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Addendum to the report | Doc. 13867 Add. | 28 September 2015
Countries of transit: meeting new migration and asylum challenges
Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons
1. Introduction
1. This addendum is intended to
expand the scope of the explanatory memorandum to cover in more
detail the crisis that has arisen during summer 2015 in the eastern
Mediterranean, western Balkans and central Europe, covering primarily
Turkey, Greece, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Serbia,
Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, Austria and Germany. The current crisis
has thrown into sharp relief the inadequacy and incoherency of European
asylum policy as regards both “primary” and “secondary” movements
of refugees; it also underlines that distinctions between countries
as “transit” or “destination” are often arbitrary, or at least mutable,
and the crucial importance of taking account of individual refugees’
rational actions and the factors that influence their decisions.
2. Situation in specific countries
2. Turkey has registered almost
2 million refugees who fled the conflict in neighbouring Syria.
The figure has increased continuously since the conflict began in
2011 and has more than doubled in the last year alone. Turkey now
hosts more refugees than any other country in the world and has
spent some US$6 billion on their protection. Less than one in six
live in the government-run refugee camps in the south, although
basic services are available to the other, so-called “urban” refugees.
Despite their often very difficult situation in Turkey and even
more so elsewhere, it is only in 2015 that very significant numbers
of Syrian (and other) refugees have begun leaving the Turkish coast
in an attempt to reach Greece and, ultimately, other European Union
countries further north. The International Organization for Migration
(IOM) reports that 224 have died in the Aegean Sea so far this year;
including, of course, the young Aylan Kurdi, the photograph of whose
dead body, washed up on a Turkish beach, had such a huge impact
on global public opinion.
3. By mid-September, 2015 had seen over 347 000 arrivals by sea
on Greece’s Aegean islands, mainly Lesvos (almost half of the total),
Kos, Chios, Samos and Leros, compared to 43 500 for the whole of
2014. August alone saw around 108 000 arrivals, over 90% of whom
were either Syrian (around 70%), Afghan or Iraqi, all likely to
be entitled to international protection. The number of arrivals
has placed extreme strain on the Greek asylum system, already seriously
deficient, in a country struggling economically. This led to inadequate provision
of reception facilities, inability to register newcomers as fast
as they arrived or to transport them in sufficient numbers to mainland
Greece, manifestations of hostility and xenophobia by elements of
the local population (although others showed sympathy and generosity)
and demonstrations of frustration by the refugees. The deployment
of special ferry services has alleviated but not resolved the critical
situation on the islands. 90% of arrivals in Greece have indicated
that they intend applying for asylum in another country. This is
reflected in the fact that in July, which saw almost 52 000 arrivals,
there were only 1 200 asylum applications in Greece, and in the
numbers travelling north through Greece to “the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia”; in early September, it was estimated that
some 30 000 people were on the move across Greece.
4. During the initial chaos, “the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia” briefly closed its border with Greece, resulting in clashes
between refugees and police. The border was, however, soon reopened
and around 3 000 people per day are now being admitted, in accordance
with the arrival of trains for onward travel. Between 19 June and
1 September alone, over 53 000 people registered their intention
to apply for asylum at the reception centre near the border city
of Gevgelija. Transport is accessible from there to Tabanovce on
the border with Serbia, where aid is available, although the numbers
of people present at any one time hugely exceed the facility’s capacity.
Despite the number of registrations, over 90% of which are by Syrians,
Afghans or Iraqis, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” has
received only 1 675 actual asylum applications this year. In this
respect, it can be noted that the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has concluded that the country
“does not as yet meet international standards for the protection
of refugees, and does not qualify as a safe third country”, advising
that “other States should refrain from returning or sending asylum
seekers” there.
5. The next country along the refugees’ route is Serbia. There
are transit centres at the border, at Miratovac and Preševo (slightly
further north), both of which operate far beyond intended capacity.
International humanitarian aid is also available at Belgrade, and
again close to the border with Hungary at Kanjiž and Staro Vašarište
aid point, which sees around 1 000 people a day, and the informal
gathering place at Subotica. Serbia received 29 000 asylum registrations
in July (as opposed to 1 170 in July 2014) and over 37 000 in August
(1 547 in 2014), 90% of which were from Syrians, Afghans or Iraqis.
The UNHCR currently states that the Serbian asylum system “is not
adequately recognizing those in need of international protection”, recommending
that “Serbia not be considered a safe third country of asylum, and
that countries therefore refrain from sending asylum seekers back
to Serbia”.
6. Hungary has seen more than 150 000 arrivals from Serbia this
year (Hungarian police have estimated over 190 000 arrivals in total).
The Hungarian border represented the most frequented entry point
from the western Balkans to the contiguous core territory of the
“border-free” Schengen area. After briefly threatening to stop accepting
returns under the Dublin system, Hungary began erecting a fence
along its border with Serbia, patrolled by armed forces, and revised
its legislation so as to criminalise irregular entry and climbing the
fence. In early September, as the fence neared completion and the
new laws were about to enter into force, there was a surge in new
arrivals from an average of around 2 000 per day in August to a
final peak of over 9 000. Once the fence was completed and the border
closed, Hungary declared a “state of crisis” in its southern provinces,
and began transporting refugees directly to Austria without registration.
Water cannon and tear gas have been used in violent clashes with
refugees at the crossing point, and refugees, including children,
and police have been injured. Refugees now entering and prepared
to apply for asylum in Hungary are rejected within minutes, with
no apparent consideration of personal circumstances, on the basis
that Serbia is a safe third country, something with which the UNHCR
strongly disagrees (see above). Those arrested for “illegal entry”
are prosecuted under highly accelerated procedures, reportedly without
access to legal representation or interpretation. Following the
prime minister’s statement that refugees were “laying siege” to
the country, the Hungarian Parliament voted to deploy the army at
the borders, with authorisation to use rubber bullets, tear gas
grenades and other forms of “non-lethal force” against refugees.
The Hungarian response had also involved closure of Budapest train
station to refugees, forcible detention in inadequate conditions
of refugees for registration purposes, and posters telling foreigners
“not to take Hungarians’ jobs” and “to keep our laws”.
7. As a result of Hungary closing its border with Serbia, the
refugees’ route shifted east to Croatia, in the hope of reaching
the European Union via Slovenia and the Schengen area via Austria.
More than 30 000 entered Croatia in less than a week, overwhelming
reception and registration facilities. Croatian Government statements
vacillated wildly; in practice, it allowed refugees into the country,
but soon abandoned efforts to register them and instead transported
them directly to the Hungarian border. Hungary responded by erected another
razor-wire fence along its border with Croatia – a fellow EU member
State – and transporting those who had entered from Croatia directly
to its border with Austria, where some 21000 arrived in a single
weekend. Croatia then closed its border with Serbia, calling on
it to send more refugees to Hungary and Romania, which resulted
in reprisals by the Serbian authorities. As a result of these events,
mutual recriminations flowed between Hungary, Serbia and Croatia,
badly straining their relations. For its part, Slovenia increased
border controls with Hungary and Croatia and suspended train services
from the latter, allowing only limited numbers to enter, which resulted
in clashes with refugees at the border. Having initially stated
that it would not open “safe corridors” northwards through the country,
Slovenia later announced that it would consider doing so.
8. Unco-ordinated, even chaotic reactions have also been seen
in countries further north. In late August, Germany announced that
it would suspend Dublin transfers of Syrian asylum seekers, although
it was initially unclear whether it still expected EU transit countries
to register them, which may have contributed to the confusion in
Hungary and elsewhere. Germany also announced that it would be able
to cope with the up to 800 000 asylum applications it expected to
receive in 2015. Despite mobilising extensive resources nation-wide,
by mid-September, the strain on reception facilities in its southern
cities led Germany to reintroduce border controls, in effect suspending
application of the Schengen agreement. Austria has also introduced controls
at its borders with Hungary and Slovenia. Numerous other EU countries
have increased their border checks or controls, including the Slovak
Republic, the Czech Republic, Poland, Finland (at its border with Sweden)
and the Netherlands; Denmark and Austria have suspended certain
rail links with Germany. Bulgaria and Greece had previously erected
fences along their borders with Turkey; Turkey has suspended bus
routes between Istanbul and the Greek border and closed the border
to refugees arriving on foot.
9. Some have blamed this summer’s unprecedented arrival of refugees
through Turkey on “over-generous” policies in Germany and Sweden.
The crisis in the Greek islands had, however, already begun long
before, for example, Germany suspended its application of the Dublin
Regulation or announced its capacity to receive 800 000 asylum applications
this year. Blaming some countries’ more humane policies in fact
reflects the profound lack of harmonisation across the European
Union of reception conditions, asylum procedures and welfare and
integration policies. It also ignores some countries’ “race to the
bottom”: in addition to the long-unresolved inadequacies of certain
national asylum systems, we have also seen deliberate measures to
divert refugees elsewhere, such as the Hungarian posters and Denmark’s
decision to cut refugees’ benefits and advertise the fact in countries
of first asylum.
10. Overall, the most significant reason why refugees – especially,
but not only, Syrians – have been driven to seek protection in Europe
is because, firstly, the conflicts that forced them to leave their
homes continue with no end in sight; and secondly, conditions in
countries of first asylum have become intolerable. Whatever one’s views
on the causes of the current crisis, however, it cannot be denied
that the term “transit country” now clearly applies to a chain of
European States including Greece, “the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia”, Serbia, Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia, Austria and Denmark,
and to a lesser extent also others.
3. Developments at European level
11. On 14 September, the European
Union’s Justice and Home Affairs Council met to discuss responses
to the current crisis and longer-term measures for the future. The
European Commission’s wide-ranging and constructive proposals are
not prominently reflected in the Presidency Conclusions of the meeting.
Instead, these reveal a preponderant emphasis on border control,
forcing those in need of protection to remain in either countries
of first asylum or countries at the European Union’s external borders,
without any certainty that conditions there will improve. Those
asylum seekers that do penetrate the European Union’s external borders would
be concentrated at “hotspots” located in “front-line” countries.
This would seem to risk perpetuating the inequities of the Dublin
system, even whilst it is noted that the Commission will evaluate
and possibly propose revision of the Dublin Regulation. Far more
detail was devoted to returns than to resettlement or safe and legal avenues.
Whilst there was, at last, agreement to relocate 40 000 asylum seekers
from Greece and Italy, the Commission’s more adequate proposal to
relocate a further 120 000 from Greece, Italy and Hungary was not approved
at ministerial level until 22 September, and only then by a qualified
majority vote, with the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Romania
and Hungary voting against and Finland abstaining. The EU Summit on
23 September, whilst promising welcome and much-needed increases
in support to countries of first asylum and transit and humanitarian
agencies, focuses on keeping refugees out or at the periphery of
the European Union. Beyond that, however, it reveals a reluctance
to accept protection responsibilities, with no mention of resettlement,
and a lack of solidarity in burden-sharing between States.
4. Conclusions and recommendations
12. The current crisis underlines
the significance of certain general policy principles:
- Most fundamentally, all European States are legally obliged to provide effective protection to people in need and are prohibited from sending such people to countries where that protection is not guaranteed. Asylum-seekers cannot be returned to Lebanon, Jordan or Turkey; nor may they at present be returned to Greece (following the case law of the European Court of Human Rights), “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” or Serbia (according to UNHCR advice), or Hungary (according to German and Austrian courts).
- Either European States attempt, regardless of the consequences for refugees or neighbouring countries, individually to isolate themselves behind fences and strict border controls, which, even if ineffective, would be the end of European integration and co-operation; or they accept that the current challenges are a matter of common concern and formulate effective and sufficient common responses.
- The present Common European Asylum System does not amount to an effective, sufficient response. Furthermore, a response that reflected only the narrow, exclusionary focus of the Presidency Conclusions of the 14 September meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council and the statement following the 23 September EU summit would be inadequate, ineffective, myopic and damaging, falling short of Europe’s moral duties and legal obligations.
- Attempting to address root causes in countries of origin does not in the meantime exempt EU States from the responsibility to provide protection to sufficient numbers of refugees, including through sufficient, targeted, non-discriminatory resettlement and safe and legal channels.
- Under the “Fortress Europe” logic, if Hungary builds a militarised fence along its borders with Romania, Serbia and Croatia, then Slovenia, the Slovak Republic and Poland should take similar steps (Bulgaria already has). Experience shows that fortification of the European Union’s external borders will only lead to new routes opening up and further stimulate recourse to opportunistic migrant smugglers. As well as being a rejection of basic humanitarian responsibilities, such barriers would have serious geopolitical consequences for wider European integration and solidarity and are thus a matter not just of national policy but of common concern for all Council of Europe member States.
- The current incoherent EU response is having disastrous effects for refugees in transit and for Greece and other transit countries in the western Balkans. Hungary’s closure of its borders has trapped tens of thousands of refugees within these countries, none of which is able to assure adequate reception, accommodation and processing facilities. Any proposal to make these countries responsible for yet more refugees, returned from (other) EU countries, is blatantly unfair and impractical; indeed, absurdly reminiscent of the worst aspects of the Dublin system. Given how long deficiencies in the Greek system have remained unresolved, it is unrealistic to think that other countries will make rapid progress – especially if, having done so, they would then be required to receive potentially large numbers of asylum-seekers from EU countries. Support to transit countries, which already bear far greater burdens but with far fewer resources than EU member States, should not be conditional on accepting an even more unfair share of Europe’s collective responsibility.
- Any proposal to establish EU reception, accommodation, processing and/or detention centres (e.g. “hotspots”) in, for example, Greece and Italy would have to ensure that all relevant international standards, including those of the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5) and other Council of Europe instruments, are fully respected – which is not the case under the Greek national asylum system and not always the case under the Italian – and subject to independent, external monitoring.
- The development of reception capacities in countries of first asylum cannot form a basis for removing refugees from Europe unless it is guaranteed that such removal would not violate the prohibition of refoulement, on account notably of inadequate living conditions or seriously flawed status determination procedures; it should be accompanied by sufficient, targeted, non-discriminatory resettlement programmes with the involvement of all EU member States.
13. On the basis of the foregoing
principles, the rapporteur will propose certain amendments to the
draft resolution adopted and tabled by the Committee on Migration,
Refugees and Displaced Persons, with a view to their being presented
to the plenary Assembly when the report is debated.