1. Introduction
1.1. Procedure
1. The present report is based
on the motion for a resolution entitled “Transparency and regulation
of donations to political parties and electoral campaigns from foreign
donors”
which I tabled together with other members
of the Parliamentary Assembly in January 2019. I was appointed as
rapporteur by the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy on
26 June 2019.
2. In March 2020 an outline for the report was sent to the committee
members for written comments. On 15 October 2020 the committee held
an exchange of views with the participation of Mr Yves-Marie Doublet, Deputy
Director at the French National Assembly, expert to the Group of
States against Corruption (GRECO); Mr Nicolae Eșanu (Republic of
Moldova), Substitute member of the European Commission for Democracy through
Law (Venice Commission), Legal Advisor to the Prime Minister; and
Mr Fernando Casal Bértoa, Associate Professor at the University
of Nottingham and member of the Core Group of Political Party Experts of
the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR). In December
2020 I conducted two bilateral hearings with the journalists and
authors Stefano Vergine (Italy) and Anton Shekhovtsov (Ukraine).
3. The Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy discussed
a preliminary version of the present report on 30 March 2021. Several
aspects of the memorandum are further elaborated on in the preliminary
version.
1.2. Purpose
of the report
4. Political decision making in
Council of Europe member States is increasingly exposed to international influence.
Developments like digitisation and migration interfere with democratic
processes which are designed and regulated on a merely national
level.
5. One aspect of regulating political campaigns is the legal
framework for financial contributions, namely donations or other
financial support. Freedom of movement, for example between Council
of Europe member States which are also European Union member States,
migration and the existence of diaspora communities and national
minorities cause a situation in which financial contributions may
be performed by actors other than national citizens or resident
companies of the State in which the contribution is performed. In
addition to financial contributions by foreign citizens or non-resident
private companies, financial contributions to political parties
and electoral campaigns in one State may also be performed by public
or State-linked entities from another State. Both financial contributions
from foreign private and public donors may constitute an inappropriate
influence on a State’s political processes, democracy and, ultimately,
State integrity and sovereignty.
6. Accordingly, some member States and the Council of Europe
itself as well as other international organisations such as the
European Union have adopted regulation and have expressed their
political proposals concerning financial contributions to political
parties and electoral campaigns from foreign donors. The present
report shall describe the existing political and legal framework
concerning contributions to political parties and campaigns by foreign
donors while stressing the strengths and weaknesses of the texts
and proposals which have been adopted or discussed so far.
7. Recently, doubts and questions surrounding inappropriate foreign
influence on political campaigns have arisen in a number of cases
in different member States. The question is whether donations from
abroad are performed by foreign private, public or State-linked
donors in order to inappropriately interfere in a state’s political
process. In addition to that, challenges like the use of digital
technologies change the possibilities of donating to political parties
or campaigns. The present report shall describe the recent developments
and current challenges with regard to contributions to political
parties and campaigns by foreign donors.
8. Furthermore, the present report shall introduce proposals
to update the existing political and legal framework concerning
contributions to political parties and campaigns by foreign donors
considering recent developments and current challenges. In doing
so, the report shall contribute to strengthening citizens’ confidence
in the integrity and independence of the process of public decision
making in Council of Europe member States.
1.3. Scope
of the report and definitions
9. The present report deals with
constellations in which foreign citizens, foreign companies or foreign-state-linked
entities perform voluntary financial contributions, namely donations
or other financial advantages, to political parties or campaigns
in Council of Europe member States.
10. The report focusses on constellations in which the recipient
political party or electoral campaign resides in one member State
while the donating source sits in another member State. However,
foreign donations may also be performed by a donating source residing
in a non-member State of the Council of Europe.
11. The report focusses on political parties, meaning political
organisations which present candidates and ideas to public elections.
It deals with the funding of political parties’ electoral campaigns
as well as their funding which is not related to a particular electoral
campaign. Moreover, the report aims to address political campaigns
which are not linked to an election, but to a referendum. Due account
must, however, be taken of the fact that not all member States possess
national instruments of direct democracy. The exact distinction between
party and campaign funding is therefore based on the national legal
situation. Although some relevant political and legal statements,
guidelines or rules which are to be assessed in the report refer
either to parties or to campaigns, some general principles governing
democratic processes will be drawn from them.
12. The object and purpose of the report is intensely linked to
the issue of corruption. Pursuant to the definition of Transparency
International, “corruption” means “the abuse of entrusted power
for private gain.” Accordingly, improper or illicit donations to
political parties and electoral campaigns from foreign donors may also
constitute an act of corruption, if some financial advantage is
directly or indirectly granted to a private recipient. However,
an improper or illicit donation to a political party or an electoral
campaign in a foreign country does not automatically fulfil the
definition of corruption.
13. Despite the scope of the presented definitions, the present
report explicitly aims to investigate constellations of circumvention.
Hence, an improper or illicit donation to a political party or an
electoral campaign may be deliberately performed in a way to avoid
the fulfilment of the above-mentioned definitions, for example by
donating to individuals or NGOs and foundations instead of political
parties and electoral campaigns. However, such action may under
certain circumstances still constitute an act of improper influence in
a country’s democratic process.
2. Political parties, electoral campaigns
and foreign donors – political and legal framework
2.1. Funding
of political parties and electoral campaigns as a key challenge
in democracies
14. Political parties and the freedom
to organise political campaigns are fundamental elements of the democratic
systems in Council of Europe member States. They are essential tools
of expression of the political will of citizens and of organising
political debates within a society.
15. Citizens’ confidence in the integrity and independence of
the process of public decision making are important aspects to ensure
acceptance and resilience of democratic systems. In political systems
based on political parties, the internal organisation of a political
party is subject to the citizens’ expectation concerning the integrity
of political processes.
16. The role of political parties, in particular the organisation
of electoral campaigns and the participation in elections, cannot
be carried out without adequate financial resources. In order to
ensure the democratic rights of citizens to form political organisations,
to protect the equality between parties and to avoid corrupt or
undue influence, States typically impose regulation on political
parties and electoral campaigns regarding their finances.
17. There are various possibilities of financing political parties
from public and private sources. Council of Europe member States
apply a variety of different regulatory and budgetary models in
the field of financing political parties. “At present there is no
international standard or reference, the question of political party financing
being closely linked to the constitutional and electoral systems
of each State, which are themselves generally the product of each
country’s historical or cultural background.”
18. Nevertheless, several Council of Europe institutions have
tried to set standards with respect to the financing of political
parties and electoral campaigns.
In 2001, the Assembly
stated general principles with respect to the financing of political
parties.
2.2. Committee
of Ministers Recommendation Rec(2003)4
19. In Committee of Ministers Recommendation
Rec(2003)4 on Common Rules Against Corruption in the Funding of
Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns,
Article
7 provides that “States should specifically limit, prohibit or otherwise
regulate donations from foreign donors”.
20. The Recommendation also contains general guidelines with respect
to ensuring transparency and regulations of donations to political
parties and electoral campaigns.
2.3. European
Convention on Human Rights and European Union Law in assessment
by the Venice Commission (2006)
21. In 2005 the European Court
of Human Rights (hereafter the Court) requested the Venice Commission
to prepare an opinion
on the problem of political parties receiving financial contributions
from abroad. As a result, the “Opinion on the Prohibition of Financial
Contributions to Political Parties from Foreign Sources” was adopted
by the Venice Commission in 2006 (Opinion no. 366/2006, CDL-AD(2006)014).
22. It has to be noted that the 2006 opinion focusses on the financing
of a political party by another political party. The focus of the
study did not lie in the financing of a political party, movement
or campaign by a foreign state. When assessing the different regulations
in Council of Europe member States the Venice Commission included
regulations concerning the donations by foreign States, foreign
citizens and foreign legal persons. Also, the financing of a political
party by a foreign political party may constitute an indirect financing
by a foreign state as the donor organisation may have received State
funding in its country of origin. However, the legal aspect of the
financing of a political party, movement or campaign by a foreign
State was not the core aspect of the study.
23. The Commission conducted an analysis of the legal situation
in 44 Council of Europe member States. It concluded, that, at the
time, 28 member States prohibited or substantially limited foreign
donations to political parties and 16 did not impose any such restrictions.
The Commission held that regulations on political parties differed
substantially from one country to another. The legislative framework
for parties as a specific type of association is, according to the
Commission, largely based on national history, political tradition
and practice and it is very hard to draw unambiguous conclusions
on the advantages and disadvantages of each system. The Commission
considers several historical and politico-cultural factors, like
for example attempts to exert influence during the Cold War, geographical
affiliation to the post-Soviet area and membership in the European Union.
24. The Commission came to the overall conclusion that each case
of prohibition of financing from foreign sources must be considered
separately. Due consideration must be given to the political system
of the country concerned, its relations within neighbours, its constitution
and constitutional values as well as the general system of financing
of political parties. Widely accepted international or regional
legal texts and standards, such as Article 11 of the Convention
(freedom of assembly and association) must be respected. The Commission also
stresses the importance of EU regulation concerning political parties
on the European level.
2.4. Guidelines
on political party regulation by OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission
(2010, updated 2020)
25. In 2010, the Venice Commission
and the OSCE/ODIHR published joined Guidelines on political party regulation.
Referring
to Committee of Ministers Recommendation Rec(2003)4, the guidelines
state in their paragraph 172 that “
Contributions
from foreign sources should generally be prohibited”.
Nevertheless, such regulation shall not undermine the international
co-operation of political parties. These Guidelines were updated
in 2020
.
2.5. Parliamentary
Assembly
26. In 2001, the Assembly stated
general principles with respect to the financing of political parties
without explicitly mentioning the issue of transparency and regulation
of donations to political parties and electoral campaigns from foreign
donors.
Since
then, the Assembly has repeatedly reaffirmed its call for transparency of
the financing of political parties.
In 2019, the Assembly voted in favour
of a resolution proposing a prohibition of foreign donations to
political campaigns with respect to referenda.
27. It should be noted that the Assembly has set a specific focus
on the situation of NGOs after restrictive laws and regulations
had been adopted in several member States.
In
Resolution
2362 (2021) “Restrictions on NGO activities in Council of Europe
member States”
it is stated in paragraph 10.
7. that member States are urged to “ensure that NGOs can seek, secure
and use financial and material resources of both domestic and foreign
origin, without suffering discrimination or encountering unjustified
obstacles, in line with the recommendations included in the Venice
Commission ‘Report on the funding of associations’”. Accordingly, regulations
governing donations to political parties and electoral campaigns
from foreign donors should not impose inappropriate restrictions
on NGOs.
2.6. Group
of States against Corruption (GRECO)
28. Council of Europe GRECO focussed
on the transparency of party funding as part of its third evaluation round.
In doing so, it referred to the above-mentioned Recommendation of
the Committee of Ministers to member States (Rec(2003)4).
29. Despite the fact that member States were invited to elaborate
on their regulation regarding donations from foreign donors in the
questionnaire circulated among member States,
Article 7 of the Committee
of Ministers Recommendation (“States should specifically limit,
prohibit or otherwise regulate donations from foreign donors”) is
not explicitly part of the country-specific evaluation reports.
At the beginning of each country report the “Theme II – Transparency
of party funding” is narrowed to Articles 8, 11, 12, 13b, 14 and
16 of Recommendation Rec(2003)4, and, more generally, to guiding
principle 15 (financing of political parties and election campaigns)
of the Committee of Ministers Resolution (97) 24 on The Twenty Guiding
Principles for the Fight Against Corruption. The reports, however,
do contain observations regarding foreign donations. Also, the issue
of foreign funding of political parties and political campaigns
does not play a role in the overall thematic review of GRECO’s third
evaluation round.
30. When GRECO's recommendations are implemented as foreseen,
it will contribute to making foreign funding to political parties
and election campaigns more transparent (namely by requiring parties
and campaigns to keep accounts and disclosing information on their
income and expenditure in a sufficiently detailed and standardised
manner). In addition, for those countries which have regulations
on foreign donations, implementation of GRECO’s recommendations
will limit possibilities for circumvention (given that GRECO requires
countries, inter alia, to
strictly regulate anonymous donations, in-kind donations, loans, donations
to entities related directly or indirectly to political parties,
and also addresses the issue of spending by third parties benefiting
a certain party or campaign) and will contribute to having violations
of these rules addressed (given that GRECO requires its members
to ensure effective and independent supervision over political party
and campaign finance rules and effective, proportionate and dissuasive
sanctions for violations of these rules).
2.7. European
Union
31. In the aftermath to the European
Parliament election of 2019, the European Parliament adopted a resolution
“on foreign electoral interference and disinformation in national
and European democratic processes.”
In doing so, the Parliament
“acknowledges that the overwhelming majority of Member States have
full or partial bans on foreign donations to political parties and
candidates; recalls with concern that even where laws place restrictions
on the sources of political funding, foreign actors have found ways
to circumvent them and have offered support to their allies by taking
out loans with foreign banks, as in the case of the Front National
in 2016, through purchase and commercial agreements, as in the case
of the allegations reported by Der Spiegel and Süddeutsche Zeitung
on 17 May 2019 against the Freedom Party of Austria and by Buzzfeed and
L’Espresso on 10 July 2019 against Lega per Salvini Premier, and
the facilitation of financial activities, as reported by the British
press in relation to the Leave.EU campaign.”
32. As a result, the European Parliament “calls on the Commission
to address the question of foreign funding of European political
parties and foundations without impeding the creation of a European
public space going beyond the European Union, and to launch a discussion
with the Member States to address these issues in relation to their
domestic political parties and foundations.”
2.8. Scientific
assessments of foreign donations
33. Besides the Venice Commission,
several other scholars have repeatedly assessed the regulation of various
countries regarding transparency and regulation of donations to
political parties and electoral campaigns from foreign donors. As
an example, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
(IDEA) shall be mentioned. The institution publishes the current
legal situation in its online database.
34. According to the database, 68.3 % of countries prohibit donations
from foreign interests to political parties whereas 30.6 % of countries
do not. Moreover, 57.5 % of countries prohibit donations from foreign interests
to candidates whereas 39.7 % do not. Both the fact that a majority
of jurisdictions entails a respective ban on donations and the fact
that IDEA differentiates between donations to parties and donations
to candidates should be noted.
2.9. Preliminary
conclusions and outlook
35. The Council of Europe and its
institutions have issued numerous political or legal statements,
guidelines or rules governing foreign donations to political parties
and campaigns. They show that the distinct historic, social, cultural
and political characteristics of member States heavily influence
their respective rules on party funding.
36. In spite of these differences, the importance of regulating
the funding of political parties or making it transparent is recognised
by various Council of Europe institutions. To that end, principles
and rules were established in the past which should now be evaluated
and discussed by both the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary
Assembly. The evaluation and discussion of those rules and principles,
moreover, should be carried out in the light of current developments
and, if necessary, revised.
37. The assessment of the legal and political statements, guidelines
or rules, issued by Council of Europe institutions shows that the
Committee of Ministers Recommendation Rec(2003)4 which provides
in its Article 7 that “states should specifically limit, prohibit
or otherwise regulate donations from foreign donors” remains an important
guideline for further considerations.
38. The important work of the Venice Commission needs to be updated
in light of recent developments. Since the Commission assessed the
Convention and EU law in 2006, both EU treaties and EU secondary
law have changed, the latter proving an explicit prohibition of
foreign donations to European political parties. Also, the focus
of the Venice Commission study laid in the assessment of the possibility
of donations from a party to a party in another country. After all,
the national legislation assessed by the Commission may have changed since
2006.
39. As the issue of donations to political parties and electoral
campaigns from foreign donors has not been a focus of GRECO so far,
the institution should be invited to take into account the findings
of the present report and to evaluate the implementation of Article
7 of Rec(2003)4, given that this did not form part of its earlier evaluations.
3. Recent
developments and current challenges
3.1. Circumventions
and loopholes
40. In August 2020, scholars Josh
Rudolph and Thomas Marley of the Alliance for Securing Democracy,
an initiative housed at the German Marshall Fund of the United States
(GMF), published the study “Covert Foreign Money: Financial loopholes
exploited by authoritarians to fund political interference in democracies”.
Although their elaborations
are to a large extent focussed on the legal situation in the United
States, several observations and examples from the context of Council
of Europe member States are mentioned. The present report seeks
to compare their findings with the outcome of discussions and hearings
in the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy, with open-source
media reports and with scientific sources regarding recent developments
and current challenges.
41. The authors point out that foreign interference in democratic
processes through financial contributions
must be seen
in the context of further tools of interference like cyberattacks
and disinformation.
42. They identify seven legal loopholes which are exploited by
foreign donors to perform improper or illicit donations to political
parties and electoral campaigns:
43. The authors consider it a first loophole that “legal definitions
of political donations are too narrowly scoped in many countries,
effectively legalizing some foreign in-kind contributions.” According
to the authors, examples include loans to the French party Rassemblement
National from banks linked to the Russian government as well as
luxurious gifts and trips for individuals. By pointing out this
loophole, the authors effectively mention two relevant constellations
of circumvention: (1) a direct loan by a bank linked with a foreign State
in order to circumvent the prohibition of a donation; (2) a contribution
to individual politicians which may not be subject to strict rules
applying to the entire party or political campaign. The study contains
several other examples of potential in-kind contributions from foreign
nationals to political parties or politicians.
44. As a second loophole, the authors identify the use of intermediaries
who enrich favoured donors, politicians or parties.
As an example, donations to the British
Conservative Party by several Russian nationals are mentioned.
45. As a third loophole, the authors identify the use of corporate
entities as footholds to establish a legal presence, and thus the
ability to donate, within target countries.
As an example, donations to several British politicians
by Ukrainian businessman Dmytro Firtash are mentioned.
46. According to the authors, the fourth loophole lies in the
use of “foundations, associations, charities, religious organisations,
and other non-profits” as they “are handy vehicles for malign finance
because Western legal systems treat them as third parties permitted
to spend on politics without meaningfully disclosing the identities
of their donors.” In the eyes of the
authors one example lies in a German association supporting the party
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD).
47. The fifth loophole is considered to be the purchase of “political
ads on social media platforms in order to covertly influence elections
and public opinion in democratic societies.”
The “intersection of malign finance and information
manipulation, including covert funding of online media outlets”
is seen as the sixth loophole.
The present report does not seek to focus
on the fifth and sixth loophole as the issues of paid political
ads and the challenges of a changing media landscape for democracy
were recently discussed in the Parliamentary Assembly.
However,
the possible intersections of financial interference with cyberattacks
and disinformation campaigns have to be taken into consideration.
48. Finally, the study mentions the use of emerging technologies
providing anonymity, such as political spending in the form of cryptocurrencies,
as well as the use of donor bots capable of automating thousands
of political contributions in the names of stolen identities, keeping
such operations under disclosure thresholds.
49. Besides the above-mentioned abuse of legal loopholes, the
study by Rudolph and Morley also mentions examples of possibly illegal
activities. As an example, negotiations of the Italian party La
Lega with Russian state-linked entities about financial aid in 2019
are mentioned.
Examples for possibly illegal activities
also involve reports about financial aids for the Italian party
M5S by the Venezuelan government in 2010.
3.2. France:
Rassemblement/Front National
50. In September 2014, the French
political party Front National (now: Rassemblement National) received a
loan of 9 million euros from the “First Czech Russian Bank” (FCRB)
– an institution whose ownership is said to have had close connections
to the Russian government.
While the FCRB approached insolvency and
had its banking licensed revoked in 2016, the loan was transferred
to another Russian company which has filed a claim against the party
demanding the repayment of the loan. Until now there has been no
repayment of the loan.
The 2014 loan
is only one example of extensive financial negotiations and relations
between the Front/Rassemblement National and Russian State-linked
entities or Russian banks.
51. The case of the Rassemblement/Front National is an example
for the phenomenon that a mere prohibition of a foreign donation
may not be sufficient regulation to avoid any financial advantage
or in-kind contribution to a political party from abroad. At the
time of the arrangement, French law only banned parties from accepting
direct or indirect contributions or material aid from foreign States
or a legal person governed by foreign law.
For
the reasons that a subsidiary of the FCRB hold a European license
in the Czech Republic and that the Rassemblement/Front National
had to pay interest at market rate, the loan of September 2014 may
not have violated French regulation at the time.Subsequently,
the rules governing financial transparency of political parties
were amended in September 2017. Since then, French parties are also
prohibited from receiving loans from a foreign State or a legal
person governed by foreign law with the exception of credit institutions
or finance companies with their registered office in a member State
of the European Union or in a State which is party to the Agreement
on the European Economic Area.
3.3. Italy:
Lega
52. In February 2019, two Italian
investigative journalists revealed that in connection with the campaign
for the European Parliament election of 2019 the Italian party La
Lega had sought financing from Russian authorities or Russian State-linked
companies to the tune of millions of euros, a support that was to
be hidden behind a resource deal. In July 2019, they published an
article referring to an audio recording containing the explicit
negotiations concerning financial contributions on behalf of a Russian
State-linked company that should have covertly channelled the financial
resources for La Lega to an Italian company via intermediate companies.
53. When reports of these negotiations emerged, an Italian public
prosecution authority opened investigation into representatives
of La Lega in accordance with Article 322 bis of the Italian Penal Code.
These
investigations have not yet been completed. As far as known, a payment
has not materialised.
54. According to scholars from the GMF’s Alliance for Securing
Democracy, the Moscow meeting occurred on 18 October 2018. At the
time, the only limit on foreign funding in Italian elections was
that all donations were capped at 100 000 euros. At the time, a
new anti-corruption law was prepared in the Italian government coalition
that completely forbade foreign funding of Italian parties and candidates.
In the weeks following the Moscow meeting,
representatives of La Lega proposed an amendment that would have removed
the ban. The amendment was eventually withdrawn and the anti-corruption
law containing the ban on foreign funding was passed in December
2018. According to media reports,
La Lega eventually
managed to weaken the restrictions in April 2019. On that occasion,
it added a provision in an unrelated economic bill that amended
the law so as to exclude “
foundations,
associations and committees” from its scope.
3.4. Germany:
Alternative für Deutschland
55. In December 2020, the President
of the German Bundestag, acting as the competent supervisory authority
in the field of campaign and party financing, enacted two penalties
against the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party for having accepted
donations from Switzerland. The President of the Bundestag had already
issued penalties in similar cases against the party before.
In Germany, donations
to political parties from EU-countries are legal under certain circumstances
whereas donations from non-EU-countries are forbidden.
56. Another penalty was enacted against the party in December
2020 with regard to a case illustrating the overall tendency of
campaigning by third-parties.
In the official
OSCE/ODIHR report concerning the German parliamentary election of
2017, it is pointed out that a private association (Association
for the Preservation of the Rule of Law and Civic Freedoms) produced
and distributed about 600,000 copies of the weekly newspaper "Deutschland-Kurier",
billboards, posters and online advertisements specially designed
for the Bundestag election, effectively campaigning on behalf of
the AfD. As a result, OSCE/ODIHR suggested that “consideration could
be given to providing a regulation of any campaigning by third-parties
to ensure transparency and accountability of the electoral process.”
3.5. United
Kingdom: alleged Russian interference
58. The report states that “there has been credible open source
commentary suggesting that Russia undertook influence campaigns
in relation to the Scottish independence referendum in 2014.”
However,
the report does not mention any direct donations or circumventing
constellations in order to provide financial assistance to the campaigns
related with the Scottish independence referendum in 2014.
59. The report states that “there have been widespread public
allegations that Russia sought to influence the 2016 referendum
on the UK’s membership of the EU. The impact of any such attempts
would be difficult – if not impossible – to assess, and we have
not sought to do so.”
However, the report expresses its discontent with
the fact that neither the British intelligence community nor the
British Government have provided sufficient evidence to investigate
a possible interference.
60. It must be noted that the issue of foreign financial contributions
is not a specific chapter of the report. Instead, a potential interference
with regard to the
2014
Scottish independence referendum and the 2016 Brexit referendum is discussed in the chapter
dealing with “disinformation”. Nevertheless, financial aspects are mentioned
in the chapter dealing with “Russian expatriates” in the United
Kingdom: “Whilst the Russian elite have developed ties with a number
of countries in recent years, it would appear that the United Kingdom
has been viewed as a particularly favourable destination for Russian
oligarchs and their money.”
The classified annex of the ISC report
is said to name nine elite Russian expatriates who donated to the
Conservative Party.
61. Concerning the Leave.EU Campaign, the report notes “that Arron
Banks became the biggest donor in British political history when
he gave £8m to the Leave.EU campaign. In October 2018, the Electoral Commission
– which had been investigating the source of this donation – referred
the case to the National Crime Agency, which investigated it. In
September 2019, the National Crime Agency announced that it had concluded
the investigation, having found no evidence that any criminal offences
had been committed under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums
Act 2000 or company law by any of the individuals or organisations
referred to it by the Electoral Commission.”
Nevertheless,
it has to be noted that Banks has several business connections with
Russia.
3.6. Donations
to political organisations of national minorities
62. In Germany, it is legally permitted
to perform donations from abroad to parties representing a national minority,
if these donations originate from a bordering country inhabited
by members of the respective ethnicity. In practice, the provision
is applied for the Party Südschleswigscher Wählerverband/Sydslesvigsk Vælgerforening
(SSW) representing the Danish minority in the north of Germany.
The SSW currently receives an annual funding of approximately 500 000
euros from the Danish Ministry of Culture. The party fulfils all transparency
requirements imposed by German law.
3.7. Cryptocurrencies
63. As stated above, digitisation
opens new ways of political funding, including threads for inappropriate
or illicit financing. Catalina Uribe Burcher of the International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) published
a discussion paper in 2019 referring to the issue of “Cryptocurrencies
and Political Finance”.
She states that as cryptocurrencies
are currently relatively unregulated, it is often unclear whether political
finance transactions using cryptocurrencies are allowed. According
to her it is also often unclear “whether they should be considered
a currency like the dollar or euro, or if they should be treated
as an asset, or something else altogether. This is an important
distinction for political finance purposes since regulations often
differ for in-cash vs. in-kind donations. Furthermore, cryptocurrencies
can facilitate the violation of political finance regulations, for
example by channelling foreign or anonymous donations to countries
where these are banned.”
64. The author delineates the role of cryptocurrencies providing
anonymity and recalls that virtual currency exchangers can play
a role in effectively enforcing political finance reporting requirements
since, as financial intermediaries, they provide a location data
point for campaigns to identify foreign donors.
As
a result of her observations, the author suggests that the use of
cryptocurrencies should be limited or forbidden for political parties
and candidates.
3.8. Anonymous,
small and cash donations
65. As anonymous donations constitute
a potential source of circumventing financial rules, they should
also be considered. According to IDEA’s database,
56.7% of
countries prohibit anonymous donations to political parties whereas
30.0% of countries do not and 11.1% of countries set a specific
limit. Moreover, 43% of countries prohibit anonymous donations to
candidates whereas 30.7 % do not and 8.9 % of countries set a specific
limit.
66. Moreover, the use of small financial quantities may constitute
a source of circumventing financial rules as some jurisdictions
generally have higher transparency requirements with larger sums
of political donations. This issue can also be related to the regulation
governing cash donations.
4. Conclusions
67. Council of Europe statements,
guidelines or rules tend to underestimate current developments in
the field of financial contributions from foreign sources to political
parties and electoral campaigns. The mere existence of rules is
not sufficient. Besides reinforcing the existing legal and political
framework, the Assembly should explicitly name legal loopholes,
problematic constellations of circumvention and a lack of enforcement. It
should provide criteria for transparency and comprehensive regulation.
68. The Assembly should express its understanding of a growing
interdependence between European societies, for example by migration
and digitisation, of European co-operation of political organisations,
for example parties, NGOs and foundations, and of the development
of a common European public space as desirable developments. However,
the greater the degrees of interdependence between European States
in the political, social, cultural and media domains, the less feasible
it is for member States’ governments and legislatures to oppose
harmonisation of the rules governing financial contributions to
political parties and electoral campaigns from foreign sources by
invoking unique historical, cultural, social or political characteristics
of their respective countries. The legal framework governing party
finances will remain in the hands of sovereign States. Nevertheless,
the Assembly should promote the States’ interest in harmonising their
regulation.
69. The Assembly should put foreign interference into context
with further tools of interference such as cyberattacks and disinformation.
It should condemn all attempts of inappropriate or illicit foreign
interference. I suggest future reports and resolutions concerning
specific campaigns of foreign interference in which financial interference
is combined with tools of interference like cyberattacks and disinformation.