1. Introduction
1. On 22 March 2016, 32 innocent
people were killed and around 340 were injured by the brutal terrorist attacks
at Zaventem airport and Maelbeek metro station in Brussels, for
which the terrorist entity known as “Islamic State” (Daesh) has
claimed responsibility. Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel called
the attacks “a black moment” for the country and urged his fellow
citizens to stay united in their response. The Belgian Government
declared three days of national mourning.
2. Daesh has a dedicated
external operations structure, mainly in Syria and Iraq, which has
been planning and carrying out mass-casualty attacks around the
world over the past few years. The Brussels attacks followed a shocking
wave of attacks in Europe since January 2015. In January, gunmen
killed 17 people at the office of Charlie
Hebdo magazine and at a Jewish supermarket in Paris;
on 14 January, an active terrorist cell was eliminated in Verviers
(Belgium); in February, two people were shot dead at a synagogue
and café in Copenhagen; in August, an attack was prevented on a
Thalys high-speed train en route from Amsterdam to Paris; and in
November, 130 people were killed and many more were injured in a
series of concerted attacks in Paris.
3. Hundreds of people all over the world continue to fall victim
to jihadists almost every day. Suicide bombers have killed civilians
over the last few months in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Iraq,
the Ivory Coast, Kuwait, Lebanon, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Russian
Federation, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Somalia, Tunisia and Turkey. In
Africa, women and children are kidnapped and enslaved.
4. The present report will focus on the most recent attacks in
Brussels, not only for the brutal and shocking violence inflicted
on innocent people at the heart of Europe, but also because, according
to the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and
Political Violence (King’s College, London), Belgium accommodates the
highest number of foreign fighters and potential terrorists per
capita in Europe.
5. The Assembly has dealt with terrorism-related issues on many
occasions over the past few years. At the January 2016 part-session,
the Assembly debated the issues of Combating international terrorism
while protecting Council of Europe standards and values
(Resolution 2090) and Foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq
(Resolution 2091). The proposals contained in those resolutions remain
fully relevant today.
2. The facts
6. Belgium has struggled with
Islamist groups for years and some 500 of its citizens have been
lured into fighting for Daesh in Syria and Iraq. Several towns have
housed Islamist cells, the most active being in Brussels, and in
particular in Molenbeek, one of the 19 municipalities of Brussels-Capital
where several of the bombers and gunmen who targeted Paris in November
2015 had been living. The main suspect, Salah Abdeslam, returned
to Belgium the day after the Paris attacks.
7. A number of European governments, France in particular, deployed
police and intelligence service resources to Belgium to support
the ensuing investigation, which resulted in the arrest of Salah
Abdesalam, in Molenbeek, on 18 March 2016, just four days before
the Brussels terrorist bombings of 22 March 2016.
8. Salah Abdeslam was able to hide for over four months with
the help of a substantial network of criminal friends.
9. According to investigators, the Daesh Belgian cell was preparing
further attacks timed for Easter 2016 that were originally intended
for France, and decided, after the arrest of Salah Abdeslam, to
shift target and attack Brussels instead.
10. Police have conducted several raids across Brussels since
the attacks. On 8 April 2016, Mohamed Abrini, the key remaining
suspect in November 2015's Paris terror attacks, was also arrested.
Reportedly, Abrini was likely to be the “man in the hat” seen on
videos before the blasts in the Brussels airport departure hall.
He allegedly participated in both the Paris and Brussels attacks
as part of a jihadi network that crossed multiple borders on several
occasions.
3. Security failures and calls
for better information and intelligence sharing
11. An outpouring of deepest sympathy
and condolences to the families of the victims and to the Government
of Belgium, as well as to all governments whose citizens were killed
in these attacks, came from all around the world. At the same time,
many political leaders and citizens alike stressed the need to intensify regional
and international efforts to overcome terrorism and violent extremism,
and to better share information and intelligence.
12. Several Belgian and international analysts have also pointed
to the dysfunction of the Brussels-Capital Region, with its 19 “communes”
and 6 police forces. Many have pointed to an alarming lack of political
co-ordination, co-operation and control that has resulted in numerous
“no-go zones” for law enforcement. Security lapses at Belgium's
airports were even identified by European Union inspectors in 2015.
Accusations that the Belgian transport minister, Ms Jacqueline Galant,
ignored those reports, led to her resignation on 15 April 2016.
13. Ongoing radicalisation and failed integration affects many
Council of Europe member States.
14. On 6 April 2016, Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel acknowledged
failures in security over the attacks but dismissed suggestions
that Belgium was a “failed State” or that it should reverse the
political decentralisation which, according to critics, let the
militants evade detection due to poor co-ordination among police
forces. He added that Belgium had convicted more than 100 people
on terrorism charges in 2015 and prevented major attacks. He also
pointed out that Islamist militants succeeded in carrying out attacks
in France, the United States, Great Britain, Spain and elsewhere,
and said that Belgium had been a pioneer in pushing for greater
international co-ordination of intelligence, including the creation
of a European investigation agency, a sort of “European CIA”. Few
other governments share this idea for the time being, while most
back greater co-operation.
15. On 14 April 2016, the European Parliament overwhelmingly backed
an EU directive regulating the use of Passenger Name Records (PNR)
data in the European Union for the prevention, detection, investigation
and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crimes. Our Assembly
has repeatedly called on our colleagues in the European Parliament
to speed up the procedure. The proposal now needs to be formally
approved by the European Council and EU member States will have
two years to transpose it into their national laws.
16. In January 2016, the European Counter Terrorism Centre was
created within Europol, to improve intelligence exchange within
law-enforcement agencies.
17. The Foreign Terrorist Fighter (FTF) programme within INTERPOL
also presents an opportunity for countries to share intelligence
on the foreign fighter threat.
18. Analysts have also highlighted the urgent need to further
integrate the work done by domestic law- enforcement and intelligence
agencies with that of their foreign and military intelligence services,
to create greater cohesion internally and hopefully better-quality
intelligence. A situation such as that in Belgium, where co-ordination
is weak, clearly needs improving. Better intelligence sharing is
of limited use if insufficient usable intelligence is being produced
internally.
19. At Council of Europe level, two major initiatives have been
developed in order to step up counter-terrorism co-operation: the
drafting of an additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention
on the Prevention of Terrorism aimed at addressing the phenomenon
of foreign terrorist fighters (CETS No. 217), and the adoption of
the Action Plan on the fight against violent extremism and radicalisation
leading to terrorism, to be implemented in 2015-2017. I refer to
the report of Mr Van der Maelen
for more information about these
two initiatives which, if properly implemented, may help in addressing
at least some causes which led to the Brussels attacks.
4. Conclusions
20. The bombings in Brussels on
22 March are not the first and, unfortunately, are not likely to
be the last terrorist attacks in Europe. It is unacceptable that,
after each new attack, State leaders are quick to make solemn statements
but are too often reluctant to learn lessons and take resolute action.
The statements are necessary to reaffirm our values but are not
enough to protect them and to guarantee security.
21. All Council of Europe member States must urgently draw conclusions
from the tragic wave of attacks since January 2015 which is a result
of many failures in the functioning of police and security forces,
in the assessment of terrorist threats, as well as in prevention
and integration policies, and in international counter-terrorism
co-operation.
22. These problems are, to a varying extent, relevant for many
Council of Europe member States. It is essential to be aware of
the scale of the threat and to make a realistic assessment of possible
security gaps. Our States are duty-bound to protect the lives of
citizens and the fundamental values of democracy. Our societies
must be ready to pay a much higher price for security.
23. A series of steps must be taken as a matter of priority, both
at national and international levels, to address security shortcomings
revealed by the tragic wave of attacks since January 2015. Those
measures should ensure a much better co-operation and information
sharing between various security and law- enforcement agencies,
an effective prevention and fight against radicalisation, in particular
by promoting inclusive, civic and secular education, a better integration
of “closed” communities into society so that there are no more “no
go” areas in European cities, and a careful study of best practice
of countries with extensive counter-terrorism experience.
24. In the face of vast international terrorist networks, a co-ordinated
pan-European response is needed more than ever. As terrorism respects
no borders, counter-terrorism efforts must go beyond European boundaries
and involve the third countries ready to co-operate, in particular
in the neighbouring regions.