1. Introduction
1. The total population in the
47 member States of the Council of Europe stood at 826 million in
2015. This figure represents 11.3% of the world population.
2. Over the last decades, the dynamics of the European population
have undergone important changes directly affecting the social and
economic development of Europe. Birth rates in Europe have been
low for several decades, with an average of 1.5 children born per
woman over that period. This is one quarter below the threshold
for the “simple replacement of generations”, which is 2.1 children
per woman in a Europe with high health standards. This type of sustained
low fertility rate has been defined by demographers as a “demographic
winter”.
3. The first consequence of this demographic winter is to accentuate
the ageing of the population, increasing the proportion of elderly
people in society. The rate of “ageing at the bottom” of the age
pyramid, as it is known in demographics, is high, given the low
levels of generations successively being born.
4. A second consequence, which so far applies only to certain
European countries and a growing number of regions, relates to an
excess of deaths in relation to births, creating a negative natural
balance, known as “depopulation”. This depopulation causes a slump
in the population, and therefore desertification, in areas where
the net migration count is negative or not positive enough to compensate
for this negative natural balance.
5. A third consequence of the “demographic winter” impacts on
the workforce. For one thing, it gradually ages as the working-age
generations arriving on the labour market are smaller than the previous
generations. Accordingly, the proportion of members of the workforce
aged 55-64 years may become more sizeable than that of the 25-34
year-olds. At the same time, the intensity of the “demographic winter”
may engender a reduction in the workforce.
6. The reduction in the workforce may be counteracted by increased
rates of employment, among young people and seniors for example.
But this will not necessarily be enough to meet the needs of the
economy.
7. The inadequacy of the workforce may mean that immigration
is needed – this is known as “replacement migration”. It should
further be pointed out that there are various past examples providing
an insight into the impact of population dynamics on migration policies.
8. The Parliamentary Assembly has previously tackled the issue
of demographic and population trends in Europe in its several of
its resolutions and recommendations.
The latest one is
Resolution 1864 (2012) “Demographic trends in Europe: turning challenge into
opportunity”. Taking into account recent developments in Europe,
in particular the economic crisis and the important influx of migrants,
it is high time to analyse the impact of present European population
dynamics on migration policies.
9. The present report is based on an expert analysis prepared
by Mr Gérard-François Dumont, Professor at Paris-Sorbonne University
and the findings
of a hearing organised by the Committee on Migration, Refugees and
Displaced Persons. It also includes the data collected during the
fact-finding mission I made to Germany on 31 May 2016. The conclusions
of the mission to the Republic of Moldova (26-27 September 2016) can
be found in an addendum to the present rapport.
10. The report presents the salient features of European countries'
population dynamics, taking into account inter
alia settlement, birth rates, death rates and age structure,
and their effects. It analyses the modern-day demographic trends
using a few historical examples illustrating the effects of demographic
trends on migration policies. Finally, the report discusses to what
extent migration can contribute to improving a situation marked by
the ageing of the European population and the reduction of the work
force.
2. The salient features of
European population dynamics
11. The entity formed by the 47
Council of Europe countries has a population with a highly diversified geographic
distribution, and its natural change is characterised by a very
low birth rate and rapid ageing.
2.1. Very uneven geographic distribution
of the population
12. Regarding the populations of
Council of Europe member States, the question is whether population density
can be considered to leave so little margin for further growth that
those countries are obliged to adopt anti-immigration or even pro-emigration
policies.
13. The 826 million inhabitants of the Council of Europe member
States have at their disposal a total area of 23.835 million km2,
making an average density of 35 inhabitants/km2,
which is much lower than in India (400) or China (143). It is even
lower than the world average (55), slightly lower than in Africa
(39), but higher than in America (25). One may therefore deduce
from these comparisons that in the geographic entity formed by the
member States there are undeniably still margins for population
growth.
14. It must be pointed out, however, that the Council of Europe
counts among its members the world’s biggest country in terms of
area: Russia, with 17 098 million km2,
namely 13.4% of the ecumene. There are many vast zones within that
country that, for topographical or climatic reasons, offer very
few possibilities for human settlement. Life there is difficult
for the human metabolism due, in part, to low to very low average temperatures
all year round and to the fact that much of Russian territory lies
within the Arctic polar circle, which means at least one winter
day when the sun does not rise at all and several months each year
with only a few hours of sunlight each day. In view of its specific
geography, therefore, it makes sense to exclude Russia from our
examination of the Council of Europe countries’ populations.
15. This leaves a population in the remaining 46 countries of
681 million people living on 6 737 km2.
That is two thirds of China’s surface area and double that of India.
But it is five times less than that of Africa and almost seven times
less than that of America. The average population density of those
46 countries is 101 inhabitants/km2,
which is almost twice the world average, but again it is less than
for China and much less than for India. From these quantitative
data it may be inferred that there are still margins within Europe,
all other things being equal, for the population to increase.
16. An examination of the geographic distribution of the population
only confirms that conclusion. One characteristic of the geo-demographic
entity of the Council of Europe is the very uneven distribution
of its population, which shall be considered below first at country
level, and then at the level of regions within those countries.
17. The population geography of the Council of Europe corresponds,
roughly speaking, to the centre-periphery model,
the
densest region being what is generally known as the “European backbone”.
This area extending from the United Kingdom to Italy via Benelux
and Germany is composed of countries with a population density of
more than 200 inhabitants/km2; in the
case of the Netherlands it even slightly exceeds 400 inhabitants/km2.
18. The population density of the European countries on the immediate
periphery of that backbone – Austria, Denmark, Hungary, Poland,
the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic and France – is lower, between
101 and 150 inhabitants/km2.
19. Beyond that immediate periphery the density falls to 100 inhabitants/km2 or
less, but remains above 55 inhabitants/km2.
The countries concerned are Bulgaria, Spain, Romania, Ukraine and
the Balkan countries. The only exceptions are the Republic of Moldova
and Portugal, with a population density, respectively, of 121 and
112 inhabitants/km2.
20. Finally, the population density is particularly low – less
or much less than 55 inhabitants/km2 –
in the Baltic States and in the northern countries: Iceland, Norway,
Sweden and Finland, part of whose territory lies within the Arctic
polar circle.
21. In order to find a population density equivalent to the average
for the Council of Europe countries (excluding Russia), namely around
100 inhabitants/km2, we need to go to
Turkey and to two of the three countries of the South Caucasus,
Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia’s population density being less
than half that average.
22. However, the highest population density is to be found in
two small European countries: Malta – in fact a tiny Mediterranean
archipelago – has 1 333 inhabitants/km², while Monaco, the smallest
country in terms of area, located not very far from the European
backbone, has 40 000 inhabitants/km².
23. At country level, then, there is an overall geographic pattern
to the distribution of Europe’s populations.
24. At the level of the regions of Council of Europe countries,
the densest areas are concentrated along the above-mentioned backbone;
this is the case for Germany’s Rhine regions, for example. At the
level of the regions the differences in population distribution
are much more marked: they are the result of policy decisions, of
urbanisation and of migration from unattractive towards more appealing
regions.
25. On the one hand, the population density exceeds 1 000 inhabitants/km²
in small, highly urbanised regions such as the United Kingdom’s
Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham and, of course, London areas or Germany’s
three city-states (Stadtstaaten),
Bremen, Hamburg and Berlin. The Île-de-France region around Paris
has a density close to 1 000 inhabitants/km², one of the legacies
of France’s centralist policies.
26. On the other, population density is relatively high in European
regions whose attractiveness derives from their economic dynamism
or perceived quality of life; this is the case of certain coastal
areas (Community of Valencia, Catalonia, Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur,
Liguria) and continental regions (some Swiss cantons, Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg,
Piedmont and Lombardy).
27. Conversely, the population density in Europe’s northern regions
is very low. This is also true of non-coastal areas without any
big towns and from which there has been a rural exodus, such as
Spain’s Castilian regions and France’s Massif Central.
28. Consequently the Council of Europe countries do not form what
in demography is meant by a “monde plein” (full
world). There is undeniable potential for population growth, in
particular in sparsely populated regions. That additional population
could come either from an excess of births in relation to deaths
or from migration. Accordingly, it is important to establish whether
natural demographic change is leading to population growth in the
Council of Europe countries, which in turn requires us to look more
closely at birth and death rates.
29. In several other regions, such as sub-Saharan Africa and the
Indian sub-continent, demographic changes are experiencing a so-called
“demographic transition” period, in which there is a shift from
high to lower birth and death rates.
In
other regions which have completed their demographic transition,
such as America, democratic changes remain dynamic. In contrast,
the Council of Europe countries are, on average, particularly concerned
by unprecedented demographic changes with a “demographic winter”
situation which requires the framing of appropriate policies.
2.2. A “demographic winter” for
birth rates almost everywhere
30. In the mid-2010s, the average
birth rate in Council of Europe member States was lower than on
any other continent:
11 births per thousand
inhabitants, as compared with a world average of 20. It can be noted that
this rate is almost on a par with that of China, whose birth rate
decline has admittedly been exacerbated by its coercive demographic
policy. It is higher than that of Japan, whose birth rate has fallen
considerably these last few decades and which has a particularly
large elderly population thanks to a life expectancy that is among
the highest in the world. The low average birth rate in Council
of Europe member States can be clearly illustrated by comparing
two percentages: the Council of Europe countries account for 11.3%
of the world’s population but only 6.3% of births, namely 9.3 million
births in 2015 out of a world total of 147 million.
31. The low average birth rate in member States is due mainly
to a decline in fertility,
which
has fallen these last few decades to an average of 1.5 children
born per woman. The total fertility rate in Europe fell from 2.65
children per woman at the beginning of the 1950s to 1.5 in the 2010s,
bearing in mind that given the quality of health-care in Europe,
it would take 2.1 children per woman in order simply to replace
each generation, in other words for 100 women in one generation
to be replaced by the same number of women in the next generation
30 years later. At the end of the 1970s, the term “demographic winter”
was used to describe this situation of a fertility rate that is
lastingly well below the replacement threshold.
32. This “demographic winter” is a natural demographic system
that shows variations between the different areas, corresponding
in part to geographic criteria. Indeed, the latest data on the geography
of fertility (2015) reveal contrasting situations. Only one country
has a fertility rate that exceeds the replacement threshold: that country
is Turkey, with 2.2 children born per woman. Azerbaijan has the
same fertility rate, but given its relatively high mortality before
the age of adulthood the replacement threshold is 2.27 children
per woman. The highest fertility rates – or should we say the least
low – are found above all in northern Europe (Ireland, Iceland, Norway,
the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark and Finland), France – western
Europe’s biggest country by surface area – and Russia, where fertility
has increased since the 2000s.
33. Conversely, very low fertility rates (less than 1.4 children
per woman) are found in southern Europe (Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Spain, Greece, Portugal) and eastern Europe (Republic of Moldova,
Poland and Romania). Republic of Moldova, in fact, is a country
with the fastest shrinking population in the world.
34. Between the two we find low fertility rates of 1.5 or 1.6
children born per woman in some 15 countries such as Germany, Austria,
Ukraine, Croatia, Serbia, etc.
35. The differences in fertility from one European country to
another can be explained by country-specific cultural, economic,
social and also political factors. Generally speaking, countries
that spend more on family policy have higher fertility rates, while
those with weak family policies have very low fertility rates.
36. The low average fertility rate in Council of Europe member
States is likely to cause a population decline. Indeed, a fertility
rate of 1.5 children per woman means that a cohort of 100 women,
i.e. 100 women born the same year, will be followed 30 years or
one generation later by a cohort of only 71 women. Admittedly, the mean
projections for 2050 predict not a population decrease but stagnation,
with 831 million people in 2050, compared with 826 million in 2015.
But that non-decline can be explained mainly by two favourable assumptions:
longer life expectancy and migration.
37. In order to address the “demographic winter”, the Council
of Europe countries should ideally pursue policies and deliver services
enabling couples to choose the number of children they wish to have
and, in particular, to strike a balance between their family and
working lives, which is likely to increase the birth rate.
2.3. Mortality: a particularly
favourable context
38. In the 2010s, the Council of
Europe countries as a whole are seeing a rise in the number of deaths,
which reached 9.3 million in 2015, or 18.2% of deaths worldwide
(51 million). This is by no means due to a deterioration of living
conditions: quite the contrary, in recent years the life expectancy
of both sexes has risen. However, the more elderly people there
are, the more deaths there are also. Hence the main reason for the increased
mortality is the increase in the number of people of an age to die,
since, as J. M. Keynes put it, “in the long run we are all dead”.
39. Reduced mortality, which equates with a longer life expectancy,
is the result of four main factors:
- a better, more complete, rich and varied diet, in particular
due to progress in farming techniques and improved transport, and
therefore trade, possibilities;
- improved hygiene;
- progress in the field of medical and pharmaceutical technologies
and health-care systems;
- more extensive use of machinery, and therefore less arduous
working conditions.
40. The geography of the mortality of Council of Europe countries
can be approached from the angle of life expectancy.
Women’s
life expectancy is equal to or higher than 79 years in all the northern
and western countries, and in most of the eastern and southern countries
including Cyprus, Georgia and Turkey.
41. A lower life expectancy – less than 79 years – is found in
only a minority of countries: Bulgaria, Republic of Moldova, Romania,
Russia, Ukraine, Bosnia and Herzegovina, “the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia”, Serbia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.
42. In all countries, men’s life expectancy at birth is lower
than women’s, with the biggest differences in Latvia (9 years),
Lithuania and Ukraine (10 years) and, lastly, Russia (11 years).
43. Of course it is to be hoped that the decline in child, adolescent
and childbirth mortality – which, it must be said, has been quite
marked these last few decades – will continue. However, given the
already very low rates, any further progress is unlikely to have
a major demographic impact. The life expectancy of the elderly may
also increase further, but no significant population growth should
be expected from this.
44. However, there is a real risk that improved life expectancy
could halt in the event of a deterioration in health systems, health
insurance and hygiene practices. For example, the possible increase
in high-risk behaviours (smoking, drugs, alcohol, etc.) could have
detrimental effects on life expectancy and, because of the young
age of the persons engaging in such behaviour, lead to an increase
in the number of potential years of life lost. To address this risk,
it is essential to improve health education. In addition, there
must be greater vigilance and reactivity of the public authorities
vis-à-vis the industry sector to ensure that the quality of food for
humans and animals (food additives, crop-protection products, cosmetic
products, endocrine disrupters), and of the environment in which
people live (air, water, etc.) is maintained. Decreasing excessive
mortality at working ages will also lead to healthier and more numerous
labour forces, thus reducing the need for labour migration.
2.4. The geography of natural
growth rates
45. The ratio of births to deaths
in 2015, comparable to that of previous years, therefore signifies demographic
stagnation, in other words an equivalent number of births and deaths.
46. However, and with reference to the Population Reference Bureau’s
data for 2015, the natural demographic systems divide the Council
of Europe countries between those that show positive natural population
growth, namely more births than deaths, and those with zero or negative
growth. In geographic terms, the latter are to be found in central
and eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Hungary, the Republic of Moldova, Poland,
Romania, the Czech Republic and Russia), northern Europe (Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania and Finland) and southern Europe (Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Serbia). These countries are
suffering the cumulative effect of a particularly low fertility
rate combined with a less than average life expectancy. In western
Europe there is only one country – Germany – with negative natural
growth.
47. Conversely, in 2015 there were only two Council of Europe
countries – Turkey and Azerbaijan – with a clearly positive natural
growth rate, that is to say equivalent to the world average (1.2
per 100 inhabitants).
48. In the Council of Europe countries where the natural growth
rate is positive but much lower than the world average, the fundamental
reason for this positive rate is almost always what is known as
demographic inertia. What this means is that the analysis of a population
must take account of demographic changes hidden in the sex and age
structure of the population (the age pyramid). For example, there
are Council of Europe countries (Denmark, Austria, Luxembourg or
Switzerland) that have natural population growth – that is to say an
excess of births in relation to deaths – in spite of a much reduced
fertility rate, due to an age pyramid that (still) gives them a
relatively high proportion of women of childbearing age.
49. The trend as regards natural population change within the
member States is clear: unless there is a strong increase in the
fertility rate, life expectancy or migration, the population will
decrease due to the effect of ageing.
2.5. Accentuated ageing of the
population
50. The entity formed by the Council
of Europe countries has the oldest population in the world due to
the high percentage of people aged 65 and over.
51. The main reason for the ageing of the European population
is what is known as “ageing at the bottom” of the population pyramid,
caused by a big drop in the fertility rate. As a result, there are
smaller generations of young people, hence a smaller percentage
of young people in the population, while the percentage of elderly people
is increasing. In parallel to this phenomenon there is another cause
of ageing: improved health and hygiene standards together with a
better standard of living, leading to “ageing at the top” of the
pyramid, in other words increased life expectancy for the elderly.
52. Migratory movements are a third factor that may impact the
rate of ageing of a population. In the case of the Council of Europe
countries, migration is a factor that slows down ageing of the population
since the majority of immigrants are young. Indeed, the propensity
of working-age individuals to emigrate to Europe for economic reasons
(in search of a job or better, more highly paid work, or a better
standard of living) is inversely proportional to their age. The
Latin Americans, Africans and Asians who come to Europe to provide
personal services such as childcare or assistance to the elderly,
for example, come from the younger working-age generations. The
same is true of the immigrants who work in the building and public
works sectors.
53. A generally young age is also characteristic of the asylum
seekers who emigrate to Europe and, even more, of candidates for
family reunification, who are mainly women and children. The same
applies to students from other continents. Moreover, as can be seen
from the regularisation of illegal immigrants in several member
States these last few decades, the average age of these people is
generally well below the average age of the population in general.
54. Migration limits the ageing of the population in another way,
in that it involves a higher proportion of individuals of an age
to have children, and their fertility rate is often higher than
that of the host population. The European migration system therefore
contributes to reducing the age of the population, but the increase
in the rate of ageing both at the top and the bottom of the pyramid
to a large extent offsets that effect.
55. The ageing of Europe’s population seems likely to accelerate
in future, since demographic projections generally suggest that
the effects of the first two factors studied – ageing “at the top”
and “at the bottom” of the pyramid – will intensify: the birth rate
will decline, even in the case of a slight increase in the fertility
rate, due to a reduction in the number of women of childbearing
age, and the elderly will live longer.
56. A fourth factor with a similar effect is the demographic legacy:
the generations now reaching retirement age are larger than the
previous ones, which were smaller in size due to the world wars.
57. However, the rate of ageing varies considerably from one member
State to another. There are wide gaps between the highest rates
– to be found in Italy (with 22% aged 65 and over in 2015) and Germany
and Greece (21%) – and the lowest ones, in Turkey (8%) and Azerbaijan
(7%). These gaps are due to variations in the intensity of the different
ageing factors: changes in fertility levels and the timing of childbearing,
differences in the way the life expectancy of the elderly is evolving
and in the level it has reached in the different countries, differences
in the demographic legacy and differences as regards the migration
system and the age structure of immigration and emigration flows.
58. Since the intensity and rate of ageing vary widely among the
different European countries, the spectrum of economic, social and
political consequences is also very broad. Judging by the trends
at the start of the 21st century, the highest rates of ageing in
the future are likely to be in eastern Europe, due to very low fertility rates
and the potential there for increases in the life expectancy of
the elderly, together with the failure to attract a young migrant
population that might offset the ageing process.
59. The member States having recorded a considerable exodus of
their younger working-age generations should pursue employment policies
to enhance their economic appeal and reduce rural depopulation which,
in view of its magnitude, harms both their demographic balance and
their economic dynamism.
2.6. A double inversion of the
age pyramid
60. Another demographic characteristic
of the member States is the shape of their age pyramid, resulting essentially
from changes in the birth and mortality rates. The world population,
logically enough, has a pyramidal age structure, while the age pyramid
of the Council of Europe countries presents at least two major differences.
The first is the much larger size of the oldest generations, with
a preponderance of women, due to Europe’s longer life expectancy
and women’s greater longevity as compared with that of men.
61. The second is the narrow base of that age pyramid, since the
generations under 20 are much smaller than the working-age generations,
due to the lower fertility rate. Consequently, we have a double
inversion of the pyramid, with more older than younger people in
general and a larger number of older than younger people within
the workforce.
62. As a result, several countries are experiencing a reduction
of their workforce and some, like Germany, are coming out in favour
of what has been termed, since the publication of a United Nations
report in 2000, “replacement migration”. The Eurostat figures indicate
wide variations in the trend of the 15-64 age group between 2005
and 2015: +23.0% for Luxembourg, due exclusively to the contribution
from migration, +15.4% for Turkey owing to its natural dynamics
and -14.6% for Latvia. Some 20 Council of Europe countries saw a decline
in their population within that age group. After Latvia, the countries
with the biggest decreases in their workforce – more than 7% – were
Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania. And in spite of the contribution
made by migration during the period from 2005 to 2015, Germany’s
population in the same age group declined by 2.72%.
63. It is true that a reduction in the workforce can be counteracted
by increased rates of employment, for example among young people
and senior citizens. But this will not necessarily be enough to
meet economic needs. Other countries have experienced an increase
in their workforce due either solely to migration – this is the
case of Switzerland, Austria and Italy – or thanks to migration
combined with a smaller decline in the fertility rate over previous
decades, as in France and the United Kingdom. The fact is that,
in European countries with comparable economic systems, wealth creation
is correlated to the size of the workforce or, more specifically, the
employed workforce. For example, France’s gross domestic product
(GDP) is six times higher than that of Belgium because its workforce
is six times larger.
64. To assist in the reflection concerning the impact of population
dynamics on migration policies, some examples may be drawn from
the past in order to place the issue in a historical perspective.
3. Historical examples that
illustrate the effects of population changes on migration policies
65. History provides many examples
of migration policies founded, amongst other things, on population dynamics,
whether in terms of population level, births or deaths.
3.1. Population level and migration
policy
66. Looking back in history, authors
such as Plato and Machiavelli already called for the application
of variable migration policies according to population changes.
Plato, in his Laws, advocated fixed population levels. For example,
he called for the number of households in the City of Athens to
be maintained at 5 040 and suggested a whole series of public measures
for achieving that. He was in favour of encouraging emigration if
the birth rate was deemed too high, or conversely, a pro-immigration
policy if the birth rate could not be increased. Machiavelli, in Florentine Histories (1520-1526),
advised the princes and republics to maintain “an abundant population”
everywhere. But, depending on the available resources, he advocated adopting
emigration or immigration policies.
67. In reality, many countries, considering their population too
small in relation to their economic potential, have had recourse
to migration policies that boost immigration. During the 19th century
and the first quarter of the 20th century, Brazil, for example,
was keen to attract large numbers of immigrants from Europe, a movement
which reached its peak between 1900 and the 1914-1918 war. Similarly,
19th-century Argentina encouraged European immigration, in some
cases by giving away land for free or renting it at very low prices. The
United States’ use of migration policy to promote European immigration
is well known. The country’s selective immigration policy was based
on two types of regulation: firstly, prohibitions according to origin,
with fixed quotas to deter or ban non-European immigrants (the quotas
were abolished only in 1965) and, secondly, a system of filtering
immigrants applied, for example, from 1892 to 1954 at Ellis Island
in New York Bay, which was the principal gateway into the United
States for the 12 million people who passed through it. Among the pro-immigration
policies adopted, notwithstanding the above-mentioned prohibitions
supplemented by bans on certain categories of individuals (anarchists,
polygamists, etc.), mention must be made of the legal security that the
United States offered immigrants, with the granting of American
nationality to children from the moment of their birth according
to a system of jus soli that
is still in force today.
68. In the 20th and 21st centuries, well-known examples are Canada
and Australia, two very sparsely populated countries, with population
densities, respectively, of 4 and 3 inhabitants/km2.
Each year, the Canadian Parliament votes a law fixing the number
of immigrants that the country is prepared to receive under its
selective immigration policy. Among the countries keen to encourage
immigration in recent decades reference must be made to Gabon, a
very sparsely populated country (7 inhabitants/km2)
that does not have the workforce to develop its economic potential,
in the ore-mining sector and the timber and related industries, for
instance.
69. Conversely, there have been examples of densely populated
countries discouraging immigration and, in particular, the return
of their emigrants. After attaining independence in 1947, India,
for example, wanted its emigrant communities, representing several
million people, to be integrated into the States that had emerged after
the collapse of the British Empire. For example, many Indians living
in Burma and Malaysia were encouraged to adopt the nationality of
those newly independent States, and therefore discouraged from returning
to India and adding to its population. Subsequently, in 1972, the
Indian Government again showed a considerable reluctance to take
back its overseas emigrants by refusing the return of the 50 000
or so Indians expelled from Uganda by Idi Amin’s government. Many
were consequently obliged to seek refuge elsewhere, in particular
in the United Kingdom.
3.2. Birth rate and migration
policy trends
70. Birth rate dynamics also have
an impact on migration policies. A very low birth rate will lead
to a shortfall in the working population 20 years later. There have
been cases of countries trying to offset such a shortfall by means
of replacement migration. 19th-century France, for example, had
an exceptionally low birth rate and hence a small workforce. It
therefore decided to encourage immigration, at the time essentially
from Europe. In 1851, for example, it strengthened its policy of
keeping the children of foreign parents in France by adopting the
law of double jus soli, in
other words by automatically granting French nationality to all
persons born in France of a foreign parent also born in France.
71. Conversely, in countries with a high birth rate, governments
do little to discourage emigration, even though it reduces their
human resources, particularly those most active, given that it is
the 18-30 age group that is the most affected. Of all the African
countries which have, in recent decades, experienced a high birth rate
that has stimulated population growth, none has had a government
that adopted measures to limit emigration. Moreover, very little
action has been taken to combat the people smugglers who not only
exploit human misery, but also in some cases deprive countries of
their most highly skilled workers (doctors, engineers, etc.).
3.3. Mortality and migration
policy trends
72. Death rate dynamics also have
an impact on migration policies. Countries whose population has declined
due to a high mortality rate can use migration policies to attract
workers. After losing 1 350 000 young men in the First World War
and finding itself with two million wounded whose productivity was
limited or non-existent, France, for example, introduced policies
to attract workers from other countries, whether neighbouring or
not, such as Poland. Another example: after the Second World War,
Belgium signed agreements with Italy for the recruitment of Italian
workers. A protocol signed in Rome on 23 June 1946 and its annexes
of 26 April 1947 enabled Italian workers to be recruited in Italy,
where they underwent medical tests before being taken by train to
the main stations in Wallonia.
73. A high death rate resulting from a pandemic in one country
may have the opposite effect of prompting neighbouring countries
to close their borders in order to prevent immigration. During the
cholera epidemic from August 2008 to July 2009 in Zimbabwe, for
example, Botswana reinforced the 500 km-long electric fence along its
border to prevent the possible entry of Zimbabwean carriers of the
disease.
74. These examples show that various countries have used or are
still using migration policies in which their population dynamics
play a role.
4. Can migration solve population
problems in Europe?
75. Looking at the table in Appendix
3, representing natural movements and migration throughout Council of
Europe member States, it is evident that even taking into account
an important increase in migration flows into Europe in recent years,
provoked inter alia by the
influx of refugees, the European population dynamics have not been
influenced significantly. Thus, it is unlikely that migration alone
will solve the demographic decline in Europe.
76. However, migration could be considered as a contributing factor
in counterbalancing population ageing in Europe. Many European countries
will not be able to sustain their social and welfare systems without
an increase in a number of working taxpayers. About 20% of the population
of Germany, for example, is over the age of 65 and the natural growth
of the population is negative. To address this problem, the German Government
is spending about €250 million per year on family subsidies in an
attempt to reverse the trend, but with little success. However,
due to the resettlement of refugees during the last two years a
slight population increase has been registered. Nevertheless, even
with the present level of inflow of migrants, the decade’s long tendency
of population decline would be difficult to reverse. Furthermore,
it has been challenging for Germany to integrate so many refugees
into their labour market. This is due to the fact that the large
majority of the refugees arriving in Germany over the last years
come with low skills and little education. This is a challenge, since
Germany is more in need of filling vacant skilled jobs than low-skilled
jobs.
77. The problem is that while focusing on finding a solution for
the issue of refugees and their integration, there is no well-developed
governmental strategy on how to encourage the natural growth of
the population and to bring in qualified migrants to fill skilled
job vacancies.
78. One should also bear in mind that Europe will compete with
such countries as Australia, Canada, the United States and New Zealand
for qualified labour forces. These countries of traditional immigration
have positive population growth and very attractive labour markets.
To compete with them, it would be very important to rebuild trust
on migration issues among the European population. In many European
countries, people overestimate the number of migrants in their countries
and are afraid that migrants will take their jobs. Data from the
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) shows that permanent
migration from third countries to European countries is low and
much lower than to the United States. However, net migration from
outside the European Union drives the population dynamic in these
countries.
79. In the long term, an influx of young migrant workers could
play a positive role in tackling demographic problems in some European
countries, in particular in covering a lack of skilled workers to
contribute to GDP growth and pension financing. In order to achieve
this, it is necessary to develop policies creating favourable conditions
for migrants to participate in the labour market. These policies
should be based on comprehensive sectorial analysis of the labour
market to identify the real needs in migrant labour. It is also
necessary to eliminate all obstacles in national legislation hampering
a quick access of qualified refugees to the labour market.
80. Bilateral agreements between migrant sending and receiving
countries should be encouraged in order to reduce the costs of migration
and ensure legal employment opportunities, social and health security coverage
of migrants. It will also help to eliminate the black labour market
and prevent the exploitation of migrants.
81. Apart from creating legal opportunities for refugees’ faster
integration into the labour market, the receiving countries should
promote vocational training for refugees who do not have the skills
required by the labour market. For highly educated migrants, it
is important to facilitate the recognition of their educational
and vocational diplomas and skills.
82. Finally, although a decent job is the best integration incentive
for migrants, the receiving countries should revise their integration
policies to ensure that migrants are not segregated in the host
society, but involved in the social and cultural life of local communities.
It is also important to encourage the participation of women migrants
in the labour market. This will help their integration and hinder
segregation. Special integration programmes for women, including
language courses, vocational training and introductory courses to
the culture of the host countries, should be developed. The local
population should also be better informed of the economic benefits
of legal migration and cultural diversity for their society. They
should be encouraged to accept the different cultural and religious
identities of migrants, as long as they are not against the law
or in contradiction with fundamental human rights values. At the
same time, national legislation should foresee strict measures against
all forms of discrimination, racism and xenophobia.
5. Conclusion
and recommendations
83. In view of the very uneven
geographic distribution of the population throughout Europe, States
must take account of their specific demographic situation in seeking
to correct this distribution.
84. With birth rates which are close to a demographic winter almost
everywhere, it is desirable to promote policies that enable couples
to have the number of children they wish for, because this is liable
to increase birth rates. To this end, suitable policies (“family”
policy, working/family life balance requiring care facilities for
young children, etc.) must be pursued so that potential parents
can decide on the number of their children freely and any obstacles
in this respect are removed.
85. The fact that mortality rates are particularly favourable
compared with other regions of the world must not be taken for granted.
Action must be taken to maintain that situation and, indeed, further
improve healthy life expectancy. As the right to health is a human
right, it is necessary to continue efforts to improve health and hygiene,
in particular through health education, while also strengthening
health systems and supervision of the use of chemicals (plant protection
products, cosmetics, endocrine disruptors, etc.).
86. Although migration cannot be a permanent solution to Europe’s
demographic challenges, proactive migration policies could improve
the situation. To make better use of the current important migration
influx in Europe, receiving countries need to develop long-term
political strategies based on the needs of the labour market, responding
to integration challenges for migrants and encouraging their rapid
entry into the labour market.
87. Through its body of legislation, each country has a migration
policy, even if it is not explicitly described as such. Just as
they do for foreign, economic or social policy, it is legitimate
that States should give thought to the migration policies that best
serve the common good and the interests of their populations. That
process of reflection must be founded on values such as those enshrined
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention
on Human Rights (ETS No. 5). It must also be guided by the principle
of reality, which means that a country must have a good understanding
of its population dynamics and the needs of its labour market.
88. Given the increasing population ageing and in some cases population
decline, individual countries’ migration policies need to be adapted,
which means, for instance, introducing policy incentives for young people
to remain in their countries of origin where high emigration rates
are observed, thus limiting the effects of ageing.
89. The demographic winter varies in intensity from one Council
of Europe country to another, engendering diverging population trends.
Accordingly, migration policies should not necessarily be the same
for all countries, but fit the specific dynamics of the population
concerned.