1. Focus,
topicality and guiding questions
1. Public service is the foundation
of our societies. It allows for our everyday needs to be met, conflicts
to be resolved and the quality of life to be improved. Every country
needs to ensure that the public service meets its objectives effectively
and that it makes the best possible use of available resources.
While local authorities are in direct contact with people and are
well placed to respond to their needs efficiently, national authorities have
a comprehensive overview of the situation in the country and a responsibility
to arrange for resources to be shared fairly and for support to
be provided to those in need. Thus, responsibilities need to be
assigned in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, so that
problems are resolved at the most immediate level that is consistent
with their resolution. This principle lies at the foundation of
decentralisation, and parliaments play an important role in the
development of relevant arrangements.
2. Successful decentralisation implies that competences are assigned
in a clear way, relevant authorities have sufficient resources and
public servants have the necessary skills. Furthermore, it requires
that a balance is established between continuity within the State
administration on one hand, and flexibility of its institutional arrangements,
on the other. Such flexibility allows for the necessary adjustment
to the changing needs of the population. It is therefore crucial
that the decentralisation process is not conceived as a one-off,
top-down action, but rather as an ongoing negotiation process, bringing
together key public actors.
3. Ideally, decentralisation consolidates democratic systems,
strengthens local governance, promotes inclusive growth and local
economic development, and makes public services more effective in
responding to local needs, for example when it comes to protecting
and promoting the rights of minorities and marginalised communities.
Decentralisation is regularly considered a way of promoting a more
accountable exercise of power, the principle of subsidiarity and
the right of local communities to manage their own affairs in an autonomous
way, as enshrined in the Council of Europe’s European Charter of
Local Self-Government (CETS No. 122).
4. However, recent studies have shown that some decentralisation
processes have failed to achieve the desired effects and that the
success of decentralisation depends to a great extent on how it
is designed and put into practice.

When major
decisions about decentralisation are made in a top-down manner,
with little consideration of the views of the people concerned,
this tends to result in frustration and resentment. When the responsibilities
given to local authorities are not accompanied by sufficient financial
resources or fiscal autonomy, this tends to lead to a decline in
the quality and reliability of public services. When local authorities do
not get the training that is needed to fulfil new tasks, this undermines
the efficiency of the public administration.
5. To shed some light on the challenges of successful decentralisation
processes and to support co-operation in this area, I will explore
the following questions in particular: 1) Which are the overall
trends of decentralisation observed across Europe over the past
years?; 2) What are the determinants of successful decentralisation
processes?; 3) What is the particular role of national parliaments
in decentralisation processes?; and 4) What lessons can we draw
from previous experience in different countries and what are, consequently,
the recommendations for upcoming decentralisation processes?
6. In July 2017, Ms Bettina Petersohn (lecturer in Politics at
Swansea University), external expert, was mandated to explore these
matters; her research results (which focused in particular on territorial
reforms) were presented to the committee at its meeting on 6 December
2017 in Paris and provided the basis for this explanatory memorandum,
next to the findings and recommendations of the Congress of Local
and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe (Congress), the
European Committee on Democracy and Governance (CDDG), the Council
of Europe Centre of Expertise for Local Government Reform, and the
European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission),
as well as those of the OECD, which I also discussed during a fact-finding
visit to the OECD on 20 September 2017. In June 2018, an exchange
of views was held on the lessons learned with respect to decentralisation
in diverse national contexts, with the participation of Ms Alba
Dakoli Wilson, Director of the Foundation for Local Autonomy and
Governance (FLAG), Albania; Mr Tomàs Font i Llovet, Emeritus Professor
in Administrative Law, University of Barcelona, Spain; and Mr Andreas
Kiefer, Secretary General of the Congress of Local and Regional
Authorities of the Council of Europe. Valuable feedback on the provisional
draft report was received from PLATFORMA, a pan-European coalition
of 30 local and regional governments hosted by the Council of European
Municipalities and Regions (CEMR).
2. Overall
trends of decentralisation in Europe
2.1. Content
and dimensions of decentralisation
7. Decentralisation is closely
linked to territorial reforms (changes to the territorial structures
of sub-national governments), institutional reforms (i.e. the re-organisation
of powers, responsibilities and resources) and public-management
reforms redefining administrative procedures.

By means of decentralisation, administrative,
legislative (in the case of federal States) and fiscal autonomy
is transferred to regional and local levels with the aim of increasing
accountability and efficiency of delivery of public services, strengthening democratic
government and ensuring that decisions made correspond to the interests
of the people, and/or giving recognition and self-government to
distinct communities with a clear territorial base.
8. Decentralisation generally involves political processes by
which new arrangements are negotiated, enshrined in relevant legislation
and implemented in practice. They mainly aim at changing the allocation
of powers and resources across different levels of government, and
usually include a formal negotiation involving representatives of
different administrative levels and often a formal adoption of legislation
involving national parliaments.
9. Reform processes pass through multiple stages, including initiation
and agenda-setting, deliberating and formulating principles and
goals, drafting of details in smaller working groups, negotiating
the details amongst elected officials or parties and reaching the
agreement following the respective rules that apply in each context. Reform
packages are generally very complex and require expert knowledge
for the formulation of details while at the same time ensuring that
solutions are within the range of political feasibility and acceptable
to the public. Progressively, public consultations are also used
in this context.
2.2. Trends
in decentralisation
10. Increasing the level of autonomy
for lower tiers of government has been a worldwide trend over recent decades.
Of the 81 countries covered by the Regional Authority Index, 52
experienced a net increase in decentralisation and only nine experienced
a net decline.

Since the 1990s financial crisis, many
countries have used public administration reforms to promote regionalisation,
municipal reorganisation and decentralisation of powers.
11. There exists a great variety of decentralisation models, ranging
from federal (Germany and Switzerland) or unitary (Denmark, Sweden
and Finland) highly decentralised systems to highly centralised
unitary systems (Greece, Ireland, Portugal or Turkey). In central
and eastern European countries, the reforms have been substantially
influenced by European Union standards, in the prospect of EU accession
and often with the use of donor funding. Further adaptations are
currently under way. The Nordic countries continue the long established
tradition of local self-government, with current focus on more responsive
and cost-effective local services. “Free-communes” trials were introduced
in Norway, Finland, Sweden and Denmark, which permit experimentation
before enacting relevant legislation. In the United Kingdom, Spain,
France and Italy, decentralisation has been closely linked to regionalisation,
often with an asymmetric approach, with different powers transferred
to sub-national entities in the same country.

12. The economic crisis has added impetus to municipal amalgamations
(mergers) already in progress, in a quest for modernisation, rationalisation
and above all economies of scale.

More widespread inter-municipal co-operation
between local authorities in service provision and the sharing of
administrative resources and processes has been promoted.

To
better respond to a new set of concerns of the population and promote sustainable
development, governments today actively seek a broad partnership
with civil society and the private sector.

13. Finally, another growing trend is co-operation among local
authorities across borders (for example Basel Trinational Eurodistrict,
Galicia-North Portugal or Øresund Region), which helps to improve
the public service, to overcome difficulties and to promote intercultural
dialogue. Such co-operation works best where there is a genuine
interest, pragmatic approach and enabling legal environment. European
Union and Council of Europe instruments have proved very useful
in supporting such co-operation.

2.3. Key
challenges
14. All 47 Council of Europe member
States have ratified the European Charter on Local Self-Governance (ETS
No. 122), which shows that local democracy has become a shared European
value. However, in some countries the crisis and subsequent austerity
policies, as well as uncertainty about the democratic model have halted
or even reversed some of the reforms, at least in the short term
and in particular with respect to the control of subnational expenditure.
15. According to the OECD, virtually all sub-national entities
in the European Union report investment spending gaps, nearly half
report a drop in investment since 2010, of which 70% experienced
a drop of more than 10%, and over half are experiencing cuts in
grants from central government.

Furthermore,
there is worrying evidence of cutbacks in discretionary expenditure
in aid of vulnerable groups.

16. The trend towards re-centralisation is a growing concern for
the Council of Europe. Already back in 2013, Herwig van Staa, President
of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council
of Europe, pointed out that local and regional democracy “has reached
a crossroads. Threats to democratic governance are on the rise,
aggravated by the severity of the economic crisis, and undermining
the very essence of true democracy that must be inclusive and based
on participation and ownership …Today, governments are using economic
arguments to recentralise and to claw back competences. Local budgets
are being squeezed. The freedom of local authorities to raise income
through taxation and to decide how to spend their resources is being
restricted.”

When addressing
the Committee of Ministers in December 2017, Andreas Kiefer, Secretary General
of the Congress, underlined that going back to recentralisation
would not reflect the expectations of the people, who are ready
to take responsibility for their communities.
17. Both the Congress and the Parliamentary Assembly have expressed
this concern in a number of adopted texts, including the Congress’
Resolution 357(2013) and Recommendation 340(2013) and the Assembly’s
Resolution 1886 (2012) “Austerity measures – a danger for democracy and social
rights” and
Resolution
1884 (2012) on the impact of the economic crisis on local and regional
authorities in Europe.
18. In 2017, Thorbjørn Jagland, Secretary General of the Council
of Europe, warned member States about the dangers of growing nationalism
and populism and recalled that a “balanced distribution of powers throughout
all levels of government is one of the main pillars of any democratic
State. It represents an essential component of the necessary checks
and balances … Strong local and regional democracy brings democracy closer
to the people, thereby enhancing democratic security.”

2.4. Recurrent
issues
19. One of the main obstacles to
successful decentralisation in many countries is the persistent
failure of central authorities to effectively include local governments
in decisions that directly affect them. More specifically, formal
mechanisms of consultation are often lacking; and/or the existing
consultation mechanisms are not sufficiently used; and/or the means
of consultation are of a controversial nature and the time frame
is excessively limited.

Quite often, initial input
from local authorities is requested, but no or little feedback is provided
on whether and how such input has been taken into account. In some
cases, parliaments have to endorse relevant legislation only after
all the negotiations have taken place.
20. Devolution of public powers to local/regional governments
can either take the form of delegated powers, where local/regional
governments exercise public competences on behalf of the central
administration which sets the implementation frame or policy objectives,
or it can take the form of decentralised powers, becoming an original
competence of local/regional governments including full decision-making
on policy and implementation. Limited definition, allocation and
exercise of local competences are another important recurrent issue.

This
includes a lack of genuine local government functions, imprecise
delimitation of competences and unclear accountability mechanisms.
21. The fiscal component of the public competence must be adequately
devolved (delegated or decentralised) in parallel with the powers,
otherwise such incomplete decentralisation can be considered as
a mere withdrawal of the State from the public function, and burden
self-governing authorities with inadequately funded competences,
restricting further their autonomous status and role in an indirect
manner. Fiscal reforms, which are considered to be key components
of decentralisation processes, are difficult to design and implement,
and therefore often become the “weak link” in reforms.

The
Congress came across intensified problems related to local government
finance in recent years in many countries, as local governments
have been among the primary targets for budget cutbacks.
22. Capacity building is another crucial area for successful decentralisation
reforms. It is particularly important in highly centralised countries
initiating decentralisation. The Committee of Ministers recognises
that “the capacity of local government hinges essentially on the
skills of elected representatives, the corporate management capacity
of the organisation, the workforce capacity and financial and project
management skills”, and highlights “the importance of developing
this capacity further.”

23. Successful decentralisation is to a great extent about finding
the right balance within a continuum, between empowerment and accountability,
between economies of scale and adaptability, between competition and
co-operation, and between equality and entrepreneurship. When power
is decentralised it might get misused or lead to corruption. When
health facilities are made available for a small municipality they
might not be able to provide specialised services or use expensive
modern technologies. The disparity between the better-off and worse-off
communities (whether resulting from access to natural resources
or better management or any other factors) might lead to unequal
access to public services and exacerbate existing cleavages and
tensions. Sub-national entities might act in their own interests
at the expense of the “common good” (“not in my backyard”). The
right balance needs to be found with regard to the specific context,
in a way that is transparent, fair and foreseeable, and it should
be reviewed and adapted as required.
24. Based on the member States’ experience in the field of decentralisation,
the Committee of Ministers adopted a number of recommendations,
which provide useful guidance on the above-mentioned challenges. This
includes in particular: CM/Rec(2005)1 on the financial resources
of local and regional authorities; CM/Rec(2004)1 on financial and
budgetary management at local and regional levels; CM/Rec(2004)12
on the processes of reform of boundaries and/or structure of local
and regional authorities.
3. Determinants
of successful decentralisation processes
3.1. Definition
of success of decentralisation
25. A decentralisation reform is
generally regarded as having had formal success if a legislative
act has been passed successfully. Such formal success, however,
does not guarantee that the original, substantive demands for reform
have been met. Substantive success of a reform can be measured by
the degree to which: 1) the initial agenda has been achieved and
is reflected in the legislation; and 2) relevant stakeholders evaluate the
reform as a contribution to the original goal. One would generally
expect members of governing parties to claim it as a success because
they have been in favour of it from the beginning. However, if opposition
parties or minority leaders, representatives of sub-national units,
experts or civil society organisations, also perceive a reform as
an effective contribution towards the initial goal one would consider
the substantive success of the reform to be higher. If a new proposal
for further reforms is brought forward shortly after, the present
reform would normally be regarded as having failed in substantive
terms despite successfully passing legislative hurdles.

3.2. Factors
influencing the success or failure of decentralisation reform
26. The OECD has identified pre-conditions
for successful decentralisation reforms.

Studies on measuring success of constitutional
reforms in this area are also useful for drawing a number of conclusions.

27. In particular, research demonstrates that the establishment
of a separate arena for the reform negotiations (e.g. through a
constitutional convention or special reform commissions for larger
consultation) seem to have a positive effect on its effectiveness.
Such an approach may lead to a more inclusive consultation process
with business or civil society organisations, thereby ensuring broader
representation of interests and the reference to time frames which
are independent of elections or political cycles (to avoid sheer
replication of existing political conflicts between parties over
the reform), and preventing controversial issues from being excluded
or postponed, thus reducing the substantial success.
28. Separating the agreement on principles from negotiations over
details and organising the reform in sequences seems to facilitate
relevant arrangements. However, political arenas and reform sequences
need to be sufficiently connected to achieve coherent and effective
reform processes.
29. Effective communication seems to be a key factor in ensuring
a connection between negotiation and adoption stages, for example
by including all actors or institutions whose consent is required
for passing the reform, even though the backlash could result in
political bargains diminishing the substantive success.
30. Extending the time perspectives of negotiating actors increases
the chances that long-term considerations are included into proposed
solutions. Governments initiating reforms would often confine their objectives
to electoral cycles, whilst to achieve more lasting reform outcomes
different time horizons may be required. This can, for example,
be achieved by creating inclusive reform commissions gathering representatives
of various backgrounds including representatives of all parties,
civil servants, civil society organisations, experts and randomly
selected members of the wider public.
31. Clear and coherent assignment of responsibilities among administrative
levels and entities allows duplication and loss of accountability
to be avoided. It needs to be clear who does what, with respect
to finances, regulations, strategic planning, implementation and
monitoring. At each level, responsibilities need to be assigned
in accordance with the characteristics and needs of the entities
concerned. Adequate solutions should be found for specific territorial
units (asymmetry of reforms). The responsibilities should match
the evolving needs, and they should be adjusted periodically, based
on the experience and feedback received. It is important to ensure
that both the responsibilities assigned and the processes for their
adjustment are enshrined in legislation. The development of co-ordination
mechanisms is essential for smooth interaction between various levels.
32. Complementary reforms may be required in order to take into
account the lessons learned and to adjust the design and implementation
of the decentralisation processes. Pilot projects may be helpful
as part of a national learning process, in order to test various
approaches on a small scale and to support adjustments through learning
by doing.
33. National associations regrouping local and/or regional authorities
represent a single voice for local/regional government concerns
and act as an intermediary between the central government administration
and the local/regional governments of the country. The existence
of strong associations is an important success factor in decentralisation
processes.
4. Parliaments
as sites for negotiating and monitoring decentralisation reforms
34. Parliaments are important players
in the deliberation of reform principles, scrutiny of details as
well as in the adoption of relevant legislation. Decentralisation
reforms are as a rule ratified by a vote in parliament, thus receiving
the approval of a directly elected body and involving a democratic
process. Parliaments are therefore essential stakeholders in the
legitimacy of decentralisation reform.
35. Parliaments are in a good position to ensure the coherence
of policy development in the area of decentralisation within the
overall social and economic policies in their country. Furthermore,
as decentralisation impacts many areas (such as competences, elections,
representative bodies and executive bodies, supervision bodies or
finance), it is important that parliaments take care not to overlook
any of these interconnected areas and request governments to provide
holistic responses, “en bloc” or in a sequel.
36. Parliamentary committees may provide resources and space for
formulating drafts and for scrutinising details of a reform. In
this respect it is worth recalling that the challenge of multilevel
governance reforms is not to adapt to a new, stable and definitive
situation but rather to enable public administration at all levels
to adapt continually to a permanently evolving environment.

In
this case, parliament should be involved on a regular basis as well,
and not only at the stage of the adoption of relevant legislation.
When this is the case, parliamentarians might feel that their constituencies’
concerns have not sufficiently been taken into consideration. This
is likely to lead to lack of support for the proposed reforms, delays
with adoption or subsequent contestation of relevant arrangements.
37. Parliamentary working groups are regularly formed to focus
on one specific aspect of the reform (for example for drafting proposals
on the redistribution of financial resources, on the recognition
of distinct communities or on specific selected policies such as
education). Overlapping membership between parliamentary committees
and working groups and parliamentary research staff are often found
to be valuable assets in providing expertise and knowledge to the
drafting of proposals as well as to ensure that the political feasibility
of solutions is considered during that stage.
38. The contribution of national parliaments to the success of
a decentralisation reform depends on the one hand on the extent
to which the committees or working groups are dominated by political
divisions and party politics. On the other hand, national parliaments
need to balance consensus-building efforts with considerations about
what reform is politically feasible under existing political majorities
or constraints. Parliaments as sites for negotiating decentralisation
reforms offer an opportunity to deliver that balance because they
reflect political majorities while having the expertise and resources
to reach out to economic and societal interests to foster a broader
consensus about the content of the reform.
39. Local and regional government, including their representative
national associations, are best placed to assess the impact of proposed
reforms. It is therefore important to ensure that they are involved
in any parliamentary committees deliberating or supervising decentralisation
reform initiatives.
40. Like in other legislative processes, parliamentary committees
provide an opportunity for engaging with outside actors, for example
through hearings with other stakeholders, including civil society
organisations, or by calling for comments from experts or the interested
general public on reform drafts. This engagement with civil society
and the public is important for gathering information about the
potential impact of decentralisation on different sectors or interests
but also for building a broader consensus for the intended reform.
In particular in the context of ratification processes which include
popular referenda, the communication between elected representatives
and civil society needs to be organised and strengthened in order
to increase the chances of a successful reform.
41. Mobilisation of adequate resources including human resources
and training programmes for civil servants directly involved – in
accordance with the responsibilities assigned – is essential for
successful decentralisation processes. As parliaments approve the
State funding, they have the power and a responsibility to ensure
that the State provides local and regional authorities with the
means that correspond to the missions and responsibilities that
are entrusted to them.
42. Furthermore, adequate resources commensurate with the responsibilities
assigned are also the subject of the provisions of Article 9 of
the European Charter of Local Self-Government, against which a number
of signatory States members of the Council of Europe have expressed
reservations in their ratification instruments. Parliaments, when
deliberating and approving decentralisation legislation have the
opportunity to revise the ratification status of the Charter and
withdraw existing reservations, towards full applicability and implementation
of the Charter.
43. Decentralisation law takes years to implement and produce
results. It should be the responsibility of political forces and
governments, if they have initiated the relevant legislation, to
ensure its successful implementation, possibly through monitoring
and adjustments. Parliaments should pay attention to this aspect and
vote relevant provisions in the law. Furthermore, monitoring systems
help to ensure that the decentralisation arrangements meet the needs
of the population and provide data for decision making on necessary
adjustments if required. A follow-up committee, a bi-partisan monitoring
body, or a joint government/parliament committee can oversee the
implementation process and report to parliaments on difficulties,
delays, and obstacles that may require further legislation or administrative
action.
5. Lessons
to be drawn from previous experience
5.1. Federal
State: Fiscal equalisation system in Switzerland
44. The fiscal equalisation system
in Switzerland aims at reducing disparities among different cantons, related
to geographical/topographic and socio-demographic factors. For example,
in mountainous areas the infrastructure costs are higher and in
centrally situated cantons the proportion of the elderly and poor
is above average. To address such disparities, financially weak
cantons receive financial resources from the financially strong
cantons and from the Confederation.
45. Switzerland has a long-standing tradition of fiscal equalisation,
with the first equalisation system dating back to 1959. The system
is regularly reviewed and updated. In 1992, the federal government
and the cantons undertook a joint, comprehensive reform of the system.
A wide range of criticisms of the proposed system included the following:
some financially strong cantons felt that they were being too heavily
burdened and would lose their international competitiveness, some
weak cantons would have preferred to see an even greater distribution
of revenues among the cantons, and the left-wing parties and the
trade unions objected to the continued tax competition among the
cantons.
46. In spite of the above-mentioned concerns, the present fiscal
equalisation system was approved by a majority of almost 65% in
a 2004 referendum.

The Federal Council submits a report
on the implementation and effectiveness of the National fiscal equalisation
system every four years,

thus providing an opportunity for
further debate and adaptation.
47. While the existing fiscal equalisation system might not be
perfect, the ability of Switzerland to evolve, based on its consensual
political culture and close co-operation between federal and cantonal
civil servants, is undeniably an important success factor in its
decentralisation reforms.
5.2. Quasi-federal
State: advantages and pitfalls of the Spanish asymmetrical approach
48. In about two decades, Spain
was transformed from one of the most centralised countries to one
of the most decentralized.

According
to the Regional Authority Index (University of Oxford) Spain is
the 2nd most decentralised country in the world (after Germany).
Spain provides a large degree of autonomy to its 17 Autonomous Communities.
The asymmetrical approach allows the diverse needs of the regions
to be taken into account. Local government is a constitutional element
in Spain, which is protected by legal and procedural devices.

According to the
OECD, Spain has the highest levels of spending autonomy and tax
autonomy. There is a high degree of popular support for decentralisation.
49. Nevertheless, the Spanish decentralisation model is not without
its weaknesses. One issue that seems to be of concern is the reluctance
of key partners to engage in horizontal and multilateral processes
of decision making, due to the step-by-step evolution of the decentralisation
in Spain as a response to the diverse needs of regions and municipalities.
Bilateral and ad hoc centre-periphery relationships are favoured.
The Senate in its present composition is neither a chamber of territorial
representation nor a mechanism of integration or co-operation.

Other instruments
for co-operation compensate for this, but only to a limited extent.
The Conference of Presidents of Autonomous Communities has only
met six times since 2004 and dealt only with political agreements
and recommendations, all of which had no legal impact. The reforms
were developed with the help of think tanks, study groups and hearings.
50. The case of Catalonia provides a few illustrations of the
weaknesses of the Spanish decentralisation model. For example, in
2006 the Spanish Parliament adopted a new statute which reinforced
the autonomy of Catalonia and the preamble of this statute defined
Catalonia as a “nation” within the Spanish State. However, in 2010
the Constitutional Court cancelled 14 articles of the Autonomy Statute,
annulled the concept of the “Catalan nation” and rejected the use
of Catalan as a “preferred language” in the administration and the
media. This was badly received by many Catalans and resulted in
massive demonstrations. Similarly, in 2012 the refusal of the central
government to grant Catalonia the same fiscal privileges as those
that the Basque Country already enjoyed had fuelled a further upsurge
of independence movement in the region.
51. Spain has made a remarkable transition towards a highly decentralised
governance system in a relatively short period of time. The success
factors that contributed to the peaceful transition include the ongoing
demands for self-government from some regions and the preparedness
of the central government to accommodate such demands, the influence
of the European Union, the existence of a stable democracy and the
vivid memory of the Spanish civil war of 1936-1939.

Today, however, we are reminded
that these achievements cannot be taken for granted. The need for
a constitutional change and a reform of the Senate are being increasingly
evoked as a means to bring more clarity and transparency to this
process and to ensure a fairer representation of the interests of
the autonomous communities at national level.
5.3. Unitary
State: Overcoming political polarisation as an obstacle to decentralisation
in Albania
52. Albania is a unitary State
which traditionally was highly centralised until its transition
to democracy in 1991. Since then, the decentralisation reforms in
Albania took place in two successive waves in 1999 and 2014.
53. The first decentralisation wave targeted the Constitution
and local autonomy principles and the second one targeted performance
and fragmentation. The initial reforms were put on hold for nearly
a decade, in the face of disagreement from the opposition and following
the political change after subsequent parliamentary elections.
54. Building on the lessons learned from past experience, during
the second wave the parliament played a stronger role in the reform,
with a special parliamentary committee for Territorial and Administrative
Reform being established. The committee envisaged co-chairmanship
and proposed equal representation by the majority and the opposition.
Extensive parliamentary hearings with stakeholder groups and with
civil society organisations were held. Wider consultations with
various target groups reached 16 000 citizens. Nevertheless, the
reformers failed to reach political consensus over the reform. The
opposition boycotted the work of the parliamentary committee and
the final vote in parliament

.
55. Since 2015, important legislation has been adopted in the
framework of the “Cross-cutting Decentralisation and Local Government
Strategy 2015-2020”, including the Law 139/2015 “On Local Self-Government”,
the Law 68/2017 “On local finances”, as well as the Decision of
the Council of Ministers consultation between central government
and local self-government. The Local Self-Government and Central Government
Consultative Council was launched in January 2017, and has held
four meetings. It serves as a tool for consultation, dialogue and
preparation of relevant legislation.
56. In spite of the above-mentioned developments, the opposition
parties claim that Albania remains a highly centralised country
and advocate new reforms. They feel the latest reform failed to
ensure an inclusive consultation and that insufficient progress
was achieved, in particular in the area of health services, including primary
health care.
57. It might well be that at times Albania went very far very
fast, and further adaptation might be needed to make sure that the
governance mechanisms meet the local needs and demands. Effective
reforms require trust among key partners, and such trust takes time
to develop. Bearing in mind that democratic governance reforms in
Albania have only started three decades ago, the progress made so
far is quite substantial, and the Albanian case is definitely worth
studying and analysing.
6. Conclusions
and recommendations for upcoming decentralisation processes
58. Decentralisation brings decision
making closer to citizens, it helps to ensure the quality of public
services and strengthens accountability. Furthermore, decentralisation
empowers the public servants who are in direct contact with the
citizens. Their increased ability to meet the needs of the population
enhances citizens’ trust in public authorities.
59. Over the last decades, there has been a clear trend towards
an increase in decentralisation and the transfer of administrative,
legislative or fiscal powers towards lower levels of government.
60. In recent years, however, this trend has slowed down or has
even been reversed in several countries. This is a growing concern
for the Council of Europe, as a balanced distribution of responsibilities
is essential for the effectiveness of democratic institutions and
an important factor in ensuring democratic security. There is therefore
a clear need for the Council of Europe member States to give a higher
political priority to decentralisation.
61. One possible factor for this re-centralisation might be the
fact that in some countries the decentralisation reforms have not
achieved their intended aims and objectives. We need to look very
carefully at the lessons learned from these processes, to ensure
that we do not “throw the baby out with the bathwater,” and that
we do not give up on democracy because things went wrong when we
were trying to put it into practice.
62. I am convinced that the success of decentralisation depends
to a great extent on the way in which it is done. If we want to
overcome the economic crisis, the way to do it is not to give up
on decentralisation, but to do it better.
63. While there is no “one-fits-all” recipe for successful decentralisation,
and every country needs to develop its own unique model that works
in its specific context, there are certainly some “ingredients”
that seem to be indispensable.
64. Well-established mechanisms for consultation and co-operation
promote a sense of shared ownership and commitment. Enshrining decentralisation
in legislation and in the statutory frameworks, including the Constitution,
helps ensure the sustainability of relevant arrangements. The promotion
of a culture of dialogue and co-operation provides an enabling environment
for decentralisation.
65. Parliaments play an important role in each of these areas,
by adopting relevant legislation, promoting public debate and ensuring
scrutiny of government policies, actions and spending. This role
needs to be further strengthened and made more sustainable.
66. A lot can be learned from the wide range of experience in
the Council of Europe member States. Systematic involvement of parliaments
from the very beginning and throughout the reforms, close co-operation between
parliaments and local and regional authorities, in particular through
their national associations, setting up specialised parliamentary
committees bringing together representatives from different parties,
extending the reform time schedule beyond the electoral cycle, reaching
out to the broader public to ensure that the full spectrum of concerns
is taken into consideration in relevant policies – these are just
some ideas that could be of help.
67. It is important that the Council of Europe member States share
experiences and learn both from success stories and from failures
that result from these decentralisations processes. With its Committee
of Ministers, Parliamentary Assembly, Congress of Local and Regional
Authorities, the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the
Venice Commission) and the Conference of International Non-governmental Organisations,
the Council of Europe brings together all the key partners involved
in decentralisation processes and provides a valuable forum for
such sharing and learning among member States.
68. As we celebrate the 30th anniversary of the European Charter
of Local Self-Government, it is a good time to take stock of our
achievements and current challenges, and to give a new momentum
to decentralisation, as a way of bringing democracy closer to the
people, improving the well-being of all and strengthening democratic
security in the Council of Europe member States.