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A. Draft resolution
(open)
Report | Doc. 15443 | 25 January 2022
Challenge, on substantive grounds, of the still unratified credentials of the parliamentary delegation of the Russian Federation
Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee)
Summary
The Monitoring Committee draws attention to the deteriorating situation with regard to pluralism, human rights and fundamental freedoms in the Russian Federation manifested by the crackdown on opposition politicians, independent civil society, dissenting voices and critical journalists.
It deplores the closure of Memorial and the plight of Mr Alexei Navalny. It refers to the serious shortcomings identified during the 2021 parliamentary elections and expresses its concern about the deterioration of relations with its neighbours and the escalation of tension which threatens European security.
At the same time, the Committee emphasises that the Parliamentary Assembly constitutes the unique pan-European parliamentary platform for political dialogue with the participation of all European countries.
It therefore proposes that the Assembly ratify the credentials of the delegation of the Russian Federation and returns to the assessment of the progress made when a monitoring report is submitted later this year.
A. Draft resolution 
(open)1. The Parliamentary Assembly
recalls its Resolution
1990 (2014), Resolution
2034 (2015), Resolution2063
(2015), Resolution
2292 (2019),Resolution
2320 (2020), and Resolution
2363 (2021), and reiterates the recommendations addressed to the Russian
authorities therein.
2. The Assembly expresses its utmost concern over the deteriorating
situation with regard to pluralism, human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the Russian Federation manifested by the crackdown on
opposition politicians, independent civil society, dissenting voices
and critical journalists.
3. In particular, the laws on foreign agents, undesirable organisations
and extremism, recently amended, are incompatible with Council of
Europe standards, and have a negative impact on democracy, the rule
of law and respect for human rights.
4. The closure, despite multiple appeals of the international
community, of Memorial, one of the most respected human rights organisations
in the Russian Federation constitutes a serious blow to democracy
and the freedoms of association and expression. This is a turning
point and an important obstacle to the functioning of independent
civil society in the Russian Federation.
5. The plight of Mr Alexei Navalny, arrested and detained despite
the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights, raises utmost
concern, in particular taking into account his role in the political
process in the Russian Federation, as well as the events surrounding
his poisoning.
6. The Assembly notes that, contrary to the last parliamentary
and presidential elections held in Russia in 2016 and 2018 respectively,
it was invited to observe the 2021 parliamentary elections. It nevertheless
regrets the shortcomings in the electoral legislation and the conduct
of the 2021 parliamentary elections to the Duma as identified by
the Assembly Assessment Mission and the Venice Commission.
7. The Assembly expresses its deep concern about the escalating
tensions which threaten security in Europe and about Russia’s build-up
of military troops along the border with Ukraine.
8. The Assembly regrets that no progress has been made with addressing
the Assembly’s demands and requests in the context of the 2008 war
between the Russian Federation and Georgia as expressed in Resolution 1633 (2008), Resolution
1647 (2009) and Resolution
1683 (2009), as well as with regard to the military intervention
in Donbass and the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation
as expressed in Resolution
1990 (2014); Resolution
2034 (2015); Resolution
2063 (2015) and Resolution
2132 (2016).
9. The Assembly expresses its utmost disappointment that none
of its recommendations included in Resolution 2363 (2021) “Challenge, on substantive grounds, of the still unratified
credentials of the parliamentary delegation of the Russian Federation”
has been fulfilled.
10. In addition, the Assembly regrets the lack of co-operation
of the Russian Federation with the Assembly in the preparation of
the reports entitled “Shedding light on the murder of Boris Nemtsov”
(Resolution 2297(2019)); on “The arrest and detention of Alexei Navalny in January
2021” (Resolution 2375
(2021)); on the “Poisoning of Alexei Navalny” (Resolution ...
(2022)) and “Political prisoners in the Russian Federation”.
11. While the above mentioned concerns justify questions with
regard to the respect by the Russian Federation of its commitments
and obligations as a member State of the Council of Europe, it should
be emphasised that the Assembly constitutes the unique pan-European
parliamentary platform for political dialogue with the participation
of all European countries about the ways of upholding the values
and standards that the Council of Europe stands for, including in
the Russian Federation. It is recalled that the Assembly can play
a meaningful role in this process only if the Russian Federation
is a member State of the Organisation and fully participates in
its bodies, co-operation mechanisms and activities.
12. In this respect, the Russian delegation’s commitment to co-operate
with the Monitoring Committee should be acknowledged. The Assembly
should use this opportunity to have an impact on developments in
the Russian Federation with regard to democracy, rule of law and
respect for human rights.
13. It should also be highlighted that, more generally, the Russian
Federation is an active member of the Council of Europe, intensively
involved in its numerous activities including under the Conventions
of relevance to the country’s compliance with its commitments and
obligations in the Organisation.
14. The supremacy of the decisions of the Constitutional Court
of the Russian Federation over the international law including the
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights does not guarantee
to the Russian citizens a human rights remedy, and the possibility
to hold the authorities accountable, which remains an important
argument in favour of continuing co-operation at all levels including
the parliamentary level.
15. It should be noted that the European Union, NATO, the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and also the United
States, while clearly expressing their criticism of the behaviour
of the Russian authorities, have not interrupted their relations
with Moscow with a view to maintaining a dialogue on security in
Europe and favouring an evolution that will see the rule of law
and democratic principles respected in the Russian Federation.
16. Consequently, the Assembly resolves to ratify the credentials
of the members of the Russian delegation.
17. At the same time, the Assembly calls on the Russian authorities
to fulfil the recommendations included in Resolution 1633 (2008), Resolution
1647 (2009), Resolution
1683 (2009), Resolution
1990 (2014), Resolution
2034 (2015), Resolution
2063 (2015), Resolution
2132 (2016), Resolution
2292 (2019), Resolution 2320
(2020), and Resolution
2363 (2021) and in particular to:
17.1. address
concerns with regard to repealing the 2012 law on foreign agents
as amended, and the 2015 law on undesirable organisations as amended
and revising the law on extremism in order to put it in compliance
with Council of Europe standards;
17.2. abstain from adopting new laws putting further restrictions
on civil society, human rights defenders and journalists;
17.3. refrain from acts leading to violations of fundamental
rights and freedoms, in particular freedom of association, freedom
of assembly and freedom of expression;
17.4. co-operate with all Assembly committees and facilitate
the activity of Assembly's monitoring and information missions;
17.5. incorporate the judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights into the Russian legal system and implement them;
17.6. implement without delay all Committee of Ministers’ decisions
regarding the execution of the judgments of the European Court of
Human Rights and the multiple recommendations of the European Committee
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (CPT);
17.7. fully implement Resolution
2375 (2021) “The arrest and detention of Alexei Navalny in January 2021”,
Resolution ... (2022) “Poisoning of Alexei Navalny” and Resolution 2297 (2019) “Shedding light on the murder of Boris Nemtsov”.
18. The Assembly expects that by ratifying the credentials of
the Russian delegation, this should be reciprocated by a meaningful
dialogue, leading to concrete results. It invites the Monitoring
Committee to continue the dialogue with the authorities of the Russian
Federation and to submit its report on the honouring of obligations
and commitments by the Russian Federation at its earliest convenience
and not later than before the end of 2022.
B. Explanatory memorandum by Mr Piero Fassino, rapporteur
(open)1. Introduction
1. On 24 January 2022, with the
support of more than 30 members of the Parliamentary Assembly present in
the Chamber and following the proceedings via videoconference and
belonging to at least five national delegations, Mr Emanuelis Zingeris
(Lithuania, EPP/CD) challenged the still unratified credentials
of the Russian delegation on substantive grounds on the basis of
Article 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly. Later, Ms Yevheniia
Kravchuk (Ukraine, ALDE) challenged the credentials of the Russian
delegation on the procedural grounds on the basis of Article 7 of
the Rules of Procedure with the support of more than 10 members
present and belonging to at least five national delegations.
2. The substantive grounds on which the credentials were challenged
refer to violations of the basic principles of the Council of Europe
enshrined in Article 3 and the Preamble of its Statute (ETS No.
1); to non-fulfilment by the Russian Federation of the Assembly`s
recommendations addressed to it and included in relevant past resolutions,
in particular, Resolution
1990 (2014), Resolution
2034 (2015), Resolution
2063 (2015), Resolution
2292 (2019),Resolution
2320 (2020), and Resolution
2363 (2021); further violations with regard to the rule of law and
democracy, the respect for basic freedoms and human rights, and,
more generally the non-compliance of the Russian Federation with
its commitments and obligations in the Council of Europe.
3. In line with Article 8.3 of the Rules of Procedure, the Committee
on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States
of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee) was seized for a
report on substantial grounds and the Committee on Rules of Procedure,
Immunities and Institutional Affairs for opinion.
4. At its meeting on 24 January 2022, the Monitoring Committee
appointed me to be rapporteur.
5. The present challenge of the credentials follows similar challenges
submitted in June 2019 (upon the return of the Russian delegation
to the Assembly after the absence since 2015), in January 2020 and
in January 2021.
6. In the following chapters I will try to take stock of the
developments and concerns of relevance to the Russian Federation`s
compliance with its obligations and commitments in the Council of
Europe. For obvious reasons I cannot present an exhaustive picture
of the state of democracy and human rights in the Russian Federation,
and in any case this is not the purpose of my report which is not
meant to replace or duplicate a report under preparation by the
monitoring rapporteurs for Russia, scheduled for debate in the Assembly
later this year. The present report will only outline some outstanding
concerns with regard to democracy, rule of law and protection of
human rights in Russia which are relevant for the debate on the
credentials of the Russian parliamentary delegation.
2. Parliamentary elections
7. The parliamentary elections
took place over 3 days from 17 to 20 September 2021. It can be noted
that in contrast to the previous parliamentary elections held in
2016 and the presidential election held in 2018, the Assembly this
time received an invitation for the election observation. Upon the
decision of the Bureau of the Assembly, an ad hoc Committee of the
Assembly composed of representatives of the five political groups
held, on 2-3 September 2021, remote pre-electoral meetings in order
to collect information about the preparations for the elections
and to assess the feasibility of holding an in-situ meeting.
The ad hoc committee then met in Moscow from 16 to 20 September
2021 in the format of an Election Assessment Mission.
8. Despite the absence of a fully-fledged International Election
Observation Mission ,
the Election Assessment Mission was not in a position to conduct
an election observation, visiting a number of polling stations and
holding meetings with some stakeholders. Building upon the information
collected within the framework of the remote and in situ meetings, including with
the Central Electoral Commission, domestic observers and civil society
organisations as well as the findings of the Venice Commission,
the Election Assessment Mission reported back to the Bureau and
its conclusions have been transmitted to the Monitoring Committee
to be taken into account in the next monitoring report on the Russian
Federation.
,
the Election Assessment Mission was not in a position to conduct
an election observation, visiting a number of polling stations and
holding meetings with some stakeholders. Building upon the information
collected within the framework of the remote and in situ meetings, including with
the Central Electoral Commission, domestic observers and civil society
organisations as well as the findings of the Venice Commission,
the Election Assessment Mission reported back to the Bureau and
its conclusions have been transmitted to the Monitoring Committee
to be taken into account in the next monitoring report on the Russian
Federation. 9. The Mission identified some concerns with regard to the electoral
legal framework.
10. Election-related legislation in Russia is in constant evolution,
with the most recent changes introduced in 2020 and 2021. In particular,
recent amendments vested the Central Election Commission (CEC) with
the right to decide on the extension of voting for up to three days.
The multiday voting was first introduced in April 2020 during the
All-Russian vote on the constitutional amendments which was spread
over 7 days. It was subsequently used during the regional and local
elections in September 2020 and 2021. It was criticised for giving
the authorities more control over elections and not ensuring necessary
transparency and security of voting. That criticism was confirmed
during the parliamentary elections by observers who had no possibility
to monitor the storage of ballot boxes overnight and complained
that multiple-day voting was used to exert pressure on voters to
come to polling stations in order to increase turnout.
11. Furthermore, access to video monitoring was restricted only
to a limited number of accounts allocated to representatives of
political parties and to certain observers contrary to the previous
elections when video streams from polling stations could be consulted
by anyone online. The new system appears to raise issues with regard
to the respect of the Venice Commission’s Code of Good Practice
in Electoral Matters, as it opens a possibility for limiting the
capacity of observers to follow different election-related operations.
12. There were also serious concerns relating to electronic voting
which was introduced in May 2020. This option was available in seven
federal subjects and according to the CEC data, could potentially
affect approximately 15 million voters.
13. A number of domestic organisations involved in the election
observation process and some political parties raised concerns about
the secrecy and transparency of the process, the lack of possibility
to observe electronic voting, the absence of instruments allowing
to audit and verify its functioning, and for voters to verify the
vote, as well as the lack of clarity regarding the competent body
to consider related complaints.
14. The most recent amendments introduced to the electoral legal
framework include serious restrictions to the right to stand for
elections, in particular in relation with the “foreign agent” status,
the law on extremism as well as the holding of assets abroad. Indeed,
some well-known members of opposition parties were denied registration,
and a number of initiated and ongoing criminal proceedings as well
as criminal sentences against some opposition figures effectively
prevented them from running in the elections.
15. What was even more worrying, the CEC proceeded to the deregistration
of a number of candidates on the basis of information received from
the authorities without any judicial decision. Allegedly some 9
million Russian citizens have thus been deprived of their passive
voting rights.
16. The electoral campaign clearly lacked a level playing field.
Unequal campaigning conditions, in particular media coverage as
well as the allegations of misuse of State and administrative resources
had a negative impact on fairness of the campaign.
17. Following the elections, United Russia maintained its constitutional
majority despite some losses, winning 324 out of 450 seats and receiving
49,82% of the vote. Besides three other parties already present
in the previous Duma (The Communist Party, A Just Russia – for truth,
and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia), and a new party, New
People, made it to the parliament receiving 13 seats and 5,32 %
votes. The turnout was 51,72%. According to the extra parliamentary
opposition, in particular Yabloko, independent civil society and
journalists and genuine critics of the authorities have remained
outside the Duma, as has been the case since 2012.
18. Finally, I would like to refer to the Assembly`s position
regarding the illegal annexation of Crimea, confirmed most recently
in Resolution 2363 (2021) and it referred to the Venice Commission’s opinion on
“The compliance with Council of Europe and other international standards
of the inclusion of a not internationally recognised territory into
a nationwide constituency for parliamentary elections” which points
out that “the organisation of elections in the annexed territory
does not and cannot remedy the annexation”.
3. Crackdown on civil society and political opposition
3.1. The case of Mr Alexei Navalny
19. The emblematic case of the
opposition leader, Mr Alexei Navalny, is the subject of another
Assembly report entitled “Poisoning of Alexei Navalny”, prepared
by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (Rapporteur,
Mr Jacques Maire, France, ALDE) to be debated during the 2022 January
Part Session. With no intention to interfere in
the rapporteur`s work, I would like to point out some issues of
relevance to the present report.
With no intention to interfere in
the rapporteur`s work, I would like to point out some issues of
relevance to the present report.20. On 17 January 2021, Mr Navalny was arrested upon his arrival
from Germany where he was recovering from poisoning. He was arrested
for having breached the terms of a suspended sentence passed in
2014 in the Yves Rocher case. The original trial which led to this
sentence was found unfair by the European Court of Human Rights
which amounted to a violation of Article 18 of the European Convention
on Human Rights (ETS No. 5). Mr Navalny
has remained in the prison until today, despite heavy criticism
of the international community, including by the Assembly monitoring
rapporteurs who have made a public statement in this respect.
Mr Navalny
has remained in the prison until today, despite heavy criticism
of the international community, including by the Assembly monitoring
rapporteurs who have made a public statement in this respect.21. Mr Navalny’s political activities prior to his poisoning and
arrest included an anti-corruption campaign (he was a founder of
Anti-Corruption Foundation, FSK). He was a candidate in the 2013
Moscow mayoral election and won 27% of the vote cast. He attempted
to run for the presidential election in 2018 but the CEC rejected his
candidacy due to his previous conviction. He nevertheless continued
his political activities organising a “smart vote” in the regional
and local elections and a network. He was repeatedly detained on
charges of organising or participating in unauthorised public rallies.
22. In several other judgements with regard to complaints by Mr Navalny,
the European Court of Human rights has found violations by the Russian
authorities of Mr Navalny`s freedom of expression, right to liberty and
security, as well as the right to fair trial, the prohibition on
punishment without law, and the prohibition on inhuman and degrading
treatment and punishment.
23. Regrettably, Mr Navalny`s case is symptomatic of the plight
of political opponents and government critics. Moreover, in its
several judgements, the European Court of Human Rights recognised
the negative impact that the treatment of Mr Navalny by the authorities
has had on pluralism and democracy in Russia. It referred to the
chilling effect of the authorities’ actions by “discouraging Mr Navalny
and others from participating in protest rallies and engaging actively
in opposition politics”.
3.2. Restrictive legislation: foreign agents law, law on undesirable organisations and law on extremism
24. The situation of critical journalists
and civil society operating in the field of democracy, rule of law
and human rights has been systematically deteriorating over the
last years. However, the most recent developments raise the utmost
concerns.
25. Among the laws which have a devastating impact on the activities
of civil society, the law on foreign agents is of particular concern.
It was adopted in 2012 and already then was severely criticised
by the international community, including by the Assembly and the Venice Commission. Unfortunately,
instead of being revoked, it was considerably strengthened by successive
amendments introduced in 2014, 2017, and in 2019.
and the Venice Commission. Unfortunately,
instead of being revoked, it was considerably strengthened by successive
amendments introduced in 2014, 2017, and in 2019.26. The package of most recent amendments to the law on foreign
agents was adopted in 2020 and was criticised in the Venice Commission`s
Opinion published on 6 July 2021. In its Opinion, the Venice Commission expressed
deep concern that “this legislation enables the authorities to exercise
significant control over the activities and existence of associations
as well as over the participation of individuals in civic life”. Now,
the Ministry of Justice has the power to recognize as foreign agents
not only organisations, but also media outlets and individuals.
The label can be applied to bloggers, journalists, students receiving
grants and activists participating in international conferences.
Now,
the Ministry of Justice has the power to recognize as foreign agents
not only organisations, but also media outlets and individuals.
The label can be applied to bloggers, journalists, students receiving
grants and activists participating in international conferences.27. The criteria for defining an individual as a foreign agent
are broad and unclear. Definition of “political activity” is vague
and includes election monitoring, posting comments on Russian politics
and taking part in rallies. “Support from abroad” does not only
mean foreign funding but also “assistance from foreign sources”. The
amendments in 2020 also introduced new registration and reporting
requirements. Furthermore, individuals labelled foreign agents are
banned from joining civil service or holding a municipal government position.
They cannot be election observers. The law provides for a punishment
of up to five years in prison for individuals or organisations labelled
as foreign agents who fail to inform official entities about their
status and/or refuse to report their activities to the Russian authorities.
Media and NGOs which are designated foreign agents very often have
to close down as they lose advertisers, journalists and activists.
28. The decision of the Ministry of Justice can be challenged
in court. However, there has been no successful challenge so far.
29. Among the organisations labelled “foreign agents” are well
respected NGOs, human rights defenders and journalists. In the most
worrying developments, in August 2021, GOLOS, a respected election
watchdog, was labelled “foreign agent”. As of July 2021, Russia
labelled 76 organisations and 20 media outlets or individual persons
as “foreign agents”.
30. The Law on undesirable organisations was first adopted in
2015 and raised a lot of international criticism. “Undesirable organisations”
are banned or limited from engaging in any activities inside Russia.
Organisations that do not disband as well as Russians who maintain
ties to them, are subject to high fines and significant jail time.
The label, likewise, in the case of “foreign agents” aims not only
to prevent international NGOs from conducting their activities on
the territory of the Russian Federation, but also to prevent the
citizens of the Russian Federation from participating in the activities
of the NGOs themselves, both in Russia and abroad.
31. On 9 June 2021, the State Duma adopted a package of laws on
countering “the infiltration of undesirable organisations into the
Russian Federation”. As a result of these amendments, citizens are
banned from taking part in the work of “undesirable organisations,”
even if they are located abroad. The law also allows Russia’s State
financial watchdog (Rosfinmonitoring) to obtain information about
any money transfers from abroad.
32. In July 2021, there were 34 organisations on the list including
“Open Russia” (put on the list in 2017, and its dissolution was
announced in 2019). Shockingly, included on the list is an organisation
linked to the work of the Council of Europe entitled “the Council
of Europe Schools of Political Studies” (since December 2020) and 3
German non-profit organisations (Forum of Russian-speaking Europeans,
Center for Liberal Modernity and German-Russian Exchange) (in May
2021), which help people with disabilities and run exchange programmes for
students. Since then, new entities have been added to the list.
33. The Law on extremism is another piece of legislation used
and abused to supress independent opinions and criticism. Its major
problem is a vague definition of extremist activities which allows
for a wide scope for arbitrary decisions. The revised Article 275
is very broad and vague, very unspecific and it is easy to imprison journalists
on the grounds of revealing State secrets. The law does not specify
what information is classified leaving it up to various government
agencies. According to lawyers, this law can be used to target anyone
with international contacts, including scholars, journalists, researchers
and human rights activists.
34. In a number of emblematic cases the law has been applied against
journalists critical towards the authorities.
35. Strikingly, Alexei Navalny`s Anti-corruption Foundation has
also been labelled as extremist.
36. Furthermore, the legal professionals at “Team 29” who specialize
in Russia`s political prosecutions have effectively been declared
enemies of the State under this law.
37. In addition, under a newly amended electoral law, people linked
to organisations declared extremist cannot run for elections.
3.3. Dissolution of Memorial
38. Memorial is one of the best
known and respected Russian non-governmental organisations dedicated to
the history of political repression and the protection of human
rights and symbolizing the country`s democratisation. It was founded
in 1989 by a group of Russian human rights activists led by Nobel
Peace Prize laureate Andrei Sakharov, initially with the aim of
documenting the history of Soviet repression, rehabilitating its
victims and monitoring the observance of human rights. It has campaigned
for the rights of political prisoners, migrants and other marginalised
groups and highlighted abuses particularly in the North Caucasus.
39. On 11 November 2021, the General Public Prosecutor`s Office
of the Russian Federation filed a case in the Supreme Court against
Memorial International in Moscow, the umbrella organisation of all
Memorial organisations in Russia, demanding its dissolution over
systematic violations of foreign agent legislation. In particular,
the Organisation was accused of failing to identify itself publicly
as a designated foreign agent.
40. On 28 December, the Supreme Court ordered the closure of Memorial
International and its regional branches. An appeal has been filed.
41. This dissolution of the respected human rights organisation
comes after many years of harassment, extortionate fines for alleged
non-compliance with the law on foreign agents, and arbitrary criminal
and administrative prosecution of its staff, who have also been
subject to attacks and harassment, including the 2009 killing of
researcher Natalia Estemirova, never been properly investigated.
Mr Oyub Titiev, winner of Václav Havel Prize and Head of Memorial
Office in Chechnya as well as Mr Yury Dmitriev, Head of the Karelian branch,
have been imprisoned on politically motivated charges. In one of
the most recent developments, the International Memorial Office
in Moscow was raided by the police on 14 October 2021.
42. The international community has severely criticised this decision
and qualified it as a heavy blow to rapidly shrinking space for
independent civil society, media and pro-democracy activists in
Russia. The Council of Europe Secretary General in her statement
spoke about “devastating news for civil society in the Russian Federation”.
She stressed that the existence and development of civil society
organisations is an essential pillar of any European democracy and
recalled that Russia`s authorities have ignored the Council of Europe’s repeated
calls to review the “Foreign agent law” in line with the European
Convention on Human Rights.
43. The monitoring rapporteurs for Russia have reacted on this
issue and have had a constructive exchange of letters with the Russian
Commissioner for Human Rights, Ms Tatiana Moskalkova. While the
competence of the Commissioner as defined by the Federal Constitutional
Law does not permit her to interfere in the judicial proceedings,
her staff are following the procedure and the Commissioner has announced
her intention to use all legal tools available to her once the court
decision enters into force.
3.4. Restrictions on freedoms of assembly and expression
44. Restrictions on freedom of
assembly have been of concern for many years. In one of the most emblematic
cases on 6 May 2012 almost 700 people were detained during peaceful
rallies at Bolotnaya Square). The majority of them were subject
to one-month administrative detention and fines.
45. In big rallies before the September 2019 municipal elections,
thousands of peaceful protesters gathered in central Moscow to demand
that opposition candidates be permitted to run for the city’s legislature
(they had been refused registration). The local government did not
grant a permit for the event and the authorities responded with
excessive force against peaceful protesters. Over 1 300 demonstrators
were arrested, often through violent force. Three days later, Moscow’s
Investigative Committee opened a criminal case that human rights
advocate Pavel Chikov called “a signal that the price of protest
is now prison”. This criminal case alleged that the rally was not
a peaceful protest but rather a set of violent “mass riots” punishable
not by fines and administrative detention but by prison sentences.
Those convicted of calling for the “riots” could face up to two years
in prison, participants could receive three to eight, and organizers
could be put behind bars for up to 15 years. As a result, six people
were charged in this case.
46. In January 2021, large crowds gathered in more than 100 cities
across Russia to protest against the arrest of Alexey Navalny, sparking
more protests in Moscow and St. Petersburg, again leading to mass
arrests. In all three days of protests, police arrested more than
11 000 people and subsequently launched dozens of felony criminal
investigations.
47. Freedom of expression is another serious concern. The Russian
Federation is ranked 150 out of 180 countries in the Reporters without
Borders 2021 World Press Freedom Index.
48. Very few independent outlets still operate, most of them online
and some with headquarters abroad. There is no independent TV channel
with national coverage. TV Dozhd, which is the last television channel known
for its independent editorial line, has, since 2014, been accessible
only on internet.
49. As for the print media, just a few national newspapers, led
by Novaya Gazeta maintain their editorial independence and express
opposition views. Thus, the internet, including social networks
and online versions of print media, has become an important source
of information.
50. New anti-extremism legislation which entered into force in
July 2016 gave State authorities a wide range of tools to control
the media by introducing unclearly defined notions of “separatism”,
“extremism” and “incitement to violence” open to abusive interpretation,
and by granting the authorities great discretion to crack down on
any criticism.
51. Roskomnadzor, (Federal Service for Supervision of Communications,
Information Technology and Mass Media), a State agency composed
of 71 regional offices responsible for media (including online)
control is formally subordinated to the government and lacks independence
from the authorities. Its Head and deputies are appointed by the
Minister of Telecom and Mass Communications. Yet it enjoys broad
sanctioning powers including fines, requesting removal of publications
deemed inconsistent with the legislation, blocking websites without
a prior court ruling and initiating media`s closure in case of two
warnings in a calendar year.
52. Attacks and threats against journalists are common. Critical
journalists and editors are also often persecuted on criminal charges
which are widely considered as politically motivated by the international community.
53. On 23 June 2020, the European Court of Human Rights found
a violation of Article 10 (right to freedom of expression) and 13
(right to an effective remedy) of the Convention in four emblematic
cases concerning the blocking of websites in Russia.
4. Relations with neighbouring countries
54. The developments with regard
to relations with a number of neighbouring countries remains a point
of serious concern that has been brought to the forefront again
in the context of the recent escalation of tensions and build-up
of military forces along the border with Ukraine.
55. In relation to its neighbouring States, when acceding to the
Council of Europe the Russian Federation committed itself to, inter alia: “settle international
as well as internal disputes by peaceful means (an obligation incumbent
upon all member states of the Council of Europe), rejecting resolutely
any forms of threats of force against its neighbours” and to “denounce as
wrong the concept of two different categories of foreign countries,
whereby some are treated as a zone of special influence called the
“near abroad”.
and to “denounce as
wrong the concept of two different categories of foreign countries,
whereby some are treated as a zone of special influence called the
“near abroad”. 56. In an extraordinary large and unannounced troop movement in March and April 2021, Russia
amassed more than 85 000 troops along its border with Ukraine, considerably
increasing tensions in the region and raising fears of a military
conflict. Following interventions by inter
alia German Chancellor Merkel and US President Biden,
the Russian authorities announced that the troops would return to
their normal bases, while reportedly leaving much of the military
infrastructure in place. However, in November 2021 Russia
started again to massively build up its troop presence along the
Ukrainian border. At this moment there are an estimated 100 000
Russian troops stationed along this border. In an attempt to defuse
tensions, Presidents Biden and Putin held a video call on 7 December
2021. This was later followed by a series of meetings between Russian
and US officials as well as meetings between Russian officials and
NATO, as well as the OSCE Permanent Council. While denying that
Russia would have any intent to invade Ukraine, the Russian authorities
have publicly made a series of demands from NATO as a condition
for de-escalating the tensions, including a legally binding promise
that Ukraine would never be allowed to join NATO and that NATO would not
deploy troops or deploy missiles in any of the new NATO member-States.
These demands were firmly rejected by all NATO member states as
this would run counter to the open door policy of NATO as well as
the sovereign rights of these countries. Emphasising that NATO has
fully abided with the 1997 “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation
and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation” NATO Secretary General
Stoltenberg underscored that Russia has no right to establish a
sphere of influence to try to control their neighbours”. Despite the flurry of diplomatic
initiatives, tensions and fears of an imminent re-invasion of Ukraine
by the Russian Federation have not subsided and even increased following
the start of Russian-Belarusian military exercises along the border
between Belarus and Ukraine. An additional 1 500 Russian troops
– not counting Russian Peace keepers – are stationed in the Transnistrian
region of the Republic of Moldova, along the border with Ukraine,
in violation of its commitments to the Council of Europe and under the 1999 OSCE
Istanbul summit.
in March and April 2021, Russia
amassed more than 85 000 troops along its border with Ukraine, considerably
increasing tensions in the region and raising fears of a military
conflict. Following interventions by inter
alia German Chancellor Merkel and US President Biden,
the Russian authorities announced that the troops would return to
their normal bases, while reportedly leaving much of the military
infrastructure in place. However, in November 2021 Russia
started again to massively build up its troop presence along the
Ukrainian border. At this moment there are an estimated 100 000
Russian troops stationed along this border. In an attempt to defuse
tensions, Presidents Biden and Putin held a video call on 7 December
2021. This was later followed by a series of meetings between Russian
and US officials as well as meetings between Russian officials and
NATO, as well as the OSCE Permanent Council. While denying that
Russia would have any intent to invade Ukraine, the Russian authorities
have publicly made a series of demands from NATO as a condition
for de-escalating the tensions, including a legally binding promise
that Ukraine would never be allowed to join NATO and that NATO would not
deploy troops or deploy missiles in any of the new NATO member-States.
These demands were firmly rejected by all NATO member states as
this would run counter to the open door policy of NATO as well as
the sovereign rights of these countries. Emphasising that NATO has
fully abided with the 1997 “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation
and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation” NATO Secretary General
Stoltenberg underscored that Russia has no right to establish a
sphere of influence to try to control their neighbours”. Despite the flurry of diplomatic
initiatives, tensions and fears of an imminent re-invasion of Ukraine
by the Russian Federation have not subsided and even increased following
the start of Russian-Belarusian military exercises along the border
between Belarus and Ukraine. An additional 1 500 Russian troops
– not counting Russian Peace keepers – are stationed in the Transnistrian
region of the Republic of Moldova, along the border with Ukraine,
in violation of its commitments to the Council of Europe and under the 1999 OSCE
Istanbul summit.57. Regrettably, no progress has been made with regard to resolving
the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, while
the Minsk process to resolve the military conflict in Donbass is
all but moribund with the Russian Federation reportedly refusing a ministerial level meeting
in the framework of the so-called Normandy format. Similarly, no
progress has been made with addressing the Assembly’s demands and requests
in the context of the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, as expressed
in Resolutions 1633 (2008), 1647 (2009) and 1683 (2009). On the contrary the rapporteurs
for Georgia have repeatedly expressed their concern about the ongoing
borderisation and creeping annexation of the Georgian regions of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia by the Russian Federation and have urged
the Russian authorities to allow the free movement of Georgian civilians
across the administrative boundary lines with these two regions.
refusing a ministerial level meeting
in the framework of the so-called Normandy format. Similarly, no
progress has been made with addressing the Assembly’s demands and requests
in the context of the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, as expressed
in Resolutions 1633 (2008), 1647 (2009) and 1683 (2009). On the contrary the rapporteurs
for Georgia have repeatedly expressed their concern about the ongoing
borderisation and creeping annexation of the Georgian regions of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia by the Russian Federation and have urged
the Russian authorities to allow the free movement of Georgian civilians
across the administrative boundary lines with these two regions.5. Conclusions
58. The situation in the Russian
Federation with regard to the country’s compliance with its commitments and
obligations in the Council of Europe is very worrying. Restrictive
policies and measures adopted by the authorities and used to suppress
pluralism and limit basic rights and freedoms raise utmost concern. Crackdowns
on extra parliamentary political opposition and independent civil
society, human rights defenders and media have been severely criticised
by the international community including by the Council of Europe. The
plight of the opposition figure, Mr Alexei Navalny and the closure
of the oldest and well known human rights organisation Memorial,
have been seen as emblematic and serious blows to democracy.
59. As rapporteur of the Monitoring Committee for the challenge
of the credentials of the Russian delegation I have outlined all
these outstanding concerns and I have had to face the responsibility
of proposing to the Assembly the way forward. Should we accept the
Russian delegation? Should we ratify its credentials?
60. It is clear that our Organisation, and the Assembly in particular,
is the most important, if not unique, pan-European platform instrumental
for conducting political dialogue at the parliamentary level. And,
we have to recognise that such dialogue takes place. The Monitoring
Committee is well placed to testify to the commitment and political
will of the Russian delegation illustrated by active participation
of its representatives in the Committee’s activities in general,
but also importantly concerning Russia itself, including through
hearings, exchanges of views and discussions.
61. The monitoring rapporteurs for Russia visited Moscow in July
2021 despite challenging sanitary conditions and reported back to
the Committee stressing the readiness of Russian parliamentarians
for dialogue. They announced their intention to prepare a roadmap
– in co-operation with Russian colleagues – which would define the
Committee’s expectations as to concrete steps to be undertaken in
terms of legislative and policy measures. I think that as the members
of the Assembly we have no right to reject this chance, however
slim it is, for having some impact on developments in the Russian
Federation with regard to democracy, rule of law and respect for
human rights.
62. Similarly, other Assembly committees co-operate with Russian
colleagues in the preparation of their reports, as illustrated by
the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy and the Committee
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights’ work on “The continuing need
to restore human rights and the rule of law in the North Caucasus
region”.
63. Furthermore, the Russian Federation is an active member of
the Council of Europe, intensively involved in its numerous activities
including under many Conventions of relevance to the country`s compliance
with its commitments and obligations in the Organisation.
64. Access of Russian citizens to the European Court of Human
Rights, guarantees them a human rights remedy and the possibility
of holding the authorities accountable for respect of the rule of
law. This remains an important argument in favour of continuing
co-operation at all levels including the parliamentary level.
65. Finally, it should be noted that the European Union, NATO,
the OSCE and also the United States, while clearly expressing their
criticism of the behaviour of the Russian authorities, have not
interrupted their relations with Moscow with the aim of obtaining
a reduction in tensions and favouring an evolution that will see
the rule of law and democratic principles respected in Russia.
66. It is in this context, therefore, that I recommend to the
Assembly to ratify the credentials of the Russian delegation.