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A. Draft resolution
(open)
Report | Doc. 14845 | 20 March 2019
The role and responsibilities of political leaders in combating hate speech and intolerance
Committee on Equality and Non-Discrimination
Summary
Hate speech and intolerance are on the rise in Europe, with increasing use of expressions that spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, antisemitism or other forms of hatred.
Hate speech has become part of political discourse, not only among populist and extremist groups but also across the political spectrum and information technology contributes to spreading and amplifying it. Hate speech dehumanises the individuals and groups it targets and makes them more vulnerable to discrimination; it erodes the social fabric and hinders peaceful living together in diversity.
The most effective way of preventing hate speech and intolerance is to strengthen the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and to promote a model of society that embraces diversity and respects human dignity.
Politicians have a vital role to play in combating hate speech and intolerance and bear a moral responsibility to do so. Countermeasures include self-regulation, particularly by political movements and parties, and civil, administrative and criminal legislation. Co-operation between the authorities and information technology players also helps to combat online hate speech. A notable example of self-regulation is the Charter of European Political Parties for a Non-Racist Society, which should be updated and relaunched.
A. Draft resolution 
(open)1. Europe is facing an upsurge
in hate speech, including all forms of expression which spread,
incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, antisemitism
or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including intolerance
expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination
and hostility against national or ethnic, religious and linguistic
minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin, women and lesbian,
gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people.
2. The political arena is no exception to this worrying trend:
hate speech and intolerance have become part of political discourse,
where they are used not only by populist and extremist groups but
increasingly by representatives of movements and parties across
the political spectrum. Information technology has significantly
contributed to spreading and amplifying hate speech, therefore trivialising
it in the eyes of the general public.
3. The Parliamentary Assembly is concerned by the threat posed
by hate speech, which dehumanises the individuals and groups it
targets, making them more vulnerable to stigmatisation, discrimination
and violence. Hate speech erodes the social fabric and hinders peaceful
living together in diversity. It produces a feeling of exclusion
among minority groups and can contribute to alienation, marginalisation,
the emergence of parallel societies and, ultimately, radicalisation.
When used in the political debate, it becomes a barrier to constructive dialogue
between political forces and it undermines democratic values.
4. The Assembly considers that the most effective way of preventing
hate speech is to strengthen adherence to the principles of democracy,
human rights and the rule of law, and to promote a model of society that
embraces diversity and respects human dignity. Politicians, along
with other public figures, have a vital role to play in this process.
Their status and visibility allow them to influence a wide audience
and to define to a significant degree the themes and the tone of
public discourse.
5. In fact, politicians have both a political obligation and
a moral responsibility to refrain from using hate speech and stigmatising
language, and to condemn promptly and unequivocally its use by others,
as silence may be interpreted as approval or support. The enhanced
protection of freedom of expression that they enjoy also strengthens
their responsibility in this area.
6. The Assembly believes that a wide range of measures is necessary
to counter hate speech, ranging from self-regulation, particularly
by political movements and parties, and in the statutes and rules
of procedure of national and local elected bodies, to civil, administrative
and criminal legislation prohibiting and sanctioning its use, which
should be considered as a last resort. Restrictions and sanctions
should be proportionate and should not be misused to silence minorities
or to suppress criticism.
7. Self-regulatory instruments adopted by political parties,
such as statutes and charters, are particularly effective and more
likely to be respected due to their voluntary nature. The Charter
of European Political Parties for a Non-Racist Society, drawn up
in 1998 under the auspices of the European Union Consultative Commission
on Racism and Xenophobia, provides guidance for self-regulation
by political parties in this area. To be relevant in the present
times, however, it should be updated to take into account different
forms of hatred, based on all grounds, and the technical means currently
used to spread it. It should also redress one of its main weaknesses,
namely the lack of measures for breaches of the Charter.
8. Media, including social media, should play an important role
in limiting the impact of hate speech, by providing accurate, unbiased
information and not giving excessive visibility to instances of
stigmatising or abusive language, including by political leaders.
9. The Assembly refers to the exchange of letters between the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe and the main players
of information technology to promote an open and safe internet,
where human rights, democracy and the rule of law are respected
in the online environment, as a useful example of dialogue and co-operation
with internet intermediaries.
10. The Assembly commends the work conducted by the European Commission
against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) in this area and supports,
in particular, its General Policy Recommendation No. 15 which indicates
a wealth of measures on preventing and combating hate speech, providing
support for those targeted by it, and calling for self-regulation
by public and private institutions, including elected bodies and
political parties.
11. The Assembly recalls its No Hate Parliamentary Alliance, a
network of parliamentarians who commit to taking an open, firm and
proactive stand against racism, hatred and intolerance on whatever
grounds and however they manifest themselves, as an example of a
forum for discussion and exchange of good practices that should
be replicated in national parliaments. It also recalls the No Hate
Speech Movement and that, although the Council of Europe campaign
came to an end in 2017, its national committees continue to be active.
12. In the light of these considerations, the Assembly calls on
the Council of Europe member States to:
12.1. monitor the situation as regards hate speech, including
in political discourse, and collect accurate, comparable data on
its nature and prevalence, disaggregated by grounds of discrimination, target
groups, types of perpetrators and channels used;
12.2. implement ECRI’s General Policy Recommendation No. 15,
by adopting relevant administrative, civil and, as a last resort,
criminal law provisions;
12.3. encourage political movements and parties to adopt self-regulation
texts, such as codes of conduct and ethical charters, which prohibit
and sanction the use of hate speech by their members;
12.4. encourage the media to provide accurate, unbiased and
responsible information in matters relevant to individuals and groups
that are vulnerable to discrimination and hatred;
12.5. engage in dialogue and co-operation with internet intermediaries,
in particular social media, to encourage them to adopt and apply
self-regulation texts to prevent and sanction the use of hate speech and
commit to removing offensive content;
12.6. promote information and awareness-raising activities addressed
to politicians and elected representatives at all levels, focusing
on initiatives and measures adopted to counter hate speech and intolerance,
including at international level, such as the Charter of European
Parties for a Non-Racist Society and the No Hate Parliamentary Alliance;
12.7. provide public officials with training on fundamental
rights, equality and non-discrimination, particularly in schools
and other educational institutions and in contexts where institutional
discrimination may take place, including in police forces and the
judiciary, the armed forces, legal services and the medical profession;
12.8. promote awareness-raising activities targeting the general
public on racism and intolerance as well as hate speech specifically;
12.9. support the national committees of the No Hate Speech
Movement campaign;
12.10. encourage politicians to disseminate, also on social media,
positive messages in relation to minorities in their countries.
13. The Assembly calls on the parliaments of member States, as
well as the parliaments enjoying the status of observer or partner
for democracy, to:
13.1. provide
parliamentarians and other political actors with information and
training on how to prevent, identify and react to hate speech on-
and offline, as well as on human rights, equality and non-discrimination,
and the malignant use of social networks and other media, including
disinformation;
13.2. ensure that their statutes and rules of procedure contain
specific provisions against hate speech and stigmatising language,
sanctions for non-compliance and accessible complain mechanisms;
13.3. establish study groups with the participation of parliamentarians,
experts and civil society representatives, to monitor hate speech
and recommend measures to address it at national level.
14. The Parliamentary Assembly believes that the 25th anniversary
of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, which
falls in 2019, provides a good opportunity to update, including
measures for breaches of it, and relaunch the Charter of European
Political Parties for a Non-Racist Society.
B. Explanatory memorandum by Ms Elvira Kovács, rapporteur
(open)1. Introduction
“Hate speech is objectionable [because] it views members of the target group as an enemy within, refuses to accept them as legitimate and equal members of society, lowers their social standing, and in these and other ways subverts the very basis of a shared life. It creates barriers of mistrust and hostility between individuals and groups, plants fear, obstructs normal relations between them, and in general, exercises a corrosive influence on the conduct of collective life. Hate speech also violates the dignity of the members of the target group by stigmatising them, denying their capacity to live as responsible members of society, and ignoring their individuality and differences by reducing them to uniform specimens of the relevant racial, ethnic, or religious group.”
Bhikhu Parekh, member of the House of Lords, former Professor of Political Philosophy at the University of Westminster and the University of Hull
1. Today Europe faces an alarming
rise in hate speech, racism, xenophobia and intolerance. Nationalist and
xenophobic movements play on fears and uncertainties. Racist abuse
and hate speech targeting national minorities and migrants have
reached unprecedented levels. This poses a serious threat to human
rights and fundamental values, the rule of law and democracy. In
addition, impunity is rife. Worryingly, some parliamentarians and
State representatives contribute to spreading hatred and intolerance
by means of shocking language and narratives.
2. Offensive remarks are made in political discourse in a large
number of European countries. While the use of hate speech is particularly
prominent within extremist groups, it has expanded to invade the
entire political spectrum. The rise in populist movements in many
European countries has led to more hate speech with a diversity
of targets, including elites and national minorities. Representatives
of populist movements have often disseminated false information
and used hate speech for political gain. National minorities and
migrants are the victims of constant, particularly conspicuous examples
of hate speech.
3. This report addresses hate speech related to racism, xenophobia,
misogyny and homophobia, as well as intolerance towards national
minorities, because they all threaten the integrity of our democratic
societies. Even though hate takes different forms, I believe that
its roots are always the same.
4. This report builds among other things on the work of the European
Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), in particular
its General Policy Recommendation No. 15 on Combating Hate Speech,
which was adopted on 8 December 2015, and on Assembly texts such
as Resolution 1967 (2014) on a strategy to prevent racism and intolerance in Europe, Resolution 2069 (2015) on recognising and preventing neo-racism and Resolution 2144 (2017) and Recommendation
2098 (2017) on ending cyberdiscrimination and online hate.
2. Self-regulation: good practices
5. One of the key issues regarding
hate speech in politics lies in drawing the limit between political discourse
that is protected by freedom of speech, on one hand, and stigmatising
language on the other. No precise, infallible rule has been formulated
to define this subtle threshold. Taking into account the difference between
the content of expression and the context in which it takes place
is a useful element of guidance. Politicians, in particular, move
in a very delicate area, as they need to catch the public’s attention,
express their thoughts effectively and be convincing. In addition,
there is an element of competition in politics that makes “fighting”
a physiological part of the political discourse.
6. The need to ensure that politicians may fully enjoy freedom
of expression makes self-regulation and voluntary codes of conduct
particularly appropriate tools for effectively combating hate speech.
Parliaments’ rules of procedure are also effective to this end.
In 2018, the European Parliament changed its rules of procedure
concerning sanctions against racist and xenophobic comments, thanks, inter alia, to support from political
groups and the assistance provided by ARDI (European Parliament
Anti-Racism and Diversity Intergroup) and ILGA Europe (International
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association).The OHRID
Institute for Economic Strategies and International Affairs, an
organisation based in Skopje, has been promoting an interesting
initiative for several years. On the occasion of elections, it invites
the leaders of the youth branches of all political parties to sign
a “Declaration for fair, free and democratic elections”. The aim
of the Declaration is to encourage young politicians “to make greater
efforts in the implementation of fair and democratic elections and
electoral campaigns” and to show that political parties’ youth branches
have “the responsibility and maturity” to contribute to the country’s
democratisation.
7. The preamble and the text show that the Declaration is the
outcome of a sensible, mature reflection on the importance of fundamental
freedoms, in particular the freedom to vote and the freedom of expression,
and the way in which these freedoms are closely interconnected.
Two chapters, respectively on specific responsibilities and on information
and awareness raising, spell out a number of commitments that the signatories
make. Behaviour during the electoral campaign shall be one of dignity
and respect, both during the presentation of one’s own political
programme and those of the competitors. The paragraph most strictly relevant
to this report is the one on “Media and media campaigns”, which
reads “The undersigned political youth shall actively influence
to minimise the hate speech on social networks and in everyday life”.
8. These commitments are reiterated at each election, as the
Declaration is signed at a public event. I find this initiative
positive in many respects. Firstly, it focusses on politicians’
roles and responsibilities in preventing and combating hate speech,
which is entirely in line with the aims of my work as rapporteur.
Secondly, it acknowledges the potential of young politicians, which
I welcome not because they represent the future – they are in fact
already part of the political landscape – but rather because youth
is typically the time when people are more ambitious, more daring
and more open to change. Last, but by no means least, the public
dimension of the signing of the Declaration has considerable added
value, as it contributes to raising the awareness of all political
players, the media and the general public.
9. A less recent, but still inspiring, initiative is the Charter
of European political parties for a non-racist society, signed in
February 1998 in Utrecht. The Charter’s signatories (“We, the democratic
political parties of Europe”), “being aware of the special tasks
and responsibilities of political parties as actors in a democratic political
process, defending, articulating and bearing witness to the basic
principles of a democratic society”, commit themselves to abide
by a list of principles, including in particular “to defend basic
human rights and democratic principles and to reject all forms of
racist violence, incitement to racial hatred and harassment and any
form of racial discrimination”, “to refuse to display … in any way
views and positions which stir up or invite … prejudices, hostility
or division between people of different ethnic or national origins
or religious beliefs”. They also commit to dealing “responsibly
and fairly with sensitive topics relating to such groups and to
avoid their stigmatization”.
10. In Resolution 1345
(2003) on racist, xenophobic and intolerant discourse in politics,
the Parliamentary Assembly strongly supported this Charter, recommending
that all European political parties sign it and fully implement
its provisions.
11. The Charter corresponds only partially to the focus of this
report, which not only covers racist and xenophobic hate speech,
but also all other forms of it. However, it is interesting to note
that two decades ago the initiators were fully aware of the special
responsibility held by political parties. Since then, hatred has become
pervasive and technology has made it much easier to spread it. In
October 2015, the parties represented in the Finnish Parliament
signed the Charter, on the occasion of a debate on racism held at
the initiative of Nasima Razmyar, a member of parliament of Afghan
descent. This shows that almost two decades after its launch, the
Charter is still relevant. In the light of the mounting tide of
hate speech in the present day, especially online, the time has
come to update and relaunch this initiative, calling on politicians
to formally take responsibility for their language and usage of
communication tools. They should constantly keep in mind that they
are in very powerful positions and that people look up to them.
They are role models and representatives for all. The geographic
scope of the Charter should include all Council of Europe member
States and all forms of hate speech should be covered by its provisions.
3. Denmark: a case study
12. I had the opportunity to learn
more about the situation in Denmark concerning hate speech, particularly in
political discourse, thanks to the meeting of the Committee on Equality
and Non-Discrimination in Copenhagen on 1 March 2018 and the meetings
I held in the margins of it. The information I collected was thought-provoking.
The ongoing debate on the language that should be used when discussing
matters relevant to minorities, the challenges that politicians
face and the activities carried out by civil society and some media outlets
seemed to me particularly interesting and worth presenting in this
report.
13. At a hearing held during our meeting in Copenhagen, well-known
journalist Lisbeth Knudsen explained that in Denmark the main targets
of hate speech were Muslims and people with a migration background. Although
reliable data were insufficient, she had empirically observed that,
whenever she mentioned Islam and its believers in her blog, hateful
comments would skyrocket. Politicians were also often targeted by
hate speech. One third of them had even received death threats at
least once in their career. While most online news outlets and discussion
forums in Denmark where moderated, and hateful comments filtered,
she deemed it important to leave the discussion open and give everyone
the possibility to express their opinions. The risk, when the debate
is silenced and censorship is practised, is to push online hatred
underground, towards closed Facebook groups or other less accessible
spaces, that are more difficult to control and potentially more dangerous.
14. The Danish public seems to be aware of the role of social
media: 77% of respondents to a survey thought that social media
had a large responsibility when it came to spreading hate speech,
and many of them said that they would not engage in a debate on
social networks when the tone was harsh.
15. Ms Knudsen was in favour of legislation to counter hate speech
by putting social media companies in charge of some vigilance. However,
she found that additional measures were necessary, including awareness raising
and proper digital education included in school curricula. In other
words, young people should receive education on how to communicate
on the internet and how to interpret the information coming from
it. Combating hate speech is everyone’s responsibility. Up to now,
civil society organisations have been the most effective actors.
Finally, law enforcement services had a role to play in the prevention
and prosecution of hate speech. This sector, Ms Knudsen said, should
be provided with more resources.
16. At that committee meeting, fellow members raised the issue
of Denmark’s underprivileged urban areas, typically inhabited by
large communities with a migration background, currently referred
to as “ghettos”. Worryingly, this term is also used by the authorities.
A “list of ghettos” was first introduced by the Ministry of Transport
and Housing in 2010, regularly updated since then, and is available
to the public.
17. As if this sort of reverse-quality labelling process were
not stigmatising enough, in February 2018 the Danish Government
tabled a bill on “special punishment zones”. The idea behind it
was to sanction more severely certain criminal behaviours, such
as vandalism and theft, when committed in certain areas. The government’s
initiative left to the parliament the task of defining the details,
including the designation of the special zones and the specific
crimes. The idea found the support of representatives of the opposition
but was criticised by civil society organisations and legal experts
as a threat to the principle of equality before the law.
18. I had the opportunity to discuss this initiative and the situation
in Denmark as regards hate speech with several interlocutors, namely
Vibeke Borberg, Head of research of the Danish School of Media and
Journalism; Qasam Ijaz of the Center for Forebyggelse af Eksklusion
(CFE); journalist Bent Jensen of the online newspaper Sameksistens (Coexistence); Jens
Elo Rytter, Professor at the Faculty of Law of the University of
Copenhagen, and Lumi Zuleta, Special consultant at the Danish Institute
for Human Rights.
19. The representatives of academia said during our meeting that
statistical data about Danish “ghettos” were not as grim as some
were depicting them, in terms of unemployment and other indicators
of social well-being. Indeed, a few weeks after our conversation
the press revealed that according to national police statistics, the
crime rate in these areas had decreased by 30% between 2013 and
2017.
20. My interlocutors explained that a debate was going on in Denmark
about “calling things by their name”: some politicians and public
figures refused the limits of “politically correct” language, especially
when referring to people with a migration background residing in
the country. The use of the term “ghetto” was a symptom that public
discourse in this area was becoming increasingly harsh. In the past,
the use of “parallel communities” was preferred, to describe the
situation of communities not being included in the socio-political
and cultural spheres of the host country.
21. This leads us to a crucial point: attention should be paid
to the choice of words. While
it is fair to use a straightforward communication style, to fully
exercise freedom of expression and to avoid self-censorship, it
is important to refrain from any form of derogatory language, stigmatisation
and even negative stereotyping, particularly regarding vulnerable
groups, as this might fuel hostility towards them. This applies
to the media and to political communication alike. The experts I
met explained that empirical observation showed a link between the
tone of headlines in online newspapers and the comments from readers.
When the headlines contained hostile words, the share of hateful
comments was higher.
While
it is fair to use a straightforward communication style, to fully
exercise freedom of expression and to avoid self-censorship, it
is important to refrain from any form of derogatory language, stigmatisation
and even negative stereotyping, particularly regarding vulnerable
groups, as this might fuel hostility towards them. This applies
to the media and to political communication alike. The experts I
met explained that empirical observation showed a link between the
tone of headlines in online newspapers and the comments from readers.
When the headlines contained hostile words, the share of hateful
comments was higher.22. The same dynamic applied to the political discourse: although
there was a general lack of data on hate speech in Denmark, some
studies hinted that the use of certain terms by politicians was
reflected in the attitudes of their supporters. Citing one of the
interlocutors: “It is mostly hate speech against foreigners, migrants,
religious, ethnic and other kind of minorities. There is no real
integration, but rather assimilation. I believe we would all agree
that there is a big difference between integration and assimilation.
A problem of integration is a social problem.” However, Danish politicians
did not, strictly speaking, practice hate speech. They were more
often the targets than the perpetrators. Women politicians were
particularly at risk of abuse. They were more exposed to hate speech
and consequently often refrained from using social media, to avoid sexist
and misogynous hate speech targeting them. Some public figures even
decided to leave political life so as not to have to put up with
this situation. The Danish Prime Minister denounced the challenge
of online abuse and called for a responsible use of social media,
that needed to remain a forum for discussion open to everyone.
23. The Center for Forebyggelse af Eksklusion is a small non-governmental
organisation “wishing to contribute in creating a more cohesive
society which embraces all the differences that our society contains, across
religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation and political standpoint”.
One of their main projects, “Anmeld Had” (Report Hate) aims to raise
awareness on hate speech and protect victims. Their website allows
victims to report physical or verbal assaults, which the Center
assesses and transmits to the police if necessary. This project
is useful for the victims but also on a more general scale, as it
helps to investigate the extent of hate speech and hate crimes in
Denmark, providing data that support the work of those who prevent
and prosecute it.
24. Sameksistens carried out research on how seven Danish newspapers
portrayed Islam and Muslims between March and November 2017, analysing
136 articles. An interesting result that is relevant to our report is
that politicians were influential in shaping this representation;
in these articles, politicians were featured more often than Danish
Muslims (45% of the persons interviewed versus 16%). Politicians
set the agenda of media coverage, meaning that the focus of news
reports were political statements or initiatives rather than a description
of Danish Muslims’ beliefs or life. According to this analysis,
the image of Danish Islam was distorted for the sake of creating
“conflict” and in order to make information more interesting.
25. The situation in Denmark is interesting in many respects.
It highlights that even in modern, open societies that have benefited
economically from the contribution of a migrant population, prejudice
is present and can easily be exploited for political gain. It also
shows, once again, that there is a link between the language used
in public and political discourse, and the attitudes of the population.
My impression is that the former has an impact on the latter, even
more than the other way around. Some politicians master the art
of influencing the political debate by producing and evoking fear
and anxiety. I would like to highlight that politicians, particularly
members of the government and legislators, should be aware that
prejudice may originate not only from fully fledged hate speech.
Even more subtle forms of stigmatisation, or discrimination, such
as unequal criteria for the application of criminal sanctions, may
disrupt peaceful coexistence and trigger vicious circles of exclusion
and anger.
4. Anti-Roma hate speech
26. Roma, Sinti and Travellers
are among the main targets of hate speech and hate crime in most
Council of Europe member States. The language used against them
is particularly harsh, and dehumanisation often reaches disconcerting
levels. Members of these groups are regularly described as a threat
to social order and are associated with criminal activities. This
is also a clear example of how prejudice against a category or group is
used by certain politicians for electoral gain.
27. “Whenever politicians take an interest in my community, it
is often to attack us and further division between us and the settled
community”, observed Cassie Marie McDonagh, an Irish Traveller and
member of the Gypsy, Roma and Traveller Women’s Empowerment Network,
in an article in The Guardian on
11 October 2017. She reported that during a debate on “Gypsies and
Travellers and local communities” at the House of Commons, in October
2017, Labour MP John Speller claimed that “the public view of the
community will continue to be shaped by the appalling behaviour
of the minority, who bring absolute chaos to their own communities”. While this is not an example
of hate speech, it shows how easily the political discourse can
slip into negative stereotyping and stigmatisation of this group.
While this is not an example
of hate speech, it shows how easily the political discourse can
slip into negative stereotyping and stigmatisation of this group.28. In the Slovak Republic, while Ombudswoman Jana Dubovcová has
highlighted on various occasion the unjustified use of violence
by police forces on the occasion of raids on Roma sites, Interior
Minister Robert Kaliňák justified and even praised the police without
any hint of the possibility of an internal investigation to clarify
possible responsibilities.
29. Examples of even harsher rhetoric abound across Europe. In
the Czech Republic, Jaroslav Staník, a member of the SPD Party,
is said to have declared that members of various minority groups
should be gassed to death. The 2017 Report on Extremism, prepared
by the Czech Republic’s Interior Ministry, observed that Tomio Okamura,
leader of the conservative SPD Party, had used xenophobic rhetoric and that in the past, when anti-Roma sentiment
was dominating the news cycle, he had made anti-gypsy comments.
and that in the past, when anti-Roma sentiment
was dominating the news cycle, he had made anti-gypsy comments. 30. Revisionism is often part of the derogatory rhetoric targeting
Roma. Czech parliamentarian Miloslav Rozner, for instance, called
the Second World War concentration camp for Romani people at Lety
a “pseudo-concentration camp”.
31. In Italy, the leader of the League party Matteo Salvini has
repeatedly indulged in anti-Roma statements. In March 2018, on the
occasion of International Roma Day, he tweeted that “if many of
them worked more and stole less, if many of them sent their children
to school instead of teaching them to steal, then it really would be
something to celebrate”. He continued to use extremely offensive
language after he was appointed Interior Minister and Deputy Prime
Minister. In June, he announced during a television interview that
he had given instructions for a “census” of the country’s Roma community,
adding that those with Italian nationality would “unfortunately”
be allowed to stay.
32. Several attacks are currently being investigated in Italy
as possibly being motivated by racism. Among them there is the shocking
case of a 13-month-old Roma child who was shot with an air gun in
Rome on 25 July 2018. The existence of a link between violent or
discriminatory behaviour targeting Roma and other minorities and
the attitude of politicians is particularly evident.
33. On 7 August 2018, a loudspeaker announcement was heard on
a regional train on the Milano-Mantua line inviting Roma passengers
to get off the train as they were a nuisance (the language used
was particularly insulting). An internal investigation identified
a female staff member as the person behind this announcement and
the company announced that she faced sanctions and possible dismissal.
Minister Salvini reacted by defending the staff member and stated
that he would do his utmost to avoid any sanctions being applied.
Days later, he declared publicly that this person should by be awarded
a prize for her actions.
34. In its opinion on Romania adopted in June 2017, the Advisory
Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities indicates that the persistence of negative attitudes
and prejudice against the Roma is a reason for considerable concern.
“In particular, the continuing pernicious language employed by some
politicians against the Roma and persons belonging to the Hungarian
minority perpetuate divisions which are detrimental to finding solutions
to problems affecting society.” This report describes a worrying
process that probably applies to many other countries: “Intolerant
language which used to be restricted to the extreme right-wing political
parties has, over the years, become commonplace and entered mainstream
political discourse. Regrettably, it has to be noted that negative
stereotypical portrayal of the Roma and exacerbated nationalism
brings a measure of electoral success in particular at local level,
and even more respectable political organisations resort to using
anti-Roma and anti-Hungarian rhetoric.”
35. A 2014 report published by Harvard University on “Accelerating
patterns of anti-Roma violence in Hungary” analyses several causes
of the increasing anti-gypsyism in the country. In addition to general patterns
of impunity and lack of accountability for violence targeting specific
groups in the past, and the creation of paramilitary and vigilante
groups as well as extreme-right organisations, the report highlights
that “events amounting to hate speech and hate crimes, especially
by leaders and organised groups, lead to an inflammatory atmosphere
and insecurity”. The text refers among other things to the expression
“gypsy crime” used in the public discourse (words ruled as racist
by the European Court of Human Rights as they associate crime with
a specific group) and to anti-Roma events organised by the Jobbik
Party, such as a march held on 12 January 2013 in Szigethalom.
36. A direct cause-effect relationship between hate speech by
politicians and hate crime has not been proven. However,
the simultaneous increase in anti-gypsy rhetoric, including in public
discourse, and in violent attacks on Roma and Traveller people in
Europe hardly looks like a coincidence. When they use the “Roma
card” to gain visibility and popularity, public personalities and
politicians in particular should be aware that they may be encouraging
discrimination and ultimately violence against this community, with
possible serious consequences.
However,
the simultaneous increase in anti-gypsy rhetoric, including in public
discourse, and in violent attacks on Roma and Traveller people in
Europe hardly looks like a coincidence. When they use the “Roma
card” to gain visibility and popularity, public personalities and
politicians in particular should be aware that they may be encouraging
discrimination and ultimately violence against this community, with
possible serious consequences. 5. ECRI’s general policy recommendations: GPR No.1 5 on Combating Hate Speech
37. The European Commission against
Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), an independent monitoring body composed
of impartial members, has worked relentlessly to combat racism in
Europe since it was established in 1993.
38. In addition to country-specific monitoring activities, ECRI’s
mandate includes the preparation of general policy recommendations.
These provide Council of Europe member States with guidelines to
be used when drawing up national policies in areas including racism,
xenophobia, anti-Semitism and intolerance.
39. Sixteen general policy recommendations have been adopted so
far. GPR No. 15, on Combating Hate Speech, is particularly relevant
to this report.
40. According to GPR No. 15, hate speech is based on the unjustified
assumption that a person or a group of persons is superior to others;
it incites acts of violence or discrimination, thus undermining
respect for minority groups and damaging social cohesion. In this
recommendation, ECRI calls for speedy reactions by public figures
to hate speech; promotion of self-regulation of media; raising awareness
of the dangerous consequences of hate speech; withdrawing financial
and other support from political parties that actively use hate
speech; and criminalising its most extreme manifestations, while
respecting freedom of expression. Anti-hate speech measures must
be well-founded, proportionate, non-discriminatory, and not be misused
to curb freedom of expression or assembly nor to suppress criticism
of official policies, political opposition and religious beliefs.
41. Through extensive research on the various manifestations of
hate speech in Europe and legislation and policies to counter it,
ECRI has identified a range of measures and summarised them in ten
recommendations within GPR No.15. First come the more general and
far-reaching measures, that should be considered as a higher priority.
More specific measures follow. Criminal law provisions are listed
last, which shows they are considered as the last resort. I will
present here a selection of measures, namely those that are particularly relevant
to the role and responsibilities of politicians:
- awareness-raising and counter-hate speech measures
- self-regulation: appropriate codes of conduct should be adopted by public and private institutions, including elected bodies and political parties. The latter should be encouraged to sign the Charter of European Political Parties for a Non-Racist Society. Complaint mechanisms should be established so that non-compliance may be reported and sanctioned;
- of great interest for politicians, and therefore for our report, is GPR No. 9 on the funding of political parties, calling on member States to withdraw all financial and other forms of support from political parties or other organisations that use hate speech or fail to sanction its use by their members. The recommendation even envisages the possibility of applying rigorous sanctions, such as prohibiting or dissolving such parties or organisations “where their use of hate speech is intended or can reasonably be expected to incite acts of violence, intimidation, hostility or discrimination”.
42. As already mentioned, criminal law is the last of the tools
recommended by GPR No.15. While criminal provisions are necessary
in this area, they should be applied only where no administrative
or civil law measure is considered effective. ECRI’s prudence in
recommending criminal law sanctions is motivated mainly by two types
of risk that they pose: on the one hand, they might unduly limit
freedom of expression; on the other hand, there is a risk of potential
misuse of such provisions, even in the realm of politics where they
could, for instance, be used to silence opponents. Therefore, the
recommendation adds, criminal law provisions related to hate speech
should be drafted with clarity and precision.
43. ECRI’s General Policy Recommendation No.15 is one of the main
references in the area of countering hate speech and it adequately
covers public and political discourse. Its indications should be
carefully studied and interpreted, so as to allow different implementation
in different contexts. Legislators and policy makers should make
good use of them. I believe that the Assembly should promote this
text and do its utmost to support ECRI’s activities in general.
6. Freedom of expression and hate speech in politics: the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights
44. The case law of the European
Court of Human Rights (“the Court”) provides guidance in the interpretation
of the nature and limits of freedom of expression and may help to
understand how this freedom should be exercised in the realm of
politics.
45. Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS
No. 5, “the Convention”) stipulates that “[e]veryone has the right
to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers”. In
other words, everyone has the right to hold opinions and to express
them freely. This is a crucial element of democracy and is particularly
relevant to the activity of politicians, but also for the possibility
for citizens to choose among the opinions presented to them by politicians
and behave – vote – accordingly.
46. When pronouncing on alleged breaches of Article 10 of the
Convention, the Court uses two different approaches. The first is
exclusion from the protection of the Convention, based on Article
17 (Prohibition of abuse of rights), which reads: “Nothing in this
Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or
person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed
at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein
or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for
in the Convention” (or, in the simplified version of selected articles
provided by the Court, “Nothing in this Convention can be used to damage
the rights and freedoms in the Convention”). This means that the
most general limit to freedom of expression is the need not to infringe
all other fundamental rights, nor to negate the fundamental values
of the Convention.
47. The second approach applied by the Court is based on the restrictions
on protection, provided for by paragraph 2 of Article 10, which
refers to “formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society”.
The interests protected by this paragraph include national security
and public safety, the prevention of disorder or crime, and the
protection of health or morals. The Court uses this approach when
it considers that the expression in question amounts to hate speech,
but it does not undermine the fundamental values of the Convention.
48. Françoise Tulkens, former Vice-President of the European Court
of Human Rights, highlights that “the general rule should be respect
for freedom of expression, and the utmost care is to be commended
when it comes to the legal framework of this fundamental freedom”.
She adds that the case law of the Court enshrines the right to express
“ideas that offend, shock or disturb the State or others”. This
confirms that even harsh criticism does not necessarily amount to
hate speech.
This
confirms that even harsh criticism does not necessarily amount to
hate speech.49. However, particularly relevant to this report, the Court indicates
that “it may be considered necessary in certain democratic societies
to sanction or even prevent all forms of expression which spread,
incite, promote or justify hatred based on intolerance”.
50. On the other hand, as researcher Tarlach McGonagle underlines, the
Court states that the limits of acceptable criticism are wider for
politicians than for private individuals because politicians “inevitably
and knowingly” lay themselves open to scrutiny of their words and
deeds and must therefore display a greater degree of tolerance. Freedom
of expression is especially important for elected representatives
of the people, as they represent the electorate, draw attention
to their preoccupations and defend their interests. The protection
of freedom of expression is particularly strong as regards political
expression: the Court states that “[p]arliaments … are the essential
fora for political debate” and that “very weighty reasons must be
advanced to justify interfering with the freedom of expression exercised
therein”. But
heightened protection for political expression extends beyond such
institutional framework, Dr McGonagle observes, as “freedom of political debate
is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society which
prevails throughout the Convention” (Lingens
v. Austria).
the
Court states that the limits of acceptable criticism are wider for
politicians than for private individuals because politicians “inevitably
and knowingly” lay themselves open to scrutiny of their words and
deeds and must therefore display a greater degree of tolerance. Freedom
of expression is especially important for elected representatives
of the people, as they represent the electorate, draw attention
to their preoccupations and defend their interests. The protection
of freedom of expression is particularly strong as regards political
expression: the Court states that “[p]arliaments … are the essential
fora for political debate” and that “very weighty reasons must be
advanced to justify interfering with the freedom of expression exercised
therein”. But
heightened protection for political expression extends beyond such
institutional framework, Dr McGonagle observes, as “freedom of political debate
is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society which
prevails throughout the Convention” (Lingens
v. Austria).51. A number of cases confirm that the Court ensures an ample
protection of freedom of expression for politicians. The judgment Temel v. Turkey of 1 February 2011,
for instance, upheld the right of the chairperson of a political
party to criticise the United States’ intervention in Iraq and the
solitary confinement of the leader of a terrorist organisation,
even though these and subsequent statements had been considered
by the national judiciary as propaganda and public defence of the
use of violence.
52. Other judgments, although not concerning politicians, shed
light on the limits to freedom of expression that probably apply
to political actors as well. Garaudy
v. France of 24 June 2003, for instance, states that denying
crimes against humanity was one of the most serious forms of racial
defamation of Jews and of incitement to hatred of them. Such acts
were manifestly incompatible with the fundamental values which the Convention
sought to promote; therefore, the Court applied Article 17 (prohibition
of abuse of rights) and held that the applicant was not entitled
to rely on Article 10 (freedom of expression). The judgment in M’bala M’bala v. France of 20 October
2015 also excluded the protection of Article 10 for expressions
of anti-Semitism disguised as an artistic production. The Court
excluded that the satirical or provocative character of the performance
may justify its contents, and that the comedian had used his right
to freedom of expression for ends which were incompatible with the
letter and spirit of the Convention.
53. The cases of Norwood v. the United
Kingdom (16 November 2004) and Belkacem
v. Belgium (27 June 2017) were both based on the same
principle, leading the Court to consider that freedom of expression
had not been breached. They concerned respectively a member of the
British National Party (who had displayed in his window a poster
representing the Twin Towers in flames and the words “Islam out
of Britain – Protect the British People”) and the leader and spokesperson
of the organisation “Sharia4Belgium”, which had been convicted for
incitement to discrimination, hatred and violence contained in YouTube
videos concerning non-Muslim groups. The expressions used were considered
incompatible with the values of tolerance, social peace and non-discrimination
underlying the European Convention on Human Rights. These judgments
are relevant to our subject in that the applicants were political
actors in the broad sense. It is worth noting that the political nature
of the expression did not justify its violent and intolerant character.
54. Reconciling the exercise of freedom of expression and the
respect of other fundamental rights is not a simple task, but the
Court carefully endeavours to strike a balance. In the case Fáber v. Hungary (judgment of 24
July 2012), for instance, the Court prioritised freedom of expression,
holding that there had been a violation of Article 10. The applicant
had been fined for displaying the striped Árpád flag, which had
controversial historical connotations, less than 100 metres away
from a demonstration against racism and hatred. The Court found
that “the applicant, who had not behaved violently or abusively
and had not posed a threat to public order, should not have been
sanctioned for merely displaying the Árpád flag”. Other considerations,
in particular the possible unease of participants in the demonstration,
were not considered sufficient to justify the sanction that had
been inflicted. This decision is in my opinion sensible and balanced.
However, we should be careful in applying its underlying principle
to other contexts, such as the behaviour of political leaders. In
the case of political actors, particularly prominent ones, language
and symbolic gestures have an impact on the general public’s attitude
and action and should therefore be scrutinised attentively.
55. Even though it requires identifying the boundaries of the
protection granted by Article 10, the fight against hate speech
does not run counter to freedom of expression. Protecting freedom
of expression and countering hate speech are not mutually exclusive:
on the contrary, they are mutually reinforcing objectives. Setting
limits to freedom of expression in order to prevent hate speech
allows everyone to enjoy such right while respecting all other people’s
exercise of freedom.
7. The role of political leaders
56. As already mentioned, political
leaders have an important role in preventing and combating hate
speech and intolerance. They are increasingly aware of their responsibilities
in this respect, as indicated by the Declaration of Rome signed
by 17 European ministers who met in Italy in 2013 to express solidarity
with Minister Cécile Kyenge. At the time Italy’s Minister for integration,
Ms Kyenge had been targeted by racist insults on- and off-line,
including by fellow politicians.
57. How should they play such role? The most general indication
is that politicians and public officials must refrain from making
any statement that might undermine equality or promote discrimination.
In addition, they should react to statements of this kind, as silence
may be perceived as tacit endorsement and contribute to creating
a climate of impunity. To this end, public bodies should have clear
rules governing the conduct of individuals speaking in their capacity
as public officials.
58. An interesting observation from the organisation Article 19,
represented at the hearing held in Paris on 19 September 2018 by
Ms Joanna Szymanska, is that simply condemning “hate speech” may
be insufficient. Politicians should also “substantively and persuasively
engage with the underlying anxieties and misperceptions” that contribute
to expressions of “hate speech”. Responses by public officials should
be nuanced. In addition to denouncing the use of hate speech or
negative stereotyping, they should provide persuasive counter-narratives
based on accurate facts. They should also take into account the
fears of the public and possibly challenge the biased information
underlying them. An additional, very sensible indication is that
in some cases reacting to hate speech incidents is counterproductive.
When the perpetrators are fringe individuals or groups that are
not influential, responding to their provocation may give them the
visibility they would not otherwise have.
59. It is also important to address the causes of the specific
hate speech incidents, such as the hostility towards certain individuals
or groups, especially by expressing solidarity with them and support,
and by giving them the opportunity to express their views.
60. Politicians also have the power to instigate or encourage
dialogue between groups, for instance when hate speech originates
from tensions between communities. They can create opportunities
for counter-speech and counter-narratives by others, in addition
to using these tools themselves.
61. The No Hate Parliamentary Alliance, officially launched within
the Parliamentary Assembly on 29 January 2015, is a step in the
right direction. As members of the Alliance, parliamentarians “commit
to taking firm, proactive and public stances against racism, hatred
and intolerance, for whatever reasons and in whatever form they
appear”. The Alliance provides a forum for many of the activities
that I have mentioned (such as counter-speech and counter-narratives)
and for debate on how to counter hatred. The Charter of Commitments
that members sign underlines the element of personal responsibility
of parliamentarians and gives it visibility.
8. Self-regulation in political parties: Venice Commission guidelines
62. The Council of Europe’s European
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) has conducted
extensive work on political parties as major players in democratic
life. The Commission writes that “as a specific type of free association
of persons, political parties are central to the functioning of
democracy. They are essential to a pluralist society, and their
role in the formation of the will of the people is fundamental”. The
Venice Commission has issued Guidelines on Political Party Regulation, a
Code of Good Practice in the field of Political Parties and Guidelines
on prohibition and dissolution of political parties and analogous measures. In the
Code of Good Practice in the field of Political Parties, adopted
in 2008, the Venice Commission explains that the activities of political
parties are regulated both by national legislation and self-regulation.
This text notes, among other things, that “the codes to which political
parties voluntarily subscribe as instruments of self-restraint present
an added value, not only because they are more likely to be respected but
because their very process of elaboration puts into practice the
style and culture of campaigning that these codes aspire to inoculate
into political parties”. Campaigning is a key moment in the life
of politicians and political parties, and one in which communication
is particularly important and may become more aggressive. However,
it seems to me that this principle applies to political communication
in general, and that parties’ self-regulation should be used to
encourage all members to use an appropriate language and avoid biased, stigmatising
and hateful expressions targeting individuals and groups.
a
Code of Good Practice in the field of Political Parties and Guidelines
on prohibition and dissolution of political parties and analogous measures. In the
Code of Good Practice in the field of Political Parties, adopted
in 2008, the Venice Commission explains that the activities of political
parties are regulated both by national legislation and self-regulation.
This text notes, among other things, that “the codes to which political
parties voluntarily subscribe as instruments of self-restraint present
an added value, not only because they are more likely to be respected but
because their very process of elaboration puts into practice the
style and culture of campaigning that these codes aspire to inoculate
into political parties”. Campaigning is a key moment in the life
of politicians and political parties, and one in which communication
is particularly important and may become more aggressive. However,
it seems to me that this principle applies to political communication
in general, and that parties’ self-regulation should be used to
encourage all members to use an appropriate language and avoid biased, stigmatising
and hateful expressions targeting individuals and groups.9. Hate speech in political discourse and the media
63. Mass media also have an important
role to play regarding the impact of hate speech, particularly in
the political discourse, on society. Media coverage contributes
to shaping the perception of reality by the general public. Journalists
may choose between merely reproducing the language used by political
leaders and reporting on it with an independent, critical approach.
At the hearing on “Migrant invasion – breaking the myth”, held by
the No Hate Parliamentary Alliance on 26 June 2018 in Strasbourg,
Mr Yannis Kotsifos of the European Federation of Journalists explained
to members the ethical questions that reporting on migration and
refugees raised. These matters are central in the stigmatising discourse
of certain political leaders and in stirring fear and other negative
emotions among the public. A study entitled “Getting
the facts right: reporting ethnicity and religion”, published in 2012 by the Media Diversity Institute
in partnership with ARTICLE 19 and the European Federation of Journalists,
found that most stories in newspapers revolved around five subjects
only, migrants and refugees being one of those. More recently, the
European Federation of Journalists, together with a coalition of
civil society organisations ran a project called “Media against
hate”, aimed at countering hate crime while protecting freedom of
the media. In 2018, this project published the study “Responding
to ‘hate speech’: Comparative overview of six EU countries”, which takes into
account the link between media and politics. The study reads: “Hate
speech’ is reflected in the media, online and in political discourse,
including sometimes in statements made by politicians and public
officials. In many cases, the rise in prejudice and intolerance
can be directly linked to a government’s own policies and communication
strategies.”
which takes into
account the link between media and politics. The study reads: “Hate
speech’ is reflected in the media, online and in political discourse,
including sometimes in statements made by politicians and public
officials. In many cases, the rise in prejudice and intolerance
can be directly linked to a government’s own policies and communication
strategies.”64. Mr Kotsifos was of the opinion that the best recipe against
hate speech in the media was to combine the regulations against
hate speech already existing, not necessarily related to information,
and self-regulation by media operators. Existing regulations may
have to be updated, and people involved in disciplinary bodies should
be offered adequate training on how to recognise and counter hate
speech. He made another point that I wish to support: media audiences
should be taught the skills to interpret and better understand information. This
might trigger a virtuous circle, as media dealing with an educated
audience tend to improve the quality and accuracy of their reporting.
65. In Greece, a charter of ethics for journalism has been drafted,
entitled “Charter
of Idomeni”, which aims to denounce
and discourage the climate of intolerance in the media. The European
Federation of Journalists disseminated the charter and wrote to
editors drawing their attention to the language they were using.
Such interventions were meant to raise awareness and not to control
or, even worse, sanction their work. The underlying idea was that
freedom is crucial to journalism, as a common ground between journalists
and the audience, and should not be limited unless strictly necessary.
which aims to denounce
and discourage the climate of intolerance in the media. The European
Federation of Journalists disseminated the charter and wrote to
editors drawing their attention to the language they were using.
Such interventions were meant to raise awareness and not to control
or, even worse, sanction their work. The underlying idea was that
freedom is crucial to journalism, as a common ground between journalists
and the audience, and should not be limited unless strictly necessary.66. The way social media are used to spread hate was looked into
by Ms Marit Maij, in her report on “Ending cyberdiscrimination and
online hate”, which highlighted the responsibilities
not only of member States but also of internet intermediaries. The
indications contained in this report and in the resolution and recommendation
stemming from it are still timely and relevant. However, the main
focus of the present report is on the ethical and political responsibility
of political leaders not to spread hatred, including as social media users.
The formidable impact of Facebook or Twitter makes this responsibility
even more serious.
which highlighted the responsibilities
not only of member States but also of internet intermediaries. The
indications contained in this report and in the resolution and recommendation
stemming from it are still timely and relevant. However, the main
focus of the present report is on the ethical and political responsibility
of political leaders not to spread hatred, including as social media users.
The formidable impact of Facebook or Twitter makes this responsibility
even more serious.10. Conclusions
67. Hate speech is pervasive and
on the rise in today’s societies. Politics is not immune to it:
some political leaders are targeted by it, particularly online,
and some of them indulge in stigmatising or abusive language that
may amount to hate speech.
68. In the light of its negative impact on targeted individuals
and groups, as well as society at large, hate speech should be prevented
and countered effectively. The most relevant and effective way of
combating it is to strengthen the values of human dignity, democracy
and human rights in European societies.
69. Politicians, along with other public figures, have a particularly
significant responsibility with regard to combating hate speech,
considering that their status allows them to influence a wide audience.
Political leaders contribute significantly to defining the themes
and the tone of the public discourse. The public’s attention or concern
about a given matter often reflects the messages conveyed by politicians
during an electoral campaign or a particularly important parliamentary
debate.
70. On the other hand, political leaders operate in a social and
cultural environment defined by a variety of actors, including the
media and civil society organisations. These actors also bear responsibilities
and a role to play in preventing and countering hate speech.
71. The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance has
conducted an extensive work on hate speech. The main outcome of
such work, General Policy Recommendation No. 15 on Combating Hate
Speech, provides Council of Europe member States with a wide range
of indications on measures to prevent and combat hate speech, support
the people it targets and reduce its harmful impact. These measures
should be implemented by member States.
72. Self-regulation is a particularly effective way to counter
hate speech, especially in politics, and should be practised by
political organisations such as movements and parties. The same
applies to the media.
73. Co-operation among all social actors is needed to combat hate
speech and reinforce peaceful living together in diversity in today’s
Europe.
74. As regards media specifically, while fully enjoying freedom
of expression, they should ensure unbiased, accurate reporting and
avoid negative stereotyping and stigmatising language.