1. Introduction
“A
political opposition in and outside parliament is an essential component
of a well-functioning democracy.”
1. The present report derives
from a request for an urgent debate tabled by Mr Tiny Kox (Netherlands, UEL)
on behalf the UEL political group. The request referred specifically
to the cases of Mr Selahattin Demirtaş, Ms Leyla Güven and other
hunger striking prisoners, and Mr Ertuğrul Kürkçü, proposing that
“the Assembly should discuss the worsening situation of oppositional
politicians in Turkey and consider how to protect their fundamental
rights in a Council of Europe member State”.
2. Following the Parliamentary Assembly’s decision to hold an
urgent debate on this topic and its referral for report to the Committee
on Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Council of Europe
member States (Monitoring Committee), as co-rapporteurs on Turkey
and in accordance with the established practice, we were appointed
as rapporteurs for this report under urgent procedure by the committee
at its meeting on 22 January 2019.
3. Since the urgent procedure does not permit original fact-finding,
this report will rely on existing authoritative sources of information,
including
Resolution
2121 (2016) and
Resolution
2156 (2017) on the functioning of democratic institutions in Turkey
of the Parliamentary Assembly and opinions and reports of the European
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) and reports
from international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and national
civil society organisations.
2. Democracy, parliament and the opposition
– general principles
4. As the Venice Commission has
recalled, “the most important element for ensuring good parliamentary democracy
is a tolerant and mature political tradition and culture, under
which the governing faction does not abuse its power in order to
suppress the opposition, and the opposition for its part engages
actively and constructively in the political process”.
5. In a presidential system – such as, following the 2017 constitutional
amendments, that of Turkey – the Venice Commission has stated that
“the legislative and executive powers should be kept separate and
the system of checks and balances should be put in place to guarantee
that neither of the two will become too dominant in the country…
The very logic of a presidential system … is based on the separation
of powers and therefore on the possibility of conflicts among these
powers. To be meaningful, separation of powers requires that the
different powers are constituted in a way which prevents a uniformity
of approach of the various powers”.
In
order to ensure proper balance between the executive and the legislative,
the latter should properly reflect the political diversity of the
whole country.
6. An important issue for this report is that of parliamentary
immunity. The Assembly has noted that “the primary purpose of parliamentary
immunity … lies in the fundamental protection of the parliamentary
institution and in the equally fundamental guarantee of the independence
of elected representatives, which is necessary for them to exercise
their democratic functions effectively without fear of interference
from the executive or judiciary”.
7. As regards parliamentarians’ freedom of expression, “[o]ne
cannot blame a member of parliament for defending ideas that go
against the government’s official policy or that are not well received
by a majority of the population… National parliaments of the Council
of Europe member States shall acknowledge the following rights in
relation to the opposition or parliamentary minority: freedom of
expression and freedom of opinion; members of the opposition shall
enjoy freedom of speech; they must be able to express their ideas
freely”.
The Venice Commission has also noted
that “[f]reedom of expression of Members of Parliament is an essential part
of democracy. Their freedom of speech has to be a wide one and should
be protected also when they speak outside Parliament”.
3. Recent evolution of the democratic
situation in Turkey
8. The recent evolution of the
democratic situation in Turkey, especially since 2015, has given
rise to various issues of cumulative concern. A series of events
and developments have increasingly complicated, obstructed or undermined
the ability of opposition politicians to exercise their rights and
fulfil their democratic roles both inside and outside parliament.
9. The Assembly’s observation report on the 7 June 2015 parliamentary
elections recalled that “[t]he 1982 Constitution, which was adopted
under military rule, concentrates on bans and prohibitions rather
than broad guarantees of fundamental rights and freedoms, as it
entrenches undue limitations on the freedoms of association, assembly
and expression, as well as on electoral rights”. It then noted that
“the [electoral] campaign was tainted by a high number of attacks
on party offices and serious incidents of physical attacks, some
resulting in fatalities … Undue restrictions remain and media critical
of the ruling party faced increasing pressure and intimidation by
public figures and political actors during the election period.
Media coverage was polarised along partisan lines, including the
public television broadcaster, displaying a significant bias in
favour of the ruling party. The President enjoyed extensive television
coverage which benefited the ruling party”.
10. Similarly, the Assembly’s observation report on the early
parliamentary elections of 1 November 2015 “[regretted] that the
election campaign was tarnished by a challenging security environment,
in particular in the south-east of the country, and a high number
of violent incidents, including attacks against party members and campaign
staff, as well as on party premises, which hindered contestants’
ability to campaign freely”. It further “concluded that the electoral
campaign was characterised by unfairness, given the serious restrictions
on freedom of the media, the criminalisation of dissenting voices
…, and the context of fear prevailing in the country following the
resumption of terrorist attacks and the renewed fight against terrorism”.
The head of the Parliamentary Assembly delegation of the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) focused on the situation
in south-eastern Turkey, noting that “[t]he violence in the largely
Kurdish southeast of the country had a significant impact on the
elections, and the recent attacks and arrests of members and activists,
predominantly from the HDP, are of concern, as they hindered their
ability to campaign.”
11. In May 2016, parliament stripped 154 of its members of their
immunity through what the Venice Commission described as a “’one
shot’,
ad homines measure”,
derogating from the constitutional regime of immunity “for specific
cases concerning identifiable individuals while using general language.
This is a misuse of the constitutional amendment procedure”.
The
Assembly concluded, “with great concern, that such lifting of immunity
has seriously undermined the democratic functioning and position
of the parliament. In addition, this decision has disproportionally
affected the opposition parties and in particular the HDP, with
55 out of 59 … of its members stripped of their immunity”.
12. On 15 July 2016, Turkey experienced an attempted
coup d’état during which hundreds
of people lost their lives. In response, a state of emergency was
introduced, under which the government adopted 31 emergency decree-laws
covering a very wide range of issues, including the dissolution
of over 1 500 associations and foundations and the closure of over
170 media outlets; in addition, over 150 journalists and media workers
were imprisoned during the state of emergency.
A
report of the Assembly’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights
found that although the state of emergency was, at least initially,
intended to eliminate the “FETÖ terrorist organisation” considered
responsible for the failed coup, the emergency measures had a particular
impact on Kurds, Kurdish organisations and academics advocating
a peaceful settlement of the Kurdish issue.
It also found that “decree-law 674 concerning
local democracy has … mainly affected the HDP, with a “vast majority”
of dismissed mayors being members of, or close to, the HDP. These mayors
have reportedly been replaced by persons who are members of or close
to the ruling AK Party. Previous waves of arrests and dismissals
of mayors in south-eastern Turkey were also ‘connected to the Kurdish
question’ and raised ‘serious questions with respect to Turkey’s
commitment to local democracy’”. In the related
Resolution 2209 (2018) “State of emergency: proportionality issues concerning
derogations under Article 15 of the European Convention on Human
Rights”, the Assembly found that the measures taken under the state
of emergency were “disproportionate on numerous grounds”.
13. On 21 January 2017, whilst the state of emergency was still
in force, the parliament adopted amendments to the Constitution
intended to replace the parliamentary system established under Ataturk
with an executive presidency. The amendments were submitted to a
national referendum on 16 April 2017. The Monitoring Committee noted
“with concern that the adoption procedure in parliament was speedy
… and marked by tense debates, infringement of the secrecy of votes,
no continuous broadcasting of all parliamentary debates on television,
and no public consultation on the proposed changes”. It also reiterated
“its deep concern about the lack of media freedom, the large number
of journalists currently in detention …, significant political influence
exerted on the media, insufficient editorial independence of the
public radio and TV broadcaster, problematic interpretation of the
penal code and the anti-terror law provisions and the chilling effect
and pressure on journalists and human rights defenders, which are
seriously impeding freedom of expression … The high number of NGOs,
associations, foundations and media closed after the publication
of 19 emergency decree-laws has further undermined the possibilities
for debate, in a safe environment, on the complex issues raised
by the constitutional amendments”. In addition, “[t]he stripping
of the immunity of 154 parliamentarians in May 2016, the current
detention of 11 parliamentarians, all belonging to the opposition
party Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), has had a deterrent effect
and will lead to serious restrictions to democratic debate in the
run up to the referendum”.
The referendum went ahead and
the constitutional amendments were approved by 51% to 49%, a result
tainted by additional serious concerns over ballot papers and other irregularities.
14. The Venice Commission had also examined the content of these
constitutional amendments. In relation to parliament and the separation
of powers, it noted that “[t]he elections of deputies of the [Turkish
Grand National Assembly] and of the President are to be held on
the same day … This will mean in practice that usually the President
will also control the parliamentary majority … Holding elections
simultaneously makes it unlikely that there will be a meaningful
separation of powers … [It] does not follow the model of democratic presidential
systems based on separation of powers. It rather follows a concept
of unity of power which is characteristic for not so democratic
systems … In the light of the above, the Grand National Assembly’s counter-powers
in respect of the President’s new powers are insufficient: it is
unlikely that the [Turkish Grand National Assembly] may stand as
a balancing counter-weight to the President”.
15. The Venice Commission also addressed the impact of the constitutional
amendments on the judicial system, noting that they “introduce new
provisions which run contrary to European standards and curtail
the independence of the judiciary vis-à-vis the president …The proposed
composition of the [Council of Judges and Prosecutors, CJP] is extremely
problematic [and] would place the independence of the judiciary
in serious jeopardy … The changes regarding the manner of appointment
of the members of the CJP will have repercussions on the Constitutional
Court … The influence of the Executive over the Constitutional Court
is therefore increased”.
16. On 18 April 2018, President Erdoǧan announced that the parliamentary
and presidential elections that should have taken place in November
2019 would be brought forward to 24 June 2018. In response, the Monitoring
Committee was “deeply concerned that [the] adverse context will
impede the conduct and organisation of genuinely democratic elections,
and confirms that, at the end of the process, the overall legitimacy
of these elections is at stake … It also recalls that these elections
will be crucial; this will be the final step for the shift to an
executive presidential system, which will grant extensive powers
to the President of the Republic while limiting checks and balances.
All these factors combined seriously challenge the democratic nature
of the elections. The Committee thus recommends the Turkish authorities
to postpone the elections”.
The elections nevertheless
went ahead: President Erdoǧan was re-elected, becoming Turkey’s
first executive president; and his party, the AK Party, obtained
295 of the 600 seats in parliament, with the MHP obtaining a further
nine, giving their alliance a majority.
17. Around the time that the early elections were announced, the
Turkish parliament adopted two sets of amendments to the electoral
law. In its aforementioned statement, the Monitoring Committee noted
that “[t]hese amendments substantially change the rules for elections
and the election campaign … The extremely short period between the
adoption of these new rules and the upcoming elections leaves too
little time for political parties to adjust and complete their preparations
for the elections”.
The Venice Commission and the Office
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) subsequently
stated that “significant changes to the electoral legislation were
made very close to election day without meaningful public consultation.
These amendments appear to have been initiated and finally adopted
at a time when the same majority in the parliament which initiated
the amendments, also considered calling for early elections … Based
on this sequence of events as well as their content, the application
of the March amendments for the 2018 parliamentary and presidential
elections is clearly problematic and runs counter to the Code of
Good Practice in Electoral Matters. Regardless of the actual motive
behind the amendments, their timing and process challenge the legitimacy
of Turkish electoral legislation”.
18. The Venice Commission and ODIHR also had concerns about the
content of the amendments to the electoral law. These concerns included
that the 10% electoral threshold for election of a party’s candidates
to parliament was maintained, despite its effect having been “somewhat
mitigated by the possibility to form alliances introduced by the
amendments”; that “it is hard to see how the [three] civil servants
in the [seven-member Ballot Box Committees] can be considered impartial,
as required by the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters”;
and that “Insofar as the independence of the Council of Judges and
Prosecutors [CJP] can be questioned, so can the independence of
the [Supreme Board of Elections, the appointment of whose members
is under the CJP’s indirect control]”.
19. The Assembly’s election observation mission noted that “[t]hese
early elections took place under the state of emergency … [The]
way in which the state of emergency has been implemented in Turkey
has greatly limited the space for democratic debate and the expression
of pluralism, let alone political dissent … Candidates did not have
equal opportunities to campaign and to put their message across,
in terms of either resources or media coverage … The delegation
was informed about misuse of administrative resources by the ruling
party during the campaign, which is contrary to the commitment to
ensure separation between State and party and international good
practice … Media outlets, including the public broadcaster, did
not present voters with balanced information about the candidates
… Restrictions to fundamental freedoms and the absence of a level
playing field have had an impact on these elections”.
20. We would like to stress in particular that the persisting
10% electoral threshold remains a restriction to the possibility
for political parties from the opposition to be represented in parliament.
For the past fifteen years, the Parliamentary Assembly has repeatedly
asked the Turkish authorities to lower this threshold, which is
the highest in Europe and which does not match a mature democracy.
21. The state of emergency first declared in 2016 came to an end
on 19 July 2018. All emergency decree-laws had by then been approved
by parliament and so remained in effect. On 25 July 2018, the parliament adopted
a new anti-terrorism law perpetuating certain provisions of the
state of emergency, including the power for provincial governors
to restrict freedom of assembly.
22. Finally, a perennial concern in relation to freedom of expression
in Turkey relates to anti-terror law and its interpretation, which
is not in compliance with the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights. This issue was repeatedly raised both by the Council
of Europe and the European Union. Other concerns, which impact the
ability of politicians to express views and opinions, relate to
Articles 299 (insulting the President of the Republic) and 301 (degrading
the Turkish Nation, the State of the Turkish Republic, the Organs
and Institutions of the State) of the Penal Code. The Venice Commission
has stated that “[Article 299] fails to take into account the European
consensus which indicates that States should either decriminalise
defamation of the Head of State or limit this offence to the most
serious forms of verbal attacks against them, at the same time restricting
the range of sanctions to those not involving imprisonment. Having
regard to the excessive and growing use of this Article, the Commission
considers that, in the Turkish context, the only solution to avoid further
violations of the freedom of expression is to completely repeal
this Article and to ensure that application of the general provision
on insult is consistent with these criteria … With respect to Article
301 (Degrading Turkish Nation, State of Turkish Republic, the Organs
and Institutions of the State), the problem of vague wording, despite
the amendments made in 2008, has persisted. It is recommended that
the provision be redrafted and further amended with the aim of making
all the notions used in it clear and specific. Further, the application
of this provision should be limited to statements inciting to violence
and hatred”.
The number of prosecutions
under Article 299 rose from 132 in 2014 to more than 6 000 in 2017.
23. In this context, opposition members, due to their critical
stance, face increased risk of prosecution and detention. Concerning
deputies and former deputies of the main opposition party, the Republican
People's Party (CHP), we recall that we followed with great concern
the prosecution and conviction of the deputy (and former journalist)
Enis Berberoǧlu who was sentenced to five years in prison for disclosing
information about the possible involvement of Turkey in the Syrian
conflict and released in September 2018 due to parliamentary immunity
(see below). We have also been informed that Eren Erdem, a former
CHP deputy and former editor-in-chief of the (now closed)
Karşı newspaper, faces a prison
sentence of up to 22 years for “publishing illegal wiretapping carried
out by FETÖ” and “helping a terrorist organisation albeit not being
a member of the organisation”.
He was released on 7 January 2019
after spending six months in detention – and re-arrested on 8 January
2019.
24. There are nevertheless positive elements to the state of democracy
in Turkey. As noted in the observation report on the June 2018 elections,
“Turkish citizens are willing to mobilise for their democracy. They
are willing to take to the streets, go to rallies, campaign, supervise
the integrity of the election process and vote, in great numbers…
Turkish citizens had a genuine choice between presidential candidates
and parties expressing different views and belonging to different
political affiliations… The election administration worked efficiently
and under great pressure of time to finalise the preparations of
the early elections … The [election observation mission] assessed
voting positively or very positively in 94% of polling stations”.
25. There is also a welcome willingness on the part of the Turkish
authorities to discuss problems. The informal Working Group between
the Council of Europe and the Turkish Ministry of Justice was set
up with the general aim of addressing the main issues identified
in judgments of the Court and thereby reducing the number of cases.
The Working Group has worked on various issues mentioned in the
present report, including pretrial detention, freedom of expression
and mitigation of the lasting consequences of the state of emergency, with
some results. Work on a Judicial Reform Strategy may be particularly
promising, especially if it reinforces judicial independence, as
may the drafting of a new Human Rights Action Plan. The Assembly
should support this process.
4. The cases mentioned in the request
for an urgent debate
26. Selahattin Demirtaş, along
with his HDP co-chair Figen Yuksekdag and other parliamentarians,
having been stripped of their parliamentary immunity in May 2016
(see above), were arrested and charged with a variety of terrorism-related
offences in November 2016. The Assembly’s Monitoring Committee described
this development as “extremely worrisome and jeopardis[ing] the
functioning of democracy”, and called for their immediate release.
Assembly President Liliane Maury
Pasquier described the imprisonment of Mr Demirtaş and former HDP
parliamentarian Sirri Süreyya Önder in September 2018 as being “of
particular concern to me, as is the situation of other parliamentarians
and former opposition parliamentarians in detention or under prosecution
for ‘terrorist’ acts”.
On 4 December 2018, the sentences against
Mr Demirtaş and Mr Önder were confirmed on appeal.
27. In its judgment on his case,
the Chamber of the European Court
of Human Rights (“the Court”) found “that the judicial authorities
extended [Mr Demirtaş’ pretrial] detention on grounds that cannot
be regarded as ‘sufficient’ to justify its duration.” Furthermore,
“the fact that it was impossible for him to take part in the activities of
the National Assembly on account of his pretrial detention constitutes
an unjustified interference with the free expression of the opinion
of the people and with the applicant’s right to be elected and to
sit in Parliament”.
28. Exceptionally, and therefore perhaps most significantly, the
Court found that “it has been established beyond reasonable doubt
that the extensions of the applicant’s detention, especially during
two crucial campaigns, namely the referendum and the presidential
election, pursued the predominant ulterior purpose of stifling pluralism
and limiting freedom of political debate, which is at the very core
of the concept of a democratic society … There has therefore been
a violation of Article 18 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which
prohibits the application of restrictions to Convention rights for
any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed”.
The Court therefore called on Turkey to release Mr Demirtaş “at
the earliest possible date, unless new grounds and evidence justifying
his continued detention are put forward.”
29. In response to this, President Erdoǧan challenged the judgment
and vowed to undertake “a countermove to finish the job”. The detention
of Mr Demirtaş was not immediately ended, as the Ankara 19th Heavy
Criminal Court requested guidance from the Ministry of Justice,
since the Chamber judgment had not yet been finalised.
30. Leyla Güven was elected to the Turkish Parliament for the
HDP in June 2018, whilst already in pretrial detention. She had
previously twice been elected mayor (she was then a member of the
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities) and was previously a
member of parliament from June to November 2015. In January 2018,
she was arrested on charges relating to her criticism of the Turkish
military intervention in Afrin, Syria. She has been detained in
a high security prison ever since and faces up to 31 years in prison
if convicted. Despite her election and parliamentary immunity, she
remains in detention. At the same time, CHP deputy Enis Berberoǧlu,
who had been convicted to five years of prison, was released in
September 2018 due to parliamentary immunity – until the end of
his parliamentary mandate – following the decision of the Supreme Court
of Cassation, which was welcomed by the President of the Parliamentary
Assembly.
We deeply regret that opposition
politicians have to resort to ultimate means, ie hunger strikes,
in order to bring issues, may they be sensitive or unpopular, to
public debate.
31. On 22 November 2018, Leyla Güven began an indefinite hunger
strike in protest at the isolation imposed on Abdullah Öcalan, leader
and founder of the PKK, in Ímrali prison. On 15 January 2019, it
was reported that she had lost 10 kilos and was suffering from low
blood pressure, insomnia, nausea and fever, heightened sensitivity
to light, smell and sound, and difficulty taking liquids, with her
symptoms worsening.
A
number of other prisoners went on hunger strike in solidarity with
Ms Güven; various figures have been given, ranging from 162 to 226.
32. Ertuğrul Kürkçü, then HDP MP for Izmir, was charged with “spreading
propaganda for a terrorist organisation” following a speech he gave
during the 2016 Newroz (Spring) celebrations in which he claimed that
the Turkish security forces had committed human rights violations
in the south-east of the country. This speech was reportedly identical
to one he had given in parliament. He was one of those parliamentarians whose
immunity was lifted in May 2016, following which he was convicted
in December 2016 and sentenced to two years in prison. He was also
a member of the Parliamentary Assembly from 28 September 2015 to 7 October
2018, covering the period of his prosecution, conviction and imprisonment
and became an Honorary member of this Assembly in October 2018.
He is currently facing further charges relating to three speeches
he made in 2012 and 2015-16.
On
20 December 2018, we expressed our deep concern at the conviction
of honorary Parliamentary Assembly member Ertugrul Kürkçü and expected
the Turkish authorities to ensure Mr Kürkcü’s freedom of expression
is duly guaranteed by the Turkish justice system. We will therefore
follow with great attention Mr Kürkçü’s appeal trial.
33. In addition to Mr Demirtaş, Ms Yuksekdag, Mr Önder, Ms Güven
and Mr Kürkçü, another seven former HDP parliamentarians are currently
in prison: Idris Baluken (convicted), Gulser Yildirim (pretrial
detention), Caglar Demirel (pretrial detention), Ferhat Encu (convicted),
Burcu Celik Ozkan (convicted), Abdullah Zeydan (convicted) and Selma
Irmak (pretrial detention).
5. Conclusions
and recommendations
34. The issues described in section
4 above give rise to cumulative concern about the situation and,
more generally, the role and rights of opposition politicians in
Turkey. The 2015 elections, especially those of November, were characterised
by unfairness and hindrances on the ability to campaign, particularly
in the south-east of the country. The resulting parliament stripped
154 of its members of their immunity, including 93% of those from
the HDP; eleven current or former HDP parliamentarians are currently
in detention (see below). The state of emergency introduced later
in 2016 further limited the activities of independent civil society
and media and removed many HDP mayors from office in south-eastern
Turkey. Against this background, and with inadequate parliamentary
scrutiny and a lack of media freedom contributing to serious restrictions
on democratic debate, constitutional amendments were adopted in
2017, transforming Turkey from a parliamentary system to an executive
presidency and, amongst other things, curtailing judicial independence. At
the same time as the electoral legislation was being revised, reducing
the independence of administrative and supervisory bodies, parliamentary
and presidential elections were brought forward from November 2019 to
June 2018. These elections took place in an atmosphere of limited
space for pluralistic, democratic debate, unequal campaigning opportunities
and media coverage, and misuse of administrative resources. As a
result, Turkey now has an executive president with very extensive
powers, a parliament with insufficient powers as a counter-weight,
whose majority comes from the President’s party and its ally, and
a judiciary whose independence has been curtailed. Freedom of expression,
assembly and association is restricted, and independent media and
civil society are under severe pressure. The scope for opposition
politicians to play a meaningful role in public life, whether inside
or outside parliament, has become extremely limited.
35. The Assembly should take the opportunity of the present report
to reaffirm its position on the rights and role of opposition politicians
in a democracy and its stance on recent developments in the democratic
situation in Turkey, especially in relation to parliamentary immunity,
fairness of the election processes, detention and imprisonment of
opposition politicians for expressing legitimate, peaceful opinions,
whilst acknowledging those areas where democracy remains vibrant
and encouraging democratic reform.
36. We call on the Turkish authorities to address these concerns
as a matter of priority and implement the Assembly’s recommendations
in the framework of the ongoing monitoring procedure. These recommendations seek
to ensure the protection of the democratic rights of the opposition
– and to ensure that the pluralism of ideas and opinions which exists
in Turkish society is also guaranteed in the public sphere and reflected
in a democratic expression and representation.