1. Origin
and aim of the report
On
25 June 2014, Salwa Bugaighis, lawyer, human rights activist and
leading figure in the protests against Colonel Gaddafi, was assassinated.
A former member of the Libyan National Transitional Council, which
she left after a few months in protest at the almost complete lack
of women in that body, she was one of the founding members of the Libyan
Women’s Platform for Peace. She was well known for her opposition
to the armed militias and radical Islamists. She had just returned
to Libya to exercise her right to vote (against the advice of those
close to her on account of the death threats she had received).
On her return home from the polling station, she was attacked by
a group of masked men who stabbed her and shot her twelve times.
Salwa Bugaighis was not the only courageous
woman in this troubled region, nor the only one to have given her
life for the cause of democracy. However, her sacrifice is particularly
painful because, through her independent and consistent stances,
she made a significant contribution to establishing a new country.
To commemorate this woman’s commitment and out of solidarity with
all those, both men and women, who continue her fight, I would like to
dedicate this report to the memory of Salwa Bugaighis.
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1. Parliamentary Assembly
Resolution 1873 (2012) «Equality between women and men: a condition for the success
of the Arab Spring» proposed, for the countries in the region, a
number of measures and reforms to be initiated in order to improve
the status of women and eliminate all forms of discrimination against
them. Some of these suggestions were addressed to all countries
in the region, others to specific countries. They related in particular
to the political representation of women and their participation
in public life, family law, combating violence against women, the
image of women in the media, gender stereotypes, and co-operation with
civil society.
2. In drafting a new report, two years later, I intend to take
stock of the situation in the wake of various key developments in
the political and institutional life of the countries in the region.
This report will look at the direction taken regarding respect for
human rights and the status of women. At the same time, I shall
seek to identify the measures to be taken to improve this status.
3. I would like to reiterate that formulating recommendations
does not mean exporting or imposing the principles and standards
upheld in Europe. The substance of
Resolution 1873 (2012) reflected the aspirations of the women in the region,
as conveyed by their political representatives and civil society.
When drafting my 2012 report, I was able to talk to numerous representatives
from these quarters and was able to see that we shared the same
aims, based on international human rights standards. The widespread
involvement of women in the early stages of the Arab Spring undoubtedly
helped raise awareness of the role they can play in society at all
levels.
4. In this connection, I would like to quote the words of the
Algerian sociologist and political scientist, Feriel Lalami: “As
soon as women’s associations put forward a demand for equality,
they are accused of manipulating or flatly imitating western feminist
movements. This criticism has a strategic aim: to discredit the
movement. However, such calls for changes in the status of women
have their roots in Arab society itself. It has not been imported.
Each women’s association will take specific local forms, fitting
in with the social and political conditions of the country.”
5. Bearing in mind the Council of Europe’s co-operation activities,
in 2012 the Assembly also addressed the Committee of Ministers in
order to help define the general focus of this programme and to
strengthen the components relating to gender equality and to improving
the status of women, making sure that they were made top priorities.
It is intended that this report will also be relevant in this context.
It seeks to provide useful guidance for the Committee of Ministers
in assessing the co-operation activities in the region and identifying priorities
for the future of the programme.
2. A diverse situation
6. The whole southern shore of the Mediterranean has,
to a greater or lesser extent, been affected by what is generally
termed the “Arab Spring”. This term is not entirely accurate given
that several so-called Arab countries are ethnically very diverse,
with in particular a large Amazigh population. A few years later,
this very image of a “Spring” has proved to be deceptive, for in
several countries this season which was so full of initiatives and
hope has not produced the desired results. Nonetheless, the term
“Arab Spring” has become firmly established in the media and will
probably remain so in the collective memory.
7. Despite common features, such as the grass-roots origins of
the protesters, the involvement of young people and women and use
of social networks on the Internet, the movements are very diverse.
The impact has been very uneven in the various countries in question,
since the context, from the outset, was very different. In Egypt,
Libya and Tunisia, autocratic regimes have fallen. In Morocco, the
protests have given strong impetus to a process of democratic reform
initiated a long time ago. In Algeria, the impact has been much
more limited than elsewhere.
8. The situation is also very diverse with regard to women’s
rights. The legal framework, which in Tunisia was historically more
advanced thanks to the choices made post-independence, has developed
positively in Morocco too over the course of the last decade. In
Egypt, under the first post-Mubarak government, the status of women
has deteriorated.
9. In this report, I shall first of all look at the situation
in Morocco and Tunisia, referred to in
Resolution 1873 (2012) as examples to be followed. These two countries have
entered into a close relationship with the Council of Europe. Both
members of the Venice Commission, they have acceded to a number
of Council of Europe conventions and are partners in the co-operation
activities carried out under its neighbourhood policy. Morocco is
also a member of the European Centre for Global Interdependence
and Solidarity (North-South Centre) and its parliament requested
and was granted partner for democracy status with the Parliamentary
Assembly. The Council of Europe has opened programme offices in
Rabat and Tunis. Despite having followed very different paths, both
countries have adopted advanced standards in the field of women’s
rights.
10. Next, I shall outline the situation of women in Libya and
Egypt, where the process of democratic transition is proving particularly
difficult. In Libya, the structures of the State are still too weak
and violence between the various factions continues. In Egypt, the
post-Mubarak era has seen upheaval following the fall of the first
post-revolutionary government headed by the Muslim Brotherhood,
which was overthrown by the army in the wake of mass protests.
11. Lastly, I shall analyse the status of women in Algeria, a
country in which the wind of change has had only limited effects
but in which there have been some positive signs, such as an improvement
in the political representation of women. While I am fully aware
of the political issues which hamper relations between Algeria and
other countries in the region, I sincerely hope that it will strengthen
its co-operation with both its neighbours and Europe.
3. Tunisia following
the adoption of the new constitution
12. Tunisia can be seen as a country in which the revolution
has been a success: following the fall of the regime in power, Tunisia
was able to build democratic institutions. The adoption of a new
constitution on 26 January 2014 marked a major step in Tunisia’s
recent history.
Three years after the first mass demonstrations
and the suspension, in March 2011, of the former constitution, a
process has been completed. The overwhelming majority obtained in
the final vote in the National Constituent Assembly (200 votes in
favour, 12 against and 4 abstentions) demonstrates the strength
of the agreement between the Islamists of Ennahda, having a relative
majority with 89 seats out of 217, and the other political forces.
13. The National Constituent Assembly asked the European Commission
for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission), to issue an opinion
on the draft constitution. The Venice Commission examined the provisions,
article by article, in order to verify whether the draft complied
with the fundamental texts of international law regarding democratic
functioning, civil liberties and the rule of law. Its aim was also
to identify any shortcomings and, where necessary, make recommendations
to rectify these. The Venice Commission’s opinion,
published
on 17 October 2013, praised the “outstanding work accomplished by
the Tunisian National Constituent Assembly” and the clear reference
to “fundamental rights”, welcoming the fact that the draft constitution,
firstly, was based “on the universal principles of democracy and
human rights” and created, for the first time in the history of
Tunisia, “an independent Constitutional Court”.
14. At the same time, the Venice Commission noted some inconsistency
between certain articles, for example with regard to the balance
and functioning of powers and the provisions concerning the profession
of one’s faith. Following the publication of the opinion, the work
of the National Constituent Assembly continued for several months
up to the promulgation of the Constitution. I would like to emphasise
that the request for an opinion submitted by President Ben Jaafar
afforded an opportunity for fruitful co-operation between the new Tunisia
and the Council of Europe, and constituted a positive response to
the recommendations contained in Assembly
Resolution 1873 (2012).
15. The adoption of a new Tunisian Constitution represents the
fulfilment of the democratic aspirations of the demonstrators in
2010 and 2011. At the same time, a new process began. Following
the dismantling of the former State and the creation of democratic
institutions, it is essential to implement the democratic principles set
out in the new constitution.
3.1. The principle of
gender equality in the new constitution: the challenge of implementation
16. In the course of the work of the Tunisian National
Constituent Assembly, the debate over the principle of “complementarity”
between women and men had given rise to serious concerns. The text
approved by the National Constituent Assembly’s Committee on Rights
and Freedoms in August 2012 provided that “the State shall ensure
the protection of women and their achievements in accordance with
the principle of complementarity with men within the family and
as the associates of men in the development of the homeland”. This
provision sought to eliminate the principle of gender equality and
expressed “a total rejection of the human rights of women”, striking
a blow to their dignity and citizenship. This was condemned by the
Tunisian section of Amnesty International and by the Tunisian Association
of Democratic Women.
17. In its final version, Article 21 establishes the principle
of equality between women and men. The text approved in plenary
session on 6 January 2014, by an overwhelming majority of 159 votes
out of 169 votes cast, stipulates that “[a]ll citizens, male and
female, have equal rights and duties, and are equal before the law without
any discrimination ...”.
18. Those with whom I spoke during my fact-finding visit to Tunisia
on 16 June 2014 confirmed this feeling of satisfaction, and indeed
relief, at what had been accomplished with the adoption of the new
constitution. At the same time, as Ms Samira Merai, member of parliament
for the Afek Tounes party so rightly said, “the threat is ever present”:
in the field of human rights, nothing is settled once and for all,
in Tunisia as elsewhere. There is still a danger that what Tunisia
has achieved with regard to women’s rights could once again be put
into question.
19. Article 46 lays down obligations for the Tunisian State to
implement the principle of equality: “The State commits to protect
women’s long-standing rights and shall work to strengthen and develop
those rights. The State guarantees the equality of opportunities
between women and men to have access to all levels of responsibility
in all domains. The State works to attain parity between women and
men in elected assemblies. The State takes all necessary measures
in order to eradicate violence against women.” This wording is fairly comprehensive
and, in my view, positive. The challenge for the years ahead resides
in the practical implementation of these commitments.
3.2. Political participation
by women: the principle of parity and alternation on voting lists
20. On 11 April 2011, the High Authority responsible
for preparing the 24 July election of the Tunisian Constituent Assembly
decided to formally establish parity on voting lists. The International
Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) commented favourably on this
decision, describing Tunisia as a country in the forefront “regarding
women’s participation in political life”. This vote, carried by
a substantial majority, provided that all lists must be gender balanced
and show men and women candidates alternately.
21. Five months later, when the lists were submitted, women represented
only 5% of the candidates heading a list. The fragmentation of the
political forces brought about a proliferation of lists, which greatly
weakened the impact of the principle of alternation. Only 49 women
(out of 217 Assembly members) had the opportunity of participating
in the drafting of the new constitution and consolidating their
gains. It is essential to prevent such undesired effects of the
electoral legislation by drafting laws promoting both horizontal
and vertical parity.
22. Tunisian women, young ones included, can and wish to participate
in political life. However, lack of opportunities for acquiring
experience, and the absence of real dialogue in the forums that
exist prevent many women from participating more actively in political
life. In this context, cyber-activism has offered women a new platform
for engaging in political dialogue and freely expressing their political
opinions. According to the findings of the Centre for Arab Women’s
Training and Research (CAWTAR) which has been providing documentation
on the participation of Tunisian women in politics since 2011, it
is easier for a woman in Tunisia to manage a blog or a website in
complete independence than to participate in the activities of a
political movement. Despite this cyber-activism, politics has a
tendency to reproduce the traditional forms of discrimination: women’s
access to the institutions continues to be more difficult.
In addition, as those with whom
I spoke in Tunisia pointed out, so far there has been a lack of
training for elected representatives in equality issues.
3.3. Violence against
women
23. As indicated above, the Tunisian State authorities
have undertaken to implement the necessary measures to eradicate
violence against women. I wholeheartedly welcome the formalisation
of this ambitious undertaking in the text of the constitution. Gender-related
violence is widespread and underestimated in virtually all countries,
and Tunisia is no exception. A very full report on violence against
women was published in December 2010, on the eve of the demonstrations
that triggered the Arab Spring. According to the report, 47.6% of
women aged 18 to 64 say that they have suffered at least one form
of violence (physical or psychological) during their lives.
24. In order to implement Article 46 of the constitution, it will
be necessary to commit resources for updating and amplifying knowledge
of the problem, to establish an adequate legislative framework,
and to adopt appropriate policies on this issue.
25. The launch by the Ministry for Women and Family Affairs in
December 2013 of an enlarged consultation process with representatives
of the various government departments and civil society with a view
to drawing up a draft framework law to combat violence again women,
which is due to be tabled on 25 November 2014, is a step in the
right direction. This demonstrates the political will not only to
tackle the problem but also to do so inclusively, in co-operation
with civil society, which is bound to make the action more effective.
26. Ms Neila Chaabane, State Secretary for Women and Family Affairs,
whom I was able to meet in Tunis, told me that in June 2014 this
draft framework law was still being drawn up and was at a very advanced
stage, and that the draft law on combating human trafficking had
been finalised. Unfortunately, it was not certain that these two
draft laws would be debated before the end of the Assembly’s term
(the elections will be held in October 2014).
27. The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating
Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (ETS No. 210, “Istanbul
Convention”), which entered into force on 1 August 2014, is a major reference
text in this field, even beyond the borders of Europe. The Tunisian
authorities could bring their legislation closer into line with
the provisions of the convention and draw on this instrument in
framing integrated policies. In due course they should, I feel,
consider the possibility of acceding to the Convention.
28. However, Ms Chaabane said that Tunisia’s accession to the
Istanbul Convention was not currently on the agenda. The priority
of the country’s authorities was to have an appropriate range of
legal instruments in the field of combating violence against women,
without that necessarily falling within the context of its international
obligations.
29. This seems to me to be a reasonable approach, provided that
the fight against violence is pursued proactively, in proportion
to the seriousness of the problem. Tunisia is, quite rightly, proud
of its democratic progress and wishes to follow its own path in
developing legislation and policies on gender equality. However, this
should not rule out, in the medium term, the gradual alignment with
international standards, which would be helpful not only in the
field of violence against women, but also in respect of other human
rights violations. With regard to trafficking in human beings, for
example, the harmonisation of legal norms – in order to ensure consistency
in what constitutes an offence – is as important as co-operation
between police forces.
3.4. Withdrawal of reservations
to the CEDAW: relaunching legislative reforms
30. Among the recommendations specifically made to Tunisia
in
Resolution 1873 (2012) was the withdrawal of the general declaration concerning
the interpretation of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), under which the Tunisian
Government declared “that it shall not take any organisational or
legislative decision in conformity with the requirements of this
Convention where such a decision would conflict with the provisions
of Chapter I of the Tunisian Constitution”. In the aftermath of adopting
a new Constitution, the Tunisian authorities should reconsider this
declaration, which weakens the scope of the obligations accepted
under the convention.
31. However, although the general declaration remains in place,
on 24 April 2014, the United Nations confirmed receipt of notification
of the withdrawal of the specific reservations made by the Tunisian Government
in 1985 upon ratification of the CEDAW on 16 August 2011. The Council
of Ministers of the transitional government adopted the draft legislative
decree on the withdrawal of the specific reservations. The reservations
related in particular to equality of spouses during marriage and
upon its dissolution, parental authority, the wife’s right to confer
her surname or nationality on her children and the right of choice
of residence. In the past, these reservations had the direct effect
of halting the reforms designed to improve women’s legal status
and implement the principle of equality.
Today, the formalisation of the
lifting of the reservations should facilitate the implementation
of the principles enshrined in the constitution: I cannot but enthusiastically
welcome this encouraging development.
3.5. Women and the media
in Tunisia
32. Tunisian women do not have sufficient visibility
in the media. This aspect of life in Tunisia, revealed in various
studies,
was mentioned several times
during my talks in Tunisia. The media, and in particular television,
continue to convey an image of women reflecting old gender stereotypes.
In addition, women involved in politics are only very rarely represented
in the media, which constitutes a further obstacle to their public
activity.
4. Morocco: gender
equality in the legislation and its implementation
33. This year marks the tenth anniversary of the adoption
of the “Moudawana”, the Family Code which was hailed
at the time of its adoption as a major advance for women’s rights
in Morocco. Ten years later, and despite the considerable progress
made, more still needs to be done to improve implementation of this
text.
34. A discrepancy remains between the seminal principles of Moroccan
family law and the relevant practice, including that of the courts.
The example of underage marriages illustrates this situation. Article
19 of the current Family Code stipulates that matrimonial capacity
is acquired at 18 years of age for young people of both sexes (in
the former code, the stipulated age was 16 years for girls). However,
Article 20 grants family courts power to authorise the marriage
of persons under that age. According to data released by the Ministry
of Justice, the number of underage marriages doubled between 2004
and 2011, increasing from some 18 000 to 39 000.
These marriages sometimes involve
girls aged 13 to 15. This practice conforms to the letter, but certainly
not the spirit, of the law: it is a form of discrimination and is
detrimental to the personal development of the girls concerned.
The Moroccan authorities should place strict limits on the possibility
of approving underage marriage and in no circumstances allow it
under the age of 16.
35. A general problem with the Family Code is that it is not applied
uniformly. In rural areas, particularly the more remote, women and
children are more vulnerable to discrimination and violations of
their rights. Furthermore, they have more difficulties in their
access to justice. In the last few years, activities to raise women’s
awareness and inform them of the protection afforded by law have
been organised. At the same time there should be training for members
of the judiciary, especially those applying family law, in order
to harmonise practices in the country. Raising the awareness of
citizens and specifically women, and providing training for judges
are crucial for widening women’s access to justice.
36. An improvement to the country’s legal system may occur in
the near future thanks, amongst other things, to co-operation with
the Council of Europe. In May 2013, Morocco obtained from the Committee
of Ministers of the Council of Europe observer status with the European
Commission for the Effectiveness of Justice (CEPEJ). The CEPEJ had
been collaborating closely with the Moroccan authorities since 2012
under a Council of Europe co-operation programme with Morocco and
Tunisia, with the support of the European Union. It is a programme to
strengthen the independence and effectiveness of both countries’
judicial systems. The access of women to justice and the implementation
of the Family Code could benefit from the impact of these co-operation activities.
37. The 2011 Moroccan Constitution represented a major step forward
from the standpoint of the principle of gender equality in the country:
according to Article 19, “[m]en and women equally enjoy the rights
and freedoms of a civil, political, economic, social, cultural and
environmental character set forth in this Title and in the other
provisions of the Constitution, as well as in the international
conventions and covenants duly ratified by Morocco, in accordance
with the provisions of the Constitution, the constants and the laws
of the Kingdom. The State works for the realisation of parity between
men and women. An authority for parity and combating of all forms
of discrimination is created to that effect”.
38. This authority, which will concern itself primarily with equality
between women and men, will be crucial in applying this principle
enshrined in the Constitution. It had appeared that this authority
was almost ready to be set up, following the finalisation in October
2013 of a draft law to this effect. The text was prepared by a multidisciplinary
committee which examined the memorandums submitted by civil society
and worked in consultation with several State departments and the
Council of Europe (Venice Commission, secretariat of the Human Dignity
and Equality Division). It was a positive response to the demands
of the Parliamentary Assembly and yet another signal from the Moroccan
authorities of their readiness for co-operation with the Council
of Europe.
However, during my visit to Morocco,
I noted that there has been no further progress made since then.
39. There is no recent news even concerning the reservations made
by Morocco when it ratified the Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Discrimination against Women. The reservation made
to Article 29.1 on the obligation to submit to arbitration any dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of the convention,
and the declaration relating to Article 2, still stand. This declaration
states that the Moroccan Government is ready to apply the provisions
of this article provided that they do not conflict with Islamic
law.
40. The inclusion in the government plan for equality ICRAM (the
Concerted Initiative for the Strengthening of the Achievements of
Moroccan Women), which I shall discuss below, of the words “Morocco’s
commitment to enforce the provisions of international conventions,
particularly the CEDAW, as ratified by Morocco” clearly indicates
that Morocco does not wish to lift the general reservation.
41. I hope that in the near future Morocco will come even closer
to the CEDAW standards by renouncing every reservation and this
declaration. It would also be expedient to sign and ratify the optional
Protocol to the CEDAW, recognising the competence of the Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women to receive complaints
from individuals or groups, as recommended by
Resolution 1873 (2012).
42. The ICRAM Plan, referred to above, is a major contribution
to securing gender equality. Adopted in June 2013 on the basis of
a partnership agreement between Morocco and the European Union for
its financing, this programme has eight focal points. These include
upgrading the education and training system on the basis of equity
and equality, the social and economic empowerment of women, and
achieving equal opportunities between men and women on the job market.
43. Adopting a realistic starting point (the government recognises
that the lessons learned from the past decade confirm that gender
disparities continue to exist) this plan is based on a cross-sectoral
approach, making gender equality a goal to be pursued by all ministries,
under the co-ordination of the Ministry of Solidarity, Women, Family
Affairs and Social Development.
44. During my visit to Morocco, I was able to meet Ms Bassima
Hakkaoui, Minister for Solidarity, Women, Family Affairs and Social
Development, to take stock of changes in the status of women in
Morocco. Ms Hakkaoui felt that there was a continuous improvement
in this status, a positive change of attitudes and greater visibility
of gender equality issues. She expressed her commitment to regular
consultation with civil society. I believe that significant progress
has been achieved, but that the inequalities that persist require
an ongoing effort by the authorities. In addition, the outreach
to organisations representing women’s rights is a very important
aspect. It should apply to all these organisations whose extremely
important role in the progress achieved in recent years must be
acknowledged.
45. The ICRAM plan expresses the Moroccan Government’s commitment
to moving towards gender equality. This is a goal requiring considerable
and determined efforts. However, on 17 June, the day I met Ms Hakkaoui,
the Prime Minister said in parliament that today Moroccan women
were neglecting their age-old role of wife and mother in order to
find a position in society. He added that women had a more important
role to play in the home than in a company or administrative authority.
I find these words to be in manifest contradiction to the plan adopted
by the government, and it is essential to go beyond this contradiction
in order to ensure that the plan receives all the support it needs.
46. At the same time, this plan demonstrates the major role that
international co-operation can play. The financial support of the
European Union, with a contribution amounting to some 45 million
euros, represents a significant lever to strengthen action on this
front.
4.1. Women’s participation
in public and political life
47. Women’s political representation in parliament has
improved significantly of late. This is due primarily to the electoral
legislation in force: a quota system allocates 60 seats to the lists
reserved for women, while leaving other female candidates the possibility
of standing for election on the general lists. The outcome of this system
at the last elections was to raise to 67 the number of women among
the 395 members of the Chamber of Representatives, almost double
the number in the previous legislature.
48. The Parliamentary Assembly has always been in favour of electoral
quotas reserved for women. This is a necessary measure to put an
end to situations of inequality that are firmly rooted in certain
countries. It should be a measure with a limited time-frame. In
Morocco, this measure has led to some very positive results. In future
it is desirable that the number of women elected on the general
lists increases. I wish to emphasise that all political players
can, and should, contribute to this change: political parties in
particular have an important role to play. It is a matter of reflecting
in political life the changes that have long since occurred in Moroccan society,
where women occupy an important and more and more visible place.
49. At local government level, the law enacted in 2011 also provides
for quotas: at least one third of the seats in regional councils,
which are elected directly, must be reserved for women. For elections
in the municipalities and districts, the law adopts the system of
additional electoral constituencies reserved for women.
Despite its recent enactment, this
legislation will be comprehensively reformed in the near future.
The next municipal elections will
be held in 2015. Before then, “no fewer than 10 laws, 5 of them
institutional acts” are to be drafted, as the Minister of the Interior,
Mohamed Hassad, announced. I hope that the new statutes will put
into effect the principle of parity enshrined in the Moroccan Constitution,
consolidating and enhancing the attainments of the earlier electoral
legislation.
50. Women’s increasingly significant participation at all levels
of Moroccan political life should be reflected in the composition
of the government. Two women currently sit in the executive as ministers,
and four are junior ministers. I hope that future governments will
witness more meaningful participation by women, as has already been
the case in the past, or ideally a gender-balanced composition.
This would significantly exemplify the application of the principle
of equality as proclaimed in Article 19 of the Moroccan Constitution.
4.2. Violence against
women
51. There has been progress in efforts to combat violence
against women. A few months ago, for example, we welcomed the approval
of an amendment to Article 475 of the Moroccan Criminal Code. Henceforth
it will no longer be possible for the culprit of an abduction or
rape of a minor to escape conviction by marrying his victim. Once
again, this was a measure called for by the Assembly in
Resolution 1873 (2012) and strongly advocated by Moroccan civil society. In
2012, the suicide of Amina Filali, a girl who preferred death to
married life with her rapist, aroused protests from defenders of
women’s rights.
52. This reform has confirmed the determination of the Moroccan
authorities to act to improve the status of women. They should assert
themselves more in that respect, particularly by adopting legislation
and coherent, systematic policies on prevention of violence against
women, based on the protection of victims and on the recognition
of their rights.
53. In November 2013, the Minister for Solidarity, Women, Family
Affairs and Social Development, Ms Hakkaoui, presented a bill on
violence against women. This seeks to criminalise all violations
of women’s physical integrity, harassment, forced marriage and the
misuse of family financial resources. The bill has been criticised
by civil society because of a number of inconsistencies (it also
includes provisions on violence against children) and because civil
society movements and associations were not consulted. Therefore,
and without the hoped-for political backing, no progress with examining
it has been made in recent months.
54. What I have written about Tunisia also holds true for Morocco:
I hope that the country’s legislation will gradually come into line
with the standards of the Istanbul Convention and that the authorities
will consider requesting accession to this instrument. The Parliamentary
Assembly and the Council of Europe as a whole are ready to co-operate
on this.
4.3. The representation
of women in the Moroccan media
55. There is still insufficient representation of women
in the Moroccan media, and all too often it is based on stereotypes.
In 2012, the High Authority for Audiovisual Communication (HACA)
conducted a study on this issue and recommended a change to the
Audiovisual Act in order to combat any violation of the dignity
of women in the media and, at the same time, to strengthen the presence
of women. In July 2014, the Minister for Communication, Mustapha
El Khalfi, in reply to a parliamentary question, expressed regret
at the current situation. The involvement of women in media programmes
in the fourth quarter of 2013 was less than 10% of airtime.
56. The media need to be brought into line with the social reality
of the country, or indeed be ahead of it. Legislation should be
reformed, as recommended by HACA, but the various stakeholders in
the communication world can play a key role on their own initiative.
For example, in March 2014, the second national Moroccan channel,
2M, adopted a “Charter to enhance the image of women”. The channel
has undertaken to promote the role of women as economic, social
and political agents, to combat stereotypes and diversify its programming,
taking into account the changes in the status of women.
5. Algeria between
isolation and progress
57. In 2013, Algeria was ranked 124th out of 136 countries
by the World Economic Forum in its annual report on the gender gap.
This report was drawn up, amongst other things, on the basis of
statistical criteria such as female labour force participation and
economic prospects, education, political responsibilities, health
and life expectancy.
58. In Algeria, the protests did not achieve such major results
as in other countries in the region and the measures adopted by
the authorities were a mixture of clampdowns, limited political
openness and social assistance, as if the only aim was to restore
order rather than make genuine progress. In April 2014, following the
re-election of President Bouteflika with an overwhelming majority,
Mr Amar Saadani, Secretary General of the National Liberation Front
(FLN) – the party that has dominated the political scene since independence
– said that the FLN was opposed to any form of transition and that
“anyone who wished to import the Arab Spring into Algeria [did]
not know Algeria very well”.
59. Algeria is continuing along its chosen path in relative isolation,
responding to internal dynamics rather than major international
political currents. The political activism of women has been eroded
by the years of violence and terrorism that had engulfed the country.
However, civil society has seen an upsurge of activity in recent
years – reflecting the key role it has played in the region – and
women’s NGOs are no exception. These organisations have exerted
increasing pressure on the Algerian authorities to legislate on,
amongst other things, violence against women and to reform the Family
Code. In addition, they have established co-operation with their
counterparts in neighbouring countries, taking part for example
in the Tunis Social Forum in 2013. This marks a departure, which
must be supported and encouraged, from the tendency towards the
isolation of one part of the social and political forces in the
country.
5.1. Public and political
life, an increase in the participation of women
60. In 2008, the reform of the Algerian Constitution
introduced the first major signs of change with the introduction
of Article 31
bis.
Under this article, “[t]he State
shall work for the promotion of political rights of women by increasing
their chances of access to representation in elected assemblies”.
In January 2012, the implementing arrangements for this article
were laid down by an institutional act
introducing quotas. In the course
of numerous debates which preceded its passing, it was amended to
such an extent that its substance was somewhat diluted, but nonetheless
there has, as a result, been a significant increase in the number
of elected women.
61. For example, women’s representation rose from 7.7% to 32%
in the People’s National Assembly, from 6.6% to 29.7% in the People’s
Assemblies of the wilayas (provinces), and from 9% to 16.5% in the
municipal people’s assemblies. None of these women have become president
of the assembly to which they have been elected. With regard to
the executive branch, there are nine women in the 33 ministerial
posts in the Algerian Government, seven of whom were appointed on
7 May 2014. Women judges comprise 45% of the judiciary – a high
rate which has not recently changed significantly. Algeria’s efforts
to move towards parity at the institutional level should not be
ignored.
5.2. Participation of
women in economic life
62. In a report published by the National Statistics
Office in 2013,
women accounted for only 17.6% of
the total working population: a very low rate which has increased
very little in recent years. At the same time, the figures published
by this institute show that it is more difficult for women to enter
the private sector. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that
many women continue with their studies and the higher their level
of education, the narrower the gap in the hiring rate compared with
men.
63. The influence of traditions remains a significant obstacle
to the participation of women in economic life: while the main reason
for not seeking work given by men (in 39.8% of cases) is the belief
that they will not find any, 53.7% of women (compared with 1.2%
of men) state that it is for family reasons that they opt not to
work.
64. Current labour legislation and policies do not offer women
appropriate protection. Law No. 11 of 1990 admittedly introduced
the principle of equal pay for workers without any discrimination,
but gender equality in the employment sector is not merely a question
of remuneration. It also encompasses access, career prospects and
many other aspects.
5.3. Violence against
women
65. In the fight to combat violence against women, in
2007 Algeria launched a national strategy, but the results have
so far fallen short of what is required. Considerable improvements
also need to be made to the legislation. The current law is based
on a very partial approach and penalises only physical attacks.
In January 2012, the group of NGOs “Stop the violence! Rights for
women now” managed to obtain the 40 signatures of members of parliament
necessary for a private member’s bill, but the latter has never
been tabled for debate in plenary session.
This is an example of the upsurge
in NGO activity, exerting pressure on parliament to come up with
a modern law, criminalising all the types of violence of which women
are the victims.
66. The attitude of the different people concerned vis-à-vis this
phenomenon is a problem: in 2008, a survey by the National Statistics
Office showed that 68% of Algerian women accepted violence from
their husbands. Judges also seem little prepared for dealing with
cases of violence, including rape.
It was based on this finding that
a communication plan
was initiated as an integral part
of the national strategy to combat violence against women,
which became operational in November
2013 with the setting up of a national committee. Its main task
is to train the media in how to raise awareness of this problem
among various target audiences.
5.4. The Family Code:
the need for reform
67. The Algerian Family Code was reformed in 2005.
Numerous changes were introduced,
often with considerable symbolic force: for example, abolition of
the woman’s duty of obedience to her husband, and the formal declaration
of equality between spouses in the family. However, inequalities
remain in a fair number of provisions. For example, women must be
assisted by a guardian in order to marry. Polygamy is legal – this
is the case in most countries in the region, with Tunisia being
the only one to have proscribed it, but it is nonetheless a clear
violation of equality between women and men. Parental authority
is recognised to women only in the event of divorce. Furthermore,
the conditions for seeking a divorce are much stricter for women
than for men.
68. Despite the innovations introduced in 2005, the Family Code
is in need of radical new reforms. The challenge here goes far beyond
the relations governed by private law. As the sociologist Feriel
Lalami, whom I have already quoted, says, “the trade unions and
the progressive parties have seized upon the question of the Family
Code. For example, the associations striving to combat violence
against women since the early 2000s cite this Code as the main source
of violence”.
69. Reform of the Family Code in a genuinely egalitarian way is
absolutely essential. I believe we must support the efforts of civil
society to this end and, at the same time involve, in particular
through interparliamentary co-operation, the national authorities
that are in a position to carry out such reform.
6. Libya: women’s
rights against the background of rebuilding the country
70. “Tunisia is struggling alone to keep the hopes of
democracy alive. Egypt has fallen back into a military dictatorship
which is crushing any attempts at opposition. And Libya is engulfed
in destructive chaos.” That is how the newspaper Le Monde summed
up the situation in these countries of North Africa in an editorial
on 13 January 2014, three years after the start of the Arab Spring
uprisings. At the conference in Rabat on 16 and 17 June, Shahrazad
Magrabi, representative of the Libyan Women’s Forum, gave a very
clear description of the difficulties experienced by women in her
country. Flagrant inequalities, political pressure and patriarchal mindsets
persist, exacerbated by the context of a State in collapse. Her
call for help was explicit and must be heeded. I hope, through this
report, to help ensure that it is heard.
71. Following the collapse of Colonel Gaddafi’s dictatorial regime,
calm has never been fully restored in Libya. To have an idea of
the chaos in the country, one need only think of the 260 successive
demonstrations against the government and parliament that took place
in 2013, or the proclamation of an autonomous Cyrenaican government
by Ibrahim Jadhran, a militia leader.
72. Demonstrations and, what is more alarming, outbreaks of violence,
have never ceased. These included the kidnapping of the Prime Minister
in a hotel in the heart of Tripoli in October 2013 (he was released
a few days later), the attack by armed men on a military checkpoint
50 km from Benghazi and the assassination of Fethallah Al Gaziri
(new head of military intelligence) at the end of December, quite
apart from the escape of 1 200 inmates from Benghazi prison on 28
July, at the end of a week in which the town was rocked by a series of
political assassinations. In January 2014, armed men burst into
parliament demanding the resignation of the Prime Minister, while
the Deputy Industry Minister, Hassan Al-Droui, was assassinated
in Sirte and five employees of the Egyptian embassy were kidnapped.
73. Building democratic institutions is proving difficult in a
country where Muammar Gaddafi had neither built a State, nor entirely
dismantled the previous tribal system. It is a deeply divided country,
where the rivalries between parties, which are based on armed militias,
are so great that stabilisation seems a far-off prospect.
The
divisions are also geographical, as there are clear differences
between the three main regions, Tripoli, Cyrenaica and Fezzan. There
is also an Amazigh (Berber) minority which has its own specific
demands.
74. In spite of these difficulties, Libya is seeking to move forward
and establish new institutional arrangements based on the rule of
law. The first democratic elections in the country’s history were
held in July 2012. The National Forces Alliance, which is regarded
as largely secular, won the elections with 39 of the 80 seats, as
against 17 for the Muslim Brotherhood. The country went to the polls
again in February 2014 to elect the Constituent Assembly. Two months
later, the Assembly elected its President, the liberal, Ali Tarhouni, former
exile and former Minister for Finance and Oil in the National Transitional
Council. Although also known as the Council of 60 for the number
of members it should have had, the Constituent Assembly actually
has 47 members: in some constituencies, voting did not take place
because of continuing violence and of boycotts (the Amazigh minority
did not take part despite two seats being reserved for it).
75. In a further sign of the country’s instability, the Assembly
sits in Bayda, a thousand kilometres from the capital. This is not
only for symbolic reasons (the first Libyan Constitution was drawn
up in the town in 1951) but above all because it is safer. The national
parliament in Tripoli has often come under attack.
76. Against such a troubled background, the difficulty in promoting
women’s rights is obvious and there is always a risk of backsliding.
In February 2013, for instance, the Libyan Supreme Court partially
overturned the ban on men marrying several women. That is a big
step backwards, given that polygamy was strictly prohibited under
Gaddafi.
6.1. Political representation
of women
77. A 2013 poll by the International Foundation for Electoral
Systems showed that a high percentage of Libyan women are interested
in the political situation in their country (77%). Two thirds of
them (66%) said they had taken part in the 2012 elections, while
the corresponding figure among men was 88%. There is therefore a
significant disparity between the two groups, which more information
and awareness raising for women would help to overcome.
78. Of the 200 members of the General National Congress, 33 (17%)
are women. The 2012 electoral law introduced a hybrid system: 120
seats are based on the majority (first-past-the-post) system and
80 on a proportional representation system, with lists on which
male and female candidates must alternate. That is a completely
new development for Libya. These arrangements had a positive impact,
leading to the election of a number of women to the Congress. However,
as the report by the European Union election assessment team noted,
the impact of the male–female alternation on the lists was limited
by the fragmentation of parties, as, in some cases, only the head
of the list, usually a man, was elected.
79. At municipal level, the law provides for three types of lists,
including one for women only. However, it does not introduce quotas
or other measures for ensuring that a minimum percentage of women
are represented in municipal councils. In my view, while there is
a clear will to promote the political representation of women at
all levels, this should now be put into practice through consistent
legislation. The Council of Europe, in particular through the Venice
Commission, would be one of the most appropriate bodies for supporting
a process of that kind. I hope that co-operation can be established
between the Council of Europe and Libya, as is the case with neighbouring
Tunisia and other countries in the region.
80. In the election to the Constituent Assembly, where political
parties were not officially represented, and all candidatures were
individual, only 73 of the 692 registered candidates were women.
6.2. Women’s participation
in economic life
81. Traditionally, and even under the Gaddafi regime
in spite of its apparent openness to gender issues, Libyan women
in work were stigmatised and their employment was seen as a sign
of neediness or of the absence of a man capable of meeting family
needs. The 2011 revolution had an impact on attitudes, as women played
new and leading roles, including supporting the uprising financially
(in particular by collecting funds and selling jewellery to help
meet the cost of the struggle against the regime). The current situation
is very fluid, as the country is in the process of rebuilding its
economy following the destruction caused by the civil war. It is vital
that the authorities support women’s participation in economic life
in Libya. Given that their level of education is the same as for
men (according to UNESCO data, in Libya, as in some other Arab countries,
there are more female than male science graduates), they should
be able to make a contribution in all productive sectors and at
all levels.
6.3. Violence against
women: rape as a weapon of war
82. Libyan legislation on violence against women is currently
seriously inadequate. The country’s authorities should address this
issue without delay because the only existing provisions, set out
in the 1984 law on marriage and divorce, are outdated and ineffective.
Firstly, violence is deemed “a crime against the honour and the
family of the woman”, rather than against the woman as an individual.
Rapists can absolve themselves of guilt merely by making statements
that the victims consented. That explains the limited number of
victims who report the offence: the social stigma associated with
rape is compounded by a total lack of protection for victims.
83. More attention has focused on a very serious problem that
emerged in Libya during the 2011 revolution in particular. This
involved systematic rape perpetrated by forces of the Gaddafi regime
as a means of suppressing the revolt, in particular in the town
of Misrata in the west of the country. Sexual violence was practised
widely by Gaddafi and his entourage throughout his rule, as the
press reported after his downfall. In 2011, however, it spread in
an unprecedented manner.
84. I can only welcome the passing
by the Libyan Government on 19 February 2014 of a legislative decree recognising
women victims of rape during the 2011 revolution as “war victims”.
In providing the victims with medical, financial and legal assistance,
the measure seeks, above all, to protect these women and compensate for
the harm they suffered. At the same time, the decree should make
it possible to determine the number of cases of rape and gain a
better insight into the extent of the problem, which has never been
properly assessed. It is an innovative law which goes in the right
direction: I would add my voice to those of people such as Souhayr Belhassan,
Honorary President of the International Federation for Human Rights
(FIDH), who say that other countries should follow this example.
It is essential that the Libyan National General Council takes ownership of
this text and that it passes the decree together with an implementing
decree. This would also be an opportunity to improve its wording
since, as Céline Bardet, an international lawyer who helped draft
the text, explains, it does not give a precise definition of rape.
Furthermore, at present, there is no financial projection to ensure
implementation of the decree.
7. Egypt
85. In the past few years, Egypt has seen as much upheaval
as Libya. The 2011 revolution in the country led to the fall of
Hosni Mubarak’s authoritarian regime. In May 2012, Mohamed Morsi,
the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood, was elected president.
In December, the Egyptian people approved a new constitution by
a large majority in a referendum. However, mass protests developed
against the regime, as Egyptians were increasingly disappointed
by the deteriorating economic situation and concerned about the
gradual Islamisation of the State. In 2013, President Morsi was
overthrown by the army, which suspended the new constitution in
July. The chaos continued: a month later, the demonstrations by
the overthrown president’s supporters were violently crushed. Five
hundred demonstrators were killed by the armed forces on 14 August 2013,
and 50 died two days later.
86. In December 2013, a new draft constitution was presented.
Based on the text suspended a few months previously, the 2013 draft
was more modern and secular. Although Article 2 providing that Sharia
was the “main source of legislation” was retained, religiously based
political parties were banned, as under the Mubarak regime. The
text is much more modern than the previous one in terms of civil
liberties. Freedom of belief is recognised as an absolute principle.
Gender equality is reasserted, whereas the previous constitution
made no provision for it. Moreover, for the first time in the country’s
legislation, the text refers to international human rights conventions.
The January 2014 referendum approved
the new constitution with a vote of 98.1%. The next stage in the
stabilisation of the country was a new presidential election in
May 2014. Abdel Fattah El-Sissi, former Army Chief and Minister
of Defence, won the election with an overwhelming majority of around
94% of the vote.
7.1. The situation of
Egyptian women between the past and the near future
87. During the 2000s, the Mubarak regime introduced several
reforms to improve the situation of women. The Nationality Act,
under which both parents could pass on Egyptian nationality without
discrimination, and the establishment of a family affairs court
to speed up the administration of justice in matters of personal
status were steps in the right direction. The establishment of the
National Council for Women (and a National Council for Motherhood
and Childhood) were also signs of political will for modernisation,
even though, as in other authoritarian regimes in the region, the
sincerity of the authorities’ intentions could easily be questioned.
88. Today, the challenge for the defenders of women’s rights in
Egypt is to defend these advances, which have been seriously undermined
since Mubarak’s downfall, and reinforce them on the basis of democratic processes.
That is no easy task: according to a poll of 336 gender experts
at global level by Thomson Reuters, published in November 2013,
Egypt is the country in the Arab world where the situation of women
is the most difficult. This ranking is a direct result of widespread
violence and sexual harassment and the still high rates of female
genital mutilation in the country, as well as discriminatory legislation
and the scourge of human trafficking.
7.2. Participation and
political representation of women
89. In Egypt, as in the other Arab Spring countries,
women played a key part in the initial phase, but have seen the
scope for their participation in politics gradually reduced. The
representation of women in Egyptian institutions has been extremely
limited to date. There were three women in the first post-revolutionary government,
which comprised 34 ministers. The bicameral parliament elected in
2011-2012 and dissolved in July 2013 had 508 members, only 10 of
whom were women: the corresponding proportion of approximately 2%
was one of the lowest worldwide. Women made up only 7% of the committee
which drafted the first post-revolutionary constitution. That figure
rose to 10% in the group of experts who amended the text in 2013.
90. If a genuinely democratic Egypt is to be established, women’s
representation must necessarily be increased. After the fall of
an authoritarian regime and the opening up of new spaces for freedom
and participation for citizens, accepting a situation where only
part of the population can exercise its political rights in full
would be illogical. The developments in Egypt since 2011 confirm
that gender equality is an essential prerequisite for the success
of the Arab Spring: in this country which is so unequal in gender
terms, the establishment of a stable and democratic State seems
a distant prospect for the time being.
7.3. Participation in
economic life
91. Egypt is ranked 125th in terms of gender equality
in the 136 countries taken into consideration by the World Economic
Forum. As far as women’s participation in the economy is concerned,
the situation is not only very difficult but is gradually deteriorating.
The most recent statistics show a decline in women’s rate of participation
in the labour market, which is now below 20%, one of the lowest
figures worldwide. Among 18 to 29-year-olds, women have a participation
rate of 19% as opposed to 50% for men. The very high inactivity
rate is a result both of the conditions on the labour market and
also of cultural norms and, to some extent, women’s own choices.
This state of affairs is harmful not only to women but also to the
economy as a whole, as it limits the possibility of using human
capital and ultimately reduces overall growth. It is also hard for
women to obtain loans for running their own businesses.
7.4. Violence against
women
92. The fight against violence against women is a real
emergency in Egypt. Domestic violence, which is substantially under-reported
for sociocultural reasons, goes hand-in-hand with sexual harassment,
which is very widespread, even in public places, and affects 91%
of women according to sources quoted by Thomson Reuters. A study
conducted in 2013 by the government showed that over 99.3% of the
Egyptian women and girls surveyed claimed to have suffered some
form of sexual harassment during their lives. 82.6% did not feel safe
at home, while as many as 86.5% did not feel safe in public transport.
93. The impunity of the perpetrators is a constant feature of
this violence. According to a report published in April 2014 by
a group of human rights organisations co-ordinated by the FIDH,
250 cases of rape were reported between 2011 and the end of 2013
in Cairo, often in or around the iconic Tahrir Square. The report
indicates that none of the cases has been brought to court to date.
The message is just as clear as
it is unacceptable: in Egypt, rapists usually go unpunished.
94. Female genital mutilation is another widespread problem in
Egypt. According to data published by the Forward organisation,
97% of Egyptian women are believed to be victims of this practice.
A law of 1995 introduced a general
prohibition and the most senior religious authorities have on several
occasions explained that these mutilations are the subject of an
absolute prohibition, but this has not been enough to eradicate
this practice: the figures are getting lower but are still very
high.
95. The new Egyptian President, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, is showing
increasing sensitivity to the problem of violence against women,
including in public places. Following numerous cases of mass sexual
violence in Tahrir Square during the celebrations of his election,
President El-Sisi visited one of the victims in a Cairo hospital,
apologised to Egyptian women for the inadequate action of the State
in this matter and undertook to strengthen the efforts to combat
violence against women. This commitment was reiterated in July 2014
by Prime Minister Mahlab, and the Interior Minister, Mohamed Ibrahim,
has announced the setting up of a department specialising in combating
violence against women, in co-operation with the human rights department
in his own Ministry.
I cannot but welcome these positive
signs, indicative of a political commitment to deal with the problem.
96. The establishment of a consistent legislative framework to
prevent and punish all forms of violence against women so as to
protect victims and put an end to perpetrators going unpunished
is an absolute priority which the Egyptian authorities should tackle
without hesitation. Although ambitious, the standards set out in the
Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention could be a key benchmark
for Egyptian lawmakers and policy makers.
8. International co-operation
and the Council of Europe’s neighbourhood policy
97. The events in Tunisia and other countries of the
region from 2011 onwards have raised fundamental questions about
respect for human rights, the rule of law and democracy, which lie
at the heart of the Council of Europe’s role. In response to the
interest expressed by several countries in our southern neighbourhood, closer
co-operation in these areas took practical shape with the launch,
in January 2012, of the programme entitled “Strengthening democratic
reform in the southern Neighbourhood” (South Programme), financed
by the European Union to the tune of €4.8 million.
98. As Ms Gabriella Battaini Dragoni, Deputy Secretary General
of the Council of Europe, explained in a recent exchange of views
with our committee on 2 June 2014 in Paris, action plans have been
drawn up for Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan, in consultation with the
authorities of those countries. With regard to gender equality,
the action plans cover four major topics: participation in political
processes, violence against women, the image of women in the media
and access to justice. There is permanent co-operation with all
relevant stakeholders on these issues, including the central and
local authorities and civil society, in particular thanks to the
presence of Council of Europe offices in Morocco and Tunisia.
99. Not only the “South Programme” but all the activities which
the Council of Europe carries out with the countries in its southern
neighbourhood, including interparliamentary co-operation, in particular
through the partnership for democracy, should also be part of this
approach. International co-operation, in its various forms (whether
development co-operation through technical support to the public
authorities, financial support to civil society, or interparliamentary
co-operation) is a key aspect of relations between States. These
activities can undoubtedly now consolidate the relations of friendship
between the two shores of the Mediterranean. At the end of the day,
they can contribute to the success of the democratic transition
in the countries of our southern neighbourhood, including in terms
of women’s rights. The ultimate goal is to create more just societies,
based on gender equality.
9. Conclusions
100. Three years after the uprisings which started the
Arab Spring and two years after my previous report, the picture
is a mixed one. It is difficult to identify a single trend in the
region regarding the status of women and the situation varies considerably
from one country to another. On the one hand, Tunisia and Morocco, following
different approaches, are managing step by step to improve and consolidate
what they have achieved. On the other, Libya on the verge of civil
war and Egypt struggling to regain stability have not yet given women’s
rights the commitment they demand. In Algeria, against an almost
rigid political context, there has clearly been insufficient progress
regarding the status of women.
101. Equality between women and men must also be viewed as a precondition
for the success of democratic transitions in the region. No democracy
can claim to be complete if half of the population is the victim
of unjustified limitations of its rights. This is particularly true
in the countries of the region, where women have played a key role
in the uprisings which started the processes of democratic transition.
102. Gender equality is an indicator of the degree of democratisation,
and of the will and ability of a country to include all its citizens
without discrimination. Similarly, violations of women’s rights
are an alarm bell revealing that the rights and freedoms of all
are under threat. The most conservative governments on women’s rights
among those established in the wake of the revolutions, such as
the first post-Mubarak government in Egypt, have lost the support
of the citizens and have not held up against the people’s protests.
103. The attentive and vigilant attitude to the situation of women’s
rights in the countries of the region which the Assembly advocated
two years ago is still necessary, since in the field of human rights
backward steps are always possible and the political and institutional
context is particularly unstable in some of these countries.
104. So far, Morocco and Tunisia have been the Council of Europe’s
priority speaking partners. Ideally, these fruitful relations should
continue in the future. With regard to Morocco, the partner for
democracy status has proved a valuable tool in facilitating exchanges
and mutual understanding, including in the field of women’s rights.
105. Morocco and Tunisia have the opportunity to play an exemplary
modernising role in the region and in the community of countries
with a Muslim majority. They demonstrate that it is possible to
move towards gender equality without abandoning one’s traditional
cultural and religious roots. This is all the more necessary in
the current context, characterised by instability and the influence
of other external forces with fundamentalist tendencies.
106. Civil society can greatly help improve the status of women
and the democratic context in general. It has done so in various
processes of democratic transition and can continue to do so, provided
it has the necessary human and financial resources and its activities
are not hampered by the public authorities. The international players,
including the Council of Europe and its member States, should lend
their support to this dimension.
107. The media also have a key role to play in modernising society
and supporting gender equality. They have a powerful influence on
attitudes and should exert this influence in order to eradicate
gender stereotypes, by reflecting the contribution made by women
in all spheres of life in their country.
108. The Council of Europe and the other international, particularly
European, players must strengthen their co-operation activities
with all countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean. It
is imperative that improvement of the status of women is incorporated
in a cross-sectoral way into all programmes. These activities, including
at interparliamentary level, will help strengthen the relations
of friendship and mutual knowledge and recognition between the two
shores of the Mediterranean and contribute to the success of the reforms
in the countries of our southern neighbourhood, with the aim of
creating a society that is more just, more democratic and more respectful
of human rights.