1. Introduction
1.1. Origin
of the report
1. On 8 April 2014, the Parliamentary
Assembly adopted
Resolution
1984 (2014) by which it granted partner for democracy status to
the Parliament of Kyrgyzstan, the “Jogorku Kenesh” (Supreme Council).
It thus became the third parliament to be granted this status, after
the Parliament of Morocco and the Palestinian National Council.
The Parliament of Kyrgyzstan is also the first and only partner
for democracy in Central Asia.
2. When making its official request, the Kyrgyz Parliament declared
that it shared the values upheld by the Council of Europe and entered
into a number of political commitments in accordance with Rule 64.2 (formerly 61.2)
of the Assembly’s Rules of Procedure. These commitments are set
out in paragraph 4 of Resolution 1984 (2014). In paragraph 15 of
the Resolution, the Assembly also considered that a number of concrete
measures were essential to strengthen democracy, the rule of law
and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Kyrgyzstan.
3. The Assembly likewise pointed out that “progress in taking
forward reforms is the prime aim of the partnership for democracy
and should constitute the benchmark for assessing the efficiency
of this partnership” (paragraph 19 of Resolution 1984 (2014)). None
of my three predecessors as rapporteur managed to complete their
work, however, with the result that the Assembly has never assessed
the partnership.
4. On 16 November 2020, with the country in post-election political
turmoil, the late Dame Cheryl Gillan tabled a motion for a resolution
asking the Assembly for a review of the partnership for democracy
in respect of the Kyrgyz Parliament.
5. I was appointed rapporteur in June 2021. Authorised by the
Bureau of the Assembly to carry out a fact-finding visit to Kyrgyzstan,
I was unable to travel until March 2022 because of the Kyrgyz election
timetable. This report is based on the outcome of that visit, and
also the information provided by a representative of the European
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) at a hearing
in January 2022.
2. General background
2.1. From
a peaceful transfer of power to political confrontation (2017-2019)
6. In his introductory note entitled
“Evaluation of the partnership for democracy in respect of the Kyrgyz Republic”
(2017),
Mr Alain Destexhe (Belgium, ALDE)
highlighted the negative impact of the constitutional amendments
initiated by former President Almazbek Atambayev. Adopted by referendum
on 11 December 2016, these amendments, according to the joint opinion
of the Venice Commission and the Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR), effectively undermined the balance and separation
of powers by strengthening the powers of the executive.
7. Mr Destexhe also noted that there had been several highly
publicised civil and criminal cases brought during the final year
of Mr Atambayev’s presidency. They were directed against journalists
and opposition leaders,
including
Sadyr Japarov (founder of the Mekenchil (Patriots) party
) and Omurbek Tekebayev
(Ata-Meken party).
8. On 15 October 2017, Mr Sooronbay Jeenbekov, a former Prime
Minister from the Social Democratic party, described as the candidate
of the outgoing president, won the presidential election. Although
described as “competitive”
by the International Election Observation
Mission (IEOM), vote buying, voter pressure and misuse of public
resources for the campaign were identified as issues. On 24 November
2017, Mr Jeenbekov was inaugurated as President of the Kyrgyz Republic
in what was widely described as a peaceful and democratic transfer
of power.
9. A political rift sparked by criticism levelled by Mr Atambayev
(re-elected chairman of the Social Democratic Party) at Mr Jeenbekov
in March 2018 divided the ruling party and triggered a political
crisis. Several prominent figures close to the former president,
including the Prosecutor General Ms Indira Joldubayeva, and the
government of Prime Minister Sapar Isakov, were dismissed. In connection
with the scandal over a power plant in Bishkek that broke down in
January 2018, leaving many residents without electricity in freezing
temperatures, Mr Isakov was arrested on 5 June on charges of corruption
and misappropriation of public funds. In March 2019, the Kyrgyzstan
Social Democratic Party decided to join the opposition. Parliament
voted to strip the former president of his immunity from prosecution
so that he could be called as a witness in a case involving the
unlawful release of a crime boss. Having barricaded himself in his residential
compound and surrounded by supporters, Mr Atambayev surrendered
on 9 August 2019, after a two-day standoff with security forces.
He was then charged with murder for the death of an officer during
the raid on his compound.
2.2. Post-electoral
political crisis and democratic backsliding (2020-2021)
10. On 4 October 2020, Kyrgyzstan
held parliamentary elections. The Parliamentary Assembly could not observe
them owing to Covid-19 restrictions, but the OSCE/ODIHR was able
to conduct a limited election observation mission. The latter
concluded
that the elections were “competitive and candidates could, in general,
conduct their activities freely”. It also stated, however, that
“credible allegations of vote buying remain a serious concern”.
The elections were won by the parties close to President Jeenbekov.
11. As allegations of electoral fraud mounted and unrest spread
throughout Bishkek, the Kyrgyz Central Election Commission (CEC)
took the decision on 6 October 2020 to cancel the results. Demonstrators
burst into several government buildings and succeeded in getting
Mr Atambayev and Mr Japarov released from prison. Mr Japarov was
appointed acting Prime Minister by parliament following the sudden
resignation of Prime Minister Kutabek Boronov. President Jeenbekov
then declared that the country was facing a coup.
12. On 15 October 2020, Mr Jeenbekov resigned from the presidency,
prompting Mr Japarov to also assume the position of acting President.
13. Just as the CEC announced that new parliamentary elections
would be held in December 2020, the interim parliament enacted a
constitutional law suspending the elections until June 2021. It
also proposed a constitutional amendment initiated by Mr Japarov
to establish a presidential form of government in Kyrgyzstan. At
the request of the Constitutional Chamber of the Kyrgyzstan Supreme
Court, the Venice Commission issued an urgent
amicus
curiae brief on 17 November 2020, which concluded that
an interim parliament should not adopt “extraordinary measures”
such as amendments to the Constitution, and that parliamentary elections should
be held as soon as possible.
Despite these calls for caution,
the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court approved the postponement
of the parliamentary elections.
14. Mr Japarov won the presidential election on 10 January 2021
(79% of the vote, on a turnout of only 33%). The Assembly was unable
to observe them owing to Covid-19 constraints. The OSCE election
observation mission
concluded that the election had been
well organised, that fundamental freedoms had been generally respected,
but that the campaign had been dominated by one candidate who had
benefited from disproportionate financial means and misuse of administrative
resources.
15. On the same day, the referendum on the constitutional reforms
aimed at establishing a presidential form of government took place,
in which 84% of voters approved the proposed change. Shortly afterwards, Mr Japarov
decided to postpone the parliamentary elections to autumn 2021.
16. The joint opinion published by the Venice Commission and the
OSCE/ODIHR
on the draft
version of the new Constitution concluded that there were serious
shortcomings that threatened “the balance of powers” and respect
for individual rights in Kyrgyzstan. A second referendum was held
on 11 April 2021. 79% voted in favour of the new Constitution on
a turnout of 37%. On 5 May 2021, the new Constitution came into
force, reducing the size of parliament by 25% and abolishing the
post of prime minister. The presidency gained broader powers to
propose laws and referendums, as well as increased powers to dismiss
officials and strip MPs of their immunity from prosecution.
17. In the summer of 2021, several controversial laws were passed
by the interim parliament. For example, the scope of the Code of
Criminal Procedure was expanded to include the prosecution of organisations
or individuals considered “extremist”. According to observers, this
legislation poses a threat to civil society actors and political
opposition groups. The interim parliament also passed a law on “foreign
agents”, which obliges foreign-funded NGOs and civil society groups
to comply with strict financial requirements. Other controversial laws,
including one on “protection against false and inaccurate information”
have been denounced as potential tools for intimidating independent
media and restricting public access to information.
18. The year 2021 was thus marked by significant democratic backsliding,
a trend confirmed at a hearing with a representative of the Venice
Commission in January 2022.
2.3. 2021
parliamentary elections
19. On 28 November 2021, namely
more than a year after the above-mentioned political upheaval, new parliamentary
elections were held. After a record low turnout (34% according to
the CEC), they were won by the Ata-Zhurt party, which is politically
aligned with President Japarov. Representatives of the five other
political parties (out of 21 parties seeking election) make up the
new parliament. Following the revision of the Constitution and the
reform of the electoral system, the Jogorku Kenesh now has 90 seats
(compared with 120 seats previously); 54 MPs are elected by proportional
representation in a single national constituency and 36 in single-member
constituencies. MPs are elected by universal suffrage for a five-year
term of office.
20. The renewed IEOM
and
the ad hoc Committee of the Bureau of the Assembly
concluded in their reports that the
elections had been competitive but hampered by constitutional and
electoral changes enacted by an interim parliament whose mandate
had expired, and promulgated by the President only a few days before the
start of the electoral campaign. They also considered that the record
low turnout reflected voter burnout, disillusionment and faltering
public trust. The ad hoc Committee of the Bureau of the Assembly
likewise regretted that many of the Venice Commission’s and Assembly’s
recommendations remained unaddressed, in particular as regards certain
limitations on freedom of expression and association, the lack of
provisions for transparency and accountability in campaign finance,
or for ensuring equitable media access and coverage.
21. Note that the changes made to the electoral system have also
deprived many women, young people and a large proportion of the
population who have not completed higher education of the chance
to be elected to parliament. This amounts to a violation of domestic
and international norms. For while Kyrgyz electoral legislation
stipulates that at least 30% of seats in parliament must be held
by women, no women have been elected in single-mandate constituencies,
with the result that the number of women in parliament stands at
18 (namely 20% of MPs, up slightly from the outgoing parliament
where the figure was 17%).
22. The new parliament met on 29 December 2021 and elected Mr Talant
Mamytov its new Speaker. On 12 January 2022, it set up eight committees
and elected their chairs. The partner delegation that is to participate
in the work of our Assembly has been formed; it includes at least
one woman, as well as a Deputy Speaker of Parliament.
3. Political
commitments arising from partner for democracy status
23. In asking to be granted partner
for democracy status, the Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic undertook to
comply with the provisions of Rule 64.2 of the Assembly’s Rules
of Procedure. In terms of implementation, however, progress has
been very mixed.
3.1. Willingness
to embrace democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms
24. In the eight years since partner
status was granted, there have been numerous public statements in support
of these values, which were reiterated by the Kyrgyz people I spoke
to during my fact-finding visit.
25. The Assembly, however, has observed a worrying trend where
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Kyrgyzstan
is concerned. In effect, the aforementioned developments in the
corpus of legislation (paragraphs 16 and 17), including notably
the controversial laws on false information and on “foreign agents”,
threaten freedom of expression and restrict the space in which journalists
and media, NGOs and human rights defenders operate. During my fact-finding
visit, several recently opened cases were brought to my attention.
These include the search on the premises of Next
TV and the arrest of its director, Taalaibek Duishenbiev,
in March 2022, for inciting racial hatred. He was accused of spreading
fake news on social media regarding the possibility of an agreement
whereby Kyrgyzstan would provide military assistance to the Russian Federation
in connection with the invasion of Ukraine. Two other criminal cases
have recently been brought against journalists, one against Kaktus Media and another against
Bolot Temirov, a journalist (Temirov
live). Other examples of persons who were intimidated
or arrested because of their participation in peaceful demonstrations
against the war in Ukraine were mentioned, including Aziza Abdirasulova
(from the NGO Kylym Shamy), Dinara
Oshurakhunova (from the NGO Civic initiatives), Ondurush Toktonasyrov
(a human rights defender) and Nurbek Toktakunov (a lawyer). We also
heard reports about the situation in prisons, the still widespread
practice of torture, and backsliding on gender issues.
3.2. Abolition
of the death penalty
26. Kyrgyzstan should be congratulated
on this point because the death penalty was suspended in the country
in 1998 and abolished in 2007; this decision has never been challenged.
The new Constitution adopted in 2021 stipulates that “Everyone has
an inalienable right to life. Encroachment on human life and health
shall not be permitted. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
life. The death penalty shall be prohibited.” (Article 25, paragraph
1).
3.3. Intention
of the parliament to make use of the Assembly’s experience and the
expertise of the Venice Commission in its institutional and legislative
work
27. Kyrgyzstan became a member
of the Venice Commission in 2004. Since its accession, the Commission has
issued more than 20 opinions, including 9 since parliament was granted
partner status in 2014. In 2013, parliament sought an opinion on
the draft law on freedom of association, and certain recommendations
were heeded. Other provisions were adopted in line with the Opinion
on the amendments to the legislation
of the Kyrgyz Republic related to sanctions for violations of the
electoral legislation adopted in 2020.
28. Unfortunately, the recommendations made in the opinion on
the draft Constitution adopted in 2021 have not been followed.
29. Between 2013 and 2020 the Venice Commission co-operated with
Kyrgyzstan in several EU-funded projects, including “Support to
the Kyrgyz authorities in improving the quality and efficiency of
the Kyrgyz constitutional justice system” (2013-2015) and “Support
to strengthening democracy through electoral reform in the Kyrgyz
Republic” (2017-2020).
30. Since 2020, Kyrgyzstan has been part of the “Central Asia
Rule of Law” and “Support to Reforms of Electoral Legislation and
Practice and Regional Human Rights Instruments and Mechanisms in
Countries of Latin America, Central Asia and Mongolia” projects
implemented by the Venice Commission.
31. The main partners of the Venice Commission in Kyrgyzstan have
been the Constitutional Chamber (Constitutional Court since 2021),
the Central Election Commission, the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme
Court and, in some cases, Parliament’s Legislative Committee.
32. Exchanges with the Constitutional Chamber have always been
satisfactory. Co-operation with the Central Election Commission
has also been quite close. Despite occasional contacts with parliament,
the latter has never engaged in a sustained dialogue. Dialogue with
national experts and NGOs, on the other hand, has been constructive
and fruitful.
3.4. Commitment
to organise free and fair elections in compliance with relevant
international standards
33. Kyrgyzstan has held several
elections over the past eight years, including during the Covid-19 pandemic.
The authorities regularly seek the views of the electorate, especially
when it comes to important decisions. Kyrgyzstan has systematically
invited our Assembly to observe its elections. International observers have
noted an improvement in the electoral process.
34. A number of recurring problems have been observed, however
(see paragraph 20 above). The changes to the electoral system in
2021 are an additional cause for concern, not least because they
deprive a large section of the population of the right to be elected
to parliament (see paragraph 21). Parliament and the national authorities
should be encouraged to bring the electoral processes in Kyrgyzstan
into line with international standards, including through the implementation
of Assembly’s and Venice Commission’s previous recommendations in
this area.
3.5. Commitment
to encourage balanced participation of women and men in public and
political life
35. The Constitution of 2021 states
that “No one shall be discriminated against on the grounds of sex,
race, language, disability, ethnicity, religion, age, political
or other opinion, education, origin, financial or other status, or
other circumstances” (Article 24, paragraph 1) and that “men and
women have equal rights and freedoms and equal opportunities for
their realisation” (Article 24, paragraph 3).
36. The “National Development Programme of the Kyrgyz Republic
to 2026”, however, implicitly recognises the existence of gender
inequality as it reads: “there is a need to ensure the economic
empowerment of women and to increase their representation at the
decision-making level. The legislation concerning quotas and representation
of women in elected bodies of central and local government must
be preserved. Women's representation in the executive branch must
also be strengthened.”
37. The fact is that, as indicated in paragraph 21, despite the
30% quota for women in parliament provided for in the electoral
legislation, in practice women make up only 20% of MPs. While the
30% rule does seem to be observed when it comes to electing MPs
from party lists (with 18 women out of 54 seats, namely one third), no
women have been elected to parliament in the 36 single-member constituencies.
38. Women are very active in the political arena and play a key
role in community life and civil society in Kyrgyzstan. Tradition
weighs heavily on people's attitudes, however, peddling stereotypes
typical of a patriarchal society in which men take part in public
and economic life and women take care of their families and their
homes. More effort is needed on the part of the Kyrgyz authorities
to develop and consolidate a culture of equality in all fields.
3.6. Accession
to relevant Council of Europe conventions and partial agreements,
in particular those dealing with human rights, the rule of law and
democracy
39. Kyrgyzstan has not signed any
Council of Europe conventions open to non-member States. It has
only acceded to the partial agreement establishing the Venice Commission,
in January 2004. It is a matter of great regret to me that Kyrgyzstan
has not availed itself of the opportunity afforded it to move closer
to the common European legal space.
3.7. Obligation
to inform the Assembly regularly on the state of progress in implementing
Council of Europe principles
40. Another missed opportunity.
As Mr Alain Destexhe pointed out, the participation of Kyrgyz parliamentarians
in the work of the Assembly and its committees has so far been very
uneven and not very active compared with that of their Jordanian,
Moroccan and Palestinian colleagues, who are fully integrated into
our work.
41. The distances and travel time, as well as the limited and
shrinking budget of the Kyrgyz Parliament, make it difficult for
Kyrgyz MPs to come to Strasbourg or Paris. Nevertheless, there can
be no genuine partnership without their presence and participation
and without dialogue. During my contacts with representatives of
parliament and the executive, I have been most insistent on this
point. Such participation, too, could provide them with a platform
from which to raise awareness among their European colleagues of
the specific problems facing their country. We, in turn, could consider
holding certain activities – committee and sub-committee meetings,
conferences and seminars – in Kyrgyzstan.
4. Fact-finding
visit to Bishkek (22-24 March 2022)
42. From 22 to 24 March 2022, I
carried out a fact-finding visit to Kyrgyzstan in preparation for
this report. As with my predecessor, Mr Alain Destexhe, the visit
had been postponed several times pending the country’s political
and institutional stabilisation.
43. For me, the fact-finding visit was an opportunity to discover
Kyrgyzstan and to discuss the implementation of the partnership
with numerous people, including representatives from the international community,
Kyrgyz parliamentary partners (including the Deputy Speaker of Parliament,
members of the partner for democracy delegation newly appointed
and representatives from the main parliamentary committees), representatives
from the executive (the Minister of Justice, the Deputy Ministers
of Foreign Affairs and of the Interior, and the Ombudsperson) and
the judiciary (the President of the Constitutional Court), and lastly,
civil society. The programme can be consulted on the Assembly website
(AS/Pol/Inf (2022) 11).
44. Throughout the visit, I stressed the need for Kyrgyzstan to
respect the political commitments made as part of its status as
a partner for democracy, as set out in paragraph 5 of Parliamentary
Assembly Resolution 1984 (2014), and to make progress, as a priority,
in the areas listed in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the resolution, which
the Assembly considered essential for strengthening democracy, the
rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
in the country. This included pervasive corruption, a judiciary
lacking impartiality and independence, widespread use of torture
and impunity for the law enforcement officers who perpetrate it,
acts of intimidation of civil society and the still unresolved consequences
of interethnic tensions.
45. I also made it clear, in accordance with paragraph 19 of Resolution
1984 (2014), that progress in the reforms was the prime aim of the
partnership and should be the benchmark for assessing its efficiency.
46. During my discussions, I wished to take stock, with my hosts,
of the eight years of partnership. I began by noting the positive
points, such as Kyrgyzstan’s desire to differentiate itself from
neighbouring countries, the fact that the authorities give the people
a voice more regularly (in particular, through referenda), the promotion of
the participation of women and minorities in political life (it
is worth noting that the recent introduction of uninominal voting
in some constituencies has been detrimental in this respect), the
elections which were considered “acceptable” by international observers
despite the practice of vote buying, and the appointment of a Kyrgyz
Ambassador to France in the summer of 2021.
47. I then expressed our concerns regarding certain developments.
Firstly, the furious pace of elections and the scale of the reforms
carried out. Since October 2020, presidential, parliamentary and
local elections have been held. The new Constitution, which came
into force on 5 May 2021 after having been adopted a month earlier
in what some observers considered an unconstitutional manner, weakened
the balance and separation of powers, with the transition from a
parliamentary to a presidential system, the diminution of the role
of parliament (in particular, a reduction in the prerogatives and
number of MPs), and the lack of independence of the judiciary. The
electoral system was also changed in July 2021. The elections were
held, and the reforms carried out without any real, informed debate
and with a record low level of participation by the people. In addition,
the legislative stocktaking process launched by the executive in
April 2021, which covers more than 300 laws and whose outcome is
to be announced shortly, also featured prominently in our discussions. Although
the people I spoke to justified the stocktaking exercise, citing
the obsolescence of certain laws and the need to bring them into
line with the Constitution, I reminded them of the importance of
not calling into question international standards, in particular
where human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law and
democracy were concerned. I also raised other matters of concern,
including the lack of any real opposition in parliament, the resurgence
of certain traditional values detrimental to the status of women
in society (particularly in the southern part of the country) and
rising religious extremism.
48. In addition, at the level of the Assembly, I deemed it necessary
to insist on the lack of involvement of the Kyrgyz partner since
2014, and on the missed opportunities to communicate with the Venice
Commission in 2021, notably during the above-mentioned adoption
of the new Constitution.
49. Regarding these aspects, civil society representatives stated
that they shared our concerns. Gender issues and the need to pursue
the fight against torture and improve the situation in prisons were
addressed. In this respect, the death in detention of Azimjon Askarov
in 2020, in circumstances which have not yet been elucidated, was
brought up. Also, the many significant legislative changes made
in the summer of 2021 were highlighted, including the law on fake
news, amendments to the law on non-commercial organisations, to
the law on the registration of legal entities, to the Criminal Code,
the Code of Criminal Procedure or to the law on public procurement.
They felt that these changes might complicate the fight against
corruption and undermine the rule of law and freedoms, by, for example,
worsening the situation of journalists and human rights defenders.
This tendency was confirmed by cases of intimidation and criminal
charges being brought against journalists (see paragraph 25). Civil
society representatives also spoke, however, of the need to continue
the partnership, as it was a genuine help in their efforts, and
of their hopes for the new parliament.
50. As for the Kyrgyz authorities, they reiterated their deep
commitment to the Kyrgyz Parliament’s partner for democracy status
and said that, overall, they shared its objectives. They justified
the previously mentioned changes, citing the need to improve effectiveness
and to make political players accountable in order to fight corruption
and impunity. They also said that the political instability and
the epidemic over the past few years, as well as budgetary issues,
explained their limited participation in and contribution to the
work of the Assembly.
51. Everyone I met pointed out that democratic values were part
of the Kyrgyz identity and culture, whose legacy was reflected in,
for example, the presence of a particularly active civil society.
Representatives from parliament, the government and civil society
considered that continuing with the partnership would be a major incentive
to carry on developing democracy, the rule of law, and the protection
of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the country.
52. I insisted that there was now a need to achieve concrete progress,
after eight years of partnership. During the discussions, I pointed
out, in accordance with paragraphs 17 and 22 of Resolution 1984
(2014) and with the commitment made by the Speaker of Parliament
in his letter of 27 October 2011, the importance of Kyrgyz legislation
being brought into line with Council of Europe standards, which
could be achieved through the country’s accession to some relevant
conventions and partial agreements open to non-members. The presence
of members of the newly appointed Kyrgyz delegation at forthcoming
Assembly sessions and the outcome of the legislative stocktaking
process would also send an important political message.
53. I also wished to discuss with those I met the considerable
difficulties and challenges faced by the county, be they economic,
social or geopolitical. Kyrgyzstan’s heavy dependence on the Russian
Federation, not least due to the presence there of more than a million
Kyrgyz migrant workers whose money transfers represent approximately
25% of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP, is one of them. The country is also particularly
affected by the fallout from the current geopolitical context, as
the Russian Federation has, for example, temporarily suspended its grain
exports to the former Soviet republics. Despite these issues, the
war being waged by the Russian Federation in Ukraine has led Kyrgyzstan
to distance itself from the aggressor, including by refusing to
send soldiers as part of the defence agreement with Russia, by reiterating
Ukraine’s sovereignty, by calling for a political solution and by
offering to host talks.
5. Conclusions
and proposals
54. When the Assembly agreed to
grant partner for democracy status to the Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic,
it stressed that progress in taking forward reforms was the prime
aim of the partnership and should constitute the benchmark for assessing
its efficiency.
55. Eight years on, I have to point out that the democratic reform
process in Kyrgyzstan, which seemed well under way and promising
when the status was granted, has seen mixed results. Not enough
progress has been made in implementing the political commitments
entered into by parliament.
56. It is a matter of particular regret to me that the parliament
has not been able to make good use of the opportunities afforded
by the partnership to advance democratic reforms in the country,
to bring it closer to the common European legal space and to contribute
to European political dialogue at parliamentary level. It is also regrettable
that, since being granted partner status, the Kyrgyz Republic has
not become party to any Council of Europe conventions or partial
agreements, as it pledged to do.
57. I note that the
ad hoc Committee
of the Bureau of the Assembly tasked with observing the 28 November 2021
elections called on the newly elected Kyrgyz Parliament to step
up its co-operation with the Assembly and to recommit to the aims
of, and fully use the opportunities offered by, its partner for
democracy status so as to ensure compliance with political commitments
entered into upon requesting the status, as set out in
Resolution 1984 (2014).
58. The recent political and institutional developments mentioned
above, such as the political crisis and the cancellation of the
October 2020 elections, the constitutional reform and the adoption
of several laws aimed at strengthening the executive at the expense
of parliament and the judiciary, restricting freedom of association and
amending the electoral legislation, are cause for concern. It does
not appear from these developments that the country’s political
system is moving in the direction proclaimed at the time of the
application for partner for democracy status.
59. The situation regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms
in the country is also a matter of serious concern. The recent attempts
to intimidate and bring criminal prosecutions against human rights
defenders and journalists support this observation. They run counter
to the commitments made by Kyrgyzstan under the partnership for
democracy, as listed in paragraphs 14 and 15 of Resolution 1984.
Among the priorities identified were the following:
- “guaranteeing and promoting
freedom of expression and media independence and plurality; implementing
legal provisions that effectively guarantee press freedom and protect
the media from political pressure” (paragraph 15.21);
- “guaranteeing and promoting, in law and in practice, freedom
of association and peaceful assembly; ensuring strict implementation
of the law on associations” (paragraph 15.22);
- “refraining from adopting laws aimed directly or indirectly
at restricting civil society activities” (paragraph 15.23).
60. The country has also entered into commitments regarding gender
issues, the fight against the use of torture, and the improvement
of living conditions in places of detention. Concerns have been
reported in relation to these issues, too.
61. Like my predecessors, moreover, I note that the representatives
of the Kyrgyz Parliament have shown little interest in developing
genuine co-operation with our Assembly and have hardly participated
in the work of our committees at all. In this connection, I have
to point out that the Assembly’s Rules of Procedure state that the
parliament enjoying partner for democracy status shall inform the
Assembly regularly of the progress made in the implementation of
Council of Europe principles.
62. During my visit to Kyrgyzstan in March 2022, I had the opportunity
to discuss these concerns with our newly elected colleagues in parliament,
as well as with representatives of the government, the Constitutional Court,
civil society and the international community. Almost everyone I
spoke to expressed their support for the continuation of the partnership
and their determination to make it more effective.
63. I also note the particular international context in which
Kyrgyzstan is situated, its willingness to defend the sovereignty
of Ukraine, not to associate itself with Russian aggression and
to advocate a strictly peaceful settlement of disputes between these
two countries, and its readiness to act as a mediator in the talks.
64. In view of the above, I consider it important that the Assembly
continue to support the efforts of the Kyrgyz authorities to move
the country towards democracy, respect for human rights and the
rule of law.
65. I therefore propose that the Assembly continue with its partnership
with the Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic while at the same time
maintaining a rigorous dialogue, and that it reassess the partnership
in depth in two years' time based on an analysis of results and
tangible progress made.
66. In this connection, I welcome the appointment of the new partner
delegation by the parliament elected in November 2021 and would
encourage it to redouble its efforts to use the framework offered
by the partnership to drive democratic change in the country.