1. Introduction
1. A member of the Council of
Europe since 1995, the Republic of North Macedonia has been engaged
in a post-monitoring dialogue with the Parliamentary Assembly since
the year 2000. In its
Resolution
1949 (2013), the Assembly stressed that the country had “multi-level
challenges to face to secure its political stability and social
cohesion”. While praising the country’s aspiration to further integrate
into Europe and to fully comply with European standards in the fields
of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, the Assembly expressed serious
doubts as to whether there was “sufficient political stability (…)
to carry out the required reforms at a regular pace”.
2. Since our appointment as co-rapporteurs in June 2015
, Mr Ghiletchi and I conducted
four fact-finding visits to the country in February 2016, May 2017,
June 2018 and in May 2019, which resulted in the preparation of
three detailed information notes.
During
our visits, we met the highest official authorities of the country, including
the President of the Republic, Mr Pendarovski, the Speaker or Vice-Speakers
of the parliament and the leaders of the parliamentary factions
and political parties. Additionally, we met the Ministers of Justice,
of the Interior, Labour and Social Policy, Information Society or
their representatives, the high judicial officials, the Ombudsman
and other independent regulatory bodies. We also met representatives
of civil society and the media, as well as representatives of the
European Union, the OSCE Mission, the UN Special Resident and the diplomatic
community to gather information about the state of play of reforms.
3. We would like to thank the delegation of North Macedonia to
the Parliamentary Assembly and the authorities of the country for
their co-operation throughout our mandate and for the assistance
provided in preparing our visits. We would also like to thank the
delegation for the extensive comments on the preliminary draft report
sent on 12 August 2019.
4. The Assembly also observed a number of elections including
the presidential election of 13 and 27 April 2014 and the early
parliamentary elections of 27 April 2014. These observations were
followed by two post-electoral visits in July 2014 and April 2015.
In view of the political
situation that arose after the April 2014 elections and the boycott
of both the elections and the parliament by the opposition, the
Parliamentary Assembly organised a current affairs debate on “the
situation in “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”
” on 22 May 2015 following
a request by four political groups.
A
post-election delegation from the Monitoring Committee paid a fact-finding
visit to Skopje on 28-29 April 2015 and called on the authorities
to comply with constitutional and legal requirements, while pursuing
a political dialogue.
The
Assembly also observed the early parliamentary elections of 11 December
2016
, the referendum on the “name issue”
on 30 September 2018
and the presidential election on
21 April and 5 May 2019.
These ad hoc commissions of the
Assembly produced valuable material to assess the legal electoral
framework and the issues that needed to be addressed.
5. In 2013, the Assembly had recommended the reinforcement of
the Council of Europe presence in the country in order to, inter
alia, “provide advice, promote and support the policies and activities
of national authorities and local partners related to membership
of the Council of Europe”.
The establishment of
the Council of Europe Project Office in Skopje in 2015 has been
a very positive development, and is to be welcomed. In the framework
of the “Horizontal Facility for the Western Balkans and Turkey”
the office has been implementing joint EU-Council of Europe Programmes
aimed at bringing the country closer to European standards, in particular
in the fields of justice, the fight against discrimination and the
fight against corruption. The office has contributed towards the
strengthening of co-operation with the Council of Europe.
2. Political context
2.1. Domestic
politics: the “Pržino Agreements” of June 2015 and July 2016
6. In spring 2015, the release
of illegally wire-taped conversations revealing “apparent direct
involvement of senior government and party officials in electoral
fraud, corruption, abuse of power and authority, conflict of interest,
blackmail, extortion, criminal damage,” as well as “unacceptable
political interference in the nomination/appointment of judges”
stirred a major political
crisis that lasted two years. It ended in 2016 with the resignation
of Prime Minister Gruevski and the signing of the EU-sponsored “Pržino
Agreements” in June 2015 and July 2016.
Other
events that marked the end of the crisis include the establishment
of a technocratic government from July 2016 to January 2017 (with
the participation of opposition members), and the eventual organisation
of early parliamentary elections on 11 December 2016.
7. The 2016 elections were inconclusive and did not allow for
the formation of a clear majority. Out of 123 seats, the VMRO-DPMNE
won 51 seats, the SDSM 49 seats and the Albanian party DUI 10 seats.
The formation of a new government was delayed for months after the
December 2016 elections, as President Ivanov refused the SDSM’s
request for a mandate to form a government after the VMRO–DPMNE,
which had won a plurality of seats in the elections, was unable
to form a parliamentary majority. The VMRO–DPMNE deputies, meanwhile,
filibustered a vote to install an SDSM-backed Assembly speaker,
Talat Xhaferi, who is an ethnic Albanian member of the Democratic
Union for Integration (DUI).
8. In 27 April 2017, while Mr Xhaferi was being elected Speaker
of the parliament, VMRO–DPMNE supporters stormed the parliament
building and violently assaulted several opposition leaders (see
below). The SDSM and their Albanian coalition partners were finally
able to form a government on 31 May 2017. After a period of mediation
led by the European Union and the United States State Department,
Mr Zaev was designated as Prime minister.
The
SDSM-led government has prioritized rebooting North Macedonia’s European
Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) accession
paths.
2.2. Regional
and international developments: the Prespa Agreement of 17 June
2018 and its impact on the Euro-Atlantic integration process
9. At a regional level, Prime
Minister Zaev and the Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov signed
an “Agreement on Friendship, Good Neighbourly Relations and Co-operation”
on 1 August 2017, thus paving the way towards enhanced bilateral
co-operation in several areas including: energy, transport and communication infrastructures,
financial services and capital markets. This Agreement put an end
to years of disputes between the two countries concerning the denomination
of the language and resulted in increased co-operation and economic
programmes between the two countries.
10. The authorities also resumed negotiations aimed at settling
a 27-year old “name dispute” with Greece, which ended successfully
with the signing of the historical “name agreement” on 17 June 2018,
also called “Prespa Agreement.”
The agreement was signed by the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the two Parties, Mr Kotzias and
Mr Dimitrov, in the presence of the Prime ministers of Greece (Mr Tsipras)
and of North Macedonia (Mr Zaev) at the border Lake Prespa. Other
parties present included the UN Mediator Matthew Nimetz, the EU
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica
Mogherini, and the EU Enlargement Commissioner, Johannes Hahn.
11. The Agreement was flagged as an EU accession issue, and thus
underwent a speedy adoption procedure in parliament. The ratification
law was adopted by the parliament of North Macedonia on 20 June 2018
by 69 votes in favour and none against; all parliamentary parties
expressed their support for the Agreement, with the exception of
the VMRO-DPMNE, who refrained from voting. Opponents of the agreement demonstrated
in the street and in front of parliament.
The demonstrations were
triggered by some small extra-parliamentary parties and football
hooligans.
The President’s
veto on the “name agreement” (see below) did not however hamper
the continuation of the process foreseen in the Agreement.
12. The Agreement regulates the “name issue(s)”, excludes any
territorial claims, prohibits hostile activities, actions or propaganda
by State agencies or agencies and clarifies some historical issues.
The Agreement also resulted in the establishment of a Joint Inter-Disciplinary
Committee of Experts on historic, archaeological and educational
matters (which met twice since then) and provides a basis for an
extended strategic partnership between the two countries.
13. On 30 July 2018, the parliament decided to organise a consultative
referendum (not legally binding) on 30 September 2018, with 68 votes
in favour (and none against).
The
question was phrased as follows: “
Are you
in favour of European Union and NATO membership by accepting the
agreement between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of
Greece?” 94% of the 666 000 voters voted “yes” during
a voting process, which the Assembly ad hoc committee considered
to be administered impartially, with fundamental freedoms being respected
throughout the campaign.
However,
due to the low turnout (36,89%, i.e. less than the 50% threshold
required), which was triggered by the absence of an active ‘Against’
or organised boycott campaign, the State Election Commission declared
the referendum invalid.
14. The “name issue”, alongside other identity issues addressed
in this agreement, has stirred heated and emotional reactions for
decades, and remains a highly divisive issue in Macedonian society.
We had stressed that these concerns and opinions ought to be articulated
and debated in a free, peaceful and constructive manner, without
recourse to violence, intimidation and inflammatory rhetoric.
15. After the referendum, the constitutional amendments needed
to ratify the “name agreement” had to be adopted by a two-thirds
majority. As the VMRO-DPMNE opposed it, political negotiations were
undertaken to unblock the situation. After the adoption of the Amnesty
Law in December 2018, charges pressed against 8 opposition MPs involved
in the storming of the parliament were dropped (see below). With
the support of these deputies, the required parliamentary majority
needed to adopt the constitutional amendments could be secured.
This amnesty was, at that time, deemed necessary to overcome polarization,
to enable the adoption of the constitutional amendments and to take
a step towards reconciliation. At the same time, such action raises
questions in terms of respect of the rule of law. Such processes
should not contravene the powers of the judicial system to establish
liability of those who perpetrated violence.
16. The constitutional amendments were adopted on 13 December
2018. Following the ratification of the Prespa Agreement by Greece
on 26 January 2019, the country formally changed its name to “Republic
of North Macedonia” on 12 February 2019.
17. The conclusive ratification of the Prespa Agreement paved
the way for integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) and for the launch of EU accession negotiations (the country
had signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2001, which
entered in force in 2004, and was engaged, since 2012, in a “High-Level
Accession Dialogue” with the European Union). As a result of its
ratification, and in line with the Agreement, the Greek authorities
sent a notification to the EU and NATO on 25 June 2018, indicating their
approval of North Macedonia’s accession to these two institutions.
The accession Protocol was signed with NATO on 6 February 2019.
The authorities expected the ratification process of the Protocol
by the 29 NATO member States to be completed by the end of the year
2019.
18. The EU General Affairs Council, for its part, had decided
to make a “conditional opening” of accession negotiations in June
2018. The final decision whether to open these negotiations would
depend on the progress made in reforming several priority areas.
Most notably, judicial reforms would need to produce tangible and sustained
results and the government would need to proactively investigate,
prosecute and convict individuals involved in corruption and organised
crime cases (including individuals in high levels of power, members
of the security and intelligence services and individuals involved
in public administration). Other pre-requisites for the opening
of negotiations included a positive report of the European Commission
and a decision by the European Council and First Intergovernmental
Conference at the end of 2019. In a report released on 29 May 2019
, the
European Commission recommended that European Council should open
EU accession negotiations. On 18 June 2019, the European Council
decided to postpone the decision to open accession negotiations
– a decision which requires unanimity of EU member States – until
October 2019.
19. It transpired from our meetings that the signing of the agreement
has raised immense hopes of strengthening Euro-Atlantic integration
– which has been a consensual strategic objective of the country.
This objective has transcended political parties and ethnic communities
who, for a while, have focused their attention on this process and
have left their traditional demands aside. After a two-year political
crisis that stalled the democratisation process of the country,
it has also enhanced the authorities’ desire to pursue reforms which
have been under way since April 2017.
2.3. Context
of the current reforms
20. On 8 June 2015, during the
political crisis, a group of European Commission Senior Experts
led by retired EC Director Reinhard Priebe, issued the so called
Priebe report, which made a wide range of recommendations. These
recommendations have constituted the basis for the reforms undertaken
by the Government after April 2017. The so-called “
Plan
3-6-9” implantation plan sought to outline urgent issues that needed
to be addressed in order to restore rule of law, democracy and human
rights within given a deadline (respectively 3, 6 and 9 months).
Detailed information about the state of implementation of these
reforms was summarised in a report published by the government in
spring 2018.
21. In June 2018, the European Council underlined “the critical
need for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue making
concrete progress on the Urgent Reform Priorities and to deliver
further tangible results in the fight against corruption”.
As a result, the authorities of
North Macedonia adopted Plan 18 in June 2018, which focused on 4
key rule of law reforms:, namely, judicial reforms; reforms to the
security services; public administration reform; and reforms aimed
at introducing anti-corruption policies.
22. The release of the illegally wire-taped conversations has
revealed a profound dysfunctioning in democratic and State institutions
and has plunged the country into a deep political crisis. The authorities
are now expected to restore trust in the democratic system and to
reinstate protection of fundamental rights. In view of the profound
political and legal changes that have happened since the adoption
of the Assembly’s last report in 2013, we have decided to focus
this report on the post-monitoring dialogue with North Macedonia
concerning the current state of reforms. The report shall highlight
progress made in overcoming the systemic issues noted in our previous
reports and information notes, and the Priebe report. The report
also highlights issues that deserve to be addressed by the authorities.
For the sake of clarity, this report will be divided into three
chapters: namely rule of law, democracy and human rights.
3. Rule
of law
3.1. Reform
of the judiciary: state of play
23. In 2013, the Assembly noted
that citizens of North Macedonia have little confidence in their
justice system. This observation remains valid, as the 2018 Annual
report of the Ombudsman recently confirmed. Low confidence in the
justice system is triggered by delays in court procedures and by
the people’s perception that most of the rulings are partial, selective
and politically motivated.
The Assembly had urged the Macedonian authorities
to ensure that conditions are met for the creation of a non-selective
justice system.
24. With the change of the ruling party, the country has undertaken
major reforms to the justice system, as recommended by the 3-6-9
Plan and the Plan 18. The first measures included the following:
24.1. The Council for Disciplinary
Liability and Evaluation of Judges was abolished on 28 July 2017. This
disciplinary body had been established in 2015 by the former ruling
party. It was considered by the then opposition as a political tool
and criticized by the Venice Commission.
Disciplinary procedures now fall
within the remit of the Judicial Council once again.
24.2. The Chief Public Prosecutor Marko Zvrlevski, who was perceived
as an ally of the former ruling coalition, was dismissed by the
parliament (following a positive opinion from the Council of Public Prosecutors)
on 17 August 2017.
24.3. The mandate of the Lustration Committee was terminated
by the parliament on 14 September 2017. This Committee had been
put in place in 2009 and was criticized both by the Assembly
and the Venice Commission
in an
amicus curiae brief dated
March 2013 and was subsequently challenged by the Macedonian Constitutional
Court. The lustration process was suspended in 2015 as part of the Pržino
Agreement and the law abolished.
25. Significant reforms have been launched since then. The Law
on Courts and the Law on the Judicial Council were adopted in line
with most of the Venice Commission recommendations issued in 2015
and 2018. These recommendations focused most notably on the grounds
for disciplinary liability of judges, disciplinary procedures and
bodies, as well as the performance evaluation system of judges.
The Law on the Judicial Council
intends to improve the system of appointment, promotion and professional
evaluation of judges. The law ensures that appointments to the first
instance give prominence to candidates’ ranking upon their completion
of the training in the Academy for Judges and Prosecutors in the
appointment procedure. The law also introduces a procedure for appeals
to the Supreme Court regarding appointment procedures. In addition, the
law grants the possibility for citizens to launch petitions and
requests for the dismissals of judges – which raised some concerns
from the President of the Judicial Council.
26. A number of other pieces of legislations have been adopted
in recent months to render the justice system more efficient and
more accessible. This legislation includes: amendments to the Law
on Judges, Law on the Academy of judges and public prosecutors (August
2018); the Law on Misdemeanours; the Law on Administrative Disputes;
the Law on salaries of judges and the Law on Judicial Service (December
2018); and the Law on Free Legal Aid (March 2019). Some amendments
to the criminal code pertaining to the criminal prosecution of hate
crime were introduced in December 2018. New provisions on witness
protection and interference with justice were also introduced. There
were important pieces of legislation still in preparation, including
the Law on the Public Prosecution office and the Law on the Council
of Public Prosecution.
27. During our visits in 2018 and 2019, the President of the Council
of Prosecutors regretted that this institution was not involved
in the preparation of the draft laws on the public prosecutor office
and the draft law on the Council of prosecutors at an early stage.
The President of the Association of Judges had welcomed, for his
part, the involvement of his association in the drafting of the
Law on judges and the Law on the Judicial Council but stressed that
a lot needed to be done to overcome the lack of trust in the judiciary
and its dysfunctional institutions (notably the Supreme Court and
the Judicial Council).
28. The President of the Judicial Council had also expected a
greater involvement of the Judicial Council in the drafting of the
laws. He stressed the insufficient budget allocated to courts (ie
0,34% of GDP instead of the expected 0,8%) and the shortage of about
200 judges, which, according to the authorities, could be addressed by
a shortened training period provided by the Academy, and by making
it possible for judges about to retire to extend their mandate.
29. However, the President of the Judicial Council took issue
with allegations made in a survey carried out by the Ministry of
Justice in 2018 that the allocation of court cases had been controlled
in the Basic Court of Skopje 1, the Appellate Court and the Supreme
Court. Further to these allegations, the Minister of Justice informed
us this year that investigations have been carried out to identify
those who abused the automated court case management information
system (ACCMIS). As a result, investigations have been opened both
by the Public Prosecutors' Office and by the Judicial Council, which
have still to reach their conclusion. As a first step, the law now
allows for the dismissal of Court Presidents who fail to allocate
cases through the ACCMIS, and of judges who would accept to deal
with cases not allocated through the system.
30. While questions concerning the vetting of judges were raised
by some of our interlocutors, the President of the Judicial Council
considered that there are already existing tools allowing for the
evaluation of judges’ performances. NGOs, for their part, regret
that the lack of reasoning of decisions issued by the Judicial council and
the Council of Public Prosecutors concerning the (non) election
and transfer of judges or prosecutors. Amendments to the Law on
Courts in March 2019 dealing with the grounds for liability of judges,
which were endorsed by the Venice Commission, aim at strengthening
the independence of judges. It is important that the reforms undertaken
also strengthen the impartiality and accountability of judges: the
politicisation of the judiciary has been an issue in the past and
has allegedly had an impact on the election processes of judges
at a national and European level. There are still open questions
concerning the functioning of the ACCMIS system in the justice system.
We
were informed by the Minister of Justice that amendments to the
Law on ACCMIS were under preparation.
3.2. Reform
of the Law on the public prosecution office and future status of
the Special Prosecutor
31. The release of illegally wire-taped
conversations in 2015 brought to light conversations revealing alleged government
interference in the judiciary and election administration and its
control over a number of media outlets. Given the mistrust of the
opposition in the prosecution office to handle these sensitive cases,
the four political parties agreed to establish a “Special Prosecutor
for Crimes Related to and Arising from the Content of the Illegal
Interception of Communications” (hereafter the Special Prosecutor)
and, on 15 September 2016, appointed Ms Katica Janeva, a prosecutor
from the basic court of Gevgelia, to this position. Under the terms of
the Pržino Agreement, she was to have “full autonomy to lead the
investigations surrounding and arising from the interception of
communications” and her mandate was meant to remain valid for a
period of 18 months after the hand-over of the tapes. We met Ms Janeva
on several occasions to be informed about her work, the state of
progress of the cases and the relations with the prosecutors and
the Council of Prosecutors which considerably improved after 2017.
32. Ms Janeva was concerned about the status of limitation and
had requested an extension of the term of her mandate (which ends
in September 2019). This concern was also echoed by the OSCE Mission
in Skopje, which has been monitoring 20 cases in which the Special
Prosecution Office (SPO) filed indictments by the (very narrow)
statutory deadline (30 June 2017). In a recent interim report, it
found that the current limitations in the legal and institutional
framework jeopardised the process of ensuring accountability for
the serious crimes revealed in the wiretaps.
As part of the on-going
discussions on the preparation of the reform of the public prosecution
office, Ms Janeva conceded that the wire-tape conversations would
not need to be produced in court, since sufficient evidence had
been gathered to proceed with these cases in courts without the
taped material. The validity of the action undertaken by the Special
Prosecutor after July 2017 is subject to different interpretations.
While the Special Prosecutor considers that crimes arising from
the investigation launched before July 2017 should not remain unpunished,
the Supreme Court has issued an opinion stating that it would consider
cases opened after 30 June 2017 as invalid and that the interpretation
provided by the Special Prosecutor amounted to obstruction to justice
and abuse of taxpayers’ money.
33. The SPO was established in exceptional political circumstances
and as a result of a political agreement of the four main political
parties. Within three years, this office pressed charges in 20 high
level cases and indicted more than 100 people in at least 18 high
cases of serious criminal offenses, most of them concerning abuse
of office, abuse of position, forgery of documents, embezzlement
and large-scale fraud. In June 2017, the Special Prosecutor charged
former Prime Minister Gruevski, along with nearly 100 other people,
with corruption. Mr Gruevski’s trial began in December 2017. The
former Prime minister eventually fled the country in 2018 and was
granted political asylum in Hungary. The authorities of North Macedonia
have launched a request for extradition which has, so far, remained
unfulfilled.
34. At the time of our May 2019 visit, there were still discussions
between the government and the opposition to reach an agreement
on the reform of the Law on the public prosecution office, which
should encompass a special prosecution office. A draft law had been
submitted to the parliament. There were on-going political negotiations
between the SDSM government and the VMRO-DPMNE party, whose support
is needed to reach the two-thirds majority required for the adoption
of the law. One of the disputed issues is the management of the
flow of cases opened by the Special Prosecutor, including those
being investigated after July 2017
. The demand formulated
by VMRO-DPMNE to amnesty all these cases was deemed unacceptable
by the authorities.
35. On 15 July 2019, as the negotiations were stalled, Ms Janeva
unexpectedly submitted her resignation, which would become effective
after the adoption of the new law on the Special Prosecution office
and the designation of her successor. Ms Janeva expressed her frustration
over the ongoing feud between the country’s main political parties
over the future law on the Prosecution office. The following day,
Ms Janeva’s phone was seized in connection with an investigation
over a suspected extortion case (so-called “Extortion case”) launched
by the regular Prosecution Against Organised Crime against two businessmen:
Mr Jovanovski (who owns a TV network in Skopje) and Mr Milevski.
They were suspected of demanding millions of euros from a suspect
in one (so far unnamed) Special Prosecution case in exchange for
a promise of that they would help him avoid a jail sentence or get
a lighter one by using their alleged influence over the prosecutor
running the case.
According to the prosecutor Vilma
Ruskovska, the Special Public Prosecutor, Katica Janeva, had her phone
seized in order to determine whether there is a connection with
Jovanovski. Ms Janeva has denied any abuse of office.
36. On 8 August 2019, the Italian newspaper La Verità published
recorded conversations allegedly involving Mr Kamcev, Mr Jovanovski
and Ms Janeva. Ms Janeva acknowledged that it was her voice and
that she had been in contact with Mr Kamcev over another unnamed
case but denied any illegitimate move in relation with the “Extorsion
case”. On 21 August, the prosecutor office for organised crime requested
the arrest of Ms Janeva on suspicion of “abuse of office”. She was
placed in pre-trial detention for 30 days.
On
30 August 2019, the Council of Public Prosecutors unanimously decided
to initiate a motion and propose to the parliament to dismiss Ms Janeva
from her position of Special Prosecutor. This request was unanimously
approved by the parliamentary Committee on Elections and Appointment
issues on 5 September 2019 and submitted to the parliament. In the
meantime, from her place of detention, Ms Janeva has reportedly
sent a request to her colleagues from the SPO to hand over all their
cases (including those already in trial), investigations and pre-investigative
procedures, to the regular prosecutor’s office. This request was
then submitted to the Chief Prosecutor of North Macedonia.
At
the time of writing, the investigation into the “Extorsion case,”
and whether other persons, including ruling party politicians, are
involved in the case, was still in progress. These developments
came as a shock to the country, shaking people’s trust in the SPO.
We are not in a capacity to judge on the merit of the case. However,
this case shows that no one is above the law and must be entitled
to a fair trial. It is now crucial that the prosecution office and
the judiciary system act in a diligent and independent manner to
bring justice and cast light on this case. We also remain confident
that the SPO will continue to operate and investigate high level
crimes, in line with its mandate.
37. As announced by the Prime Minister Zoran Zaev on 19 July,
the draft law on Public Prosecution was submitted to the parliament
end of August 2019. Under this law, both the Public Prosecution
and the Special Public Prosecution should be amalgamated together
in order to form a new organisation, entitled the: “Public Prosecution
For Organised Crime and High Corruption.” This new entity could
be headed by Prosecutor Vilma Ruskoska. The SPO prosecutors, whose
mandates expire in September 2020, would be entitled to apply again.
At
the time of writing, no compromise had been reached with the opposition.
This draft law was flagged as an EU accession issue, and thus undergoing
a speedy adoption procedure in parliament.
38. It is essential to reach an agreement that will ensure the
independent and efficient functioning of the prosecution office
and enhance its capacity to handle sensitive cases. While political
compromises might be necessary, fundamental rule of law principles
should be respected. It is also important to provide a legal framework
to ensure that the SPO can operate with the necessary autonomy and
independence. We therefore strongly encourage the authorities to
seek the expertise of the Council of Europe, so as to ensure that
this key piece of legislation will comply with Council of Europe
standards.
3.3. Fight
against corruption
39. In the Corruption perception
index 2018, North Macedonia ranks 93 out of 180 countries, with
a score of 37/100, although slight progress has been made since
2017 (when it ranked 107).
Corruption remains a widespread phenomenon
in many areas. In 2018, GRECO found that the country has made some
limited progress in adopting amendments to the Law on the Judicial
Council (in December 2017 and May 2018). Limited progress has also
been made in the creation of new advisory and supervisory bodies
for judges and prosecutors to support the implementation of their
respective rules of conduct in daily practice.
No
meaningful developments had taken place to strengthen the control
function and to support a “more balanced and political interference-free
approach” of the State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption
(SCPC) in charge of controlling declarations of assets and interests
of public officials. North Macedonia’s performance at this stage was
described as “clearly disappointing” by GRECO, which urged the authorities
to take more determined and focused action in respect of a number
of recommendations issued four-and–a-half years ago. The authorities were
asked to provide a report on the country’s progress in implementing
the recommendations as soon as possible, but no later than 30 June
2019.
40. The new Law on the Prevention of Corruption and Conflict of
interests adopted in January 2019, which now encompasses the prevention
of corruption and conflict of interests, is an important step towards strengthening
the fight against corruption. A new State Commission for the prevention
of corruption was established. Its members were elected in the basis
of clear criteria, in open and transparent procedures (with interviews
of candidates being broadcast on TV) which have been praised by
many of our interlocutors, including civil society representatives.
A new electronic tool interconnecting several databases was set
up, which should strengthen the co-operation of all institutions
involved in the prevention of and the fight against corruption and
facilitate direct access to statistical data.
41. As allegations of nepotism and conflict of interest of high
officials surfaced, the Commission swiftly launched action to deal
with them, with a clear political backing and strong media attention.
This is encouraging. We hope that this institution will continue
to have the means, the capacity and the political backing to tackle
deeply-rooted corruptive habits and practices which have undermined
democratic societies. Strong and effective independent bodies could
have a deterrent effect in the future. This development however needs
to be confirmed in the long-run and must be confirmed by responsive
judicial institutions which should stretch the cases to their final
conclusion. We therefore encourage the authorities to ensure that
the new pieces of legislation and their implementation will take
into account the recommendations made by GRECO and step up their
efforts to combat corruption. We believe that these measures can
strengthen the independence and impartiality of the State Commission
for the Prevention of Corruption, as requested by the Assembly in
2013, provided that its financial and technical means can be stepped
up.
42. In March 2019, the Commission also adopted a strategy for
the promotion of a whistle blower protection system. For the record,
the Assembly had, in 2013, called for a stronger legal and institutional
protection for “whistle-blowers, which has remained an issue in
North Macedonia.
43. In its recent report on Preventing corruption and promoting
integrity in central governments (top executive functions) and law
enforcement agencies (Fifth Evaluation Round), GRECO acknowledged
that North Macedonia had established a rather broad policy and institutional
framework for preventing and combatting corruption with its 2016-2019
State Programme for Repression of Corruption and Reduction of Conflicts
of Interest. North Macedonia had also adopted the 2019 Law on Prevention
of Corruption and Conflicts of Interest, the Law on Lobbying and
the Law on the Protection of Whistle-blowers. However, it notes that
several shortcomings still remain to be addressed and that “the
overall strength of the anti-corruption framework is questionable,
as the implementation of different policies and laws is weak and
selective in practice”. GRECO also points out the perceived politicisation
of the police and the need to strengthen its operational independence.
GRECO further recommends strengthening the efficiency of the internal
control mechanisms, subordinated directly to the Minister of the
Interior, as well as the external oversight performed by the Assembly,
the Ombudsman and the Public Prosecutor in order to improve the
public accountability of the police. It recommends the elaboration
of a new code of ethics for the police addressing issues such as
the integrity, conflicts of interest, gifts and corruption prevention
within the police.
44. In the field of rule of law, North Macedonia has taken meaningful
steps to restore rule of law principles. We would like to stress
all efforts undertaken to normalise the system and put the country
back on track towards meeting European standards should further
enhance transparency, impartiality and accountability and the independence
of the justice system. It remains to be seen, however, how these
new laws will be implemented by the judicial and prosecutorial instances.
The challenges faced by the Special Prosecutor Ms Janeva since 2015
– as we had noted during our visits – in bringing the (politically
sensitive) legal cases to court and ensuring that they would be
duly processed by the ordinary judicial system raises concerns.
At the very least it has shown that the judiciary still has a long
way to go towards restoring trust. At the same time, the State Commission
for the Prevention of Corruption of Conflict of Interests emphasised
during our last visit that the main problem of corruption lays within
political parties. This requires strong attention and a change of mentalities.
In June 2019, the Prime minister decided to reshuffle his government
and release underperforming ministers, following the disappointing
results of the party during the presidential election. Prime Minister
Zaev proposed that he himself take on the function of Minister of
Finance, a decision which was rebuffed by the State Commission for
the Prevention of Corruption and Conflict of interests which qualified
this situation as a conflict of interests. As a result, the Prime
minister decided to temporarily take on this function until the
appointment, on 2 September 2019, of Nina Angelovska, the first
woman to hold this position in the government of North Macedonia.
4. Democracy
4.1. Follow-up
to the 27 April 2017 events
45. On 27 April 2017, while a new
parliamentary coalition was in the process of being formed, the
parliament was stormed, which we strongly condemned. More than 100
people, including the SDSM leader, Mr Zaev, and other MPs, were
injured. During this deplorable event, Mr Sela, leader of the DPA
party, was heavily beaten and severely injured. The trial of those
involved in the violence started in August 2018, with thirty people, including
the former minister of the Interior, the police chief, five opposition
MPs, police employees and activists being charged with “endangering
constitutional order and safety”, by participating in or being part
of the logistics behind the events.
46. As mentioned earlier, in the context of the political negotiations
over the constitutional amendments needed for the ratification of
the Prespa Agreement, an amnesty law was adopted by the parliament
in December 2018, exempting eight deputies from their liability
in the April 2017 events.
47. On 20 February 2019, the former Speaker of the parliament,
Trajko Veljanovski and former ministers, Spiro Ristovski and Mile
Janakievski were arrested by the police in Skopje under suspicion
of being organisers of the 27 April 2017 attacks in Parliament.
These arrests were qualified as political by the VMRO-DPMNE leader.
The former ministers were sent to pre-trial detention (for 30 days)
while Mr Veljanoski, enjoying parliamentary immunity, remained free.
In the Skopje remand prison of Sutka, the two former ministers were involved
in verbal and physical incident and suffered minor injuries, which
resulted in the launch of an urgent investigation initiated by the
Ministry of Justice and the resignation of the prison governor on
25 February 2018.
48. The situation related to the prosecution of senior VMRO-DPMNE
officials had created high political tensions, resulting in the
boycott of the parliament by the main opposition party. However,
in the spring of 2018, the VMRO-DPMNE party decided to return to
parliament, a decision that we viewed as a sign of political responsibility:
it has indeed enabled the adoption of crucial pieces of legislation
– which requires a 2/3 majority – such as the Law on Energy and
the Law on Higher Education (which has restored the autonomy of universities),
the Law on Foreigners, as well as a package of laws aimed at reforming
the system for interception of communications by the Government,
etc.
4.2. Considerations
about the political transition period.
49. North Macedonia experienced
a major and deep political crisis in 2015-2016, followed by a transition period
(2016-2017). The resolution of the political crisis, which ended
with the peaceful organisation of parliamentary elections (December
2016) and a presidential election (May 2019), was facilitated by
two actors: the international mediator Peter Vanhoutte, and the
expert group led by senior European Commission expert Reinhard Priebe
which drafted the “Priebe report” in 2017. The Priebe report provided
a roadmap which was then agreed upon by all major political parties,
paving the way to redress systemic problems concerning the functioning
of democratic institutions and the rule of law.
50. This process was completed on the basis of the consensus reached
by the four main political parties, encompassing the two major communities.
It is commendable that political parties, despite a highly polarized context,
managed to make the necessary compromises. A constructive dialogue
is still needed to continue the reform process, fully implement
the recommendations included in the Priebe report and to respect
the obligations of North Macedonia as a Council of Europe member
State. As noted by the European Commission in its 2019 report, “consensus
across party and ethnic lines was established on several occasions,
including for the amendments to the laws requiring a two-thirds
majority, in particular (…) in the field of judiciary, fight against
corruption and intelligence services”.
It
is also commendable that political parties in North Macedonia have,
in recent months, opted for a full and active participation in the
work of the parliament, which is the place where all subjects, including
sensitive and controversial ones, need to be discussed. At the same
time, the parliament has strengthened its oversight role and decreased
the use of shortened and urgent procedures.
4.3. Electoral
issues and changes of the election legislation
51. In 2013, the Assembly had requested
the revision of the electoral code and addressed the electoral issues
identified by the Parliamentary Assembly’s ad hoc committee on the
observation of the elections of 2011. North Macedonia needed in
particular to address the blurring of the line between State and
party and to strengthen the legal mechanisms for protecting the
status of public officials, especially at the local level. These measures
needed to be taken in order to deal effectively with the perceived
widespread cases of pressure and threats made during the election
campaign that individuals would lose their jobs.
52. In 2016, upon request of the Monitoring Committee, the Venice
Commission and OSCE/ODIHR noted that key recommendations pertaining
to parliamentary elections remained unaddressed. These recommendations
addressed a number of areas including: candidate registration and
the dismissal of members of the election administration; restrictive
campaign regulations related to the length of the campaign, and
to the broad definition of campaign activities; public hearings
on complaints and appeals, and periodic reallocation of seats or
review of district boundaries by an independent body. It was stressed
that the preparation of further amendments to the electoral code
should be based on an inclusive process and a constructive dialogue
among all political forces and stakeholders. Electoral reforms need
to be completed well in advance of the next elections and implemented
in good faith. The Venice Commission also noted that previous recommendations,
including those on municipal and presidential elections, remained
unaddressed by these amendments.
53. In the process of preparing the parliamentary elections of
2016 (first scheduled on 5 June 2016, then postponed to December
2016 following decisions of the Constitutional Court), several laws
were adopted. Contentious issues raised by the SDSM, the DUI and
the DPA related to the accuracy of the electoral lists and the functioning
and composition of the Audiovisual Agency and the Public Broadcaster
Council. The VMRO-DPMNE-led parliament adopted, in the absence of
the SDMS, amendments to five laws related to the President’s right
to pardon (see below), a law on protection of privacy banning the
publication of wiretap material made between 2008 and 2015 that
endanger the privacy and personal life of individuals, and the use of
such materials for electoral, political and other goals. In addition,
changes were made in the laws on protection of public information,
the electoral code and the law on administrative disputes
.
54. In the light of these issues, the Monitoring Committee decided
on 23 May 2016 to invite the leaders of the two main parties (VMRO-DPMNE
and SDSM) to take part in an exchange of views on recent developments and
the state of implementation of the Pržino Agreement in September
2016 in Tirana.
55. During the December 2016 early elections, the Assembly
ad hoc election observation committee
pointed out the ineffective internal organisation of the State Election
Commission (SEC); its politicised decision-making and shortened
legal deadlines; the lack of transparency of some SEC activities
(closed sessions, no systematic publication of decisions); the misuse
of administrative resources and pressure exerted on voters, in particular on
civil servants.
The
final report of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission (February
2017) confirmed that there were “allegations of voter intimidation,
coercion, pressure on civil servants, vote-buying, and the misuse
of administrative resources [that] persisted through the campaign”.
56. With regards to the SEC, during our 2017 visit we had expressed
our concerns about the fact that despite its new composition (six
nominees from the four main political parties and three independent
members), the SEC remained prone to political interference along
both political and ethnic lines in this highly polarised country.
The influence of political parties in that electoral body remained
a source of tensions and could hinder its work. In December 2017,
all SEC members (except one) resigned.
57. Amendments to the electoral code were adopted in 25 July 2018.
The new provisions related to the composition of the SEC (comprising
experts instead of representatives of political parties), the funding
of political parties and candidates (which will be covered by the
State budget, and no longer be funded by the parties themselves)
and to media regulations during election campaigns.
They have however raised concerns
among media associations, since a) they reintroduce state-funded
advertising, which was halted a few years ago, and b) they empower
the SEC to register and monitor online media reporting on the elections and
to impose fines of up to 4,000 euros on traditional and online media
if they are found guilty of “unbalanced or impartial reporting moves
that watchdogs and journalists say will curb media freedom and distort
the media market again.
An alert was also published on the
Council of Europe Platform to promote the protection of journalism
and safety of journalists.
In
their reply of 6 September 2018, the authorities vowed to take these concerns
into consideration when preparing the revision of the election legislation
and drafting the new Electoral Code.
58. In its report on the observation of the referendum on the
name issue of 30 September 2018, the Assembly delegation had noted
that “the accuracy of the voter list was not cited as a major concern
by its interlocutors, although the abnormally high number of voters
registered in comparison with the population of the country remains
a matter of concern.” The delegation also stressed the need for
a new census to be organised in the country, as the latest one dates
from 2002.
Although the bill needed to be ratified
by the parliament, the opposition has threatened to boycott the
process. In its memorandum, the Assembly ad hoc committee
concluded
that the” referendum was administered impartially, and fundamental
freedoms were respected throughout the campaign.” The commission
noted, however, that the legal framework governing the conduct of
referenda was neither comprehensive nor harmonised, and encouraged
the authorities to request an opinion from the Venice Commission
on the Referendum Law in order to clarify and develop the text,
with the aim of harmonising it vis-à-vis the Election Code.
59. During our May 2019 visit, we were informed of the authorities’
intention to organise a new census in 2020 with the help of Eurostat
experts. In 2011, there was an attempt to launch a new census. However,
this was aborted due to dissenting opinions on the counting method.
The issue concerned notably citizens working abroad. Organising
a new census has, during our previous visits, been a sensitive issue,
due to the linguistic and cultural rights deriving from the size
of the communities (in 2001, the Albanian community amounted to 25%
of the population). During our last visit in May 2019, none of our
interlocutors mentioned the census as controversial. This census
could contribute to updating the list of voters. One key concern
is the fact that citizens who are actually working abroad, are nevertheless
registered on the domestic voting lists. In this context, there
were some reflections about implementing and out-of-country voting
system for North Macedonian citizens living abroad. The political
parties have not yet reached a political agreement, and the discussions
were postponed after the 2019 summer recess.
60. During the presidential election held on 21 April and 5 May
2019, the Assembly
ad hoc election observation
committee noted that the election campaign was conducted in a calm
environment. Unlike previous elections, this time public employees
tried to maintain a clear distinction between their official and
political activities, and to avoid using State resources and abusing
administration resources in the campaign. Media outlets, including
the public broadcaster, presented a variety of information about
presidential candidates and the political parties that supported
them, allowing voters to make an informed choice. The elections
were well organised on election day; the election administration
performed its key functions, operated impartially and enjoyed the
confidence of most stakeholders. However, the Assembly noted that
the electoral code had been changed four times since 2016. “Key
previous recommendations aimed at improving electoral litigation,
voter registration, representation of the diaspora, campaign financing
and the political campaign, as well as at addressing the use of
participation thresholds for both referendum and presidential elections,
could be addressed in the next electoral reform.”
61. In conclusion, a positive trend was noted throughout the previous
elections. It is also noted that the electoral code had been amended
several times since 2013, but still failed to address all of the
Venice Commission’s recommendations. Drawing from the observation
of Assembly election observers, we would strongly encourage the
authorities of North Macedonia to consider reviewing the election
legislation in its entirety to make it consistent and in compliance
with the Venice Commission recommendations. At the time this draft
report was drafted, the government was considering revising the
electoral system. We hope that the authorities of North Macedonia
will foster cross party consensus and work with the Venice Commission
to align the election legislation with European standards.
4.4. Constitutional
issues
62. In 2014, the VMRO-DPMNE, which
was then the ruling party, sought to revise the constitution and
to adopt seven draft constitutional amendments. These amendments
addressed several areas including: the removal of the Minister of
Justice from the Court Council (which appoints judges) in order
to reduce political influence on the courts; the introduction of
a mechanism of “constitutional complaint” which would allow citizens to
lodge complaints against the authorities; a narrower definition
of marriage, as a union between a man and a woman; the opening of
an “international financial zone” (ie a tax haven) and the limitation
of the rate of the public debt to 60% of the GDP and the budget
deficit to 3% of the GDP. After the adoption of the Venice Commission
opinion
,
the revised draft amendments reflected some but not all of the criticism
expressed by the Commission in its opinion. However, due to a lacking
two-thirds majority, these amendments were not endorsed by the parliament.
4.4.1. The
President’s right to pardon
63. The transition period experienced
by North Macedonia raised some issues concerning the prerogatives of
the President of the Republic and the exercise of his mandate in
a highly polarised context.
64. On 16 March 2016, in a closed session, the Constitutional
Court annulled a legal provision which had previously barred the
President of the Republic from granting pardons. This caused the
opposition to fear that this decision would pave the way for the
President to pardon former senior government officials suspected
of organising election fraud, should they be sentenced. This decision
also triggered demonstrations from both sides in front of the Constitution
Court building. We noted at that time that the decision of the President
of the Republic to terminate all criminal investigations linked
to the illegally wire-taped conversations, however well-intentioned
it might be, would lead to a breach of the rule of law, hinder the
work of the Special Prosecutor, undermine the implementation of
the Pržino Agreement and lead to impunity.
65. On 12 April 2016, In the light of the deteriorating political
situation, President Ivanov took the unilateral decision to terminate
all criminal investigations against ruling or opposition party members
related to the illegally wire-taped conversations and
to grant an amnesty to the one person convicted so far.
56
people were pardoned, including former Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski
(from five criminal proceedings), former Transportation Minister
Mile Janakieski (16 proceedings) and former Minister of the Interior
Gordana Jankulovska (11 proceedings). The former President, Prime
Minister and leader of the SDSM party Branko Crvenkovski, as well
as current SDSM leader Zoran Zaev (with two criminal proceedings)
were also pardoned.
66. On 19 May 2016, at the proposals of leaders of the VMRO-DPMNE
and DUI parliamentary groups, the Parliament adopted, amendments
to the law on pardons granted by the President of the Republic.
The amendments sought revoke pardons within a 30-day period after
the law was passed and to oblige the president, on receipt of a
request, to withdraw pardons bestowed on certain individuals; The
decision stirred demonstrations and strong reactions from the European
Union and the United States.
67. On 6 June 2016, the President of the Republic decided to cancel
the pardon granted to the 22 politically exposed persons (out of
56 pardons granted earlier), signaling that politicians should not
be untouchable. No names were made public at that stage.
4.4.2. The
President’s “pocket veto”
68. Another issue developed after
the December 2016 elections, when President Ivanov refused the SDSM’s
request for a mandate to form a government after the VMRO–DPMNE--
who had won a plurality of seats in the elections--was unable to
gather enough support to form its own majority, thus delaying the formation
of a new government for months.
69. After the formation of the new government in 2017 and the
change of the name of country in 2019, the President of the Republic
refused on several occasions to promulgate laws adopted by the parliament
which he deemed unconstitutional or saw as a danger for the national
unity.
It
is highly questionable whether this “pocket veto” is in line with
the constitution: Article 75 stipulates that “the President of the
Republic may decide not to sign the promulgation declaring a law.
The Parliament reconsiders the law and the President of the Republic
is then obliged to sign the promulgation in so far as it is adopted
by a majority vote of the total number of Representatives”.
70. In our conversation, Prime minister Zaev indicated in June
2018 that he was seeking advice from experts to circumvent the President’s
veto. Impeaching the President (whose mandate expired in April 2019)
might have proved difficult, since it required a two-thirds majority
in parliament
and the support of the main opposition
party to which the President belonged. In order to overcome this
“pocket veto”, these laws were eventually signed by the Speaker
of the parliament and published in the Official Gazette. A change
of the constitution would be welcome to avoid deadlocks in the future
and to clarify the procedure to be followed in the event that the
President refuses to promulgate laws adopted by the parliament for
a second time (and to avoid the use of this “pocket veto”). The
authorities could draw inspiration from good practices developed
in other Council of Europe member States, which have clear constitutional
provisions on this issue.
4.5. Local
democracy
71. The last local elections in
North Macedonia were held in 2017. Although the elections were originally planned
in May, they had to be postponed until October 2017. The postponement
stemmed from a stalemate in electing the Speaker of Parliament and
the expiration of all election deadlines, which required amendments to
the Electoral code in June and September 2017. The amendments were
enacted via an expediated procedure designed to extend the mandates
of the incumbent mayors and municipal councilors until the elections
in question and to enable BESA (the fourth political force in parliament)
to have one member in the State Election Commission.
72. On 15 October 2017, 45 mayors (out of 81) were elected following
the first round of elections, including 37 from the SDSM party,
three from the VMRO-DPMNE and two from the DUI. The second round
of elections—including in the Capital Skopje – was held on 29 October
2017. The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council
of Europe observed the elections. The international election observation
mission noted that these elections were held in a competitive environment.
Candidates were generally able to campaign without restriction and
fundamental freedoms were respected overall. There were however
credible allegations of vote-buying, pressure on voters and isolated
cases of violence during the pre-election period. The mission concluded
that “despite organisational challenges, the election administration
ensured that voters were able to exercise their voting rights. Election
day generally proceeded orderly, although some procedural irregularities were
observed”.
73. We stressed in previous reports that decentralisation is key
element to good governance at local level and to the effective implementation
of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. During the meetings we had in
2017, prior to the local elections, several representatives of the
Association of Local Self-Government Units (ZELS), including its
Chair and Mayor of Skopje, Mr Trajanovski (VMRO-DPMNE), and its
Vice-Presidents Nevzat Bejta, Mayor of Gostivar (DUI), and Zoran
Damjanovski, Mayor of Kumanovo (SDSM), had regretted that the series
of presidential and (early) parliamentary elections since 2013 had
put mayors under pressure. Because of the three-year political crisis,
the essence of decentralisation had been lost. Asked about their
expectations from the new government, the three mayors mentioned
a broadening of the competences of local authorities, increased
fiscal decentralisation and fiscal capacities, and fair and equitable
implementation of the Law on equal regional development.
74. The new government will be expected to review the legislation
and complete the fiscal decentralization so as to ensure that all
municipalities have the capacity to carry out their obligations
with adequate fundings.
4.6. Reform
of the public administration
75. In 2013, the Assembly had called
on the authorities to reinforce the merit-based recruitment system, which
needed to be based on transparent criteria in selection or election
processes. “In the context of the perceived polarisation and politicisation
of society, the ruling parties, which have held a majority both
in the parliament and at local level since the March 2013 elections,
have a major responsibility for ensuring that an inclusive dialogue
is developed with all segments of society and political parties.”
76. The implementation of the Public Administration Reform Strategy
and the Public Financial Management Reform Programme has continued.
The European Union acknowledged that concrete efforts have been
made in increasing transparency and accountability and in improving
consultations in policy-making. As already stated in the 2013 Assembly
report, it is necessary to ensure that the recruitment, appointment
or dismissal of civil servants and public administration staff is
merit-based (and not based on party affiliation). The legal steps adopted
in October 2017 and February 2018 by the Government obliging ministries,
state administrations, as well as public enterprises or regulatory
bodies established by parliament, to publish and regularly update
a list of 21 documents
is a step towards
more transparency. At the same time, it is also important to bear
in mind the need to ensure transparent and equitable representation
in the administration.
In this context,
the swift action undertaken by the State Commission for the Prevention
of Corruption following allegations of nepotism in the administration
is to be welcome.
77. The new law on Free access to Information of Public Character
of January 2019 could also strengthen transparency in public administration.
This law aims at drastically easing public access to information, increasing
institutional transparency and redressing the legal loopholes that
exist in current legislation, which enable parties to hide or delay
the disclosure of data. Political parties will be obliged to disclose
all financial data, such as their incomes and expenditures. The
law contains a much stricter definition of what the public interest
is. The Commission for Free access to Information of Public Character
will now be able to launch procedures against institutions who prevent
the right to free access and should issue penalties on its own.
5. Human
Rights
5.1. Latest
developments pertaining to gender equality
78. Some important developments
have occurred in the field of gender equality. 38% of the representatives in
the current parliament are women. The action plan for gender equality
(2018-2020) sought to introduce a 50% quota for ensuring the participation
of women in election processes and decision making, while gender budgeting
measures are being implemented at ministerial levels.
The
authorities indicated that the amendments to the Electoral Code
which are under preparation should include a 50/50 quota to ensure
an equal representation of women and men on lists of candidates
for parliamentary elections.
We welcome this commitment and strongly
encourage the authorities to ensure that this provision will be
based on a “zip system” (ie alternating female and male candidates
on candidate lists) with effective mechanisms preventing political parties
from failing to comply with this requirement.
79. We also welcome the efforts undertaken by the Government to
adopt gender responsive budgets (including in the 2019 Law on Budgets)
and to support State institutions in making gender budgeting analysis with
the creation, by the end of the year 2019, of a resource centre.
With the support of the UN Women Office, this centre will help promote
gender responsive budgeting and gender equality policies.
80. Following the ratification of the Council of Europe Convention
on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic
violence (
CETS
No.210) (Istanbul Convention) on 23 March 2018, North Macedonia
adopted a national action for its implementation, which should also
address the need to increase the number of shelters for victims
of gender-based violence. A new Law for the Prevention of and Protection against
gender-based violence is expected to be adopted by the end of 2019.
New services, such as shelters, crisis centres and counselling centres
for victims and perpetrators of violence, should be opened. During
the period from 2019-2023, training will be provided for specialized
service providers, as well as professionals working in health care,
police, social work centres, civil society activists and the media.
81. In March 2019, after a long process and a heated debate, parliament
adopted the Law on Termination of Pregnancy (however, the law was
not signed by the President of the Republic Mr Ivanov), annulling
the previous more restrictive law which had been in place since
2013. The law was eventually promulgated by President Pendarovski.
More specifically, the new law removes in particular administrative
barriers, obligatory counselling of women and a three-day waiting
period which had been put in place by the previous legislation.
5.2. The
ombudsman institution
82. In 2013, the Assembly had called
on the authorities to allocate sufficient financial and human resources to
this area and to ensure the proper functioning of the Office of
the Ombudsman.
83. The adoption of amendments to the Law on the Ombudsman has
strengthened this institution. In addition to being the national
preventive mechanism of the Optional Protocol to the Convention
against Torture (OPCAT), the Ombudsman is now mandated to oversight
action by the police and prison police officers. The Ombudsman will
serve as a civil control mechanism and will ensure protection and
assistance for victims. The ombudsman will also be responsible for
the monitoring of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
and its Optional Protocol. In order to fulfill these mandates, independent
and sufficient financial and human resources should be secured.
In this context, ECRI had noted that despite the increase of the
number of staff at the ombudsman’s office, only 50% (79 out of 142
positions) of the posts were staffed in August 2018.
84. In view of the need to strengthen the ombudsman’s office as
an independent body, the fact that the parliament of North Macedonia
has debated the Annual reports of the ombudsman is to be welcomed.
In June 2018, the parliament adopted measures with a view to implementing
the recommendations listed in the 2017 Annual report.
5.3. Reform
of the Intelligence Service
85. The wire-taped conversation
scandal of spring 2015 revealed a massive wire-tapping in the country: during
its investigation, with allegedly 670 000 illegally recorded conversations
from more than 20 000 telephone numbers, the EU senior expert group
established that the ruling party had misused the national security
services in order to control top officials in the public administration,
prosecutors, judges and political opponents. It revealed a concentration
of power within the national security service (UBK) – which, at
that time, held the monopoly over the use of surveillance in both
intelligence and criminal investigations. Additionally, the report
revealed the malfunctioning of the mechanism tasked with overseeing
the UBK, which could intercept communications directly, autonomously
and unimpeded, regardless of whether a court order has issued in accordance
with the Law on Interception of Communications.
86. In 2015, in the wake of the release of the wire-taped conversations,
the previous authorities adopted new legislation to restrain and
regulate the use and, in particular, the publication of this material.
This was done so as to protect privacy – and personal and family
rights in particular – and to protect the public interest in the investigation
of crime and corrupt misbehaviour. After the formation of a technical
government, a law adopted in September 2015 established a Special
Prosecutor (see previous sections), who was tasked with investigating
these allegations. Laws on the Protection of Privacy (focusing on
the disclosure of material allegedly intercepted by the UBK between
2008 and 2015) and on the Protection of Whistleblowers were enacted
on 10 November 2015. In an opinion dated March 2016, the Venice
Commission suggested an in-depth revision of the Privacy Law, which
failed to achieve a proper balance between private interest and
the interest of the public to be informed and recommended that the
Whistleblowers Law be upgraded.
87. In March 2019, a set of laws aimed at reforming the security
intelligence community, including the Law on State Security Agency,
was adopted. An Operational Technical Agency was established. It
has been operational since November 2018. The Law entrusts the Agency,
upon a court order, to intercept communications for the protection
of the security of the State or for criminal investigations. The
Intelligence Service is now under the authority of the government.
All telecommunication interceptions should be ordered by a court.
An oversight parliamentary committee, chaired by the opposition,
is monitoring the activities of the intelligence service. These
safeguards should limit the abuse of the system.
5.4. Situation
in prisons
88. In 2017, the European Committee
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CPT) published a highly critical report on the situation
of prisons in North Macedonia. The report highlighted a wide range
of concerns, especially at Idrizovo Prison (which accommodate 60%
of the country’s prisoners), such as “totally inadequate provision
of health-care”, continued problems of ill-treatment, inter-prisoner
violence, corruption and a lack of activities offered to prisoners,
insufficient number of prison staff and the lack of training and
support provided to them. The conditions of detention in several
parts of this prison could be considered as inhuman and as placing
prisoners’ lives at risk. In the remand section of Skopje Prison (which
holds the vast majority of the country’s pre-trial prisoners), inmates
were confined to their cells for up to 23 hours a day for periods
of up to two years. Little progress had been made on systemic issues
raised since 2006 (such as an inadequate system of reporting and
supervision, and the poor management and performance of staff).
On 14 October 2017, the President
of the CPT held meetings with senior government officials, including
the Prime Minister Mr Zaev, to see how the situation could be addressed.
The CPT will pay a visit to the country in 2019. The situation of
the Idrizovo Prison needs to be urgently addressed, as do the poor conditions
in police stations, social care facilities and psychiatric institutions.
89. We have been informed that, since February 2018, the Directorate
for the Execution of Sanctions (the DES) has submitted 6 quarterly
reports to inform the CPT about measures and activities implemented
to improve the penitentiary system. These measures envisage, inter alia the increase of accommodation capacities
and facilities, the improvement of conditions for stay and work
in prisons and educational-correctional facilities, the reconstruction
of the Idrizovo Prison (with the support of the Council of Europe Development
Bank), the construction of a pre-trial detention ward at the Idrizovo
Prison, the improvement of health care for convicted and remand
inmates at prisons and educational-correctional facilities and the recruitment
of additional staff.
90. Overcrowding in prisons also remains an issue. On 21 September
2017, as part of a wider reform of the judicial system, the government
announced its plan to pardon all convicts serving jail sentences
of less than six months and to cut the jail terms of prisoners serving
less than five years by 30% in order to tackle "the overcrowding
in prisons and the inhumane conditions inside them."
The amnesty law adopted in January 2018
applied to 2 345 convicted persons, of whom 736 were released, while
1 560 received a 30% reduction in their sentence. This contributed
to a reduction in the number of prisoners.
In addition, the DES is
also developing a sustainable probation system for providing alternative
measures within the community.
5.5. Ill-treatment
and torture
91. Ill treatment, coupled with
the lack of an adequate response by State institutions in relation
to such ill-treatment, remains an issue. In 2018, the European Court
of Human Rights issued a ruling in the case of Mr Selami (and others),
who had been arrested for his suspected involvement in the killing
of two police officers and was seriously injured during his arrest.
The Court found that Mr Selami had clearly been the victim of torture
and unlawful detention. The Court concluded that the domestic courts
had not provided adequate redress for the torture and detention
of Mr Selami.
92. Following the publication of the CPT report, the authorities
have undertaken measures to improve the conditions of detention
of persons in police stations and the renovation of these premises.
Amendments
to the Law on Internal Affairs of February 2018 also provide for
an
ex-officio criminal prosecution
in cases where criminal reports indicate that police officers or
authorised official person for security and counterintelligence with
police powers, have allegedly perpetrated a criminal act while performing
an official act. The law further criminalises police officials who
have perpetrated a criminal act outside the service by using serious
threat, force or means of coercion resulting in death, grievous
bodily harm, bodily harm, illegal detention, torture and other cruel,
inhuman or humiliating treatment and punishment.
These
investigations should be carried out by the newly created Section
for Investigation and Prosecution of Criminal Acts Perpetrated by
Persons with Police Powers and Prison Police Officers. This new
service was created following amendments that were made to the Law
on the Public prosecutor’s office adopted in October 2018, as their
investigations were previously seen as inefficient and ineffective.
93. The authorities indicated that, in March 2017, with the assistance
of Council of Europe experts, the Directorate for the Execution
of Sanctions adopted a Strategy for the implementation of the policy
of zero tolerance of ill-treatment and a Plan for the prevention
of corruption to establish more effective mechanisms for dealing
with cases of ill-treatment of persons deprived of their freedom,
as well as cases of corruption among the staff at prisons and educational-correctional
facilities. Standard Operating Procedures (to keep records of the
use of means of coercion) and a new Code of Conduct for staff at
prisons and at educational – correctional facilities were developed
in 2018 and included in the training provided for staff employed
at prisons and at educational-correctional facilities. The DES is
currently developing a new National Strategy for the Penitentiary System
(2020-2025) with the assistance of the Council of Europe. Meanwhile,
under the EU funded twinning Project, a Strategy will be designed
for the development of the probation service.
94. In this context, we welcome, within the ombudsman’s office,
the creation of a special organisational unit for civil control.
This has been established as an additional correction to the system
of investigation of criminal acts perpetrated by persons with police
powers and prison police officers, including three representatives
of NGOs. As criminal charges against police and prison police officers
have been very low so far, the European Commission expressed the
hope that the external oversight mechanism could address the sense
of impunity.
5.6. Media
95. North Macedonia ranks 95 in
the 2019 World Press Freedom Index, which constitutes an improvement compared
to its 2018 performance, when it ranked 109.
In our information notes, we have
highlighted a number of challenges with respect to media freedom,
including attacks against journalists
and
a lack of court decisions against perpetrators (thus fostering a
climate of impunity for the perpetrators). Attacks against journalists,
undue political interference in, and political control over, the
media and problematic public funding of media are all issues that
need to be addressed. Journalists have also described a “corrupt
system” functioning in a closed-circuit, with public institutions
contracting with advertisement companies and commercial distributing
companies close to the ruling authorities.
96. We observed improvement in the climate for journalists in
recent months, who now have more freedom to express critical views.
However, more needs to be done to fight what was described as “more
subtle forms of pressure” (of economic nature, for example), to
ensure that previous attacks against journalists do not go unpunished
and to strengthen the regulatory bodies in the media sector.
97. Amendments to the Law on Audio and Audio-visual Media Services
in North Macedonia were adopted in December 2018 and entered into
force in January 2019. This law is expected to improve the independence, transparency,
efficiency and accountability of the Audio and Audio-visual Media
Services. This Law is now considered to be in line with European
and international standards on audio-visual media.
These amendments
include provisions designed to strengthen the diversity of representation
in various media regulatory bodies and to ensure that the interests
of different ethnic groups are taken into consideration.
98. One of the main challenges relates to the financial sustainability
of the media. One of the first measures announced by the government
in 2018 was the scrapping of the monthly payment of radio and television
taxes (which funded the public broadcaster up to then), so as to
ease the financial strain on low-income families. Media representatives
criticised this measure which they considered populist, as it would
not strengthen the independence of the public broadcaster and would
run against European standards. In May 2019, there were still discussions
as to whether the funding of the public broadcaster through the
State budget was advisable.
99. We also noted that journalists and staff of the public broadcaster
feared that they would be evaluated according to the Law on Employees
in the Public sector, which, according to the Association of journalists, could
have an impact on the editorial policy of the public broadcaster
and could lead to political pressure.
100. The public broadcaster MRT still needs to be reformed in order
to become an independent public medium. In its 2019 yearly report
on the World Press Freedom Index, Reporters Without Borders noted
that “for the time being, the State broadcaster’s programming continues
to serve the interests of the former ruling conservative party,
the VMRO-DPMNE”
:
MRT’s program council and its management remain led by “the same
people who were often accused of subordinating MRT to the interests
of VMRO-DPMNE party”.
The terms of office of the outgoing
13 members of the Program Council (appointed in December 2014) expired
in early 2019, but they have not yet been replaced. In particular,
the re-election, of Marijan Cvetkovski in February 2018, as head
of MRT raised controversy since he is the subject of a probe instigated
by the Special Prosecution in October 2018 for alleged abuse of
office and criminal affiliation.
101. Combating hate speech on online media and the internet is
an issue that should be addressed and monitored by the authorities.
Political leaders have a responsibility in this matter: they need
to refrain from using hate speech, and they need to condemn the
use of hate speech. Inflammatory speeches often lead to further hateful
rhetoric. Public figures need to ensure that their statements do
not trigger further hate speech by their supporters. According to
data collected by the Helsinki Committee, 64% of the 123 hate crimes
registered in 2018 were ethnically motivated, and 25% were politically
motivated.
102. The announced plan to fight disinformation and fake news by
the Prime minister on 24 July 2019 stirred a lot of reaction: the
opposition party VMRO-DPMNE claimed that this could amount to censorship,
while the Association of Journalists expressed its concerns about
the so-called “proactive measures” foreseen, such as paid campaigns
at private media, co-regulation, the introduction of criteria regulating
the accreditation of media allowed to follow government events or
the problematic role of the action group to fight disinformation
to be formed.
103. After our visit in May 2019, we concluded that the media was
operating in a better environment: the safety of journalists is
a lesser issue; the focus is now on financial and other systemic
issues. We notably expect the authorities to ensure that the public
broadcaster will operate as a high quality and impartial information
medium. Media regulation bodies, but also associations like the
Media Ethics Council which promote the application and advancement
of ethical and professional standards in the media, have an important
role to play in this respect.
5.7. Ohrid
Framework Agreement
104. During our visits, we have
collected continuous information about the implementation of the
Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA). As described in the previous post-monitoring
dialogue report, this Agreement had been signed in 2001 to put an
end to the fighting between the Albanian National Liberation Army
(NLA) and the State security forces. An additional aim of the agreement
was to enact significant reforms designed to improve the rights
of the ethnic Albanians, who represent some 25% of the country’s
two million inhabitants, while maintaining the State’s unity. These
reforms included changes to key passages of the constitution, including
its preamble, to promote the concept of equal citizenship over the
preferential status formerly given to ethnic Macedonians; provisions
on language to regulate and expand the use of the Albanian language, especially
in communities that are at least 20% Albanian; proportional representation
in public administration and State institutions; protection mechanisms
for minorities in parliament and decentralisation. It also required the
use of a qualified majority (so-called "Badinter rule"), ie a double
majority requiring 1) a majority vote and 2) a majority vote from
non-majority communities when the parliament adopts laws that directly
concern the rights of national communities, as specified in the
2007 Law on the Inter-Community Relations Committee.
105. Interethnic relations remain fragile. This crisis period was
marked by renewed inter-ethnic tensions and heavy fighting in the
ethnically mixed city of Kumanovo, on the northern border (30 km
from Skopje) on 26 April 2015,
then
on 9 May 2015 armed clashes and heavy gunfire erupted, leaving eight
policemen and ten Albanian militants dead,
more
than 40 wounded and causing significant damage. This attack was
described as a “terrorist attack” by the authorities. It led DUI
leader Ali Ahmeti, then Deputy Prime Minister (and former leader
of the “Kosovo (*)
Liberation
Army” (KLA) in Macedonia in 2001), to resign under pressure from
the Albanian community. On 12 May 2015, the Minister of the Interior
Gordana Jankulovska, Minister of Transport and Communications Mile
Janakievski, and the Director of Security and Counterintelligence
(UBK) Saso Mijalkov all resigned. During the appeal trial (currently
going on in Skopje), the 33 defendants reiterated their claim that
they were victims of a political set-up by the former government
led by ex-premier Nikola Gruevski, and asked for an international
investigation with testimonies from top-ranking former and current
officials. The Appeal court should decide whether to hold a retrial
of the defendants.
106. Tensions had arose after the killing of five ethnic Macedonian
fishermen by, allegedly, six ethnic Albanians in the so-called “Monster
Case” in 2015. They were exacerbated after alleged interference
of the authorities in the case revealed by the release illegally
wiretapped conversations.
In November
2017, the Supreme Court overturned the verdict, called for a re-trial
and released the four defendants on probation.
The Criminal Court of Skopje resumed
the case in June 2019.
107. The 3-6-9 plan drafted by the Government in 2017 addressed
the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The report
also took into consideration the adoption by the government of a
new draft law on the use of languages, following the coalition agreement
concluded between the SDSM and the Albanian parties DUI and BESA.
A draft law was adopted on 4 August 2017 by the government, with
Prime Minister Zaev indicating that controversial provisions (such
as adding Albanian to banknotes and coins, and to the insignia of army
and police uniforms), had not been included in the draft law.
108. The Parliament finally adopted the Law on the use of Languages
in January 2019. The Law extends, at national level, the use of
the Albanian language in administrative, health, judicial, police,
and other official matters. The Albanian language had until now
been an official language only in areas where the minority makes up
at least 20 percent of the population. This law was opposed by the
right-wing party VMRO-DPMNE, and by the President of the Republic
(who refused to promulgate it, arguing that it could endanger Macedonia’s
unity and sovereignty) and sparked demonstrations in the country.
The Law was ultimately signed by the Speaker of the parliament and
published in the official gazette. Subsequently, the authorities
requested an opinion from the Venice Commission which is due to
be adopted in 2019.
109. In the meantime, the Committee of Ministers of the Council
of Europe has recommended the monitoring and effective implementation
of the Law on the Use of Languages at central and local levels,
including as regards the display of minority languages on topographical
signs, and has encouraged the use of minority languages in the public
sphere where possible, while refraining “from relying exclusively
on the 2002 census”
.
It is also obvious that the implementation of the Law on the Use
of Languages would pose many practical challenges, in particular
in court proceedings. For the time being, we welcome the creation
of an Agency responsible for the implementation of the Law on the
Use of Languages, which has started its work. We also note that
a draft law establishing the Inspectorate for the implementation
of the Law on Languages was prepared by the Government and submitted
to the Parliament.
110. On 28 March 2018, the parliament decided to close down the
Secretariat for the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement
and to replace it with the Ministry for Political System and Relations
between Communities. On 5 July 2019, Sadula Duraki was appointed
deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Political System and Relations
between Communities. We hope that this new Minister will promote
the spirit of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and contribute to enhanced
cohesion between all communities.
111. Further attention will need to be paid to inter-ethnic relationships
in the future. The normalisation of political life will most certainly
re-open discussions concerning issues that are deemed important
for the Albanian community, such as regionalisation issues or ethnically-based
distribution of funds. We welcome the inclusive approach of the
newly elected President of the Republic Mr Pendarovski, who could
foster social cohesion and reinforce this multiethnic society. The
recent adoption of the Law on the Use of Languages, which is currently
being examined by the Venice Commission, is an important step forward
to further implement the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement, even if
the implementation of this Law could be challenging in practice.
5.8. Fight against discrimination
112. In 2013, the Assembly urged
the authorities to intensify efforts to combat discrimination, in
particular against the Roma, and to pursue local integration programmes.
Additionally, the Assembly urged authorities to ensure effective
access to identification documents, as well as access to health
care and social rights. The Assembly recalled at that time that
the fight against discrimination should encompass all forms of discrimination,
including prejudice against sexual orientation.
113. A new Law on Prevention and Protection against Discrimination
(Anti-discrimination Law) was adopted in March 2019. The Venice
Commission issued an opinion on the draft law in March 2018
and welcomed many positive aspects
introduced by the law, including the introduction of a shared burden
of proof in discrimination cases, the professionalisation of the
Commission which now has full time employed members, financial independence
of the Commission, and the addition of new responsibilities and
competences for the Commission. It also lays down the condition
of a “gender-balanced participation” for the selection of the members
of the Commission. The law also establishes an administrative office
for the Commission, allows courts more latitude to impose effective,
proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, mentions expressly sexual orientation
and gender identity as grounds for discrimination, empowers the
relevant associations and other organisations to initiate proceedings
on behalf or in support of victims of discrimination (even if a
specific victim is not referred to) and exempts court proceedings
in discrimination cases from court fees, etc.
The State Commission for the Protection
against Discrimination will also be entrusted with the prevention
of discrimination in the future. ECRI however had been informed
that the draft revised law on the Prevention and Protection against
Discrimination, which should establish a support service for the
professional, administrative and technical work of the Commission
for the Protection against Discrimination had not yet been adopted
and applied.
In the meantime, the authorities
indicated that new premises have been provided for the Commission
and its Secretariat.
114. In May 2019, we met the President of the State Commission
for the Protection against Discrimination, which is composed of
seven members, who are appointed and dismissed by the Parliament
upon proposal of its Committee on Elections and Appointments. As
noted by the Venice Commission, this State Commission has faced
“serious budgetary and staff shortage problems which prevented it
from playing a significant role in the fight against discrimination”.
The
State Commission has suffered from public mistrust, since it was
seen as being linked to the former ruling party.
The new law stipulates that new members
of this commission should be appointed by the parliament
, thus shortening
the mandate of the current members, which the Venice Commission
considered as “highly problematic”: these provisions would “make
illusory the concept of independence of human rights bodies, as
any new majority may follow this precedent and interrupt the mandate
of an independent body by adopting a new law.” The Venice Commission
also recommended that the authorities consider transitional solutions
“enabling current members to bring their mandate to its term and
to ensure their replacement under appropriate conditions”.
115. In March 2019 as well, the Committee of Ministers invited
the authorities of North Macedonia to “ensure the proper functioning
of the Commission for Protection against Discrimination as a fully
independent and professional equality body, equipped with a functioning
Secretariat, and take comprehensive measures to promote awareness
of applicable anti-discrimination standards within the judiciary
and amongst society, particularly among the most disadvantaged.”
116. With regard to the promotion of the rights of LGBTI persons,
the legal framework was upgraded in recent months thanks to the
activities of civil society organisations and the inter-parliamentary
group for the promotion of human rights of LGBTI persons. A number
of promising initiatives have been enacted including the Law on Prevention
and Protection against Discrimination of March 2019, the anti-discrimination
clause of the 2018 Law on Audio and Audio-visual Media services
and the amended criminal code, which now includes sexual orientation
and gender identity as grounds for hate speech. Skopje hosted North
Macedonia’s first Pride Parade in July 2019 with the participation
of representatives of the Government. However, as noted during our previous
visits, LGBTI persons remain subject to discrimination. In its 2019
conclusions on North Macedonia, ECRI reiterated the recommendation
made to the authorities in 2016 to carry out an independent comprehensive
study on all forms of discrimination against LGBT persons jointly
with the LGBT community.
117. Concerning the situation of transgender people, the European
Court of Human Rights issued a landmark judgment in January 2019
and found a violation
Article 8 of the Convention on account of the lack of a regulatory
framework ensuring the right to respect for the applicant’s private
life. This should prompt the country to adopt a law that should
enable transgender people to have access to a fast and transparent
procedure for the legal recognition of their gender.
5.9. National minorities
118. North Macedonia ratified the
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in
1997 (
ETS
No. 157). In March 2019, the Committee of Ministers urgently
recommended, the authorities to “take with resolve all necessary
measures to continue building an integrated society and avoid mutually
exclusive ethno-nationalist politics that further the formation
of parallel societies.” Additionally, the Committee of Ministers
called on national authorities to “implement measures to regain
trust in public institutions and actively disengage from politically
and ethnically based hate speech” and to “take all necessary measures
to build an integrated and multicultural education system in line
with the Education Strategy for 2018-2025.” Finally, the Committee
of Ministers urged authorities to “continue to implement the principle
of equitable representation and promote the effective participation
of all persons belonging to national minorities, in public life
and in relevant decision-making processes at all levels.”
119. We were informed by the Ministry of Social affairs of social
actions taken to reach people in need. The situation facing the
Roma community and children in institutions demonstrates why the
country needs to implement inclusive policies. This initiative was
taken as part of an action plan designed to eradicate transgenerational
poverty, set up a minimum guaranteed income for 26 000 families
in social need (following the adoption of amendments to the Law
on the Protection of Children and the Law on Social Security of
the Elderly that entered into force on 23 May 2019), end the institutionalisation
of children with mental disabilities
and
to promote the inclusion Roma children in pre-school education.
120. Roma continue to face multiple discrimination. Concerning
the implementation of the Framework convention, the Committee of
Ministers asked the authorities to “ensure that Roma representatives
are effectively included in all decision-making processes related
to the promotion of their socio-economic integration, including
the adoption and implementation of relevant strategies and action
plans, and to take all necessary measures to resolve the remaining
obstacles to the issuance of personal documentation, registration,
and property legalisation processes.”
Further
action was undertaken to identify unregistered persons (notably
Roma people). In 2018, 700 persons could be identified and included
in registers, thus enabling their access to social, health and education
services.
5.10. Migration and asylum issues
121. The country has been facing
a major migration crisis triggered by the conflicts in Syria and
Iraq. The so-called “Balkan route” used by migrants to reach European
countries such as Germany and the United Kingdom passes through
the country. In August 2015, up to 3 000 migrants a day would enter
the country. North Macedonia, along with its neighbours, was facing
this humanitarian crisis with limited resources, which very much
affected the country
. Legal steps were taken to
require migrants to either claim asylum within three days or leave
the country. More radical actions were also taken, such as building
technical hindrances and fences at the Greek border to stop the
unlawful or illicit State border crossing (and consequently contain
the flow of refugees). The authorities pinpointed that the legal
transit of migrants was allowed and ran smoothly until the beginning
of March 2016. After the countries along the “Balkan route” signaled
that they would no longer allow entry or transit of these migrants,
the country is nowadays dealing with “attempts for an illegal/unlawful
transit of foreign nationals (illegal migrants)”.
122. In the meantime, a new Law on International and Temporary
Protection was adopted. Effective control at the southern border
has been ensured. Guest officers from EU Member States at the border
were deployed, and a European Border and Coast Guard Status Agreement
with the EU was initiated.
123. Despite these measures and international agreements aimed
at managing the flow of refugees, the country remains under severe
pressure due to its geographic location. According to the latest
data published by the European Commission, the flow continues to
be “largely transitory”. Since the beginning of 2018, “about 32 500
migrants are considered to have illegally crossed the country’s
border in both directions, including many Iranians crossing illegally
from Serbia and moving onwards to Greece”.
In
2018, only 299 individuals applied for asylum in North Macedonia.
Six were granted subsidiary protection (no refugee status was granted)
while the procedure was terminated for 278 asylum seekers – either
because they had left their place of accommodation, or because they
had failed to appear when so requested by the authorities of the
Asylum Sector without justifying their absence.
The
authorities also indicated that 16 895 illegal border crossing attempts
were prevented on the State border.
6. Conclusions
124. Since the last report on the
post-monitoring dialogue with North Macedonia was produced in 2013,
major changes have occurred. Despite the polarisation of the society
along ethnic and political lines observed in 2013, the main political
parties managed to overcome their differences and build consensus
by agreeing on a democratic roadmap contained in the Pržino Agreements
of 2015 and 2016. The agreement aims to address crucial issues related
to the rule of law, the judicial system and the fight against corruption.
125. We commended the goodwill and courageous steps taken by two
Council of Europe member States, North Macedonia and Greece, that
put an end to a 27-year name dispute with the signature and ratification
of the Prespa Agreement. This deal is an invaluable contribution
to the stability of the whole region. We also commend the efforts
of the authorities, of its functioning parliament and of the people
of North Macedonia to strengthen the country’s good relations with
its neighbours (in particular Bulgaria) and to contribute to the cohesion
of the region.
126. It transpired from our meetings that the signing of the Prespa
Agreement has raised immense hopes of strengthening Euro-Atlantic
integration – which has been a consensual strategic objective of
the country, transcending political parties and ethnic communities.
It has also boosted the authorities’ intention to pursue the reforms
which have been under way since April 2017, after a two-year political
crisis that stalled the democratisation process of the country.
127. However, the society remains polarised, wounds from the past
should be overcome. Promising steps towards reforming the judiciary,
strengthening media freedom, reviewing electoral laws, reforming
the intelligence and secret services and preventing and prohibiting
discrimination are to be welcomed and must be supported. They should
also contribute toward ensuring equality for all citizens and overcome
political and ethnic divisions.
128. The reform of the justice system, in particular, will be of
utmost importance. In a context marked by sharp mistrust in the
judicial system, the reform should enhance the accountability, transparency
and independence of judges – and restore trust. There are still
important steps to be undertaken, notably to reform the public prosecution
office. In this context, it is necessary to ensure that the Special
Prosecutor’s office, which has played an important role in addressing
highly sensitive cases that have undermined the functioning of state
and judicial institutions which is so necessary for the rule of
law, will be in a position to operate, within the national public
prosecution office, without undue political interference.
129. In conclusion, we welcome the constructive attitude of the
authorities and their co-operation with the Council of Europe. In
the past two years, many important laws have been adopted or revised
on the basis of the recommendations issued by the Venice Commission,
GRECO and other monitoring bodies. This process will be challenging;
it will take time. Mindsets will have to change to implement effectively
the laws that have recently been adopted.
130. The post-monitoring procedure is a tool that allows a reinforced
dialogue with the authorities of North Macedonia and that helps
to ensure that reforms in line with Council of Europe standards
will result in the establishment of sustainable and accountable
institutions. We should therefore propose to the Assembly to resolve
to pursue the post-monitoring dialogue with North Macedonia, and
to assess, in the next report which we intend to prepare in 2022,
progress made in particular in the following areas:
130.1. The further consolidation of
the sustainability and functioning of democratic institutions;
130.2. The independence of the judiciary, notably the strengthening
of the independence and accountability of judges and prosecutors.
The Assembly expects the reform of the prosecution office to be
done in line with Council of Europe standards and to ensure the
Special Prosecutor’s office, which has played an important role
in addressing highly sensitive cases, will be in a position to operate,
within the national public prosecution office, without undue political
interference;
130.3. The fight against corruption, in line with the recommendations
issued by the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), in particular
with respect to high level corruption cases and non-selective implementation
of laws and policies;
130.4. The consolidation of its electoral framework, in line
with the recommendations of the Venice Commission and the Assembly
election observation mission reports;
130.5. The pursuance of inclusive policies aiming at securing
the rights of the minorities, in the spirit of the Ohrid Framework
Agreement, including for the Roma community.
131. The Council of Europe remains available at all times to assist
the authorities in meeting European standards through its expertise
and to support both this transition period – which could be a source
of inspiration for other Council of Europe member States – and the
people’s aspiration for European integration.