1. Introduction:
the mission of the Council of Europe Development Bank and ties with
the Council of Europe
1. Over the last years and since the latest report of
the Parliamentary Assembly on the Council of Europe Development
Bank (hereafter “CEB” or “the Bank”) in 2010, the socio-economic
landscape in Europe has been radically transformed by the financial
and economic crisis. Many countries are struggling to restore growth
and living standards, while social hardship has sprawled across
society. In these difficult times, multilateral development banks
are important actors in supporting solidarity between and within
countries and stepping in where the private sector alone would not
venture to go.
2. The CEB plays a special role in alleviating the social crisis
sparked by the economic crisis and austerity measures, since it
has a unique social vocation. At the same time, the external constraints
and changing economic circumstances are challenging development
institutions to work differently and to deliver “more with less”.
The Council of Europe Development Bank is perhaps even more challenged
than its peer institutions in Europe, since in 2012 two of the three
rating agencies downgraded the Bank from AAA to AA+, as a consequence
of the downgrading of many CEB member countries and borrowers.
3. The Bank is a partial agreement of the Council of Europe and
currently groups 40 States
(eight member States
have
opted not to take part in this agreement so far) and which Kosovo*
joined on 4 November 2013. The Parliamentary
Assembly has been following the Bank’s work more closely since the
early 1990s, when the CEB underwent important structural transformations
and rapidly integrated many new members from central and eastern
Europe.
More recently,
both the Council of Europe and the Bank have tried to reform their functioning,
so as to become more relevant, focused and efficient in accomplishing
their respective missions.
4. The Bank’s member countries can use the CEB as an instrument,
but also a partner, for supporting social projects. They have a
direct interest in that this institution has sufficient means and
clear objectives to pursue its social vocation. Its relation with
the Council of Europe and its commitment to the Council of Europe's political
and social objectives are of crucial importance for the Bank’s existence
and purpose. The impulse from the Committee of Ministers’ representatives,
who sit on the Bank’s Governing Board to provide a strategic orientation,
is therefore essential for the CEB to succeed. Just as crucial is
the close co-operation between the Bank and other Council of Europe
entities. In this respect, the Assembly seeks to contribute proposals
for optimising the Bank’s work and to facilitate discussions regarding
its future.
5. This report will review the CEB’s activities in recent years
(2010-2013), follow up on the Assembly’s earlier recommendations
and assess progress in the Bank’s strategies to adapt to changes
in its environment and on its internal strengthening. I am grateful
for the information and insights I was able to obtain in particular from
the relevant documents
of
the Bank’s main working structures and meetings with the various representatives
of the Bank (Chairperson and selected members of the Governing Board,
the Chairperson of the Administrative Council, the Governor, Vice-Governors
and several directors), the Secretariat of the Partial Agreement
on the CEB and some other officials. As the Assembly’s rapporteur,
I also attended the Bank’s Annual Joint Meeting held on 14 and 15
June 2013 in Malta and the meeting of the Governing Board on 22 November
2013 in Paris.
2. Overview
of the Bank’s work in 2010-2013 in the light of Europe’s economic
woes: new dynamics in lending, risk management and co-operation
with partners
6. Since the onset of the financial crisis in Europe
over 2008-2009, the CEB has seen economic turbulence spread deep
and wide across its member countries. If in the beginning the financial
storm caused a “credit crunch” mainly for countries in central and
eastern Europe, the situation rapidly deteriorated also in the West. Large
shareholding countries that were at the heart of the Bank’s high
creditworthiness-and-risk profile have been downgraded several times,
which inevitably led to the lowering of the CEB’s own rating despite
stable performance and profitability (see Table 1 in the appendix).
7. The CEB, as well as other multilateral development banks,
came under increased pressure from international rating agencies
which no longer consider callable bank capital as being of the same
quality as paid-in capital. At the same time, regulators have been
slow in recognising the special role multilateral development banks
play and the need for specific provisions in regulatory frameworks
in this respect. Incidentally, as from 2012, several major development
banks (European Investment Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, World Bank and the CEB itself) changed their top
leadership.
8. In addition to international investors getting wary of engaging
across more and more European countries, the main rating agencies
have tightened up the requirements on capital and leverage for financial institutions
under their scrutiny. Fortunately, the Bank’s capital increase became
effective at the end of 2011: its funds thus grew from €5 to €6.5
billion.
This
was an extremely timely and necessary step in order to meet tighter
prudential standards and to preserve the level of lending activities,
in particular in favour of countries where uncertainties and risks
are greater.
9. A total of €2.26 billion in loans was approved in 2010, €2.1
billion in 2011, €1.8 billion in 2012, and €2.27 billion in 2013.
Funds disbursed were €1.78 billion in 2010, €1.85 billion in 2011,
€1.58 billion in 2012, and €1.84 billion in 2013. Figures for 2013
are mostly a consequence of diversification efforts and of member States’
increased interest in job creation and preservation. On average,
CEB disbursements increased by 9% in the 2010-2013 period compared
with the previous Development Plan period (2005-2009). We see a
sort of convergence between the financing commitments for projects
approved and those actually financed on the basis of earlier multi-year
commitments. Given the delicate external environment, the last few
years have represented a big challenge for the Bank.
10. The number of projects approved during the period 2010-2013
was 30 in 2010, 34 in 2011, 28 in 2012 and 38 in 2013. On average,
two thirds of projects approved were in favour of the neediest –
target group – countries.
This
group of 21 countries (22 including Kosovo from November 2013) consists
of non-European Union and new European Union member States, roughly
accounting for half of the CEB’s members. Some of those countries
have been progressing in terms of development much faster than others,
which made it necessary to make clear distinctions between the better-off
and the more disadvantaged countries for achieving greater added
value through the Bank’s projects.
11. In 2013, out of 38 projects approved, 27 projects (representing
almost 50% of the total amount of loans approved) were meant to
benefit target countries. These figures show a continuous effort
deployed in favour of the target countries and a balancing act of
combining both the volume of activity and risk exposure. Overall, as
indicated in Table 3 of the Appendix, countries such as Croatia,
Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Turkey were the key beneficiaries
among the target countries over the 2010-2013 period, whilst Belgium, France
and Spain were the grand western recipients of the Bank’s funds
in the same period.
12. Concerning the number of countries actively borrowing from
the CEB, this stood at 18 in 2010, 16 in 2011, 14 in 2012, a decrease
mostly due to domestic budgetary constraints, and 22 in 2013. Some
countries discontinued projects already on track: 13 projects (€242
million) were stopped in 2010, 20 projects (€140 million) in 2011,
15 projects (€540 million) in 2012, and 18 projects (€668 million)
in 2013. However, there have been no non-performing loans. Thanks
to the redesigning of some ongoing projects (such as those in favour of
Cyprus) and better targeting of new ones, project activity picked
up throughout 2013, with loan approvals rising about 27% and disbursements
up by 17%.
13. In terms of sectoral distribution (see Table 2 in the Appendix),
activities mainly focused on fostering social cohesion, in particular
job creation, urban and rural modernisation and social housing.
The share of projects in this field grew from about 50% in 2010
to 79% in 2012 and 75% in 2013, while that in favour of environment-related
work shrank, mainly due to budgetary constraints and use by the
countries concerned of the European Union funds (grants) instead
of CEB loans. Support for public infrastructure with a social vocation remains
an important area of activity, although the intensity of involvement
in underpinning administrative and judicial public services diminished
considerably from 2010 to 2013 for the same budgetary reasons. I
hope that this trend will be reversed because investment in infrastructure
and training services in this domain is most valuable for the Council
of Europe member States in strengthening the rule of law, not least
under the Human Rights Trust Fund managed by the CEB.
14. In the light of profound social and demographic changes across
Europe, the CEB’s work in synergy with international, regional and
local partners is of utmost importance. The Bank is particularly
proud of developing its operations under the so-called Sarajevo
process which implements the Regional Housing Programme in the Western
Balkans (covering Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and
Serbia). This initiative enjoys the strong political and financial
backing of the international community (the European Commission,
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) and the United States). According to the plans, the framework
with €600 million earmarked should benefit nearly 74 000 people
(or some 27 000 households), especially refugees and internally
displaced persons. Yet a number of European donor countries are
dragging their feet on their pledges.
15. In a similar manner, the Bank is working with institutional
partners to help the integration of Roma communities (some 12 million
people are concerned in Europe). The latter suffer from sky-high
unemployment rates, an insufficient level of education and health
care, as well as from a poor housing situation. The Bank therefore
follows the Council of Europe expert advice and participates in
the Alliance of Cities and Regions for Roma Inclusion. In 2013,
the Governor also met with the Special Representative of the Secretary
General for Roma issues at the Council of Europe, and Bank staff
regularly attends meetings and conferences on Roma issues. Priority
projects are financed through a mix of loans and grants, with substantial
co-funding from the European Commission, the World Bank and the
UN agencies
, and
the contribution of various specialised non-governmental organisations.
16. As the recession was biting into European labour markets,
the CEB boosted its support for job creation and preservation in
micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises. This orientation accounted
for nearly half of projects in 2012-2013 and about a third over
the last five years, mostly in target countries.
Projects are essentially
financed through credit lines to local banks and leasing institutions.
Indeed, one in ten people, or about 28 million people, are unemployed
in countries covered by the CEB, and youth unemployment is hitting record
heights in comparison with the rest of the population, notably in
southern Europe. Emphasis on skills development, professional counselling
and mobility in the youth group, but also, as appropriate, among
the disabled, minorities and displaced persons, is therefore particularly
necessary.
17. Decent housing for people with low incomes and for the population
in disadvantaged areas is a vital aspect of the CEB’s mission to
enhance social cohesion and to improve living conditions. Large
multi-annual programmes of CEB investment have been put in place
in Belgium and France to help poor first-time buyers of accommodation,
renovation and improvements in energy efficiency of housing, as
well as adaptation of dwellings to the needs of the elderly and
the disabled. Such programmes could be replicated across all member States
because needs in this area are particularly acute; however, governmental
partners of the Bank have first to find ways of departing from austerity
in favour of more social investment.
3. Developments in
strategy
18. Aiming to improve the Bank’s performance and governance
so as to meet growing expectations, member States carried out the
Strategic Review of the CEB and its recommendations were submitted
in October 2008. In 2011, the Chairperson of the Governing Board
launched a consultative process to explore possibilities for the
implementation of these recommendations regarding CEB’s governance
structure (for example voting procedures).
19. Moreover, the Bank’s new Governor, Rolf Wenzel, presented
ideas for the longer term vision. Immediately after taking office,
he launched a broad-based discussion on internal and external challenges
for the CEB, including consultations with the Governing Board and
the Administrative Council, who welcomed and supported the initiative.
This discussion yielded important improvements which have sharpened
the social focus of the Bank (for example a two-pronged approach,
reform of the social dividend account) and making the CEB’s work
more efficient and transparent (for example job classification exercise
and new prudential framework). In addition, responding to the changed
financial and economic landscape in Europe and in particular in
many of its member countries, the Governor launched, in early 2013,
a review of the Development Plan with a view to clarifying the orientations
of the Bank and strengthening its toolkit. The new Development Plan
2014-2016 was thoroughly discussed by the Organs of the Bank and
approved by the Governing Board in November 2013. We shall look
at these strategic areas one by one.
3.1. Implementing the
recommendations of the Strategic Review
20. The CEB Strategic Review of 2008 proposed a series
of steps concerning the Bank’s mandate, relations with the Council
of Europe, the financial and operational framework, relations with
external partners (such as financial institutions and international
organisations) and, perhaps most importantly, governance. In its
Recommendation 1937 (2010), the Assembly strongly supported this process, notably
on the proposed increase in the Bank’s capital and improvements
in governance. The latter concerned in particular the duration of
the term of office of appointed officials, duties and responsibilities
of vice-governors, simplification of the voting system in the Bank’s
organs, and reporting of the evaluation mechanisms inside the Bank.
21. After lengthy and tedious discussions in the CEB’s Governing
Board and Administrative Council, some progress was finally achieved.
As referred to in the previous chapter, the Bank’s capital was increased.
The selection and appointment procedure for the posts of vice-governor
has been modified to ensure the required professionalism and to
balance managerial efficiency and the inter-governmental nature
of the Bank. Concerning the evaluation functions, a relevant department
of the Bank has been renamed and ensures the participation of evaluators
from the early stages of assessment of new applications for loans.
Evaluators’ reporting to the Governor and the Bank’s organs has
been aligned with international best practices (for example loan
documents now include a dedicated chapter on “lessons learned” from
evaluation). Moreover, the term of office of newly appointed officials
(governor and vice-governors) is now limited to two mandates.
22. However, the consultations on adjustment to the voting system
have not yet yielded results. This mainly concerns proposals supported
by a number of smaller and medium-sized countries which sought to
revise statutory requirements for majorities to be achieved in voting,
such as for electing chairs of the Bank’s organs or making important
decisions on capital. The deadlock also continues in the Governing
Board on the streamlining of the Bank’s governance model. Despite
these difficulties, member States have shown unity in adopting the
CEB’s new development plan.
3.2. Development Plans
for 2010-2014 / 2014-2016 and the Governor’s proposals for Reform
23. When its Development Plan for 2010-2014 was put in
place, the Bank was confident that Europe was slowly recovering,
although high unemployment and social needs were expected to persist.
Three long-term trends have continued to affect all member States:
population aging, higher energy prices and larger financial needs
of local authorities. Against this background, the Bank was asked
to provide further enhanced support to “priority” countries (that
is, target group countries). The share of loans to these countries
reached 61% of the total loans outstanding at the end of 2012, but
the annual lending volumes dipped, largely because of lower demand
from member States. Similar banks, such as the European Investment
Bank (EIB), faced the same problem.
24. With the continued deterioration of the economic situation,
the CEB was compelled to review its quantitative targets and pay
greater attention to the balancing of risks in its portfolio. A
review by the Banque de France of
the CEB’s prudential framework and internal control system also
called for adjustments in that direction.
25. The backdrop for discussions on the Bank’s new development
plan for the next three years was a clear understanding that major
changes in strategy were needed. This was so because as some of
the earlier assumptions were no longer valid, earlier policy objectives
were not all appropriate and former targets were no longer realistic.
National governments are now concentrating on macroeconomic restructuring,
debt refinancing and efficiency “savings”, to the detriment of fresh
investments. Even the absorption capacity of structural and cohesion
funds in European Union countries diminished (it is 54% on average,
but as low as 26% in Romania and about 40% in Bulgaria, Italy and
Malta). Pro-employment projects will remain of utmost importance
for the Bank’s relevance.
26. The CEB’s Development Plan for the next three years emphasises
the following strategic orientations:
- increased added value of loans and projects in favour
of social investment;
- support to member States concerned in the absorption of
European Union funds, notably for the social sector;
- enhanced flexibility of loans and more “client-needs-oriented”
financing;
- greater support for job creation and preservation, in
particular small and medium-sized enterprises and start-ups;
- developing new ways of financing for strengthening social
cohesion.
27. To ensure more added value, the Bank will provide additional
technical assistance and project monitoring for countries with a
high country index (in line with the two-pronged approach) by using
grants. It might also participate in a project’s financing above
the current limit of 50% and support up to 90% of projects with
the highest expected social impact. Whenever European Union co-financing
is envisaged, the CEB could pay special attention to the needs of
accession countries or those covered by neighbourhood policies (seven CEB
member States are concerned).
28. The Development Plan for 2014-2016 is underpinned by the reform
proposals that the Governor launched when he took office in December
2011. Under the heading “Addressing challenges” he introduced the
following:
- a two-pronged approach
was developed and started to be implemented in 2013 to improve the
screening of projects in terms of potential social added value.
This new method enables the Bank to weigh the merits of each new
project on the basis of country rankings and
more in-depth project rating for the inherent social content. Systematically,
for all the projects financed by the Bank, the method takes into consideration,
among others, the sectoral context, the social impact as well as
the institutional arrangements and sustainability, with emphasis
on the delivery of expected social and economic outcomes;
- a strengthened evaluation function in the Bank;
- increased transparency and explanation of loan documents;
- the reform of the Social Dividend Account (formerly “Selective
Trust Account”) from March 2013 allows the Bank to diversify its
use of grants and to take valuable project-related side initiatives.
29. An important step will be attempts to launch innovative financing
(programme loans) to under-funded public bodies that are crucial
for maintaining viable public services. This means resources not
only for investment, but also – on an exceptional basis – for operational
expenditure to cover any existing or anticipated gaps. Such action
will support sustainability of structural reforms and continuity
of larger projects in a difficult economic setting. Moreover, it
is foreseen to develop co-operation with the private sector (such
as through public–private partnerships) and risk-sharing mechanisms
(mainly in favour of microcredit and improved access to finance
for the vulnerable population).
30. In financial terms, focus on the target countries will be
maintained. Actually, in terms of geographic distribution, the CEB
aims to maintain the 60/40 ratio of disbursements between the target
and non-target group countries, on condition that the Bank preserves
its financial soundness. Loan approvals are expected to recover
to the level of 2010-2011 (that is, between €1.9 and €2.3 billion)
and fund disbursements should stabilise around €1.8 billion as seen
in 2013. The Bank’s “Loan and project financing policy” was accordingly revised
in November 2013, still pursuing conservative risk management orientation,
and regulatory framework adjusted in the light of evolving regulatory
standards (Basle III and IFRS
).
Various stress tests were carried out and support the new framework,
provided that the economic context does not deteriorate significantly.
3.3. Long-term vision
and proposals by the Governor
31. In a highly unstable environment, the Bank’s development
plans realistically cover a shorter time span than before. However,
the Governor’s mission is also to project a longer term vision for
the future. This vision was set out in the electoral platform of
the current Governor (in 2011) and remains a key benchmark guiding the
Bank’s development.
32. The “Towards a stronger Bank” vision statement reaffirms the
mission of “contributing to a socially cohesive and sustainable
Europe in the 21st century”. It insists on continued adjustments
in governance so as to draw maximum strength from the Bank’s comparative
advantages. By far the most important asset for the CEB is its close
links with the Council of Europe, also as reflected in the Bank’s
title. This is what distinguishes the CEB from other development
banks and what should further fuel the complementarity of the two
institutions’ work. Efforts should continue to convince outsiders
to join the partial agreement.
33. The main challenge is and will remain making more precise
social targeting of projects feasible, with emphasis on project
quality, the blending of grants and loans, as well as good management
of risks and uncertainties. It entails enhanced co-operation on
capacity building with both borrowers and financing partners (such
as the European Commission, the EIB and the EBRD).
34. The Bank’s mission would be greatly served by increased visibility.
Building on past steps, the CEB shall therefore continue improving
its communication (external and internal) and public relations,
including with parliamentarians. Dialogue with member countries
(governmental and non-governmental actors) is particularly important
in sharing information, expectations and ambition for the Bank’s
future. In short, the aim is to make the Bank “more relevant, transparent
and effective to the benefit of all stakeholders”.
35. As rapporteur, I appreciated a series of concrete steps in
that direction. These concern mainly:
- the internal restructuring (such as the creation of the
Directorate for Human Development and Internal Services composed
of the Directorate for Human Resources, the Department for Information Technology
and the Department for General Facilities and Security, as well
as new Corporate Social Responsibility Department, a stronger Internal
Audit Unit and the Office of the Chief Compliance Officer) to streamline
the Bank, make it more efficient and better deal with risks and
compliance;
- increased attention to, and concentration of, capacities
on European co-operation and co-operation with other multilateral
development banks through the creation of a cross-directorate Committee
for European Cooperation chaired by a vice-governor and the creation
of the Directorate for European Cooperation and Strategy;
- the adoption of a revised prudential framework (based
on recommendations from the Banque de
France, new Basel III requirements on capital adequacy,
leverage and liquidity, and new methodologies applied by the rating
agencies) and adjustments in development plans;
- increased attention and adaptation to changes in the regulatory
environment which could impact the CEB’s business model;
- the introduction of a two-pronged approach for the better
social targeting of new projects while preserving focus on target
countries;
- new non-lending services;
- the transformation of the Selective Trust Account into
the Social Dividend Account;
- the signature of a memorandum of understanding with the
EBRD;
- a solution for keeping the essential functions of the
secretariat of the partial agreement in Strasbourg;
- improvements in the social climate within the Bank;
- enhanced dialogue with the Bank’s shareholders (through
the Governing Board and the Administrative Council), including the
discussion on the challenges to the Bank’s strategy and the field
visits of projects organised for Board members;
- more attention paid to internal and external communication
(CEB Info newsletter and the strengthening of the Communications
Department) in a spirit of transparency and accountability;
- better information on projects: loan documents have been
restructured and include an executive summary called “The loan and
its social value”, which ensures better and more transparent information on
the project’s social value for the Administrative Council which
approves the loan. The Secretary General of the Council of Europe
continues to issue an opinion as to admissibility based on the project’s conformity
with the political and social aims of the Council of Europe.
We
shall look at these and related issues in the next chapter.
4. Structure and governance:
developments, challenges and response
36. Times are tough and the economic storm is not over.
Many Europeans keep on struggling to survive and entire countries
are grappling with setbacks in development. Their capacities are
weaker – in need of stimulus – to embrace a new, more virtuous development
cycle. The CEB has also been challenged to change so as to adapt
to rapidly evolving external circumstances. However, reforming internal
structures and governance takes time. If there were more trust and
consensus within and between the Bank’s top bodies, as well as in
relation to other Council of Europe bodies, further progress could
be made.
37. As my fact-finding discussions with members of the Governing
Board have shown, there is concern about the speed of progress in
reforming governance. After several years of deliberations, there
are still disagreements among members: some opt for a grand package
deal along the lines of “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”
(like at the World Trade Organization (WTO) over the Doha round
– with limited results after years of talks); while others would
rather see a graduated approach. Yet discussions on “unresolved governance
issues” should eventually produce results, based on greater trust
among Governing Board members and their shared sense of common purpose.
38. In my view, breaking the deadlock requires a fresh look at
the CEB’s key strengths versus weaknesses, and the new, future-oriented
ideas on the table. Some of those ideas should come from the broad
field of the Council of Europe’s work. The Parliamentary Assembly
and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council
of Europe, and their members, too, could propose bankable social
projects to help advance the Organisation’s values on the ground.
However, they need more information and more regular contacts with
the Bank. A CEB stand during the Assembly and Congress sessions
could present information about the Bank, its working methods, ongoing
projects and potential for action, notably in priority countries.
In this context, it would be helpful to clarify the external representation
of the CEB and bring it into line with other international financial institutions.
39. Many of my interlocutors in assessing the Bank’s work noted
the heaviness of its governance structure in relation to the size
of the institution.
Leaner decision-making bodies
could ensure a more efficient decision process and enhance the Bank’s
responsiveness to a changing environment. This might also save some resources
that could in turn be channelled to reinforcing direct project management
capacities within the Bank and among borrowers. Establishing a Board
of Directors with reduced yet balanced membership – as recommended
by the Strategic Review – remains one possible option that could
still be worth considering for the future.
40. Any structural changes in the Bank’s governance are intrinsically
linked to the voting system, which is complex, and can sometimes
be frustrating to the shareholders of the Bank. It has too often
slowed down or blocked decision making, which is not in the general
interest of the Bank. I wish to encourage members of the Governing
Board to reconsider proposals for lowering the majorities required
for decisions on the appointment of top officials.
41. From the angle of corporate social responsibility, the CEB
continues its regular self-assessment by publishing annual dedicated
reports and giving them a prominent place on the Bank’s website.
Moreover, since 2012, the Annual Report of the Governor includes
a separate section on governance and corporate responsibility. This
valuable form of communication is addressed to the general public
to explain the Bank’s mission of socially and environmentally sound
financing and how commercial activity is reconciled with the collective
interest of sustainable development. As this approach draws on the
Council of Europe values enshrined in the European Convention on
Human Rights (ETS No. 5) and the European Social Charter (ETS Nos.
35 and 139), it could be stated more prominently in annual reports.
42. Turning to the challenges of implementing the Bank’s new development
plan for 2014-2016, it will be interesting to see how innovative
investments accompany prudent banking. Member States have squeezed themselves
into the austerity trap and the CEB was pushed into a tighter prudential
framework – a genuine “straight jacket” on social ambitions. If
public–private partnerships seem to be a luring option, prudence
is called for. This is because experience in various European countries
shows that public authorities and taxpayers often get ripped off
on costs over the longer term, whilst profits and rents for the
private sector partners can be exorbitant, with contracts being
covered by excessive commercial secrecy and lack of accountability.
43. Regarding staff policies, the current Governor inherited a
set-up with a certain number of regulatory rigidities and a rather
poor social climate. Before his arrival, following repeated signals
of malaise among staff members, a survey on staff motivation, engagement
and well-being at work was carried out by an external consultant
(at about the same time as a similar study was done at the Council
of Europe). I am confident that changes have been introduced in
a careful and responsible manner, with transparency and fairness
for recruitments, promotions and departures being key aims of the
process. A new staff survey could be useful to assess progress.
Since 2012, a mediator’s function has been put in place and rules
on various allowances have been clarified.
5. Conclusions
and recommendations for future work
44. The CEB’s business model has been challenged by a
difficult economic and financial environment. The Bank therefore
needs to persevere in fine-tuning its activities, structures, working
methods and strategic orientations. It has to do so in order to
respond more effectively and more rapidly to radical changes in
its environment and demands from member States. It should further
maximise the social added-value of its projects, its comparative
advantage and focus. In particular niche activities – sectoral ones
(like prison infrastructure and services and small-scale health
sector projects) and geographical ones (such as non-European Union
countries in south-eastern Europe) – should be expanded.
45. There is much room for further strengthening the CEB’s links
with the Council of Europe, such as in making contributions to supporting
various ongoing campaigns, and co-operation with the European Union towards
strengthening solidarity mechanisms on the ground, in particular
with more co-financing in favour of youth employment, Roma integration
and housing for vulnerable population groups through projects developed within
the Bank’s mandate. Important momentum was created by the changes
introduced recently in terms of social screening and the quality
of projects. The potential for going even more social, including
via further strengthening of the co-operation with the Council of
Europe, ought to be tapped without affecting the Bank’s financial
stability and position on the market. Complementarities between
the CEB, the EIB and the EBRD should be fully exploited and supported
by the member States for boosting project resources, management and
use of best practice.
46. For reforms to succeed and in order to fully tap the Bank’s
potential, all Governing Board members have to contribute towards
change and put aside some of their vested interests. The governing
structure could be streamlined and the voting system simplified
for the sake of greater balance, cost-efficiency and more flexible decision-making.
The evaluation and project support functions could further be strengthened,
not least by investing more in field visits, technical advice and
controls. There is a wealth of creativeness and resources in the
Bank and this constructive power should be optimised to enhance
the CEB’s ambitions for the future.