1. Introduction
1.1. Procedure
1. In its
Resolution 2096 (2016) “How can inappropriate restrictions on NGO activities
in Europe be prevented?” adopted on 28 January 2016, the Assembly
“mindful of the precarious situation of civil society in the Council
of Europe area” resolved “to remain seized of the matter and to
continue to give it priority, in view of the urgent need to monitor
respect for freedom of association, of assembly and of expression”
(paragraph 8). Following the Bureau of the Assembly’s decision of
22 April 2016, this issue was referred to the Committee on Legal
Affairs and Human Rights. At its meeting on 21 June 2016, the committee
appointed Ms Aleksandra Djurović (Serbia, EPP/CD) as rapporteur.
Following her subsequent departure from the Assembly, the committee
appointed me as rapporteur on this subject at its meeting on 13
November 2017. At its meeting on 12 December 2017, the committee
authorised me to undertake a fact-finding visit to Turkey. On 23
January 2018, it held a hearing with the participation of Mr Nils
Muižnieks, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe,
Ms Anna Rurka, President of the Conference of International Non-Governmental Organisations
(INGOs) of the Council of Europe, and Mr Konstantin Baranov, member
of the board of the International Youth Human Rights Movement, Russia.
The hearing was also held in the framework of the work on the report
on “Protecting human rights defenders in Council of Europe member
States” (rapporteur: Mr Egidijus Vareikis, Lithuania, EPP/CD). On
5 and 6 April 2018, I undertook a fact-finding visit to Ankara (Turkey).
1.2. Issues
at stake
2. The issue of inappropriate
restrictions on activities of non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
in Council of Europe member States has already been the subject
of a report, of which I was the author.
On the basis of
that report, the Assembly adopted the above-mentioned
Resolution 2096 (2016) and
Recommendation
2086 (2016).
3. As recalled in
Resolution
2096 (2016), NGOs are a key component of an open and democratic
civil society and make an essential contribution to the defence
of human rights and to the strengthening of democracy and the rule
of law. By adhering to the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS
No. 5, “the Convention”), member States of the Council of Europe
have agreed to ensure respect for freedom of assembly and association
(Article 11 of the Convention) and freedom of expression (Article
10), which are inextricably linked to one another and are vital
to the proper functioning of civil society. These freedoms are also
enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. They are not absolute, as the Convention
provides clear criteria allowing their restriction (in paragraph
2 of Articles 10 and 11). Such restrictions must be prescribed by
law and be “necessary in a democratic society”, which presupposes
the existence of a “pressing social need”, and respect for the principle
of proportionality.
They
must pursue at least one of the legitimate aims listed in the Convention,
such as national security, public safety, the prevention of disorder
or crime and the protection of health or morals. The rights enshrined
in Article 11 may also be restricted for “the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others” and those guaranteed in Article 10
also in the interests of territorial integrity or “the protection
of the reputation or rights of others, preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence and maintaining the authority
and impartiality of the judiciary”. On many occasions, the European
Court of Human Rights (“the Court”) has stressed that, along with
the press, NGOs play the role of “watchdog” in a democratic society.
When examining
a large number of applications concerning dissolution of or refusals
to register NGOs and political parties that aim at reversing the constitutional
and institutional order of their States, the Court stressed that
“any organisation may campaign for a change in the legal and constitutional
structures of the State if the means used to that end are in every respect
legal and democratic and if the change proposed is itself compatible
with fundamental democratic principles … The mere fact that an organisation
demands such changes cannot automatically justify interferences
with its members’ freedoms of association and assembly”.
4. The Council of Europe fully supports the existence of a dynamic
civil society and co-operates with NGOs on a structural, permanent
basis through one of its institutions – the Conference of International
Non-governmental Organisations, which has been gradually established
by the Committee of Ministers since the 1970s
and
is composed of over 400 NGOs holding participatory status. In its
Recommendation
CM/Rec(2007)14 on the legal status of non-governmental organisations
in Europe, the Committee of Ministers acknowledged the role of such
organisations and gave national legislators clear guidelines as
to the proper content of legislation on NGOs. This recommendation
defines NGOs as “voluntary self-governing bodies or organisations
established to pursue the essentially non-profit-making objectives
of their founders or members”, which are not political parties (Principle
I.1). It also contains guidelines as to their objectives, formation
and membership, legal personality, management, fundraising, property
and public support, accountability and participation in decision-making.
According to its Principle 50, NGOs “should be free to solicit and
receive funding … not only from public bodies in their own State
but also from institutional or individual donors …”. They should
be able to take part in “dialogue and consultation on public policy
objectives and decisions” and be consulted during the drafting of
primary and secondary legislation concerning their status (Principles
76 and 77). The changing nature of the environment in which NGOs
operate due to the development of media and the information society
has been recognised in Committee of Ministers
Recommendation
CM/Rec(2016)5 on Internet freedom of 13 April 2016. On 27 September 2017, the Committee
of Ministers adopted
Guidelines
for civil participation in political decision-making. Further guidelines on this issue are contained in the
“
Joint guidelines
on freedom of association” of the European Commission for Democracy through Law
(Venice Commission) and the Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE/ODIHR) of 17 December 2014.
5. In its
Resolution
2096 (2016), the Assembly expressed concern about the deterioration
over the last few years of the situation of civil society in certain
Council of Europe member States, especially in Azerbaijan and the
Russian Federation. It noted that this was due, in particular, to
the adoption of restrictive laws and regulations, amounting to various
impediments to the registration, functioning and financing of numerous NGOs,
and to their stigmatisation. Similar concerns were expressed in
Resolution 2095 (2016) on strengthening the protection and role of human rights
defenders in Council of Europe member States, adopted on the same
day.
Moreover, my report of 2015 also
pointed out some negative trends in Turkey and Hungary. In his report
on “
The
state of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Populism –
How strong are Europe’s checks and balances?”, of 2017, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe,
Mr Thorbjørn Jagland, concluded that in some member States “NGOs
are effectively prevented from carrying out their work by legal and
regulatory obstacles to their creation, activities and funding”.
These obstacles include in particular “cumbersome and lengthy registration
procedures, excessive administrative requirements and obstacles
to accessing financial resources, particularly foreign funding”.
According to the Secretary General, “[i]n the last few years a few
countries have seen a continuous deterioration in the environment
in which NGOs operate, through stigmatisation, smear campaigns and
judicial, administrative or fiscal harassment”.
In April 2017, the Council
of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr Nils Muižnieks, noted
“a clear trend of backsliding in several European countries in the
area of freedom of association, particularly in respect of human
rights organisations and defenders”.
In his 6 February 2018 Statement
to mark the 10th anniversary of the Declaration of the Committee
of Ministers on Council of Europe action to improve the protection
of human rights defenders and promote their activities, he stressed
that “a growing number of European governments are narrowing the
space for the work of independent civil society and human rights
organisations”. Furthermore, the Council of Europe’s Advisory Council
on Youth (CCJ) has informed me about the increasing difficulties encountered
by youth organisations in their work and especially in accessing
financial support. According to the European Union’s Fundamental
Rights Agency (FRA), NGOs active in the field of human rights consider that
it has become harder for them to contribute to the protection, promotion
and fulfilment of human rights across the European Union. The FRA,
which conducted research focusing on the period from 2011 to 2017, has
found several challenges affecting the work of civil society: disadvantageous
changes in legislation or inadequate implementation of laws; hurdles
to accessing financial resources and ensuring their sustainability; difficulties
in accessing decision-makers and feeding into law- and policy-making;
and attacks on and harassment of human rights defenders, including
negative discourse aimed at delegitimising and stigmatising NGOs.
It
also notes the lack of reliable and comparable data on attacks against
civil society organisations across the European Union and of information
concerning available funding schemes and expenditure for organisations
working for the field of human rights. Concerns about shrinking
civil society space worldwide have also been expressed by United
Nations bodies.
6. Against this background, I intend to take stock of recent
developments in the countries which were examined in my previous
report, namely the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Hungary
(listed in the order of that report). Nonetheless I will also take
account of the developments (mainly legislative) that have occurred
in other Council of Europe member States between 2016 and 2018.
The choice of the countries is based on information and documents
of the Assembly, other organs and institutions of the Council of
Europe, other international organisations, prominent NGOs working
for the protection of human rights and human rights defenders.
2. Recent
developments concerning the situation of civil society in selected
member States
2.1. The
Russian Federation
7. In its
Resolution 2096 (2016), the Assembly expressed concerns about the so-called
“foreign agents law” modifying the Russian legislation on non-commercial
organisations to the effect that NGOs receiving foreign funding
were obliged to register as “foreign agents” (a term considered
in the Soviet Union as a synonym for “traitor” or “spy”); this law
had been criticised by the Venice Commission.
The Assembly was also
worried about the adoption, in May 2015, of the “law on undesirable
organisations” allowing the authorities to ban certain international
NGOs.
8. Since the adoption of
Resolution
2096 (2016), new developments have taken place as far as the implementation
of these pieces of legislation is concerned. In May 2016, the “foreign
agents law” was amended, expanding the definition of “political
activity” used in the context of defining “NGOs performing the functions
of a foreign agent”. The register of “foreign agents” currently
includes 79 organisations (including four which have registered
voluntarily) working mainly on human rights, the environment, lesbian,
gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) issues, health and
social issues.
In all, the Minister of Justice is
reported to have added 158 NGOs to this list. Over 40 NGOs were
added in 2016 alone (including the Moscow-based Levada Analytical
Centre, which carries out sociological research and surveys, and
Memorial, an international association that focuses on historical
issues, education, human rights and charitable works and is well-known for
its research and documentation on the persecutions that took place
under the Soviet regime). Nonetheless, the Minister of Justice is
said to have removed from this list more than 20 NGOs after determining
that they had stopped receiving foreign funds. More than 30 NGOs
preferred to cease their activities rather than be officially designated
as “foreign agents”. Others have been wound up following court rulings,
such as the Kazan-based organisation Agora, which worked to protect
human rights (especially in the case of the punk rock group Pussy Riot).
On 22 March 2017, the European Court of Human Rights communicated
to the Russian Government 49 complaints from 61 NGOs concerning
the application of the “foreign agents law”. In July 2017, the Commissioner
for Human Rights presented his observations in this case,
emphasising once again
that, in his opinion, this law was incompatible with international
human rights standards and that its application had had “a chilling
effect” on the work of Russian civil society. The Levada Centre
recently also filed an application with the Court.
9. As far as the “law on undesirable organisations” is concerned,
on 10 June 2016, the Venice Commission issued its opinion, in which
it found that this law interfered with several rights guaranteed
under the Convention, including those enshrined in Articles 10 and
11. The Venice Commission criticised, in particular, the vague definitions
(including the definition of NGO) and the blanket prohibitions and
sanctions contained in the law.
To
date, the registry of “undesirable organisations” includes 14 NGOs.
It should also be noted that some activists
and NGOs have taken legal action on the basis of the Code of Administrative
Offences for having “been involved” in activities carried out by
“undesirable organisations”. For example, in November 2017 the Andrey
Rylkov Foundation (which works to bring about a responsible drugs
policy) was issued a fine of 50 000 roubles (approximately €720)
by a court of first instance because one of the organisation's websites, dating
from 2011, contained a link to a publication of the Open Society
Foundations, currently considered an “undesirable organisation”.
Similarly, in September 2017 the SOVA think tank, which works on
issues to do with freedom of religion, nationalism and forms of
extremism, and its director Alexander Verkhovsky were informed by
the public prosecutor that they had broken the law because their
organisation’s website contained links to former donors that were
“undesirable organisations”, including the National Endowment for
Democracy and the Open Society Foundations.
Moreover, in November
2017 a new law came into force that enables the Minister of Justice
to register as “foreign agents” media that either directly or indirectly
receive funds from abroad.
10. Since the Russian Parliament has decided not to send its representatives
to the Assembly for this session, it is regrettable that the committee
and I as rapporteur have been unable to listen to their views and to
obtain more information on the present situation of civil society
in the Russian Federation.
2.2. Azerbaijan
11. In its
Resolution 2096 (2016), the Assembly condemned once again the deterioration
of the working conditions for Azerbaijani NGOs and human rights
activists, following changes to the legislation on NGOs imposing
inappropriate restrictions on their activities. It called on Azerbaijan
to,
inter alia, amend its
legislation in accordance with the recommendations of the Venice
Commission (Opinions Nos. 636/2011
and 787/2014).
The question of the reform of legislation
on NGOs and the situation of civil society in Azerbaijan was subsequently
taken up by the Monitoring Committee’s co-rapporteurs on Azerbaijan
and by the former Chair of our committee, Mr Alain Destexhe (Belgium),
who drew up a report on “Azerbaijan’s Chairmanship of the Council
of Europe: what follow-up on respect for human rights?”.
Accordingly,
in order to avoid any duplication, I will confine myself to reiterating
briefly the most relevant facts and issues.
12. Since January 2016, further changes to the Azerbaijani legislation
on NGOs have been made. On 28 December 2015, the Ministry of Justice
adopted new “rules on studying the activities of NGOs, branches
or representative offices of foreign NGOs”. They came into force
in February 2016 and have granted the minister broad powers to conduct
“regular” or “extraordinary” inspections of NGOs. Moreover, the
President of the Republic signed a decree on 21 October 2016 facilitating
grants by foreign donors to NGOs and establishing a “one-stop shop”
(or “single window”) for this procedure as of 1 January 2017.
The aim of the decree is to simplify
the procedure for obtaining an opinion on the financial and economic
expediency of grants and to ensure the implementation of the grant
at the request of both the foreign donor and the recipient. However,
the NGOs that receive funds from abroad and their donors are also
subject to the obligation to obtain authorisations from the authorities.
According to some NGOs, the procedures involved remain cumbersome
and their outcome arbitrary.
13. In October 2016, having previously downgraded Azerbaijan’s
status, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI),
a coalition of governments, companies and non-governmental groups
promoting better governance of resource-rich countries, which requires
governments to foster “an enabling environment for civil society”,
gave Azerbaijan four months to eliminate legal and bureaucratic
obstacles to the activities of civil society. However, in response
to this, the Azerbaijani Government decided to withdraw from EITI.
14. In its judgment in
Rasul Jafarov
v. Azerbaijan, concerning the arrest and detention of
the prominent human rights activist and chairperson of the Human
Rights Club in 2014 due to his failure to register grants, the European
Court of Human Rights found several violations of the Convention
(of Articles 5.1, 5.4, 18 in conjunction with Article 5, and 34).
The Court observed in particular that the legislative environment
regarding the operation of NGOs had forced some of them to operate
on the fringes of the law and had grown “increasingly harsh and
restrictive”, with additional registration and reporting procedures
and heavy penalties.
15. On 11 October 2017, the Assembly, in its
Resolutions 2184 (2017) and
2185
(2017), reiterated that the legislative framework for the
activities of NGOs did not comply with European standards and expressed
its concern in view of the legal proceedings brought against NGO
leaders and the fact that some of them continue to be held in custody.
It called on the authorities to put an end to the reprisals against
activists, create an environment conducive to the activities of
NGOs and repeal all laws restricting freedom of association.
2.3. Turkey
16. Although the situation of civil
society in Turkey did not raise any serious concern at the time
when my previous report was finalised (except for the use of anti-terrorist
legislation against some human rights organisations and their activists),
the circumstances have changed dramatically since the failed
coup d’état attempt of 15 July 2016.
On 20 July 2016, the government declared a State emergency, which
has already been prolonged seven times, and under which the government
has been given extraordinary powers. On 21 July 2016, Turkey announced
that it would derogate from certain obligations under the European Convention
on Human Rights, in line with Article 15 of the Convention. This
issue is examined in Assembly
Resolution
2209 (2018) “State of emergency: proportionality issues concerning
derogations under Article 15 of the European Convention on Human
Rights”, based on the report by our fellow committee member Mr Raphaël Comte
(Switzerland, ALDE);
in this resolution,
the Assembly reiterated its concerns about,
inter
alia, the situation of human rights defenders, civil
society and the media. It should be recalled that, in its
Resolution 2156 (2017), the Assembly voted to establish a procedure to monitor
the functioning of democratic institutions in Turkey, a decision
based on its concerns over the emergency measures and their impact.
17. Numerous measures taken under this emergency regime on the
basis of legislative decrees, including massive dismissals in the
judiciary, prosecution services, academia (including over 500 “Academics
for peace”, criticising the military operations in the Southeast),
police, security and armed forces, and other State institutions,
and closures of television stations, newspapers and other media,
raise concern as to their compatibility with human rights, democracy
and the rule of law and are addressed in
Resolution 2209 (2018) and continue to be followed by the Monitoring Committee
and its co-rapporteurs on Turkey. In its “
Report
on the impact of the state of emergency on human rights in Turkey,
including an update on the South-East. January – December 2017” published on 20 March 2018, the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) concluded that
“the prolonged state of emergency has led to a continued erosion of
the rule of law and deterioration of the human rights situation”
in the country and noted that “the deterioration of the domestic
human rights situation and the shrinking of the political and civic
space require immediate steps for Turkey to be compliant with its
obligations under international human rights law”.
The situation of civil society is worrying.
During my fact-finding
visit to Ankara, I discussed this issue with members of the Grand Assembly,
the deputy Ombudsman responsible for human rights issues, high officials
from the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior, the
Director General for Foundations and a large number of representatives
of NGOs and public employees’ trade unions.
18. Legislative Decree No. 667 of 22 July 2016 calls for the winding
up of organisations “affiliated to FETŐ/PDY
or
having a link to or contact with it”, including associations and
foundations, and orders the assets (money, movable objects, real
estate, business files, etc.) of the entities concerned to be transferred
to the State without any kind of compensation. On the basis of Article
2 of this decree, 1 125 associations and 104 foundations which were
alleged to have had links with the FETŐ/PDY and had been listed
in the Appendix to the decree were immediately dissolved and their
assets confiscated. Following the simplified administrative procedure
for the further dissolution of NGOs set out in this provision (giving
such powers to relevant ministries), additional associations and
foundations have been dissolved.
In
Resolution 2209 (2018), the Assembly considered that the overall impact of
emergency measures on such bodies had been excessive, both in scope
and in being indiscriminate as to the degree of alleged culpability
and permanent in effect. The individuals and legal entities affected
by these measures can lodge appeals with a special commission charged,
inter alia, with ruling on appeals
against measures taken directly by the legislative decrees enacted under
the state of emergency. The Inquiry Commission for State of Emergency
Measures began to receive appeals on 17 July 2017 and its decisions
can subsequently be subject to judicial review. As at 28 February 2018,
the commission had received 107 076 applications and had rejected
1 126 of them. In only 100 cases, did the commission rule in favour
of the applicants. In
Resolution
2209 (2018), the Assembly was critical of the delays in providing
a timely, effective remedy, which had unduly prolonged the impact
of emergency measures on persons who may have been wrongly affected,
and called for the Inquiry Commission to expedite its examination
of outstanding applications. Unfortunately, during my visit to Ankara,
I did not have the opportunity to meet with the members of the Commission,
as our meeting was cancelled at short notice.
19. According to a recent report by the Turkish Human Rights Joint
Platform (IHOP),
as at 20 March
2018, the number of closed associations amounted to 1 419. In the
case of 188 associations which lodged administrative complaints,
closure decisions had been revoked (out of 1 607 associations closed
by emergency decrees Nos. 667, 677, 679, 689 and 695); during my
visit to Ankara, the authorities confirmed the figures for closures
and revocations of closures. IHOP’s report also indicates that,
as of 28 February 2018, closure decisions had been revoked for 23
out of 168 foundations closed by emergency decrees Nos. 667, 689 and
695; therefore the total number of closed foundations amounted to
145. According to the authorities, the closed associations and foundations
operated in various areas of life, including social affairs, tourism,
culture, media or education and the geographical scope of their
activities was not limited to a specific area (whilst a higher number
of NGOs had been closed in big cities like Ankara and Istanbul);
they had been established and/or infiltrated by terrorist organisations
and were closed on the basis of information received from intelligence services
and local governors. The majority of them have not applied to the
Inquiry Commission (only around 150 out of over 1 400 closed associations).
None of them have complained to the Ombudsman. If a decision on
closure has been revoked, the assets of the association/foundations
have been returned. In total, there are currently nearly 113 000
associations and over 5 000 foundations in Turkey.
20. According to the Venice Commission, the liquidation of associations
and foundations for having alleged connections or contact with FETŐ/PDY
on the basis of emergency decree No. 667 constitutes “a far-reaching interference”
with several rights provided by the European Convention on Human
Rights, namely the right to freedom of association (Article 11)
and the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions (Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (ETS No. 9)). The Venice Commission
also regrets the fact that the associations have been dissolved
instead of having been temporarily suspended.
These measures have also
been roundly criticised by the Commissioner for Human Rights, the
Conference of INGOs
and the Assembly itself. The latter,
in its
Resolution 2156
(2017), called on the Turkish authorities to “refrain from
applying sweeping measures, including against … NGOs, on the basis
of vague criteria of alleged ‘connection’ to a terrorist organisation
without evidentiary grounds and in the absence of judicial decisions”
(paragraph 27.4).
21. Furthermore, cases of judicial harassment or arbitrary arrests
of some
human rights defenders and journalists have been reported on several
occasions. Legal proceedings have been brought against the heads of
the Turkish section of Amnesty International. On 6 June 2017, its
chairperson, Taner Kiliç, was arrested by the police and was charged
with “belonging to the Fethullah Gülen group” for allegedly downloading
ByLock, a messaging application used by the “Gülenists”. On 31 January
2018, an Istanbul court ordered his conditional release, but following
the prosecutor’s appeal the decision was reversed by another court.
Therefore, he is still in pretrial detention despite several interventions
by international bodies
and is in danger of being sentenced to
a long term in prison. On 5 July 2017, the Director of Amnesty International,
Idil Eser, was arrested together with seven other Turkish human
rights defenders and two trainers (a Swede and a German) at a seminar
being held on the island of Büyükada, on the ground that they had
allegedly committed a crime on behalf of a “terrorist organisation”
without being a member of it. All ten were released on bail on 25
October 2017. Cases of harassment of members of other NGOs have
also been reported. On 30 January 2018, police searched the homes
and workplaces and arrested 11 members of the Central Council of
the Turkish Medical Association (TTB) on the basis of anti-terror
law provisions. This event took place a few days after the TTB publicly
criticised the Turkish military’s “Operation Olive Branch” in Afrin,
northern Syria. Although the TTB members were released after seven
days, they are still under criminal investigation. Moreover, at
the end of January 2018, several members of the Human Rights Association,
whose directors had already been subject to an investigation launched
on the basis of anti-terror law provisions, were arrested and detained
in reaction to their social media posts criticising the operation
in Afrin.
As I learned during my visit
to Ankara, the activities of LGBTI associations – such as Kaos GL
and Pinklife – have been restricted following the Ankara local governor’s
decision to prohibit them from organising public events. In Istanbul,
they were forbidden to organise the annual gay and trans pride march.
In general, almost all NGO interlocutors complained about the shrinking space
for civil society, due to the high number of closed NGOs (in their
view, especially those working mainly for the protection of children’s
or women’s rights or on humanitarian issues in the Southeast and
human rights lawyers’ groups), lengthy audits launched against some
of them and investigations started into their members. They stressed
that numerous activists had been detained (mainly for taking part
in peaceful protests and for their critical posts on social media)
and are now subject to travel bans. In their view, there is no effective
remedy against the measures taken under the state of emergency.
Those who were dismissed under the state of emergency measures complain
about their “civil death”, as they can find a job neither in the
country nor abroad (due to travel bans) and are denied other basic
rights, and their freedom of expression has been restricted.
2.4. Hungary
22. Although the Assembly expressed
no criticism about the situation of Hungarian civil society in
Resolution 2096 (2016), my report of 2015 pointed out some problems, such as
“a general and mutual mistrust between NGOs and the authorities”,
smear campaigns in the media, and searches and legal proceedings
launched against the NGOs running the “NGO Fund” programme, financed
by the European Economic Area, and some NGOs receiving grants from
this scheme.
Since then, while most of the proceedings
brought against these NGOs were set aside or terminated in early
2016, further critical statements have been made by certain Hungarian
politicians, including Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, in the media
on the subject of NGOs working to protect human rights. The Open
Society Foundations, founded by the billionaire financier George
Soros, have been the target of a particularly vicious campaign,
including a virulent poster campaign financed by Orbán’s Fidesz
party.
According to the report of the
United Nations Special Rapporteur, Mr Michel Forst, Hungarian human
rights organisations are forced to operate in an increasingly polarised
and politicised environment, while the State attempts to discredit
their work with fabricated criminal proceedings.
Moreover, on
13 June 2017 the parliament passed a law – the “Law on the transparency
of organisations receiving support from abroad”, which obliges NGOs
receiving funds from abroad (associations and foundations) to reveal
their exact amount if this support exceeds 7.2 million forints (nearly
€24 000) and to register as “organisations receiving support from
abroad” or else face a fine of up to approx. €3 000, be dissolved
or struck off. This law came into force on 27 June 2017, despite
criticism voiced by several Council of Europe bodies, including
the Venice Commission, the Commissioner for Human Rights, the Conference
of INGOs and the Assembly itself.
Moreover, on 13 July
2017, the European Commission opened infringement proceedings, considering
that this legislation is in breach of European Union law, and on
7 December 2017 it referred the case to the European Court of Justice.
Twenty-three NGOs (including Amnesty International)
have filed an application
with the Hungarian Constitutional Court and over 200 refuse to comply
with the law. In December 2018, 14 NGOs lodged an application to
the European Court of Human Rights, invoking the right to respect
for private and family life, freedom of expression, freedom of association
and the prohibition of discrimination.
23. Ahead of the general election of 8 April 2018, on 13 February
2018, the government submitted a package of three draft laws called
the “Stop Soros Package” (T/19774, T/19775 and T/19776), which they justified
by claiming that mass migration poses a severe security risk to
Hungary. The package is aimed at restricting the work of NGOs working
on asylum and migration issues. If adopted, it would require NGOs
that receive funding from abroad and allegedly “propagate mass migration”
or “support illegal migration” to, i
nter alia,
register at court acknowledging such “illegal” activity and make
this information public (on their website and on every publication).
Their activity would need to be approved by the Minister of Immigration
and Refugee Affairs, who could deny permission in case of “national
security risk”. Any foreign revenue given to such organisations
would be subjected to a 25% tax and would need to be transferred
to a separate bank account, which would be monitored by the Prosecutor’s
Office and the Central Bank. Non-compliance with the rules may lead
to the imposition of a fine of 200% of the foreign revenue or dissolution
of the organisation. NGOs would be also required to disclose to
the authorities the personal data of any person to whom they make
payments (staff, contractors or partners). Moreover, the new legislation
would empower the authorities to bar foreigners working on migration
and refugee issues from the country and to ban Hungarian activists
from approaching border areas. This legislative package raises several
concerns as to its compatibility with international human rights
standards, in particular with the right to freedom of expression
and association, the right to freedom of movement and the prohibition
of discrimination. Criticism in this respect has been voiced by
the United Nations Human Rights Committee, the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights,
the President of the INGO Conference and a large number of international
NGOs.
At its meeting in Paris on 14 March 2018,
this committee agreed to seize the Venice Commission for an opinion
on the compatibility of the government’s “Stop Soros Package” with
international human rights standards. The Venice Commission plans
to adopt its opinion during its June 2018 plenary session.
2.5. Other
Council of Europe member States
24. Over the last two years, the
situation of civil society in some other member States has given
cause for concern, especially with regard to certain recent changes
in the law, its interpretation, or attempts to make legislative
changes aimed at introducing more State control over the funding
of NGOs. In November 2017, Amnesty International in
Ireland was ordered to pay back
a grant of €137 000 received from the Open Society Foundations a
year earlier. The Irish Government’s regulatory body – the Standards
in Public Office Commission (SIPOC) – reversed its previous position
and considered that the organisation had broken the 1997 Electoral
Law by accepting a grant from an international donor for “political
purposes”, i.e. a campaign for reforming abortion laws. In June
2017, in the
Republic of Moldova, the Minister of Justice
drew up amendments to the draft law on non-commercial organisations
with the aim of imposing several new obligations on NGOs that obtain
funding from abroad and are engaged in “political activities”. Since
most Moldovan NGOs receive grants from abroad, this proposal was
fiercely criticised by the NGOs. It seems that this proposal was
abandoned in September 2017. In
Poland,
on 15 September 2017 the parliament passed a law creating an official
body – the National Freedom Institute (NFI) – Centre for the Development
of Civil Society – one of whose tasks will consist in distributing
public funds to NGOs. This body will report to the Prime Minister’s
office and be overseen by another new body, the Committee on Activities
of Public Benefit, made up of senior officials from several ministries.
According to the OSCE/ODIHR, the law should have provided more safeguards
against potential government interference in the NFI’s work and
could lead to centralisation of the distribution of public funds
to civil society organisations. Moreover, the government initially
wanted the NFI to distribute funds originating from the EEA, but
the Norwegian Government was opposed to this and a compromise solution
seems to have been found in October 2017.
25. In
Romania, a draft
law to amend Ordinance No. 26/2000 on associations and foundations
(L140/2017 of 21 March 2017) was initiated by two members of parliament
in March 2017. On 21 November 2017, it was tacitly adopted by the
Senate and is now pending before the Chamber of Deputies. Although
it focuses mainly on public utility associations, foundations and
federations, it also introduces additional financial reporting obligations
on all such entities. Under the draft law, any association, foundation
or federation would be obliged to declare its income and expenditure
biannually, on pain of suspension of the activities for a period
of 30 days and in case of continuous non-compliance, immediate dissolution
proceedings. This raised criticism by the Government of Romania,
which issued a negative opinion on the draft law, and of 70 Romanian
NGOs, which addressed an open letter to the leadership of the Social
Democratic Party (the governing party) in November 2017. On 11 December
2017, the Expert Council of the Conference of INGOs of the Council
of Europe issued a critical opinion on Draft Law 140/2017.
Moreover,
following the committee’s request in December 2017, the Venice Commission,
jointly with the OSCE/ODIHR, issued an opinion at its March 2018
plenary session. It concluded that the proposed financial reporting
obligations and the sanctions for their non-respect were clearly unnecessary
and disproportionate in light of Article 11 of the European Convention
on Human Rights and should be repealed. They also posed dangers
for the privacy rights of the donors. The opinion criticised the exhaustive
and rigid list of activities that rendered associations/foundations
eligible for public utility status and which excluded democracy,
human rights, the rule of law and the fight against corruption.
It also concluded that the ban on engaging in political activities
for associations/foundations with public utility was too broad and
that the draft law should be submitted to broad public consultations.
26. In
Ukraine, the adoption,
on 23 March 2017, of Law No. 1975-VIII amending the Law on Prevention
of Corruption led to an outcry as it obliges activists working in
this field to submit electronic declarations of their assets in
the same way as government officials or civil servants, even if
they receive no public funding. These provisions have been criticised
in particular by the Commissioner for Human Rights.
They
entered into force on 1 April 2018. Moreover, in July 2017, the
presidential administration submitted to the parliament two draft laws
(Nos. 6674 and 6675) amending certain laws and the Tax Code with
the aim of ensuring the transparency of the funding of civil society
organisations. These draft laws impose onerous asset-reporting obligations
on all “public associations” (whose number amounts to over 77 000)
and some of their employees. According to the authorities, this
would be necessary in order to enhance the publicity of information
on the financing of “public associations”. In March 2018, the Venice
Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR adopted an opinion, in which they found
that the new financial disclosure regime would conflict with human
rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular with the freedom
of association, the right to respect for private life and the prohibition
of discrimination.
They noted,
inter alia, that associations would
be required to submit more reports that businesses, charitable organisations,
foundations or professional organisations. The new reporting obligations would
concern specifically international and not domestic donors and would
not respect their desire to remain anonymous. Sanctions foreseen
for non-respect of the new obligations – namely the loss of non-profit institution
status, coupled with tax penalties and fines – were too severe.
Thus, the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR called on the Ukrainian
authorities to reconsider them in their entirety or, at least, to
narrow them substantially to ensure their legitimacy and proportionality
and to “conduct inclusive and effective consultations” with civil
society and the general public. The Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR
also called on the authorities to cancel the e-declaration requirements
for anti-corruption activists as a matter of urgency. The authorities
announced that they would cancel these provisions.
27. Furthermore, the offices of some Ukrainian NGOs were searched
in October 2017 on the ground that these organisations were involved
in the activities of “Kremlin agents”. On 11 October 2017 in particular,
the offices of the charity Patients of Ukraine were searched and
their documents seized, even though no audit had ever brought to
light any misappropriation of funds in that organisation. Its managers
were suspected of financing the self-proclaimed “popular republics”
Donetsk and Luhansk.
28. Other problematic cases were reported by the Expert Council
on NGO Law of the INGO Conference in Greece (due to the delays in
registration of associations of groups claiming minority group status),
the Republic of Moldova (delays or non-registration of certain associations,
including religious ones) and the United Kingdom (due to a variety
of measures resulting in the closing of space for civil society,
namely anti-terrorist measures affecting the work of certain charities).
According to the then Commissioner for Human Rights, certain NGOs
were the target of negative official rhetoric in Bulgaria, Hungary,
Poland, Romania, Serbia, the Slovak Republic and “the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia”.
More
examples concerning European Union member States can be found in
the above-mentioned report of FRA.
29. In its
reply of 23 November 2016 to Assembly Recommendation 2086 (2016), the Committee of Ministers reacted positively
to most of the Assembly’s proposals concerning the reaction to new
threats to the functioning of independent civil societies. However,
it regretted that although a study on the implementation of Recommendation
CM/Rec(2007)14 had been embarked upon in 2010 by the European Committee
on Legal Co-operation (CDCJ), only a few member States took part
in it. Nevertheless, the CDCJ intended to undertake a new review
of the Committee of Ministers recommendation’s implementation. In
addition, in 2014 and 2015, the Committee of Ministers held thematic
debates on freedom of assembly and association. Following the 2014 debate,
the Rapporteur Group on Democracy (GR-DEM) examined the Assembly’s
proposal to strengthen interaction with NGOs and concluded that
this could be achieved in compliance with the rules in force, in particular
by enhancing its co-operation with the INGO Conference. On 6 July
2016, the Committee of Ministers adopted Resolution
CM/Res(2016)3 on the participatory status of international non-governmental organisations
with the Council of Europe, defining more clearly the criteria for
obtaining such status and ways of strengthening co-operation with
the Organisation. The INGO Conference has recently proposed a project aimed
at providing a better-researched, systematic, transparent and upstream
response to situations of potential concern. If implemented, it
will introduce a special mechanism for NGOs to communicate rapidly information
to the INGO Conference, including on State practice and legislation,
and concerns regarding the freedom of association. The Expert Council
will then assess the information and will make its evaluation public.
30. The Committee of Ministers is also examining the proposal
presented in the report by the Secretary General on “
The
state of democracy, human rights and the rule of law: a security
imperative for Europe” of 2016 to prepare a study on the standards applied
to foreign funding of NGOs in the member States and, on the basis of
the findings of this study, to consider the need for new Committee
of Ministers guidelines.
Moreover, the Council
of Europe’s Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH) has drawn
up a report entitled “Analysis on the impact of current national
legislation, policies and practices on the activities of civil society
organisations, Human Rights defenders and national institutions
for the promotion and protection of Human Rights”.
4. Conclusion
31. The space for civil society
in the Council of Europe geographical area has been shrinking over
the past two years. It has not only been the case in the four Council
of Europe member States analysed in my previous report (Azerbaijan,
Hungary, the Russian Federation and Turkey), but also in other States.
In Azerbaijan and Russia, new legislative and regulatory provisions
adopted between 2009 and 2016 have become applicable, despite the
criticism of the Venice Commission and other international expert
bodies, and their application has led to the cessation of operation
of numerous NGOs. In Hungary, the Law on the transparency of organisations receiving
support from abroad adopted in June 2017 has also entered into force,
despite the fact that it was criticised by the Venice Commission
and despite the legal actions brought against it at the domestic
and European level. Moreover, the “Stop-Soros package”, which is
to be soon examined by the Venice Commission, has raised additional
concerns. In Turkey, nearly 1 600 associations and foundations have
been closed on the basis of state of emergency decrees or administrative
measures taken on the basis of the latter. It has not yet been shown
that they have an effective legal remedy against such decisions.
The number of closed NGOs, the procedure used to close them and
the overall atmosphere prevailing after the failed coup are worrying.
The Turkish authorities invoke the national security argument, and
namely the fight against terrorism, but in my view such arguments
are often used against any critic of the government. I find the excessive
use of such arguments counterproductive not only for the good functioning
of a democratic society but also for the fight against terrorism.
Moreover, some other member States – like Romania and Ukraine – have
been trying to take legislative measures imposing burdensome financial
reporting obligations on associations. In Poland, the creation of
the NFI distributing public funds to NGOs has been criticised for centralising
and politicising the process. In many countries, NGOs face difficulties
in obtaining registration and funds for their activities. Their
leaders are subjected to judicial or administration harassment or
are victims of serious human rights violations, such as ill-treatment
or arbitrary arrests; the latter issue is examined in detail in
the report on “Protecting human rights defenders in Council of Europe
member States”.
32. Against this background, I would like to recall the recommendations
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, who stressed
in 2016 that there were five essential elements to “create and maintain
a safe and enabling environment for civil society: a robust legal
framework that is compliant with international standards as well
as a strong national human rights protection system that safeguards
public freedoms and ensures effective access to justice; a political
environment conducive to civil society work; access to information;
avenues for participation by civil society in decision-making processes;
and a long-term support and resources for civil society”.
These recommendations were
backed by the United Nations Human Rights Council in its Resolution
on “Civil society space” of 1 July 2016.
I am fully convinced that the Assembly should
support them as well and call on Council of Europe member States
to adopt the necessary measures for their implementation.
33. As regards the legal framework affecting NGO work, the examples
mentioned in this report show that there is a growing tendency to
propose and even adopt laws which are not compliant with international
human rights standards. Some of these laws are discriminatory, as
they are aimed at restricting foreign funding of NGOs, which might
have a very detrimental effect on their overall activities. As regards
access to information and to decision-making processes, there have
been cases in which NGOs have not been consulted on the proposed
legislation affecting their status. Finally, as regards a political
environment conducive to civil society, smear campaigns in the media
and the use of terminology delegitimising civil society actors (such
as “foreign agents” or “undesirable organisations” in Russia, “terrorists”
or “gülenists” in Turkey or the “anti-Soros” speeches and posters
in Hungary) increase negative public opinion of civil society and
discourage the latter from exercising its fundamental freedoms.
The availability of funding is an important issue in this context.
Let us be honest: without access to funding, no serious NGO work
is possible. The examples listed above show that laws curtailing
civil society activities and funding have been proposed and/or enacted
in several member States of the Council of Europe. This demonstrates
a worrying trend that should be closely monitored by the competent
bodies of the Organisation and raises the question of whether and
to what extent NGOs should (also) be financed by public funds in
order to remain “independent”, i.e. to be able to fully enjoy their
rights and freedoms stemming from Articles 10 and 11 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. In any case, private donors should not
be intimidated or otherwise discouraged.
34. To conclude, the situation of NGOs in Council of Europe member
States requires further attention from the Assembly. I make proposals
to this end in the draft resolution and draft recommendation.