1. Introduction
1. Matters relating to national
defence do not fall within the scope of the Council of Europe, as
explicitly stated in its Statute (ETS No. 1). Military affairs are
not included in the mandate of any Council of Europe subsidiary
body or committee. But security is a wider concept than defence,
and rests to a great extent on compliance with democratic processes,
human rights and the rule of law, issues which fall squarely within
the remit of the Council of Europe. Indeed, the Statute itself says
that the very aim of the organisation is “to achieve a greater unity
between its members” and refers to the “pursuit of peace based upon
justice and international co-operation”.
2. While the Russian Federation’s large-scale, unprovoked, and
unjustified aggression against Ukraine has brought to the forefront
military concerns, it is necessary to take a comprehensive and long-term
view and work towards strengthening democratic security in Europe,
so as to make Council of Europe member States more resilient in
the face of current and future crises. Even before the current war
of aggression in the heart of Europe, Council of Europe member States
had acknowledged that as threats to security evolve, the Organisation’s
contribution to common stability and security needs to evolve accordingly
and concerted responses developed.
In this spirit, it is important
for the Council of Europe to look at all the various aspects of
security that are related to its mandate.
3. Within the Parliamentary Assembly, various notions of security
fall within the mandates of committees. Issues related to democratic
stability, soft security, and the prevention and settlement of crises
and conflicts fall within the remit of the Committee on Political
Affairs and Democracy. The fulfilment of the obligations assumed
by the member States under the terms of the Statute, the European
Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5), and other conventions, are
under the purview of the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and
Commitments by Member States, which also has a Sub-Committee on
Conflicts between Council of Europe Member States. To confirm the
transversal concern with these matters, in the past a Sub-Committee on
Conflict Prevention through Dialogue and Reconciliation and an ad hoc Sub-Committee on early warning systems
and conflict prevention in Europe existed in the committee on Political
Affairs and Democracy. The Committee has currently set up a Sub-Committee
on Democracy.
4. The Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights is concerned
with allegations of serious human rights violations, rule of law
and issues relating to the fight against terrorism. And while the
Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons is tasked
with addressing all matters relating to these groups, the Committee on
Culture, Science, Education and Media covers issues related to freedom
of the media, disinformation, internet governance and security.
5. Themes explored by previous Assembly reports and resolutions
have included private security firms and the erosion of the State
monopoly on the use of force, escalation of tensions and conflicts
in specific areas of Europe and the neighbourhood, counter-terrorism
co-operation and the threat to European security posed by drug trafficking.
Some of the specific security challenges in Europe addressed by
the Assembly in the past include the Chechen wars, the conflicts
over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, the Russian Federation’s illegal annexation
of Crimea and the Russian war with Georgia in 2008.
2. Democratic security
6. The notion of democratic security,
first put at the heart of the Organisation’s mission in the Vienna Declaration
of 1993, is central to understanding the role of the Council of
Europe in this area and how to further strengthen it. Concluding
their First Summit, the Heads of State and Government affirmed their
will to render the Council of Europe “fully capable of contributing
to democratic security” and consolidating peace and stability on
the European continent, while countering “territorial ambitions,
the resurgence of aggressive nationalism, the perpetuation of spheres
of influence, intolerance or totalitarian ideologies”. They committed
to promoting joint security by opening doors to newly democratic
countries and building a European construction based on the Organisation’s
values.
7. The subsequent Summits of 1997 in Strasbourg and 2005 in Warsaw
also reaffirmed the need for the Council of Europe to intensify
its contribution to stability and security on the continent, outlining
new threats that called for concerted responses in numerous areas.
8. Former Secretary General Thorbjørn Jagland made democratic
security the central analytical framework through which to assess
the state of human rights, democracy and rule of law in his 2015
annual report.
This report followed two
major threats to security in Europe: the illegal occupation and
annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, in violation of
the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity which are
enshrined in international law including, amongst others, in the
Helsinki Final Act; and two terrorist attacks in Paris and Copenhagen
committed by radicalised individuals affiliated with Daesh.
9. Noting that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with each
other, and that democratic practices protect States from internal
strife, he stressed that Council of Europe member States have a
shared responsibility for ensuring democratic security. While “hard
security” continued to be vital, the report noted that deterrence
and military capacity could not guarantee stability on their own,
and that democratic norms and practices were the necessary foundations
for lasting peace.
10. In this respect, the backsliding of democracy, as described
by the current Secretary General Marija Pejčinović Burić in her
2021 annual report,
is
all the more worrying. In addition to domestic repercussions, this development
is bound to have consequences on the collective security of Europe
if allowed to persist, as the two spheres are interdependent. We
cannot reasonably expect a country which violates democratic principles domestically
to be a safe and reliable partner in its relations with its neighbours.
Democratic strength in all of our societies leads to more collective
security within the common democratic European home.
11. Democratic security has many dimensions. One of them is citizen
and civil society engagement, as underlined by the Assembly in its
Resolutions
2437 (2022) “Safeguarding and promoting genuine democracy in Europe”,
and
2186 (2017) “Call for a Council of Europe summit to reaffirm European
unity and to defend and promote democratic security in Europe”.
12. To strengthen democracies and counter the backsliding it is
essential to find new ways of involving citizens in decision-making
processes, in addition to ensuring the good functioning of representative democracy.
Civil society plays a key role in holding the authorities accountable
– but civil society engagement is often the target of manipulation,
and for this reason the Council of Europe needs to give citizens
tools to stay resilient against misinformation and attempts to manipulate
them. Freedom of the media, the protection of journalists and access
to reliable information are also essential to ensure a healthy pluralist
environment and to exert a counterbalance to power.
13. In a context of democratic backsliding, freedom of association
is often restricted, specifically to limit the scrutiny by civil
society organisations, and must therefore be better safeguarded.
Local democracy plays a key role in shaping public trust towards
public institutions, as it is the governance level which is the
closest to people. Cross-border initiatives can further help confidence
building, conflict prevention and the establishment of good neighbourly
relations.
14. Working on all these fronts will serve to increase the public’s
trust in democratic institutions and will contribute to strengthening
democratic security.
3. A
comprehensive concept of security
15. The Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the first intergovernmental organisation
to have adopted a concept of comprehensive and co-operative security,
which its participating States have reaffirmed in major documents
and decisions taken since the Helsinki Final Act.
According to this approach, comprehensive
security includes:
- a politico-military
dimension,
- an economic and environmental dimension,
- a human dimension.
16. These three dimensions are complementary, interconnected,
interdependent and of equal importance. The underlying idea is that
the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms and economic
and environmental governance are as important for the sustainability
of peace and security as is politico-military co-operation.
17. Another way to describe this complex interaction is by using
concepts such as:
- hard security,
which relies on the use of military force to respond to external,
inter-State, threats,
- and soft/deep security, which focuses on non-military
ways to build resilience against threats and prevent conflicts.
4. Human
security and equality
18. The Council of Europe’s core
priority of promoting human rights, democracy and rule of law contributes directly
to the notions of soft, deep and comprehensive security.
19. The Westphalian notion of security is centred on contracts
between sovereign countries, on military activity and on national
and regional stability. While still relevant today, since the fall
of the Berlin Wall there has been a significant shift in recognising
the importance of “soft” security – societal stability and individuals’ well-being
– in both the domestic and the international arena.
A human security approach, focused
on human beings and on their rights, livelihoods and dignity, became
more important in political discourse, including within the Council
of Europe.
20. The Final Declaration of the Second Summit of Heads of State
and Government recognises the citizens’ concerns regarding new dimensions
of threats to their security and includes people-centred elements
in its Action Plan. As the guardian of human rights on the continent,
and as the principal body for standard-setting in democracy and
rule of law, the Council of Europe has played a central role in
promoting human security, whether explicitly presented as such or
not.
21. Zooming out from the individual to the societal, the Council
of Europe has always paid close attention to equality as a cardinal
factor in a democratic society. Beyond the anti-discrimination and
human rights aspects of equality, it is important to underline that
socio-economic inequalities threaten the democratic stability of
our countries and dent citizens’ trust in politics. The Assembly
addressed this topic recently in
Resolution 2437 (2022), noting how growing inequalities are among the factors
having contributed to a general feeling of disenchantment with democracy
in Europe.
5. New
security threats
22. In the past decade, new security
threats have emerged, forcing a realignment of resources and attention from
governments and international organisations. These new threats also
point to the importance of organisations such as the Council of
Europe, to focus on how they can play their part to contribute to
shared security outside the military sphere. Many of these new threats
are transnational and see the involvement of non-State actors.
23. New forms of “hybrid wars” seek to use cyberattacks, disinformation,
migration and energy supplies as ways of destabilising rivals, even
outside the context of open war. The classic distinction between
war and peace is therefore blurred, leading to new security threats
faced by Council of Europe member States outside of the military
realm.
5.1. Cyber
security
24. Cyberattacks have become a
mainstay in both peacetime intelligence operations and more overt conflicts
as parallel means of harming the enemy. Cyberattacks are particularly
dangerous as they can hit a country’s strategic infrastructure,
such as its energy supply, financial networks, the air traffic control
system or nuclear plants. The Assembly has already explored the
ramifications of such type of warfare, and raised specific concerns,
in Resolution 2217 (2018) and Recommendation 2130 (2018) “Legal
challenges related to hybrid war and human rights obligations”.
25. The recent aggression is no exception. In the two months preceding
the Russian aggression, Ukraine was targeted by at least three waves
of cyberattacks specifically aimed at sites of government bodies,
the networks of the Ministry of Defence, banks and other State institutions.
26. Beyond the most obviously disruptive cyberattacks involving
the functioning of computers and servers, States are increasingly
confronted also with mass disinformation campaigns, including fake
news, interference in election processes, and disruption of communications.
These represent direct attacks on the functioning of our democracies,
and therefore of our common democratic security. In this respect,
the Budapest Convention on cybercrime (
ETS
No. 185), whose Second Additional Protocol was opened for signature
on 12 May 2022, remains an important framework.
5.2. Disinformation
27. In Resolution 2326 (2020),
the Assembly expressed its concern over the scale of “information
pollution,” the spread of disinformation campaigns aimed at shaping
public opinion, and trends of foreign electoral interference and
manipulation. It pointed to the need to improve the internet’s content
and architecture, build up the resilience of Europe’s democratic
systems and societies, counter disinformation, invest in quality journalism
and preserve freedom of expression and media and political pluralism,
especially in the context of elections. Similarly, two recent recommendations
by the Committee of Ministers identified disinformation as a growing
threat to democracy and provided specific guidelines for States
to address it.
28. The European Parliament, likewise, has expressed concern about
the growing incidence and increasingly sophisticated nature of attempts
at foreign interference and manipulation of information, mainly
by the Russian Federation and China, targeting the democratic functioning
of the European Union and its member States. In a March 2022 resolution,
it called on the Commission to propose a cross-sector strategy aimed
at equipping the European Union with appropriate foresight and resilience
policies and deterrence tools, and to consider the establishment
of an independent European Centre for Interference Treats and Information Integrity.
5.3. Migration
as a weapon
29. While ensuring the safety of
migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers remains a humanitarian concern for
European governments, the appalling truth is that migrants are increasingly
being weaponised. Non-democratic governments use the aspirations
and desperate situations of human beings as tools to exploit political
divisions and public fears over uncontrolled immigration in European
countries. This, in turn, hardens attitudes towards migration and
asylum seekers within specific countries, leading to less stability
and social cohesion.
5.4. Energy
security
30. While the notion of energy
security is not new, the recent large-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine
has demonstrated in the starkest terms the potential security effects
of energy supply chains. Many European countries’ dependence on
Russian gas has been a brake on the full force of international
reactions to the invasion. Conversely, hydrocarbon flows have been
a convenient political lever for Moscow – and other energy suppliers
– for many decades, also helpful to defuse criticisms over their
human rights or democratic records, in turn hampering prospects
for shared democratic security.
31. In a sharp demonstration of the risks to European countries,
the Russian Federation abruptly suspended natural gas deliveries
to Poland and Bulgaria on 27 April 2022 due to their refusal to
pay in roubles, despite this not being in breach of their contractual
obligations to Gazprom. This followed the Russian leadership’s announcement
a few weeks earlier that “unfriendly” foreign buyers would have
to pay for gas in the Russian currency.
5.5. Violent
extremism and terrorism
32. While in the past few years
these issues have been less in the focus of public attention, radicalisation leading
to violent extremism and terrorism continue to be major threats
to democratic security in Europe. The Council of Europe should continue
to support its member States in preventing and combating this scourge while
ensuring international co-operation and assisting its victims.
5.6. Food
security
33. The Russian Federation’s aggression
against Ukraine has cast a tragic light on the impact of conflict
on food security. Ukraine is a net exporter of agricultural products,
and nearly 50 countries depend on the Russian Federation and Ukraine
for at least 30% of their wheat imports and generally to meet their
consumption needs.
The Russian aggression has resulted
in an enormous food security challenge, disrupting livelihoods during
the agricultural growing season in Ukraine and significantly affecting
global food supplies. Scarcity of key food and agricultural products
can lead to instability and unrest in many countries and has the
potential to affect European security.
6. Conflicts
in Europe
34. Since the end of the Second
World War, multilateral fora have played an important role in providing
a space for bilateral issues to be addressed constructively. Disputes
have emerged throughout the years, ranging from interpretation of
historical events to trade and economic disagreements, but dialogue
prevailed as the option to address outstanding issues.
35. Nonetheless, certain long-standing, unresolved conflicts in
Europe, often fuelled by dangerous political narratives, continue
to create instability and can potentially escalate.
36. The island of Cyprus remains divided by an unresolved conflict
which saw multiple military interventions in the 1970’s. Despite
several attempts over the past 47 years to reach a political agreement,
the outcome remains uncertain, and the presence of blue helmets
is maintained to this day. Disagreements remain among Council of
Europe member States over the status of Kosovo.*
Twenty-five
years following the end of a brutal war in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
tensions are once again on the rise and threatening to tear apart
a delicately crafted balance. The implementation of the Good Friday
Agreement in Northern Ireland has provided much respite from past
violence but remains fragile and in need of responsible political
stewardship. Disagreements on maritime boundaries and natural resources
in the Eastern Mediterranean have led to military build-up, and dangerous
rhetoric, between member States over the last years.
37. There are also a number of protracted conflicts with significant
military activity which have been affecting the lives of thousands
of people. The situations in Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
where the Russian Federation has supported breakaway movements in
violation of member States’ sovereignty and territorial integrity,
pose serious security and humanitarian problems. Longstanding hostilities
between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh erupted into
full scale armed conflict in 2020 and, despite a peace deal from
later that year, a renewed crisis in 2021 led to further clashes.
38. Notwithstanding these different types of conflicts affecting
Europe, it is clear that the ongoing Russian aggression against
Ukraine is on an entirely different scale. Nothing compares to what
we are witnessing in Ukraine, with the full-on invasion of sovereign
country from various sides, through land, air and sea attacks and with
the complete destruction of entire cities and civilian infrastructure.
The Geneva Conventions on international humanitarian law are being
openly flouted, with civilians being targeted and numerous recorded instances
of war crimes.
39. The Council of Europe must draw lessons from this war of aggression.
In this new hostile environment, where the scale of conflict is
unlike anything our continent had seen since the Second World War,
the Organisation needs to redouble its efforts to contribute to
deep/soft security throughout all of its activities and be a forum
for member States to uphold democratic security with renewed vigour.
Its role as a platform for dialogue, diplomacy, confidence-building
and conflict prevention should also be strengthened.
7. The
need to protect and reform rules-based multilateralism
40. The Russian aggression against
Ukraine cannot be seen as a bilateral issue between two States.
It is a clash between two mindsets and approaches to international
relations: one relies on a rules-based international order while
the other is based on spheres of interest. One is based on rules,
dialogue, co-operation and finding political solutions to disputes;
the other one is based on confrontation and the use of force.
41. Rules-based multilateralism must be part of the solution to
the new and revived security concerns facing Europe. As a direct
result of the Russian aggression against Ukraine, however, many
multilateral institutions find themselves weakened.
42. The UN General Assembly’s 145-5 vote against the Russian aggression
on 2 March 2022, and its April decision to suspend the Russian Federation
from the Human Rights Council, showed the relevance of international
diplomacy. But the main body charged with international peace and
security, the Security Council, finds itself paralysed. The Russian
Federation’s veto power has prevented the Security Council from expressing
itself on one of the most consequential security matters of our
time and will likely inhibit its action in the future. The lack
of co-operation in the Security Council will also impact international
responses to crises globally.
43. The Russian aggression on Ukraine represents the most severe
test for the OSCE since its founding in 1975. As the multilateral
body most involved in the security architecture in Europe since
the days of the Cold War, it had already played an important role
in Ukraine since 2014, leading a sizeable monitoring mission and participating
in the Trilateral Contact Group, with the Russian Federation and
Ukraine, to try to find a diplomatic solution to the war in Donbass.
The OSCE remains one of the few organisations with the potential
to play a role in implementing any ceasefire agreement between the
Russian Federation and Ukraine, given its wide membership and security
focus.
44. Nonetheless, as a consensus-based organisation, the stark
differences of views on the situation among the participating States
will prove a difficult obstacle for the effectiveness of its work.
The recent failure to extend the mandate of the Special Monitoring
Mission, which expired on 31 March 2022, is a concrete demonstration
of the challenges to the OSCE’s core functioning.
45. The Arctic Council has been a venue for the eight States and
indigenous peoples of the Arctic to tackle the challenges of sustainable
development and environmental protection since 1996. In March 2022,
all members aside from the Russian Federation announced a pause
in their participation in the Council, and their withdrawal from
all meetings to be hosted by the current chair, the Russian Federation.
46. The Russian aggression on Ukraine is an event of such magnitude
that it is leading to the repositioning of some Council of Europe
member States in relation to their military alliances. Sweden and
Finland are in the process of formally applying to join NATO, abandoning
decades-long neutrality policies. The popular sentiment in both
countries seems to be shifting as well, with 62% of Finnish respondents
saying they favour NATO membership, up from 21% five years ago,
and a growing majority in Sweden supporting the move.
Finland’s accession to NATO would
be particularly significant, as it would represent the sixth State
bordering the Russian Federation to join the alliance, and one with
a 1 340 km-long shared border.
47. For more than one reason, 2022 will be a defining year for
NATO. In addition to eventual decisions on enlargement, allies will
adopt a new Strategic Concept in June 2022, the first one in twelve
years. As part of its recommendations for the Strategic Concept,
the NATO Parliamentary Assembly proposed the establishment of a
Democratic Resilience Centre within NATO Headquarters, to protect
democracy and strengthen allies’ ability to resist and counter attempts
to undermine it.
It also suggested that the Strategic
Concept should promote a more “political NATO” to facilitate the
convergence of views among Allies.
48. These kinds of initiatives to reinforce democratic resilience
and political dialogue are to be supported. In the face of the current
challenge to rules-based multilateralism, it is necessary not only
to protect multilateral institutions but also to reform them and
equip them with new tools which can make them more effective and capable
of tackling the current and future threats. This includes questions
regarding enlargement, as more countries in Europe seek to join
multilateral institutions on the basis of shared values.
49. In this new security context fraught with risks, Council of
Europe member States should renew their commitment to the values
of democracy, human rights and the rule of law and reiterate their
support for the Council of Europe as the cornerstone European organisation
aimed at developing a shared space for these values to thrive, in
the pursuit of peace based upon justice and international co-operation.
While Europe is experiencing a period of uncertainty, it should
reaffirm its unity around the values which are and should continue
to be the foundation of the multilateral architecture and support
the next phases of European enlargement as a strategic way of reinforcing
democratic security.
8. European
Union response
50. The Russian aggression on Ukraine
has proved to be a catalyst for the unity and greater leadership
of the European Union as a global actor. In just over two months,
with unprecedented speed, the European Union adopted several packages
of increasingly fierce sanctions against the Russian Federation.
President von der Leyen’s visit to Kyiv and Bucha – the site of
an alleged massacre of civilians by Russian forces – in early April was
the most visible representation of the European Union’s solidarity
with a third country under attack. The security and defence discourse
that has emerged from both Brussels and EU capitals indicates a
fundamental shift in the European Union’s approach to continental
security.
51. France, a long-time proponent of stronger EU military integration
and current holder of the rotating presidency, has pointed to the
Russian invasion as evidence that Europe must become more self-reliant
for its own defence.
At the informal European Council
meeting in Versailles of 10-11 March 2022, EU leaders reaffirmed
their commitment to strengthen European security and defence and
increase the EU’s capacity to act autonomously. President von der
Leyen announced that the European Commission would prepare an analysis
of the defence investments gaps by May 2022, and the President of
the European Parliament also indicated the European Union should
go further on joint defence.
52. As President von der Leyen asserted in a speech to the European
Parliament in early March 2022, “European security and defence have
evolved more in the last six days than in the last two decades.”
53. Several EU countries, including Germany, Romania and Sweden,
have announced an increase in their defence spending.
In addition, many of them, including
traditionally neutral ones like Finland and Sweden, have been sending
weapons to Ukraine since the beginning of the Russian aggression,
with High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, and German Foreign Minister,
Annalena Baerbock, both calling on EU member States to increase
their supply of heavy weapons and military equipment in the leadup
to a recent Foreign Affairs Council.
54. Under the European Peace Facility, an instrument established
only in 2021 aimed at enhancing the European Union’s ability to
prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, the European
Council approved a total of €1.5 billion in funding since February
2022 to support the Ukrainian armed forces.
55. Even the new Strategic Compass, approved by the European Council
on 21 March 2022, has a strong defence focus, with plans to establish
a rapid deployment capacity of up to 5 000 troops, conduct regular
live exercises on land and at sea, enhance military mobility and
substantially enhance member States’ individual defence expenditures.
The new strategy also seeks to address the prominence of hybrid
threats, committing to developing Hybrid Toolbox and Response Teams,
an EU Cyber Defence Policy, and a Foreign Information Manipulation
and Interference Toolbox.
9. The role
of the Council of Europe: conclusions and proposals
56. At different moments of their
history, Council of Europe member States decided to join this common European
home because they believed in a Europe without dividing lines. They
cherished the same values and accepted to be bound by the same obligations.
And yet, we are faced with the tragic reality of a brutal military aggression
in the heart of Europe. This event has shaken the international
and regional order.
57. Reacting to this challenge, the Committee of Ministers for
the first time used Article 8 of the Statute to end the membership
of a member State. If there is one initial lesson to learn is the
confirmation that Council of Europe member States are interdependent
for their security and stability. They are interdependent for ensuring the
pursuit of peace based upon justice and international co-operation,
which, as the Statute reads, is vital for the preservation of society
and European civilisation.
58. In this new, volatile and tense geopolitical context, it is
necessary to give a new vigour to the Council of Europe, support
it politically and equip it with robust means to carry out its mission.
The Council of Europe needs to have its deserved place in the European
political and institutional architecture, to support the democratic
security of its member States as well as rules-based multilateralism.
59. If this Organisation and its bodies are called to have an
impact on democratic security, it should have a clearer focus on
reversing the current trend of backsliding of democracy, on proposing
ways to strengthen and rejuvenate democratic institutions and to
tackle the root causes of this downward momentum. To this end, it
is imperative for the Council of Europe to put greater emphasis
on its activities aimed at strengthening the respect of the rule
of law in its member States, including through the Group of States
against Corruption (GRECO), the work of which is crucial not only
to enhance institutional resilience against corruption but also
to enhance public trust in the functioning of democratic institutions.
The ongoing reflection on the Council of Europe’s monitoring procedures
should be further pursued, and the Assembly should also play its
part.
60. Amongst the proposals that I would like to put on the table
is the creation of a new Council of Europe structure to strengthen
the member States’ democratic resilience. This Democratic Resilience
Initiative should monitor democratic developments in member States,
bringing to bear the work of existing Council of Europe bodies and
mechanisms with a view to preventing breaches of Council of Europe
standards and putting forward measures to strengthen democracy and
the rule of law.
61. Strengthening the Council of Europe’s action to reinforce
civil society in its member States should also be a priority. As
a cardinal element of democratic life, the vitality of civil society
will help determine the resilience of our shared democratic security
and help deter further backsliding. In this respect, I believe the
Council of Europe should establish a mechanism to monitor developments
related to civil society, freedom of association, and civil participation
in member States and provide early warning and recommendations to
the Secretary General. A reinforcement of the already-existing Expert
Council on NGO Law, for example, could be an avenue to be explored.
62. Building resilience of our domestic institutions is one of
the best investments our Organisation can make for the long-term
stability and security of Europe as a whole.
63. The Council of Europe should also have greater flexibility
and capacity for rapid reaction, particularly for issues which could
have spill-over effects beyond national borders, such as the protection
of the rights of national minorities. Unresolved issues can augment
tensions in the Council of Europe’s shared space, challenging democratic
security as well as democratic stability.
64. The Council of Europe should also play a greater role in the
area of conflict prevention, including through its parliamentary
dimension, and in promoting good neighbourly relations. When disputes
emerge between member States, parliamentary diplomacy can play an
important role to defuse tensions and promote mutual understanding
before things escalate further. The Assembly should increase its
activities on this front: through field visits, urgent procedures,
hearings, and its ability to bring parliamentarians together for
dialogue, it can be even more useful as part of our Organisation’s
efforts at early warning and conflict resolution.
65. Another area where the Council of Europe can re-focus more
attention and resources is in confidence-building measures. The
Organisation already conducts some limited activities in this regard,
bringing together civil society from the two sides in a conflict
situation to undergo joint trainings, thereby not only helping to
forge understanding but also spreading awareness of European human
rights, rule of law and democratic standards. The added value of
the Council of Europe in confidence-building lies precisely in the
vast array of standards that it can offer as a way of bringing people
together. The Assembly could therefore encourage member States to
allocate specific financial resources to this, and the Secretary
General could consider allocating staff dedicated to confidence-building
measures in the field offices.
66. Finally, the Council of Europe should place greater emphasis
on identifying and addressing new security challenges, including
“hybrid wars”, and to establish processes to step back and look
at how all the specific new challenges, from energy supplies to
cyber-attacks, relate to one another and affect European security.