1. Introduction and scope of the report
1. The aim of this report is to
analyse how corruption can affect democracy in different contexts
and to better understand why, notwithstanding the long history and
continuous spread of the phenomenon of corruption in today’s society,
it remains difficult to apply a unique “recipe” which is guaranteed
to produce effective results throughout Europe.
2. The original title of the motion for a resolution was “Corruption
as a governance regime: a barrier to institutional efficiency and
progress”. I proposed the following: “Promoting integrity in governance
to tackle political corruption”, so that we shift the focus onto
tools and strategies to promote a culture of integrity, transparency
and accountability.
3. The Parliamentary Assembly took a firm stance on corruption
as a threat to the rule of law by adopting
Resolution
1943 (2013) and
Recommendation
2019 (2013), which was followed by a
reply by the Committee of Ministers on 21 January 2014. The
Assembly underlined the need to provide for appropriate incriminations of
corruption offences, to guarantee the independence of the judiciary
and to ensure a high level of transparency in political, administrative
and economic life. It also called for the mainstreaming of anti-corruption in
various Council of Europe activities and programmes and stressed
the need for domestic parliaments to actively contribute, in their
respective national contexts, to the implementation of recommendations
issued by the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption
(GRECO) and other monitoring bodies.
4. In my report, I will focus primarily on political corruption,
that is to say the misuse by government or political officials of
their governmental powers and resources for illegitimate, usually
secret, private gain.

This issue
goes to the very heart of what the Council of Europe stands for,
as the fight against corruption remains not only a cornerstone of
the rule of law but also a key component of a genuine democracy.
5. In some countries, corruption is considered to be a “pathology”
of the social system, while in others it is perceived as something
“physiological” and seems to play a structural role in society.
In order to be effective, anti-corruption strategies cannot ignore
the cultural background, that is different traditions and customs,
and existing perceptions in a heterogeneous Europe. These strategies
should also take into account the impact of the building of the
modern State on corruption. Thus, the problem of corruption in southern
Europe cannot simply be solved by applying anti-corruption policies
and structures that work in northern European countries, which traditionally
come at the top of various anti-corruption ratings. Also, former
eastern and central European countries have gone through a political
transition from a totalitarian to a democratic regime relatively
recently (in less than 30 years) and this element needs to be taken
into account when trying to understand and analyse the phenomenon
of corruption in these countries and design appropriate anti-corruption
strategies. To illustrate this point, I have focused on four case
studies, following fact-finding visits in three of them: Ukraine,
which I visited in January 2016; the Netherlands, which I visited
in November 2016, Spain, where I had some fruitful discussions in
March 2017, and the United Kingdom, which was presented to me by
Professor Mark Knights, historian at the University of Warwick.
6. My aim is not to name and shame individual countries but to
understand the root causes of corruption and what can be done at
national and European level to favour a culture of integrity, taking
into account the national and local environment. I will also, inter alia, outline a number of
anti-corruption strategies in terms of legislation, institutions
and education, and pay specific attention to the mandate and powers
of national anti-corruption institutions.
7. I wish to thank the committee for organising a number of hearings,
namely: on 20 April 2015, in Strasbourg, with the participation
of Mr Raffaele Cantone, President of the Italian Anti-Corruption
Authority and Mr Sergei Guriev, Professor of economics at the Paris
Institute for Political Studies; on 1 September 2015, in Paris,
with the participation of Mr Giovanni Kessler, Director General
of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) of the European Commission,
Mr Bálint Magyar, Researcher and strategic consultant at Financial
Research Plc., Hungary, and Ms Kathryn Gordon, Senior Economist,
OECD Anti-Corruption Division; and on 8 March 2016, in Paris, with
the participation of Mr Drago Kos, Chairperson of the OECD Working
Group on Bribery.
8. Furthermore, on 4 June 2015, the committee participated in
a conference on “Towards a code of conduct for parliamentarians:
a comparison of national and international experience”, organised
by the Italian Chamber of Deputies in Rome, under the auspices of
Ms Laura Boldrini, President of the Chamber of Deputies.
9. On 23 September 2015, I participated in an exchange of views
with a delegation of the Constitutional Affairs Committee of the
European Parliament (AFCO) in Brussels; and on 2 December 2016,
I co-organised, in co-operation with the Council of Europe Directorate
General of Human Rights and Rule of Law and Deputy Secretary General
Gabriella Battaini-Dragoni, at the Council of Europe office in Venice,
a hearing of experts to discuss “Corruption and its trends: a policy
challenge”, whose discussions have greatly informed my report.
10. On 20 March 2017, I attended the launch event of the GRECO’s
Fifth Evaluation Round on the subject on “Preventing corruption
and promoting integrity in central governments (top executive functions)
and law- enforcement agencies”.
11. A number of other important issues, including lobbying, protection
of whistle-blowers, money laundering, revolving doors and conflicts
of interest, as well as the relevant work of the Committee of Experts
on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing
of Terrorism (MONEYVAL), have fallen outside the scope of my analysis.
These issues are being dealt with successfully by the Committee
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights

and
I also wish to refer to the proceedings of the Venice workshop as
regards current European trends in the fight against corruption,
including asset recovery and beneficial ownership.

12. Last but not least, the Committee on Culture, Science, Education
and Media adopted a report by Ms Gülsün Bilgehan on “Parliamentary
scrutiny over corruption: parliamentary co-operation with the investigative
media”,

which will contribute to a discussion
on how to rebuild trust in the media and in democratic institutions.
A joint debate with the present report will take place at the June
2017 part-session.
2. Case
studies
13. The following four countries,
United Kingdom, Ukraine, the Netherlands and Spain were selected
on the basis of their historical, cultural, geographical and political
differences.
2.1. The
impact of the building of the modern State on corruption: the case
of Britain
14. The morning session of the
Venice workshop on Corruption and its
trends: a policy challenge focused on corruption drivers
and anti-corruption reforms. Corruption has reached and captured
public structures since the early stage of the formation of the
modern State. During the State’s subsequent development, some societies
managed to progressively prevent and eliminate corruption by addressing
those risk areas or attitudes. In other societies, corruption continued
to affect public policy as well as public life in general.
15. Professor Knights discussed what the United Kingdom’s history
can tell us about corruption, and I will borrow his analysis to
show the impact of the building of the modern State on corruption.
16. The United Kingdom is today seen, according to corruption
perception indices, as a country that is relatively un-corrupt.

But it has a long history of struggling
with corruption, and anti-corruption strategies evolved over centuries
rather than years or decades.

Such strategies were often shaped
by peculiarly British factors – Protestant reformation in the 16th
century, two revolutions in the 17th century, and the expansion
of State and Empire in the 18th century – suggesting that each State
has to take measures which are adapted to its national history,
culture and mind-set.
17. The understanding of what corruption was, or why and how it
posed the greatest danger, changed over time; and what constituted
corrupt behaviour was also contested, with rival versions at stake
over time, from the idea of corruption of the Catholic Church in
16th century Protestant Britain to the corruption of officeholders or
the corrosion of the political system in the early 19th century.
Also, while the concept of “self-interest” was seen as the root
of corruption in the 16th and 17th centuries, it became the invisible
regulator of the free market that could undermine corruption in
the 18th and 19th centuries.
18. Many corrupt practices were also embedded in social practices,
customs and norms of the time and place. Britain’s struggle with
corruption was part of a larger story about notions of friendship,
kinship, patronage and gift-giving, since “bribes” were defended
as “gifts”, “presents” and “acknowledgements” from a friend or someone
who “owed” thanks or who had incurred an obligation.
19. Therefore, if corruption is tied closely to the socio-cultural
character of a country, we have to recognise that such attitudes
and values change slowly and that such a process reflects an extensive
debate that goes far beyond the institutions and administration
of public office. Progress was not consistent and could reverse and
anti-corruption strategies could require many attempts to achieve
their aims, spread out over a long period.

20. It is therefore important to think of anti-corruption as a
wave-like process that continually has to respond to new forms of
corruption as they emerge, rather than a linear process leading
to a State in which corruption has been eradicated.
21. Despite the favourable perception indices today, the British
Brexit may in part be ascribable to a popular, expansive and very
loose notion of corruption: that the system was only working for
self-interested groups who were profiting at the expense of the
people as a whole. Anti-corruption, like corruption, comes in many
forms and can also be highly political.
22. Some remedies which might seem self-evident from our modern
perspective were also double-edged swords in the past. Thus, before
the representative system was overhauled in the 19th century, elections
and political parties were seen as an important driver of corruption,
rather than mechanisms restraining it. The press, which could expose
corruption, could also pedal justifications for corrupt systems
and the independence of the press could be bought off by the government.
Whistle-blowers, who could expose corruption and offer solutions,
were systematically denigrated, threatened and thwarted.
23. There was also a paradox at the heart of the pre-modern State.
Its expansion created new opportunities for corrupt behaviour. However,
such expansion also created greater powers and regulatory frameworks
that curtailed corruption. The growth of the State was both part
of the problem and the solution.
24. Interestingly, administrative reform worked best when non-political
commissions examining every branch of governance were given political
backing. It also seems to have coincided in the British case with waves
of “moral reform” which sought to purify both the elite and the
nation as a whole. Institutional reform was thus seen alongside
a wider process of self-scrutiny at personal and national levels.
Some of that wider public debate and process of self-scrutiny took
place around corruption scandals, which generated a lot of interest and
discussion, as well as popular pressure for reform. But scandals
also had the potential to – and frequently did – trigger ad hominem attacks that failed to
follow through with any systemic reform.
25. To sum up, anti-corruption is a difficult balancing act. One
of the most difficult challenges is to find a way of enabling discretion
in office-holders that allowed them to be efficient, innovative
and flexible in their work, while at the same time restraining such
discretion through frameworks that required adherence to rigid rules and
protocols that could stifle initiative, impede the business of governance
and even create new ways of extracting corrupt payments. Such balancing
acts require constant calibration both by the State and the people.
26. Much of the scholarly literature on corruption has, for understandable
reasons, focused on governmental, administrative and institutional
corruption. However, Professor Knights concluded that more academic
and policy attention needs to be paid to the ways in which corruption
was, and is embedded in social and cultural values, which change
slowly but provide the essential environment in which the institutional reforms
take place.
2.2. Transition
to democracy from the Soviet Union system: the case of Ukraine
2.2.1. Background
information
27. In choosing Ukraine as a case
study, I have privileged the rich historical past which it shares
with its neighbours in the region as well as the current context
marked by important and radical efforts to fight corruption. Clear
and tangible steps to address corruption have become one of the
main demands of the Euromaidan and its aftermath, as discussed during
my visit to Kiev on 19 and 20 January 2016.
28. Some preliminary figures for Ukraine reveal that:
- the control of corruption measurement
by the World Bank World Governance Indicators has remained almost
unchanged in the period 2010-2014 with only 17% of countries in
the world doing worse than Ukraine;
- Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index
2015: Ukraine is ranked 130th out of 167 States;
- despite envisaged sanctions for corruption offences, in
2013 only three civil servants, as a result of investigations, were
deprived of the right to occupy civil service positions according
to an official Ministry of Justice report;
- despite criticism of high-level corruption cases, I was
told that citizens regularly bribe State officials to “accelerate”
inefficient public services and rarely see the damaging effect of
petty corruption in nurturing an overall culture of bad governance
and impunity;
- PACT Uniter survey
also indicates that over a half
of citizens experienced corruption in 2015; moreover one third of
the population believes that corruption today is more prevalent
than prior to Euromaidan.
2.2.2. Historical
background
2.2.2.1. The
period under the Russian Empire (19th – the early 20th century)
29. In 1830, when most of current
Ukraine’s territory was part of the Russian Empire, one of the printing houses
in Saint Petersburg published a book entitled “
The art of taking bribes”. In this
book, the author set out, in a satirical manner, a classification
of bribes – gifts or meals, money, reciprocal favours – and provided
advice on how a civil servant could extract a bribe from the user.
This reflected society’s awareness about how corruption, in particular
bribery, penetrated a strong State bureaucracy on which, together
with the army, the public authority, represented by the monarch,
was based. Some legislation aimed at better detection and deterrence
of corruption was adopted in the course of the 19th century.

A
special commission of the Senate, set up in 1862 to investigate
the causes of the bribery of civil servants, found that corruption
was due to inappropriate legislation, low salaries and the lack
of the deterrent effect of penalties. In addition, the lack of independence
of the justice system, the strong hierarchical subordination within
the State administration, the weak qualifications of civil servants
and the lack of openness in public affairs were also mentioned.

2.2.2.2. The
Soviet period
30. The Russian revolutions were
followed by the setting up of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
some of which might have originally had different cultural and historical
relations with public authorities. A harmonisation took place through
the establishment of a new government machinery composed of the
State apparatus (a pool of positions of political or bureaucratic
responsibility in local and central bodies) and the nomenklatura (high ranking party
management). This structure apparatus remained the State’s bedrock
until the end of the Soviet period.
31. The first interesting observation related to this period is
that the term “corruption” was not used until the 1980s. Such an
offence did not exist in relevant criminal codes of Soviet Republics,
including Ukraine. Instead the terms “bribe” and “misuse of official
position” were used, leaving the manifestation of favouritism and nepotism
outside the scope of reprimanded behaviour. Later some offences
were also added to criminal codes to tackle the “shadow” market
which had started developing as from the 1970s to meet the growing
number of citizens’ consumption requirements. This approach jeopardised
and narrowed the understanding of corruption during the Soviet period.
In addition, the official position to consider bribes as typical
of an exploitative State did not enable classification as corruption
of some actions by the new State apparatus.

Several
bribery cases were nevertheless reported, especially in the late
Soviet period.

32. The planned economy, State-owned enterprises with productivity
objectives set in advance, fixed prices, the limited possibilities
to acquire personal belongings and property as well as advantages
attributed to elites in an official way reduced the volume of corruption
transactions but accentuated growing social and economic discrepancies.
33. However, even though the Soviet Union system allowed little
room for goods or services to be redistributed beyond official channels
and procedures, the planned economy was reported as being an incentive
for distorted practices. At the time, political objectives prevailed
over economic realities. To meet these sometimes unrealistic objectives
or, alternatively, to falsify figures to maintain a successful appearance, the
State needed to count on a strong apparatus of executives, ranging
from local managers to officials in the capital cities, each of
whom was bribing his own hierarchical superior.
![(15)
According to Mr Gorbachev’s
Prime Minister, Nikolai Ryzhkov, the “moral state of the society”
in 1985 was its “most terrifying” feature: “[We] stole from ourselves,
took and gave bribes, lied in the reports, in newspapers, from high
podiums, wallowed in our lies, hung medals on one another. And all
of this – from top to bottom and from bottom to top”, Nikolai Ryzhkov,
Perestroika: Istoriya predatel’stv [Perestroika: The History of
Betrayals] (Moscow: Novosti, 1992), 33, 94.](/nw/images/icon_footnoteCall.png)
An
example of such an organisation is provided in the famous “Cotton
Mafia case” investigated in the 1980s. Though this case concerned
the Republic of Uzbekistan, the same system was more or less present
in other Soviet Republics.
2.2.3. Fight
against corruption and State-building in post-Soviet and modern
Ukraine
34. The word “post-communist”,
like “post-Soviet”, does not refer merely to a historical sequence,
but rather to the fact that the conditions preceding the democratic
transition had a decisive role in the formation of the system.

Some authors claimed that,
regardless of the monolithic appearance of the Soviet State, ultimate power
and authority resided with the party rather than the State. Therefore,
when the party collapsed, there was “little of the latter to take
its place”.

35. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, elections took place
in Ukraine, which brought to power, as was the case in some other
post-communist countries, some former party elites who were used
to a special inner structure and operation mode of the system.

In
addition to inheriting the operation and the decision-making structure,
the former elite were able to acquire economic weight through large-scale
privatisation. At the same time, corruption penetrated all levels
of public institutions such as the civil service and the custom
and the tax services.
36. In this period, corruption started appearing as a major indicator
of the weakness of the State. Basic State institutions started losing
their autonomy vis-à-vis competing elites shaping policy making,
and the regulatory and legal environment, and they also saw their
policy implementation power reduced.

In
the wake of Euromaidan, the distribution of positions in public
institutions opening became a form of commerce.
37. What was the impact of this new reality on forms of corruption?
First of all, new forms of corruption not regulated by criminal
law, appeared such as misuse of public office for personal gain,
misuse of public budget, the trading in influence and many others.
Accordingly, Ukraine started, under the pressure of international institutions,
to draw up appropriate legal tools to counter these actions. However,
even several years afterwards, these tools are still not sufficient,
given that there was no clear understanding of the various forms of
corruption, including bribery, embezzlement and misuse of the State
budget.

Moreover,
corruption continues to be qualified as such mostly when it concerns
the misuse of State money and is performed by natural persons.

The
concept of criminal liability for corruption offences by legal persons
raises great concerns as the introduction of such liability would
require the resetting of the whole system of detection and investigation
which is currently directed only against natural persons.
38. Secondly, according to some experts, as “[in] transition economies,
corruption took on a new image – that of so-called oligarchs manipulating
policy formation”.

It
has received the name of the “State capture”. “While most types
of corruption are directed toward changing how existing laws, rules,
or regulations are implemented with respect to the bribe payer,
State capture refers to corrupt efforts to influence how those laws, rules
and regulations are formed. Bribes to parliamentarians to ‘buy’
their votes on important pieces of legislation, bribes to government
officials to enact favourable regulations or decrees, bribes to
judges to influence court decisions – these are the classic examples
of grand corruption through which firms can encode advantages for
themselves into the basic legal and regulatory structure of the
economy.”

2.2.4. The
current situation
39. Clear and tangible steps to
address corruption have become one of the main demands of Euromaidan. In
the aftermath of Euromaidan, after uneasy negotiations that follow
each introduction of anti-corruption draft laws into parliament,
the legislators (the previous legislature) adopted a comprehensive
anti-corruption package in October 2014, and voted through important
legal instruments in 2015. For more recent updates, I refer to the
report by the co-rapporteurs of the Committee on the Honouring of
Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe
(Monitoring Committee), Mr Jordi Xuclà and Mr Axel Fischer, which analysed
the ongoing domestic reforms in detail, including the fight against
corruption.

40. In
Resolution
2145 (2017) on the functioning of democratic institutions in Ukraine,
adopted on 25 January 2017, the Assembly noted that “the widespread
corruption in Ukraine continues to be a main point of concern. The
prolonged absence of marked and concrete progress in this area,
including with regard to prosecutions and convictions, could potentially
diminish the effects of the ambitious reform agenda of the authorities
and, in the long run, undermine public trust in the political and
judicial system as a whole. In this context, the Assembly is concerned
that the pace of the fight against corruption is too slow, and concrete results
are too limited. Moreover, it reiterates its concern about the intertwinement
of political and economic interests in the country’s political environment,
which influences public perception and can hinder the fight against
corruption. The Assembly therefore welcomes the establishment of
the main institutional framework to fight corruption in the country
and expects this to now lead to tangible and concrete results, including
with regard to prosecutions and convictions. In particular, the
Assembly welcomes the implementation of the e-declaration system
and calls on the authorities to ensure that the National Agency
on Corruption Prevention has the required resources to audit these
asset declarations; calls on the authorities to ensure that the Specialised
Anti-Corruption Prosecutor has sufficient resources to execute his/her
tasks, including to open offices in all regions of the country;
encourages the authorities to establish a specialised anti-corruption
court, and to fight the widespread corruption in the judiciary,
which is essential for the success of the fight against overall
corruption; and welcomes the adoption of the law on the civil service
and calls on the authorities to ensure the speedy adoption of all
implementing legislation”.
41. These recommendations show that, in the case of Ukraine, a
multifaceted approach is needed, along with international pressure
and conditionality used by international bodies to persuade the
authorities to show true progress in the fight against corruption.
At the same time, understanding the difficult transition to democracy
and the rule of law from a former Soviet system offers useful insight
to better shape any anti-corruption support, including the one provided
by the Council of Europe's Action Plan for Ukraine 2015-2017 and
any future plan.
2.3. Preserving
trust in the democratic institutions: the case of the Netherlands
2.3.1. Background
information
42. On 8 November 2016, I carried
out a visit to The Hague. Despite the excellent co-operation and programme
set up with the help of the Dutch Parliament, discussing corruption
in the Netherlands was somehow a more challenging task than my previous
visit to Ukraine, in the sense that the authorities were less interested
in what is considered “not to be a problem” for the country. My
analysis is therefore less probing and articulate and mainly focuses
on the reasons why the Netherlands was able to build a relatively
corruption-resilient society.
43. During my discussions with the Dutch interlocutors, I focused
in particular on the link between the quality of governance and
the rule of law, on the one hand, and the current trends of corruption,
including existing gaps, governance challenges, historical traditions,
culture, societal and religious features of the Dutch society and
political landscape, on the other.
2.3.2. Corruption
in history
44. The Netherlands is a country
with a puritan and Protestant background which has now largely secularised.
Catholic communities, more prominent in the south of the country,
are sometimes perceived as being more corrupt than Protestant communities.
However, the religious background and differences between Catholics
and Protestants are not so relevant.
45. A low level of corruption and a high level of trust are perceived
by the Dutch not just as a moral value but also as an economic advantage,
and it is often actively promoted by the government to attract foreign investment.
In 2015, the Netherlands ranked fifth on Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index and there is strong public demand for
transparency and accountability and a collective understanding of the
damaging effects of corruption.
46. I had an interesting discussion with researchers on the history
of corruption, who stressed that the Seven United Netherlands in
the 17th and 18th century were regarded as corrupt and the elite
relied on gentlemen’s agreements to keep corruption under control.
Following liberal reforms after 1848, the advent of free press, direct
elections and the rise of stronger State institutions which collected
taxes for the common good, new laws drew a sharper distinction between
public and private interests.
47. The “gentlemen’s agreement” way of doing politics and dealing
with all problems in society still seems to be present in today’s
mentality. Furthermore, preserving trust in the institutions also
seems to be a key feature of Dutch politics and when a corruption
scandal erupts, reports are made public and discussed in parliament,
also through parliamentary inquiries, as well as through the press,
and rarely result in convictions.
2.3.3. Key
features of the Dutch anti-corruption strategy
48. There is no dedicated agency
for the prevention and fight against corruption. However, anti-corruption and
integrity policies are central to the Dutch public administration
both at national and local level, with a focus on prevention. This
was evident during my talks with various interlocutors, including
the President of the Supreme Court and the Attorney General, the
Ombudsman, members of the Senate, and the government’s integrity
advisor for mayors and local representatives.
49. Many of them acknowledged that corruption still occurs but
also pointed to a clear distinction between political corruption
(few cases, mostly at local/provincial level) and bureaucratic corruption
(mostly affecting civil servants and functions related to urban
planning and the building sector). The burden of proof is often
too high to follow through public prosecution of individuals and
most corruption cases end in plea bargaining. It is generally accepted
that fewer regulations are linked to fewer cases of corruption.
50. For combating corruption, since 1996, the Dutch police have
a highly specialised investigation service (National Police Internal
Investigations Department – Rijksrecherche),
reporting to the Board of Procurators-General. This service is responsible
for investigating cases of corruption involving police officials,
members of the judiciary and prominent public office-holders. More
recently, it has also been given the task of investigating foreign
bribery, as the OECD called on the Netherlands to do more to enforce
its foreign bribery laws.
51. All recommendations by GRECO during the Third Round of Evaluations
concerning incriminations had been implemented by 2010. During the
Fourth Round of Evaluations of GRECO (Corruption prevention in respect
of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors), launched in 2012,
GRECO pointed out that in the Netherlands, prevention of corruption
among MPs, judges and prosecutors relied to a large degree on mutual trust,
openness and public scrutiny, but also voiced a number of concerns.
With respect to members of parliament, positive developments have
occurred, such as the revision of the Rules of Procedure of both chambers
to include integrity aspects and conflicts of interest, the development
of disclosure requirements and new awareness measures decided by
both chambers.
52. GRECO also recommended the establishment of guidelines for
MPs’ contacts with third parties and a recent paper on lobbying
was drafted by some members of the House of Representatives (Second
Chamber). According to my discussions, there seemed to be a disagreement
in regulating this issue, which is perceived as “unnecessary”.
53. My discussion with the Ombudsman confirmed that among the
40 000 yearly complaints, very few concerned cases of corruption.
Most of them were related to integrity, good governance and nepotism,
in particular in relation to the Dutch Caribbean, which experiences
a high level of corruption. He highlighted the importance for each
institution to adopt internal integrity rules or codes of conduct,
which play an important role in building citizens’ trust in the
institutions.
54. An independent Whistle-blowers Protection Committee has been
in place since July 2016; however there are still concerns about
the effectiveness of the legislation in place which may not fully
guarantee the anonymity of whistle-blowers.
2.3.4. The
importance of integrity at the local level
55. Integrity, transparency and
accountability appear to be of great importance in the public sector,
in particular at local level. Most Dutch cities have implemented
a local integrity policy, which involves integrity counselling and
coaching for elected local officials and public servants.
56. I had an interesting discussion with an advisor from the Ministry
of Internal Affairs, Mr Hans Groot, who is tasked with advising
mayors on integrity issues related to city management and city council
members. The vast majority of issues raised by the mayors were related
to conflicts of interests and misuse of funds. This also helps raise
citizens’ awareness of the behaviour that they can expect from their
elected local officials and public servants. I found this to be
a good practice which can be useful to other Council of Europe member
States.
57. In all of my discussions, I was able to confirm that the environment
and a certain social control play a crucial role. Over the past
few years, corruption cases have resulted in a number of convictions
and, when it was a matter of integrity, those who were found guilty
have been ostracised or have resigned from their position. The same
day I was in The Hague, for instance, the Central Works Council,
representing 65 000 police officers, resigned en masse over allegations
of misuse of public funds, which were diverted to parties, dinners
and luxury goods.
58. The same favourable environment, which is conducive to a misconduct-resilient
society, has been much more difficult to achieve in the Dutch Caribbean,
former colonies once controlled by the Dutch crown and the Dutch
West India Company. In the 19th century public administration was
managed by governors, including local elites and Dutch civil servants,
with little role given to the local population. The problems of
high debt and general financial mismanagement, oversized bureaucracy
and corruption continue to plague the region. Patronage is also
an issue in these small islands with small populations, where close
ties make it difficult to hold persons to account.

The
spokesman on Caribbean affairs at the House of Representatives confirmed that
corruption of public officials continues to be a major concern,
despite major efforts to combat it.
59. This only strengthened my idea that looking at the environment
and trying to understand corruption in a given social and political
context is key to tackling this phenomenon effectively.
2.4. Drawing
attention to local governance issues: the case of Spain
60. Spain, as a southern European
country, represents an interesting case study and political corruption scandals
seem to be a constant in Spanish politics, often amplified by the
media.

Spain is also relatively
new to democracy, which emerged in 1975 after more than three decades
of authoritarian rule following a bloody civil war in 1936-39.
61. The country has been a member of the Council of Europe since
1977, joined the European Union in 1986 and adopted the euro in
2002. During this period, it experienced rapid modernisation and
economic growth, including a boom in infrastructure spending and
real estate development. The recent outbreak of corruption has also
been linked to urban development and infrastructure, and to a flawed
institutional design, particularly at the regional and local level.
Since 2006, there has been growing concern and the government has
invested in new staff and better regulations to fight corruption
and improve the local integrity system. The wave of investigations
gave rise to political scandals and indictments of politicians and
administrators.

62. On 9 and 10 March 2017, in the margin of the Bureau and Standing
Committee meetings, I was able to meet with representatives of the
Spanish Council for Transparency and Good Government, the Centre
for Constitutional Studies and the Public Prosecution Office. I
would like to thank the President of the Spanish delegation for
arranging these meetings.
63. In 2014, GRECO issued a report on corruption prevention in
respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors in which
it raised the alert regarding the rise of political corruption in
Spain. In a compliance report, adopted on 1 July 2016, GRECO took
note of a number of reforms included in the “Regeneration of Democracy
Plan”, which involved greater control of the economic activity of
political parties, a specific regulatory framework for senior positions
in public administration, a major package of criminal measures contained
in the reform of the Criminal Code (e.g. criminalisation of the
offence of illegal party financing, extension of the statute of
limitations and more severe sanctions for corruption offences).
GRECO also noted that, according to market research institutes,
the lowest levels of trust were for politicians and political parties.
64. I was able to discuss this issue with the Spanish authorities,
with a focus on a number of reforms to rebuild trust levels, in
particular the 2014 Transparency Law, which represented a turning
point in the fight against corruption in Spain. This bill introduced
rules regarding the publication of public contracts, good governance,
access to information, the development of website portals of public
administrations, all of which is essential for fighting corruption,
ensuring participation in public debate and restoring public trust
in politics. When the government denies a request or does not supply
sufficient information, citizens can appeal to the Transparency
and Good Government Council, the organ tasked with overseeing compliance
with the law. I also discussed the recent “Law 3/2015” on Senior
Positions of the State General Administration passed in March 2015,
which establishes rules aimed at preventing conflicts of interest
of this category of officials coupled with monitoring and enforcement
machinery.
65. Ongoing corruption scandals seem to have strengthened the
political will to take transparency more seriously and recent convictions
demonstrate that there is accountability for illegal acts of corruption.
As stressed by civil society organisations, there is clearly a strong
desire in Spain, both within government and among the wider public,
to move to a different, more open and participatory, form of governance

. At the same time, these cases perpetuate
the public’s concerns about the lack of control over public spending, strengthening
the gap between perception and reality.
66. A study of public perceptions based on a survey carried out
in Spain in 2009 suggests that perceptions of administrative as
well as political corruption are associated with less satisfaction
with democracy and the performance of government, lower levels of
social and institutional trust, and greater acceptance of rule-breaking
behaviour. The findings also suggest that anti-corruption efforts
should not be limited to grand or political corruption, despite
the high profile of such cases, and that equal attention should
be given to preventing petty or administrative corruption at street
level, where citizens are most likely to have face-to-face encounters
with government.

67. Corruption in local government has become an increasingly
recognised problem in Spain. A number of officials I had talks with
in Madrid confirmed that serious difficulties remain at local level,
which was described as a sort of “feudal society”, where a culture
of impunity, especially amongst the political parties, remain strong. Of
the over 8 000 Spanish towns, some 5 000 are small villages. A process
of decentralisation has taken place in Spain since the 1980s, creating
three levels of government: central, regional and local. With the
economic boom in the 2000s, there was also a boom in political corruption
at local level.
68. One possible structural explanation of the high level of corruption
could be the high number of party political appointees who work
in local government. In a typical mid-sized European city of 100 000
to 500 000 people, perhaps two or three people, including the mayor,
depend on the victory of a certain party for their jobs. In a mid-sized
Spanish city, the party that wins local elections can give senior
posts to hundreds of people. This means that people need to get
rich quick in case they lose their jobs at the next election. It
also means that corrupt elected politicians need not fear being
denounced by impartial, independent civil servants.

69. While prosecution and accountability for illegal acts of corruption
is key, one should be wary of the overemphasis of the role of magistrates
in the fight against corruption, as happened in Italy in the 1990s,
which may have unintended consequences, such as deep-rooted pessimism
concerning the integrity of political elites and reinforcement of
widespread tolerance of illegal acts.

70. In conclusion, I believe that the Spanish experience underlines
the importance of paying close attention to the regional and local
level and of setting up an institutional design and institutional
procedures that promote accountability and transparency in government
and prevent corruption, which may help diminish disaffection and
promote compliance with laws and social norms.
2.5. General
remarks
71. Analysis of the historical,
political, economic and social background in those four countries,
representing the four corners of Europe, shows some important features
which need to be taken into account in any anti-corruption strategy.
72. First of all, they all prove the importance of taking into
account the impact of the building of the modern State on corruption.
An absent State lacking an impartial, independent, non-political
administration, as the history of Ukraine shows, will produce different
results from Britain, where these conditions developed over the course
of centuries. Independent administrative and supervisory bodies,
free from political influence, are therefore key to any successful
anti-corruption strategy.
73. Secondly, as shown by the Spanish and Dutch cases, the State’s
impartiality is essential at all levels, be it the central, regional
or local level, in its metropolitan territory and in overseas territories.
74. Thirdly, as shown by the Dutch and the British cases, any
anti-corruption strategy needs to be supported by two essential
pillars, namely economic growth and cultural developments.
3. Strategies
to fight corruption
3.1. Action
by international and European institutions
75. In this chapter, I provide
an overview of the main international actors which are actively
supporting Council of Europe member States in the fight against
corruption. This list is not exhaustive and does not include all
the legal tools available in the fight against corruption.
3.1.1. OECD
76. On 8 March 2016, the committee
held an exchange of views with Mr Drago Kos, Chairperson of the OECD
Working Group on Bribery, set up in 1994 to monitor the implementation
and enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, the 2009 OECD
Recommendation for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions (2009 Anti-Bribery Recommendation)
and related instruments.
77. Mr Kos warned against the risk of a two-speed Europe, with
some countries having advanced anti-corruption regulations and specialised
anti-corruption bodies, while others are lagging behind, including
some in the “old” Europe. Many new EU member States had set up strong
anti-corruption systems as requested by the European Union. However,
they did not always enjoy government support and often lacked resources
and staff. He noted that the powers of anti-corruption authorities,
in particular, varied across Europe, with some only focusing on
prevention and others having law-enforcement power, and that the
right balance had to be found between prevention and repressive
measures. Greece, for instance, had even set up an anti-corruption ministry,
the effectiveness of which still had to be proven.
78. The OECD also issued guidelines for managing conflict of interest
in the public service, aimed at promoting a public service culture in
which conflicts of interest are properly identified and resolved
or managed and supporting partnerships between the public, private
and non-profit sectors. A toolkit provides examples and instruments
for policy makers and managers.
79. As stressed more recently by Mr Kos, one of the biggest challenges
for the OECD is enforcement and more emphasis needs to be put on
detection, mainly the protection of whistle-blowers, media involvement
and resources and knowledge of law-enforcement agencies, and on
international co-operation and businesses’ involvement. Since 1999,
half of the 41 signatories haven’t had one single prosecution for
foreign bribery. “It is not lack of clarity or legal provisions
but lack of will by governments for political, economic or personal
reasons”, he said.

80. The OECD also set out a Recommendation on Public Integrity
providing policy makers with the blueprint for a public integrity
strategy. It is based on the assumption that traditional approaches
based on the creation of more rules, stricter compliance and tougher
enforcement have been of limited effectiveness. A strategic and sustainable
response to corruption is public integrity, which refers to the
consistent alignment of, and adherence to, shared ethical values,
principles and norms for upholding and prioritising the public interest
over private interests in the public sector. Integrity not only
concerns the national government but should permeate all the way
down to municipalities where individuals experience integrity first
hand.

81. It is therefore important to support the tools available at
the OECD also through national parliaments’ initiatives, in synergy
with the Council of Europe bodies, and spur all governments into
action. The introduction of sanctions for non-compliance with OECD
recommendations could also be considered.
3.1.2. Council
of Europe
82. The European Committee on Crime
Problems (CDPC), GRECO and the Economic Crime and Co-operation Division
are part of the Organisation’s anti-corruption support. Starting
in the 1990s, the Council of Europe adopted the Criminal Law and
Civil Law Conventions on Corruption (ETS Nos. 173 and 174), as well as
a series of recommendations to member States on the twenty guiding
principles for the fight against corruption, on codes of conduct
for public officials, and on common rules against corruption in
the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns.
83. In 1999, the Council of Europe established GRECO, a monitoring
body to evaluate compliance with these standards. This mechanism
for mutual evaluation and peer pressure respects the equality of
rights and obligations of all its 49 members

.
84. On 20 March 2017, I attended the launch event of GRECO’s Fifth
evaluation round and stressed the importance of compliance. The
recommendations issued by international and European bodies such
as GRECO and the OECD need to be fully implemented, especially at
the highest political levels, and parliaments can be more actively
involved.
85. Regrettably, progress made by member States in implementing
GRECO’s Fourth evaluation round recommendations as regards the prevention
of corruption in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors,
has been generally slower than in previous evaluation rounds. It
is alarming that the closer we move to the central institutions,
the more reluctant member States are to open up and co-operate with
GRECO. This trend must be reversed with the Fifth Evaluation round,
targeting the very heart of the State, its top executive functions
and law-enforcement agencies. Ministers, deputy Ministers, State
Secretaries, members of a private office and senior political officials
must set the tone for the rest of the central, regional and local administration,
the private sector and each and every citizen, to whom they are
held accountable.
86. The Council of Europe has also been supporting countries in
the implementation of European and international anti-corruption
and anti-money laundering standards on the basis of country bilateral
interventions and multilateral co-operation programmes, in areas
such as good governance, corruption, ethics, conflict of interests,
money laundering, asset recovery, terrorist financing, organised
crime and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters as well as
all related criminal law and judicial reforms pertaining to such
areas.
87. These past two years as rapporteur have shaped my conviction
that we need deeper synergies to step up the fight against old and
new forms of corruption and increase compliance with the recommendations
issued by Council of Europe bodies. Dialogue between civil society
and national and international organisations can be intensified.
One way to do that could be to set up an anti-corruption network
of policy makers, scholars, students, intellectuals, NGOs and human
rights defenders, hopefully with the support of voluntary contributions by
member States and by the European Union. Similar networks are already
active and effective at Council of Europe level in the human rights
field, for instance in combating violence against women and protecting children
rights. It is high time to draw attention to the field of the rule
of law, of which the fight against corruption is an essential cornerstone.
88. Our own Assembly monitors the honouring of commitments by
member States, including in addressing corruption, and issues reports
on the rule of law. Furthermore, on 8 April 2014, it launched an
Anti-corruption Platform, bringing together elected representatives
from the parliaments of the 47 member States of the Council of Europe
and of non-member States, with experts and other stakeholders, to
share information, spread good practices and discuss how to deal
with new forms of corruption.
89. On 25 April 2017, the Assembly decided to create an independent
external investigation body to carry out a detailed independent
inquiry into the allegations of “corruption and fostering of interests”
made against certain Assembly members or former members. The investigation
body shall verify whether there are any forms of individual conduct
by members or former members of the Assembly which have not respected
the provisions of the Code of Conduct for members of the Parliamentary
Assembly and other relevant codes of conduct. It shall also identify
any practices contrary to the Assembly’s ethical standards, and
determine the extent thereof. Finally, it shall draw up recommendations
on the measures to be implemented to rectify the shortcomings and fill
the gaps in the Assembly’s ethical framework.

3.1.3. European
Union
90. The European Commission issued
the latest report on corruption in 2014, showing the nature and
scope of corruption in EU member States and the differences in the
effectiveness of anti-corruption policies. The European Union urged
member States to strengthen controls, put in place more “dissuasive
sanctions”, and improve transparency. No internal assessment was
included in the report. A follow-up was announced for 2016 to take
stock of progress.
91. However, in January 2017, European Commission Vice-President
Frans Timmermans sent a letter to the chair of the European Parliament's
Committee on Civil Liberties, British socialist MEP Claude Moraes, stating
that there was no need to publish any more reports, as the 2014
report provided an overview and created a basis for further work.
92. In September 2015, the Committee of Ministers considered that
EU accession to key Council of Europe conventions, monitoring mechanisms
and bodies should be promoted and facilitated. EU accession to GRECO remains
the sole credible response to confirm the European Union’s commitment
to anti-corruption. According to the EU priorities for co-operation
with the Council of Europe in 2016-2017, the analysis of the implications of
the European Union’s full participation in GRECO is still ongoing
and no significant development has taken place regarding EU accession.

93. A report on Transparency, accountability
and integrity in the EU institutions by rapporteur Sven
Giegold MEP, adopted in March 2017 by the Constitutional Affairs
Committee of the European Parliament calls on the European Union
to advance its application for membership of GRECO and on the European
Commission to include in the report an overview of the greatest
corruption problems in the EU member States, policy recommendations
to tackle them and follow-up measures to be taken by the European
Commission, taking specific account of the detrimental impact of
corrupt activities on the functioning of the internal market. It
also called on the Commission to publish its next EU Anti-Corruption
Report as soon as possible and to include a chapter on the EU institutions
and to carry out further analysis, at the level of both the EU institutions
and the member States, of the environment in which policies are
implemented, in order to identify inherent critical factors, vulnerable
areas and risk factors conducive to corruption.
3.2. Creating
transparency in governance through anti-corruption specialised bodies
94. The Italian case shows an interesting
example of how new forms of corruption should lead to special measures
aimed at creating transparency in governance, depending on the national
context.
95. Mr Raffaele Cantone, President of the Italian Anti-Corruption
Authority, speaking before our committee in 2015, stressed that
corruption has changed radically in Italy over the past 20 years.
Before the 1990s, it was seen as a means by which criminal organisations
could achieve their objectives by bribing politicians, for instance,
to award public procurement contracts. Investigations that started
in the early 1990s led to convictions of senior political leaders.
Since then, corruption has become a means of penetrating political
life and clinging to power. In 2014, corruption scandals in Rome
disclosed a new approach whereby some politicians were financed
to “foster” their careers and thus become instruments of corruption.
Investigations pointed to a network of corrupt politicians involved
in the construction business. The usual relationship of a corrupt
perpetrator paying a public official to obtain an undue benefit
was not applicable. The perpetrator and the civil servant or the
politician belonged to the same organisation. They were no longer
remunerated for an unlawful action but for their membership of this
organisation. A similar system was reportedly in place in areas such
as the judiciary, public procurement and social assistant networks.
96. The 2012 Italian law on anti-corruption focuses on transparency
of all kinds of activities by public authorities. All public authorities
have to disclose remuneration and actions taken, thus allowing for
a global oversight by civil society. Also, each public institution
must prepare a risk assessment report and set up preventive measures.
Furthermore, an anti-corruption authority was set up to monitor
compliance with transparency rules, and to implement Article 6 of
the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), thus entrusting
the task of preventing corruption to one single and independent
institution. Its President is proposed by the government, approved
by parliament’s committees with a two-thirds majority for a six-year period
and appointed by the President of the Republic. Regretfully, the
anti-corruption law cannot target private organisations which are
actively involved in public life but are not subjected to transparency
requirements. Furthermore, the authority cannot target parliamentarians,
judges and extraordinary commissioners, which represents a gap in
the monitoring system.
97. Ms Nicoletta Parisi, member of the Italian Anticorruption
Authority, speaking at the Venice workshop, highlighted the institution’s
main challenges, including “the sheer bureaucratic attitude in implementing
plans and strategies for the prevention of corruption and the increase
of transparency; difficulties in incorporating whistle-blowing in
the Italian legal system; and the large size of the administration
necessary to supervise and monitor public administration duties
and tasks”.

98. Transition, emerging democracies and developing economies
often establish separate specialised anti-corruption bodies due
to high corruption-levels in existing agencies, or in response to
pressure from donors and international organisations. This is seen
as a way to reduce widespread corruption, as existing institutions were
considered too weak for the task, or were considered to be part
of the corruption problem and could not therefore be part of the
solution for addressing it. These bodies must have specialised skills,
a clear mandate and sufficient powers, such as investigative capacities
and effective means for gathering evidence, subject to proper checks
and balances. Any new institution needs to adjust to the specific
national context taking into account the varying cultural, legal
and administrative circumstances.
99. According to the OECD,

corruption
prevention and combating corruption through law enforcement involve
a large number of multi-disciplinary functions, including:
- anti-corruption policy development,
co-ordination, monitoring and research (also to understand the extent
of the problem and which areas and sectors are the most exposed);
- prevention of corruption;
- anti-corruption education and raising awareness;
- investigation and prosecution of corruption-related crimes.
100. Different models of specialised institutions fighting corruption
include:
- multi-purpose anti-corruption
agencies, based on the key pillars of repression and prevention
of corruption;
- law-enforcement bodies, including specialised police and
prosecution services, which can result in a combination of detection,
investigation or prosecution of corruption;
- policy co-ordination and prevention bodies, which normally
have research, analysis, co-ordinative as well as prevention functions,
but do not have law-enforcement powers;
- internal control mechanisms by other public institutions
(for instance, units on conflict of interest prevention and internal
ethics and integrity in public administration or in elected bodies,
judicial councils or dedicated ethics commission for judges, central
election commission to enforce rules on financing of political parties
and electoral campaigns).
101. It is important that all Council of Europe member States that
have established separate specialised anti-corruption bodies ensure
their independence and provide them with specialised skills, a clear
mandate and sufficient powers, subject to proper checks and balances,
in accordance with Committee of Ministers
Resolution
97 (24) on the twenty guiding principles for the fight against
corruption and with the guidelines of the UNCAC. In this respect,
as also shown by GRECO's monitoring work, several member States
are on the right track (among others, Italy with the National Anticorruption
Authority (ANAC),

Slovenia with the Commission for
the Prevention of Corruption

and Latvia with the Corruption Prevention
and Combating Bureau

), while others need to strengthen
the effective functioning of anti-corruption bodies or enforcement authorities,
and enable them to carry out their functions free from undue influence.
102. As recommended by the OECD, it is of key importance that anti-corruption
agencies develop their own monitoring and evaluation mechanisms
to examine and improve their own performance and to improve public accountability
and support.
103. Experience shows that establishing a dedicated anti-corruption
body alone cannot help to reduce corruption. Anti-corruption bodies
need the support of all other public institutions, including various
specialised integrity and control bodies, and internal units in
various public institutions in a harmonised system aimed at preventing
and detecting corruption in the public sector. This is something
that the Assembly could encourage member States to develop further.
3.3. Focus
on integrity, transparency and accountability
104. I have not discussed a number
of indexes and rankings available at European and global level,
such as the well-known Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency
International, mainly because they are largely based on perceptions
of citizens and experts. Most anti-corruption recommendations also
fail to take into account the local environment and specific circumstance
and needs.
105. As I mentioned in the Dutch case study as well as in the previous
paragraph, integrity, transparency and accountability should have
a place of honour in all public policies.
106. Despite significant investment, contemporary anti-corruption
efforts seem to lack effectiveness and some scholars have developed
a new index, the Index of Public Integrity (IPI), which offers a
transparent, evidence-based approach to controlling corruption and
measuring progress.

107. The IPI focuses on judicial independence, administrative burden,
trade openness, budget transparency, e-citizenship and freedom of
the press. Evidence shows that establishing effective control of
corruption goes beyond the adoption of specific tools and strict
legal regulations and relies on the State’s ability to reduce the possibility
of abuse (for instance by decreasing the amount of red tape and
the number of bureaucratic processes and by opening opportunities
for external actors to participate in the budget process) and society’s ability
to hold its government accountable (by strengthening accountability
and, in particular, civil society actors and free press).
108. This research also highlights that a good anti-corruption
strategy is context-dependent and cannot be transferred from one
country to another. It also acknowledges that, despite the need
for common reforms to improve democracy and the rule of law, each
country should research the reasons for its own underperformance
and should then develop its own strategy.
109. Rather than just focusing on tackling corruption, it seems
sensible to also step up efforts to build public integrity, an area
in which the Council of Europe has extensive expertise, in particular
when it comes to judicial independence, freedom of the press and
citizenship education.
3.4. Educational
measures
110. Our colleague Ms Eleonora Cimbro
(Italy, SOC) is currently preparing a report on “Youth against corruption”
and analyses in detail issues related to youth involvement in anti-corruption
activities, corruption within the education system, and the use
of internet, social media and media by young anti-corruption activists. Nevertheless,
I think it is important to briefly refer to two major areas related
to education in which the Council of Europe plays an important role.
3.4.1. Education
for democratic citizenship and human rights
111. To fight corruption effectively
we need a bottom-up approach, which starts in the early years with education
and should be part of primary and secondary school curricula. Children
must be taught to recognise corrupt behaviour early in life and
training youth in sound morals and a sense of civic duty is at the
root of addressing a whole range of social and political problems.
112. The Council of Europe is developing a Reference Framework
of Competences for Democratic Culture, to be adapted for use in
primary and secondary schools and higher education and vocational
training institutions throughout Europe as well as national curricula
and teaching programmes. In this framework, I believe that specific
attention should be given to anti-corruption education.
113. In 2010, the Council of Europe also adopted a Charter on Education
for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Eduction,

as a reference point for all
those dealing with citizenship and human rights education, and a
way of disseminating good practice and raising standards throughout
Europe and beyond. The Charter focuses chiefly on discrimination,
prejudice and intolerance and preventing and combating violent extremism
and radicalisation. A first review cycle of the implementation of
the Charter took place in 2012 and a second review cycle is underway.
The report will be discussed at a Conference on the State of Citizenship and
Human Rights Education in Europe, which will take place in Strasbourg
from 20 to 22 June 2017.
114. I was surprised to note that the word “anti-corruption” is
mentioned neither in the Charter nor in the ensuing implementation
reports. I believe the Charter should draw more attention to the
rule of law component of citizenship education, and more specifically
to anti-corruption education, which could be possibly considered in
the framework of a revised version of the Charter, currently underway.
115. On a more practical level, a joint programme “Human Rights
and Democracy in Action” was launched in May 2013 by the Council
of Europe and the European Commission, providing funding to enable
at least three States Parties to the European Cultural Convention
(ETS No. 18) to co-operate on projects of common interest within
the field of education for democratic citizenship and human rights
education. Current projects focus on promoting school governance
for inclusion and competences for democratic action in the digital
era. Once again, the Organisation could consider developing anti-corruption
education projects, with the support of EU funding or national voluntary
contributions.
3.4.2. Tackling
corruption in the education sector
116. There is worldwide concern
over corruption in education in all member States and at all levels
of education, and this form of corruption is difficult to quantify.
It is most widespread regarding access to higher education and higher
education qualifications.
117. In 2015, the Council of Europe launched a Platform on Ethics,
Transparency and Integrity in Education (ETINED), a network of specialists
appointed by member States of the Council of Europe and of States
Parties to the European Cultural Convention (50 States).

Its
mission is to tackle corruption and fraud in education by sharing
good practices in the field of transparency and integrity in education,
defining guidelines and developing capacity-building for all actors.
Activities include the promotion of ethical behaviour of all education actors,
academic integrity and plagiarism, recognition of qualifications
and contribution to the global action against corruption.
118. In some countries, such as Ukraine, corruption in higher education
is a serious problem, but diploma mills, ghost writing and a culture
of cheating exist all over Europe. Hence, a convention on education
fraud could be a relevant contribution that the Council of Europe
could bring and I hope that the Committee on Culture, Science, Education
and Media will give proper consideration to this issue in a forthcoming
report.
4. Conclusions
and recommendations
119. Corruption scandals erupt almost
daily in many Council of Europe member States as well as in national and
European political institutions, including our own Assembly. In
many European countries, insufficient accountability has generated
a perception of quasi-impunity of political elites. When core institutions
in a democratic society, i.e. political parties, parliament, public
administration and the judiciary, are systematically implicated
in corruption, they cease to be regarded as responsive to people’s
needs and problems.

This trend has led populist leaders
to exploit the disenchantment of the people with the “corrupt elite”
and to present themselves as the “only solution” while, in reality,
they fail to address the problem and can even significantly increase
it. Fighting corruption therefore also means restoring trust in
democratic institutions, also through the active participation of
civil society.
120. Furthermore, corruption continuously infiltrates new sectors,
beyond the traditional ones such as the building sector. For instance,
over the past years, the Italian mafia has infiltrated some of Europe's
largest reception centres for migrants, creaming off State funds
that were earmarked for the care of new arrivals. Corruption also
takes a serious toll on the environment, from embezzlement during
the implementation of environmental programmes to grand corruption
when permits and licences for the exploitation of natural resources
are issued.
121. In addition, what is perceived as inadmissible corruption
is evolving rapidly. For instance, the 2017 French presidential
election campaign shows that politicians employing family, a widespread
and accepted practice in many parliaments, is no longer to be accepted
and that the argument that this protects the integrity of the parliamentarian
from potential lobbying pressure by external employers on family
members is weakening. In 2009, the United Kingdom parliamentary
expenses scandal, concerning expense claims made by members of the
British Parliament over the previous years, also shows that what
had been accepted as a widespread practice is no longer so. The
perception of corruption is therefore changing in many Council of Europe
member States.
122. This report focuses primarily on the drivers of corruption.
It tries to understand why existing transparency and accountability
measures to control corruption have limited success and how to favour
an environment which is conducive to a corruption-resilient society.
As the case studies have shown, this is also inherently related
to the diversity and richness of political, social, economic and
cultural traditions in Council of Europe member States and, in my
view, to a lack of focus on building integrity into public institutions
and into society as a whole.
123. When designing effective anti-corruption strategies, national
and European institutions cannot ignore cultural background and
existing perceptions, and should also take into account the impact
of the building of the modern State on corruption. History shows
that it is important to think of anti-corruption as a wave-like process
that continually has to respond to new forms of corruption as they
emerge, rather than a linear process leading to a State in which
corruption has been eradicated. Britain, for instance, a relatively
un-corrupt country, has a long history of struggling with corruption,
and anti-corruption strategies have evolved over centuries rather
than years or decades. This suggests that each State has to take
measures which are adapted to its national history, culture and
mind-set.
124. The buzzword often repeated in anti-corruption circles is
“lack of political will”. In Francis Fukuyama’s words “without a
political strategy for overcoming this problem, any given solution
will fail. Corruption in its various forms – patronage, clientelism,
rent-seeking and outright theft – all benefit existing stakeholders
in the political system, who are generally very powerful players”.

According
to Fukuyama, transparency initiatives on their own often fail and
only collective-action mechanisms can bring about change, when received
by committed leadership. Also, anti-corruption institutions and
special prosecutors are successful when they receive strong grass-roots
political backing from citizens.
125. Hence, the real challenge is to create a broad coalition of
groups in society opposed to an existing system of corrupt politicians.
In my view, that should be the target of the Council of Europe,
in addition to the good work already done to monitor and strengthen
legal mechanisms and transparency initiatives in the democratic
institutions of our member States. Public campaigns and education
tools and projects focusing on the fight against corruption and
the promotion of integrity in various layers of society, including
schools and universities, should be a priority for the Organisation.
The regional and local level should not be left behind and the Congress
of Regional and Local Authorities could also consider similar initiatives
targeting regional and municipal councils.
126. National anti-corruption institutions can have various functions,
including multi-purpose anti-corruption agencies, law-enforcement
bodies, policy co-ordination and prevention bodies, and internal
control mechanisms by other public institutions. Where appropriate,
separate specialised anti-corruption bodies can be necessary and
governments must provide them with specialised skills, a clear mandate
and sufficient powers, subject to proper checks and balances. These
bodies should develop their monitoring and evaluation mechanisms
to examine and improve their own performance and to improve public
accountability and support. The Council of Europe could provide
a platform for anti-corruption authorities in all GRECO member States
to gather and discuss good practices and current challenges in the
fight against corruption. It could even set up a network at European
level.
127. For its part, the Assembly should pay special attention to
the effective implementation of its own Code of conduct and full
support must be given to the independent external investigation
body to carry out a detailed independent inquiry into the allegations
of corruption made against certain Assembly members or former members.
128. The Assembly’s Anti-corruption Platform can be strengthened
and given the tools and the resources to promote integrity campaigns
in all parliaments, with the support of national contributions or
EU funding.
129. Furthermore, all parliaments of the Council of Europe member
and observer States and parliaments that enjoy observer or partner
for democracy status with the Parliamentary Assembly can further
promote transparency and accountability measures, in particular
by:
- developing a code of conduct
covering guidance on the prevention of conflicts of interest, gifts
and other advantages, accessory activities and financial interests,
disclosure requirements, and make it easily accessible to the public;
- considering setting up an institutionalised source of
confidential counselling to provide elected representatives with
guidance and advice on ethical and integrity questions and possible
conflicts of interest, as well as dedicated training activities;
- ensuring that parliamentary immunity does not protect
members of parliament from criminal prosecution for corruption-related
acts;
- setting up specific parliamentary scrutiny procedures,
with special emphasis on the implementation of recommendations emanating
from GRECO’s Fifth Evaluation Round, focusing on preventing corruption and
promoting integrity in central governments (top executive functions)
and law-enforcement agencies.
130. In accordance with the Code of Good Practice in the Field
of Political Parties of the Venice Commission, if the membership
of a person who has been condemned on corruption charges is maintained
in his/her party, this will lead citizens to believe that the whole
party is corrupt (and they may even extend this view to apply to all
parties) and contributes to questioning the fairness of politics
in general. The Assembly could therefore reiterate the Venice Commission’s
recommendation to political parties to exclude from their lists
of candidates and from party membership any person convicted of
corruption.
131. Council of Europe member States could also be invited to step
up the fight against corruption by:
- adopting sound rules on the declaration of assets, income
and financial and other interests by members of government and parliament,
by leaders of political parties and political movements and by civil servants,
judges and prosecutors, and making such declarations easily accessible
to the public, and by setting up independent supervisory bodies
and regulating lobbying activities;
- ensuring full co-operation with GRECO and MONEYVAL and
implementing their recommendations;
- ensuring the independence of the judiciary through transparent
appointment and promotion procedures and, if need be, the use of
appropriate disciplinary measures, applied by bodies free from political interference
and other undue influence;
- acknowledging the role of the media in denouncing corruption
and ensuring that media regulation respects media freedom and responsibility;
- implementing the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity,
which provides a blueprint for upholding and prioritising the public
interest over private interests in the public sector;
- considering establishing specialised integrity units in
public institutions to promote ethics, accountability and transparency;
- paying attention to the regional and local level and considering
setting up an institutional source of confidential counselling to
provide local representatives with guidance and advice on ethical
and integrity questions and possible conflicts of interest, as well
as dedicated training activities;
- organising public awareness anti-corruption campaigns
targeting various groups of citizens, media, NGOs, businesses and
the general public;
- developing integrity education programmes as part of primary
and secondary school curricula, with the support of the Council
of Europe.
132. European Union accession to GRECO remains the sole credible
response to confirm the European Union’s commitment to anti-corruption.
133. In addition to the traditional approaches based on the creation
of more rules, specialised institutions, stricter compliance and
tougher enforcement, governments pay due attention, through further
academic and policy research, to the ways in which corruption was
and is embedded in social and cultural values, as these provide
the essential environment in which the institutional reforms can
succeed.
134. In conclusion, democracy remains a powerful tool to control
corruption, if democratic institutions increase transparency, promote
integrity and enhance systems of accountability. Some of the elements
to strengthen democracy are well known: an independent and impartial
judiciary; a meritocratic, well-paid and competent bureaucracy;
mechanisms of transparency such as a mandatory asset disclosure
system; free and responsible media; the development of a democratic
civic culture, in schools and universities.
135. At the same time, political will remains the key ingredient
for anti-corruption strategies to succeed and political parties
need to be more resolute in tackling corruption in their own ranks
and in promoting integrity in public life.