Civic society
organisations, such as NGOs and trade unions, are rather sceptical
as a result of social injustices caused by rash privatisations,
especially with regard to sectors
such as water, since access to water is a fundamental human right.
Civil society organisations in Egypt have expressed more general
fears that the founding values of the EBRD are of less importance
than the Bank’s push for the liberalisation and privatisation of
public services, for example the provision of potable water and
energy.
49. If it is true that there are multiple similarities between
the transition process in the SEMED and in eastern Europe and the
CIS, the EBRD has nevertheless recognised that differences in economic,
social and political institutions and development may challenge
its expertise while operating in the SEMED. In particular, the number
of private companies present in the region is about a third of those
which were active in the EBRD countries of operations in 1991. These
firms are not concentrated in the heavy industry and medium technological
sectors which helped the countries of the former Soviet block to
integrate global supply chains relatively soon after the beginning
of the transition process. In addition, greater cultural distances
between northern Africa and western Europe as opposed to Eastern
Europe, as well as an average lower level of human capital in the
SEMED region, will mitigate against offshoring from western Europe,
thus potentially lowering the speed of the transition towards sustainable
economic growth of the SEMED. Non-tariff barriers are still binding in
the region and their reduction will expose the production sector
of the region to further major challenges. The Sustainable Impact
Assessments of the Free Trade Agreement that the European Union
is seeking with countries in the region show that major economic
sectors may be totally wiped out. In the food, beverages and tobacco
sector, production is predicted to fall by 96.9% in Egypt, 98.5%
in Morocco and 94.1% in Tunisia. In the textile, clothing, leather
and footwear sector, production falls by a staggering 99.7% in both
Egypt and Tunisia.
50. Finally, the current global economic context is different
now from the early nineties. The protracted economic crisis has
reduced the availability of funding from independent country donors,
in particular from the euro area, as well as the corporate sector’s
appetite for risk. What is more, the appeal of the market economy among
the people is much less widespread today than twenty years ago,
thus potentially raising the resistance of the SEMED population
to the inevitable costs imposed by the transition. The EBRD will
have to acknowledge these changing perspectives and take them into
account when designing its investment strategy in the SEMED region.
The EBRD should step up its dialogue and collaboration with trade
unions and local civil society organisations in order to do justice
to the aspirations of the Arab Spring. In order to make use of synergy
in the European support for the emerging democracies in the Arab
world, co-ordination should be stepped up between the EBRD, the
Parliamentary Assembly (partner for democracy status), the Venice
Commission, but also the OECD and other relevant bodies.
5.2. The food crisis
and the EBRD investment in agribusiness
51. Food export prices almost doubled from the beginning
of 2007 to mid-2008, with especially high growth rates for grains
and fat and oils. This historical peak in prices was however reached
and surpassed in 2011 and 2012. Although prices decreased again
during the winter season, global prices remained volatile.
The dynamics of
prices in the period 2010-2012 suggest that a repeat of the 2008-2009
food crisis cannot be excluded, and that volatile prices will remain
a reality in the foreseeable future. The continuously rising demand for
agricultural products, in particular animal protein and biofuel,
coupled with low levels of food stocks, creates alarm in the global
community. Further constraints to export capacity are represented
by climate change and the availability of arable land, as well as
the lack of effective transportation infrastructures in many producing countries.
Therefore the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to
Food, Olivier de Schutter, concludes that “Food and other basics
must not be left to the mercy of economic cycles”.
Projections suggest that global
agricultural production will need to increase by about 70% over
the next 40 years to support current consumption patterns.
One could
argue that new regulations and co-ordination mechanisms are needed
in food production and distribution.
52. The EBRD has placed the phenomenon high on its agenda because
its countries of operations have been affected by the food crisis
on both the consumption and the production side. In many of these
countries, food represents 40% or more of the average consumption
basket, so that further increases in prices may translate into inflation
and severe subsistence constraints. Governments in countries of
operations have already reverted to export bans and price caps in
order to contain the surge in food prices of recent years. At the
same time, the food crisis could represent a great opportunity for
some of the transition countries. Russia and Ukraine produce today
18% of world grain exports, but they can potentially reach 50% of
world exports.
53. The EBRD can assist these developments, offering its technical
expertise in the sector and in public-private dialogue, as well
as its capacity to raise funds for private sector support. Priority
sectors of investments are infrastructure, energy efficiency, and
SME development so as to improve agricultural trade logistics and the
management of risk. As a consequence, the EBRD stepped up its intervention
in the agribusiness sector from 2010 to 2012 to reach 945 million
euros in 2011 alone. In the same year, it also created the Agribusiness Sustainable
Investment Facility to improve energy efficiency in the sector and
support socially and environmentally sustainable projects. Through
this facility, the Bank invested a further 200 million euros in
the sector. Finally, the Bank launched the “Private Sector for Food
Security Initiative”, together with the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) of the United Nations, in 2011. The two organisations agreed
to share their research knowledge and contacts with the agribusiness
sector to address the food crisis through greater private sector
involvement, which is the key expertise of the EBRD. However, enhanced
private sector involvement also risks losing public authority over
its land.
A balanced approach is thus needed.
6. Conclusions
54. The transition region experienced a considerable
economic adjustment between 2010 and 2012. The economic recovery
fuelled by increased exports to the European Union did not last
long. The worsening of the euro crisis reduced growth expectations
and the availability of capital from western Europe. What is more,
the long-lasting effects of the crisis and of the consequent austerity
programmes on unemployment and the well-being of the population
in the countries of operations has on average reduced the appeal
of democracy and a market oriented economy among the people. Therefore
the pace of reforms towards such institutional settings has slowed
down. It would be wise to review these reforms in the light of the
new political and economic situation.
55. The EBRD has reacted to the effects of the crisis by increasing
its capital by 50% to 30 billion and maintaining a high level of
investment in the countries of operations, especially in the financial,
infrastructure and energy sectors. The Bank’s valuable expertise
in the financing and development of the private sector in a context
of transition was recognised by the call for the extension of the
geographical mandate of the Bank to the SEMED by the G8 and the
Deauville Partnership. The key challenge of the Bank in the near
future will most likely be adapting its investment strategy to this
new context characterised by important political, social and economic
uncertainties which do not necessarily correspond to those the Bank
faced while investing in eastern Europe and central Asia.
56. The fight against the food crisis also represents a new challenge
for the Bank: although investment in agribusiness has always been
part of the Bank’s portfolio, support to the sector has reached
an historic high record, making the Bank the biggest investor in
the sector in the transition region. In this new role, it will invest in
the improvement of the whole supply chain, and in particular in
storage and transportation infrastructure, so as to facilitate a
greater participation of the region in global trade in food. At
the same time, the EBRD has yet to incorporate the critique of the
United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food.
57. The EBRD will have to make sure that its operations bring
the region further in the transition process towards more democracy
and the creation of prosperity and stability. Under the new scoreboard
for the benchmarking of the transition requirements of countries
of operations, greater attention should be devoted to the institutional
developments related to the projects financed. In particular, the
Bank will have to support more inclusive growth and contrast the
setbacks in corruption, media and political freedom which were registered
in some of the countries of operations during the crisis.
58. In December 2012, the EBRD adopted a new methodology to assess
the compliance of its countries of operations with the political
aspects of the Bank’s mandate. Reports by the Council of Europe
are mentioned, together with those by the United Nations and the
OSCE, as references for the Bank’s assessments. The four criteria
for the political assessment are: representative and accountable
government; civil society, media and participation; rule of law
and access to justice; and civil and political rights. The effective
implementation of this new methodology – which should be welcomed
– will lead to concrete measure being taken concerning those countries
which do not apply the principles of democracy and the rule of law.
The Council of Europe – and in particular the Assembly – should
be ready to co-operate with the EBRD in making and monitoring its assessments.