1. Introduction
1. The basis for the Assembly’s
monitoring procedure is
Resolution
1115 (1997) on the setting up of the Monitoring Committee, as modified
by
Resolution 1431 (2005),
Resolution
1710 (2010),
Resolution
1936 (2013) and
Resolution
2018 (2014). This resolution defines the mandate of the Committee
on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States
of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee), and entrusts it
with the task of ensuring “the fulfilment of the obligations assumed
by member States under the terms of the Statute of the Council of
Europe (ETS No. 1), the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No.
5, “the Convention”) and all other Council of Europe conventions
to which they are parties” as well as ensuring the “honouring of
commitments entered into by the authorities of member States upon
their accession to the Council of Europe”.
2. In accordance with
Resolution
1115 (1997), as amended, the Monitoring Committee is obliged to
report to the Assembly, on a yearly basis, on the general progress
of the monitoring procedures. Until 2015, the reports on the progress
of the Assembly’s monitoring procedure were discussed at the October
part-session of the Assembly. In order to align the presentation
of the progress report more closely with the reporting cycles of
the other monitoring mechanisms of the Council of Europe, it was
agreed in
Resolution
2078 (2015) to henceforth present
the reports on the progress of the Assembly’s monitoring procedure
during the January part-session of the Assembly. In line with established
practice, the committee entrusted me, as its Chairperson, with the
task of being the rapporteur on the committee’s activities.
3. In line with its mandate, the Monitoring Committee follows
all Council of Europe member States with regard to the honouring
of their membership obligations and, if relevant, specific accession
commitments. Currently, nine countries are subject to a monitoring
procedure
sensu stricto and
four countries are engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue with the
Assembly. Since 2014, all – currently 34 – countries that are not
subject to a monitoring procedure
sensu
stricto, or engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue, are
subject to a periodical review with regard to the honouring of their
membership obligations to the Council of Europe. In line with the working
methods adopted by the Monitoring Committee,
each year approximately
six countries are subject to such a periodic review. Their reports
are included in the report on the progress of the Assembly’s monitoring procedure
for the year in which they were reviewed.
4. The progress in the monitoring procedure for the countries
that are subject to a monitoring procedure of the Assembly sensu stricto, or engaged in a post-monitoring
dialogue, will be discussed in the next section of this report.
Following customary practice I have limited myself to the findings
in the relevant texts adopted by the Assembly as well as the reports,
statements and other public documents prepared by the co-rapporteurs for
the respective countries. In addition, where appropriate, I have
made reference to the reports of the ad hoc committees for the observation
of the elections in the countries in question.
5. During the period covered by this report, the committee adopted
periodic reviews in respect of Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France and Germany.
These
periodic reviews are contained in Parts 2 to 7 of this progress
report.
2. Overview of the committee’s activities
2.1. General
remarks
6. In the period covered by this
report, nine countries
remained
under the monitoring procedure
sensu stricto and
an additional four countries
were
engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue with the Assembly.
7. During the reporting period, one report on the functioning
of democratic institutions in Turkey was debated in the Assembly.
8. During the reporting period, the committee met 13 times, five
times in Strasbourg during the plenary session of the Assembly,
six times in Paris, once in Sarajevo on the invitation of the Bosnian
Parliament and once in Tirana on the invitation of the Assembly
of the Republic of Albania. I wish to thank the parliament of Bosnia
and Herzegovina and the parliament of Albania for the kind hospitality
extended to the committee on these occasions.
9. During this period, the respective co-rapporteurs carried
out fact-finding visits to Albania, Armenia (two visits), Azerbaijan
(two visits), Bosnia and Herzegovina (two visits), Georgia (two
visits), the Republic of Moldova (two visits), Serbia, Ukraine (two
visits), Bulgaria (two visits),
Montenegro, “the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” and Turkey. In addition, the respective
co-rapporteurs participated in the pre-electoral and election (referendum)
observation missions in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Georgia, Montenegro, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine,
“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” and Turkey.
10. The co-rapporteurs produced information notes on Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine Bulgaria,
Montenegro, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” and Turkey,
which were declassified by the committee, as well as declarations
and statements with regard to developments in Albania, Armenia (two
statements), Azerbaijan (two statements), Georgia (five statements),
the Republic of Moldova (three statements), the Russian Federation
(two statements), Ukraine (four statements), Bulgaria (two statements),
Montenegro, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (two statements)
and Turkey (four statements).
11. Following the adoption of
Resolution 2034 (2015) on the challenge, on substantive grounds, of the still unratified
credentials of the delegation of the Russian Federation, in which
the Assembly decided to maintain a number of sanctions with regard
to the Russian delegation to the Assembly over Russia’s illegal
annexation of Crimea and its military intervention in eastern Ukraine,
the Russian delegation decided to cease all contact with the Assembly
and its organs, including the monitoring rapporteurs. However, considering
that it is unacceptable for a country to
de
facto withdraw itself from the monitoring procedure,
even on a temporary basis, by refusing all co-operation with the
Assembly, the committee decided to consider, during its October meeting,
an information note prepared by the co-rapporteurs on the functioning
of democratic institutions in the Russian Federation.
This
information note was approved by the committee and declassified
on 11 October 2016. On the basis of this information note, the committee
adopted a statement expressing its concern with regard to the deteriorating
democratic environment and space for civil society in the Russian
Federation.
12. On 2 October 2015, the Monitoring Committee was seized for
report on the motion for a resolution on creating a Europe without
dividing lines.
At its meeting in Tirana on 22 September
2016, the committee considered that the subject matter of the motion
is already extensively dealt with by the committee and its rapporteurs
in the framework of the monitoring and post-monitoring dialogue
procedures, as well as in the preparation of the periodic reviews
of all countries that are not already covered by the above-mentioned procedures.
The preparation of a separate report on this topic would be an unnecessary
duplication of the already existing work of the committee and its
rapporteurs. The committee therefore decided not to produce a separate
report on this issue, but to include a short section on this topic
in the 2016 progress report. It will thus be discussed in section
3 of this report.
13. On 4 February 2016, Mr Schennach and others tabled a motion
for a resolution on “The functioning of democratic institutions
in Poland”.
On 27 May 2016, the Bureau of the
Assembly seized the Monitoring Committee for a report in line with
Article 7 of the terms of reference of the committee. On 23 June
2016, the committee appointed Mr Yves Cruchten (Luxembourg, SOC)
and Mr Thierry Mariani (France, EPP/CD) co-rapporteurs for this
report.
14. On 3 November 2015, the committee held an exchange of views
with the Governor (Bashkan) of the Autonomous Territorial Unit of
Gagauzia-Yeri of the Republic of Moldova. On 9 March 2016, the committee organised
a hearing on the recent developments in south-east Turkey and the
resumption of the peace process, with the participation of Mr Mehmet
Tekinarslan, Deputy Undersecretary of the Ministry of the Interior of
Turkey, Mr Osman Baydemir of the Democratic Peoples’ Party (HDP)
and Mr Andrew Gardner, Researcher on Turkey for Amnesty International.
On 19 April 2016, the committee organised an exchange of views with Mr Thorbjørn
Jagland, Secretary General of the Council of Europe. Underscoring
the extensive co-operation between the committee and the European
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), the committee
organised, on 23 June 2016, an exchange of views with Mr Thomas
Markert, Director and Executive Secretary of the Venice Commission,
and on 10 October 2016, with Mr Gianni Buquicchio, President of
the Venice Commission. On 22 September 2016, the committee organised,
during its meeting in Tirana, an exchange of views on recent developments
in “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” and on the state of
implementation of the Przino Agreement in this regard, with the
participation of Mr Zoran Zaev, President of the SDSM Party and
Mr Aleksandar Nikoloski, representing Mr Gruevski, President of
the VRMO-DPMNE Party. On the occasion of its meeting in Sarajevo,
the committee held a hearing on “The Dayton Constitution: 20 years
later” with the participation of, inter
alia, Ambassador Valentin Inzko, High Representative
for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr Thomas Markert, Secretary of the
Venice Commission, Ms Ermira Mehmeti Devaja, Member of Parliament
of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. In the framework
of its meeting in Albania, the committee organised a joint hearing
with the Albanian Parliament on “Interreligious tolerance and dialogue”,
with the participation of, inter alia,
Mr Ilir Meta, Speaker of the Albanian Parliament, and Mr Blendi Klosi,
Minister for Social Welfare and Youth of Albania, as well as Albanian
and international experts. On 11 October 2016, the committee held
an exchange of views on the domestic developments in the Russian Federation,
with the participation of Mr Alexander Cherkasov (Memorial Human
Rights Centre), Ms Rachel Denber (Human Rights Watch) and Mr John
Dalhuisen (Amnesty International).
15. In addition to the committee meetings, the Ad hoc Sub-Committee
on Conflicts between Council of Europe member States met twice in
Strasbourg, on 19 April and on 11 October 2016, and once in Paris
on 10 March 2016. In line with its terms of reference, the ad hoc
sub-committee adopted an evaluation report of its first year of
work at its meeting in Strasbourg on 11 October. This report was
presented to the Monitoring Committee on 9 November 2016. At that
meeting, the Monitoring Committee approved the evaluation report and
adopted a decision to transform the ad hoc sub-committee into a
standing sub-committee of the Monitoring Committee. In addition,
the committee enlarged the composition of the sub-committee to include
a member of the Monitoring Committee from all the countries that
are party to the conflicts and adapted its working methods.
16. The excellent co-operation with the Venice Commission continued
over the reporting period. In addition to the organisation of two
hearings with representatives of the Venice Commission, the committee
requested, on 9 October 2015, an opinion by the Venice Commission
on the “Citizens’ Security Law” of Spain as well as on the Spanish
law on “Changes to the powers of the Constitutional Court”. In addition,
on 3 November 2015, the committee decided to ask the Venice Commission
to analyse the conformity with European human rights standards of
Article 299 of the Criminal Code of Turkey on defamation of the
President of the Republic, and its application in practice. On 25
January 2016, the committee requested an opinion on the Polish draft
law entitled “Law changing the Law on Police and several other laws”.
During its meeting on 9 March 2016, the committee decided to ask
for the opinion of the Venice Commission on the compatibility with
Council of Europe standards of the legal framework governing curfews
in Turkey as well as on the law on amendments to the law on the election
of the people’s deputies of Ukraine. On 21 April 2016, the committee
asked for an opinion on the amended Election Code of November 2015
of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” and on 23 May 2016,
on the “duties, competences and functioning” of the “criminal courts
of peace” established by the Law 5235 of Turkey. Also on Turkey,
the committee decided, on 22 September 2016, to ask the Venice Commission for
an opinion on the overall compatibility of the implementation of
the state of emergency in Turkey, in particular all subsequent decree-laws,
with Council of Europe standards. In addition, on 10 October 2016,
the committee decided to ask Venice Commission for opinions on the
Bulgarian Law on Judicial Power, as amended by the two packages
of amendments passed in March and July 2016, and on the amendments
to the Electoral Code of Bulgaria as adopted by the Bulgarian Parliament
since the 2014 Venice Commission opinion on the draft Election Code
of Bulgaria. The rapporteur wishes to express his great appreciation
for the cordial working relations with, and prompt replies, often
in a very short time frame, by the Venice Commission to the committee’s
requests.
2.2. Overview
of monitoring in the reporting period with regard to countries under
a monitoring procedure sensu stricto
2.2.1. Albania
17. The co-rapporteurs visited
the country in October 2016.
18. The insufficient independence and impartiality of the judiciary
and the political pressure and interference in the judicial system
have been long-standing concerns of the Assembly. The adoption of
the constitutional amendments paving the way for a thorough and
comprehensive reform of the judiciary should therefore be welcomed.
The justice reform is also seen as a major contribution to the fight
against corruption and organised crime. A swift adoption of the
reform and its consequent implementation are important for the possible
opening of European Union accession negotiations. The European Commission
adopted its annual Enlargement Package in which it recommended that
member States consider opening accession negotiations with Albania, subject
to credible and tangible progress in the implementation of the judicial
reform, in particular the re-evaluation of judges and prosecutors
(“vetting”).
19. The tense political climate continued in the current reporting
period. The co-rapporteurs stressed the importance of co-operation
between majority and opposition towards reforms, in particular ahead
of the 2017 general election. Shortcomings in the electoral process
noted during previous elections need to be properly addressed, on
a consensual basis, between all stakeholders, before the 2017 parliamentary
elections. However, changes to the Election Code are not in themselves
sufficient to resolve the recurrent shortcomings in the electoral
process: all the political stakeholders need to demonstrate the
commensurate political will to hold genuinely democratic elections
and to implement the Election Code fully and in good faith.
20. The heavily politicised media environment in Albania has been
a long-standing concern of the Assembly. There is widespread self-censorship
among journalists and editorial independence is often hampered by political
influence and interference. The issue of the criminalisation of
defamation created some controversy. In November 2015, draft amendments
to the criminal code regarding “Defamation towards senior officials
or elected officials” were proposed. These proposals ran counter
to the Assembly’s position as expressed in
Resolution 2019 (2014) in which it had welcomed the abolition of prison sentences
for insult and defamation and the abolition of special protection
against defamation for specific categories of people, and had called
on the parliament to fully decriminalise defamation. The proposed
amendments were eventually withdrawn.
21. The issue of property rights in the framework of the execution
of the pilot judgment of the European Court of Human Rights concerning
non-enforcement of domestic decisions awarding compensation for
confiscated property is an important issue for the monitoring procedure,
in particular in view of the Committee of Ministers’ decisions as
well as the Venice Commission’s amicus curiae in this regard.
22. The territorial administrative reform, which was outlined
in the previous report, was adopted and is being implemented. Genuine
devolution of powers and means to ensure effective and efficient
democratic local self-government should be ensured in this process.
23. Corruption and organised crime continue to be issues of concern
with regard to Albania. The fight against corruption and organised
crime is a stated priority of the authorities. However, marked progress
in terms of prosecutions and convictions still needs to be achieved.
In that respect, the authorities should be urged to clearly demonstrate
that there cannot be any impunity for corruption at any level within
the government, the police, the judiciary or the prosecution service.
2.2.2. Armenia
24. Developments in Armenia were
dominated by the constitutional reform process that was initiated
by President Sargsyan. In this context, the co-rapporteurs visited
Armenia from 10 to 12 May 2016 and on 22 and 23 November 2016.
25. On 5 October 2015, the Armenian National Assembly adopted,
with a large majority, a series of amendments to the Constitution.
Taken together, these amendments amount to a quasi-total revision
of the previous Constitution. The politically most controversial
part of these amendments was the transition from a presidential
to a parliamentary system of government and the introduction of
a fully proportional electoral system for the National Assembly,
to replace the mixed proportional-majoritarian system. The new Constitution was
drawn up in close consultation with the Venice Commission. While
underscoring that, according to European standards, each country
is free to adopt its own democratic system, the Venice Commission
lauded the co-operation with the authorities on the development
of the new Constitution, which it considered to be of high quality
and fully in line with international standards. All stakeholders
should be commended for their efforts in this respect.
26. In line with constitutional provisions, a public referendum
on the constitutional amendments was organised on 6 December 2015.
The referendum took place in a very polarised and tense political
climate, and, regrettably, was marred by allegations of irregularities.
The conduct of the referendum underscored the still low public trust
in the electoral system and regrettably did not fully provide the
unambiguous democratic credibility to the constitutional reforms
that was hoped for.
27. Following the adoption of the constitutional amendments, the
process of drafting a new Election Code was started in order to
implement the new electoral system foreseen in the Constitution.
While this Election Code was drafted with the involvement of most
stakeholders, including opposition parties and civil society, the short
time available for the drafting of this law at times affected the
overall inclusiveness of the drafting process. The opposition parties,
supported by civil society, made a number of proposals for mechanisms
to be included in the Election Code with a view to making the election
system more robust and resistant against fraudulent activities.
A joint agreement between the ruling majority and the opposition
was achieved and a number of mechanisms to combat electoral fraud
and increase public trust in the election system were included in
the new Election Code. This agreement and the improved co-operation
between ruling majority and opposition that is at its base should
be strongly welcomed.
28. The Venice Commission concluded in its opinion on the Election
Code that it could form an adequate basis for the conduct of democratic
elections, but warned that the complexity of the code could undermine public
trust in the election process. All stakeholders should now exercise
the commensurate political will to implement the Election Code fully
and entirely, both in spirit and according to the letter of the
law, in order to ensure the conduct of genuinely democratic elections
in Armenia.
29. The introduction of the new political system in Armenia could
potentially reward parties that are willing to seek co-operation
and enter into political coalitions, which could counteract the
zero-sum mentality that has regrettably been prevalent in Armenia’s
political environment, often at the cost of its democratic consolidation. It
is therefore important that mechanisms to ensure a stable majority
will not undermine this important coalition-building process.
30. The fight against corruption was high on the agenda of the
authorities and the many reforms that were introduced in recent
years in that respect were welcomed in the Fourth Round Evaluation
Report on Armenia by the Council of Europe’s Group of States against
Corruption (GRECO) that was published on 25 February 2016. However,
endemic corruption continues to be a serious problem in the country,
with the public perception of corruption, especially of the judiciary,
continuing to be very high. It is therefore important that the authorities promptly
implement all recommendations in the Fourth Round Evaluation report
which focuses on corruption prevention in respect of members of
parliament, judges and prosecutors. In this respect it should be
noted that the recent constitutional amendments address a number
of GRECO recommendations, especially in relation to the independence
of the judiciary and prosecution.
31. The near collapse of the cease-fire regime in the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict and the unprecedented escalation of military hostilities
along the line of contact, at the beginning of April 2016, have
had a profound impact on the political climate in the country. It
united all the political forces in the country who agreed that any domestic
political disagreements should not be allowed to develop to such
extent that it could undermine the stability and security of their
country. This led to increased co-operation in the political arena,
as already mentioned in the context of the drafting of the new Election
Code.
2.2.3. Azerbaijan
32. The co-rapporteurs visited
the country in April and June 2016. The co-rapporteurs were also
part of the election observation mission of the Parliamentary Assembly
to monitor the parliamentary elections of 1 November 2015 and of
the Assembly’s presence for the repeat election in District 90 on
18 June 2016. They also took part in the assessment mission for
the September 2016 referendum.
33. The repetitive harsh sentences against human rights defenders,
lawyers and journalists in Azerbaijan are of concern. In that context,
the committee stressed that a climate favourable to pluralism, free
campaigning and freedom of the media should be guaranteed by all
relevant Azerbaijani authorities. This was particularly stressed
ahead of the 1 November 2015 elections. In that context, the recent
release of some human rights defenders, political activists, journalists
and bloggers should be welcomed as positive and encouraging steps.
34. The reform of the justice system with a view to addressing
the causes of the arrest, detention, prosecution and conviction
of political activists, media representatives and human rights defenders
over recent years remains an important priority. In this respect,
shortcomings remain in the legal framework as well as its implementation,
such as in the criminal law (notably with regard to the excessively
long prison sentences and the use of pretrial detention), the law
on freedom of assembly and laws regarding media, non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and political parties. NGO legislation and its implementation
in particular should be reformed without any further delay.
35. Reforms were carried out in the field of the judiciary and
criminal law, notably regarding the selection procedure for judges
and prosecutors, the Judicial Legal Council and the salaries of
judges, the modernisation of the judicial system and the introduction
of e-justice. Legislation was adopted which increased the threshold required
for the criminalisation of economic offences and legislation has
been proposed to decrease the level of prison sentences.
36. The draft law “on the possibility of the implementation by
the Republic of Azerbaijan of the decision of the interstate body
for the protection of human rights and freedoms” is officially pending
in parliament. The draft law would give the Constitutional Court
new powers in relation to the execution of decisions passed by international
organisations on human rights and freedoms in Azerbaijan. This proposal
caused some concern and controversy. However, reportedly this proposal
was an initiative by a single MP and would not have the support
of the majority of members of the Meijlis. In this context, the
obligation of all Council of Europe member States to ensure full
implementation of court decisions should be emphasised. The Secretary
General’s initiative under Article 52 of the European Convention
on Human Rights in the case of Ilgar Mammadov is instrumental in
this regard.
37. General elections were held in Azerbaijan in November 2015.
The Assembly’s ad hoc committee for the election observation concluded
that the increase in voter turnout and the transparency of voting
and counting procedures demonstrated a step forward by Azerbaijan
towards free, fair and democratic elections. The ad hoc committee
was of the opinion that the result of this vote expressed the will
of the Azerbaijani people. While noting some irregularities during
the voting and counting processes, the report considered that these shortcomings
did not constitute systemic violations of the Election Code. The
ad hoc committee called on the Central Election Commission to duly
investigate and report on this irregularity and welcomed its decision
to cancel the results in constituency No. 90. The Assembly ensured
a presence at the repeat election in District 90 on 18 June 2016.
38. Following the Referendum Act on “Making Changes to the Constitution
of the Azerbaijan Republic” (including amendments to 29 articles
of the Constitution) submitted by the President and validated by
the Constitutional Court, a referendum on amendments to the Constitution
was held on 26 September 2016. The Bureau of the Assembly requested
the Venice Commission to provide an opinion on the draft amendments
to the Constitution of Azerbaijan and constituted an ad hoc committee
to conduct an assessment mission of the referendum.
39. In its opinion, the Venice Commission was deeply concerned
about the institutional reform put forward by the proposed amendments
which, inter alia, severely
upsets the balance of power by giving unprecedented powers to the
President.
40. The Assembly’s assessment mission concluded that the referendum
was organised in accordance with the national legislation and the
Constitution of Azerbaijan and was therefore legal and legitimate
in the opinion of the assessment mission; the voting process was
transparent, well organised, efficient and peaceful throughout polling
day and no serious violations were observed during the counting
process. It invited the Azerbaijani authorities to respect the opinion
of the Venice Commission and called for further improvement of the
electoral process.
41. The near collapse of the cease-fire regime in the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict and the unprecedented escalation of military hostilities
along the line of contact, at the beginning of April 2016, had a
profound impact on the political climate in the country. The co-rapporteurs
expressed strong concern and insisted that negotiations in the framework
of the Minsk group should urgently be resumed for a peaceful resolution
to this ongoing tragedy.
2.2.4. Bosnia
and Herzegovina
42. During the reporting period,
the co-rapporteurs made two fact-finding visits to Bosnia and Herzegovina: one
to Sarajevo and Travnik in September 2015, and one to Sarajevo,
Mostar and Banja Luka in June 2016. In Sarajevo, discussions focused, inter alia, on the decision of Republika
Srpska (RS) to hold a referendum on the RS national day, despite
a ruling of the Constitutional Court holding that this holiday was
discriminatory. The High Representative described the holding of
this referendum, which took place on 25 September 2016, as a blatant
violation of the Dayton Peace Agreements.
43. Local elections were held throughout the country on 2 October
2016 and were observed by a delegation of the Council of Europe
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. Elections were well
organised and peaceful, except in Stolac where they had to be suspended.
For the first time since the war, a Serb was elected mayor of Srebrenica.
No elections were held in the city of Mostar because amendments
to the election law were not adopted in time. The 2010 judgment
of the Bosnian Constitutional Court concerning the electoral system in
Mostar thus remains unimplemented. Citizens of Mostar have been
unable to vote since 2010.
44. Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted its application for membership
of the European Union in February 2016 and in September 2016 the
Council of the European Union invited the European Commission to
submit its opinion, on this application.
45. In 2017, the co-rapporteurs will present a report to the Assembly
on the fulfilment by Bosnia and Herzegovina of its obligations and
commitments to the Council of Europe.
2.2.5. Georgia
46. The co-rapporteurs made fact-finding
visits to the country from 12 to 14 October 2015 and from 3 to 5 May
2016. Parliamentary elections took place on 8 October 2016. A second
round for those majoritarian races where in the first round none
of the contestants obtained 50% of the vote took place on 30 October
2016. The rapporteurs participated ex
officio in the pre-electoral visit and in the election
observation missions of the Assembly for both rounds of the election.
47. Regrettably, the political environment in Georgia continued
to be tense and polarised during the reporting period. Tensions
were not only prevalent between the opposition and ruling majority
but also within the ruling majority coalition and opposition itself.
These tensions in the political environment increased in the run-up
to the parliamentary elections on 8 October 2016. Public opinion
polls showed that the popularity of the ruling coalition was decreasing,
but that at the same time this did not result in an increase of
support for the opposition. As a result, most of the Georgian electorate
was still undecided about its choice close to election day, adding
to the tense political environment.
48. Georgia has a mixed proportional–majoritarian election system.
As was the case before the 2008 and 2012 elections, negotiations
to change the election system to a fully proportional regional open-list
system failed to result in an agreement between the opposition and
ruling majority. While both the opposition and ruling majority agreed
on the need to abolish the majoritarian part of the election system,
regrettably no agreement could be found on the timing for such a
change of the election system. The opposition insisted that this
should happen before the 2016 parliamentary elections, while the
ruling majority insisted on implementing this change only after
the 2016 elections. As a result, no changes to the electoral system
took place. It is hoped that the incoming government will make good
its promise and change the election system before the next legislative elections.
49. In a welcome development, the Georgian authorities have addressed
the long-standing concern regarding the extremely large variations
in size of the majoritarian districts, which ranged from 6 000 to 120 000 voters,
which is a variation far beyond what is considered acceptable by
European standards. On 28 May 2015, on the basis of a complaint
filed by the Public Defender, the Constitutional Court ruled that
the variance in size of the election districts violated the principle
of equality of vote as enshrined in the Georgian Constitution and
ordered the district sizes to be changed to remedy this situation.
Amendments to the Election Code to redraw the district boundaries
were adopted on 18 December 2015. At the same time, the threshold to
be elected in a majoritarian district was raised from 30% to 50%,
which had been a long-standing demand of the opposition. The boundaries
were established without in-depth consultations with, and consensus between,
all electoral stakeholders, which is an essential prerequisite to
increase the public trust in the election process. At the same time,
allegations of widespread gerrymandering were not substantiated.
50. The ruling coalition became increasingly fragmented in the
run-up to the parliamentary elections. On 31 March 2016, Prime Minster
Kvirikashvili announced that all coalition members would run in
the upcoming elections independently and not as a coalition list.
At the same time, most opposition parties decided to run individually
and not as part of a joint list. The parliamentary elections took
place on 8 October 2016. The International Election Observation
Mission, of which the Assembly was a part, concluded that the “elections were
competitive, well-administered and fundamental freedoms were generally
respected”. However, it also noted that “[t]he calm and open campaign
atmosphere was, however, impacted by allegations of unlawful campaigning
and some incidence of violence”. The Georgian Dream Party (GDDG)
gained 48.6% of the vote in the proportional elections and the main
opposition party, the United National Movement (UNM) of former President
Saakashvili, gained 27.11% of the vote. Of the other parties contesting
in these elections only the Alliance of Patriots passed the 5% threshold
to enter parliament with 5.01% of the votes. Of the majoritarian races
the GDDG candidates passed the 50% threshold in 23 constituencies.
A second round of elections between the two candidates who obtained
the most votes in the first round was organised in the remaining
50 constituencies on 30 October 2016. According to the International
Election Observation Mission “the 30 October run-offs were competitive
and administered in a manner that respected the rights of candidates
and voters, despite the lack of a legal framework for the second
round”.
In that context, it noted that the
“principle of transparency and the right to effective redress were
often not respected in the investigation and adjudication of election
disputes by election commissions and courts”. Of the 50 majoritarian
races, 48 were won by GDDG candidates. One race was won by an independent
candidate supported by the GDDG, and one by a candidate of the Industrialist
Party. As a result of these elections, Georgian Dream will have
a constitutional majority of 115 seats in the new parliament, the
UNM 27 seats and the election bloc lead by the Alliance for Patriots
six seats. As mentioned above, there will be also one independent
majoritarian member and one majoritarian member of the Industrialist
Party in the new parliament.
51. The reform of the justice system has continued to be a key
priority of the government. The Ministry of Justice has implemented
an ambitious reform of the judiciary with a view to strengthening
its independence and to “depoliticising” the justice system. This
reform not only focused on the independence of the justice and court
systems, but also on the prosecution service. Several amendments
to the Law on the Prosecution Service were adopted on 28 September
2015 with regard to the appointment and dismissal processes for
the Prosecutor General. These reforms alone, while a clear improvement
over the previous situation, cannot by themselves fully ensure the
de-politicisation and independence of the prosecution service. Further
reforms are necessary in this respect. The authorities have indicated
that they plan to implement the next step in the reform process
of the prosecution service after the parliamentary elections.
52. The requests for, and use of, pretrial detention have considerably
decreased in Georgia over the last two years and the situation has
improved overall in that respect. However, pretrial detention is
still used too regularly and easily in certain cases, including
in politically sensitive cases involving former government officials.
As mentioned in the previous progress report, one of the more serious
and questionable uses of pretrial detention used under successive
governments was the filing of consecutive charges, each accompanied
by a request for pretrial detention, resulting in a person being
kept in pretrial detention for a longer period than the nine months
allowed by the Criminal Procedure Code. In September 2015, following
a complaint filed by former Tbilisi mayor Gigi Ugulava, the Constitutional
Court ruled that the provisions in the law that allowed this practice
were unconstitutional. The Ministry of Justice has announced a number
of initiatives to further reduce the use of pretrial detention in
Georgia, including the possibility of other methods of restraint
that can be used as an alternative to pretrial detention and a system
of more frequent reviews of pre-trail detention decisions.
53. A recent issue of controversy was the reform of the functioning
of the Constitutional Court in Georgia. While the government asserted
that these reforms were needed to increase the efficiency and transparency
of the work of the Constitutional Court, opposition parties claimed
that the aim of these amendments was to undermine, or even render
impossible, the proper functioning of the Court in retaliation for
a number of rulings by the Court that had gone against the interests
of the government. This was denied by the authorities. Following
an agreement between the Prime Minister and the President of Georgia
– who had vetoed the original amendments – the amendments to the
law on the functioning of the Constitutional Court were changed to
address Venice Commission recommendations and were subsequently
adopted by the parliament. The co-rapporteurs for Georgia expressed
their concern about the attempts by all sides to politicise the
Constitutional Court and its work.
54. With regard to the repatriation of the deported Meskhetian
population, an Interagency Action Plan for the Repatriation and
Reintegration of Meskhetians was adopted. This is a welcome development
as it addresses a long-standing recommendation that the repatriation
of the Meskhetian population should not only entail the establishment
of a legal framework but also a concrete strategy to allow the repatriation
and reintegration of all those Meskhetians who wish to repatriate.
The authorities have indicated that the period to provide documentary
evidence to support a request for repatriation status has been increased
from two to five years, which is to be welcomed. The committee wishes
to reiterate the recommendation of the Assembly that the authorities
organise a comprehensive evaluation of the repatriation framework
and integration strategy, and formulate additional policies, if
necessary, in order to ensure that all those Meskhetians that were
deported and wish to return to Georgia do indeed have an objective
chance to do so.
2.2.6. Republic
of Moldova
55. The co-rapporteurs paid two
visits to the Republic of Moldova, on 22 and 23 February 2016 and
from 27 to 29 June 2016.
56. The Republic of Moldova remains committed to the European
Union integration process and the implementation of the Association
Agreement which entered into force on 1 July 2016 and which prompted
the adoption of numerous laws. The political environment was dominated
by a major bank scandal that erupted in 2015 which led to many popular
demonstrations. In total, more than one billion dollars had been
siphoned off three banks (Banca de Economii, Banca Sociala and Unibank)
in 2014-2015. These events, which still need to be fully investigated,
caused a crisis that led to political instability
and
destabilised the pro-European coalition.
57. The detention of former Prime Minister and sitting MP Vlad
Filat, then Head of the Liberal Democratic Party, on 16 October
2015, further exacerbated the mutual mistrust among the coalition
partners. This made it practically impossible for the three parties
to find an agreement and form a governing coalition. On 30 October 2015,
the government formed three months earlier by Valeriu Streleț (Liberal
Democratic Party) fell after its coalition partner, the Democratic
Party, supported a no-confidence vote.
58. In December 2015, the shifting of 14 MPs from the communist
faction to a platform supported by the Democratic Party and the
defection of MPs from other factions signified a change in political
affiliation of about a quarter of the Moldovan parliamentarians
within a few weeks. Political parties remain under the strong influence
of business interests. This political nomadism led, on 20 January
2016, to the formation of a new government under Mr Pavel Filip.
The conditions under which this government was formed were controversial and
stirred up large demonstrations, but the government has remained
in place since then. A priority for this government has been the
adoption of the legislation needed to fulfil the requirements of
the European Union Association Agreement roadmap, as well as legislation
on financial institutions, with a view to regaining the confidence
and support of international financial organisations. The reform
process has accelerated, resulting in the adoption of new laws on
the Prosecutor’s Office, the media, the fight against corruption
and financial institutions. A constructive dialogue was established
with the Gagauz authorities with a view to harmonising Moldovan
legislation with the statute of this autonomous entity.
59. These political developments and the mass demonstrations organised
by the opposition and civil society, led to the emergence of a “Platform
for Dignity and Truth” (which later became a political party). The platform
sought to initiate a constitutional referendum to achieve direct
election of the President of the Republic, a decrease in the number
of members of parliament (from 101 to 71) and the lifting of immunities
granted to MPs.
60. The functioning of the judiciary, and possible politically
motivated cases, remained a problematic issue. Stefan Schennach,
then Chairperson of the Monitoring Committee, visited Chisinau on
22 and 23 December 2015 to assess the prison conditions of former
Prime Minister Vlad Filat and former Parliamentary Assembly member
Grigore Petrenco. The co-rapporteurs continued to follow these two
cases. Coincidently, Grigore Petrenco was released under judicial
control on the first day of their February 2016 visit. In view of
the ongoing restrictions on freedom of assembly and movement imposed
on Grigore Petrenco, the co-rapporteurs considered in June 2016
that such measures amounted to political harassment.
61. On 4 March 2016, the Constitutional Court issued an unexpected
decision by declaring unconstitutional the constitutional amendment
adopted in 2000 – which introduced the indirect election of the
President of the Republic – thus re-establishing the direct election
of the President. This prevented a possible repeat of the political
deadlock the country had faced from 2009 to 2012, when the parliament
failed to reach the three-fifths majority needed to elect the President
for three consecutive years. The presidential election, which took
place on 30 October and 13 November 2016 in a polarised environment,
were won by Igor Dodon, of the Socialist Party. According to the
Parliamentary Assembly election observers, the presidential election
in the Republic of Moldova was competitive, with respect for fundamental
freedoms. However, increasingly polarised media coverage, harsh
and intolerant rhetoric and continued instances of abuse of administrative
resources detracted from the process.
62. With respect to the Transnistrian conflict settlement process,
the efforts by all stakeholders to resume the 5+2 discussions, under
the leadership of the Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE), in order to settle the conflict and to improve
the lives of citizens on both sides of the Nistru River, should
be welcomed. The Moldovan authorities and the de
facto authorities of the Transnistrian Region of the
Republic of Moldova should be encouraged to pursue their efforts
to implement the Berlin Protocol of June 2016, which addressed the
issue of recognition of diplomas and car license plates. Progress
should also be made with regard to Latin-script schools, access
of farmers to their lands and free movement of goods and persons
across the Nistru River.
2.2.7. Russian
Federation
63. The Russian delegation maintained
its regrettable decision to boycott the work of the Parliamentary Assembly
in 2015 and 2016, when it decided not to present the credentials
of its delegation. As a result, it was not possible for the co-rapporteurs
of the Monitoring Committee to visit the Russian Federation. However,
the co-rapporteurs have continued to follow the developments in
the country. Emphasising that it is unacceptable for a country to
de facto withdraw itself from the
monitoring procedure, even on a temporary basis, by refusing all
co-operation with the Assembly, the committee adopted an information
note on the functioning of democratic institutions in the Russian
Federation
which focused on the domestic developments
with regard to the functioning of democratic institutions and the
respect for human rights and the rule of law in line with Russia’s obligations
and commitments to the Council of Europe in that respect.
64. Full co-operation with the monitoring procedure of the Assembly
is an explicit accession commitment to the Council of Europe
undertaken
by the Russian Federation as a country. This commitment remains
valid, irrespective of whether its delegation wishes to participate
in the work of the Parliamentary Assembly or not. The monitoring
procedure should not be drawn into this stand-off, it should neither
be a hostage to, nor bargaining chip for, co-operation between the
Assembly and the Russian delegation, or vice versa.
65. Since President Vladimir Putin’s re-election in 2012, which
was followed by large-scale protests, a number of restrictive laws,
placing limits on the rights to freedom of association, expression
and assembly, have been enacted that have created an unfavourable
climate for the operation of civil society organisations in the
Russian Federation. In addition, there has been an increased stigmatisation
of independent human rights institutions by labelling them as “foreign
agents” based on their alleged “political activity” and foreign
funding.
66. To date, the Ministry of Justice has designated 145 organisations
as “foreign agents”, and over 20 organisations have shut down in
order to avoid such designation. Administrative proceedings have
been started against NGOs for their failure to comply with the requirements
of the Law on Foreign Agents and large fines have been levied on
well-known human rights organisations such as Memorial and the Committee Against
Torture. Overall, it is clear that the implementation of the Law
on Foreign Agents has resulted in harsh action against civil society,
aimed at preventing and dissuading civil society organisations from
carrying out their work and often forcing them to shut down or face
harassment and persecution at the hands of the authorities. Several
international organisations and entities, including the Venice Commission
and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights have urged
the authorities to thoroughly revise the law and to drop the stigmatising
term of “foreign agent”. This has not been followed by the Russian
authorities, who conversely widened the already overbroad definition
of what constitutes political activity.
67. New legislation was adopted that established a new category
of foreign organisation, namely those “undesirable on Russia’s territory”,
whose activities are deemed to pose
a threat to Russia’s constitutional order, defence or national security.
The law on the undesirable activities by foreign and international
non-governmental organisations foresees criminal and administrative
liability for foreign or international NGOs recognised as undesirable
and carrying out activities on Russian territory, as well as for
the persons involved in these activities. To date, seven international
organisations, including the Open Society Foundations and the National
Endowment for Democracy have been declared undesirable. In its opinion
on this law, the Venice Commission concluded that it interferes,
inter alia, with the freedoms of
association, assembly and expression, as well as with the right
to effective remedy. This law should be retracted as soon as possible.
68. Like the situation for civil society organisations, the space
for political opposition parties to operate and express dissenting
opinions has further narrowed in the recent period, especially for
those that oppose the Kremlin’s policies with regard to Ukraine.
This is compounded by the systematic harassment and intimidation of
opposition leaders and opposition activists by the authorities,
as well as by civil groups that are seen as being connected to the
authorities.
69. The increase in harassment and intimidation of opposition
political leaders and others who present political opinions that
diverge from those of the government, especially with regard to
Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and its involvement in the
conflict in eastern Ukraine, has continued in this reporting period.
Increasingly harsh and inflammatory rhetoric is aimed at those who
express views diverging from those of the authorities, resulting
in an increasingly polarised and confrontational political environment.
Similarly to the branding of NGOs as “foreign agents”, political
parties and their leadership that question the official line are often
painted as traitors of the Russian nation and/or as agent provocateurs of the West.
A chilling example was the publication of an image showing former
Prime Minister Kasyanov, ally of Mr Nemtsov and his co-chair of
the RPR-PARNAS party, through the crosshairs of a sniper rifle’s
scope when he was visiting our Assembly in Strasbourg.
70. An issue that is raising concern is the increased frequency
of the involvement of conservative social groups linked to the ruling
party in quelling protests and harassing opposition figures. A point
in case was the attack on a group of anti-corruption activists led
by Alexei Navalny, a prominent anti-corruption blogger and opposition
activist, by Cossack paramilitaries in Anapa, with the police idly
standing by, giving the impression of official collusion.
71. These actions, combined with the clampdown on NGOs and their
work, have resulted in a deterioration of the democratic environment
in Russia and overshadow and diminish some limited positive developments that
were noted with regard to the electoral framework in Russia.
72. On 18 September 2016, elections to the State Duma of the Russian
Federation took place. The OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights (ODIHR) was invited to deploy an international
election observation mission to observe the legislative elections
on 18 September 2016. Regrettably, no invitation was sent to the
Parliamentary Assembly to observe these elections. President Putin’s
United Russia party won 54% of the vote, and 343 of the 450 seats
in the State Duma, which is a considerable increase of mandates
over the previous elections when United Russia won 49% of the vote
and had 238 mandates. “A Just Russia” obtained 6% of the votes and
the Communist Party and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)
both obtained just over 13% of the votes. These parties are all
considered as supporting President Putin. The main opposition parties,
Yabloko and RPR-PARNAS failed to pass the 5% threshold to enter
parliament.
73. In the view of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission,
the elections had been more transparent than in previous elections
but “challenges to democratic commitments remain”. In particular,
it considered that “[t]he legal framework can serve as an adequate
basis for the conduct of elections, but democratic commitments continued
to be challenged and the electoral environment was negatively affected
by restrictions to fundamental freedoms and political rights, firmly
controlled media and a tight grip on civil society”.
On election day, voting was orderly, but
numerous violations, including ballot stuffing and procedural irregularities in
the counting process, were witnessed by international and domestic
observers. The domestic observer organisation “Golos” considered
that, while the levels of violations had been lower than in 2011,
these elections were still “far from what could be called free and
fair”.
74. The State Duma elections also took place on the Ukrainian
territory of Crimea illegally annexed by Russia. This was decried
by the international community, including by the Assembly. In
Resolution 2132 (2016) on the political Consequences of the Russian aggression
in Ukraine, the Assembly considered the holding of State Duma elections
in Crimea a gross violation of international law that effectively
compromised the legitimacy of the Russian Parliament. The Assembly
therefore considered these illegal elections in the Crimea null
and void.
75. Media freedom continues to deteriorate in the Russian Federation.
The Russian authorities have used restrictive laws to curtail freedom
of expression. Russia’s so-called extremism law gives the authorities
broad powers to close down any media organisation deemed to spread
extremist information. A lack of clarity over the legal definition
of extremism has led to abuse and arbitrary application. Legal obstacles
have hampered independent media, including restrictions on foreign
ownership of news outlets, warnings, revocation of licences, closure
of news outlets and blockage of websites and online platforms. Similarly
to the Law on Foreign Agents with regard to civil society organisations,
the authorities have recently targeted media with a new law regulating
media companies financed from abroad. The latest anti-terrorism
legislation – the so-called Yarovaya law – further reinforces government
control over communications and subjects social networks to the same
legal provisions as media outlets with respect to the crimes of
inciting and condoning terrorism. Cumulatively, these developments
have had a chilling effect and threaten the freedom of the media
and freedom of expression and are of serious concern as they are
a setback for the overall democratic environment.
76. The rule of law, and in particular the independence of the
judiciary and right to a fair trial, has been a long-standing focus
of attention for the Assembly. While there have been welcome improvements
as a result of reforms implemented by the authorities with assistance
from the Council of Europe, such as the establishment of a system
of free legal aid, several concerns remain. The non-enforcement
of national and international court decisions, obstacles to the
system of human rights protection, lack of independence of the judiciary
and excessive powers of the prosecution undermine the establishment
of an “accessible, transparent, effective and credible” justice
system in the Russian Federation that would adhere to European standards.
77. The Assembly has repeatedly expressed its concern about the
lack of independence of the judiciary and its vulnerability to external
and internal pressure and interference. The proceedings and outcome
of a number of recent controversial high-profile trials, such as
the trials against Nadiia Savchenko and filmmaker Oleh Sentsov,
have raised questions with regard to the independence of the judiciary
and have given credence to the allegations that these prosecutions
were politically motivated. In addition to lack of independence
of the judiciary, the justice system is too biased in favour of
the prosecution, which raises concern with regard to the equality
of arms between prosecution and defence and thus the fairness of
trials themselves. These concerns are underscored by the current
conviction rate of 99.5%.
78. In July 2015, Russia’s Constitutional Court established that
no international treaty or convention had precedence over national
sovereignty and that the decisions of the European Court of Human
Rights should be upheld only if they do not contradict Russian law.
This decision by Russia to disregard its international obligations
was written into law by the amendments to the constitutional law
on decisions by international courts, which were adopted and promulgated
in December 2015. According to these amendments, if the Constitutional
Court finds that a decision of an international court contradicts
the Constitution, it may rule that the execution of this decision
is entirely or partly impossible and, thus, no action aimed at its
execution can be taken. It should be stressed that the full implementation
of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights is an international
commitment which the Russian Federation has undertaken under the
European Convention on Human Rights, and which it must strictly
respect. This is an essential obligation for all members of the
Council of Europe. It cannot be accepted that such a stringent obligation
be subject to individual decisions by the Constitutional Court of
a member State. Respect for the Convention is an absolute principle and
this obligation must be honoured unconditionally. Consequently,
the Russian authorities should be urged to promptly change the law,
and if necessary the Constitution, to ensure full compliance with
the European standards
79. Overall, recent developments have given rise to serious concerns,
especially with regard, but not limited, to the democratic environment
and space for civil society to operate and enjoy its rights to freedom
of expression and association. Taken together, these developments
make it clear that the monitoring procedure of the Assembly with
regard to the Russian Federation should not only promptly continue,
but indeed be reinforced in the immediate future.
2.2.8. Serbia
80. Serbia continued to pursue
its European integration process while following a twin-track foreign
policy, between East and West. The country remained committed to
the normalisation of its relations with Kosovo*
and remained a key player in ensuring
stability in the region, despite continuing turbulence in the region
and a major migrant crisis faced by the country.
81. Early parliamentary elections were organised on 24 April 2016,
together with provincial elections in Vojvodina and municipal elections.
The Assembly observers stated that the early parliamentary elections offered
voters a variety of choices and fundamental freedoms were respected,
and that the election administration performed its duties efficiently
and generally enjoyed the trust of the electoral stakeholders. However,
concerns were expressed in relation to abuse by incumbents of the
administrative advantages of office as well as cases of pressure
on voters and intimidation, particularly those employed in the public
sector. Other shortcomings noted were biased media coverage favourable
to the ruling parties; the lack of full transparency in party and
campaign funding; cases of around 15 000 falsified signatures to
support some candidate lists; unclear rules for signature verification
and the lack of transparency of this process. Many of these issues
had already been criticised by the Assembly in previous election
observation reports.
82. After the organisation of repeat elections in 15 polling stations,
seven lists passed the 5% threshold. Of these, two parties, the
Serbian Radical Party (22 seats) and the Democratic Party of Serbia
(DSS) in coalition with the Dveri movement (13 seats) oppose the
European integration process. The incumbent Prime Minister’s Serbian
Progressive Party (SNS) maintained a majority, with 131 seats out
of 250, and the list of its main coalition partner, the Socialist
Party of Serbia (SPS), obtained 29 seats. A new political formation,
the “That’s Enough” party (DJB) gained 16 seats. The opposition
comprises the Democratic Party (DS) (16 seats), the coalition of
the Social Democratic Party (SDS), the Liberal-Democratic Party
(LDP) and the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina (LSV) (13
seats). Five parties representing national minorities, which are
exempt from the 5% threshold, obtained 10 seats. The government
was formed on 11 August 2016, with the appointment of Aleksandar
Vučić as the Prime Minister, on the basis of a coalition agreement
between the SNS, the SPS and the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians.
83. From 26 to 28 October 2016, the co-rapporteurs visited Serbia.
84. The steps taken by the authorities to strengthen the independence
and efficiency of the judiciary, in line with Assembly
Resolution 1858 (2012), after the opening of Chapter 23 (Judiciary and fundamental
rights) and Chapter 24 (Justice, freedom and security) of the EU
accession negotiations in July 2016, should be welcomed. These steps
included the adoption of new judicial laws, and the preparation
of constitutional amendments addressing the judicial system. It
is hoped that this will lead to a restriction of undue political
interference in the judiciary and reinforce the separation of powers.
Good progress in improving the legal framework for media has been
made. However, proper implementation of the recently adopted media
laws is still needed so as to secure a pluralistic, free and sustainable
media environment in line with Council of Europe standards. The
fight against corruption should be intensified.
2.2.9. Ukraine
85. The co-rapporteurs visited
Ukraine from 1 to 3 February and on 17 November 2016.
86. The monitoring of Ukraine’s honouring of obligations and commitments
to the Council of Europe continued to be affected by the ongoing
military conflict in eastern Ukraine, which has had a profound impact on
the reform agenda. On 12 October 2016, the Assembly adopted
Resolution 2132 (2016) on the political consequences of the Russian aggression
in Ukraine, which outlines the Assembly’s position and concerns
with regard to the developments in relation to this conflict.
87. The reform process in Ukraine was dominated during the reporting
period by the constitutional reform process, in particular with
regard to decentralisation and with regard to the justice system
and the judiciary.
88. The constitutional reform process with regard to decentralisation
consists of two separate but interlinked issues. Firstly, the constitutional
provisions needed to allow the decentralisation of government powers
and establishing the principles of local and regional self-government.
Secondly, the constitutional provisions that would allow for the
establishment of a special status for certain areas of the Donetsk
and Luhansk oblasts (Article 18 of the draft transitional provisions).
The amendments on these two issues are contained in one package
of amendments, which has hindered their adoption.
89. The decentralisation chapter of the constitutional amendments
was drafted in close consultation with the Venice Commission, whose
recommendations were practically all included in the draft amendments.
The constitutional amendments on decentralisation were passed in
first reading on 31 August 2016. However, as a result of the continuing
violations of the cease-fire agreement and absence of progress with
the implementation of the other provisions of the Minsk Agreement
provisions with regard to the security situation, there is a general
feeling among the Ukrainian public that only Ukraine is implementing
the Minsk Agreements, while the Russian Federation and its proxies
in Luhansk and Donetsk have not honoured their obligations under
these agreements. Realising that it is unlikely that in such a context
sufficient support could be found to adopt in final reading the
constitutional amendments on decentralisation – which include Article
18 of the transitional provisions – the vote in final reading has
been provisionally postponed until significant progress has been
made on the implementation of the Minsk Agreements by the Russian
Federation and the separatist forces in Donetsk and Luhansk.
90. Conversely, considerable progress has been achieved with regard
to the constitutional reform in relation to the justice system and
the judiciary. As mentioned in several resolutions adopted by the
Assembly, the adoption of constitutional amendments ensuring the
independence of the judiciary is a crucial precondition for the
reform of the judiciary and justice system in line with European
standards. Following lengthy negotiations, the constitutional amendments
with regard to the judiciary and justice system, which were drafted
in close consultation with the Venice Commission, were adopted in
final reading by the Verkhovna Rada on 2 June 2016. The amendments
removed the oversight function from the Prosecutor General, which
was contrary to European standards and the abolition of which is
an accession commitment of Ukraine to the Council of Europe. This
is to be welcomed.
91. The proposal, supported by a large part of the population,
to dismiss all sitting judges and have them reapply for their positions
was not adopted by the Verkhovna Rada,
as it would have violated European standards with regard to the
independence of the judiciary and the rule of law. Instead, a procedure
was adopted where all sitting judges would be subject to an evaluation
process, implemented by the High Qualification Commission of the
High Council of Justice, before being appointed for an indefinite
term, which has been included in the Constitution, following the
adoption of the amendments. Such an evaluation would not violate
European standards.
92. The amendments to the Constitution have removed the role of
the Verkhovna Rada and President in the appointment of judges and
abolished the right of the President to dismiss judges, which were
a key threat to the independence of the judiciary. The President
will now appoint judges on the basis of a binding proposal by the
High Council of Justice, which is the sole body that can dismiss
judges. In addition, the amendments have changed the composition
of the High Council of Justice and removed the possibility for the
President and Verkhovna Rada to dominate and unduly influence its
work and decisions.
93. The political environment changed considerably in Ukraine
during the reporting period. Local elections took place in Ukraine
on 25 October 2015 which showed the changing support for the parties
that – at that time – made up the ruling coalition. The People’s
Front of then Prime Minister Yatsenyuk did not participate in the local
elections as its public support had sunk below 2%. The main winners
of the local elections were Samopomich and, in particular, Batkivshchyna
of Yulia Timoshenko. While the Petro Poroshenko Bloc scored relatively
well percentage-wise, the elections in six of the seven regional
capitals were won by representatives of other parties. Two new parties,
Vidrodzhennia and UKROP, entered these elections and established themselves
as political forces with a national dimension.
94. On 16 February 2016, President Poroshenko asked Prime Minister
Yatsenyuk to resign in light of the latter’s dwindling public support.
However, on the same day, the government of Mr Yatsenyuk survived
a vote of no-confidence in the Verkhovna
Rada, reportedly with the help of a number of MPs of
the Petro Poroshenko Bloc. Subsequently, on 17 February 2016, Ms Timoshenko
announced that Batkivshchyna was leaving the ruling coalition, followed,
on 18 February 2016, by Samopomich. Following several weeks of political negotiations
between all parties, who were generally eager to avoid the prospect
of early elections, Mr Yatsenyuk formally resigned on 12 April 2016.
He was replaced as Prime Minister by the Speaker of the Verkhovna
Rada, Volodymyr Groysman. Mr Groysman is a close ally of President
Poroshenko. Ministers from Yatsenyuk’s People’s Front maintained
their positions in the government. The new government was supported by
the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, the Peoples Front and Samopomich, as
well as the Revival and People’s Will Party, ensuring it a governing
majority in the Verkhovna Rada. Batkivshchyna remained in opposition
to the new government.
95. On 12 May 2016, the Verkhovna Rada appointed Mr Yuriy Lutsenko,
faction leader of the PPB and former Interior Minister, as Prosecutor
General to replace Prosecutor General Shokin, who was widely seen
as an obstacle to the much needed reform of the prosecution service
in Ukraine.
96. The fight against the endemic corruption remains a key priority
for Ukraine. The institutional framework to fight corruption has
now been fully established. It consists of a three-tier set of institutions
to implement the anti-corruption strategy: the National Anti-Corruption
Bureau (NABU), the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutors Office
(SAPO) and the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption
(NAPC).
97. On 12 October 2016, the Assembly adopted
Resolution 2133 (2016) on legal remedies for human rights violations on the
Ukrainian territories outside the control of the Ukrainian authorities,
in which it expressed its deep concern about the human rights situation
in Crimea and in the self-proclaimed “people’s republics” of Donetsk
and Luhansk.
2.3. Countries
engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue
2.3.1. Bulgaria
98. The co-rapporteurs visited
Sofia on 8 and 9 June 2016. In addition, on 1 March 2016, they visited Brussels
for an exchange of views with European Commission officials dealing
with matters relating to Bulgaria.
99. The political environment has become more stable since the
last elections, which initially led to an acceleration of the reform
processes. The preparation of the November 2016 presidential election
had an impact on the reform process, with political agreement becoming
more difficult and with the minority government obliged to seek
a majority in parliament on an ad hoc basis. It is important that
the reforms be carried out meaningfully and in compliance with European
standards, in particular with regard to the reform of the judiciary.
100. The developments regarding the judicial reform process should
be welcomed, notably with the adoption, in December 2015, of the
amendments to the Constitution that aim to increase the independence
of the judiciary by reforming the self-governing body of the Bulgarian
judiciary – the Supreme Judicial Council – notably by diving it
into separate chambers for judges and prosecutors and by strengthening
the Inspectorate to the Council, as a way to address more efficiently
problems of integrity and conflicts of interest within the judiciary.
As mentioned by the Venice Commission in its opinion on the constitutional
amendments, these amendments can only be effective in conjunction
with subsequent related legislative processes, in particular the
amending of the Judiciary System Act. Therefore the impact of the
constitutional amendments on the overall reform of the judiciary
depends on the adoption of proper implementing legislation. For
this purpose, the Monitoring Committee decided on 10 October 2016
to ask the Venice Commission for an opinion on the Bulgarian Law
on Judicial Power as amended by the two packages of amendments passed
in March and July 2016. The opinion is expected to be adopted in
March 2017. The Bulgarian authorities are urged to move forward
with the reform of the judiciary.
101. As part of the latest reform strategy, the government sought
to create a single anti-corruption body. A draft law to this end
was rejected by parliament in September 2015. In 2016, a second
attempt was made with the draft Act on prevention of corruption
and confiscation of illegally acquired property, which provides
for the establishment of a single anti-corruption body – the National
Bureau of Preventing Corruption and Forfeiture of Illegally Acquired
Assets. This body should unite four existing bodies: the Commission
for Prevention and Ascertainment of Conflict of Interest, the Asset
Forfeiture Commission, the Centre for Prevention and Combating Corruption
and Organised Crime (BORKOR) and the unit of the National Audit
Office. The draft law was adopted in first reading before the summer
recess. It is now important that the authorities ensure that the anti-corruption
system is genuinely effective and produces tangible results without
further delay.
102. The electoral law of Bulgaria was repeatedly amended over
previous years. The committee therefore decided, on 10 October 2016,
to ask the Venice Commission for an opinion on the amendments to
the Electoral Code of Bulgaria as adopted by the Bulgarian Parliament
since the 2014 Venice Commission opinion on the draft Election Code
of Bulgaria. The opinion is expected to be adopted by the Venice
Commission in March 2017. At the same time, the importance of the
principle of stable election legislation before elections should
be underscored.
103. The presidential election was held on 6 and 13 November 2016.
The election observation delegation of the Parliamentary Assembly
concluded that the election was technically well administered and
fundamental freedoms were respected. The election administration
worked in a professional, scrupulous and transparent manner. The
campaign was competitive and an increase of public confidence in
the electoral procedures was observed. However, the accuracy of
the voters lists remains a concern.
104. Former Commander of the Bulgarian Air Force, Rumen Radev,
won the election against the Speaker of the Parliament, Tsetska
Tsacheva, who was backed by Prime Minister Borisov. Consequently,
Prime Minister Borisov resigned and the parliament approved the
resignation of the government on 16 November 2016.
2.3.2. Montenegro
105. The co-rapporteurs undertook
a fact-finding visit to Montenegro in November 2015 and participated
in the observation of the parliamentary elections in October 2016.
106. Montenegro plays an active role in regional co-operation and
contributes to good neighbourly relations, being a source of stability
for the region. A number of reforms have been initiated since the
adoption of Assembly
Resolution
2030 (2015) in January 2015, such as on the reform of the electoral
framework and judiciary as well as the fight against corruption.
However, in order to ensure their sustainability, these reform processes
need to be followed by full implementation of all the newly adopted
laws.
107. The Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor for organised crime
and corruption, war crimes and human trafficking was established
in July 2015. However, the related special police unit still needs
to be fully established in order to allow for the actual functioning
of the Chief Special Prosecutor’s Office. In addition, the newly
established Agency for the Prevention of Corruption needs to be
enabled to effectively carry out its functions and the necessary
resources need to be allocated to it
108. The investigations and prosecution of the violent incidents
in Podgorica in October and November 2015 have been repeatedly delayed.
It is of the utmost importance that the Montenegrin competent authorities effectively
investigate these incidents, and take appropriate action to ensure
that there is no impunity in cases of abuse of force by law-enforcement
officials.
109. The situation of the media remains a source of great concern.
Journalists must be allowed to carry out their work in a free and
safe manner. The authorities should show the commensurate political
will to end the current sense of impunity for attacks on journalists
and ensure that all cases are thoroughly investigated. The lack
of progress in this regard raises questions about the functioning
of the justice system and the democratic system as such. The work
of the Commission for monitoring the actions of the competent authorities
in the investigation of cases of threats and violence against journalists
seems to reflect the overall lack of political will to bring to
justice not only the perpetrators but also those who are behind
such offences. The monitoring of the actions of the competent authorities
in the investigation of such cases should be continued. The new mechanism
established for this purpose should be given adequate resources
to effectively perform its functions.
110. Political interference and financial pressure on media outlets
and journalists remain a serious problem, as do the public smear
campaigns carried out by some media against journalists and NGO
representatives expressing critical opinions. It is a shared responsibility
of the authorities and journalists to further improve ethics in
this highly polarised media environment.
111. Trust in the electoral process is essential for the proper
and stable functioning of democracy. The tense political situation
and the climate of confrontation between the political forces is
a result of the frustration about the perceived unfairness of previous
elections. There is a clear lack of trust between the political
forces.
112. The elections took place on 16 October 2016 and were organised
in a calm and orderly manner in a competitive environment. Fundamental
freedoms were generally respected in a campaign characterised by
a lack of distinct domestic policy alternatives and permeated by
personal attacks. While pluralistic, the media lacked editorial
independence.
2.3.3. “The
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”
113. The political crisis that erupted
in April 2014 in “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” continued to
dominate the political agenda in the country. The four main political
parties,
under the auspices
of the European Commission and members of the European Parliament,
signed in June and July 2015 the Przino Agreement to exit the political
deadlock. This initiated a “transitional period”, marked by the
end of the release of wiretap recordings, the return of the opposition
to parliament (on 1 September 2015), the appointment of a Special
Prosecutor (in September 2015) to investigate the allegations contained
in the illegally wiretapped conversations and the expected implementation
of recommendations issued by the European Commission to address
systematic rule of law issues. This Agreement was also designed
to pave the way for the organisation of early free and fair elections
scheduled on 24 April 2016, subject to the cleaning of the voters
list, the upgrading of the media legislation and the adoption of
amendments to the Election Code. On 18 January 2016, the then Prime
Minister stepped down, as agreed, 100 days before election day.
A transitional government, with the participation of the opposition,
was set up to prepare the elections.
114. The co-rapporteurs visited Skopje, Tetovo and Gostivar from
15 to 18 February 2016 to assess the political crisis, progress
made in the field of the rule of law, democracy and human rights
and the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement.
115. While the country remained committed to the Euro-Atlantic
integration process, it was confronted with a major migration crisis
triggered by the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, given the country’s
location on the so-called “Balkan route” used by migrants to reach
European countries.
116. Complaints about the lack of political will to implement the
Przino Agreement in good faith were mounting from all sides. In
February 2016, due to unresolved contentious issues, especially
relating to electoral lists and media reforms, the Social Democratic
Party (SDSM) announced that the party would boycott the elections, prompting
the parliament to postpone the elections to 5 June 2016. The decision
of the President of the Republic of 12 April 2016 to terminate criminal
investigations of 56 politicians in the case of the intercepted phone
conversations “in the interest of national reconciliation” further
exacerbated the political tensions and prompted large demonstrations.
This decision was widely seen as a breach of the rule of law and
a hindrance to the work of the Special Prosecutor, which undermined
implementation of the Przino Agreement. Following strong international
and domestic criticism, the President decided on 27 May 2016 to
revoke his decision.
117. The decision of the Constitutional Court of 18 May 2016 –
ruling that the parliament's earlier dissolution was unconstitutional
and that all electoral activities should be halted – dramatically
changed the course of events. As a consequence, the parliament reconvened
that same day, cancelled the 5 June elections, resumed its normal
work and decided on a reshuffle in the interim government to prepare
early elections. The four political parties finally reached a new
political agreement on 20 July 2016 and, after progress was achieved
on a series of issues, including media legislation and the cleaning
up of the voters lists, they agreed to have early parliamentary
elections on 11 December 2016.
2.3.4. Turkey
118. The developments in Turkey
in the reporting period have been overshadowed by the failed coup
d’état in July 2016 and the subsequent developments in the country,
which have raised numerous concerns.
119. Previous to the failed coup d’état, the number of journalists
charged for “insulting the President” was an issue of concern. The
arrests of two prominent journalists, Can Dündar, Editor-in-Chief
of the Cumhuriyet newspaper,
and Erdem Gül, its Ankara correspondent, as well as the eight-year
sentence facing Bülent Kenes, Editor-in-Chief of Today’s Zaman, for “insulting the
President”, were seen as a deterioration of the media environment
and “a chilling effect on journalists, in a context already marked
by continuous and worrying restrictions on freedom of the media”.
120. On 9 March 2016, the committee expressed its disquietude with
regard to the developments in south-east Turkey and the breakdown
of the peace process. It adopted a declaration expressing serious
concerns with respect to restrictions on media freedom and access
to pluralistic information, challenges to the decisions of the Constitutional
Court and the erosion of the rule of law, as well as the human rights
situation of people living in south-east Turkey, who had been subjected
to military operations and curfews for several months. The committee
called on the Turkish authorities to consider the relaxation of
curfews, so that humanitarian considerations could be addressed,
such as securing citizens’ access to water and food, medical care
and other basic rights. In the light of these developments, on 22
June 2016, the committee presented to the Assembly a report on the
functioning of democratic institutions in Turkey.
121. On 22 June 2016, the Assembly debated the functioning of the
democratic institutions in Turkey and adopted
Resolution 2121 (2016), in which it deplored the collapse of the peace talks
on the Kurdish issue in July 2015 and the subsequent escalation
of violence in the south-east. In this respect, it condemned the
serious allegations of human rights violations during these security
operations and the human and legal consequences of the lengthy curfews.
The Assembly also expressed its concern about the stripping of the
immunity of a large number of parliamentarians – mostly from the
opposition – as well as the lack of independence of the judiciary and
numerous measures and abusive application of legal provisions restricting
freedom of expression and of the media. It also noted that the “purge
to clear the State institutions of alleged Gülenist followers raises questions
in respect of procedural guarantees and affected the judicial system,
where the large number of transfers, arrests and detentions of judges
and prosecutors could have a deterrent effect on the members of the
judiciary”. The Assembly concluded that these latest developments
constituted “a threat to the functioning of democratic institutions
of the country and its commitments to its obligations towards the
Council of Europe”.
122. The committee requested opinions from the Venice Commission
on no less than four legislative acts: Article 299 of the Criminal
Code of Turkey on defamation of the President of the Republic; on
the legal framework governing curfews; on the duties, competences
and functioning of the “criminal courts of peace”; and on the implementation
of the state of emergency in Turkey, in particular all subsequent
decree-laws, to assess their compatibility with Council of Europe
standards.
123. On 9 November 2016, the committee firmly condemned the failed
coup d’état. However, at the same time, it voiced its deep concern
at the implementation of the state of emergency, notably the continuous
and massive dismissal of civil servants and members of the judiciary
and the consequences of the measures contained in the decree-laws
on fundamental freedoms and fair trials, the arrests of leading
journalists from Cumhuriyet –
for their alleged support to the PKK and the Gülen Movement – the
closure of an additional 15 Kurdish media and the restrictions imposed
on the autonomy of the universities. These measures, as well as
the arrest of 10 parliamentarians belonging to the Peoples’ Democratic
Party (HDP), have created a climate of fear and suspicion aimed
at silencing critical voices in Turkish society.
124. The committee condemned the renewed discussions about the
reintroduction of the death penalty in Turkey, which is incompatible
with membership of the Council of Europe. Despite the continuous
terrorist attacks suffered by the country and the adverse geopolitical
context, Turkey should refrain from taking any initiatives that
could erode the country’s fulfilment of its obligations toward the
Council of Europe. In this respect, the state of emergency should
be lifted at the earliest possible date.
3. Europe
without dividing lines
125. In July 2015, Mr Tobias Zech
and others tabled a motion for a resolution on “Creating a Europe
without dividing lines”, which the Assembly referred to the Monitoring
Committee for report in October. The motion asks the Assembly to
research how each member State is faring after twenty or more years
in honouring its commitments listed in the Assembly accession opinions.
It considers that the requirements and obligations taken in a high
number of cases have not become reality and that, in a number of
cases, there has been an increase of ethnic tensions in some Council
of Europe member States.
126. Since its creation in 1997, it is precisely the task of the
Assembly’s Monitoring Committee to monitor the honouring of obligations
and commitment by all member States of the Council of Europe. Since
1997, applications for opening a monitoring procedure have been
tabled concerning Greece and Latvia in 1997, Austria in 2000, Liechtenstein
in 2003, the United Kingdom and Italy in 2006, Hungary in 2011 and
France in 2013. Currently, there are nine States under a monitoring
procedure sensu stricto: Albania,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, the Republic
of Moldova, the Russian Federation, Serbia and Ukraine, and four
States are engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue with the Assembly:
Bulgaria, Montenegro, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”
and Turkey.
127. Over the years, the Assembly closed the monitoring procedure
in respect of the following States: in 1997 Estonia, Romania, the
Czech Republic and Lithuania, in 1999 the Slovak Republic, in 2000
Bulgaria, Croatia and “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”,
in 2001 Latvia, in 2004 Turkey, in 2009 Monaco and in 2015 Montenegro.
For a number of States still engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue,
the Assembly, having been satisfied, decided to recommend to the
Bureau to close the post-monitoring dialogue: in 2001 with Estonia,
in 2002 with Lithuania and Romania, in 2003 with Croatia, in 2004
with the Czech Republic, in 2005 with the Slovak Republic and Latvia,
and in 2015 with Monaco.
128. Furthermore, as the mandate of the Monitoring Committee covers
all member States of the Council of Europe, periodic reviews on
how member States not currently involved in a monitoring procedure sensu stricto or a post-monitoring
dialogue comply with their statutory obligations towards the Council
of Europe have been submitted to the Assembly in the framework of
the committee’s annual progress report. In 2015, reports were adopted
by the Assembly concerning Andorra, Belgium, Croatia and Cyprus,
and this year the Assembly will examine periodic review reports
on Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France and Germany.
In 2017, periodic review reports will be prepared on Estonia, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland and Italy. The Monitoring Committee has
also been seized for report on the functioning of democratic institutions
in Poland.
129. Despite the intensive work carried out by the Monitoring Committee
over the years, it is of course clear that democracy, the rule of
law and respect for human rights are still “work in progress”. In
recent times there have been serious setbacks which affect the fulfilment
of Council of Europe statutory obligations: a war between Russia
and Georgia in 2008, the 2014 illegal annexation of the Ukrainian
territory of Crimea, the covert Russian military operations in eastern
Ukraine, the introduction of a state of emergency in France, or the
failed military coup in Turkey in 2016, to name but a few. In a
number of members States, political instability and protracted political
crises have also had a negative impact on the orderly fulfilment
of obligations and commitments (for example, in “the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia”, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia-Herzegovina
or Belgium). Frozen conflicts have remained frozen or, worse, have
again turned violent.
130. To date, however, all member States of the Council of Europe
have recognised the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human
Rights and generally abide by its judgments. All member States,
save for Andorra, Belgium, France, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg,
Monaco and Turkey, have ratified the Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities and are subject to the monitoring
mechanism provided by this convention. I therefore believe the concerns
raised in this motion are already addressed by the committee and that
the monitoring procedures used by the Assembly provide an effective
and sufficient tool for assessing member States’ fulfilment of accession
commitments, where applicable, as well as their statutory obligations.
4. Ad
hoc Sub-Committee on Conflicts between Council of Europe member
States
131. As mentioned above, the Ad
hoc Sub-Committee on Conflicts between Council of Europe member States
met twice in Strasbourg, on 19 April and on 11 October 2016, as
well as once in Paris, on 10 March 2016. At its meeting in Paris
on 10 March 2016, it elected Mr Stefan Schennach as Chair and, at
its meeting in Strasbourg on 19 April 2016, Mr Jordi Xuclà as Vice-Chair.
132. In line with its mandate, the Ad hoc sub-committee prepared
and adopted an evaluation report on its first year of existence.
On the basis of the work carried out by the ad hoc sub-committee,
the Monitoring Committee concluded that there continues to be a
clear need for a mechanism for the Monitoring Committee to address conflicts
between member States. It considered that the ad hoc sub-committee
had successfully provided such a mechanism. Emphasising that this
is not a temporary or ad hoc need, it was therefore decided to transform the
ad hoc sub-committee into a standing sub-committee of the Monitoring
Committee. At the same time it was agreed that one member of each
of the countries that are party to the conflicts under the sub-committee’s mandate
and also member of the Monitoring Committee, should be added to
the membership of the sub-committee on proposal of their national
delegation. The sub-committee will operate under practically the
same terms of reference as the ad hoc sub-committee, but with a
small number of clarifications added to avoid any interference in
the work of the sub-committee with the official mediation processes
for the conflicts in question. The decision to establish the standing
sub-committee is attached in Appendix I.
5. Periodic review of the honouring of
the membership obligations to the Council of Europe by countries
that are not subject to a monitoring procedure sensu stricto, or
engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue with the Assembly.
133. In line with
Resolution 2018 (2014) on the progress of the Assembly’s monitoring procedure,
the committee continued the periodic reviews of the honouring of
membership obligations to the Council of Europe of all the countries
that are not under the monitoring procedure
sensu
stricto or engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue. In
line with the working methods agreed by the committee, in 2016,
periodic review reports were prepared for six countries: Austria,
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France and Germany. These periodic
reviews are presented in Parts 2 to 7 of this progress report and
their main recommendations are set out in the draft resolution that
is presented in this report.
134. From the reactions of the authorities of the countries that
have been the subject of a periodic review to date, it is clear
that this exercise by the Monitoring Committee is appreciated by
all concerned. At the same time, it ensures that all member States
of the Council of Europe, without exception, are monitored by the Assembly
for their honouring of membership obligations. I would like to express
my gratitude for the co-operation and elaborate, detailed and in-depth
comments on the preliminary draft reports on their countries that I
received from the authorities of the countries reviewed in this
progress report. These comments have been taken into account in
the drafting of the final reports that are included in this progress
report, and greatly contributed to their high quality.
135. Given the workload of the committee, as well as the (staff)
resources at its disposal, approximately six periodic review reports
per calendar year seems to be the optimal number. This would imply
that all countries concerned will be reviewed at least every five
to six years, which is a normal democratic evaluation cycle. The next
progress report will be the second time that the committee reviews
the full quota of six countries. I intend to provide a more in-depth
evaluation of the periodic review process in the next progress report
on the basis of the experience of these the first two years.