1. Introduction
1. Recent years have witnessed
intense debates around the European Union’s policy on migration
and asylum. The events of 2015, which saw an increase in the number
of people seeking international protection within the European Union
and the fragmented response by its member States in providing this
protection, fuelled calls for a revised EU policy that would better
address contemporary challenges. As the recent events in Afghanistan
have illustrated, a significant number of refugees continue to need
international protection in 2021, some of whom will potentially
be hosted by European Union and Council of Europe member States.
The urgency of a comprehensive approach to migration and asylum
that is fully consistent with human rights obligations is manifested
in the ongoing situation at the Lithuania-Belarus border.
These ongoing geopolitical tensions
at the Eastern EU border also form part of the context which frames
the development of the European Union’s Pact on Migration and Asylum
and the need for Council of Europe member States to engage with
its development.
2. At the international level, in 2018, following a two-year
process of inter-governmental negotiations to reach consensus on
a contemporary approach to migration,
States – including most EU and Council
of Europe member States – affirmed their commitment to upholding
the human rights of migrants and refugees through the UN Global
Compacts on Refugees (GCR) and for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration
(GCM).
They pledged to protect,
promote, and fulfil these obligations as they arise from pre-existing
international and regional human rights treaties and reaffirmed
their commitment to managing their borders in full compliance with
their human rights obligations. The Compacts articulate the substantive
scope and content of pre-existing human rights obligations and provide
a migrant-specific dimension that acknowledges the specific challenges associated
with migration. They are rooted in pre-existing human rights obligations
– for refugees, as they arise through the UN Refugee Convention
and for migrants, as they arise from the core UN human rights treaties and
regional instruments. Their guiding principles include the principle
of non-discrimination and the principle of non-regression.
3. The European External Action Service and the European Commission
are fully engaged with the November 2020 regional review of the
Compacts’ implementation, providing a detailed report on EU implementation.
This indicates the commitment of EU institutions to the achievement
of the Compacts’ goals. The Parliamentary Assembly has similarly
embraced the Compacts and highlighted the role of international
co-operation in their implementation, as instruments which seek
the increased human rights protection of all migrants and refugees.
It has called upon the national parliaments of all Council of Europe
member States to take steps towards the Compacts’ adoption and implementation
in addition to proposing specific action through which the human
rights of all people on the move are protected and promoted in line
with international standards of human rights, democracy, and the
rule of law.
4. In September 2020, the European Commission published its proposal
for a New Pact on Migration and Asylum (‘the Pact’), in recognition
of the fact that the European Union’s current migration and asylum
system ‘no longer works’ and that there is a need for ‘common European
solutions to a European challenge’.
The proposed Pact includes:
a. a communication on a New
Pact on Migration and Asylum;
b. a proposal for a regulation introducing screening of third
country nationals at the external border (‘Screening Regulation’);
c. an amended proposal for a regulation establishing a common
procedure for international protection;
d. a proposal for a regulation on asylum and migration management;
e. a recommendation on co-operation concerning operations
carried out by vessels owned or operated by private entities for
the purpose of search and rescue activities;
f. an amended proposal for a Regulation on the establishment
of Eurodac (comparison of biometric data);
g. a proposal for a regulation addressing situations of crisis
and force majeure in the field of migration
and asylum;
h. a Commission Recommendation on an EU mechanism for Preparedness
and Management of Crises related to Migration (Blueprint);
i. a Commission Guidance on the implementation of EU rules
on definition and prevention of the facilitation of unauthorised
entry, transit and residence;
j. a Commission Recommendation on legal pathways to protection
in the European Union.
5. While the Pact’s proposals are primarily addressed to the
European Union and its 27 member States, its conceptualisation of
regional migration governance is relevant to the wider membership
of the Council of Europe. In addition to the shared borders with
EU member States, the Council of Europe is rooted in respect for
the human rights of all, including migrants and refugees in the
European region. In the face of global challenges, including the
impact of Covid-19, the Assembly has invited the European Union
to promote solidarity among member States, preserve access to the
asylum process and expand and improve regular migration pathways.
As the Council of
Europe’s Special Representative on Migration and Refugees’ mandate highlights,
the reality of refugees and migrants in the European region requires
continued dialogue and assistance among States.
All 47 Council of Europe member States
remain well-placed to co-operate and dialogue with the European
Union on migration-related issues.
This co-operation can bear
fruit in discussions on solidarity, including those relating to
relocation, resettlement and migration governance mechanisms that are
in full compliance with all relevant international and regional
human rights standards. In this respect, the Council of Europe Commissioner
for Human Rights communication to the European Commission outlined
key areas of concern relating to the protection of the rights of
migrants, including refugees and asylum seekers, and which include
pushbacks and the denial of access to asylum in European Union and
other Council of Europe member States.
It further outlined her willingness
to work in partnership with the Commission to support efforts relating
to solidarity and which include Council of Europe member States.
7. The publication of the Pact generated significant commentary.
Some international organisations welcomed the Pact as a “renewed
opportunity to uphold human rights in migration governance”.
The United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) welcomed specific elements, including those
relating to prompt identification of persons in need of protection,
solidarity across the European Union, stronger support for vulnerable
groups and children and the commitment to global responsibility
sharing. In its recommendations to inform negotiations, UNHCR reaffirmed
the role of existing legal obligations, including the right to asylum, as
key norms that remain applicable regardless of certain elements
within the proposals.
While cautiously endorsing certain
elements of the Pact, most notably the proposal for an independent
monitoring mechanism contained within the proposed screening regulation,
a joint statement by leading international and national NGOs highlighted
significant human rights concerns. Civil society welcomed the Pact’s
references to migration as positive for Europe and as a necessary
reframing, given a landscape dominated, as the Assembly had previously
noted, by particularly negative rhetoric surrounding migration.
Yet,
civil society has concluded that this positive view of migration
is not borne out by the proposals. Instead, these organisations
note that “the Pact risks exacerbating the focus on externalisation,
deterrence, containment and return”.
The European Council on Refugees
and Exiles’ (ECRE) article-by-article analysis of the instruments
illustrates the limitations of the Pact and their likely deleterious
impact on levels of human rights protection.
2. Relevant international standards
8. The international human rights
law framework outlines the civil, political, social, economic, and
cultural rights which accrue to every human being regardless of
migration status.
Refugees are protected
through a specific treaty – the UN Refugee Convention – which protects
them from return to States where they are at risk of persecution
because of who they are or what they believe in, and establishes
their entitlements in a number of fields, including residence, education,
and access to the labour market. Additional UN human rights treaties address
the entitlements of specific groups, such as children, women and
girls and persons with disabilities.
These
reflect how States may have heightened obligations towards those
in a position of vulnerability, including obligations of support,
to ensure that their rights are practical and effective, rather
than theoretical and illusory. These commitments have been fully
reaffirmed in December 2018 by the adoption of the Global Compacts, which
add three important obligations as regards the achievement of migrant
and refugee rights: full adherence to human rights standards, full
application of the principle of non-discrimination, and compliance
with the rule of non-regression. Given this latter commitment, the
Pact must be examined also from the perspective of whether it will
result in a diminution of migrants’ and refugees’ rights from the
current position. If so, then its proposals are not compliant with
the non-regression duty set forth in the Compacts.
9. In the European context, the European Court of Human Rights
has repeatedly affirmed the European Convention on Human Rights
(ETS No. 5) as an instrument which protects the human rights of
migrants and refugees. In considering member States’ treatment of
this population, the Court reiterates the importance for States
to exercise their migration and asylum policies in line with their
human rights obligations and has condemned States’ use of crises
– whether financial or administrative – to justify non-compliance.
The judicial
interpretation of the prohibition of
refoulement cements
its status as an absolute obligation on States not to expel individuals
when this exposes them to a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.
The
Court has further highlighted the role of States in manufacturing
and exacerbating migrants’ and refugees’ vulnerability by acknowledging
how restrictive laws, policies and practices can prevent them from effective
enjoyment of rights.
10. EU law similarly provides that immigration control can only
be exercised in compliance with fundamental rights obligations.
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter) enumerates the
rights which bind EU member States when they act within the scope
of EU law, including their treatment of migrants and refugees, and
incorporates Convention rights. In the field of asylum, the Common
European Asylum System (CEAS) is meant to be in full compliance
with the Refugee Convention, the obligation of
non-refoulement, and “other relevant
treaties” within which the European Convention on Human Rights plays
a critical role. The CEAS is framed by respect for fundamental rights,
which include international human rights law obligations, particularly those
arising from the Convention.
The CEAS establishes common standards
in relation to eligibility for international protection and the
content of such protection, the reception conditions for applicants
for international protection, the allocation of responsibility among
the EU member States for examining their applications and the procedures
to be followed in their determination.
11. Within this framework, the European Commission plays a specific
role in promoting member States’ compliance with the CEAS and human
rights obligations. As the “guardian” of EU law, the Commission
has the power to take legal action against member States in specific
circumstances; it must do so if it considers that a member State
has failed to fulfil an obligation under the EU Treaties.
In the
face of widely-acknowledged implementation gaps between extant CEAS
obligations and the situation in member States,
the Commission can
institute infringement proceedings against the relevant member State.
This power has been exercised repeatedly
in the field of migration and asylum.
It has
led to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruling
that certain national laws, policies, and practices are incompatible
with member States’ obligations towards refugees.
As
such, even prior to the negotiation and adoption of the Pact’s proposals, the
Commission continues to play an important role in holding member
States to account and ensure that refugees’ and migrants’ human
rights are fulfilled through the implementation of existing fundamental
rights obligations.
3. Main
human rights concerns raised by the pact
12. This report examines five thematic
areas in the light of the comprehensive human rights framework and considers
that the proposed Pact raises significant issues for the human rights
protection of migrants and refugees: screening, immigration detention
and expulsion, asylum procedures, solidarity and vulnerable groups.
3.1. Screening
13. The proposal for a regulation
introduces a screening stage for third country nationals arriving
irregularly at the European Union’s external border (and within
the territory of the European Union where the person is unable to
establish regular entry). It presents screening as ‘a mere information-gathering
stage which prolongs or complements the checks at the external border
crossing point and which does not entail any decision affecting
the rights of the person concerned’.
Accordingly, instead
of an appeal right against incorrect screening, the proposal introduces
an innovation to the CEAS – a duty on member States to establish
an independent national monitoring mechanism to ensure compliance
with fundamental rights. The monitoring mechanism has been cautiously
welcomed by a number of actors, including international organisations
and others, with reservations about
the scope of the mechanism.
The European Court of Human Rights
has frequently had regard to the reports of independent monitoring
mechanisms when considering the situation in a country where an
allegation of a human rights abuse has taken place.
But
it has also consistently held that the right to an effective remedy
contained in Article 13 of the Convention must be respected and
is a right belonging to the individual. Unless the monitoring mechanism
has the attributes and powers of a tribunal or court, it will not
be able to provide a remedy under Article 13 of the Convention.
14. Errors in screening can result in serious harm to the individual.
For instance, a child who is incorrectly screened as being an adult
may be placed in detention with adults and will not benefit from
the additional safeguards and assistance applicable to children.
If the child is unable to articulate clearly a claim to international
protection, he or she may be streamed into an accelerated return
procedure risking refoulement. Another example is that of an Afghan
woman incorrectly screened as Pakistani, as she was born in an Afghan refugee
camp in Pakistan (which does not confer Pakistani citizenship).
She will be at risk of a truncated safe country of origin procedure
because of the incorrect screening decision. Problems like these
were widely encountered in 2015-2016 when the Commission directed
Greece and Italy to set up Hot Spots where screening took place
before access to a protection procedure. Academics have documented
the extensive problems of inadequate and incorrect screening which
occurred and the harm which the lack of an appeal caused individuals.
3.2. Detention
and expulsion
15. The likely increased use of
immigration detention contemplated in the Pact is questionable in
view of the right to liberty, which is protected across international
and European human rights law and permits the deprivation of liberty
for migrants only in narrowly circumscribed circumstances.
The deleterious
effects of immigration detention are widely acknowledged. Detention
significantly affects migrants’ and refugees’ enjoyment of other
rights and has a documented impact on mental health.
It prejudices individuals’
ability to access legal assistance, engage with immigration and
asylum procedures, and exacerbates existing vulnerabilities.
16. Notwithstanding, immigration detention features at multiple
points throughout the Pact whether implicitly or explicitly. This
likely expansion of its use appears inconsistent with human rights
obligations and diverges significantly from the trajectory under
international human rights law to move towards the use of detention
as a last resort. The lack of clarity around detention in the proposals
risks normalising migrant detention and inverting its use from an
exception into a norm.
Yet, as affirmed through the Global
Compacts, the international community committed to reducing the
use of immigration detention; detention should only be used as a
last resort, with alternatives to detention pursued with diligence.
17. The concerns around the use of detention are evident in the
pre-entry procedures contemplated in the Pact. While the proposed
screening regulation does not explicitly sanction detention, its
use is implicit throughout the procedure and, from a logistical
perspective, it is likely that some form of detention – whether in
law or in fact – will be used. The Horizontal Substitute Impact
Assessment on the Proposals, commissioned by the European Parliament,
concludes that “pre-entry procedures may involve the excessive use
of detention”.
For example, the proposal
refers to the obligation on those in the screening process to “remain in
the designated facilities throughout” (Article 9(1)(b)). For individuals
channelled into an asylum border procedure, the amended proposal
for an Asylum Procedures Regulation (APR) provides that these individuals must
also remain at or in proximity to the external border or transit
zones pending determination of their asylum application or their
return (Article 41(13) APR).
Although these facilities are not
defined, commentators highlight the “strong risk” of “de facto detention
with detainees deprived of the safeguards that apply in formal detention
regimes”.
The risk of informal detention
regimes that restrict the right to liberty and have cascading detrimental
effects on the enjoyment of other rights looms large.
18. The use of detention is closely linked to expulsion. The European
Commission’s 2020 Communication highlights the importance of “an
effective and common EU system for returns”.
The
Explanatory Memorandum to the Asylum Procedures Regulation proposal
emphasises how a “seamless link between asylum and return procedures
is therefore necessary to increase the overall efficiency and coherence
of the asylum and migration system”.
However, the design of an integrated asylum
and return procedure that appears to subordinate States’ obligations
to provide protection and puts an emphasis on return, raises considerable
fundamental rights challenges, including those related to the right
to asylum (Article 18 of the EU Charter) and
non-refoulement obligations
(Article 3 of the Convention, Articles 4 and 19 of the EU Charter).
19. For example, the border return procedure envisaged under the
APR Proposal applies to persons detained during the asylum border
procedure who no longer have a right to remain and are not allowed
to remain. These persons may continue to be detained for the purpose
of preventing entry into the member State’s territory, while preparing
the return or carrying out the removal process (Article 41a (5)).
Yet this provision does not provide clear, specific grounds for
detention. Neither is there any reference to the use of detention
as a last resort that follows a prior assessment of necessity and
proportionality, which would reflect international and European
law obligations. Similar issues arise in the use of detention in
‘return sponsorship’, which is one of the modalities of solidarity
among member States proposed in the Pact. The proposal for a regulation
on asylum and migration management foresees that those applicants
may be detained for up to eight months. If return is not affected
during this time-frame, then the individual is transferred to the
responsible member State; however, there is still no clarity as
to whether and for how long detention will continue following transfer.
3.3. Asylum
procedures
20. Access to an asylum procedure
is one of the most contested issues in the Pact.
It includes recommendations for
more co-operation with third States to ensure that people do not
arrive irregularly in the European Union (for instance, on small
and unsafe boats). This is linked to the Pact’s proposal to regulate private
sector (NGO) search and rescue activities, which have come into
existence following the failure of effective State activities in
this area. The emphasis on preventing arrival seems to take priority
over the right to
non-refoulement.
This includes the foreseen increased use of truncated asylum procedures,
which raises serious concerns in relation to their compatibility
with States’
non-refoulement obligations.
Accelerated procedures restrict applicants’ ability to substantiate
their claim to protection and adversely affect survivors of torture
and persons with additional support needs who require careful consideration
of their claims. The expanded use of derogations for the asylum
procedure which dispense with key procedural safeguards in times of
crisis are particularly problematic.
21. Among the most challenging issues for Council of Europe countries
is the Pact’s objective for the increased externalisation of asylum
procedures. This means working with neighbouring countries to prevent asylum
seekers from arriving in the European Union and remaining blocked
in a neighbouring country, frequently a Council of Europe one. The
problems attendant on this have been considered in an Assembly report
in 2007.
At
that time, the Assembly noted the negative human rights consequences
of this externalisation, as revealed in the experiences of the USA
in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and Australia in Papua New Guinea (and
Nauru). In 2018, the Assembly noted that the reduction in the number
of migrants entering Europe as a result of EU externalisation policies
that involved third countries in migration management had been achieved
at the expense of the rights of asylum seekers.
On 3 June 2021, the Danish Parliament
voted to transfer their asylum seekers and to outsource its asylum
applications for processing outside Denmark but to a destination
yet to be determined.
Yet at the same time, Australia which
has been an important architect and supporter of this off-shoring
of asylum seekers (and the most criticised for this on human rights
grounds)
is now reported to be about to abandon
its scheme.
22. The European Commission proposed changes to asylum procedures
in 2016 which have not yet been agreed by its member States. The
Pact includes amendments to that existing proposal to reinforce
links between asylum procedures and the European return procedure
(which includes border returns and returns under the Return Directive).
All the proposals go in the direction of speeding up asylum procedures,
tying them with return and limiting appeal rights. These have implications
for
non-refoulement and the
correct application of Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention (the
prohibition on return to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment and the right to an effective remedy). The justification
for these changes which are all unfavourable for asylum seekers
is that on average 370 000 asylum applications are rejected each
year and these persons need to be transferred into return procedures
(COM(2020)611, page 2). However, the European Union’s statistical
agency, Eurostat, notes that “in 2020, 521 000 first instance decisions
on asylum applications were made in the European Union member States
and a further 232 800 final decisions following an appeal or review.
Decisions made at the first instance resulted in 211 800 persons
being granted protection status, while a further 69 200 received
protection status in appeal or review.”
This means that, among those applicants recognised
as needing international protection in the European Union, approximately
a third had been rejected in first instance decision-making. Had
they not had access to a procedure with a suspensive right of appeal they
would have been returned to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment contrary to EU
non-refoulement obligations.
In 2020, fair asylum procedures which carried suspensive appeal
rights were a matter of life and death for almost 70 000 people
in the European Union (almost a third of the total granted international
protection).
23. Yet, it is these suspensive appeal rights which are being
compromised in the Pact. Between the failure to provide an appeal
right at all in the screening procedure and the truncated and accelerated
asylum border procedures, access to a fair procedure has been placed
in jeopardy, notwithstanding the Pact’s statement that “all necessary
safeguards are however in place to ensure that nobody falls in between
the cracks and that the right to asylum is always guaranteed” (p
7) and that “the right to effective remedy is adequately ensured,
as it is only in duly justified cases set out in this Regulation,
where applications are likely to be unfounded, that an applicant
should not have an automatic right to remain for the purpose of
appeal” (p 12). As noted above, where appeal rights exist but carry
no suspensive effect, the individual may be returned to the country
from which they have claimed a well-founded fear of persecution
or torture.
24. Further, a new ground for the application of accelerated procedures
is proposed, which is based on the success rate of previous applicants
from the same country (a 20% threshold). This proposed criterion
has been heavily criticised by UNHCR as both arbitrary and unjust.
It is arbitrary as recognition rates for asylum seekers from the
same country vary dramatically across EU member States (for instance
a 1% recognition rate for Syrian refugees in one State and a 95%
rate in another), and it is unjust as it pins the chance of a fair
and full asylum procedure on a statistical number relating to previous
applications and not on the individual circumstances of the person
seeking protection.
25. The numbers of people drowning in the Mediterranean while
seeking to arrive in the European Union is also a matter of concern
to the Pact, not least as many of these people, if given a chance,
would seek international protection. The challenge of search, rescue,
and disembarkation in the Eastern Mediterranean, in particular,
has been a matter of substantial international concern. The Assembly
has repeatedly decried the loss of life at sea by those migrants
and refugees attempting to reach European shores. It has called
upon European Union and Council of Europe member States to act in
line with legal obligations and designated the rescue of those at
risk as a precondition to implementing respect for human life and
assistance to people in mortal danger.
While the Pact
includes a new Recommendation (2020/1365) on co-operation among member
States concerning operations carried out by vessels owned and operated
by private entities for the purpose of search and rescue activities,
there is no concrete action to prevent further deaths. Instead,
the Recommendation links the valiant efforts of humanitarian actors
to carry out search and rescue at sea where State authorities have
abandoned their obligations in this regard to the fight against
smuggling of migrants and criminal trafficking gangs. While the
fight against smuggling and trafficking in human beings is an important Council
of Europe objective, tarnishing the reputation of European humanitarian
actors who risk their lives to carry out search and rescue at sea
as complicit with such gangs is unworthy of a European institution.
It is incumbent on EU States from a human rights perspective, consistent
with case law of the European Court of Human Rights,
to establish State-run
search and rescue operations, such as the Italian Mare Nostrum operation,
which ran for a year starting in 2013.
Any suggestion that search and rescue
could be carried out by the Libyan Coast Guard and that disembarking
those rescued in Libya would be consistent with European or international
human rights standards has been effectively countered by the UNHCR
on the basis of the situation of migrants and refugees in Libya.
26. The emphasis on preventing arrivals, prioritising return,
and transferring asylum seekers across EU member States overlooks
the other ways in which the Pact could have addressed the reality
of a European space that contemplates complementary migration pathways.
Economic migration into the European Union is a fact of life which
sits uneasily with the EU legal
acquis in
its area of freedom, security and justice. In 2019, the EU member
States issued almost 3 million first residence permits to migrants
according to Eurostat.
Well over 1 million of these permits
were for labour migration purposes, the majority issued by Polish
authorities to Ukrainian nationals (over 750 000). Very few of these
labour-related residence permits were issued on the basis of EU
law; almost all had national law as the legal basis.
Thus, it is evident that there is
an EU policy and legal gap between the realities of labour migration
into the European Union and EU legislation on the subject. The latter
is not fit for the purpose. Instead of continuing to adopt legislation
which does not create pathways to regular migration in practice,
the European Union should take a look at the Polish response to labour
migration pressure from Ukraine and the practical and effective
way this has been dealt with.
3.4. Solidarity
27. The proposed new Regulation
on Asylum and Migration Management includes new mechanisms to improve
solidarity among member States in the asylum and migration field.
This seeks to replace the existing Dublin III Regulation that allocates
responsibility for examining applications for protection among EU
member States.
The solidarity mechanism only relates
to asylum seekers and persons treated as irregularly present in
the European Union and consists of two forms. The first is solidarity
through relocation of persons from receiving States (the front-line
States) to other States when there is pressure or a risk of pressure
such that national asylum and return capacities of the formers are
unable to cope. The second is return sponsorship where member States
sponsor the expulsion of a person who is present in another member
State (which is overburdened) with the assistance of Frontex, the
EU Border Agency, or in default the relocation of the person to
the sponsoring State for procedures to be completed. The most striking
aspect of this proposal is its complexity. Efforts by the European
Union so far to achieve relocation of asylum seekers from front
line States to other States with fewer asylum seekers have been
mainly unsuccessful.
The issue of relocation has been examined
in more detail in the report of the Assembly on “Voluntary relocation
of migrants in need of humanitarian protection and voluntary resettlement
of refugees”
. This lack of success of State-initiated relocation
projects for asylum seekers can undoubtedly be understood by the
complexity of the measures put into place. In fact, it is asylum
seekers who have “self-relocated” from front-line States where reception conditions
are frequently inadequate to other States. In theory, under the
Dublin III Regulation, this is not permitted, and asylum seekers
should be sent back to the first member State of arrival. Yet, in
practice, only about 3% of asylum seekers are ever subject to a
Dublin return.
28. The Pact contemplates return sponsorship as a form of solidarity,
whereby a member State commits to returning irregular migrants with
no right to stay in the European Union on behalf of another member
State and to do so directly from the territory of the first member
State. Again, the detail of this proposal is very complex with a
long stop date; if the expulsion does not take place within eight
months the individual would be physically transferred to the sponsoring
State. The human rights issues which arise under this proposal are
mainly of two kinds, the guarantee of
non-refoulement and
a right to a suspensive right of appeal for anyone claiming a protection
need. Practically, the issue of expulsion from the European Union
is anomalous. According to Frontex, in 2019 member States took a
total of 289 190 return decisions.
In the same year they undertook 71 163
forced returns (there were also 67 656 voluntary returns). The gap
between the two figures – making a return decision and its implementation
– is consistent over the past five years at least. One of the questions which
arises from legal academic research on returns is the quality of
return decisions – to what extent are return decisions taken as
a way for officials to close complicated files or fulfil quotas
set by their superiors? Better institutional investment in the quality
of return decisions could result in a narrowing of the gap much
more effectively than creating a complex system where those officials
taking return decisions are increasingly insulated from the consequences
of poor decision making, which can result in refoulement.
29. These proposals illustrate the extent to which the issue of
solidarity is seen as reserved for solidarity among EU member States,
with limited consideration, if any, of solidarity towards those
in need of international protection or other Council of Europe States.
For instance, solidarity through the relocation mechanism fails
to integrate any considerations for the applicant’s personal preferences
in the process, despite research that shows how integration prospects
are significantly improved when an individual has a connection to
the State of transfer (for example a shared language, cultural background,
or family ties that go beyond those accepted as relevant for transfer
purposes). It highlights the proposals’ underlying conceptualisation
of the migrant as a commodity who is to be negotiated upon and transferred
at the behest of States without any consideration of personal preferences
or involvement in the decisions affecting them. This denial of agency
is one instance that creates and exacerbates vulnerability. It is
likely to entrench pre-existing disadvantage and runs counter to
the participative dimension of the Global Compacts which stress
refugees’ involvement in decisions affecting them. Although this
by no means prescribes that the individual has the final say on
where they are relocated, it is not acceptable to have systems which
do not accord any weight to their preferences. In the case of children,
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child establishes a key obligation
whereby the child’s views are integrated in all decisions affecting
them and where States must adapt systems to ensure that this can
be provided.
3.5. Vulnerable
persons
30. The risk of fundamental rights
violations arising from the Pact’s proposals is likely to disproportionately affect
persons in vulnerable situations. States have heightened obligations
of support towards persons with specific needs, for example towards
persons with disabilities to whom they owe duties of reasonable accommodation.
Yet, the emphasis on the identification of “vulnerable persons”
in the proposals is not explicitly tied to clear obligations of
comprehensive support. For example, while it is welcome that timely
and adequate support in view of physical and mental health should
ensue from a finding of vulnerabilities indicators (Article 9(2)
Screening Regulation), the content of the support to be provided
is not defined. Neither does the Pact engage with the extent to
which it is the procedure or legal framework that places migrants
and refugees in a vulnerable situation. A failure to provide support
to specific groups and the lack of an explicit obligation to provide
reasonable accommodation risks implementation which runs counter
to international and European obligations.
31. The Screening Regulation proposal refers to “vulnerability
checks” within the screening process; these are meant to ensure
the early identification of “persons with special needs” for the
purposes of taking into account ‘any special reception and procedural
needs’ in the relevant procedure’ (Recital 9). Yet, as ECRE commentary
has highlighted, the proposal provides that these checks are only
carried out ‘where relevant’ in respect of those subject to screening
at the external borders and who are undergoing medical screening
to identify whether they ‘are in a vulnerable situation, victims
of torture or have special reception or procedural needs’ (Article
9).
This formulation
excludes those who are subject to the screening procedure but who
were already in the EU member State, as well as the possibility
of systemic vulnerability screening.
32. The same proposal links those persons identified through vulnerability
checks to those considered vulnerable persons for the purpose of
the Reception Conditions Directive (RCD). This list includes “disabled people,
[…] persons with serious illnesses, [and] persons with mental disorders”
(Article 21 RCD). Yet, it is problematic that in referring to the
standard of living to be guaranteed to these individuals, the instrument’s preamble
qualifies the reference to persons with disabilities to those ‘persons
with an immediately identifiable physical or mental disability,
[and] persons visibly having suffered psychological trauma’ (Recital
27). While it is understandable that the time-period foreseen for
screening purposes is too short to identify complex forms of trauma
or invisible disabilities, the categorisation among persons with
disabilities stands out as inconsistent with obligations towards all persons with disabilities which
do not admit of such distinctions, as are provided for in the Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). It is concerning
to see that where the proposals do refer to persons with disabilities,
they adopt an approach that runs counter to the CRPD’s inclusive
approach towards all persons with disabilities, which is ratified
by the European Union and all its member States.
33. Elements of the Pact, such as the likely expanded use of detention,
risk placing individuals outside of the specified categories in
situations that generate additional vulnerability. An example of
ways in which the Pact can contribute to or create vulnerability
is seen in the Asylum and Migration Management Regulation Proposal;
Article 10 would limit the right to material conditions in the EU
member State where the applicant is required to be present from
the moment they are notified of a decision to transfer them to the
responsible member State. As the Commission’s explanatory memorandum
thereto makes clear, this seeks to prevent “unauthorised movements”.
This provision is meant to be applied without
prejudice to the need for member States “to ensure a standard of
living in accordance with EU law”, that complies with European and international
law obligations. Yet, the content of this fundamental rights-compliant
standard of living is not elaborated on; the proposal does not set
out the form or level of living standards which must be offered.
This is compounded by the absence of a legal remedy through which
individuals can challenge the living standards that might be offered
in practice; in so doing, the proposal reverses earlier CJEU jurisprudence.
The attempt to overturn
court judgements by legislative amendment is bad legislative practice
that undermines the rule of law. Moreover, given considerable jurisprudence
and documentation that member States routinely fail to provide reception
conditions in line with existing fundamental rights obligations,
the absence of
detail on appropriate reception conditions appears likely to create
and exacerbate violations. These include rights to dignity (Article
1 of the European Charter) and to freedom from inhuman and degrading
treatment (Article 4 of the EU Charter, Article 3 of the Convention).
Proposals such as this one run the risk of placing individuals in situations
of precarity where they are unable to meet basic needs and lead
a life in dignity, thus, creating vulnerability.
34. Additional hurdles to securing recognition of protection needs
can also contribute to vulnerability. The creation of the screening
process means an additional procedure that delays the individual’s
access to asylum procedures and risks delaying access to the entitlements
that follow registration. Pursuant to the Reception Conditions Directive,
EU member States must ensure that material reception conditions
are available to applicants as soon as they apply for international
protection (Article 17 RCD). Yet, the proposed Regulation is silent
as to whether access to material reception conditions follow the
individual’s expression of a desire to be recognised as a beneficiary
of international protection, which increases the likelihood of delays
in access to basic rights.
35. The absence of any clarity as to whether asylum seekers in
vulnerable situations are to be exempted from border procedures
is problematic.
The emphasis
on time-limits is likely to come at the expense of fundamental rights
guarantees. Although time-limits in processing asylum applications
are important to ensure the swift recognition of refugeehood and
concomitant access to rights, truncated timelines are implicated
in the misidentification of protection needs. While this is problematic
for all applicants, it disproportionately affects those in vulnerable
situations who require additional support to exercise their right
to asylum, for example it is well-documented that survivors of torture
and trauma can require longer timeframes to effectively participate
in the asylum process. Similarly, refugees with claims based on
sexual orientation can require longer timeframes to disclose their
reasons for seeking protection. In the absence of concrete procedural
guarantees that integrate the specificities of applicants who are
already in a ‘vulnerable’ situation due to their status as asylum-seekers,
shorter timelines which do not explicitly exempt those in need of
additional support can exclude those they are meant to protect.
3.6. Children
36. At face value, the Pact appears
to dedicate significant attention to vulnerable groups, with children
being the primary beneficiaries. This attention aligns with the
Assembly’s consistent emphasis on the need to take concrete action
to protect migrant children.
In the Global Compacts,
States committed to addressing and reducing vulnerabilities in migration
and to place the best interests of the child as a primary consideration whenever
these are concerned. The GCM highlights this by promoting establishing
“specialized procedures for their identification, referral, care
and family reunification, and provid[ing] access to health care
services, including mental health, education, legal assistance and
the right to be heard in administrative and judicial proceedings,
including by swiftly appointing a competent and impartial legal
guardian”.
In the case of immigration detention,
it means a commitment to “favouring community-based care arrangements
…[and] work to end the practice of child detention in the context
of international migration”.
37. Yet there appears to be a contradiction in terms between the
Pact's recognition that EU member States are under an obligation
to ensure that the best interests of the child are a primary consideration
in all matters affecting them, and its proposed framework. It is
laudable that the Pact acknowledges that the best interests principle
must be a primary consideration in all procedures; this reflects
established jurisprudence that children’s vulnerability is heightened
when they seek asylum.
Yet, this attention to
the child’s best interests is not always reflected in the proposed
substantive provisions, as multiple civil society organisations
focused on children’s rights have highlighted.
Although
unaccompanied children and those under the age of twelve who are
accompanied by family members are generally exempted from border
procedures (Article 41(3) and 41(5) APR), those over twelve years
old are not.
Lowering protection standards
for children over the age of twelve is inconsistent with the protection
envisaged under Council of Europe standards, the UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child and EU fundamental rights law. The Convention
on the Rights of the Child does not categorise children’s entitlement
to rights according to their age. It defines a child as every person
until the age of eighteen.
Yet, the proposals would permit a
child above the age of twelve to be subjected to the border procedure,
with all the risks that this entails.
38. This lowering of existing protection standards towards children
is also seen through the proposal that generally the responsibility
for an application for international protection lodged by an unaccompanied
child without family members in another member State, lies with
the first member State where they applied (Article 15 of the Asylum
and Migration Management Regulation). The general provision provides
for unaccompanied children to be transferred to the first member
State in which they applied. This proposal reverses the current situation
where responsibility for examining the claim lies with that member
State where the child is present and last applied for protection.
The Commission’s explanatory statement notes that this rule allows
this cohort to have “swift access to the procedure” and allows for
a quick determination of the responsible member State, yet it is
unclear how an additional transfer of the child in question would
hasten rather than protract procedures.
Moreover,
despite the presentation that transfer would generally not appear
to conflict with the child’s best interests, it bears highlighting
that the extant provision in the Dublin III Regulation was codified following
a CJEU judgment which reaffirmed that the best interests of a child
must be a primary consideration in all decisions adopted by a member
State and that this requires the member State where the child is
present and last applied for asylum to examine that claim.
The
current proposal risks minors being placed in a situation where
they have to go through yet another procedure that delays their
access to protection, creating an additional layer of complexity
that leads to unnecessary delays and exacerbates vulnerabilities.
3.7. Gender
mainstreaming
39. The proposals do not appear
to mainstream gender considerations. This contrasts with commitments
in the Global Compacts which call for the mainstreaming of the gender
perspective throughout all migration policies and for gender-responsive
procedures and services that address gender-related barriers.
The differential
impact of the migration process on women is widely documented. Women
on the move are often in situations of great vulnerability, as they
are at higher risk of gender-based violence, including trafficking
and exploitation. They are likelier to face poverty, limited access
to basic services, and other situations of discrimination with the
concomitant risk to their physical and mental well-being. Discrimination
on the basis of gender identity and sexual orientation is also prevalent.
The Pact falls within those EU policies
that must comply with the obligation to promote equality between
the sexes (Articles 2 and 3(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union) and the prohibition of discrimination on
the basis of sex and sexual orientation set out in the EU Charter
(Article 21 of the EU Charter). Its proposals must integrate gender-mainstreaming
considerations to address existing inequalities and prevent the
creation of additional ones. Since gender mainstreaming means incorporating
a “gender equality perspective in all policies at all levels and at
all stages, by the actors normally involved in policy-making”,
these inequalities must be addressed
from the outset. The Action Plan for Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027,
which the European Commission released in November 2020, was welcomed
for the extent to which it engages with the specific needs of migrant women,
not least by acknowledging the challenges
arising from weaker social networks and greater childcare and family
responsibilities.
Yet, in contrast, the Pact’s proposals
omit to engage in any depth with the multiple and intersectional
discrimination on the basis of sex and gender faced by migrants,
refugees, and asylum seekers. Indeed, the references to women among
the vulnerable persons foreseen in the proposals consist solely
of references to pregnant women and single parents with children.
This overlooks the vulnerable situations that women and all those
subject to gender-based discrimination are placed in because of
the proposals themselves. The failure in the Pact to assess, engage
with, and address explicitly the impact of measures such as mandatory
screening procedures, the increased use of detention and the enforced relocation
on those who are already in vulnerable situations and excluded from
equal and effective access to protection stands out as ripe for
increased vulnerability to human rights violations.
4. Conclusions
and recommendations
40. The European Union’s commitment
to implementing European human rights fully into all its policies
on migration and asylum is to be welcomed. The proposed EU Pact
on Migration and Asylum needs to reflect fully this objective, which
the majority of EU States reaffirmed in 2018 on voting in favour
of the UN Global Compacts for Refugees and Migration. Before commencing
negotiation of the measures which form the Pact, a comprehensive
human rights fitness test including a careful assessment of compatibility
of each measure with the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights needs to be undertaken. The Pact should provide an opportunity
to promote co-operation and solidarity, where Council of Europe
States can play a key role. The role of the European Union and its
member States as champions of human rights protection in the region,
in particular in respect of refugees and migrants, must not be undermined
by proposals such as these.
a. The
Pact’s proposed Screening Regulation should be amended to include
an effective suspensive remedy against incorrect screening categorisation,
which fully respects the obligations arising out of the right to
an effective remedy (Article 13 of the Convention).
b. The European Union must ensure that every asylum seeker
at the EU border or within its jurisdiction receives a fair and
effective determination of their claim to international protection,
in recognition of non-refoulement obligations,
and as identified by this Assembly. The legal fiction of non-entry
must be dispensed with to ensure that access to a fair procedure
is guaranteed to all.
c. Provisions relating to restrictions and deprivation of
liberty must be precise, sufficiently clear and unambiguous to protect
migrants and refugees from unlawful detention and to ensure conformity
with the obligations flowing from the right to liberty (Article
5 of the Convention). The Pact’s proposals should include explicit
references to the use of detention as a last resort with clear references
to the obligation to work towards alternatives to detention.
d. EU labour migration regulation urgently needs to be revisited
to better reflect the realities of this kind of migration and to
accommodate legitimate movement. The case of the Polish regulation
of Ukrainian migrant workers can be used as a case study regarding
the use of complementary pathways for migration into the European
Union.
e. All children under the age of eighteen should be exempted
from border procedures, irrespective of age, in line with the principle
of the best interests of the child and the obligations towards children,
as outlined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child and Assembly
resolutions.
f. Special procedures for the protection of persons in vulnerable
situations must address the needs of those persons and integrate
the heightened duties of support that arise from human rights obligations. This
includes the mainstreaming of disability-, age- and gender- sensitive
considerations throughout all migration and asylum processes.
g. The Pact’s proposals should clarify the support that must
be made available to persons identified as being in a vulnerable
situation. This should include comprehensive support that meets
basic health and welfare needs and address specific vulnerabilities.
h. The European Union should undertake a cross-cutting assessment
of the impact of the proposals on women and girls in a vulnerable
situation. This must identify the differential impact of the proposals
in light of pre-existing disadvantages and be accompanied by proposals
to address these inequalities.
i. A cross-cutting review of the proposals must be conducted
to determine the compliance of provisions with obligations towards
persons with disabilities, in line with obligations under the UN
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. In particular,
the duty on States to provide reasonable accommodation to persons
with disabilities should be explicitly included as an obligation.
j. The European Commission should continue to hold EU member
States to account in their treatment of migrants and refugees by
fully exercising its powers under EU law to institute infringement
procedures whenever member States fail to fulfil their human rights
obligations.