1. Introduction
1.1. Procedure
1. On 1 June 2018, the motion
for a resolution on “Political prisoners in Azerbaijan” (
Doc. 14538) was referred to the Committee on Legal Affairs and
Human Rights for report.
I was appointed
rapporteur by the Committee at its meeting in Strasbourg on 26 June
2018.
2. During the preparation of the report, the Committee, jointly
with the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments
by Member States of the Council of Europe (the Monitoring Committee),
held a hearing with experts on 9 April 2019, in which Mr Otari Gvaladze
of the Azerbaijani Presidential Administration participated, along
with former political prisoners Ms Leyla Yunusova, Mr Ilgar Mammadov
(by video-conference) and Mr Rasul Jafarov.
I
conducted a fact-finding visit to Azerbaijan on 4-7 September 2019, during
which I met Ms Bahar Muradova, Deputy Chairperson of the Milli Mejlis
and chairperson of its Committee on Human Rights; Mr Ali Huseynli,
chairperson of the Milli Mejlis Committee on Legal Policy and State
Building; and Mr Samad Seyidov, chairperson of the Azerbaijani delegation
to the Parliamentary Assembly, along with other parliamentarians;
as well as representatives of the Supreme Court, the Ministry of Justice,
the Prosecutor General’s office and the Presidential Administration.
I also met members of the diplomatic community in Baku, human rights
defenders and civil society activists, and NGO representatives. I also
visited four current detainees who are widely considered to be political
prisoners: Mr Taleh Bagirzade, Mr Abbas Huseynov, Mr Afgan Mukhtarli
and Mr Said Dadashbaylii. I would like to take this opportunity
to thank the Azerbaijani delegation, in particular Mr Seyidov, and
authorities for their co-operation before and during my visit, as
well as all those whom I met – notably the detainees – for their
time and contributions to my work.
1.2. Background
3. The issue of political prisoners
in Azerbaijan has been of acute concern to the Council of Europe
since before the country’s accession. In its
Opinion 222 (2000) on Azerbaijan’s application for membership of the Council
of Europe, the Assembly called on Azerbaijan “to release or to grant
a new trial to those prisoners who are regarded as ‘political prisoners’
by human rights protection organisations”. Those who had been imprisoned before
Azerbaijan joined the Council of Europe would not, however, have
recourse to the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) as a
remedy against violations unresolved by the domestic courts, since
accession to the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention)
does not create retrospective rights or obligations.
4. In February 2001, therefore, following a decision by the Committee
of Ministers, the then Secretary General of the Council of Europe
appointed three international experts
to
“prepare a confidential opinion on [cases of alleged political prisoners
in Azerbaijan, and also in Armenia] indicating whether the persons
in question may be defined as political prisoners on the basis of
objective criteria in the light of the case-law of the European
Court of Human Rights and Council of Europe standards.” The experts
presented their report to the Secretary General in July 2001. Faced
with over 700 cases, the experts selected 23 ‘pilot cases’ on the basis
of their being “typical cases linked to specific historical events”.
17 of the 23 ‘pilot cases’ were found to be political prisoners
(including the three people specifically mentioned in
Opinion 222 (2000)), with the assumption that “other persons held in the
same or similar circumstances are also political prisoners”. Another five
were found not to be political prisoners, and the final case was
‘struck off’ due to lack of information. Armenia released all the
persons identified as “political prisoners” but Azerbaijan did not.
5. Since then, the Assembly has continued to follow the issue
closely. In its
Resolution
1272 (2002) on political prisoners in Azerbaijan, adopted six months
after the independent experts’ report, it noted that only six of
the seventeen ‘pilot case’ political prisoners had yet been released,
out of a total of around 220 assumed political prisoners. The three
individuals named in
Opinion
222 (2000) had not been released. The Assembly therefore called
on Azerbaijan “to show a stronger political will to solve the problem
in its entirety” and resolved “to take any appropriate measures
at its disposal in order to persuade the Azerbaijani authorities
of the need to release or retry any prisoner regarded as a political
prisoner.” By January 2004, when the Assembly adopted
Resolution 1359 (2004), 284 further political prisoners had been released,
although six of the ‘pilot cases’ identified in July 2001 were still
in prison. The Assembly therefore “[urged] the authorities of Azerbaijan
to find a lasting solution to this problem and [deplored] the fact
that they continue to maintain that the problem raised is primarily
a legal one and that, moreover, the majority of these prisoners
are genuine criminals, and that it will take months, even years,
to have all these prisoners released because of the alleged pressure
of public opinion”. It also expressed its “utmost concern” at reports
of new cases of political prisoners. The situation had deteriorated
further by June 2005, when the Assembly adopted
Resolution 1457 (2005) on follow-up to
Resolution
1359 (2004), in which it “firmly [condemned] the serious dysfunctions
of the Azerbaijani judicial system”, noting that “the Azerbaijani
authorities have continued to arrest and convict hundreds of persons
for clearly political reasons”.
6. Most recently, the Assembly returned to the issue in
Resolution 2184 (2017) on the functioning of democratic institutions in Azerbaijan,
in which it “[remained] concerned about the reported prosecution
and ongoing detention of NGO leaders, human rights defenders, political
activists, journalists, bloggers and lawyers, based on alleged offences
in relation to their work”, and called on the Azerbaijani authorities
to “review the cases of the so-called “political prisoners”/”prisoners
of conscience” detained on criminal charges following trials whose
conformity with human rights standards has been called into question
by the European Court of Human Rights, civil society and the international
community”. In
Resolution
2185 (2017) on ‘Azerbaijan’s Chairmanship of the Council of Europe:
what follow-up on respect for human rights?’, the Assembly called
on Azerbaijan to “release human rights defenders, journalists and
civic and political activists who were imprisoned on politically
motivated grounds”.
7. I would also recall the ‘Strässer report’ on the follow-up
to the issue of political prisoners in Azerbaijan.
This formed the basis of a draft
resolution that was rejected by the Assembly in January 2013. Since Mr Strässer’s
report had been approved by our Committee, I have relied upon it
as a source of information. The Report of the Independent Investigation
Body on the allegations of corruption within the Parliamentary Assembly
(IBAC) describes in detail the corruptive activities undertaken
in pursuit of Azerbaijani interests around the time of the 2013
vote. Since then, the Court has issued a number of judgments concerning
arbitrary detention in Azerbaijan, in some of them explicitly finding
politically motivated misuse of the criminal justice system (see
further below). Many of these concern cases that were addressed
in Mr Strässer’s report and events that took place whilst it was
under preparation, which clearly vindicates his conclusions.
2. Recent judgments of the European Court
of Human Rights
8. The European Court has produced
many judgments of direct relevance to the present report in recent years.
These include six ground-breaking judgments finding violations of
Article 18 of the Convention in nine separate cases; an unprecedented
finding that Azerbaijan had refused to fulfil its obligation to
implement a Court judgment, following the Committee of Ministers’
recourse to ‘infringement proceedings’ under Article 46(4) of the
Convention;
and numerous other judgments finding
arbitrary criminal or administrative detention, often along with
unfair trials and/ or violation of the freedom of association.
2.1. Article
18 judgments – misuse of restrictions on the right to liberty and
security
9. Article 18, entitled “Limitations
on use of restrictions on rights”, is one of the lesser-known provisions
of the Convention but is nevertheless of fundamental importance.
As the
travaux préparatoires of
the Convention make explicitly clear, its aim is to prevent totalitarianism.
It states that “The restrictions permitted under this Convention
to the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose
other than those for which they have been prescribed.” The Court’s
Case-law Guide on Article 18 observes that “Article 18 is rarely
invoked and there have been few cases where the Court declared a
complaint under Article 18 admissible, let alone found a violation.
In view of the scarcity of its case-law under Article 18, the Court
exercises increased diligence when deciding cases where allegations
of improper motives are made.” Indeed, the Court has only ever found violations
of Article 18 in seventeen applicants’ cases (in fourteen judgments).
Nine of these cases (in six judgments) concern Azerbaijan, and all
six judgments are relevant to the present report.
10. The first Article 18 judgment against Azerbaijan came in May
2014 in the case of
Ilgar Mammadov.
Mr Mammadov was and still is a leading
opposition politician who co-founded the Republican Alternative
Civic Movement (‘REAL’) party. He was considering whether to run
as a candidate in the November 2013 presidential elections. In January
2013, he visited the town of Ismayilli following an outbreak of
rioting said to have been provoked by an incident involving V.A.,
the son of the Minister of Labour and the nephew of a local politician.
In an article on his blog, Mr Mammadov blamed the rioting on “the
general tension arising from corruption and insolence” of public
officials. A few days later, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and
the Prosecutor General’s Office publicly stated that Mr Mammadov
would be investigated for acts aimed at social and political destabilization
of Ismayilli. The prosecutor then held two “face-to-face confrontations”
between Mr Mammadov and
two local residents who claimed that he had urged local residents
to throw stones at the police, which he denied. He was subsequently
charged with organizing or actively participating in actions causing
a breach of public order. A court remanded him in custody for two
months, citing a risk that he would abscond or interfere with the
investigation. Neither the charges nor the remand order mentioned
the face-to-face confrontations. He remained in detention until
he was convicted in March 2014 on more serious charges of mass disorder
and resistance or violence against public officials, posing a threat
to their life or health, and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment.
The European Court of Human Rights found that, on the facts, there had
been no ‘reasonable suspicion’ justifying his detention on remand,
and the domestic courts had failed to verify the reasonableness
of the suspicion when extending his detention, in violation of Articles
5(1) and (4) of the Convention respectively. The Court found that
the statement by the Interior Ministry and Prosecutor General could
only have encouraged the public to believe that Mr Mammadov was
guilty, in violation of the right to presumption of innocence under
Article 6(2) of the Convention. Finally, the Court found that the
Article 5(1) violation showed that the authorities had acted in
bad faith and that his arrest and detention were in fact linked to
his criticism of the authorities when reporting on the events in
Ismayilli, in violation of Article 18.
11. In March 2016, the Court issued a second Article 18 judgment
against Azerbaijan, in the case of
Rasul Jafarov.
Mr Jafarov was and still is a
well-known civil society activist and human rights defender, active
also on the international level (including within the Council of
Europe), and founder of the ‘Human Rights Club’ NGO. In July 2014,
Mr Jafarov was called for questioning by the Prosecutor General’s
Office in connection with criminal proceedings related to alleged
financial irregularities concerning a number of NGOs. The offices
of the Human Rights Club were subsequently searched and a number
of accounting documents seized. In August 2014, Mr Jafarov was arrested
and charged with illegal entrepreneurship, large-scale tax evasion
and abuse of power, and subsequently placed by court order in pre-trial
detention for three months. He remained in detention until April
2015, when he was convicted on all charges, along with an additional
charge of high-level embezzlement. Before and after his arrest,
Mr Jafarov was described as a foreign spy and a traitor in pro-government
media and by a number of politicians. In November 2014, his lawyer,
Khalid Bagirov (well known as the legal representative of many applicants
to the European Court of Human Rights), was disbarred and prevented
from visiting Mr Jafarov in prison. The Court found that the facts
relied on by the prosecution did not establish a reasonable suspicion
of any of the offences with which Mr Jafarov was charged and that
the courts had failed to conduct a proper review of his detention,
in violation of Articles 5(1) and (4). It also found that Mr Jafarov’s
arrest and detention had occurred against the background of “an
increasingly harsh and restrictive legislative regulation of NGO
activity and funding”, with several other notable human rights activists
also having been arrested and similarly charged. This, taken together
with the accusations of spying and treachery, “indicated that the
actual purpose of the measures against Mr Jafarov had been to silence
and to punish him for his activities in the area of human rights”,
in violation of Article 18. Finally, the Court found that Mr Bagirov’s disbarment
did not preclude him from representing clients before the European
Court of Human Rights; by preventing him from meeting his client
Mr Jafarov, the Azerbaijani authorities had thus also violated Article
34 of the Convention.
12. The Court’s third Article 18 judgment was delivered in April
2018 in the case of
Mammadli.
Mr Mammadli, who had also collaborated
with the Council of Europe, was the founder of several NGOs specialising
in election monitoring which had regularly criticised the government
and been either refused registration or dissolved by the authorities.
In December 2013, after one of his unregistered NGOs published a
report critical of the 2013 presidential election, Mr Mammadli was
arrested and charged with illegal entrepreneurship, large scale
tax evasion and abuse of power; he was later charged also with high-level embezzlement
and forgery in public office. He remained in detention until May
2014, when he was convicted on all charges and sentenced to five
years’ imprisonment. The Court found that there was no information
or evidence to support a reasonable suspicion that Mr Mammadli had
committed the offences for which he was initially detained, and
that the domestic courts had failed adequately to review the lawfulness
of his detention, in violation of Articles 5(1) and (4) respectively.
Finding that Mr Mammadli’s arrest and detention “were part of a
larger campaign to crack down on human rights defenders in Azerbaijan”,
and noting that the initial charges came only days after publication
of the critical report, at a time when politicians from the ruling
political party were describing arrested NGO activists and human
rights defenders as “spies” and “traitors”, the Court found that
“the actual purpose of the impugned measures was to silence and
punish the applicant as a civil society activist for his activities
in the area of electoral monitoring”, in violation of Article 18.
13. In June 2018, the Court delivered another Article 18 judgment
in the case of
Rashad Hasanov and others.
Mr Hasanov
and the three other applicants were members of the ‘NIDA’ youth
organisation, which in early 2013 was holding peaceful protests
against the deaths of soldiers in non-combat situations. Shortly before
a protest planned for March 2013, three other NIDA members were
arrested and charged with possessing drugs and Molotov cocktails;
the four applicants were subsequently arrested and detained on identical
charges of obtaining Molotov cocktails and supplying them to the
three other detained NIDA members. The Court found inconsistencies,
“large gaps” and a lack of evidence in the prosecution case against
the applicants, and a failure by the domestic courts to scrutinise
the prosecution’s requests that they be held in custody. Since there
had been no reasonable suspicion against the applicants, their detention
was in violation of Article 5(1). The Court found that since there
had been no reasonable suspicion against the applicants, the authorities
had had an ulterior motive for detaining them. Noting the earlier
arrests of other NIDA members and the authorities’ references to
NIDA’s activities as ‘illegal’, without reason or evidence, and
recalling reports by international human rights organisations of
a “crackdown on civil society in Azerbaijan”, the Court found that the
arrest and detention of the applicants had been intended to silence
and punish them for their active involvement in NIDA, in violation
of Article 18.
14. The Court delivered its fifth Article 18 judgment against
Azerbaijan in September 2018, in the case of
Aliyev.
Intigam Aliyev is a well-known
Azerbaijani human rights lawyer who has represented many applicants before
the Court and was chairman of the ‘Legal Education Society’. In
June 2014, he presented a report on the human rights situation in
Azerbaijan at a side-event during the Assembly part-session in Strasbourg.
In August 2014, as part of the same investigation of NGOs that led
to human rights violations in the case of
Rasul Jafarov (see
above), Mr Aliyev was charged with illegal entrepreneurship, large-scale
tax evasion and aggravated abuse of power; in December, he was also
charged with high-level embezzlement, very large-scale tax evasion
and forgery by an official (essentially, the same charges as were
brought against Mr Mammadli – see above). During searches of his
home and office, the authorities seized not only documents relating
to his association, but also files relating to his cases before
the European Court of Human Rights. In April 2015 he was convicted
and sentenced to 7,5 years’ imprisonment, which was reduced to a
five-year suspended sentence in March 2016, when he was released
from prison.
The Court found that
there had been no “facts or information which would satisfy an objective
observer that the person concerned may have committed the offence
involved” and hence no grounds for reasonable suspicion of commission
of any criminal offence. His detention thus violated Article 5(1).
There was also a violation of Article 5(4), since “the [domestic]
courts had automatically endorsed the prosecution case without any
genuine, independent review of the lawfulness of his detention.”
Noting the “the increasingly harsh and restrictive legislative regulation
of non-government organisations in Azerbaijan” and the fact that
the measures taken against Mr Aliyev “also had a chilling effect on
wider NGO activity”, the Court found that “the restrictions on Mr Aliyev
had actually been aimed at silencing and punishing him” and thereby
violated Article 18.
15. The Aliyev judgment
marked a significant further development in the Court’s response
to politically motivated abuse of the criminal justice system in
Azerbaijan. Recalling its judgments in the cases of Ilgar Mammadov, Rasul Jafarov, Mammadli and Rashad
Hasanov and others (see above), the Court noted “with concern
that the events under examination in all five of these cases cannot
be considered as isolated incidents. The reasons for the above violations
found are similar and inter‑connected. In fact, these judgments
reflect a troubling pattern of arbitrary arrest and detention of
government critics, civil society activists and human-rights defenders
through retaliatory prosecutions and misuse of criminal law in defiance
of the rule of law… The Court accordingly finds that the actions
of the State stemming from this pattern may give rise to further
repetitive applications. Indeed, the Court cannot overlook in this
regard the fact that a number of applications raising issues similar
to those outlined above have either been communicated to the Azerbaijani
Government or are currently pending before the Court.” The Court
then went on to dismiss the effectiveness of Azerbaijani domestic
courts as a remedy and protection against politically motivated
detention: “the domestic courts… systematically failed to protect
the applicants against arbitrary arrest and continued pre-trial
detention in the cases which resulted in the judgments adopted by
the Court, limiting their role to one of mere automatic endorsement
of the prosecution’s applications to detain the applicants without
any genuine judicial oversight”. On this basis, the Court ruled
that Azerbaijan must implement general measures focusing, “as a
matter of priority, on the protection of critics of the government,
civil society activists and human-rights defenders against arbitrary
arrest and detention. The measures to be taken must ensure the eradication
of retaliatory prosecutions and misuse of criminal law against this
group of individuals and the non‑repetition of similar practices
in the future.”
16. The most recent Article 18 judgment was delivered in November
2019, in the case of
Natig Jafarov.
Mr Jafarov was a co-founder
of the REAL political movement. In 2016, REAL decided to campaign
against the proposed constitutional reform that would, amongst other
things, increase the powers and extend the term of office of the
president and create a new unelected post of vice-president.
A
referendum on the proposals was scheduled for September 2016; in
August 2016, Mr Jafarov was arrested and charged with illegal entrepreneurship
and aggravated abuse of power in relation to funds received from
the US National Endowment for Democracy between 2011 and 2014. Shortly
after his arrest, two other REAL activists were also arrested and
sentenced to administrative detention. A few days later, REAL announced
that it had decided no longer to participate in the referendum campaign
because of political pressure, including the arrest of its members.
In early September 2016, Mr Jafarov was released on the request
of the Prosecutor as the grounds justifying his detention no longer
existed. The Court, noting the strong similarities between the charges
brought against Natig Jafarov and those brought against Rasul Jafarov
in 2014 (see above), again concluded that there had been no reasonable
suspicion justifying his detention, in violation of Article 5(1).
The Court further noted that “the restriction in question did not
merely affect the applicant alone, or his fellow opposition activists
and supporters, but the very essence of democracy as a means of
organising society, in which individual freedom may only be limited
in the general interest”. “[T]he actual ulterior purpose of the
impugned measures was to punish the applicant for his active political
engagement and to prevent him from participating as a representative
of the opposition in the referendum campaign”, in violation of Article
18. The Court found that the present case constituted “part of [the]
pattern… of arbitrary arrest and detention […] in breach of Article
18” described in the
Aliyev judgment
(see above).
2.2. Other
judgments concerning arbitrary detention under criminal law
17. The Court’s Article 18 judgments
and its finding of “a troubling pattern of arbitrary arrest and
detention of government critics, civil society activists and human-rights
defenders through retaliatory prosecutions and misuse of criminal
law in defiance of the rule of law” must be borne in mind when considering
the Court’s numerous other judgments finding arbitrary detention.
Many of these concern administrative detention, which I will examine
separately below. In relation to criminal detention, in the five
years since the
Ilgar Mammadov judgment,
the Court’s judgments include the following:
- In Yagublu, the
applicant, deputy chairman of the Musavat opposition party and a
columnist for the Yeni Musavat newspaper, had accompanied Ilgar
Mammadov to Ismayilli in January 2013 (see above) and was subsequently
subject to similar criminal proceedings, resulting in a violation
of Article 5(1). (Unlike Mr Mammadov, Mr Yagublu did not raise Article
18, despite the similarities in their cases.)
- In Ilgar Mammadov (No.
2), the Court examined Mr Mammadov’s trial and subsequent appeal proceedings.
The Court found that his conviction was based on flawed or misrepresented
evidence, that his objections to this evidence had been inadequately
addressed and that evidence favourable to him had systematically
been improperly dismissed, in violation of Article 6. (The Court
did not consider it necessary to re-examine Mr Mammadov’s complaints
under Article 18.)
- In Haziyev, the
applicant was an active member of the opposition Popular Front Party,
a journalist writing for the newspaper Azadliq and the presenter
of a satellite television programme critical of the government.
In August 2014, he was arrested following an altercation with a
stranger in the street, having himself approached the police for
assistance. He was charged with hooliganism and remanded in custody,
where he remained until January 2015, when he was convicted and
sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. The Court found that his
initial detention was unjustified and arbitrary and that the domestic
courts had failed to conduct an adequate review of its lawfulness,
in violation of Articles 5(1) and (3). The Court did not consider
it necessary to examine the Article 18 issue separately in this
case.
- In Rustamzade, the
applicant was a student and civil society activist, who had participated
in the creation in 2011 of the ‘Free Youth’ NGO. In early 2013,
he participated in and, along with the NIDA civic movement, assisted
in the organisation of a series of demonstrations against the deaths
of Azerbaijan soldiers in non-combat situations (Mr Rustamzade had
been questioned as a witness in Rashad Hasanov’s case – see above).
In May 2013, he was arrested, detained and charged with hooliganism on
account of “manifest disrespect towards society”. This charge related
to a video that had been uploaded to the Internet of a group of
his friends performing a popular dance in a public park, during which
one of his friends made sexually suggestive movements near a statue.
In May 2014, he was convicted of hooliganism, along with other charges
that had been added in the meantime, including mass disorder and
various arms-related offences, and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment.
The Court found that there could have been no ‘reasonable suspicion’
justifying his detention, in violation of Article 5(1); it found
his Article 18 complaint inadmissible on procedural grounds (non-exhaustion
of domestic remedies).
18. As noted above, for various reasons the Court did not examine
Article 18 issues in substance in these judgments. The facts were
sufficiently similar, however, that had the Court examined Article
18, it could well have come to the same conclusions as it did in
the six judgments mentioned previously.
2.3. Judgments
concerning arbitrary detention under administrative law
19. Whether ‘administrative’ or
‘criminal’, detention is still deprivation of liberty: if there
is in reality no reasonable suspicion of commission of an offence,
or no effective judicial review, then it violates Article 5 of the
Convention. Administrative detention is particularly vulnerable
to misuse, as the Court’s judgments make clear;
and
thirty, sixty or ninety days’ administrative detention would be
more than enough to prevent participation in a demonstration and
would be enough to discourage many people from future political
activity – as the Court has observed.
20. The Court’s judgments show that administrative detention has
also been widely misused by the Azerbaijani authorities.
The
Gafgaz
Mammadov group of cases, including 21 judgments in 70
(seventy) individual cases concerning administrative detention,
is currently under enhanced supervision by the Committee of Ministers.
The Committee of Ministers’ summary states that these cases all
involve “breaches of the applicants’ freedom of assembly through
the dispersal of unauthorised peaceful demonstrations not posing any
threat to public order, organised/ planned by the opposition in 2010-2014
and their ensuing arrest and administrative conviction to short
periods (3-15 days) of detention for having participated in the demonstrations…
The Court considered that in taking [these] measures […] the authorities
involved failed to act with due tolerance and good faith as regards
the applicants’ right to freedom of assembly, did not adduce sufficient
and relevant reasons justifying the interferences, and imposed disproportionate
sanctions. It found that these measures must not only have discouraged
the applicants but must also, in all probability, have deterred
other opposition supporters and the public at large from attending
demonstrations and, more generally, from participating in open political
debate (violations of Article 11). The Court also found that the criminal
proceedings leading to the applicants’ administrative convictions
were unfair (violations of Article 6). Finally, the Court found
that the applicants’ arrests and administrative detentions were
arbitrary, as unrelated to the formal ground relied on to justify
the deprivation of liberty and motivated solely by their participation / intention
to participate in peaceful demonstrations. The domestic courts also
acted arbitrarily in reviewing the legality of the deprivation of
liberty, failing to examine whether the police had invoked the correct
legal basis for the applicants’ arrests or the legality of the police
interferences with the demonstrations”.
21. There is credible evidence that misuse of administrative detention
has remained widespread since 2014. In May 2019, the Election Monitoring
and Democracy Studies Centre (EMDS) NGO published a report entitled “Politically
Motivated Administrative Detentions in Azerbaijan”. Gathering evidence
from detainees and their lawyers, as well as verified media reports,
the EMDS concluded that there had been at least 131 politically motivated
administrative detentions between January 2018 and February 2019,
with the total number likely to be much higher. It found that the
use of administrative detention to prevent or punish people for
participating in demonstrations had increased since 2016 and was
used in relation to both unauthorised and authorised demonstrations.
For example, EMDS reported that prior to and following authorised
rallies organised by the opposition National Council of Democratic
Forces in September-October 2017, the police summoned 229 people
across Azerbaijan, of whom 18 were sentenced to between 10 and 30
days administrative detention for resisting the police. During three
further authorised rallies, organised during the April 2018 presidential
election, 174 people were summoned by the police, with 17 sentenced
to administrative detention. A rally organised by REAL in May 2018
resulted in 10 of its members being summoned and 4 of them being sentenced
to administrative detention. In January 2019, demonstrations in
support of Mehman Huseynov (see below) resulted in 40 people being
sentenced to administrative detention. During the same month, when 30 people
gathered in front of a criminal court during trials relating to
an opposition party’s financing, 7 of them ended up in administrative
detention. Another NGO, the Institute for Democratic Initiatives
(IDI), has also reported in detail on numerous cases of administrative
detention connected to public assemblies organised by opposition
political groups: 30 in 2016, at least 20 in 2017, 17 in 2018, and
at least 21 in the first five months of 2019.
2.4. Pending
cases concerning arbitrary detention
22. As the Court itself pointed
out in the
Aliyev judgment
(see above), there are a large number of arbitrary detention-related
cases pending before the Court that have been communicated to the
Azerbaijani government.
Many of these invoke Article
18, including
Yunusova and Yunusov (human
rights defenders and civil society activists convicted of various
offences including large-scale fraud and high treason: alleged violations
also of Articles 3 – prohibition of torture – 5, 6, 8 – right to
respect for private and family life, home or correspondence – 13
– right to an effective remedy – and others);
Ibrahimov and 2 others (members
of NIDA convicted of large scale drug offences: alleged violations
also of Articles 3, 5, 6, 8 and 10 – freedom of expression);
Mukhtarli v. Azerbaijan and Georgia (critical
journalist’s abduction from Georgia and arrest and eventual conviction
on currency smuggling charges in Azerbaijan: alleged violations
also of Articles 5 and 6);
Nuruzade and 5 others (administrative
detention and conviction: alleged violations also of Articles 5,
6, 8 – right to family life – 10 and, in respect of two of the applicants,
18);
Khadija Ismayilova (journalist and
civil society activist arrested and detained on charges of inciting
a colleague to commit suicide: alleged violations also of 5, 6 and
10);
Ilgar
Mammadov and 4 others (administrative detention and conviction
of members of the opposition Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan:
alleged violations also of Articles 5, 6 and 10);
and
Rustamzade (criminal
convictions for public order offences: alleged violations also of
Articles 6 and 10).
23. Other pending applications give every appearance of politically
motivated deprivation of liberty, even if they do not explicitly
mention Article 18 – which does not prevent the Court from raising
the issue later, of its own motion. These cases include
Agakishiyev (administrative arrest,
conviction and detention for failure to comply with police orders:
alleged violations of Articles 5 and 6);
Hasanov (administrative conviction
and detention for obstructing a highway: alleged violation of Article
6);
Gasimov and 4 others (alleged violations of
Article 5 and, in the case of one applicant, a journalist for Azadliq,
of Article 10);
Ibrahimov (administrative conviction
and detention for failure to comply with police orders: alleged
violation of Article 6);
Mammadov (journalist and civil society
activist convicted of drug dealing, high treason and incitement
to hatred: alleged violations of Articles 6 and 10);
Ramazanov (conviction
of possession of drugs: alleged violation of Article 6);
Savalanli (conviction of possession
of drugs: alleged violation of Article 6);
and
Gahramanli (arrest and detention
of the deputy chairman of the opposition Popular Front Party for
inciting the violent overthrow of the government: alleged violations
of Articles 5, 6 and 10)
.
Other potentially relevant applications include
Rafiyev (administrative arrest,
conviction and detention for failure to comply with police orders:
alleged violations of Articles 5, 6 and 9)
and
Agayev and 6 others (arrest, detention
and conviction of offences relating to their Nursist Islamic religious
activities: alleged violations of Article 5, 6 and 9).
3. The
Court’s judgments and the Assembly’s definition of ‘political prisoner’
24. The Court’s judgments do not
explicitly state that any applicant was a political prisoner. This
is entirely unsurprising, since the Convention does not include
the concept of ‘political prisoner’ as such and the Assembly’s definition
has no legal status for the Court. For the same reasons, however,
the Court did not find that anyone was not a political prisoner.
The real question is whether or not the Court’s findings of fact
satisfy the Assembly’s definition.
25. In
Resolution 1900
(2012), the Assembly adopted the following definition of ‘political
prisoner’:
“A person deprived
of his or her personal liberty is to be regarded as a ‘political
prisoner’:
1. if the detention has been imposed in violation of one
of the fundamental guarantees set out in the European Convention
on Human Rights and its Protocols (ECHR), in particular freedom
of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression and information,
freedom of assembly and association;
2. if the detention has been imposed for purely political
reasons without connection to any offence;
3. if, for political motives, the length of the detention
or its conditions are clearly out of proportion to the offence the
person has been found guilty of or is suspected of;
4. if, for political motives, he or she is detained in
a discriminatory manner as compared to other persons; or,
5. if the detention is the result of proceedings which
were clearly unfair and this appears to be connected with political
motives of the authorities.”
26. The definition set out in
Resolution 1900 was taken from that used by the Secretary General’s independent
experts in 2001 when examining the situation in both Azerbaijan
and Armenia. The experts’ definition was accepted at the time by
the Committee of Ministers, which included Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Resolution 1900 makes clear that its definition is intended for universal
application; indeed, the report on which
Resolution 1900 was based was deliberately prepared separately from
a report on political prisoners in Azerbaijan so as to ensure that
the definition would not be seen as applicable only in that context.
27. It is explicit in the Court’s Article 18 judgments and apparent
in many of the other judgments mentioned above that one or more
of the grounds set out in
Resolution
1900 is satisfied. For example:
- In the first Ilgar Mammadov judgment, the Court
found that there had been no reasonable suspicion justifying his
detention on remand, and that the domestic courts had failed to
verify whether there was a reasonable suspicion. Furthermore, his
arrest and detention were in fact linked to his criticism of the authorities,
implying a violation of his right to freedom of expression. These
findings clearly satisfy the first, second and/ or fifth grounds.
Mr Mammadov must be considered to have been a political prisoner.
- In the Yagublu judgment,
the facts and the Court’s legal reasoning were effectively the same
as those in the first Ilgar Mammadov judgment.
For the same reasons, Mr Yagublu must also be considered to have
been a political prisoner.
- In the Rasul Jafarov, Mammadli, Rashad
Hasanov and others, Aliyev and Natig Jafarov judgments, the Court
found that there had been no reasonable suspicion justifying detention,
and/ or that the domestic courts had failed to conduct a proper
review of detention. Furthermore, the actual purpose of the measures
taken against the applicants had been to silence and punish them
for their human rights, civil society or NGO activities, as the
case may be, implying violations of their rights to freedom of expression, assembly
and/ or association. Again, in each of these cases, the findings
clearly satisfy one or more of the same three grounds mentioned
above. All of these applicants must be considered to have been political
prisoners.
- In the Aliyev judgment,
the Court made a general finding of a “troubling pattern of arbitrary
arrest and detention of government critics [etc.] through retaliatory
prosecutions and misuse of criminal law”, with the domestic courts
“systematically failing to protect” against arbitrary deprivation
of liberty, “without any genuine judicial oversight”. This clearly
implies recognition by the Court of the existence of a far greater number
of persons whose circumstances would satisfy the Assembly’s definition
of ‘political prisoner’.
- In the Gafgaz Mammadov group
of cases, the Court found that the 70 (seventy) applicants’ detentions had
been arbitrary and/ or their trials had been unfair, violating their
freedom of assembly at opposition demonstrations. Yet again, in
each of these cases, the findings clearly satisfy one or more of
the three grounds mentioned above: the administrative detention
violated the right to freedom of assembly, and/ or it was imposed
for purely political purposes without connection to any offence,
and/ or it resulted from clearly unfair proceedings apparently connected
to political motives of the authorities. These applicants must also
be considered to have been political prisoners.
- The Committee of Ministers, in its supervision of the Gafgaz Mammadov group of cases,
has referred to “the structural problems revealed by the present
group of cases” (see further below). Again, this implies the existence
of an underlying situation likely to generate further cases. The
reports of the EMDS and IDI mentioned above suggest that this has
in fact happened. These cases could also satisfy the Assembly’s
definition of ‘political prisoner’.
28. As to the cases involving administrative detention, the Committee
of Ministers’ summary of the Court’s judgments shows that the individuals
concerned had been detained in violation of their freedom of assembly; their
detention was arbitrary and motivated solely by their political
activities; it was disproportionate to any alleged offence; and
it resulted from clearly unfair proceedings. In accordance with
the definition set out in Assembly
Resolution 1900 (2012), anyone detained in such circumstances should be considered
a political prisoner. On the basis of the Court’s numerous judgments,
the Committee of Ministers’ identification of a ‘structural problem’
(see further below) and the credible reporting of reputable NGOs
on more recent incidents, I further conclude that there is also
a ‘pattern’ of deliberate, systematic misuse of administrative detention,
with the aim of preventing, punishing and deterring legitimate exercise
of the freedoms of expression and assembly.
29. It is simply no longer possible to argue that Azerbaijan does
not have a problem of political prisoners. The Court’s judgments
establish facts showing not only that a series of specific individuals
were indeed political prisoners, but also that the authorities systematically
misuse the criminal justice apparatus to persecute opposition politicians,
civil society activists, journalists, human rights defenders and
other perceived dissidents in reprisal for their activities. These
judicially established facts cannot be denied without rejecting
the authority of the Court and its judgments, along with the validity
of the Assembly’s own well-established definition.
4. Implementation
of the Court’s judgments and its supervision by the Committee of
Ministers
4.1. The
Ilgar Mammadov group of cases (Article 18 judgments)
30. The Committee of Ministers
is examining the above-mentioned Article 18 judgments (with the
exception of the recent
Natig Jafarov judgment,
which is not yet final
)
as the
Ilgar Mammadov group,
under its ‘enhanced supervision’ process. Within that group, the
Committee of Ministers considers three issues: individual measures,
payment of just satisfaction (financial compensation for damages)
and general measures. The individual measures require
restitutio in integrum, i.e. a complete
restoration of the situation prior to the violation. Whilst all
the applicants have by now been released from prison, their criminal
convictions remain on record, with negative consequences for their
professional activities: Mr Mammadov is barred from standing for election
to political office until August 2024, which would prevent him from
running in the parliamentary elections due in 2020 (he was in prison
during the 2015 and 2016 parliamentary elections and the 2018 presidential
elections); Mr Mammadli is also a politician who has been and will
be unable to stand for election; and Rasul Jafarov is unable to
practice as a lawyer.
31. In December 2017, over three years after the Court’s judgment
had become final, the Committee of Ministers for the first time
ever invoked Article 46(4) of the Convention to refer the case of
Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (see
above) to the Court for a ruling on whether Azerbaijan had failed
to fulfil its obligation to implement the judgment, since Mr Mammadov
had still not been released from detention.
In its Article 46(4) judgment,
delivered on 29 May 2019, the Court found that Azerbaijan had not
“acted in ‘good faith’” and had failed to fulfil its obligation
to implement the first
Mammadov judgment.
It then referred the case back to the Committee of Ministers under
Article 46(5), for consideration of the measures to be taken. In
the meantime, between the Committee of Ministers’ reference under
Article 46(4) and the Court’s judgment, Mr Mammadov had been released
on probation in August 2018, and the Azerbaijani Supreme Court had
reduced his sentence, found that he had served his time in full
and set aside the conditions on his release in March 2019.
32. At the Committee of Ministers’ last ‘DH’ meeting on 23-24
September 2019,
the Committee
of Ministers “underlined that […] Azerbaijan is required rapidly
to eliminate all the remaining negative consequences of the criminal
charges brought against each of the applicants, principally by ensuring
that the convictions are quashed and deleted from their criminal
records”. It noted that the Azerbaijani government had only transmitted the
relevant judgments to the Supreme Court for re-consideration, as
a first step towards eliminating the negative consequences of the
convictions, on 12 September 2019 – despite those judgments having
been final for, in some cases, several years. It also took note
of information from the Azerbaijani government that Mr Aliyev’s
offices had only recently been unsealed and that the court orders
to freeze his and his NGO’s bank accounts had become invalid at
the end of the prosecution – although Mr Aliyev complained that
the prosecutor had not informed the banks, which continued to refuse
access to the accounts.
33. The Committee of Ministers also recalled that the Court’s
judgments required Azerbaijan to adopt “effective and comprehensive
[general] measures to further enhance the independence of the judiciary
and the Prosecutor’s Office and specifically to ensure that there
are no further retaliatory prosecutions, arbitrary arrests and detention
or other misuse of criminal law against government critics, civil
society activists and human-rights defenders”. In this connection,
it noted “with interest” information from the authorities on reforms
launched by the Executive Order of February 2017 ‘on improvement
of operation or penitentiary, humanization of penal policies and
extension of application of alternative sanctions and non-custodial
procedural measures of restraint’ and the Presidential Decree of
April 2019 ‘on deepening of reforms in the judicial-legal system’.
34. The 2017 Executive Order and the 2019 Presidential Decree
have the potential to improve the Azerbaijani criminal justice and
judicial systems in general.
To
that extent, they must be welcomed. The authorities in Azerbaijan
told me, for example, that the 2017 Order had resulted in over 14,000
people benefiting from decriminalisation of certain offences, with
24% fewer people now in custody, and that the number of arrests
was now 30% lower than in 2016. As to the 2019 Decree, it would
enhance judges’ financial independence, by increasing their salaries.
In addition, it recommends to the Judicial Legal Council to take measures
against the exercise of undue influence on judges. Judges were now
accepting far fewer prosecution requests for pre-trial detention
orders. It is less clear, however, how these instruments will fulfil
the Court’s requirement of general measures to prevent future political
motivated misuse of the criminal justice system.
35. The 2017 Order includes a ‘recommendation’ to the courts “that
they examine the existence of reasonable suspicion of individuals
having committed an offence and grounds for arrest, when deciding
on measure of restraint, and arguments in favour of alternative
measures”. The requirement of suspicion of commission of an offence
as a prerequisite for pre-trial detention has long been part of
the Azerbaijani Code of Criminal Procedure, consistent with Azerbaijan’s
obligations under the Convention. Nevertheless, the Court’s judgments
concerning political prisoners show that people were often detained
despite there being no reasonable suspicion – often in the absence
of any credible evidence – with the domestic courts failing to conduct
an adequate review of detention. The Azerbaijani courts should apply
the law as a matter of course, in accordance with the Constitution;
it should not depend on instructions from the President. The essential question
is whether judges will have the professionalism and confidence to
resist pressure from prosecutors to detain individuals in ‘political’
cases.
36. The effect of implementation of the 2019 Decree will be crucial
in this respect. This Decree is aimed at “improving the mechanisms
for protecting judges from possible inappropriate interference with
their activities”. When it comes to resisting possible interference
from the executive itself, however, two essential problems remain
unresolved: the influence of the Ministry of Justice over the Judicial
Legal Council (JLC), which is responsible for judicial appointments,
transfers, evaluation and discipline; and the appointment of the
chairs of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the Nakhchivan
Autonomous Republic by the President. In
Resolution 2184 (2017) on the functioning of democratic institutions in Azerbaijan,
the Assembly expressed concern over both of these issues. In March
2019, the Council of Europe’s Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO),
which had previously recommended that “not less than half of [the
JLC’s] members to be composed of judges who are directly elected
or appointed by their peers”, noted that “Although nine out of fifteen
members of the JLC are judges […], only a minority of them are appointed
or elected by their peers. Furthermore, the JLC was still chaired
by the Minister of Justice and not elected from among the JLC members
who are judges, as it was recommended.” GRECO also called for “determined
measures to ensure that the Judicial Legal Council is involved in
the appointment of all categories of judges and court presidents”.
I am aware that Azerbaijan and
the Council of Europe are currently co-operating on a project to
give ‘support to justice sector reform initiatives in Azerbaijan’
but note that this project will not address these two structural
problems.
37. One other crucial problem may, however, have been resolved:
presidential influence over the Prosecutor General’s Office. In
November 2017, the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office was amended: instead
of having ‘oversight’ of the prosecutor’s activities, the president
now merely receives general information about them. Both Mr Schennach,
co-rapporteur of the Monitoring Committee, and GRECO have welcomed
this development – as do I.
4.2. The
Gafgaz Mammadov group of cases (administrative detention)
38. The Committee of Ministers
first examined this group of cases in June 2017, when it noted that
“nine similar judgments were classified at this meeting as clones
of the Gafgaz Mammadov group” and “noted with concern that no information
has been provided to the Committee [by Azerbaijan] in this group
of cases”. In December 2017, it noted “the constant influx of new
cases in this group, expressed their deep concern regarding the
continued absence of information” and “invited firmly the authorities to
provide, without further delay, a comprehensive action plan or action
report”. Most recently, in June 2018, the Committee of Ministers “expressed
anew their deep concern regarding the continued absence of information
on legislative and other action taken to address the structural
problems revealed by the present group of cases”. Azerbaijan has
still not provided any information to the Committee of Ministers
on how it intends to implement the Court’s judgments in such a way
as to resolve the structural problem underlying abuse of administrative
detention – two-and-a-half years after first being formally requested
to do so.
39. It is clear that politically motivated misuse of administrative
detention is still a recurrent practice. It is therefore imperative
that Azerbaijan implements the Gafgaz
Mammadov group of judgments as a matter of urgency, in
full co-operation with the Committee of Ministers. This must include
the immediate submission of a detailed and comprehensive action
plan setting out the measures to be taken.
4.3. The
attitude of the Azerbaijani authorities towards implementation of
the Court’s judgments
40. All of the institutional representatives
whom I met insisted that they respected the authority of the Court and
its judgments and that the judgments would be fully implemented.
I had some concern, however, about their attitude when asked about
key findings in the Court’s Article 18 judgments. It would be unhelpful
to enter into precise details of what they said, so I will simply
state my understanding of their position. The representatives of
the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor General’s Office both denied
that anyone was arrested or detained for their political views;
people were only subjected to criminal law measures in connection with
actual offences. The representatives of the Supreme Court and the
Presidential Administration both insisted that there was no ‘troubling
pattern’ of politically motivated misuse of the criminal justice
system and that the small number of Article 18 judgments was insufficient
to establish such a pattern.
41. When I mentioned these statements to Mr Seyidov, however,
he repeatedly assured me that I must have misunderstood them. I
hope that Mr Seyidov is correct, since it would be difficult to
have confidence in the prospects for resolution of the problem of
political prisoners if the relevant authorities denied that it even
exists. On the contrary, the authorities’ explicit recognition of
the problem would contribute greatly to the prospects of success
of reforms intended to resolve it. The Assembly must encourage such
recognition and follow closely the reforms and their impact on the
incidence of politically motivated detention. It is beyond the scope
of the present report to conduct a detailed review of all of the
measures that have and will be taken under the 2017 Order and the
2019 Decree. I trust, therefore, that the co-rapporteurs of the
Monitoring Committee will undertake this task and that Mr Efstathiou,
our own committee’s rapporteur on the implementation of judgments
of the Court, will follow the work of the Committee of Ministers
on this issue.
5. Ill-treatment
of detainees and conditions of detention
42. Detention in Azerbaijan is
particularly effective as a means of preventing and punishing criticism
and dissent because of the conditions that detainees will face.
43. Concerning ill-treatment in police custody, the Council of
Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) in 2017 noted
“numerous and very widespread allegations of severe physical ill-treatment
of persons detained by the police as criminal suspects (or who had
recently been in police custody), including juveniles as young as
15. The alleged police ill-treatment appeared to follow a very consistent
pattern throughout the different regions visited: it was said to
have occurred mostly in police establishments during initial interviews
by operational police officers (in some cases, also by investigators
and senior officers in charge of police establishments), with the
aim to force the persons to sign a confession, provide other information
or accept additional charges. The types of ill-treatment alleged
included slaps, punches, kicks, truncheon blows, blows inflicted
with a wooden stick, a chair leg, a baseball bat, a plastic bottle
filled with water or with a thick book, but there were also many
allegations of more severe forms of ill-treatment, including torture,
such as truncheon blows on the soles of the feet (often while the
person was suspended) and infliction of electric shocks (including
with the use of electric discharge weapons).”
44. Concerning ill-treatment in pre-trial detention, in 2016 the
CPT reported being “literally inundated with allegations of systematic
and severe physical ill-treatment of inmates by staff (severe beatings
whilst prisoners were handcuffed to bars in a crucifixion position
in the prison’s underground tunnel, sometimes combined with pouring
cold water over the prisoners and placing a cold fan in front of
them). […] [T]here could be little doubt that severe ill-treatment/torture
was in fact occurring.” (Further allegations of physical ill-treatment
were made to the CPT during its 2017 visit to the same facility.)
45. Concerning ill-treatment in prisons, the CPT heard a number
of credible allegations in 2016, including truncheon blows of female
prisoners whilst handcuffed behind their backs by the facility’s
(male) director – who did not deny the allegations. It further noted
a problem of inter-prisoner violence, sometimes resulting in severe injuries,
in several detention facilities.
Some of the prisoners whom I met
during my visit also told me how they had been subject to or witnessed
similar serious physical ill-treatment by prison staff – including
of a detainee being severely beaten by prison guards whilst restrained
by handcuffs.
46. As to detention conditions, following its 2017 visit, the
CPT noted “extremely poor” conditions in two of the three pre-trial
detention centres that it visited, with cells that were “dilapidated,
dirty, poorly lit and ventilated (in addition to being severely
overcrowded).”
In 2016, it had noted that “all of
the prisons visited were overcrowded to varying degrees”, which
was “aggravated even more by the advanced state of dilapidation
and insalubrity” in two of them. It also reported on the quality
of food served to prisoners, which included potatoes that were “rotten
with multiple black holes and appeared to be unfit for human consumption.”
I
saw with my own eyes the extremely cramped, dirty and dilapidated
state of the cells in Gobustan prison. I was also told by prisoners
whom I met during my visit that the food they were served was inedible
and that whenever possible, prisoners refused to eat it, relying
instead on what their families could provide. In one prison, occupying
a former warehouse, I was told that temperatures in summer became
so unbearable that the inmates themselves had paid for air conditioning
to be installed.
47. Conditions for people held in administrative detention are
also inadequate. These people are held in ‘temporary detention centres’
(TDCs), which the CPT has found to be “not adapted for such prolonged
stays [of up to 90 days],
inter alia because
of the total lack of activities… [P]ersons detained in TDCs have
no right to receive visits and make telephone calls, which is an
issue of concern in case of detention period exceeding a few days.”
This
concern is largely due to the fact that detainees’ contact with
the outside world is one of their best protections against ill-treatment.
48. The CPT has repeatedly stated of Azerbaijan that “legal safeguards
against ill-treatment, especially notification of custody, access
to a lawyer, access to a doctor and information on rights, […] remain
largely a dead letter and are mostly inoperative in practice.” I
also note the consistent reports, including from individuals whom
I met during my visit to Azerbaijan, of ‘punishment beatings’ and
of prisoners being placed in ‘punishment cells’ (i.e. solitary confinement,
in particularly brutal conditions) in retaliation for attempts to complain
to the outside world about conditions or treatment in detention.
49. Several people widely considered to have been political prisoners,
some of them by myself in this report, were found by the Court to
have been subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. For example,
Emin Huseynov was ill-treated during his arrest and police detention,
such as to cause him “serious physical pain and suffering.”
Both
Mrs Yunusova and Mr Yunusov were found to have been subjected to
inhuman and degrading treatment due to the authorities’ failure
to provide them with necessary medical care.
And Mr Aliyev was subject
to degrading treatment due to the conditions of his pre-trial detention.
50. In other words, not only does arbitrary detention in Azerbaijan
imply an unjustified loss of liberty, with everything that ordinarily
follows from this; it also involves a risk of appalling detention
conditions, at best, and serious physical ill-treatment or even
torture, at worst. In a democracy, exercise of the fundamental freedoms of
expression, assembly and association should not depend on whether
one is brave enough to confront such risks.
6. ‘Lists’
of political prisoners and recent cases not yet examined by the
Court
51. For many years, various international
and national NGOs have maintained different lists of persons whom
they consider to be political prisoners in Azerbaijan. These bodies
have acted independently of one another: their lists have been compiled
at different times, by different people, using different sources
of information and criteria. It is unsurprising that the lists have
not been identical, even if many names appear on several lists.
52. Mr Strässer’s report of December 2012 also included a ‘consolidated
list of alleged political prisoners’ containing 85 names. At least
nine of these people have won their cases before the Court, and
another four cases have been communicated to the Azerbaijan government
but not yet decided by the Court.
In the circumstances,
this is a remarkably high number: many of the people on the list
may not have applied to the Court, perhaps due to a desire to maintain
a low profile, ignorance of the possibility or the severe shortage
of independent lawyers, especially outside Baku, who are competent
and willing to conduct proceedings before the Court; and some or
even many applications may have failed the Court’s stringent admissibility
test. This underlines the rigour of Mr Strässer’s approach and the
reliability of his report.
53. In 2017, the Assembly included the names of a number of reported
political prisoners in
Resolution
2184. These included Mehman Aliyev and Faiq Amirli, 14 persons
convicted in the so-called Nardaran case (see further below) who
had been released, and Ilgar Mammadov, Ilkin Rustamzade, Mehman
Huseynov, Afgan Mukhtarli, Said Dadashbayli, Fuad Gahramanli and
Aziz Orujov.
54. In this report, I do not present my own list of presumed political
prisoners. I have chosen this approach because I have one great
advantage over my predecessors as rapporteur: I can rely on the
authoritative, binding judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights to establish the facts of the situation – which, as I have
already observed, can leave no doubt that the phenomenon of political
prisoners in Azerbaijan is real. I wanted to show that the case
can be made – can be proved – on the basis of the authoritative
findings of Council of Europe bodies, notably the Court. This does
not undermine the work of civil society bodies: on the contrary,
it confirms their credibility.
55. I find the most detailed and extensive lists of political
prisoners – in particular those drawn up by the ‘Working Group on
a Unified List of Political Prisoners in Azerbaijan’
and
the ‘Union for the Freedom of Political Prisoners in Azerbaijan’
– to
be credible and reliable. In this respect, I note that all of the
applicants in whose cases the Court found violations of Article
18 had appeared on these lists.
The
Assembly should therefore renew its call on the Azerbaijani authorities
to review the cases that currently appear on these lists and to
release everyone who was imprisoned on politically motivated grounds,
as it did in
Resolutions
2184 and 2185 (2017).
56. I would also like to comment on a few selected cases: those
of the detainees whom I met; that of Mehman Huseynov, the well-known
anti-corruption blogger and activist, who has been released from
prison and whom I also met during my visit; and one recent group
of cases of particular concern. These cases were selected without
prejudice to my position on any other reported cases of political
prisoners.
57. Taleh Bagirzade is the chairperson and Abbas Huseynov a member
of the Muslim Unity Movement (MUM). Mr Bagirzade received a religious
education in Iran but has consistently maintained, including to
me, that he is an advocate of pluralistic democracy as a means of
protecting religious freedom. He has been repeatedly arrested and
imprisoned by the authorities. In March 2013, shortly after publishing
on YouTube a sermon criticising government corruption, he was arrested
on reportedly fabricated charges of possession of drugs. In November
2013, he was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. In July 2015,
he was released and resumed his criticism of government repression
and corruption, expressing support also for other government critics.
Over the following months he was repeatedly summoned, arrested or
administratively detained by the authorities. On 26 November 2015,
a large-scale armed police operation was conducted in Nardaran,
where Mr Bagirzade was living. Shooting broke out and seven people
were killed, including two police officers. Mr Bagirzade, Mr Huseynov
and others were arrested. They were charged with a series of serious
offences, including murder, firearms offences, terrorism and attempt
to overthrow the government. Mr Bagirzade, Mr Huseynov and others
were convicted and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment. During their
trial, they gave detailed accounts of having been tortured in detention.
These claims were not investigated. Several witnesses withdrew their
statements, claiming that they had been made under torture. It is
reported that the prosecution failed to present sufficient or cogent
evidence against individual defendants, with numerous gaps in the prosecution
case left unexplained. I consider that the overall circumstances
– in particular the authorities’ clear hostility towards and prior
attempts to repress the detainees’ political/ religious activities
and the manifest flaws in their trials – are sufficient to raise
a presumption that Mr Bagirzade and Mr Huseynov are political prisoners, in
accordance with the Assembly’s definition.
58. Afgan Mukhtarli is a journalist who reported on high-level
corruption in Azerbaijan. In 2014, he moved with his family to Tbilisi,
from where he continued criticising the Azerbaijani government.
In early May 2017, a media outlet connected to the Azerbaijani government
accused him and other government critics living in Georgia of committing
crimes against the state and receiving foreign funding for illegal
purposes. On 29 May, he was arrested at the Azerbaijani border and
charged with illegal border crossing, currency smuggling and use
of violence on a public official. According to Mr Mukhtarli, he
had in fact been kidnapped in Tbilisi, his hands tied and his head
covered. He was then driven out of town and twice transferred to
other cars before arriving at the offices of the Azerbaijan border
guards. In the second car, the passengers spoke Azerbaijani. He
told me that the charges against him were absurd. €10,000 had been
planted in his pocket, but when the authorities realised that this
did not exceed the maximum permissible sum, they claimed that he
had entered Azerbaijan at an irregular border crossing point, which
allowed them to charge him with smuggling. There was evidence to
show that the man he was supposed to have assaulted, causing serious
injury, had accompanied him throughout his journey and remained
with him at the office of the border guards. There was no explanation
for why he would have entered Azerbaijan at a time when he was under
attack in the national media, when he had left Azerbaijan precisely
because he feared for his safety. At his pre-trial detention hearing
on 31 May, there were injuries visible on his face, but the court
did not order a forensic medical examination. His lawyers requests
for video recordings of the office of the border guard was ignored.
I consider that the overall circumstances – in particular his long-standing
criticism of the government, its apparent hostility towards him and
the extreme weakness of the case against him – are sufficient to
raise a presumption that Mr Mukhtarli is a political prisoner, in
accordance with the Assembly’s definition.
59. Said Dadashbayli has been in prison since January 2007, when
he and some 30 others were arrested and charged with creating a
radical religious group and spying for Iran (which is particularly
absurd, since Mr Dadashbayli is a devout Christian). Reports of
the arrests and criminal proceedings describe numerous serious irregularities,
including illegal searches, blatant planting of evidence, denial
of access to a lawyer and severe ill-treatment – one of the co-accused
died in detention, yet despite a medical certificate proving this,
the government denied that he had ever been detained. The trial
was closed to the public. The prosecution was unable to produce
evidence that the supposed conspirators actually knew one another.
Mr Dadashbayli was convicted and initially sentenced to 14 years’
imprisonment, reduced to 13,5 years following changes to the Criminal
Code in 2016. At the time of his arrest he worked for a joint US-Azerbaijani
company and had previously worked for the Azerbaijani state oil
company. He told me that he also had a very profitable business conducting
foreign currency transactions and that he had been targeted by the
authorities because he had refused to pay a large bribe to a senior
official. In this respect, I note that Mr Dadashbayli was also convicted of
large-scale manufacture or sale of counterfeit money or securities.
This senior official had since been convicted of corruption charges,
yet Mr Dadashbayli remains in prison. This case is a most absurd
and blatant miscarriage of justice, which makes Mr Dadashbayli’s
continued detention particularly outrageous.
60. Mehman Huseynov was detained in March 2017 on defamation charges,
after he had published a series of articles revealing cases of alleged
corruption and torture by Azerbaijani officials. In December 2018,
two months before the end of his sentence he was charged with violent
resisting a prison guard, which is liable to a maximum sentence
of seven years’ imprisonment. The Monitoring Committee’s co-rapporteurs
stated that “there are justified grounds for the assumption that
these new charges are clearly politically motivated and clearly
designed to further silence a prominent human rights activist”.
Following an international outcry, the new charges were dropped
in January 2019. The co-rapporteurs welcomed this, whilst noting
that “we cannot forget that this is not an isolated case.” In March
2019, following his release, they stated that “We have long considered
Mr Huseynov […] to be a political prisoner”. I share their views
in every respect.
61. Finally, I would like to mention the ‘Ganja’ cases, dating
from July 2018. Many of those whom I met in Azerbaijan, including
members of the diplomatic community, expressed serious concerns
about these cases. On 3 July 2018, someone tried to kill the governor
of Ganja. A suspect was arrested. Photographs later emerged showing
this suspect apparently unconscious, with signs of possible torture
including cuts and bruises to his face and body. In response, a
large group of demonstrators gathered spontaneously in the city
centre. During the demonstration, someone attacked the police with
a sword, killing two officers. The police then turned on the demonstration,
dispersing it and arresting some 77 people. Some of them say that
they had not even been part of the demonstration but were arrested
as part of an indiscriminate round-up. The authorities claimed that
they were all violent Islamic extremists. Persons arrested have
given detailed descriptions of being tortured in detention and were
denied access to lawyers or family. During the trials – which with
no explanation were conducted in Baku, rather than Ganja – many
journalists were either excluded or expelled from the courtroom. There
were reportedly serious problems with the sufficiency and credibility
of the prosecution evidence, which the court failed properly to
examine – for example, defence requests to examine CCTV footage
relied upon by the prosecution were dismissed. I consider that the
overall circumstances – in particular, the fact that the detainees
were arrested at a demonstration against the authorities, the authorities’
claim that they are religious extremists and the many serious procedural
flaws – are sufficient to raise a presumption that most, and perhaps
even all of them are political prisoners, in accordance with the
Assembly’s definition. I welcome the fact that the Azerbaijani courts
have already begun to review some of these cases and release certain prisoners.
7. Presidential
pardons
62. Azerbaijan has a long tradition
of presidential pardons for convicted prisoners. According to the
deputy Prosecutor General, there have been 65 presidential pardons,
along with 11 parliamentary amnesties, since Azerbaijan regained
its independence in 1991, affecting some 40,000 people; the current
president has issued 33 pardons, affecting some 5,000 people, with
431 – including over 50 people widely considered to be political prisoners
– released following the most recent presidential pardon, in March
2019.
63. Along with the co-rapporteurs of the Monitoring Committee,
I issued a statement in response to the March 2019 presidential
pardon. I agree with the views expressed by Sir Roger Gale in that
statement: “Whilst this latest pardon is of course welcome, the
exercise of discretionary power by the executive is no substitute for
an independent judiciary that prevents injustice and politically
motivated detention in the first place. I call upon the Azerbaijani
authorities to press ahead urgently with fundamental reform of the
judicial system, in line with standards and recommendations of the
Council of Europe.”
64. For the individuals concerned, release for whatever reason
is a relief. A presidential pardon does not, however, erase the
traumatic experience of imprisonment, nor does it restore the time
spent apart from family and friends or the missed opportunities.
Pardons are often conditional on humiliating public apologies, including
admissions of guilt made effectively under duress, which can prejudice
future legal proceedings. They do not undo the injustice or remove
the deterrence from future political or civil society engagement. Furthermore,
this practice raises important questions. Why do so many people
deserve to be pardoned if they had been justly imprisoned in the
first place? And if imprisonment had been necessary and proportionate,
why does it suddenly become unnecessary before the full sentence
is served?
65. Such extensive use of presidential pardons also creates the
unfortunate impression that the criminal justice system depends
not on the independent and impartial decisions of judges or parole
boards, but on the whim of the President. I recall also my earlier
observation about the 2017 Executive Order calling on criminal judges
to apply the law – as if this depended on instructions from the
President. The functioning of the criminal justice system in individual
cases should depend on the law and on the competence and professionality
of its officials, not on political intervention by the head of state.
8. Conclusions
and recommendations
66. When Azerbaijan joined the
Council of Europe, it accepted the existence of political prisoners
and co-operated on measures to release them. Since then, its position
has shifted to one of denial. With the numerous recent Court judgments,
in particular those finding violations of Article 18, that position
is no longer tenable. There can no longer be any doubt that Azerbaijan
has a problem of political prisoners and that this problem arises
from structural and systemic causes.
67. The Court, in the Aliyev judgment,
and the Committee of Ministers, in its supervision of implementation of
the Ilgar Mammadov and Gafgaz Mammadov groups of cases,
have made clear that Azerbaijan must now address the underlying
structural and systemic causes of politically motivated misuse of
the criminal justice and system and administrative detention. The
2017 Executive Order and the 2019 Presidential Decree are important
steps towards achieving this and some positive results have already
been seen. Much more remains to be done, however, especially in
relation to the independence of the judiciary, but also in other
areas, including the Prosecutor General’s Office, prevention of
ill-treatment and conditions of detention. I welcome and fully support
the fact that the Court will continue to oversee Azerbaijani’s implementation
of its obligations under the Convention, and that the Committee
of Ministers will supervise the progress of the reforms that are necessary
to address the underlying problems.
68. The Court process is judicial and the Committee of Ministers
is a diplomatic body. Both look at historical events (often quite
old, due to the length of the Court’s proceedings) or particular
aspects of a wider situation. The Assembly’s role is distinct and
complementary. We can respond more quickly to recent and current
cases, coming to provisional conclusions without going through lengthy
judicial proceedings. We can look at the bigger picture, combining
different aspects, such as both criminal and administrative detention
together, and the relevance of detention conditions. As parliamentarians,
we can support (or criticise) the work of governments in the Committee
of Ministers. We can also call on the Azerbaijani authorities to
take steps that go beyond the action necessary to implement the
Court’s judgments. We can also engage with our Azerbaijani colleagues
to encourage them to take action themselves, in their role either
as legislators or as oversight of the executive.
69. On this basis, I propose a series of recommendations, as set
out in the attached draft resolution and recommendation, to solve
the problem of political prisoners once and for all. This problem
must be solved in the interest of both democracy in Azerbaijan in
general, and more particularly of all Azerbaijani citizens who have
spent time, and are still spending time in prison, often in terrible
conditions, simply for exercising their freedoms guaranteed under
the European Convention on Human Rights.