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Addendum to the report | Doc. 14082 Add | 20 June 2016
Refugees at risk in Greece
Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons
1. Introduction
1. This addendum is intended to
supplement the report approved by the Committee on migration, refugees and
displaced persons at its meeting on 3 June 2016. It updates the
information on certain factual situations addressed in the report,
and presents my findings and conclusions following my visit as rapporteur
to Greece on 29 May 2016 and my participation in the visit by the
ad hoc committee of the Bureau of the Parliamentary Assembly on
30 and 31 May. I would like to thank the Greek
delegation for assisting with the organisation of my visit on 29
May, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) for their assistance during the visit, and the Greek Council
for Refugees, the Greek Forum of Refugees, Médecins sans Frontières
and Human Rights Watch, whose representatives I met in Athens. I
would also like to thank the Greek non-governmental organisation
(NGO) METAdrasi, whose representative participated in an exchange of
views with the committee on 3 June 2016.
2. The clearance of Eidomeni and the new sites in Thessaloniki
2. The week before my visit to
Greece, the Greek authorities launched a major operation to clear
the informal camp at Eidomeni on the border with “the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia”. I was able to visit some of the new reception
centres in Thessaloniki to which people were transferred: in particular,
Sindos (Karamanli), Oreokastro and Softex.
3. These centres are all located on disused industrial sites,
isolated from populated areas, shops or any social activity. They
were created at only a few days’ notice by the army, which now manages
them. At Softex, I met the army officer who had been responsible
for constructing several of the sites. It was clear that despite his
professional commitment and best intentions, he was unaware of what
was needed to make a reception centre meeting international standards;
the UNHCR and specialised NGOs have complained that their efforts to
advise the authorities had been ignored. A couple of police officers
were present at each site to ensure security, although I was told
that at Softex they had failed to intervene when a mass brawl had
broken out the previous day. In general, there was very little engagement
by the authorities with the camp residents. At Oreokastro and Softex,
there were obvious physical hazards such as open ditches in unlit
areas and waste material such as splintered wood and rusty metal;
children were playing with abandoned equipment that was quite unsuitable
for the purpose.
4. At the time of my visit, according to official figures, all
three sites were already at or beyond their official maximum capacity. Official occupancy
figures may, however, be unreliable: the UNHCR told me that at Oreokastro,
they had asked the authorities to conduct a recount, which had revealed
an additional 100 people. Furthermore, the projected capacity for
each site is already greater than what it would be if international standards
were respected: for instance, the UNHCR told me that by their standards,
Oreokastro, whose official capacity is 1500, has real capacity for
only 700. The inhabitants of Sindos are 90% Syrians and 10% Iraqis;
of Oreokastro, 96% Syrians; and of Softex, 99% Syrians.
5. Most of the accommodation (all in the case of Sindos) consisted
of tents pitched inside a former warehouse. I visited Sindos too
early in the day to be able to look inside the warehouse, but at
Oreokastro and Softex, where I did go inside, the buildings lacked
light and ventilation and the tents were much too close to one another.
There was inadequate electricity supply to the tents and little
lighting. Occupants had to choose either light, with their tent
doors open, or privacy, with them closed. The proximity of tents
one to another meant that if a fire broke out, it would spread quickly
and be difficult to escape from. Many areas inside the buildings were
particularly gloomy and forbidding, which may deter women from moving
freely within them due to the risk of sexual and gender-based violence.
More generally, conditions inside the buildings may exacerbate stresses and
tension and generate unrest and even incidents of violence.
6. At Oreokastro and Softex, there were tents also outside the
building. At Oreokastro, residents had moved their tents themselves
from a dirt field to the concrete apron surrounding the building,
as the former was infested with rats and snakes. At Softex, the
outdoor tents are much too close to one another and have been pitched
on land lacking drainage, especially problematic in case of heavy
rain as not all tents have a waterproof base; there is also a complete
lack of shade, which will make the summer sun difficult to bear.
7. Sanitation facilities are inadequate in quality and quantity,
with only a few chemical toilets and shower cubicles for many hundreds
of people. At Oreokastro, the waste water from the shower cubicles
flowed across the concrete apron to form a stagnant pool, close
to inhabited tents; the area was already infested with mosquitoes.
At Softex, washbasins were fastened to an external wall, exposed
to the elements. It was not known whether the mains water was drinkable,
and so until tests had been completed, drinking water was provided
in bottles – one-and-a-half litres per person per day, although
an NGO provided additional supplies. I was assured that sanitation
and water supplies would be improved considerably. There was no
psycho-social support available to residents at any of the sites,
despite the trauma many had suffered before and during their journeys
and the additional stress of the sudden, unexplained transfer to
grim and isolated new facilities – and the severity of many cases
requires more than just psycho-social support. None of the sites had any educational,
social or cultural activities or play areas, although at Sindos,
an NGO was constructing a classroom.
8. The Greek authorities have made an impressive effort to clear
Eidomeni and transfer its occupants to other sites, especially given
their severe budgetary limitations. In many ways, the new sites
are an improvement on the lawlessness of Eidomeni, even if over
time, a strong network of NGOs and volunteers had developed there
to meet many of the occupants’ basic needs. As things stand, however,
the new sites unfortunately represent a missed opportunity to create
facilities that meet international standards and that can provide
long-term shelter and other essential facilities for refugees and
migrants. I strongly encourage the Greek authorities to continue
with their efforts to improve the sites, in co-operation with the
UNHCR and relevant NGOs, and with greater European Union support.
3. Other sites in Thessaloniki and Athens
9. Whilst in Thessaloniki I also
visited Diavata reception centre, which was established in February
2016 on a former army camp and is officially run by the migration
ministry’s First Reception Service. There was no ministry official
present when I visited, however, and I was told that the person
responsible only came to the camp once every few weeks. The site
is better than those described above, being more spacious, with
shaded communal areas, a playground and a football pitch. Much of
the accommodation is in prefabricated huts, although in summer both
these and the tents risk becoming very hot inside. The UNHCR spoke
highly of the engagement of the army personnel who in practice run
the camp. There are, however, still shortcomings, including a lack
of information on the asylum procedure and refugees’ and migrants’
rights; a problem that is endemic throughout Greece.
10. In Athens, with the ad hoc committee, we visited a refugee
camp at Elliniko and the reception centre at Skaramagas. The camp
at Elliniko had originally been established for short-term, transitory
stay. Under the responsibility of the Migration Ministry, it consists
of a chaotic jumble of tents and makeshift shelters erected in and
around the main building of the former Olympic hockey stadium, some
attached to the outer walls, some inside, including in the basement,
where there is no natural light or effective ventilation. I have
little to add to the observations of others who found conditions
at the site to be completely inadequate for the longer-term stay for
which it is in effect being used. I note that the Migration
Minister, Mr Mouzalas, has announced that after Eidomeni, his next
priority is to move people from Elliniko (and Piraeus). I
would strongly encourage this, whilst urging the authorities to
ensure that any new sites comply fully with international standards
from the outset.
11. Skaramagas reception centre, opened in April 2016 for people
moved from the informal camp at Piraeus port and run by the Greek
Navy, was by contrast a far more salubrious facility. Built in a
wide-open space at a port in northern Athens, accommodation was
in containers, most if not all equipped with air conditioning –
which will be essential as temperatures rise, there being no shade.
Sanitation was adequate and there was a classroom for children.
Although perhaps somewhat isolated from populated areas, Skaramagas
is a huge improvement on hastily constructed sites such as Sindos,
Oreokastro and Softex, and shows what can be done with the correct
approach.
4. Lesvos–Moria hotspot, Kara Tepe reception centre and the Silver Bay Hotel
12. With a select delegation of
the ad hoc committee I also visited Lesvos, in particular Moria
hotspot, Kara Tepe reception centre and the Silver Bay Hotel.
13. Although the size of the delegation that visited Moria was
small, as required by the Greek authorities for security reasons,
we were allowed to see very little of the site. Apart from a meeting
with officials of the Greek Asylum Service, we were permitted only
to visit a medical facility run by Médecins du Monde, separated
by several layers of razor wire-topped fence from the main accommodation
area. Despite being accompanied by several soldiers, we were told
that beyond this point, the authorities were unable to guarantee
our security; the presence of European visitors risked inflaming
tempers, as “Europe” was seen as responsible for border closures
and the restriction of new arrivals to the islands. Even from our
vantage point, it was clear that the atmosphere in the camp was
extremely tense, with occupants holding up home-made banners for
us to see, and slogans painted on walls. As we left Moria, a group
of highly agitated young men rushed towards our bus, shouting for
freedom and an end to discrimination (a reference to the priority
given to Syrians). The police had to use physical force to prevent
the passage of our bus from being blocked. The day after our visit,
there was a major outbreak of violence, with 70 people reported
injured, including six who required hospital treatment, and a large
fire that destroyed tents and accommodation, leaving hundreds without
shelter. This is
not the first outbreak of violence in Moria; there were riots in
protest at detention conditions in late April, during a visit by the
Greek and Dutch migration ministers. There
have also been protests and unrest at other hotspots, including
those on Chios and Samos.
14. We saw many young children inside the accommodation area;
in addition to those living with their parents, Médecins sans frontières
told me that there are still more than 50 unaccompanied or separated children
living in the hotspot. With its many layers of razor wire-topped
fence, Moria has the air of a high-security prison camp, made worse
by the simmering tension and outbreaks of violence. This is absolutely
not a place for children, whether they are with their parents or
not. The Greek authorities should immediately move all children
and, where relevant, their parents or accompanying relatives out
of Moria and the other hotspots, and into appropriate accommodation.
15. Whilst I may not have seen the living conditions in Moria
close up, what I did experience gave a strong impression of the
general atmosphere and of the mental state of the people living
there. There is much uncertainty surrounding many aspects of their
situation. I had great difficulty clarifying the detention policy applied
by the authorities. According to the new law introduced on 1 April,
new arrivals may be detained for up to 25 days whilst their applications
are processed. Several NGOs told me that due to the inadequate capacity of
the asylum service, people are not even interviewed within the detention
time limit, so that in practice they are always detained for the
full 25 days. The authorities, however, suggested that in fact most
people are allowed to come and go from Moria within a much shorter
time, and even implied that in reality the camp was open for everyone,
from the day they arrived. Once released from detention, those able
to find accommodation elsewhere on the island are required to report
back three times a week, and those who could not are required to
return to the camp at night. Vulnerable persons should be screened
and transferred away from the hotspots within 10 days of arrival;
Médecins sans frontières told me, however, that there are still
many vulnerable people living in Moria (including unaccompanied
minors, although these are separated from the general population),
and that transfers to Kara Tepe (see below) had stopped, even though
it could accommodate many more people. The most acute grievances
seem to relate to people’s ignorance of their rights and prospects
under the asylum procedure. I will return to this below.
16. We also visited the Kara Tepe reception centre on Lesvos,
run by the municipality. This was a spacious, well-maintained, well-equipped
facility with social activities for its inhabitants, although the
quality of accommodation on the periphery was not as good as that
in the central areas. There were many national and international
NGOs present in the centre, providing a range of services. The atmosphere
was calm and relaxed and we were able to move freely around the
site. Finally, we visited the Silver Bay Hotel, run by NGOs, in particular
Caritas, for vulnerable refugees. Again, the facilities and services
were good and the atmosphere calm and relaxed.
17. Following these visits, we had a meeting with the local and
regional authorities, representatives of local NGOs, and representatives
of the UNHCR, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation
at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
(Frontex) and the European Commission. Three related themes emerged.
First, according to the mayor, the local population, previously sympathetic
towards the refugees and migrants as victims of grave misfortune,
has become increasingly frustrated and concerned since the implementation
of the EU–Turkey Agreement, especially following reported incidents
of burglary by destitute refugees and migrants. Unless measures
are taken to ensure security and reassure the local population there
is a risk of reaction against the refugees and migrants. Second,
the local authorities have received no assistance from central government
or the European Union, instead relying entirely on their own resources. European funds are needed if their efforts
are to continue. This led to a protracted discussion between the
representatives of the European Commission and of the Greek Asylum Service.
The former claimed that all necessary funding is available from
Brussels, that all decisions were taken in agreement with the Greek
authorities, and that the problems concerned co-ordination between
central, regional and local levels of national administration, with
the result that the available funds are not sufficiently used. The
latter replied that EU funding for humanitarian activities is directed
to NGOs via the UNHCR and is thus available to neither central government
nor, indirectly, local authorities. The third theme was that the situation
on the island had been unfairly and inaccurately portrayed in the
international media, which had had a serious impact on the tourism
sector of the local economy.
5. The pre-registration exercise launched by the Asylum Service, EASO and the UNHCR
18. In my earlier explanatory memorandum,
I noted that on 14 May, a “pre-registration exercise” had been announced,
in somewhat vague and ambiguous terms, by the Asylum Service, EASO
and the UNHCR. During my visit, I learnt more about this exercise,
which turns out to be of great importance. It is aimed at those currently on
the mainland who arrived in Greece between 1 January 2015 and 20
March 2016 and do not yet have an asylum seeker’s card. Those living
in informal sites such as Piraeus and the EKO petrol station near Eidomeni
will only be pre-registered if they are willing to move to an official
site – although there is currently no available space for them.
Individuals’ names, ages, nationalities and intention to apply for
asylum will be recorded, and those who apply for asylum will receive
an asylum seeker’s card. No details will be taken of the asylum
claim, although pre-registration will lead to appointments for asylum
interviews. It should therefore replace the current process whereby
applicants must use Skype to apply for appointments to make their asylum
claims: a failed process that has generated enormous frustration
amongst the large numbers of asylum seekers whose calls went unanswered,
apparently due to the inadequate number of Asylum Service staff allocated
to receive the calls. The
pre-registration exercise is supposed to be completed by the end
of July. Unfortunately, there were delays even before it began,
with the launch date being postponed from 30 May to 6 June. (It
appears that in the end, the exercise began on 8 June.) The timetable
for subsequent phases is also unclear: appointments for interviews
with the Asylum Service will be given “probably at the end of July”,
and the appointments themselves may be “some months” after pre-registration.
Those who do not strictly comply with the procedural requirements
of the pre-registration exercise will have to revert to the Skype
process. Given the very large number of asylum applications that
are to be expected, it could take a very long time before they are
all fully processed.
19. It is absolutely vital that the pre-registration exercise
proceeds in a timely, efficient and effective manner. The lack of
clarity and certainty concerning the asylum procedure is causing
great anxiety and distress to refugees throughout Greece and is
one of the main factors generating tension and unrest in the hotspots.
Until people are pre-registered, they cannot be considered for relocation
under the EU decisions, family reunification under the Dublin Regulation
or refugee status in Greece – for one or the other of which very
many of them would qualify – and without an asylum seeker’s card
they may have difficulty accessing essential services, including
medical care. It is thus of keen interest also to the Greek authorities,
as the key international responsibility-sharing mechanisms cannot
be engaged for people who have not been pre-registered, so it is vital
the system is operative. European Union support to Greece should
prioritise this issue, and European Union and other relevant States
should ensure that procedures for family reunification and relocation
are conducted quickly and efficiently. Pre-registration is just
the first, very preliminary administrative step, and it must be
rapidly followed by initiation of the asylum or relocation procedure.
6. Bureaucracy, responsibility and information: effectiveness and accountability
20. There appears to be considerable
bureaucratic complexity and inefficiency in the Greek authorities’ response
to the current situation. For example, of the eight sites managed
by public authorities that I visited, one (Elliniko) was run by
the migration ministry, two (Moria and Diavata) by the Ministry
of the Interior (although in practice, the latter is run by the
army), three (in Thessaloniki) by the army, one (Skaramagas) by
the navy and one (Kara Tepe) by the local authority. This multiplicity
of actors was reflected in the fact that when the ad hoc committee
visited Athens, we had meetings with no fewer than five government
ministers. There may be some hidden logic to this but it cannot
help with co-ordination, logistics and economies of scale. I note
also that the asylum service is collaborating with two different
international organisations (EASO and the UNHCR) to assist with
the pre-registration exercise. Such situations are not, however,
always brought about by the Greek authorities, such as the allocation
by the European Union of humanitarian aid for refugees and migrants
in Greece not to the Greek government but to the UNHCR (see paragraph
17), which in turn administers its distribution to NGO partners
on the ground who actually deliver the services – with the Greek
Government then playing a supervisory role. This must surely add
layers of administrative complexity, delay and expense, to the detriment
of the intended beneficiaries.
21. At several points during the preparation of my report, I found
myself confronted by apparent ambiguities, inconsistencies and omissions
in the available information on, for example, the number of Greek
and EASO caseworkers actually operational on the islands and the
number of decisions made and appeals determined. Further areas of
obscurity are identified in this addendum, such as the occupancy
rates of reception centres and the day-to-day responsibility for
their administration, the detention policy in the hotspots, the
disbursement and allocation of EU funds, and the timetable for pre-registration
of refugees and migrants and subsequent processing of their asylum
applications. A recent report concludes that much of the information
that would be necessary to assess the implementation of the EU–Turkey
Agreement is simply unavailable, or at least is published in a dispersed,
inconsistent and incomplete manner.
22. The above considerations are all important to the transparency
and accountability of the efforts made by national authorities and
the European Union to respond to the migrant and refugee situation
in Greece. If these bodies are not in possession of clear, consistent
and complete information on the situation and their responses to
it, it is difficult to see how their activities can be well-targeted,
well-co-ordinated, efficient and effective. If they are in possession
of such information – which I very much hope is the case – then
it should be published in readily accessible form, in order to facilitate
public understanding and allow proper external scrutiny. It is also difficult
to hold public authorities, including international organisations,
effectively to account when it is unclear who is responsible for
what, where multiple bodies are jointly responsible for a single
activity or where they are responsible for similar activities. I
would encourage both the Greek authorities and the European Union
to publish consistent, coherent, clear, complete and comprehensible
information and to co-operate in a way that reduces the bureaucratic
obstacles to the minimum.
7. Conclusions
23. Overall, my visit clarified
my understanding of the situation in Greece as set out in the report.
There are some bright spots, such as the generally acceptable quality
of reception centres at, for example, Skaramagas and Diavata, and
even the determination and effectiveness shown by the authorities
in transferring people from Eidomeni. These were, however, overshadowed
by the unacceptable situations at Elliniko, the new sites at Thessaloniki
and the Moria hotspot. In their current financial circumstances,
no-one can expect the Greek authorities to be able to resolve these
problems without much more outside support and assistance. I am
now more convinced than ever that unless things change soon, the
situation in Greece is simply unsustainable.