1. Introduction
1. On 13 June 2016, together with
other members of the Parliamentary Assembly, I tabled a motion for
a resolution entitled “Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP) and its implications for social rights, public health and
sustainable development” (
Doc. 14085). In this motion we asked the Assembly to assess the risk
that European social, health and environmental standards may be
lowered as a result of the conclusion of the TTIP agreement. On
24 June 2016, the motion was referred to the Committee on Social
Affairs, Health and Sustainable Development for report and I was
appointed rapporteur.
2. The TTIP trade agreement between the United States of America
and the European Union aims to increase market liberalisation and
to remove economic trade barriers.
It would create one of the strongest economic
and investment alliances, and has the ambition to set global rules
in the international trade arena by creating a free trade zone,
promoting and facilitating investments and by adjusting national
and European legislation. A similar agreement has also been negotiated
and signed between the European Union and Canada: the Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) contains a number of provisions
that form the template for TTIP, including the investment protection
and sustainable development chapters. The issues raised below apply
equally to both CETA and TTIP.
3. TTIP goes beyond the scope of traditional trade agreements
as it contains an important element of “regulatory co-operation”.
It aims at maximising regulatory co-operation between the two largest
internal markets in the world by making their regulatory systems
more compatible, and at opening up a single public procurement and
investment space.
The agreement will encroach on many areas
of public policy, in particular on environmental protection, public
health and social rights.
4. The TTIP negotiations were launched in 2013, after the European
Union ministers of trade gave a mandate to the European Commission
to negotiate with the United States on behalf of the European Union. This
agreement is still in the negotiation phase; initially, it was expected
to be concluded by the end of 2016. According to the latest developments,
the parties have not managed to find a consensus on any of the 27 articles
of the agreement. Following the change in the United States leadership,
TTIP may no longer be among the priorities of the new American administration.
A forced pause in the intense negotiation process gives us an opportunity
to take a closer look at the problems of the agreement – whether
in TTIP, CETA or any other “new generation” trade agreement
–
and to consider whether there are opportunities to use it to promote not
inhibit sustainable development, public health and the democratic
rule of law.
5. In particular CETA and TTIP introduce new powers for transnational
companies to sue European Union member States through arbitration
courts meeting in private beyond the reach of public law. Governments become
liable to compensate investors for laws they pass to protect their
citizens' environment, public health and rights at work for impacts
on future profit streams. Such powers thus punish or intimidate
democracies regarding the passing of such laws.
2. Economic overview
“Not
everything that counts can be counted, and not everything that can
be counted counts.” Albert Einstein
6. According to the forecasts
of the European Commission, TTIP would significantly boost trade
between the two partners, which would create more business opportunities,
enhance economic growth and ultimately, would generate more jobs.
Lower prices and a wider variety of available products would also
contribute to the prosperity of over 800 million European Union
and American citizens. A study carried out for the European Commission
suggests that TTIP could bring benefits to the EU economy worth
an additional 0.5% of its gross domestic product (GDP).
That is worth about a cup of coffee
per person per week, but it will not be equally distributed. It
is estimated that the sectors which will benefit the most from the
agreement are metal products, processed food, chemicals, transport
equipment, motor vehicles, etc.
7. This study was carried out by the Centre for Economic Policy
Research, using a model of the world economy, with a number of limitations.
It is important to understand that the study makes certain assumptions about
the agreement. The 0.5% growth calculations were based on the most
ambitious scenario, which implied tariff barriers being reduced
to zero, non-tariff barriers being reduced by 25%, and public procurement
barriers being reduced by 50%.
8. The overall effect for the European economy would consist
in increasing its productivity: as a result of the increased competition,
companies would have to become more efficient. This, however, could
have disastrous consequences for small companies, which would not
be able to keep up with the pace of the competition.
9. As a matter of fact, the Commission’s analysis does not take
into consideration the distribution of economic gains. There is
no analysis to support the assumption that the gains from TTIP would
be spread evenly. It is far more likely that economic gains would
be concentrated within a small section of society, with the majority
of Europeans seeing little or no benefit.
10. From an employment point of view, the study cannot quantify
the number of jobs which would be created, since the modelled free
trade agreements do not deliver employment effects. The European
Commission made its own approximate calculation, and expects that
the number of jobs dependent on exports in the European Union may
increase by several million. This estimate is based on the general
assumption that the increase in production demands more labour in
a specific sector, having a positive effect on wages.
11. In order to take rational decisions, the negotiators should
also take into account the potential loss of thousands of small
businesses: some studies estimate that TTIP may result in the loss
of at least 680 000 jobs across Europe, caused by the inability
of medium and small businesses to compete with US corporations.
It would be equally important
to take into account the costs of assisting workers in making the
transition to new sectors through lifelong learning and other labour
market flexibility programmes.
12. It remains of paramount importance to assess and scrutinise
the assumptions more critically and from different viewpoints. For
instance, the estimate that society at large will benefit from a
wider variety of products (including processed food) at lower prices
could be less attractive in view of certain facts. According to
the studies conducted following the conclusion of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the intensification of the import
of processed foods led to an increase in obesity, diabetes and an
overall decline in public health in Mexico.
The
negotiators should consider the costs of imposing countermeasures
such as health labelling, advertising restrictions, or taxes on
unhealthy foods.
13. In addition, the cost of imposing countermeasures such as
health labelling, advertising restrictions or taxes on unhealthy
foods could be multiplied many times by investors suing governments
for introducing such protections and thereby restricting their profits.
CETA and TTIP introduce new powers for transnational companies to
sue governments in privately held arbitration courts through the
Investment Court System (ICS), formerly the Investor State Dispute
Settlement (ISDS). Therefore companies, for example, will introduce products
that promote diabetes then sue governments for protecting the public
from the poor health the companies are creating. That is why the
ICS should be removed from CETA and TTIP as investors are already protected
by public and contract law and there is no justification for these
powers in these circumstances.
14. Moreover, some other unexpected costs may arise depending
on the exact terms of some sectoral issues. For instance, while
the environmental impact has been adequately assessed as far CO2 emissions
are concerned, a number of environmental aspects other than climate
change were not included in the assessment model.
15. It is important to keep in mind that TTIP is a “new generation”
trade agreement, involving regulatory co-operation, with only some
elements of classical trade agreements. Given its unprecedented
nature, its impact will be known only after the agreement takes
effect. From the standpoint of all available evidence, so far only one
fact is certain – European corporations as a whole will benefit
from the transatlantic trade deal. In order to determine the limits
of flexibility in the negotiation process, the negotiators should
conduct a more complex assessment of potential economic benefits
and costs involved. The Assembly should recommend a more careful
and wider analysis, employing a broader range of determining factors,
of the real economic potential of TTIP and other “new generation”
trade agreements like it.
3. Main
concerns and objections to the conclusion of TTIP
16. One of the issues related to
TTIP which has raised the most concern is that the negotiations
are being held behind closed doors, with even parliamentarians –
the representatives of the people – only being given restricted
access (if any) to the relevant documents. Many commentators consider
this a democratic deficit that violates the fundamental principles
of good governance, transparency and the right to information. While,
to be fair, most international negotiations are carried out behind
closed doors, the perceived lack of transparency combined with the
wide scope of the envisaged agreement has fostered a growing mistrust
among civil society and the general public, giving rise to suspicions
that TTIP would undermine European consumer protection and environmental
standards. These fears turned out to be justified in May 2016, with
the release of secret TTIP negotiation documents by the non-governmental
organisation (NGO) Greenpeace (Netherlands). The leaked information
gave an unparalleled look at the scope of American demands to lower
or circumvent EU protections for consumers, environment and public
health.
17. TTIP aims at the harmonisation of the regulations of the two
partners. It should be noted that the legislation of the European
Union and the United States differs considerably, notably in the
fields of nutrition standards, food safety and consumer protection.
In 2000, the European Commission adopted the “precautionary principle”
(Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union),
which requires a manufacturer to prove that a product is safe before
putting it on the market, and intends to safeguard the highest environmental
and health protection standards.
The preventive policy-making process
demands that politicians base a risk assessment on more factors
than the existing scientific data in cases where there is scientific
uncertainty. In contrast, the US approach puts the responsibility
on the authorities to prove that a particular product is hazardous,
before imposing a ban or refusing market authorisation. Where no
such scientific data exists, the United States authorises companies
to freely sell their products.
Moreover,
the TTIP papers, as disclosed last May, contain no mention of the
“precautionary principle”.
3.1. Investment
Court System
18. The primary concern about TTIP
is that corporations would be granted a privileged voice to defend
their interests through the Investment Court System (ICS), formerly
the Investor-State Dispute System (ISDS) arbitration mechanism.
It is foreseen in TTIP that investment provisions are to be separately
enforced by ICS tribunals, which meet in private and have no obligation
to publish their reasoning. This would entail a two-tier justice
system, with international investors given access to ICS and domestic
business (and citizens) subject to domestic law. ICS tribunals are
not bound by the doctrine of precedent and are not obliged to cohere
with other tribunals in their reasoning.
19. One principle objection to the ICS arbitration mechanism is
that different classes of individuals are subject to entirely different
sets of norms in terms of their relationship with the State and
with the justice system, which is inimical to the rule of law. Lord
Bingham, eminent British judge and jurist once said: “The law must apply
equally to all, save to the extent that objective differences justify
differentiation.”
Investor–State arbitration
courts were originally conceived in order to encourage foreign investments
in States without independent courts. The ISDS first appeared in
a bilateral trade agreement between Germany and Pakistan in 1959.
The intention was to encourage foreign investment by protecting
investors from discrimination or expropriation.
Today the mechanisms are
applied to States with independent judicial systems, free from political
interference; thus, they no longer serve their original purpose.
There is no compelling reason why foreign investors should have
exclusive rights when their rights can be soundly protected in all
European legal systems by established public and contract law and
reinforced domestically by first instance, appeal and supreme courts.
On the contrary, the case for democracy, human rights, the rule
of law, the protection of public health and environment and public
interest is stacked in favour of not including the ICS in CETA and
TTIP.
20. Further consideration of the human rights legal aspects of
the arbitration provisions, including legal uncertainty and transfer
of power from accountable to unaccountable institutions, will be
provided by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, which
is currently preparing a report on “Human rights compatibility of
investor–State arbitration in international investment protection
agreements”. In the present report, it is important to illustrate
in practice how the ICS can be expected to undermine or penalise governments
in their bid to protect the environment, public health and rights
at work.
21. Companies will use the powers of arbitration courts made available
to them. Germany is being sued for US$3.7 billion by the
Vattenfall energy corporation because
of its decision to phase out nuclear power following the Fukushima
disaster.
Most recently, the US fracking company
Lone Pine sued Canada for US$250 million for a moratorium on fracking
in Quebec, while US and European energy giants sued Argentina over
a billion dollars for freezing energy and water prices. Trans-Canada
has been taking legal action against the US government, suing it
for $15 billion as a result of its attempts to stop the mutual sand-oil
pipeline project from being carried out, due to its impact on climate
change and conflict with the Paris Agreement. In the case of S
t Marys VCNA, LLC v. Canada, a law
which prohibited pesticides to protect the environment, was found
to be in violation of Chapter 11 of NAFTA. One more violation of
the treaty, involving regulations to control dangerous additives
to petrol, was identified in the case of
Ethyl
Corporation v. Canada. The tobacco giant Philip Morris
has filed to sue the Australian and Uruguay governments for anti-smoking
packaging regulations to protect public health.
22. According to the European Commission, TTIP will guarantee
governments' rights to regulate: ICS would not stop governments
from passing laws in the interest of society. However, where new
laws allegedly discriminate against foreign firms, it allows them
to bring a claim for compensation.
In this context, it should be understood
that the ICS mechanism will inhibit and intimidate legislators from
passing laws which protect the public interest, as the tribunals
will be empowered to award damages in response to policies that
allegedly affect the financial returns of foreign investors,
even if
these returns depend on damage to the environment, public health
and rights at work, for example through promoting fracking, sugary
drinks and diesel engines.
23. We may conclude that European efforts should be concentrated
on continuing to use existing legal frameworks of public and contract
law to protect both the investor and the public interest including
legal harmonisation. They should not support the introduction of
a new external system of law designed to favour investors' profit
interests above public interest which trumps national law. Whilst
it may be worth exploring alternative approaches to settle or even
prevent investment disputes,
the existing legal
framework already balances commercial and public interests through
public law.
3.2. Regulatory
co-operation
3.2.1. Environmental protection
and sustainable development concerns
24. In the meantime, concerns have
been raised about the significant implications of TTIP for environmental standards.
Following the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, the European Union
has adopted the emissions trading system (ETS) with a view to eliminating
greenhouse gas emissions in the sector of industries and aviation.
The Fuel Quality Directive (FQD) has a similar objective in the
sector of vehicles and transport.
Such legislation creates a solid
base for environmental protection, which US laws do not provide.
The different approaches between the United States and the European
Union on emission standards raise the problem of harmonisation –
the question remains open as to whether TTIP could assimilate the
lacuna of the US legislation.
The recent ratification of the Paris
Agreement by the United States could be seen as a strong signal
showing their readiness to work in the same direction as the European
Union with regard to the reduction of carbon emissions.
25. However, the outcomes of Paris have not been integrated into
TTIP with enforceable climate change imperatives and sustainable
development goals. In fact the Environment Chapter has no legal
teeth whilst the Investment Chapter has. This means environmental
considerations will be consistently trumped in CETA and TTIP by
ICS investor-protection provisions enforced through arbitration
courts established to protect investors interests and not the environment.
To make matters worse, Donald Trump has said his incoming US administration
intends to change course on climate policies altogether. Even though
the Paris Agreement is meant to commit signatories for three years
plus a one year break clause, Donald Trump may well choose to frustrate
Paris by not contributing to the £100 billion for technology transfer
to the developing world and renege on the deal altogether.
26. Concerning the ambitious goal of TTIP to secure energy efficiency,
we should keep in mind that the European Union and the United States
also have completely different policies in the energy domain. The European
Union sets priorities to increase the share of renewable energy
sources in the energy mix, whereas the United States insist on the
production of crude oil and gas. Consequently, there is a pressing
need to debate controversial issues such as hydraulic fracturing,
and to remain vigilant about any energy-specific provisions in TTIP.
This is particularly relevant to
climate change imperatives as the latest satellite data suggests
fugitive methane emissions of 5%, which would make fracking worse
than coal for global warming,
and so is inconsistent with the
Paris Agreement.
27. To a great extent, the policy of the United States concerning
the usage of chemicals jeopardises environmental safety, in particular
water resources protection. Currently, European importers and producers are
obliged to disclose information about the chemicals they use to
the European Chemical Agency (ECHA), which limits their usage if
they are not compatible with environmental standards.
However, the Toxic Substances Control
Act in the United States does not provide for the same regulations.
Available drafts of TTIP indicate that it would include provisions
addressing environmental protection and sustainable development. However,
as mentioned, there is no equality of arms between the environmental
provisions and the investment protection provisions. The investment
protection provisions in TTIP have the advantage of a specific mechanism
for enforcement: ICS. The sustainable development provisions have
no equivalent mechanism. Thus, investment protection provisions
will, in practice, trump sustainable development provisions. The agreement
provides for significant disincentives for governments to violate
the investment protection provisions but no such disincentives to
violate the sustainable development provisions. Indeed, the investment
protection provisions would put pressure on governments to depart
from their sustainable development commitments for fear of being
subjected to legal action in arbitration courts for compensation.
3.2.2. TTIP and public health
28. Public health is defined as
“the art and science of preventing disease, prolonging life and
promoting health through the organised efforts of society”.
Member States must ensure that public
health protection is not trumped by commercial interests.
29. The pharma chapter in TTIP has provisions to reduce the total
costs of medicines by 4% for US exports and by 5% for EU exports,
by aligning current and future regulations. In fact, the removal
of tariffs on the trade of pharmaceuticals and medical devices between
the United States and the European Union has already been guaranteed
by the Pharmaceutical Tariff Elimination Agreement (1995). Nevertheless,
multinational companies claim that non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are
still high, due to the ongoing existence of different non-harmonised
standards and regulations.
30. However, whilst NTBs may include the costs of duplication
of procedures, along with the costs of delays due to approval requirements,
they also improve public health and save lives. A systematic study
at Harvard University found that whenever the length of market authorisation
reviews of drugs is shortened by 10 months, it results in an 18%
increase in serious adverse reactions, an 11% increase in hospitalisations,
and a 7.2% increase in deaths.
Meanwhile, the European Commission
estimates that adverse reactions to drugs kill nearly 200 000 Europeans
each year.
Commercial efficiency
should not be put before saving lives.
31. Europe is proud of the progress it has made on stricter EU
regulation for clinical trials. The adopted regulation obliges companies
to publish clinical test reports for medicine allowed on the EU
market, which strengthens the possibilities for public oversight
of medication and leads to greater transparency in the medical sector.
Insisting on the importance of trade secrets and commercial confidentiality
protection, the correspondent TTIP provisions may restrict the disclosure
of clinical trial data so that positive trials could be publicised
and negative trials suppressed. In addition, provisions for Trade
Secrets would restrict “whistle-blowers” from disclosing risks.
It is of the utmost importance that TTIP does not set back the positive developments
of clinical trials regulation.
32. One of the objectives of the TTIP negotiations is to maintain
and promote robust Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) frameworks
and effective levels of intellectual property protection in the
European Union and the United States. Despite its positive implications
for international business, setting such a goal might result in limiting
the accessibility of vital medicines: the changes in the IPR can
imply longer monopoly periods, higher prices on drugs, and the appearance
of new medicines with limited therapeutic value.
Meanwhile,
the production of reasonably priced generics
would be hampered, and patients
would experience difficulties in receiving affordable treatment.
These provisions may be symptomatic of the negotiations being subjected
to industrial lobbying behind closed doors.
33. TTIP deals with the questions of food safety and animal and
plant health in a separate sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) chapter.
Many international organisations are working on the issue of food
safety. For instance the United Nations issues the “codex alimentarius”
in order to contribute to safety, quality and fairness in the international
food trade. TTIP may change the rules due to an inconsistency between
the definitions of the codex alimentarius and those set out in the
trade agreement, where the definitions set by the World Trade Organization
(WTO) would prevail. Particular concerns are caused by the possible
liberalisation of the use of hormones or growth promoters for animals,
as well as of genetically modified organisms (GMO) – which, for the
moment, are restricted in Europe.
34. Cosmetic products include a wide range of commodities, such
as toothpaste, sun protection products and creams for children.
TTIP aims at the harmonisation of the safety tests, scientific safety
assessments and product labelling, while speeding up the time taken
to test and approve new products. However, harmonisation and speed
should not be at the cost of lowering standards to common levels
and hampering test innovation which improves safety at the cost
of time. One of the main points to be approached during the negotiations would
be the composition of the list of permitted and banned substances
in cosmetics, which differs significantly between the United States
and the European Union.
A precautionary principle approach
could be adopted to put public safety first.
3.2.3. Labour rights
35. With regard to the labour rights
provisions in draft TTIP documents, we may argue that the United
States and the European Union use somewhat outdated templates, which
do not fully address the problems workers confront in fast-changing
economies.
The negotiators must be encouraged
to replace previous trade models with ones built on transparency,
democracy and strong labour standards. Their leadership role should
consist in drafting a trade agreement that places equal importance
on fundamental social rights safeguards and on reducing tariffs
and technical barriers to trade.
36. The main concerns are related to the fact that unlike the
European Union, the United States has failed to ratify most of the
core International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions.
Currently, under the US trade model,
labour chapters are limited to the principles referenced in the
ILO’s 1998 Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.
This allows the United States to preserve its statutory and regulatory inconsistencies
with ILO conventions. We may conclude that limiting TTIP to the
Declaration could give the United States a discriminating advantage
with respect to labour markets (under the condition that European countries
do not lower their labour standards in order to harmonise them with
those of the United States),
which would be anti-competitive.
37. A labour chapter within TTIP and CETA should incorporate labour
standards as defined by ILO conventions and jurisprudence, which
would harmonise efforts towards meeting high and uniform international standards.
Such an approach would prevent watering down the labour standards,
while also eliminating ambiguities and facilitating understanding
of the chapter by future signatories. Negotiators should also condition
each country’s participation on its adoption, implementation and
effective enforcement of fundamental human rights reflected by the
ILO conventions and jurisprudence.
38. The ILO should also be involved in the implementation of labour
commitments through its co-operative activities, which tend to focus
on technical assistance and the institutional capacity of trade
partners. The comments of the ILO’s supervisory mechanisms can be
used to identify the critical areas that technical co-operation
can address.
3.3. Deregulation
of public services and public procurement
39. A brief analysis of the treaty
text drafts known so far shows that Europe’s public services might
be under serious threat from TTIP. Public services ranging from
health and education to social welfare and beyond have always been
national affairs, requiring proper State regulation. Since making
a profit is not their primary aim, they are often able to offer
more affordable prices. Under TTIP, not only would many public services
be open to commercialisation and liberalisation, but they would
also face increased international competition, while privatisations
and deregulation would become more difficult to reverse.
40. In essence, governments would be encouraged to externalise
public services to private companies, which would be difficult to
reverse without financial penalties. For example, the Dutch insurance
company Achmea sued the Slovak Republic for reversing the health
privatisation policies of the previous administration and was awarded
€22 million in compensation under the investor rights provisions
of a bilateral investment treaty. The threat of litigation may compel
policy makers to avoid enacting new legislation and regulations
that, while in the public interest, may have an impact on foreign
investors. The proposed stabilisation clause in TTIP would lock
in its deregulatory norms even after a State denounces the treaty.
The proposed stabilisation clause will provide for the investment
protection provisions to remain in effect (for any investment made
while the treaty had effect) for up to 20 years after a State denounces
the treaty. This means that TTIP and CETA will bind States even
after they leave them and will fundamentally compromise their sovereignty.
41. The TTIP talks provide an opportunity to remove the remaining
obstacles in the public procurement sector enabling EU firms to
bid for a larger share of the products and services which US public
authorities buy and to compete with US firms on the same grounds.
At present, Europeans estimate that the openness of the EU procurement
markets is at 85%, against 32% for the United States.
The EU procurement is more transparent
due to the comprehensive coverage of all levels of procurement by
uniform EU rules. In contrast, State and city government procurement
in the United States is not fully covered by the WTO’s Government Procurement
Agreement (GPA) and procurement procedures vary from State to State.
The major challenge in the field of public procurement in TTIP would
be obtaining the US sub-federal government’s agreement to be covered
by rules that would make these markets more transparent for potential
EU suppliers and free from provisions favouring local suppliers
(such as, for instance, the Buy American Act).
4. Conclusions
and recommendations
42. It is estimated that TTIP,
being a trade agreement between the world’s largest developed economies, would
bring economic benefits to both partners amounting to 0.5% of GDP,
although these benefits would not be evenly distributed. The challenge
is to ensure that these small but significant benefits fully respect
and support human rights, the rule of law and democracy, and that
negotiations are transparent and publicly scrutinised so that public
interest is prioritised over business interests. In addition, the
agreement should provide a boost to both economies and also enhance
and not undermine people's health and the environment on both sides
of the Atlantic. If properly drafted, incorporating the needs of
the environment, public health and human rights, it could help to
provide a blueprint for world trade.
43. A solid, mutually beneficial trade agreement must provide
for sustainable development, along with international rules for
better trade that promote environmental, social and human well-being.
Instead of granting privileged treatment for multinationals, it
needs to guarantee their accountability and social responsibility
through the enforceable protection of our public health, environment
and human and social rights. It is of paramount importance that
in the process of standard harmonisation, the respect of the highest standards
is set as a priority.
44. Unfortunately, the evidence shows that, for the time being,
TTIP and other “new generation” trade agreements, including CETA,
have the potential to deregulate controversial and risky products,
downgrade existing standards and influence policy makers in their
decisions. The Parliamentary Assembly should therefore recommend
that the European negotiators pay very close attention to the precise
wording of provisions regarding the environment, food safety, public
health, human rights and consumer protection set out in any such
agreements, in order to ensure that all parties are able to maintain
the highest standards that they deem necessary and appropriate.
It is also of paramount importance that negotiations are opened
to the scrutiny of democratically elected representatives, at both
the European and national levels, and that they are subject to ratification
by national parliaments insofar as they deal with shared competences.