1. Introduction
1. The basis for the Parliamentary
Assembly’s monitoring procedure is
Resolution 1115 (1997) on the setting up of the Committee on the Honouring
of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of
Europe (Monitoring Committee), as modified by
Resolution 1431 (2005),
Resolution
1710 (2010),
Resolution
1936 (2013) and
Resolution
2018 (2014). This resolution defines the mandate of the Monitoring Committee,
and entrusts it with the task of ensuring “the fulfilment of the
obligations assumed by member States under the terms of the Statute
of the Council of Europe (ETS No. 1), the European Convention on Human
Rights (ETS No. 5, “the Convention”) and all other Council of Europe
conventions to which they are parties” as well as ensuring the “honouring
of commitments entered into by the authorities of member States upon
their accession to the Council of Europe”.
2. In accordance with
Resolution
1115 (1997), as amended, the Monitoring Committee is obliged to
report to the Assembly, on a yearly basis, on the general progress
of the monitoring procedures. Since 2016 the reports on the progress
of the Assembly’s monitoring procedure are discussed during the
January part-session of the Assembly and cover the previous calendar
year. In line with established practice, the committee entrusted
me, as its Chairperson, with the task of being the rapporteur on
the committee’s activities.
3. In line with its mandate, the Monitoring Committee follows
all Council of Europe member States with regard to the honouring
of their membership obligations and, if relevant, specific accession
commitments. Currently, 10 countries are subject to a monitoring
procedure
sensu stricto and
three countries are engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue with the
Assembly. Since 2014, all – currently 34 – countries that are not
subject to a monitoring procedure
sensu
stricto, or engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue, are
subject to a periodical review with regard to the honouring of their
membership obligations to the Council of Europe. In line with the working
methods adopted by the Monitoring Committee,
this year periodic
reviews were started in respect of six countries. For four countries:
Estonia, Greece, Hungary and Ireland, the periodic review procedure
has been finalised, and the reports included in this report on the
progress of the Assembly’s monitoring procedure.
4. The progress in the monitoring procedure for the countries
that are subject to a monitoring procedure of the Assembly sensu stricto, or engaged in a post-monitoring
dialogue, will be discussed in the next section of this report.
Following customary practice, I have limited myself to the findings
in the relevant texts adopted by the Assembly as well as the reports,
statements and other public documents prepared by the co-rapporteurs for
the respective countries. In addition, where appropriate, I have
made reference to the reports of the ad hoc committees for the observation
of the elections in the countries in question.
5. The periodic review reports for Estonia, Greece, Hungary and
Ireland are contained in part two of this progress report. The conduct
of the periodic reviews of countries that are not under a monitoring
procedure sensu stricto or
engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue has been well established
in the Monitoring Committee. The periodic review process and reports
are well regarded by the countries concerned as well as by Assembly members
and help counter any allegations of double standards, where certain
categories of member States would not be monitored with regard to
their membership obligations. The combined framework of the monitoring
procedure sensu stricto, the
post monitoring dialogue and the periodic review reports, together
with possibility for the Monitoring Committee to prepare a report
on the functioning of democratic institutions in any member State
of the Council of Europe, guarantee the comprehensive monitoring
by the Assembly of the membership obligations and commitments of
all member States of the Council of Europe. At the same time, the
conduct of these periodic reviews places considerable pressure on
the resources and time of the committee, including on its secretariat,
as well as on the work of the Chairperson of the committee, who
is the ex officio rapporteur
for these reports.
2. Overview of the committee’s
activities
2.1. General remarks
6. At the start of the period
covered by this report, nine countries
were subject
to a monitoring procedure
sensu stricto and
an additional four countries
were
engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue with the Assembly. On 25 April
2017, in the light of the developments in the country, the Assembly
decided on the basis of a report prepared by the Monitoring Committee
to re-open the monitoring procedure
sensu
stricto with Turkey, which was at that time engaged in
a post-monitoring dialogue with the Assembly. Therefore there are
currently 10 countries under a monitoring procedure
sensu stricto and an additional
three countries are engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue.
7. During the reporting period, the committee prepared reports
on the functioning of democratic institutions in Ukraine, Turkey
and Azerbaijan, which were debated in the Assembly.
8. During the reporting period, the committee met nine times,
four times in Strasbourg during the plenary session of the Assembly,
four times in Paris and once in Helsinki at the invitation of the
Finnish Parliament. I wish to thank the Finnish Parliament for the
kind hospitality extended to the committee on that occasion.
9. During this period, the respective co-rapporteurs carried
out fact-finding visits to Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan (three visits),
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia (two visits), Serbia, Turkey, Montenegro,
and “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. In addition, the
co-rapporteurs for Albania participated in the pre-electoral and
election observation missions to that country.
10. Following their visits, the respective co-rapporteurs produced
information notes on Albania, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Montenegro and
“the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, which were declassified
by the committee. In addition, the rapporteurs and committee adopted
a number of statements with regard to the developments in Albania,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Montenegro, the Russian Federation,
Ukraine, Turkey, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” and
Poland.
11. With regard to the report on “The functioning of democratic
institutions in Poland”, the co-rapporteurs Mr Yves Cruchten and
Mr Thierry Mariani conducted a fact-finding mission to Poland from
3 to 6 April 2017 and prepared an information note that was declassified
by the committee on 16 May 2017. Mr Mariani ceased to be a member
of the Monitoring Committee on 29 June 2017 and was replaced by
Ms Elisabeth Schneider-Schneiter on 15 November 2017.
12. In the framework of its meeting in Helsinki, the committee
organised a public hearing on “The international legal order in
a changing world: challenges for the monitoring procedure of the
Parliamentary Assembly” with the participation of President Tarja
Halonen, former President of the Republic of Finland, Mr Sergio
Bartole, Member of the European Commission for Democracy through
Law (Venice Commission), former Professor, University of Trieste
(Italy), and Mr Daniel Tarschys, former Secretary General of the
Council of Europe.
13. On 23 January 2017, in line with the committee’s decision
of 9 November 2016, the committee constituted a Sub-Committee on
Conflicts between Council of Europe member States. The sub-committee
met in Paris on 8 March and in Helsinki on 15 May 2017. At its meeting
on 8 March, Mr Stefan Schennach (Austria, SOC) was elected Chair,
and Mr Giuseppe Galati (Italy, EPP/CD), Vice-Chair of the sub-committee.
In addition, on 25 September 2017, the sub-committee organised a
meeting in Athens at the invitation of the Greek Parliament. On
that occasion, an exchange of views was held with the representatives
of the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) for the main official mediation mechanisms
for the conflicts that fall under the mandate of the sub-committee.
I wish to thank the Greek Parliament for the kind hospitality extended
to the sub-committee on that occasion.
14. Also this year, the excellent co-operation with the Venice
Commission continued. The committee requested, on 4 May 2017, an
opinion of the Venice Commission on the amended law on the Prosecution Service
of Poland. On 7 September 2017, it requested opinions on the Law
of Ukraine “on amending certain Laws of Ukraine regarding peculiarities
of financial control over certain categories of public officials”
and on “the legal framework governing the funding of political parties
and campaigns, as well as the recent amendments to the electoral
legislation of the Republic of Moldova”. I would like to express
again my great appreciation for the cordial working relations and
prompt replies by the Venice Commission to the committee’s requests.
15. The work of co-rapporteurs for a monitoring procedure or post-monitoring
dialogue is complex, time consuming and demands considerable availability
and flexibility. Regular working visits, at least twice a year, are
necessary to prepare the reports. Clearly such visits need considerable
investment in terms of time and preparation from both rapporteurs
and accompanying staff of the committee. I would therefore like
to pay tribute to all monitoring rapporteurs, past and present,
for their hard work and commitment to the monitoring procedure.
However, recently, the committee has noted that elections and busy
domestic agendas have reduced the availability of the rapporteurs
to conduct fact-finding missions and even to participate in the committee
meetings where the country under their responsibility is on the
agenda. This in turn has created at times considerable delays in
the preparation of the reports before the committee and the Assembly.
This is an issue of concern and needs to be addressed by the political
groups, who are responsible for proposing the members on the committee
as well as for proposing candidates to fill vacant rapporteur posts.
I therefore call on all political groups to appoint members to the
committee who have the necessary time and availability to take up
rapporteur positions when these become available. In this context,
I wish to recall that, as an internal working method, the committee
has strived to appoint rapporteurs who have been members of the
committee for about a year to ensure their understanding about the
ongoing monitoring procedure, although several exceptions have been
made. However, it is not certain that under the current conditions
this internal working method can be maintained for much longer.
16. Another issue of concern in this context has been the fact
that on numerous occasions appointments of rapporteurs have been
postponed because the political groups concerned were unable to
come to an agreement on a nomination. This has resulted in unacceptable
delays within some of the monitoring procedures. As a result of
this, the committee, at its meeting in Paris on 13 December 2017,
agreed to a package of internal guidelines for the appointment of
rapporteurs that will in principle limit to one the number of times
the appointment of a rapporteur can be postponed by the committee.
2.2. Overview of monitoring in
the reporting period with regard to countries under a monitoring procedure
sensu stricto
2.2.1. Albania
17. The co-rapporteurs visited
the country from 27 February to 1 March 2017 and participated ex officio in the ad hoc committee
to observe the general elections on 25 June 2017.
18. The polarisation between the main political parties in Albania
continued during the last year, especially in the run-up to the
parliamentary elections on 25 June 2017. The tense political climate
hindered or otherwise negatively affected the implementation of
much needed reforms, including electoral reform and, most importantly,
the reform of the judiciary, which was confronted with important
delays.
19. In January 2017, the Democratic Party (DP) and other small
opposition parties stated that the elections that were, at that
moment, foreseen for 18 June 2017, would not be democratic unless
several conditions were met, including the establishment of a technical
government and the introduction of electronic voting and vote count
in the upcoming elections. The ruling majority countered that the
government was democratically elected and therefore did not need
to resign, while most of the proposed changes to the electoral framework,
including the introduction of electronic voting, were too complex
to introduce in the short timespan before the June 2017 elections.
20. In response, the Democratic Party announced, on 18 February
2017, that it would boycott the parliament as well as the upcoming
elections and started a permanent demonstration in front of the
Prime Minister’s office demanding his resignation as well as the
fulfilment of its previous demands. The ruling majority retorted
that changes to the electoral framework could be discussed in the
parliamentary working group on elections that had been set up in
the parliament and alleged that the main reason for the boycott
was the wish by the opposition to derail the vetting process of
judges. The co-rapporteurs of the Monitoring Committee, expressing their
principled opposition against parliamentary boycotts, called on
all parties to return to the negotiation table.
21. The standoff between opposition and ruling majority continued
until 18 May 2017 when, following intense mediation by the United
States and the European Union, a political agreement was reached
between the Socialist Party (SP) and the DP that,
inter alia,
established a technical
government in which a number of key positions were reserved for
the opposition, who also could appoint the heads of several State
agencies, including the Central Elections Commission and the office
of the national ombudsman. A number of these appointments were in
contradiction to the Albanian legislation, which provided for these
persons to be appointed by the parliament. In addition, it was agreed
to postpone the elections until 25 June and to extend the deadline
for the submission of the candidate lists.
22. The parliamentary elections that took place on 25 June 2017
were observed by a delegation of the Assembly which concluded that
“candidates were able to campaign freely and fundamental freedoms
of assembly and expression respected”, but that “the continued politicisation
of election related bodies and institutions, as well as wide spread
allegations of vote buying and pressure on voters, reduced the voters’
trust in the electoral process”.
The elections were
won by the SP-led coalition which obtained 48.3% of the votes or
74 of the 140 seats in the parliament, followed by the DP with 28.9%
(43 seats) and the Socialist Movement for Integration, which had
not joined either the DP or SP coalitions, with 14.3% of the votes
(19 seats). The Party for Justice, Integration and Unity won 3 seats
and the Social Democracy Party one seat. All other parties failed
to pass the threshold. The turnout was relatively low at 46.8%.
23. In addition to the parliamentary elections, the reform of
the judiciary, in particular the vetting process of judges and the
implementation of the so-called decriminalisation law dominated
the political agenda in Albania.
24. Following the adoption of the constitutional amendments on
21 June 2016, which paved the way for a comprehensive reform of
the judiciary, a package of seven organics laws was adopted to implement
these reforms, regulating the organisation of the judiciary, the
prosecution service, the status of judges and prosecutors, the Constitutional
Court as well as the creation of specialised institutions to fight
organised crime and corruption.
Regrettably, the DP boycotted the
vote on the judicial package with the exception of the law on the
organisation and functioning of institutions for combating corruption
and organised crime.
25. A key, but domestically controversial, law for the reform
of the judiciary is the Vetting Law, which provides for the re-evaluation
of judges, prosecutors and legal advisers based on integrity, background (possible
inappropriate links with organised crime) and professional competence.
This vetting process is an essential component for the establishment
of new institutions foreseen in the judicial reform package such
as the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecutorial Council.
The vetting process is overseen by the international community via
the International Monitoring Operations, which makes recommendations
on the appointment of the candidates for the vetting commissions
and which subsequently will monitor the vetting process itself.
26. Following demands made by the opposition, a decriminalisation
law was adopted by the parliament in 2016. This law aims to check
and ensure the integrity of all persons appointed or elected to
public functions, which is often referred to as the decriminalisation
process. Persons who are found to be lacking the required legal
integrity will lose their mandates. The implementation of this law
is the responsibility of the Prosecutor General and the Central
Election Commission.
27. Following the elections, the opposition has returned to the
parliament and is participating in the work of all parliamentary
bodies as well as other institutions and agencies in which it has
an institutional representation.
2.2.2. Armenia
28. The co-rapporteurs carried
out a fact-finding visit to Yerevan on 6 and 7 November 2017. The
political developments in the country were dominated by the implementation
of the constitutional amendments that were adopted by referendum
on 6 December 2015 and the organisation of parliamentary elections
on 2 April 2017.
29. The improved co-operation and unity among all the major political
forces to ensure the stability and security of the country that
emerged after the April hostilities along the line of contact were
maintained in 2017, which resulted in an improved, less confrontational
and more mature political environment in the country. This improved
political climate should be welcomed.
30. Parliamentary elections took place on 2 April 2017. These
were the first elections organised after the adoption of the new
Constitution which changed the political system from a presidential
republic, with a mixed majoritarian-proportional election system,
to a parliamentary republic, with a fully proportional election
system with regional lists. These elections were the first step
in the implementation of the new political system.
31. These elections were organised under a new Election Code that
was adopted on the basis of a consensus between the opposition and
the ruling majority. The consensual adoption of the Election Code
and of a number of mechanisms to help secure the integrity of the
vote increased trust in the election and is a sign of the new, and
more mature, political climate that is emerging in Armenia.
32. The elections were observed by the Assembly in the framework
of the International Elections Observation Mission (IEOM).
According
to the IEOM,
the elections were well administered
and respected fundamental rights and freedoms. The new legal framework
for the elections was seen as an improvement, although it was noted
that the complexity of the election system and election procedures
had at times led to confusion among voters and election commissions,
affecting the overall public trust in the election process. The improved
voters list and the mechanism introduced to counter the possibility
of voter impersonation and multiple voting, such as the publication
of the signed voters’ list and the introduction of voter authentication devices,
had contributed to the integrity of the vote. However, allegations
of widespread vote buying, many of them credible, as well as reports
of abuse of administrative resources, tainted the election process.
33. The Republican Party of President Sargsyan won these elections
with 49.17% of the vote, or 58 out of the 105 seats in the new parliament.
The Tsarukyan Alliance of Prosperous Armenia leader Gagik Tsarukyan came
in second with 27.35% of the vote or 31 seats, followed by the Way
Out Alliance with 7.78% (9 seats) and the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation with 6.58% (7 seats). All the other parties failed to
pass the threshold to enter parliament. Following the elections,
the Republican Party and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation formed
a coalition government and incumbent Prime Minister Karen Karapetyan
was reappointed as Prime Minister.
34. In Armenia, the national police is not accountable to the
government but directly to the President of the Republic. This institutional
arrangement has impaired civilian oversight and police accountability,
including to the parliament. The Assembly therefore had previously
recommended
that the national police be made accountable
to a specialised ministry within the government. However, this recommendation
has until now not been implemented. In the new Constitution, the
President becomes a ceremonial position and a new institutional
arrangement will have to be established for the national police.
35. Disproportionate and excessive use of force by the police,
especially in the context of protests and demonstrations, accompanied
by a sense of impunity for such actions, has been a recurrent issue
of concern in Armenia. This is recognised by the authorities who
have made combating excessive use of force and police violence a
stated priority for the government. A special unit has been established
within the police to investigate any complaints made against police
officers for, inter alia,
abuse of power or excessive use of force, which has initiated several
investigations. The establishment of this unit within the police
is a positive development, but it falls short of the independent
complaints mechanism recommended by the Council of Europe Commissioner for
Human Rights and the Assembly. The authorities should take all necessary
measures to establish a genuinely independent complaints mechanism
and guarantee the transparency of the complaints and investigation
mechanisms, in line with best practices in other Council of Europe
member States
36. Public trust in the independence and impartiality of the judiciary
in Armenia is very low, which is of concern. This is compounded
by the fact that the public perception of corruption among the judiciary
is particularly high, as noted by Transparency International.
Increasing the independence and
restoring public trust in the judiciary, as well as fighting the
pervasive corruption among the judiciary, are stated priorities
of the authorities, which should be encouraged to continue, and
where needed step up, their actions to achieve this goal.
2.2.3. Azerbaijan
37. The co-rapporteurs visited
the country three times, from 12 to 14 January 2017, from 12 to
14 June 2017 and from 13 to 17 September 2017. The Monitoring Committee
prepared a report on the functioning of democratic institutions
in Azerbaijan, which was debated by the Assembly on 11 October 2017,
and which led to the adoption of
Resolution 2184 (2017).
38. While welcoming the ongoing dialogue with the Azerbaijani
authorities in the framework of the Assembly’s monitoring procedure,
the resolution raises a number of concerns, particularly with regard
to checks and balances, the functioning of the justice system, and
freedom of expression and association in Azerbaijan.
39. Following the recent constitutional changes, the executive
has become even less accountable to parliament. The oversight function
of the parliament over the executive needs to be developed.
40. Despite the progress achieved in particular regarding the
powers granted to the Judicial-Legal Council, the justice system
in Azerbaijan still lacks independence, impartiality and suffers
from interference by the executive. Shortcomings in the criminal
justice system as highlighted by the European Court of Human Rights remain
to be addressed. The President of the Republic has initiated a reform
with the Executive Order on improving the operation of the prison
system and humanisation of criminal policies, which is a positive
first step that should be rapidly followed up with implementation.
41. The Assembly is concerned about the repressive action against
independent media as well as the reported arbitrary application
of criminal legislation to limit freedom of expression. It is also
concerned about allegations of a restrictive climate for the activities
of the extra-parliamentary opposition and limitations imposed on
freedom of assembly.
42. The country lacks an independent, impartial and effective
system for allegations of ill-treatment by law-enforcement officials.
43. Reports have linked the Azerbaijani Government to a large-scale
money laundering scheme occurring in the years 2012 to 2014, used inter alia to influence the work
of members of the Assembly as regards the human rights situation
in Azerbaijan. The Assembly has urged the Azerbaijani authorities
to start an independent and impartial inquiry into these allegations
without delay.
44. The legislative environment for the operation and funding
of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) remains restrictive and
is not compliant with European standards. Some of the arrests and
conviction of human rights defenders appear to be the result of
shortcomings in NGO legislation and practice. An Order was issued by
the President on the establishment of a single window system for
procedure of delivery of grants by foreign donors. The existing
legislation on NGOs needs to be reviewed in accordance with the
Venice Commission recommendations.
45. While welcoming the release in 2016 and 2017 of some so-called
“political prisoners”/“prisoners of conscience”, the Assembly is
concerned about the reported prosecution and ongoing detention of
human rights defenders, political activists, journalists and bloggers.
It calls on the authorities to use all possible means to release
those prisoners whose detention gives rise to justified doubts.
46. The Assembly calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to promptly
ensure the full implementation of the decisions of the European
Court of Human Rights, to strengthen parliamentary control over
the executive, to continue the reforms of the judiciary and the
prosecution service so as to ensure full independence of the judiciary,
to put an end to systemic repression of human rights defenders,
the media and those critical of the government, including politically
motivated prosecutions, and to create an environment conducive to
NGO and media activities.
2.2.4. Bosnia and Herzegovina
47. On 15 May 2017, Mr Egidijus
Vareikis (Lithuania, EPP/CD), whose term had ended, was replaced
by Mr Tiny Kox (Netherlands, UEL) as co-rapporteur for Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The rapporteurs visited the country on 5 and 6 September
2017 and prepared a preliminary draft report on the Honouring of
Obligations and Commitments by Bosnia and Herzegovina that was approved
by the committee on 26 April 2017. No comments on the preliminary
draft report were received from the Bosnian authorities within the
deadline set by the Monitoring Committee despite an extension granted
to 30 October 2017, and no explanation as to the reasons for not
providing comments was given. It is the first time in the history
of the monitoring procedure that a country has failed to provide
comments on a preliminary draft report, and a serious violation
of the country’s obligation to fully co-operate with the Monitoring
Committee. The Monitoring Committee thus decided on 15 November
to proceed without the comments and a draft resolution was subsequently
adopted on 13 December 2017 with a view to its presentation at the
January 2018 part-session of the Assembly.
2.2.5. Georgia
48. The co-rapporteurs made fact
finding visits to the country from 28 to 30 March and from 20 to 22 November
2017. On 27 June, Mr Boriss Cilevićs (Latvia, SOC), whose term as
co-rapporteur had ended, was replaced by Mr Titus Corlatean (Romania,
SOC) as co-rapporteur for Georgia.
49. The political agenda of the country in 2017 was dominated
by the constitutional reform process that was initiated by the authorities
following the parliamentary elections in October 2016, which were
overwhelmingly won by the incumbent Georgian Dream/Democratic Georgia
(GD-DG) party of Prime Minister Kvirikashvilli, which obtained a
constitutional majority of 115 of the 150 seats in the Georgian
Parliament.
50. The outcome of these elections had a profound impact on the
political environment in Georgia. The fact that the opposition parties
were unable to capitalise on the reported unpopularity of the ruling
GD-DG coalition and the fact that most of the smaller mainstream
parties failed to enter parliament underscores the existence of
ongoing questions among the population with regard to the United
National Movement’s (UNM) legacy from the time it governed the country
and about the effectiveness of the parliamentary opposition. This
is especially important in the context of the constitutional majority
of the ruling party. Immediately following the elections, clear
differences of opinion started to surface among the leadership of
the UNM party of former President Saakashvili, that ultimately lead
to the split of the party in two: the UNM and European Georgia.
51. Following the elections, the authorities announced that the
ruling majority intended to reform the Georgian Constitution with
the aim of strengthening the separation of powers. An additional
aim of the constitutional reform was to provide the constitutional
framework for electoral reform, including the establishment of a
proportional election system. On 15 December 2016, the parliament
established a Constitutional Commission, composed of, inter alia, members of the ruling
majority and the opposition, as well as civil society representatives.
52. The Constitutional Commission adopted its proposal on 22 April
2017. The members appointed by the opposition declined to participate
in the adoption of this proposal largely because of lack of agreement
on a number of issues that were contained in the proposal of the
Commission. The majority of the civil society representatives and
the Ombudsperson voted against the proposal for similar reasons.
53. The proposal of the Commission entailed a comprehensive revision
of the Constitution and encompassed a wide range of subjects. As
mentioned above, some of these proposals proved to be controversial
or contentious among the members of the Commission.
54. The proposal adopted by the Constitutional Commission considerably
reduces the powers of the President of Georgia. As a consequence,
the Constitutional Commission proposed to abolish the direct election of
the President and instead for the President to be elected by a 300-member
Electoral Council consisting of members of parliament as well as
representatives of local and regional governments. This proposal
created considerable controversy especially given the fact that
the current President has been very openly critical of the government
and ruling majority. In response to the controversy, the Constitutional
Commission proposed that indirect elections would only come into
effect after the next presidential election, which are foreseen
for October 2018.
55. Electoral reform was a key objective of the constitutional
reform process. In this respect, the Commission proposed to introduce
a fully proportional system, based on closed party lists in a single
nationwide constituency, instead of the current mixed proportional-majoritarian
system. This proposal was welcomed by the international community,
including the Assembly and the Venice Commission. In addition and
more controversially, the Commission proposed to prohibit electoral
blocs while maintaining the relatively high threshold of 5% for
parties to enter parliament. In addition, the Commission proposed
that all the votes for parties that did not make it past the threshold
would be awarded to the winner of the elections. This distribution formula,
in combination with the prohibition of party blocks and a high threshold,
could give a considerable number of bonus seats to the largest party
and undermine the proportionality of the election results.
56. In a move not related to the stated aims of the constitutional
reform and apparently driven mostly by populism, the Constitutional
Commission proposed to include an amendment in the Constitution
that would limit the institution of marriage to people of the opposite
sex. While there are no provisions in the current legislation that
would allow same-sex marriages and it is very unlikely that this
would change anytime soon in the socially conservative Georgian
society, there is currently no constitutional limitation that would
prevent same-sex marriages from taking place if ordinary law were
to be changed. Therefore, while, according to current jurisprudence,
a constitutional ban on same-sex marriages would not violate the
European Convention on Human Rights, this constitutional amendment
is a clear step backwards in terms of current legislation, even
if largely symbolic.
57. The authorities closely co-operated with the Venice Commission
during the drafting of the constitutional amendments and pledged
that the parliament would not adopt any norm or amendment that was
negatively assessed by the Venice Commission. The proposal of the
Constitutional Commission was sent to the Venice Commission for
opinion after its adoption by the Commission. The parliament adopted
the constitutional amendments in first reading on 22 June 2017.
However, during the discussions the introduction of a fully proportional
election system was postponed from 2020 to 2024, which means that
the next elections would still be organised on the basis of the
current mixed election system. This move, after the Venice Commission
had issued its opinion, was denounced by the opposition and civil
society. Negotiations between the ruling majority and opposition
to reach a consensus on the constitutional amendments, including
the change of the elections system did not lead to any results.
On 26 September 2017, the Georgian Parliament adopted the constitutional amendments
which included the introduction of a proportional elections system
in 2024. The opposition boycotted the vote. Ostensibly as a compromise
towards the opposition, election blocs will be allowed during the
2020 elections, which will take place under a mixed system, and
the threshold for those elections will remain 3% instead of 5%.
Moreover, the authorities dropped the introduction of the controversial
bonus system for the proportional elections that will be introduced
in 2024. In its opinion on the constitutional amendments, as adopted
by the parliament, the Venice Commission reiterated its positive
assessment of the constitutional amendments which are an improvement
to the country’s constitutional order, but considered the postponement of
the proportional elections system until 2024 highly regrettable
and a major obstacle to finding consensus on the new Constitution
between the different political forces in Georgia.
2.2.6. Republic of Moldova
58. On 26 April 2017, Mr Ögmundur
Jónasson (Iceland, UEL), who had left the Assembly, was replaced
by Mr Egidijus Vareikis (Lithuania, EPP/CD) as co-rapporteur for
the Republic of Moldova. On 15 November 2017, Ms Maryvonne Blondin
(France, SOC) was appointed as co-rapporteur to replace Ms Valentina
Leskaj (Albania, SOC) who had left the Assembly. Also as a result
of these changes of co-rapporteurs, no fact-finding visits took
place to the Republic of Moldova in 2017. In paragraphs 15 and 16
above, I have already outlined the problems faced by the committee
as a result of frequent changes to the composition of rapporteur
teams for a country.
59. The Moldovan Parliament has adopted an amendment to the Electoral
Code establishing a mixed electoral system, which was deemed “not
advisable” by the Venice Commission in its June 2017 opinion. Questions
were raised with regard to this change of the electoral system in
the context of the political environment in the Republic of Moldova,
as well as with regard to the funding of political parties and electoral campaigns.
The Monitoring Committee therefore agreed, on 7 September 2017,
to request an opinion of the Venice Commission on the legal framework
governing the funding of political parties and campaigns, as well as
on the recent amendments to the electoral legislation.
2.2.7. Russian Federation
60. The Russian delegation maintained
its regrettable decision to boycott the work of the Parliamentary Assembly
in 2017, as it again decided not to present the credentials of its
delegation in January 2017. As a result, it was again not possible
for the co-rapporteurs of the Monitoring Committee to visit the
Russian Federation in the last year. However, the co-rapporteurs
have continued to follow developments in the country.
61. On 21 January 2017, the co-rapporteurs for the Russian Federation,
jointly with the rapporteur for the implementation of judgments
of the European Court of Human Rights of the Committee on Legal
Affairs and Human Rights expressed their deep concern about the
decision of the Russian Constitutional Court that the payment of
compensation to the Yukos shareholders ordered by the European Court
of Human Rights would violate the Russian Constitution and therefore
should not be implemented. They reminded the Russian Federation
that unconditionally honouring the European Convention on Human
Rights is an obligation incumbent on all member States of the Council
of Europe and that selective enforcement of the judgments of the
European Court of Human Rights would not be acceptable.
62. On 26 March 2017, an anti-corruption protest took place in
the Russian Federation. Following these protests, hundreds of protesters
were arrested by the Russian authorities. The co-rapporteurs expressed
their serious concern about these arrests and in particular the
arrest of Alexei Navalny. These mass arrests underscore the repeated
concerns of the Monitoring Committee with regard to the impediments
to the right of freedom of assembly, including restrictive changes
to the legislation and disproportional police response.
63. On 21 April 2017, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
declared the Jehovah’s Witnesses an extremist organisation and closed
it down. This decision raises serious concerns regarding freedom
of religion in Russia and of the legislation against extremism being
abused to curtail freedom of expression and assembly in the Russian
Federation. This underscores the concerns of, inter
alia, the Assembly and the Venice Commission with regard
to the extremist legislation which is open to abuse and arbitrary
application by the authorities.
64. The reports of abductions, unlawful detentions, torture and
killings of men in the Chechen Republic, based on their sexual orientation
and gender identity are of serious concern and should be fully and transparently
investigated by the authorities. Any perpetrators of such heinous
acts should be held accountable and effective measures to protect
the life, liberty and security of gay and bisexual people throughout
the Russian Federation should be urgently taken.
2.2.8. Serbia
65. The co-rapporteurs visited
the country from 18 to 21 July 2017. In addition they participated, ex officio, in the ad hoc committee
that observed the presidential elections in Serbia on 2 April 2017.
66. The newly appointed Prime Minister of Serbia has highlighted
the commitment of her government to implementing the necessary economic
reforms and addressing the remaining concerns of the Assembly with regard
to the media environment in Serbia. At the same time, further efforts
are required, including a revision of the constitutional provisions
pertaining to the judiciary and reforms to depoliticise judicial
institutions, strengthen the rule of law and increase trust in State
institutions.
67. With regard to minorities’ rights, the legislative framework
provides for a high level of protection of minorities, but it is
essential that these laws are fully implemented. In that respect
the co-rapporteurs, following their visit, encouraged the continuation
European Union-facilitated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, and
called for the full implementation of the existing agreements with
a view to easing the situation in southern Serbia.
68. The presidential election took place on 2 April 2017. This
election was observed by an ad hoc committee from the Assembly.
In its report the ad hoc committee concluded that the voting day
had been calm and well organised, and that voters could make their
choice freely. However, it noted unprecedented unequal media coverage
in favour of the candidate of the ruling majority, who also benefited
in many other aspects of the campaign from his position of Prime
Minister, resulting in a number of reports of abuse of administrative resources.
All in all, these shortcomings resulted in an unequal playing field
between the presidential candidates in favour of the candidate of
the ruling majority.
69. Following the parliamentary elections that took place on 24
April 2016, the Assembly had noted that the “legal uncertainty leads
to difficulties in the implementation and effectiveness of the provisions
of the Law on Financing of Political Activities”
. Regrettably, a number
of Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR recommendations in their joint
opinion on this law that could have addressed these shortcomings
and improved transparency of campaign and party funding – including,
inter alia, limits on campaign expenditure
and party financing as well as lower limits on private funding from
private individuals and companies – have not been implemented.
70. The ad hoc committee welcomed the transparent and efficient
manner in which the Republican Election Commission had organised
the 2017 presidential election. However, it expressed concern that
its current composition formula could lead to an excessive politicisation
of the election administration.
71. Media coverage during elections in Serbia has been a recurrent
issue of concern for the Assembly. Regrettably, many of the Assembly’s
concerns in this respect remain unaddressed. While the current legal framework
for media can adequately protect freedom of expression and of the
media, its lack of implementation, especially during elections,
remains a serious point of concern that needs to be addressed by the
authorities.
72. The ad hoc committee of the Assembly to observe the presidential
election in Serbia on 2 April 2017 concluded that “Serbia needs
to improve its electoral legal framework, as well as certain election
practises, taking into consideration the lessons of past elections,
in order to increase the citizens confidence in democratic elections”
2.2.9. Turkey
73. The co-rapporteurs for the
post-monitoring dialogue with Turkey, Ms Ingebjørg Godskesen (Norway, EC)
and Ms Marianne Mikko (Estonia, SOC), visited Turkey from 9 to 13
January 2017, with special attention paid to the traumatism and
consequence of the failed coup d’état of 15 July 2016, as well as
the effects of the state of emergency on human rights, democracy
and the rule of law, and on individuals. The co-rapporteurs expressed
their serious concerns as to whether the constitutional amendments
in preparation (providing for a shift from a parliamentary to a
presidential system) would provide sufficient checks and balances,
and ensure separation of powers and independence of the judiciary.
74. During the January 2017 part-session, the proposal made by
the Monitoring Committee and the Committee on Political Affairs
and Democracy to hold an urgent debate on “The functioning of democratic institutions
in Turkey” failed to reach a two-thirds majority in the Assembly
chamber on 23 January 2017, despite the support of nearly 60% of
the Assembly members who voted.
75. In the wake of this vote, and following the adoption of 18
constitutional amendments in the Turkish Parliament on 21 January
2017, the Monitoring Committee adopted a “statement on the proposed constitutional
reform in Turkey” on 25 January 2017.
The committee expressed its serious
doubts about the desirability of holding a referendum under the
state of emergency and ongoing security operations in south-east
Turkey. It also cited the conditions under which the amendments
had been adopted in parliament, the compliance of the referendum
campaign with Council of Europe standards, the consequences of this referendum
on the separation of powers, proper checks and balances and the
independence of the judiciary. Furthermore, the committee expressed
its concern over the political context in which the referendum would take
place, marked by the stripping of the immunity of 154 parliamentarians
in May 2016, the detention of 11 parliamentarians (all belonging
to the opposition party Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP)), the disproportionate
measures taken since the declaration of the state of emergency in
July 2016, the problematic interpretation of the Penal Code and
the anti-terror law provisions, and the chilling effect of pressure
exerted on journalists and human rights defenders, which seriously
impeded freedom of expression and of the media. In conclusion, the
committee decided to request a debate on “The functioning of democratic
institutions in Turkey” during the April 2017 part-session, which
took place on 25 April 2017.
76. In its
Resolution
2156 (2017), while condemning the failed coup attempt of 15 July
2016 which was traumatic for Turkish society, as well as the multiple
ongoing terrorist threats, the Assembly remained concerned about
the implementation of the state of emergency, the large-scale and
extent of the purges conducted in public institutions targeting
alleged members of the Gülen movement, the disproportionate effect of
the emergency decree laws – including the massive dismissals of
civil servants, judges, prosecutors and academics and the closing
down of media and NGOs – as well as limited access to judicial remedies.
It was deeply concerned about the detention of parliamentarians
and journalists, repeated violations of the freedom of expression
and of the media and the situation of local administrations in south-east
Turkey, leading to a serious deterioration of the functioning of
democratic institutions. In this context, the Assembly recalled
that the reintroduction of the death penalty would be incompatible
with Council of Europe membership.
77. Based on the March 2017 opinion of the Venice Commission –
which pointed out that several constitutional amendments did not
comply with Council of Europe standards – and the preliminary findings
of the Assembly’s ad hoc committee for the observation of the referendum
held on 16 April 2017, the Assembly deeply regretted that the referendum
was held on an uneven playing field and expected the implementation
of the constitutional amendments to comply with Council of Europe
standards.
78. The Assembly thus urged Turkey to take urgent measures, such
as the lifting of the state of emergency, releasing the MPs and
journalists, establishing, and launching of the work of, the Inquiry
Commission on State of Emergency Measures (to ensure an effective
national judicial remedy for those dismissed through emergency decree
laws), and authorising the publication of the most recent reports
prepared by the Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT). In the light of the developments
in Turkey, the Assembly decided to re-open the monitoring procedure sensu stricto in respect of Turkey
so as to intensify its co-operation with the Turkish authorities
and all forces in the country.
79. Following this decision, the Monitoring Committee appointed
Ms Marianne Mikko (Estonia SOC) and Mr Nigel Evans (United Kingdom,
EC) as co-rapporteurs for the monitoring of Turkey in June 2017.
Since then, they have, on several occasions, expressed their concerns
about the detention and prosecution of journalists and human rights
activists, in particular the Chair and Director of Amnesty International.
The release of the latter and seven
other human rights activists (pending trial) was welcomed on 27
October by the co-rapporteurs, who called for the charges to be
dropped once and for all.
80. Since the adoption of
Resolution
2156 (2017), the state of emergency is still in force. The Inquiry Commission
on State of Emergency Measures, reviewing dismissals of civil servants
under the emergency measures, was established and has received,
since July 2017, about 100 000 complaints. One CPT report – on the
situation of foreign nationals detained under aliens legislation
– was published in October 2017. An Informal group set up by the
Council of Europe and the Turkish Ministry of Justice met on several
occasions and focused its recent work on “freedom of expression
and fight against terrorism”. There are still nine MPs from the
HDP, including its leader Mr Demirtas, and one MP from the Republican
People’s Party (CHP), Enis Berberoglu, in prison, as well as 76
Mayors, while 93 State commissioners (trustees) have been appointed
out of 101 municipalities run by the HDP or its sister parties.
With
respect to local democracy, the Venice Commission concluded in its
October 2017 opinion that the Decree Law No. 674 had obstructed
local democracy in Turkey, and that the Turkish authorities had
interpreted these extraordinary powers too extensively.
2.2.10. Ukraine
81. On 25 January 2017, the Assembly
adopted
Resolution 2145
(2017) on the functioning of democratic institutions in Ukraine.
In this resolution, the Assembly welcomed the ambitious reform programme
put in place after the “Revolution of Dignity” and recognised the
challenging environment in which these reforms were implemented
as a result of the Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine and the
illegal annexation of Crimea. The Assembly welcomed the considerable
progress in changing the legal framework needed for the reforms
in Ukraine and stressed that these legislative changes should now
be fully implemented and translated into changes in behaviour and
practice. In that respect, the Assembly emphasised that the absence
of progress in the implementation of the Minsk Agreements should
not be used as an excuse for not implementing other reforms that
are essential for the democratic consolidation of the country.
82. The hardening of political discourse following the Euromaidan
events and the Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine is of concern.
This polarisation is also noticeable in the media environment leading
to unacceptable attacks on journalists and media outlets. It is
important for all political forces to overcome divisions and animosity
and to jointly work for the stability and democratic consolidation
of the country. In addition, all attacks on journalists and media
outlets should be transparently investigated and perpetrators, if found,
prosecuted. The Assembly recognises the understandable and legitimate
concerns of the Ukrainian authorities about Russia’s propaganda
and information war, but urges the authorities to ensure that journalists are
only prevented from entering the country as a measure of last resort
and in accordance with Articles 16 and 17 of the European Convention
on Human Rights.
83. On numerous occasions, the Assembly has emphasised the importance
of constitutional reform for the successful implementation of democratic
and judicial reforms in Ukraine. The priority given by the Ukrainian authorities
and the Verkhovna Rada to constitutional reforms, leading to the
adoption of new constitutional provisions for the judiciary and
the justice system, is therefore warmly welcomed. The adoption of
these constitutional amendments should lead to a new impetus in
the reforms of the judiciary with a view of ensuring its independence
and impartiality. The Assembly has noted with satisfaction that
the general oversight function of the Prosecutor General has been
abolished in line with Ukraine’s accession commitments to the Council
of Europe.
84. The pervasive corruption in Ukraine is a point of concern.
Prolonged absence of concrete progress in this area could diminish
the positive effects of the reform agenda and undermine public trust
in the political and judicial system as a whole. In this context,
the continuing intertwinement of political and economic interests
in the political environment is a point of concern. While welcoming
the establishment of the main institutional environment to combat
corruption, the Assembly urged the authorities to increase the pace
of the reforms and to ensure that they now lead to tangible and
concrete results.
85. Following a challenge under the Code of Conduct for rapporteurs
of the Parliamentary Assembly, the Monitoring Committee withdrew
the mandate of Mr Jordi Xuclà (Spain, ALDE) as co-rapporteur in
respect of Ukraine. He was replaced, on 12 October 2017, by Mr Eerik-Niiles
Kross (Estonia, ALDE).
86. On 3 March 2017, the Verkhovna Rada adopted the Law of Ukraine
“on amending certain Laws of Ukraine regarding peculiarities of
financial control over certain categories of public officials”.
This law obliges activists and officials of civil society organisations
active in fighting corruption to make an annual e-declaration. This
could have a deterrent effect and could lead to pressure on civil
society activists active in the fight against corruption. Therefore,
on 7 September 2017, the Monitoring Committee agreed to request
an opinion of the Venice Commission on these amendments.
87. On 12 October 2017, the Assembly adopted
Resolution 2189 (2017) “The new Ukrainian law on education: a major impediment
to the teaching of national minorities' mother tongues”. While recognising
the legitimacy for States to promote the learning of the official
language as a “factor of social cohesion and integration”, the Assembly
stressed that measures to promote the official language must go
hand in hand with measures to protect and promote the languages
of the national minorities, and the principle of non-discrimination.
In that respect, the Assembly considered that the new Education
Law does not appear to strike an appropriate balance between the
official language and the languages of national minorities in Ukraine
and reduces rights given under previous legislation. The Assembly
called on the Ukrainian authorities to fully implement any recommendations
of the Venice Commission contained in its opinion on this law that
was requested by the Ukrainian authorities.
88. In September 2017, Ilmi Umerov, Deputy Chairperson of the
Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People, was sentenced to a two year
prison term for “separatism” by Russian-appointed judges in Simferopol.
The rapporteur for Ukraine emphasised that it is unacceptable that
the Russian authorities prosecute and detain Ukrainian citizens
for their opposition to the illegal annexation of Crimea by the
Russian Federation and called for the immediate and unconditional
release of Mr Umerov by the Russian authorities. Crimean Tatar leaders Akhtem
Chiygoz and Ilmi Umerov were released by the Russian authorities
on 25 October 2017 and exiled to Ankara.
2.3. Countries engaged in a post-monitoring
dialogue
2.3.1. Bulgaria
89. Early parliamentary elections
took place in Bulgaria on 26 March 2017. As a result of these elections,
no fact-finding visit to the country took place in 2017.
90. Following the election of President Radev on 14 November 2016,
then Prime Minister Borisov resigned as his party’s candidate lost
the election against Mr Radev. Subsequently, after being installed
in office on 22 January 2017, President Radev dissolved the National
Assembly of Bulgaria and called early parliamentary elections for
26 March 2017. These elections were observed by an ad hoc committee
of the Parliamentary Assembly.
91. These elections took place in a political environment marked
with public disillusionment with the political class and fatigue
from the repeated holding of elections in the country (six since
2013). The legal framework for elections is in general adequate
for the holding of democratic elections, but a number of Venice Commissions
and OSCE/ODIHR recommendations from previous elections were not
addressed in the recent amendments to the Electoral Code.
92. Following the request of the Monitoring Committee back in
2016, the Venice Commission adopted in June 2017 a joint opinion
with the OSCE/ODIHR on amendments to the Electoral Code adopted
by the National Assembly of Bulgaria between 2014 and 2016. This
series of amendments improved a number of issues and some previous
recommendations of the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR were
taken into account. The amendments improved, inter
alia, campaign finance provisions and their oversight,
voter registration, as well as provisions on media coverage of the
campaign. Such improved provisions need to be assessed in practice
in view of the next electoral cycles. There remain, however, unaddressed
recommendations aimed at: ensuring a broad public consultation process;
providing for electoral reform well in advance of elections; ensuring
the establishment of polling stations abroad in conformity with
the principle of equal suffrage for all Bulgarian citizens; providing
for an effective system of appeal of all election-related decisions
to a competent body; and granting an effective mechanism for challenging
election results to all electoral contestants as well as individual
citizens based on irregularities in voting procedures.
93. In the view of the Assembly’s ad hoc committee, the voters
could make a free choice from among a wide range of candidates in
well organised elections. Candidates could campaign freely but a
number of legal provisions, including with regard to State funding
for parliamentary parties, created unequal campaign conditions.
The law prohibits the creation of political parties on ethnic, racial
or religious lines, and prohibits campaigning in any other language
than Bulgarian. While this should be seen in the context of reported interference
of a neighbouring State in the elections, these provisions can hinder
the participation of minorities in elections and may be at odds
with international standards and commitments, including the Framework Convention
for the Protection of National Minorities (ETS No. 157). The ad
hoc committee also expressed concern about the frequent use of racist
and xenophobic language during the campaign as well as of allegations
of vote buying and organised voting, especially among vulnerable
groups in Bulgarian society. The reported interference of the Turkish
authorities in the Bulgarian election process, including by bussing
of voters and by endorsing specific parties, is of serious concern.
94. Following the Monitoring Committee’s request in 2016, the
Venice Commission adopted in October 2017 an opinion on the Bulgarian
Judicial System Act, as amended by the two packages of amendments
passed in March and July 2016. According to the Venice Commission,
the 2015 amendments to the Bulgarian Constitution brought in many
positive changes. In particular, the separation of the Supreme Judicial
Council into two chambers, for judges and for prosecutors, and the
election of the lay members with a qualified majority are major
steps forward. However, the current system still has some shortcomings,
and the progress achieved by the constitutional amendments and by
the 2016 revisions of the Judicial System Act should be solidified
by further structural reforms, both at constitutional and legislative
levels. The Venice Commission raises in particular the issue of
the weak structure for accountability of the Prosecutor General,
who is essentially immune from criminal prosecution and is virtually
irremovable by means of impeachment for other misconduct, which
is problematic in itself, and with regard to the system of judicial
governance where it distorts the balance of power.
2.3.2. Montenegro
95. On 26 April 2017, Mr Terry
Leyden (Ireland, ALDE), who had left the Assembly, was replaced
by Mr Andrea Rigoni (Italy, ALDE) as co-rapporteur for the post-monitoring
dialogue with Montenegro. The co-rapporteurs paid a fact-finding
visit to Podgorica from 2 to 4 October 2017.
96. The ongoing boycott of the Parliament of Montenegro and its
work by the opposition is hindering the continuation of the reforms
in the country and is of concern. Political dialogue about the transformation
of the country should take place inside the parliament. The co-rapporteurs
therefore encouraged the opposition to return to the parliament
and to engage in the reform process, including in relation to the
electoral framework ahead of the 2018 presidential election.
97. The efforts to reform the judiciary and justice system should
be welcomed. The progress made with regard to legislative reform
and institution building should now be matched by concrete results.
In particular, the legislation adopted with a view to guaranteeing
the genuine independence and professionalism of the judiciary should
be fully implemented.
98. The fight against corruption and organised crime is a stated
priority for the authorities. In this context, the impartiality
and independence of the Agency for the Prevention of Corruption
should be guaranteed not only in law but also in practise and this
agency should be provided with the necessary means to carry out
its mandate efficiently. In addition, the Special Prosecutor’s Office
and its Special Police Unit should be strengthened in order to allow
them to deal with the high number of cases before it.
99. The co-rapporteurs also expressed their continuing concern
regarding the state of freedom of expression and freedom of the
media in the country, which had seen little progress.
2.3.3. “The former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia”
100. The co-rapporteurs carried
out a fact-finding visit to the country from 30 May to 1 June 2017.
The ongoing political crisis that erupted in April 2014 in “the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” and its resolution in the
summer dominated the political agenda in the country in 2017.
101. After having been postponed several times as a result of the
political standoff, early parliamentary elections were finally organised
on 26 December 2016. These elections were observed by the Assembly
in the framework of an International Election Observation Mission.
The ad hoc committee of the Assembly noted the politicised nature
of the election administration as well as the abuse of administrative
resources by the then ruling party.
102. The holding of early parliamentary elections was supposed
to have heralded the end of the political crisis that started in
2014. Unfortunately, no party received a convincing majority in
these elections and the political standoff continued unabated. In
line with constitutional provisions, President Ivanov asked the
leader of the VRMO-DPMNE (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization
– Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity), Mr Gruevski,
as leader of the party that had won most votes in the elections
to form a government. However, Mr Gruevski was not able to find
the required majority to form a government before the legal deadline to
do so expired in January 2017. In the meantime, the main opposition
party, the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), had reached
an agreement with several ethnic Albanian parties and obtained the
support of a majority of votes in the parliament. Part of the agreement
reportedly was an agreement to make Albanian an official State language
and to have the State symbols reflect ethnic equality.
103. However, despite the SDSM and the Democratic Union for Integration
(DUI) having sufficient support, President Ivanov refused to give
a mandate to form a government to Mr Zaev, the leader of the SDSM,
citing the need to protect the sovereignty and integrity of the
country. At the same time, the members of the VRMO-DPMNE in the
parliament deployed a filibustering strategy to prevent the election
of a new Speaker of the Parliament. On 27 April 2017, the SDSM and
DUI managed to elect the Speaker in a parallel session of the parliament.
The new Speaker, Mr Talat Xhaferi, is the first ethnic Albanian
to hold this position. Following his election, hundreds of nationalist
demonstrators stormed the parliament, reportedly with the help of
some VRMO-DPMNE MPs, and assaulted opposition MPs. The police that
had been deployed to protect the parliament reportedly stood by
idle. The actions of the protesters were denounced by all political
forces in the country. It should be clear that the violent storming
of a parliament and assaulting of members of parliament are unacceptable
and have no place in a democratic society. This incident should
be fully investigated and the perpetrators brought to justice.
104. Finally, on 17 May 2017, under intense pressure from the United
States and the European Union, President Ivanov gave the mandate
to Mr Zaev to form a government. On 1 June 2017, the parliament approved
the new government with 62 votes in favour, 44 against and five
abstentions
105. The new authorities face a challenging political environment
and now urgently need to address the ongoing polarisations and ethnic
tensions in the country, as well as to depoliticise the State institutions
and ensure an efficient, impartial and independent judiciary. Regulatory
agencies need to be depoliticised, the freedom of media needs to
be assured and electoral reform continued. In addition, the authorities
should ensure the continuation of an independent and impartial investigation
into the so-called wiretapping scandal.
106. In this respect, the government has adopted a roadmap prioritising
measures to improve the administration of elections, reinforce the
independence of the judiciary, reform public institutions and promote the
freedom of the media. In addition, the roadmap focuses on the implementation
of the Ohrid Agreement. In this context, a draft law expanding the
use of the Albanian language, but without making it an official
language, was adopted on 4 August 2017.
107. A number of concrete measures to implement the roadmap, including
the abolishment of the Lustration Commission and the Council for
Disciplinary Liability and Evaluation of Judges, institutions which
had been criticised by, inter alia, the
Venice commission and the Assembly, have been adopted. The authorities
should be encouraged to continue, and even step up, the reforms
that are needed to normalise the political environment and stabilise
the democratic institutions in the country.
3. Report on the functioning
of democratic institutions in Poland
108. On 27 May 2016, on the basis
of a motion for a resolution by Mr Schennach and others (
Doc. 13978), the
Bureau of the Assembly seized the Monitoring Committee for report
on the functioning of democratic institutions in Poland. On 23 June
2016, the Monitoring Committee appointed Mr Yves Cruchten (Luxembourg, SOC)
and Mr Thierry Mariani (France, EPP/CD) as co-rapporteurs for this
report. The co-rapporteurs carried out a fact-finding mission to
Warsaw from 3 to 6 April 2017. Mr Mariani ceased to be a member
of the Monitoring Committee on 29 June 2017. He was replaced by
Ms Elisabeth Schneider-Schneiter (Switzerland, EPP/CD) on 15 November
2017 as co-rapporteur.
109. A political crisis ensued in Poland after the parliamentary
elections in 2015. These elections took place in the context of
an increasingly polarised political climate and the growing dissatisfaction
of the Polish public with the ruling elite in the country. The elections
were won by the Law and Justice Party (PiS) which obtained an absolute
majority in the Sejm and the Senate. According to the PiS, its overwhelming
election victory gave it a clear popular mandate for a profound
reform of the political system and Polish society.
110. The first institution on its agenda was the Constitutional
Court, which has considerable legal powers to block or hinder any
reforms not in line with constitutional provisions. Just before
the elections, the then ruling majority had changed the law on the
appointment of Constitutional Court judges, in a move that was seen
by the current authorities, as well as others, as an attempt to
pack the Court with supporters of the then authorities.
111. Immediately after the elections, the new ruling majority set
out to install its own supporters in the Constitutional Court. This
was done in such a manner that it soon escalated into a full blown
constitutional crisis that has impeded the independent functioning
of the Constitutional Court and has raised questions about the legality
of Constitutional Court decisions. This undermines the principle
of separation of powers and of legal certainty in the country.
112. This crisis was reinforced by a number of other reforms of
other institutions, in particular the public media, police and judiciary,
which the PiS felt were dominated and controlled by the previous
authorities. These controversial attempts by the new authorities
to bring constitutionally independent State institutions under their control
prompted a national and international outcry.
113. In addition to the developments around the Constitutional
Court, the reform of the High Council of the Judiciary is of concern.
According to an opinion of the OSCE/ODIHR on the draft amendments
to this law, these amendments “raise serious concern with regard
to key democratic principles, in particular the separation of powers
and the independence of the judiciary”. It concluded that “if adopted,
the amendments would undermine the very foundations of a democratic
society governed by the rule of law”.
114. Another area that is of potential concern is the amendments
to the law on the Prosecution Service. These amendments, inter alia, abolish the position
of an independent Prosecutor General, which was established in 2009,
and re-merge that position with that of the Minister of Justice,
which could affect the independence of the prosecution service.
This is compounded by the enhanced role in disciplinary proceedings against
judges and prosecutors of the Minister of Justice. On 4 May 2017,
the Monitoring Committee therefore requested an opinion of the Venice
Commission on the amended law on the Prosecution Service.
115. In December 2016 the Sejm adopted a series of amendments to
the law on assemblies. These amendments, inter
alia, stipulate that assemblies can be prohibited if
they coincide with so-called cyclical assemblies, which are defined
as demonstrations organised by the same organiser at least four
times a year or on a yearly basis for more than three years. The
main effect of this law is to counter demonstrations that are not
allowed to take place within a 100-metre perimeter of the demonstration
against which they are held. While this may limit counter demonstrations
on some occasions, several, if not most, member States have public order
regulations that spatially separate demonstrations and their counter
demonstrations. Some questions with regard to the cyclical status
of demonstrations remain. While unique, such a principle does not
necessarily run counter to common standards, unless such cyclical
status would only be available to a limited group/type of organisation
or demonstration. The authorities are therefore asked to ensure
that no discriminatory practices occur when attributing cyclical
status to demonstrations.
4. Periodic review of the honouring
of the membership obligations to the Council of Europe by countries
that are not subject to a monitoring procedure sensu stricto, or
engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue with the Assembly.
116. In line with
Resolution 2018 (2014) on the progress of the Assembly’s monitoring procedure,
the committee continued the periodic reviews of the honouring of
membership obligations to the Council of Europe of all the countries
that are not under the monitoring procedure
sensu stricto or engaged in a post-monitoring dialogue.
In line with the working methods agreed by the committee, in 2017
periodic review reports were prepared for four countries: Estonia,
Greece, Hungary and Ireland. These periodic reviews are presented
in Parts 2 to 5 of this progress report and their main recommendations
are set out in the draft resolution that is presented in this report.
117. From the reactions of the authorities of the countries that
have been the subject of a periodic review to date, it is clear
that this exercise by the Monitoring Committee is appreciated by
all concerned. At the same time, it ensures that all member States
of the Council of Europe, without exception, are monitored by the Assembly
for their honouring of membership obligations. I would like to express
my gratitude for the co-operation and elaborate, detailed and in-depth
comments on the preliminary draft reports on their countries that I
received from the authorities of the countries reviewed in this
progress report. These comments have been taken into account in
the drafting of the final reports that are included in this progress
report, and greatly contributed to their high quality.
118. As mentioned, the periodic reviews are an important and well
regarded tool for the Assembly to ensure that the honouring of membership
obligations, and the functioning of the democratic institutions,
of all Council of Europe member States, are regularly monitored
and assessed. This initiative has proven its value and relevancy.
At this moment, the Chairperson of the Monitoring Committee is ex officio the rapporteur for the periodic
reviews which are debated by the Assembly in the context of the
progress report on the Monitoring Procedure. Also as a reflection
of the importance of the periodic reviews, consideration should
be given to widening the rapporteurship inside the committee to
include, for example, the vice-chairpersons of the committee. For
the same reason consideration should be given to separating the
discussion of the periodic review reports from the progress report
in a separate dedicated agenda item on the Assembly’s plenary agenda.
This would allow for more appropriate discussions and more substantial
resolutions. The preparation of these reports is time and resource
intensive, both for the ex officio rapporteurs
as well as for the Secretariat of the committee. The Assembly should
therefore ensure that sufficient resources are continued to be made available
for the committee to execute this important task. The committee
will formulate concrete proposals in this respect during 2018, which
will be included in the 2018 progress report of the Assembly’s monitoring procedure.