1. Introduction
1. Since the adoption of Parliamentary
Assembly
Resolution 2308
(2019) “Functioning of democratic institutions in the Republic
of Moldova”, the country has experienced important political changes
after the November 2020 presidential election and the July 2021
early parliamentary elections, in a context marked by the management
of the pandemic and the consequences of the Russian aggression against
Ukraine. This monitoring report intends to recall the main developments
since 2019 and take stock of the progress achieved and the reforms
that are still needed.
2. We were appointed rapporteurs for the monitoring of the Republic
of Moldova respectively in October 2020 and February 2021. For the
preparation of this report, we relied on findings established by
our predecessors, Egidijus Vareikis (Lithuania, EPP/CD) and Maryvonne
Blondin (France, SOC). We issued statements after our two visits
to the Republic of Moldova from 12 to 15 October 2021
and from 6 to
9 June 2022
and published two
information notes in May 2021 and February 2022.
3. A preliminary draft report was sent to the authorities for
comments on 14 September 2022. Mr Vlad Batrîncea, member of the
opposition and Vice-President of the Moldovan Parliament, provided
comments.
We would
like to thank the Moldovan authorities for the excellent co-operation
and preparation of our visits as well as the continuous co-operation
established with the members of the Moldovan delegation to the Assembly, both
from the majority and the opposition, as well as with the Permanent
Representation of the Republic of Moldova to the Council of Europe.
Our co-operation with the Council of Europe Office in Chisinau was
also very important. We would like to extend our thanks to the Head
of the Council of Europe Office, Mr Massolin, and his team for their
invaluable assistance, as well as to the representatives of the
international organisations and diplomatic community of Chisinau
for our fruitful exchanges in these past two years.
2. Functioning of democratic institutions
2.1. Political
developments in the Republic of Moldova since 2019
2.1.1. From
November 2019 to November 2020: a period of political turbulences
4. Following a serious constitutional
crisis in June 2019,
Maia
Sandu, leader of the Platform Action and Solidarity (PAS), became
Prime Minister in June 2019, following an agreement between the
ACUM bloc (composed of PAS and the Dignity and Truth Platform (DA))
and the Party of the Socialists to “de-oligarchise” the country.
This objective and the subsequent reforms to “de-oligarchise” the
country had been welcomed by the Assembly in its October 2019 Resolution.
At the same time, the Assembly had stressed the need to adopt reforms
to the judiciary system and the prosecution office to comply with
Council of Europe standards.
5. The issue of the selection of a new Prosecutor General was
highly important in order to ensure that alleged cases of corruption,
interference in the judiciary and matters related to “state capture”
would be duly investigated.
6. As a matter of fact, the selection of the Prosecutor General
gave rise to a political crisis (as described at length by our predecessors)
and resulted,
on 12 November 2019, in a no confidence vote supported by 63 votes
(out of 101 members) from the Party of Socialists (PSRM) and the
Democratic Party (PDM), and Ms Sandu’s Government defeat two days
later, since the negotiation to form an alliance between the Party
of the Socialists and ACUM failed. Upon the proposal of the then
President, Igor Dodon, a technical government was formed in November
2019 (8 of the 10 cabinet ministers were former presidential advisors
to President Dodon) and approved by the parliament with the support
of the PRSM and the Democratic Party (PDM). On 16 March 2020 the
PRSM and the PDM signed a coalition agreement leading to a re-shuffle
of the government: the Democratic Party was granted five ministerial
posts, including the Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration and the Minister
of Defence.
7. Following the defection of 16 members from the PDM and one
from the PSRM between February and June 2020, the PSRM-PDM coalition
was left, as of 30 June 2020, without a parliamentary majority.
The opposition considered introducing a no-confidence vote. In the
meantime, it did not attend some sessions of parliament, which prevented
it from voting on texts due to the lack of quorum. In November 2020,
the PDM withdrew its ministers from the government, left the parliamentary
coalition shortly before the second round of the presidential election
and supported the candidature of Maia Sandu in the presidential
election.
8. While there was no longer a parliamentary majority, the question
whether early parliamentary elections could be organised together
with the presidential election was raised. The Constitutional Court
however ruled, on 7 July 2020, that the constitutional law clearly
bans the dissolution of parliament during the last six months of
the President’s term in office and does not envisage exceptions
from this ban – unless the President of the Republic resigns – thus
reversing its previous ruling which had permitted an exception to
this rule.
In addition, the
Constitutional Court ruled on 6 August 2020 that the President’s
discretionary powers are limited while appointing a candidate for
prime minister: the President is required to approve the prime minister’s
candidacy proposed by the absolute parliamentary majority, and can
be removed from office or dismissed if he/she fails to do so. If
there is no parliamentary majority, the President is obliged to
nominate a candidate for the post of prime minister after consulting
the parliamentary parties.
2.1.2. From
November 2020 to July 2021: from the election of the first female
President of the country to early parliamentary elections: a power
struggle between the President and the Prime Minister
9. The presidential election took
place on 1st November and 15 November 2020. Incumbent President Dodon,
running as an independent candidate supported by the Party of the
Socialists, and the leader of the Party of Action and Solidarity,
Maia Sandu, reached the second round. Businessman and leader of
“Our Party”, Renato Usaitii, who had won nearly 17% of the votes
in the first round, appeared as the kingmaker, called on the voters
not to vote for Mr Dodon and demanded that early elections be organised.
In the runoff to the election, Maia Sandu won a clear victory (57%),
with a massive support (92%) of the voters from the diaspora and
became the first elected woman to this position.
10. Due to the sanitary conditions, the Assembly could not observe
the election, but the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE/ODIHR) deployed a limited election observation mission which
concluded that fundamental freedoms of assembly and expression continued
to be respected, but that there was however negative and divisive campaigning
and polarising media coverage; lack of effective campaign finance
oversight; intolerant and divisive rhetoric in the second round;
prominent discussions over the role of Moldovan diaspora; allegations
of undue influence on public officials and voters; and possible
vote-buying and organised transportation of voters on election day.
11. The programme of newly elected President Sandu included reforms
of the judiciary and the fight against corruption. However, Maia
Sandu’s PAS did not have a parliamentary majority. At that time,
the main political parties, including PAS and the PSRM, which had
the largest political faction in parliament, were in favour of the organisation
of early parliamentary elections. Later on, their views differed
however on the timing of these elections. Subsequently a power struggle
between the presidential administration and the parliament ensued, while
questions on the interpretation of constitutional provisions were
referred to the Constitutional Court on many occasions by all political
parties to settle these disputes. This situation led to a serious
political and constitutional crisis by April 2021. We have devoted
an information note to these events and described at length the
developments between the November 2020 presidential election and
the dissolution of parliament in April 2021.
This led to a political and constitutional
crisis in a highly polarised climate, the dissolution of the parliament
and eventually the organisation of early parliamentary elections
on 11 July 2021.
12. In our note, we had also emphasised the major role played
by the Constitutional Court: several questions concerning the interpretation
of constitutional provisions were referred to the Constitutional
Court by parliamentarians belonging to different political factions.
However, on 15 April 2021, when the Constitutional Court, by 3 votes
to 2, ascertained that the conditions to dissolve the parliament
had been met, the parliamentary majority led by the Party of the
Socialists strongly reacted, dismissed the President of the Constitutional
Court (and appointed a substitute) and adopted a declaration on
the “usurpation of power” by the Constitutional Court. This amounted
to an unacceptable attack against the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional
Court later declared the decisions of the parliament as unconstitutional,
as well as the declaration of the state of emergency (which actually
rendered impossible the dissolution of the parliament).
13. On 11 July 2021, early parliamentary elections, based on the
proportional system, were organised. The Assembly
ad hoc election observation committee
concluded that the elections were competitive and well run despite
the inadequate handling of election disputes and campaign finance
issues.
14. These elections brought a new political landscape in the country:
for the first time in the history of the Republic of Moldova, a
single party, the Party Action and Solidarity, which won 52,8% of
the votes, has a large majority in parliament (63 seats out of 101).
The opposition comprises 32 MPs from the Electoral Bloc of Communists
and Socialists (BCS) and 6 MPs from the Shor Party.
15. The newly elected parliament held its first session on 26
July 2021 and elected Igor Grosu, interim leader of PAS, as President
of the Parliament. Natalia Gavrilița was appointed as Prime Minister-designate
the following day and her cabinet of 13 minister was sworn into
office on 6 August with the support of 61 votes, all from PAS.
2.1.3. Since
July 2021, an unprecedented political situation in the Republic
of Moldova, with a one-party, stable majority in parliament
16. The results of the presidential
election (November 2020) and the early parliamentary elections (11
July 2021) both indicated a clear choice expressed by the voters
in favour of eradicating corruption and building efficient and transparent
State institutions capable of functioning for the benefit of all.
17. As noted by the Assembly ad hoc committee
that observed the July 2021 elections, after years of political instability,
corruption and scandals, which cannot be uprooted by these early
elections alone, these elections have changed the political landscape:
“PAS has for the first time won an absolute majority of seats on
its own, and it is the first time since 1994 that neither the PSRM
nor PCRM have won the most votes or seats. Former PAS coalition
partner DA and the Democratic Party of Moldova (formerly connected
to oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc, who fled the country in 2019) are
no longer represented in parliament for the first time in over a decade”.
18. The new composition of the parliament would hopefully discourage
the long-criticised practice of “party hopping”, which Assembly
monitoring rapporteurs have often described and decried. Our predecessors, Ms Blondin
and Mr Vareikis, had noted, with concern, that 25% to 30% of the
members of parliament had switched political factions at least once
(if not two, or three times) from February 2019 until August 2020,
hence confirming a parliamentary practice which was not new.
More
recently, the first semester of 2020 saw the defection of 16 deputies
from the PDM, which eventually led to another political crisis,
and prompted the Moldovan Parliament to adopt on 11 June 2020 a
declaration condemning party defectors and political corruption
in parliament. We discussed this issue during our visit in October
2021, stressing that there was a momentum for the authorities to
address the roots of this political migration (or “political tourism”)
– which resulted from MPs switching political factions for reasons
other than ideological – and improve transparency in public life,
in particular to improve transparency in the financing of political
parties. This problem had been, in recent years, a chronic source
of political instability and has had a nefarious impact on the functioning
of the parliament and the trust in electoral processes.
19. A series of actions and reforms were swiftly launched by the
newly elected authorities to “cleanse” the system from its corrupt
elements and put an end to the “state capture”, including by reshuffling
the personal:
- A number of heads
of governmental agencies (such as the Land Relations and Cadastre
Agency, the Interethnic Relations Agency, the State Agency on Intellectual
Property institutions, the Public Property Agency or the National
Health Insurances Company) and 22 secretaries of state were dismissed
on 9 August 2021. The heads of the General Inspectorate of police
and the National agency for electronic communication and information
technologies were dismissed on 10 August 2021, and the Head of the General
Staff of the National Army on 8 September 2021.
- On 30 September 2021, the parliament adopted a law enabling
it to evaluate the performance of State institutions under parliamentary
control (such as the Competition Council, the National Agency for Energy
Regulation, the Audiovisual Council, the National Agency for Solving
Complaints and the National Commission of the Financial Market).
The law also provided that their managers could be dismissed if
they were considered as under-performing.
20. The appointment of new officials in State and judicial institutions
– and the speed of this process - raised questions. Some interlocutors
deplored that these positions had been allocated to members of the
extended family of the new authorities, which could undermine the
credibility of the government. We were informed that this is a long-standing
issue in the Republic of Moldova, given the traditions and personal
allegiances (“cumatrism”) prevailing in the country.
Appointment procedures were also
challenged by the parliamentary opposition: the Bloc of Communists
and Socialists decried the nomination of “loyal persons” in the
judiciary as well as the appointment of the new Ombudsperson, Ms
Moloşag, a former lawyer of Ms Sandu, on 23 September 2021.
These concerns were reiterated in
Mr Batrîncea’s comments.
21. In addition, the newly elected authorities, after major changes
that happened in the prosecution office (and notably the suspension
and
ad interim replacement
of the Prosecutor General), tackled the question of political corruption
linked to oligarch groups:
- The
prosecution and arrest of former President Igor Dodon was a major
event. He was detained on 24 May 2022 for 72 hours and sent to house
arrest. The Supreme Court of justice decided to release Mr Dodon
from house arrest on 19 November 2022, with a travel ban of 60 days.
Mr Dodon is accused of illicit enrichment, passive
corruption, illegal party funding and treason. This is related to
the alleged bribery of the then leader of the Democratic Party,
Vladimir Plahotniuc, in June 2019 (in the so-called "black bags”
case). On 27 June 2022, the Prosecutor General's Office brought
additional charges against Igor Dodon in the case of illegal schemes
for the purchase of electricity in 2008-2009 through Energocom.
- This adds to the detention, in February 2022, of four
former Communist deputies (who had “migrated” to the Democratic
Party and the Shor Party) on suspicion of corruption and illicit
enrichment, and the request for the lifting of parliamentary immunity
of MPs Ilhan Shor and Marina Tauber from the Shor party on 27 May
2022, being accused of money laundering and fraud in the investigation
on the “theft of the billion”. While Mr Shor is abroad (he fled
the country in 2019), Marina Tauber was stripped of her immunity,
arrested on 23 July 2022 and detained at the Chisinau remand prison
n°13. She was put under house arrest on 14 September 2022. She is
charged with “knowingly accepting the financing of the party from
an organised criminal group” and “falsifying the report on the financial
management of the Shor party”.
22. The newly elected authorities have also undertaken to reinvigorate
the investigation of the bank scandal which, in 2014, resulted in
the theft of one billion dollars from the bank system, which has
also impacted the functioning of democratic institutions, undermined
their credibility and shed light on the State institutions deficiencies.
Since then, the responsibilities have not been clearly established,
and the authorities failed to recover the stolen assets. In our
previous information note,
we
had explained that the investigation had been marked by high polarisation,
mistrust and allegations of manipulations.
23. On 20 August 2021, the parliament adopted a decision declaring
as “unsatisfactory” the activity of the criminal investigation body
in investigating the banking fraud and noted “the lack of measurable
action and progress in investigating the theft of the billion”.
The Prosecutor General, Mr Stoianoglo, did not appear at hearings
in the parliament but sent a four-page report on the institution’s
actions in the case. The decision stipulated that the criminal investigation
body should create an instrument and an action plan on recovering
he stolen money within 30 days. The adoption of this recovery strategy
was also crucial for the release of the next trench of the EU macro-financial
assistance.
24. The economic crisis triggered anti-government protests. Since
18 October 2022, the Shor Party has been organising regular demonstrations
throughout the country. Tents were installed by protesters in front
of the parliament and demonstrations took place in front of the
Prosecutor General’s office. Demonstrations have often led the police
to take protesters, including minors, to the police station due
to their alleged behaviour. In September 2022, the anti-corruption
prosecutor detained 24 people, including members of Shor party,
in connection with the alleged illicit financing of the demonstrations
and seized about US$181 000 in cash. Other searches were conducted
in the following weeks. On 23 October, three journalists were attacked
by the protesters, which is to be deplored. On 30 October, the police
clashed with the protesters after being prevented from entering
the Great National Assembly square. The leader of the party, Ilan
Shor (who was convicted in the ”billion dollar bank fraud” and has
fled the country), called for civic disobedience. The investigative
media Rise Moldova reported about alleged support and management
of the protesters by the Russian intelligence service and its influence
in previous election campaigns.
Further to this
investigation, the authorities opened an investigation into alleged
illegal support of political parties by the Russian authorities.
25. In addition, the Minister of Justice requested the Constitutional
Court to establish whether the Shor Party is constitutional. On
17 November 2022, the Interim President of the Constitutional Court
requested from the Venice Commission an amicus
curiae brief on declaring a political party unconstitutional,
which was adopted in December 2022. We consider that the manipulation
of protests by illegal means or for illegal purposes threatens the
stability of the country, and we support the steps undertaken by
the authorities to investigate the allegations raised by investigative
media. We also invite the authorities to take full account of the
findings of the Venice Commission and the well-established case
law of the European Court of Human Rights on the freedom of expression
and association of political parties when dealing with this question.
26. Restoring the proper and transparent functioning of democratic
institutions, “de-oligarchise” the State institutions and address
the roots of the “state capture” that has prevailed in the country
so far remains an immense challenge, for which there is no ready-made
solution. These changes trigger resistance within the system – while
the authorities stress that quick changes are needed to cleanse
the institutions. However urgent and necessary the reforms might
be, the authorities will have nevertheless to ensure that the reforms
respect the rule of law and Council of Europe norms, are based on
the involvement of the parliamentary opposition and the civil society
to ensure good quality laws and lead to sustainable changes.
2.2. The
global and regional environment, and its impact on the functioning
of democratic institutions
2.2.1. Management
of the Covid-19 pandemic
27. With the outbreak of the Covid-19
pandemic in 2020, the Republic of Moldova faced major economic and
sanitary challenges. During the reporting report, the country had
to face the consequences of the pandemic, which resulted so far
in over 11 000 deaths.
As described by our predecessors, a state
of emergency was declared in the Republic of Moldova on 17 March
2020 and extended on several occasion. The Secretary General was
notified of derogations under Article 15 of the European Convention
on Human Rights (STE No. 5) with respect to freedom of assembly
and association, the right to education and the freedom of movement.
28. The parliament empowered the “Commission for Emergency Situations”
to perform actions necessary to contain, reduce and eliminate the
consequences of the Covid-19. As of 16 May 2020, responsibilities regarding
Covid-19 restrictions were handed over from the Government State
of Emergency Commission to the National Extraordinary Public Health
Commission chaired by Prime Minister Ion Chicu.
29. The state of emergency and the crisis management generated
some human-rights-related issues. The Ombudsman, Mr Cotorobai at
that time, played an active role during the pandemic to draw attention
to the protection of children’s rights, health workers, etc., and
drew attention to the situation in prisons.
The Ombudsman
undertook to monitor the activity of the Commission for Exceptional
Situations and of the local and central public authorities, recalling
that the restrictions imposed by the authorities to ensure the population’s
protection from infection should be necessary, legitimate, reasonable
and proportional to the risk or threat to public health.
30. In order to cope with the economic consequences of the Covid-19
crisis and the slowdown of the economy, the Moldovan Government
took responsibility, on 1 April 2020, for a bill on a series of
economic and social measures to provide assistance to individuals
and businesses. This bill was partly challenged by the opposition
in the Constitutional Court. On 13 April 2020 the Constitutional
Court declared this bill unconstitutional due to a breach of constitutional
procedure during its adoption. On 23 April 2020, the parliament
adopted a new version of the law and ratified two loan agreements:
one with the International Monetary Fund for a loan of US$235 million
to the National Bank of Moldova and one with the Russian Federation
for a loan of €200 million to the Moldovan Government. The opposition
feared that this loan contained obscure provisions that would channel
the money towards unnecessary projects that favour Russian companies.
Following a complaint
lodged by the opposition, the Constitutional Court suspended the
law of ratification of the loan agreement with the Russian Federation,
and later declared it unconstitutional. The government has re-launched
negotiations with the Russian Federation in order to partially cover
the budget deficit with this loan.
31. It was reported that the then President Dodon had called the
President of the Constitutional Court, Mr Vladimir Turcan, before
the examination of the constitutionality of the law on the Russian
loan. While the President considered it as part of an inter-institutional
dialogue, there was suspicion of pressure being exerted on the Court,
which resulted in a vote of no-confidence by the Constitutional
Court members, the dismissal of its chair and the election of judge
Domnica Manole as new chair.
32. On 22 April 2020, the European Commission decided to allocate
€100 million to the country (out of a €3 billion euro macro-financial
assistance package to ten countries of the European Neighbourhood
Policy) in the form of loans to limit the economic fallout of the
Covid-19 pandemic. Following the adoption of the Law on NGOs
by the Moldovan Parliament in line with
the 2014 Association Agreement, the European Union was also in a
position to release part of the EU macro-financial aid (€30 million
out of €100 million). The European Union adopted later on an Economic
Recovery Plan for the Republic of Moldova, worth €600 million, to continue
supporting the country’s fight against Covid-19. A first trench
of €36,4 millions was disbursed.
33. These sanitary conditions added to the economic challenges
and the energy crisis that the country faced late 2021. Despite
the renewal of the contract with Gazprom in October 2021, the price
of the gaz increased from US$457 per 1000 m3 in October 2021, and
then to US$1200 in April 2022.
This led to an economic crisis,
prompted the state to declare a State of emergency to cope with
the energy crisis and diversify its energy supplies to cope with
the “inadmissible weaponisation of the gas supply from Russia in
order to put political pressure on the Government of Moldova to
change its geopolitical orientation”, as the European Parliament described
it.
2.2.2. Impact
of the Russian aggression against Ukraine and the subsequent refugee
crisis
34. The outbreak of the war in
Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has triggered important challenges which
we could discuss with the authorities, which added to the energy
crisis and the management of the Covid-19 pandemic, which disrupted
economic co-operation with neighbouring Ukraine and resulted in
high inflation rates (about 30%, the highest in the region) which
directly affect the population.
35. One of the consequences of the war was the massive arrival
of refugees from Ukraine, which has been described in detailed by
the Special Representative of the Secretary General on Migration
and Refugees, Ms Kayacik.
Since 24 February 2022, over 700 000
refugees entered the Republic of Moldova. Over 96 000 of them are
registered in the country.
Half of
them are children, and around 90% of these refugees are hosted by
over 10 000 local families, mainly in the area of Chisinau. 3 600
refugees are third-country nationals. The Special Representative
of the Secretary General recalled that the Republic of Moldova has
the second largest border with Ukraine (1 222 km, of which 453 km
are not under the control of the Moldovan constitutional authorities)
and is the neighbouring country that has received the largest number
of refugees from Ukraine in relation to its population size (under
three million).
36. This poses a major logistical challenge for the authorities,
notwithstanding the issues related to human rights and education
of children. On 24 February 2022, the parliament declared a state
of emergency for 60 days (which has been extended since then and
is still in vigour), empowering the Commission for Exceptional Situations
to issue provisions and directives to regulate the movement into
and within the territory and manage the migration flow.
The parliament also
adopted relevant legislation to manage the migration crisis as well
as the hike of registration of asylum (8 000 since the outbreak
of the war, compared to previous annual average of 100).
37. This situation has put a considerable strain on the State
administration, which has handled it remarkably. The country had
previously prepared a contingency plan and showed strong solidarity
and resilience. Given the volatility of the regional context, the
country is now preparing, as a matter of priority, a contingency
action plan at national level, for around 500 000 more people arriving
from Ukraine, with possibly half of them that may stay in the Republic
of Moldova.
While the country had deployed extraordinary
efforts to welcome people fleeing war in Ukraine, Ms Kayacik stressed
the need for additional resources and expertise to build long-term solutions
for the women, children, elderly and persons with disabilities currently
in the country, as certain facilities were not meant to accommodate
refugees for longer periods. She also suggested ten actions, including
the adoption of a specific legal framework on the status and protection
of refugees from Ukraine, the prevention and detection of human
trafficking and violence against women in all their forms, the protection
of unaccompanied and separated children arriving from Ukraine and
the promotion of an inclusive education system seeking to sustainably
integrate children arriving from Ukraine with local children.
38. In addition to the refugee crisis, the war in Ukraine has
raised new security issues. In the Transnistrian region of the Republic
of Moldova, there are 1 700 Russian soldiers, operating in peacekeeping
operations or guarding the ammunition depot at Cobasna with 20 000
tons of Soviet-era ammunition. After the Russian aggression, there
were unexplained explosions in Tiraspol in April 2022 and sophisticated
bomb threats in the Republic of Moldova linked to the conflict in
Ukraine.
39. Statements made by Russian officials or
de
facto authorities in Tiraspol have also added additional security
concerns : on 22 July 2022, the
de facto Transnistrian
“Minister of Foreign Affairs” (and Tiraspol’s Chief Negotiator in
the 5+2 conflict settlement), Mr Ignatiev, announced that he would
seek Transnistria’s annexation to Russia, what the Deputy Prime
minister for Reintegration of the Republic of Moldova, Mr Serebrian,
said was a provocation and “may be a prelude to a pro-Russian military
operation against Moldova”. On 31 August 2022, the Russian Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Mr Lavrov, asserted that Moscow is monitoring
the situation and offered assurances that Russia intends to protect
the interests of the ethnic population of Moldova, both from [the Transnistrian
region] and Gagauzia.
Early September
2022, Leonid Slutskiy, Chairman of the Russian State Duma Standing
Committee for International Affairs stated that, “Transnistria belongs
to Russia”. This statement was deemed by Deputy Prime Minister Serebrian
as “unacceptable, inadmissible and raising alarming questions in
the context of the provisions of Article 5 in the Treaty of Friendship
and Cooperation between the Republic of Moldova and the Russian
Federation of November 19, 2001" which stipulates that “each of
the contracting parties shall refrain from any action that can prejudice
the other contracting party, its sovereignty, independence and territorial
integrity”.
40. The partial mobilisation of Russian citizens decided by President
Putin has also raised concerns about the possible mobilisation of
Moldovan citizens holding dual nationality (up to 200 000 in the
Transnistrian region). President Sandu was considering the possibility
to withdraw the Moldovan nationality from persons also holding Russian
nationality and who will fight on the behalf of the Russian Federation
or impose harsher penalties against Moldovan citizens who would
promote the war.
The fate of
Moldovan citizens currently residing in the Russian Federation is
also closely monitored by the Moldovan authorities.
41. The security concerns of the country became even more acute
on 31 October 2022, when a missile shot down by the Ukrainian anti-aircraft
system fell near the town of Naslavcea, at the border with Ukraine. Fortunately,
no casualty was reported. In November 2022, bombing of energy infrastructures
in Ukraine by Russia led to massive energy cuts. The haking of the
Telegram accounts of the President of the Republic, the Deputy Prime
Minister, the Minister of Justice, the Head of the police adviser
and a presidential adviser early November added to the security
threats experienced by the country.
2.2.3. Membership
application of the Republic of Moldova to the European Union
42. Following the outbreak of the
war, the Moldovan authorities
applied on 3
March 2022, together with Ukraine and Georgia, to the European Union.
On 16 June 2022, the European Commission recommended providing the
status of candidate country to the Republic of Moldova, which was
accepted by the European Council of the European Union on 23 June
2022.
43. Since then, a National Commission for European Integration
was created, and adopted an action plan for meeting the conditions
linked to Moldova’s status as EU candidate country. This Commission
comprises, among others, the Bashkan (Governor) of Gagauzia and
the Speaker of the People’s Assembly of Gagauzia, as well as the
director of the Congress of local authorities of Moldova and other
civil society representatives. The plan includes actions that should
be carried out to advance Moldova's accession process, including
in the field of justice reform, fight against corruption, improving
the electoral legislation, de-oligarisation and strengthening the
fight against organised crime and asset recovery, strengthening
the capacity of public administration and managing public finances,
involvement of civil society in decision-making processes, as well as
strengthening the protection of human rights and combating gender-based
violence.
The road to the European
Union will be long, however, the “European perspective” offered
by the European Commission is a strong political signal for the
country.
44. Considering the current regional context, the grant of the
EU candidate status is also a response to the country’s quest for
security, including democratic security. It is also in line with
the choice of the voters expressed in November 2020 (when they elected
pro-European President Sandu) and in July 2021, with a clear majority
given to the PAS and its pro-European and pro-European Union agenda.
The war in Ukraine has accelerated the Republic of Moldova’s path
to the European Union, which has already been initiated with the signing
of the Association Agreement in 2014.
2.3. Progress
in the field of gender equality and fight against violence against
women
45. The early parliamentary elections
of July 2021 led to significant progress in the field of women's participation
in public life: there is now a better representation of women in
parliament (with 39,6% of female MPs
). Ms Maia Sandu was the first woman
elected President of the Republic, and Ms Natalia Gavrilița the first
woman appointed Prime Minister. The government comprises 4 women
(Interior, Health, Environment, and the Bashkan of Gagauzia) out
of 16 members. This progress is unprecedented in the history of
the Republic of Moldova and should inspire other countries in Europe.
We also welcome the creation, in June 2022, of a women caucus in
the Moldovan Parliament to further consolidate women’s rights in
the country.
46. Another major achievement was the ratification of the Convention
on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic
violence (CETS No. 210, “Istanbul Convention”) on 31 January 2022.
The Convention
had been signed in 2017, but the fight against domestic violence
and violence against women was an issue highly debated in society,
and instrumentalised by some political parties and churches.
47. The ratification law adopted by the parliament on 14 October
2021 had been challenged by the Socialists. The Constitutional Court
has subsequently asked the Venice Commission to assess “the constitutional
implications of Articles 3 (c) [gender], 14 [education], 28 [reporting
by professionals] and 42 [unacceptable justifications for crimes,
including crimes committed in the name of so called “honour”] of
the Istanbul Convention on the right of the parents to educate their
children according to their own religious beliefs and on the concept
of the family”.
48. In its
amicus curiae brief
of December 2021,
the Venice Commission recalled that
the Istanbul Convention did not seek to impose a certain lifestyle
or interfere with the personal organisation of private life; instead,
it sought only to prevent violence against women and domestic violence.
In addition, "the Convention does not seek to regulate family life
and/or family structures: it neither contains a definition of 'family'
nor does it promote a particular type of family setting”.
The Venice Commission concluded
that it had found no incompatibility of the above-mentioned provisions
of the Istanbul Convention with the Moldovan Constitution. On 17
January 2022, the Constitutional Court thus declared the application
as inadmissible. Ms Manole, President of the Constitutional Court,
notably stated that “the Istanbul Convention does not oblige the
States to legalise same-sex marriages. Consequently, the Istanbul
Convention does not contradict the national constitutions that define
marriage as a union between a woman and a man”.
49. The ratification of the Istanbul Convention is a major advancement
for the protection of human rights in the Republic of Moldova, which
is now among the forerunners in the region: as of 26 September 2022,
among the Eastern Partnership countries, only Georgia (2017) and
the Republic of Moldova (2021) have ratified the Istanbul Convention.
The country submitted on 3 October
2022 its
State
report to the Group of Experts on Action against Violence against
Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO), which should carry out its
fact-finding visit to the country in 2023.
50. We also welcome the adoption on 17 November 2022 of Law 316/2022
for the amendment of some normative acts (ensuring the rights of
victims in the case of crimes related to sexual life and family
violence) and the ongoing work on the preparation of action plans
on gender equality and on preventing and combating domestic violence
and violence against women. We encourage the authorities to continue
to bring their legislation into line with European standards, in
co-operation with the Council of Europe and its co-operation
project aimed at “Supporting the implementation of the Istanbul
Convention in the Republic of Moldova”.
2.4. Reform
of the Electoral Code
51. The electoral framework has
been much discussed. We recalled that the country had introduced,
against the recommendation of the Venice Commission, a mixed electoral
system for the 2019 parliamentary elections, before returning to
a proportional system for the July 2021 elections. While the Assembly
election observers noted that the legal electoral framework provided
an adequate basis for the conduct of democratic elections “if applied
in good faith”, they pinpointed several issues where improvements
were needed, including legal provisions dealing with complaints
and appeals, campaign finance oversight, number and location of
polling stations abroad and media coverage.
52. In the meantime, the authorities have launched a comprehensive
reform of the Electoral Code, accelerated by the request of the
European Commission, in June 2022, that steps are taken,
inter alia, to “address the shortcomings
identified by the OSCE/ODIHR and the Council of Europe/Venice Commission”
to be granted the status of candidate country. A draft electoral
code was prepared by the Central Electoral Commission (CEC)
following a process that, according
to the Venice Commission, “appears to have been consultative and
inclusive so far”.
It introduces a considerable number
of changes, including those related to the composition of the election
management bodies, conduct of the election campaign, regulation
and supervision of campaign financing, voting rights including voting
abroad and the rules on various types of referendums. It was adopted,
in the first reading, by the parliament on 28 August 2022.
53. At the request of the Speaker of the Parliament of the Republic
of Moldova, Mr Igor Grosu, the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission
adopted in October 2022 a Joint Opinion on the draft electoral code.
The Venice Commission noted that
the draft code included a number of welcome developments “to clarify
the procedures for voting abroad, strengthening of the campaign
funding regulations and the CEC’s mandate to engage in meaningful
control and supervision of political and campaign financing, and
increasing the capacity of district councils by making the position
of their chairpersons permanent”. The code fulfilled most of previous recommendations
by OSCE/ODIHR and from ODIHR and Council of Europe observation reports
– including recommendations made by Assembly observers – such as
introducing a rule that the most important aspects of election law
may not change within a year of elections; prohibiting the organised
transportation of voters by political parties on election day or
defining and clarifying what constitutes campaign coverage in the
broadcast media.
54. The Venice Commission issued a number of key recommendations,
notably to clarify the provisions providing for a two-day voting
(which is a novelty), specify the grounds allowing the dismissal
of members of the CEC, the de-registration of candidates or specify
the exhaustive list of circumstances which could lead to the de-registration
of political parties. It also raised some questions about the proposed
composition of the CEC. Other recommendations refer to the need
to elaborate (or make a reference) to the election processes held
in the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauz-Yeri, define more precisely
symbols that are not permitted in campaigns or review the eligibility
requirements for standing for president of the Republic and mayors,
or retain the possibility that the ballot papers and the other relevant
voter information are produced in both Romanian and the languages
spoken by national minorities. The Venice Commission also recalled
that the adoption of electoral codes should be based on a large
political consensus.
55. Some parliamentary and extraparliamentary opposition parties
expressed their dissatisfaction with the the draft code and challenged
in particular the electronic vote.
In
his comments to the preliminary draft report, Mr Batrîncea also
challenged the appointment procedure of member of the electoral
bodies, the status of the current members (appointed in 2022) and
the modalities entrusting the CEC to decide to hold the vote over two-days,
which would fail to provide equal [voting] rights for all citizens
of the country.
56. The parliament adopted on 9 December 2022, in a third and
final reading, the Electoral Code. Due to lack of time, we were
not in a position to thoroughly analyse the Electoral Code as revised
and adopted. We noted that the composition of the CEC was changed
and that elections could be held over two days (Saturday and Sunday)
in exceptional situations (such as pandemic, state of emergency,
in some constituencies) by way of derogation from the general rule
to be decided by the CEC at least 25 days before the election day. We
await further information to be in a position to assess the adopted
version of the Electoral Code. We regret however that it could not
be adopted on the basis of a broad political consensus engaging
all political forces represented in the parliament. We therefore
call on all stakeholders to implement the Electoral Code taking
into account the existing and future recommendations issued by the
Venice Commission to ensure that the election process will be conducted
in line with the European standards governing free and fair elections.
2.5. The
Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia (Gagauz-Yeri)
57. During our visits to the country,
we looked into the situation of the Autonomous Territorial Unit
of Gagauzia (ATUG), a region of 85 sq.km and about 135 000 inhabitants
(according to the 2014 census), nearly 84% of them declaring themselves
as Gagauz.
This
region aspired to independence in December 1991. A peaceful solution
was then negotiated over two years, which led the Moldovan Parliament
to adopt Law No. 344-XIII of the Republic of Moldova on the Special
Status of Gagauzia, on 23 December 1994. As regards the hierarchy
of legislation in Gagauzia, the Moldovan Constitution is followed
by the Law on the Special Status of Gagauzia, the Legal Code of
Gagauzia and, finally, Gagauz laws adopted by the People’s Assembly
of Gagauzia.
58. As highlighted by our predecessors, there are a number of
long-lasting issues and demands from the ATUG authorities which
have not been addressed, including the need to harmonise the Moldovan
and Gagauzian legislation. A working group (set up in 2015) was
re-established in the Moldovan Parliament after the July 2021 parliamentary
elections to tackle this issue and resumed its activities in March
2022.
Other demands
for more autonomous bodies have been made by the ATUG authorities,
including in the field of the justice system, the Electoral Code,
or the parliamentary representation of the Gagauz population: ATUG deputies
have recently proposed an amendment to the Electoral Code of Moldova
and demanded that five seats in the parliament be reserved for deputies
representing Gagauzia.
59. During our visits, we had meetings with Ms Irina Vlah, the
Bashkan of the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia, who was
re-elected, in the first round, for a second (and last) 4-year mandate
in July 2019.
The Bashkan
is an
ex officio member of
the government.
60. The Bashkan emphasised, in October 2021, the need to improve
the socio-economic conditions of the Moldovan people in the first
place, to fight early drop out from school, increase job opportunities,
improve access to and command of the Romanian language, and build
economic partnerships to prevent young, educated people from leaving
the country. She regretted the lack of dialog with the new Moldovan
leadership, the lack of consultation when the authorities decided
to request membership to the European Union, her exclusion from
the National Security Council and from the inaugural ceremony of
the President, and the abrogation of the ex
officio membership of the Prosecutor General from Gagauzia
from the Superior Council of Prosecutors. She also informed us about
the need to protect national minorities and the use of the three official
languages in ATUG (Romanian, Russian and Gagauz), as well as the
need to reinforce the learning of the Romanian language.
61. Regional elections of the People's Assembly took place on
19 September 2021 (they were not observed by the Congress of local
and regional authorities, due to the sanitary situation). The recent
months were marked by a struggle between the Bashkan and the People’s
Assembly, which is trying to expand its power at the expense of
both the central government in Chisinau and Irina Vlah, whose second
(and last) term expires in June 2023 (the election of a new Governor
is scheduled on 30 April 2023).
62. In her meeting with Ms Vlah on 25 November 2021, President
Sandu urged the ATUG representatives to support the reforms in the
country, especially in the field of justice and the fight against
corruption, and not to restrict the democratic freedoms of citizens.
The President announced that she would visit Gagauzia as soon as
the process of setting up the working bodies of the newly elected
regional assembly was completed.
President
Sandu visited Comrat in September 2022, called on the preservation
of interethnic peace and of the Gagauz culture, and announced the
launch, in 2023, of a national programme to learn Romanian. She
also acknowledged that the (wide) powers of the Autonomous Unit
needed to be regulated and brought in line with the legislation,
which remained a laborious process.
63. The relations between Chisinau and Comrat became more difficult
against the backdrop of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine:
- While the Moldovan Parliament
had adopted, on 7 April 2022, a law against the use of war symbols
and of the Ribbon of Saint George (see below) signed by President
Sandu, the deputies from the People’s Assembly unanimously adopted
a law entitled “On the Symbols of Victory in the Territory of Gagauzia”, permitting
symbols associated with the Great Patriotic War to be flown in Gagauzia
(thus excluding the “Z” symbol). This law was signed by the Bashkan.
The Comrat Appellate Court quickly suspended the new law passed
by the People’s Assembly because it violated the Moldovan law. In
defiance of Chisinau’s authority, the People’s Assembly organised
an emergency session the night before Victory Day and once again
voted in favour of a law that legalised the use of the Ribbon of
Saint George in Gagauzia.
- Deputies of ATUG regional assembly also adopted anti-LGBT legislation,
which bans the organisation of any form of pride parade in Gagauzia.
days after it was announced that several LGBT events would take
place in Chisinau in June 2022 to mark International Day against
Homophobia, Transphobia, and Biphobia. Igor Grosu, Speaker of the
Moldovan Parliament, criticised the new law.
- Earlier this year, while the Moldovan authorities were
coping with the energetic crisis and the increase of gaz price,
a delegation from the ATUG undertook, in January 2022, to travel
to Moscow in order to negotiate preferential gas prices.
64. Against the backdrop of the Russian aggression against Ukraine,
the relationship between Chisinau and Comrat have remained difficult,
with decisions taken by the People’s Assembly obviously defying
the State institutions. Nevertheless, we welcome efforts to contribute
to better dialog, including the inclusion of the Bashkan in the
newly created National Commission for European Integration, or the
plan to launch a programme for the learning of the Romanian language.
At the same time, it is important to support the work of the parliamentary
group, which could be a forum to discuss contentious and long-lasting
issues that should be solved in a legal way.
3. Rule
of law
3.1. Reform
of the judiciary
65. The judicial system has long-standing
issues
which have
been a matter of concern for the Assembly for many years.
The International Commission
of Jurists had even depicted the judicial system in 2019 as “only
an empty shell”, meaning endemic corruption, political control,
selective justice, lack of judicial integrity and improper application
of the law. This was also reflected in the low level of trust in
the judiciary: according to a Public Opinion Barometer of June 2021,
over 65% of the Moldovan population did not trust the judiciary.
66. The Assembly also highlighted, in January 2021, its concerns
with respect to the independence of the judiciary. In its Resolution
2359 (2021), it noted that “several attempts to reform the judiciary
have not been successful and that corruption, including within the
circles of the judiciary, remains a widespread phenomenon in this
country”. It called on the Moldovan authorities to “continue the
reform of the judiciary, the Superior Council of Magistracy and
the prosecution service in line with the recommendations of Council
of Europe organs and bodies” and “take the necessary steps to implement
the new strategy for reform of the judiciary”. It called on the
Moldovan authorities to “prioritise the issue of the evaluation
of judges and prosecutors and make full use of the procedures already
available for ensuring the integrity of the judiciary” and to “significantly
step up their efforts to combat corruption among judges and prosecutors”
by implementing the GRECO recommendations.
67. As a matter of fact, since June 2019, successive governments
focused on the reform of the judiciary and the prosecution office.
In particular the Supreme Council of Magistrates was at the centre
of a legal battle, which prompted the President of the Venice Commission
to call on the Moldovan institutions to work together to ensure
the independence and integrity of the judiciary.
The reform of the
judicial system intensified after the parliamentary elections of
July 2021, as the new majority vowed to “cleanse” it from its corrupt
elements.
68. A positive element, throughout these past years, was the intensive
co-operation of the Moldovan authorities with the Council of Europe
Secretary General’s High Level Working Group, which resulted in
the adoption of the strategy for justice reform and the preparation
of an action plan. Co-operation also continued with the Venice Commission
on the reform of the Supreme Council of Magistrate, the Prosecutor’s
Office, the Supreme Court of Justice and amendments to the law on
the Constitutional Court.
69. We would like to attempt to summary the main action undertaken
to reform the judiciary, while some of these issues have been described
in detail in our previous information notes, following the visits
we paid to the country.
3.1.1. Adoption
of constitutional amendments to de-politicise the judiciary
70. One of the key issues was the
revision of the constitution, in order to de-politicise the judiciary.
The Venice Commission assessed the draft constitutional amendments
which had been in preparation since 2018.
In its
June 2020 opinion, the Venice Commission found that the draft constitutional
amendments proposed “could improve the independence, accountability
and efficiency of the judiciary. The amendments are generally positive
and in line with the applicable international standards”.
The Venice Commission also drew attention
to the renewal of the lay composition of the Superior Council of
Magistracy upon the entry into force of the constitutional amendments,
expected to take place at the beginning of 2021, according to the
new rules requiring a 3/5 qualified majority in parliament for their
election – suggesting that the transitional provision should allow
the lay members appointed in March 2020
to
apply again.
71. The constitutional amendments were adopted in their final
reading on 23 September 2021 by a large majority (86 MPs were in
favor, the Shor MPs abstaining) after several consultations with
the Venice Commission
and took effect on 1 April 2022.
We welcomed this constitutional revision based on a large consensus
and agreed by the major political parties. The amendments have changed
the election and appointment of members of the Superior Council
of Magistracy and the Superior Council of Prosecutors and were a
major progress in the reform of the judiciary.
72. Later the Venice Commission was asked by the authorities to
assess the draft Law “on Amending Some Normative Acts” (Judiciary)
that should bring the legislation on the judiciary in line with
the 2022 constitutional amendments.
The
Venice Commission assessed, on 17 June 2022, the draft Law “positively
and in line with the applicable European standards” while making
additional recommendations to improve it. The Venice Commission
notably welcomed the removal of the probationary periods for judges,
the unification of judicial appointment procedure which excludes
involvement of parliament and the shifting of the power of appointment of
court presidents and vice-presidents to the Superior Council of
Magistracy.
3.1.2. Reform
of the Superior Council of Magistracy
73. The adopted constitutional
amendments have changed the appointment of judges and the composition and
selection of the Superior Council of Magistracy (SCM): the initial
appointment period of five years in the case of judges was abrogated;
the President can reject the candidates proposed by the SCM only
once. Judges will no longer enjoy general immunity, but only functional
immunity and the judges of the Supreme Court of Justice will be
named in the same way as the judges of common law and appeals courts,
by the President, upon a proposal from SCM. The Prosecutor General
and the Minister of Justice are excluded from the composition of
SCM, that will consist of six members from among judges and six
lay members, selected by the parliament. The amendments introduce
a constitutional requirement for a qualified majority of MPs for
the election of lay members of the SCM and include a reference in
the Constitution to the anti-deadlock mechanism in case parliament
fails to reach the qualified majority.
74. The amendments also provide that the General Assembly of Judges
will elect six judges to be members of the SCM (four from first-tier
courts, one from an appellate court and another one from the Supreme
Court of Justice). Candidates for the position of judge-members
are now required to have at least three years’ experience on the
bench and no disciplinary sanction in the last three years. The
SCM will also comprise three lay members appointed by the parliament,
and three ex officio members
(namely the Ministry of justice, the Prosecutor General and the
President of the Supreme Court of Justice) despite a negative opinion
of the SCM, which had recommended to exclude the Prosecutor General
and the Ministry of Justice from ex officio position to
ensure the depolitisation and independence of the judiciary.
3.2. Prosecution
office
75. In the context of dismantling
the “captured state”, the selection procedure of the Prosecutor
General (PG) and the organisation of the prosecution office are
a crucial issue. Amendments to the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office
had been adopted in July 2019 and September 2019, introducing a
new procedure for the appointment of an interim PG pending the selection
of a permanent one, a new composition of the Superior Council of
Prosecutors and a new procedure for both the appointment and the
dismissal of the PG. A group of MPs contested the constitutionality
of these amendments. The Constitutional Court sought guidance from
the Venice Commission, which adopted its
amicus
curiae briefs in December 2019.
In the meantime, the appointment of the
Prosecutor General triggered a major political crisis and resulted
in a no-confidence vote and the fall of Ms Sandu’s government in
November 2019 (see above).
76. After the July 2021 elections, amendments to Law n°3/2016
on the Public Prosecution Service were swiftly adopted by the parliament
in August 2021. The amendments reorganised the Superior Council
of Prosecutors, introduced new mechanisms of accountability of the
Prosecutor General and reduced the retirement age for the members
of the Superior Council of Prosecutors to 65 years. The amendments
also introduced mechanisms of
ad hoc performance
evaluations of the PG and provided for a mechanism of dismissal
of the PG for a disciplinary violation. In its opinion of December
2021, the Venice Commission criticised the swift adoption of the
amendments “during the period of summer holidays, without proper deliberations
in Parliament or a meaningful public discussion” and called for
changes in the law with respect to the procedure of “performance
evaluation” of the Prosecutor General, the composition of such Evaluation Commission,
as well as the conditions related to the suspension or dismissal
the Prosecutor General.
3.2.1. Reform
of the Superior Council of Prosecutors
77. The composition of the Superior
Council of Prosecutors (SCP) had already been modified in 2019 and the
number of members had then been increased from 12 to 15. The amendments
adopted in August 2021 again reduced the number of SCP members to
12,
excluding
the former three
ex officio members
(namely the Prosecutor General, the Chief Prosecutor of the ATUG
Prosecutor’s office and the President of the Bar Association), while
the Minister of Justice, the President of the SCM and the Ombudsman
remain
ex officio members,
and providing a new balance between prosecutorial and lay members
in the SCP.
- The Venice Commission
pointed out that the SCP composition has been changed twice since
2019. It warned that “such frequent changes may give the impression
that each respective parliamentary majority tried to change the
balance of power in the SCP in its favour” and thus suggested regulating
this issue in the Constitution “to reduce the risk of such arbitrary
changes”, and to require “a qualified majority of votes for such
important changes in the rules on the SCP”. Likewise, the amendments
providing for a new retirement age of 65, have, as a matter of fact,
enabled the early termination of the mandate of one SCP member [Mr
Pulbere] who had been appointed by the previous President and under
the previously existing rules. The Venice Commission considered
that the issue of early termination of the mandate of SCP members
should also be regulated by the Constitution and “the legitimate
expectation of the members to finish their mandate should not be
perturbed without very serious reasons”.
- The Venice Commission invited the authorities of the Republic
of Moldova to consider returning the Prosecutor General to the SCP
as an ex officio member (with
a corresponding adjustment of the composition of the SCP, if necessary)
and, concerning the exclusion of the Chief Prosecutor from Gagauzia
from the SCP, suggested that the law might provide that one of the
prosecutors elected by their peers should come from Gagauzia. The
Venice Commission noted however that the prosecutors elected by
their peers (namely 5 out of 12) remain a “substantive part” of
the SCP (in line with Venice Commission recommendations), and the
new composition of the SCP remains pluralistic enough “to ensure
that neither of the three groups (prosecutors, lay members, or ex officio members) can govern alone”.
- The participation of the Minister of Justice in the SCP
as ex officio member contradicts
the recommendations issued by GRECO in 2020 which had recommended
abolishing the ex officio participation
of the Minister of Justice and the President of the Superior Council
of Magistracy to provide appropriate guarantees of objectivity,
impartiality and transparency. The
Venice Commission has adopted a more nuanced position, and found
that “the participation of the PG in the SCP is not objectionable
if the PG has no voting rights or if the prosecutorial members in
the reformed SCP remain in the minority, even together with the
PG”.
78. On 21 January 2022, the parliament adopted additional amendments
to the Law on Prosecutor's Office which regulate the selection and
appointment procedure of the Prosecutor General and heads of specialised prosecutor’s
offices. The law provides for the establishment of an independent
commission, composed of five members (one nominated by the Ministry
of Justice, one by the Moldovan President, and three by the SCP). The
special commission will organise interviews, will verify the integrity
of candidates and submit the full list of candidates and their results
to the SCP, which has the right to make its own assessment of the
files and has the right to select any candidate admitted to the
contest, even if he/she was not nominated winner of the contest by
the special commission.
79. The authorities prepared in the meantime additional draft
amendments, which have been reviewed by the Venice Commission on
17 June 2022 (and before their adoption by the parliament, contrary
to the August 2021 amendments). The Venice Commission concluded
that these draft amendments to the Law on the Public Prosecution
Service represented “a significant improvement compared to the current
version of the Law” and suggested some further changes. It noted
that most of the key recommendations had been addressed, and notably
that the Prosecutor General will henceforth be an
ex officio member of the SCP, albeit
with limited rights; the composition of the SCP will remain compatible
with the previous recommendations of the Venice Commission; the
Evaluation Commission will not be able to function without the prosecutorial
members and its conclusions will be of an advisory nature, while
the decision to remove the PG for underperformance will belong to
the SCP; there will be no automatic suspension of the Deputies to
the PG in the case of the suspension of the latter, and, as a rule,
the SCP will decide both on the initial suspension of the PG and
on any prolongation thereof.
3.2.2. Introduction
of a performance evaluation and dismissal mechanisms of the Prosecutor
General
80. The amendments to the Law on
the Prosecution Service adopted on 24 August 2021 provide for the possibility
to conduct an
ad hoc “performance
evaluation” of the Prosecutor General once a year performed by a
specially created Evaluation Commission (which is “quite uncommon
in Europe”, notes the Venice Commission)
and to dismiss the Prosecutor
General as a result of the proceedings conducted by a Disciplinary
Commission. The evaluation procedure may be initiated upon notification
of the President or at least three members of the SCP and carried
out by the Evaluation Commission composed of 5 members.
Later, the commission’s report
is transmitted to the SCP; if the Prosecutor’s activity is assessed
as “failed”, the SCP will suggest that the President should dismiss
the Prosecutor General.
The SCP later
approved, on 22 November 2021, the Regulation on the procedure of
evaluation of the performances of the prosecutor general and detailed
the criteria which will be used to assess the work of the prosecutor
general.
81. The Venice Commission however criticised the “performance
evaluation” mechanism of the Prosecutor General established in August
2021 and called for a significant revision of it, including the
introduction of clearer assessment criteria.
Assessing
the draft amendments prepared in 2022,
the Venice Commission concluded that
these amendments met key recommendations issued in 2021, notably
with respect to the composition of the Evaluation Commission (which
will not be able to function without the prosecutorial), its conclusions
will be of an advisory nature; the decision to remove the PG for
underperformance will belong to the SCP; there will be no automatic
suspension of the Deputies to the PG in the case of the suspension
of the latter, and, as a rule, the SCP will decide both on the initial
suspension of the PG and on any prolongation thereof. The Venice
Commission however found it necessary to include “more precise formulation
of the indicators” when assessing the performance of the Prosecutor
General to meet a general requirement of legal certainty in terms
of foreseeability of any legal text and avoid the risk of arbitrary
interpretation of such terms as “efficiency”, “public behaviour”
or “trust”.
3.2.3. The
case of suspended Prosecutor General Mr Stoianoglo
82. Concerning the case of Mr Stoianoglo,
who had been appointed Prosecutor General by the then President
Dodon on 29 November 2019
, an evaluation procedure was launched
by the parliament, which found that his performance had been insufficient,
paving the way for his dismissal. At the request of President Sandu,
an Evaluation Commission
was set
up in November 2021 to evaluate Mr Stoianoglo’s performance. The
Evaluation Commission assessed the activity of the prosecutor from
29 November 2019 to 5 October 2021 and adopted its report on 26
April 2022, which was approved by the SCP on 23 May 2022. The SCP
proposed that the President of the Republic dismisses Mr Stoianoglo
from the office of Prosecutor General.
83. In its June 2022, the Venice Commission dismissed a possible
retroactive application of the law and stressed that “any assessment
of the PG’s performance before 24 August 2021, which ultimately
may lead to his dismissal, should be based on such criteria of integrity
and professionalism which could be uncontestably derived from the
pre-existing rules or from the very nature of the mandate of the
PG, as stressed in the 2021 Opinion”. The Venice Commission also
took note of the explanations provided by the Ministry of Justice
“to the effect that the PG’s performance during the period before
24 August 2021 in a new procedure will be based on pre-existing
standards of performance related to his mandate”.
84. In parallel to this evaluation procedure, a criminal investigation
was launched in October 2021 by the Prosecutor’s office against
the Prosecutor General following the statements of PAS MP Lilian
Carp, President of the Committee on National Security, Defence and
Public Order. The latter alleged, among other things, that Mr Stoianoglo,
while being an MP for the Party of the Socialist ten years earlier,
had promoted legislation that facilitated the Moldovan involvement
in the Russian (Global) Laundromat. On 5 October 2021, few hours
after the launch of criminal proceedings, the Prosecutor General
was arrested on abuse of office, bribery, perjury and facilitation
of an organised criminal group while he was about to give a press
conference. He was detained in the remand prison of the Chisinau
Police Division and sent to house arrest for 30 days on 8 October
2021
and suspended from his post on 21
October 2021. On 9 December 2021, he was released from house arrest and
has been under judicial control since then.
85. Several interlocutors expressed their concerns and questions
about the respect of procedural guarantees and the transparency
of the procedures.
86. Due to the ongoing investigation, and in line with the law,
all deputy Prosecutors General were suspended. In addition, the
arrest of Mr Stoianoglo triggered the resignation of several deputy
prosecutors general, and the prosecution of others prosecutors.
87. On 7 July 2022, one of the criminal cases initiated against
Mr Stoianoglo, in which he was accused of interfering into the administration
of justice by abusing his official position in the investigation
of the expulsion of Turkish teachers in 2018, was closed by the
Moldovan Anti-Corruption Prosecution Service due to lack of evidence.
Concerning the other
case, Mr Stoianoglo has lodged a complaint to the European Court
of Human Rights. The Government replied to the information request
made by the Court.
88. On 6 October 2021, following the arrest and suspension of
Mr Stoianoglo, the Superior Council of Magistracy appointed Dumitru
Robu, whom we met, as acting Prosecutor General. Mr Robu was not
allowed to comment the current investigation, however he admitted
that the arrest of a Prosecutor General in function was an exceptional
case.
3.3. Law on the Selection of Candidates
for Administrative Positions in Bodies of Self-Administration of
Judges and Prosecutors: the issue of the external evaluation of
judges and prosecutors (by a pre-vetting commission)
89. One of the sensitive topics
related to the reform of the judiciary concerned the creation of
an
external evaluation mechanism
to check the integrity of judges and prosecutors and ensure that
those failing the test be removed from the system. The evaluation,
promotion and dismissal of judges and prosecutors is normally performed
by the self-governing judicial bodies (namely the Superior Councils
of Magistrates and Prosecutors). It was quite clear, from our meetings
with President Sandu and other representatives of the majority,
that an evaluation performed by external stakeholders was of paramount
importance and of “extraordinary nature”, due to “extraordinary
circumstances”. President Sandu hence expected to “clean the system
of people with integrity problems and unjustified wealth” and should
“hit the deep interests of the corrupt groups, which have been rooted
and consolidated in corruption schemes during years”.
90. The authorities have therefore decided to establish an
ad hoc evaluation committee which
will be responsible for checking the integrity of the candidates
for administrative positions in the SCM, the SCP and their specialised
bodies. At the request of the Minister of Justice, Mr Sergiu Litvinenko,
the Venice Commission adopted, in December 2021,
an opinion on the draft law on “some
Measures related to the Selection of Candidates for Administrative
Positions in Bodies of Self-Administration of Judges and Prosecutors
and the Amendment of some Normative Acts”.
91. The Venice Commission found that, in general, the integrity
checks targeted at the position of SCM, SCP and specialised bodies
envisaged in the revised draft law represented “a filtering process,
and not a judicial vetting process” which could be considered as
“striking a balance between the benefits of the measures and its
possible negative effects” if implemented properly. The Venice Commission
stated that “it falls ultimately within the competence of the Moldovan
authorities to decide whether the prevailing situation in the Moldovan judiciary
creates sufficient basis for subjecting all judges and prosecutors,
as well as members of the SCM and SCP, to extraordinary integrity
assessments”. It recommended however that the law should provide
adequate guarantees for the protection of the right to private and
family life of judges, prosecutors and third persons involved in
the procedure, allow candidates to appear before the Evaluation
Committee and to participate in the procedure before it if they
so wish, clarify the notion of “development partners” and their
criteria of selection of the members of the evaluation commission,
and make a clear indication of the duration mandate of this commission.
92. In March 2022, the parliament adopted the Law on the Selection
of Candidates for Administrative Positions in Bodies of Self-Administration
of Judges and Prosecutors. It provides for the creation of an evaluation
commission composed of six members (three to be appointed at the
proposal by the parliamentary factions, according to the principle
of proportionality and three put forward by the “development partners”
and approved with three fifths of the elected MPs). The commission
should assess the integrity of the candidates and analyse their
wealth and the wealth of their families extending research and information
provided by all public bodies and authorities, public registers,
as well as all private people, including the banks. The commission
would submit the information to the relevant law-enforcement bodies,
should it find discrepancies between the information declared by
the candidate and the real situation. The decisions of the commission could
be appealed to the Supreme Court of Justice and examined by a special
panel of judges, whose members will be nominated by the SCM and
confirmed by Moldova’s President under decree. It was foreseen that
the law would be limited in time and be in effect until the end
of 2022.
The parliament
is likely to extend the term of mandate of the pre-vetting commission
until 30 June 2023.
93. During our visit in June 2022, we met some members of this
so-called “pre-vetting commission”, which is headed by a Dutch jurist
(Herman von Hebel) and comprises a Georgian and an American lawyer.
We were informed
that the Commission would evaluate about one hundred candidates
for key positions in the SCM, the SCP and their specialised bodies.
The assessment of the candidates is based on the declaration of asset,
wealth and personal interests made by the candidates and their hearing,
the data required from private people or public or private legal
entities, including the fiscal and anticorruption authorities and
the information received from civil society organisations and investigation
journalists.
94. The Commission started to work early July 2022 and should
issue a reasoned decision on the assessment of each candidate. We
noted that this Commission will work until time pressure, and faces,
like other institutions, shortage of human resources. By the end
of November 2022, 22 candidates from among the judges registered
for the competition for the position of member of the SCM reached
the public hearing stage. The pre-vetting commission announced on
11 November the top three candidates who met the criteria of ethical
and financial integrity and passed the assessment. Interviews of
other candidates were still going on at the time of the writing
of the report.
95. The issue of the pre-vetting of sitting judges was also raised
in the context of the preparation of the draft Law on the Supreme
Court of justice, submitted by the authorities to the Venice Commission.
This draft law envisaged the pre-vetting of candidates (by the Evaluation
Commission) and the vetting of sitting judges by the creation of
a mechanism for extraordinary evaluation of the integrity of the
current judges. In its October 2022 opinion,
the
Venice Commission recalled that it had stressed, in its 2019 opinion,
that it falls ultimately within the
competences of the Moldovan authorities to decide whether the prevailing
situation in the Moldovan judiciary creates a sufficient basis for
subjecting the judges of the Supreme Court to extraordinary integrity assessments.
However, extraordinary vetting might only be justified in exceptional
circumstances, provided that other avenues (namely disciplinary
procedure, regular evaluation and criminal investigations as regular methods
of judicial accountability) are not available in case there is a
very low level of confidence in the judiciary.
96. In addition to the legislative changes mentioned above, Law
No. 228 on checking the assets declarations of the candidates for
the position of judges and prosecutors already when applying to
the National Institute for Justice was adopted on 28 July 2022.
97. We welcome the adoption of the constitutional amendments on
the judiciary, which is a first step but represents a major progress.
We noted that the legislation pertaining to the judiciary have introduced
profound changes (such as the evaluation of the work of the Prosecutor
General by a commission), which are being challenged within the
system and will take time to be fully implemented.
4. Fight against corruption
98. Corruption in the Republic
of Moldova remains a prevalent issue. According to Transparency International
the country ranks 105 (out of 180 countries), with a score of 36
out of 100 in the 2021 corruption perceptions index.
We
note a slight improvement since 2016 (the country was ranked 123rd
in 2016, and 115 in 2020), these scores show that corruption remains
a major issue of concern and a pervasive phenomenon, which the new
authorities vowed to address as a matter of priority.
4.1. Recent developments
99. Few weeks after the July 2021
elections, the parliament adopted a range of important pieces of legislation.
100. Amendments to the Law on the National Integrity Authority
(NIA) and the Law on the declaration of wealth and personal interests
were adopted on 7 October 2021. These amendments should improve
the legislative framework on the work of NIA and prevent conflicts
of interests and of incompatibility among people who hold public
offices. The legislation now provides for the suspension from office
of persons once it was established that their wealth was unjustified,
or that they were in breach of the legal regime of conflicts of interest,
incompatibilities, restrictions and limitations. It also provides
for the verification of the income acquired during the exercise
of the mandate or function, related to the situation of assets held,
but also of the expenses incurred. It extends the control of wealth
and personal interests to family members.
101. The PAS Party also drafted a bill to supplement Article 70
on incompatibilities and immunities of the Constitution, with a
provision stipulating that no parliament’s consent is required for
the detention, arrest, search or criminal prosecution of deputies
in case of deputies committing violations related to passive or
active corruption, trading in influence, excess of powers, illicit
enrichment or money laundering. On 26 October 2021, the Constitutional
Court ruled that the draft constitutional amendments met the norms
of a Constitution revision. The parliament will be entitled to adopt
a law on amending the Constitution not earlier than 6 months from
the date of the submission of the bill.
102. In addition, on 25 November 2022, following the October 2022
joint
amicus curiae brief
of the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR relating to the offence
of illicit enrichment,
the Constitutional Court also declared
inadmissible several petitions on the exception of the unconstitutionality
of Article 330 (2) of the Criminal Code, which establishes criminal
liability for illicit enrichment. The Constitutional Court thus
reaffirmed that the offence of illicit enrichment remains in the
Criminal Code of Moldova.
103. On 28 October 2021, the legislative initiative aimed at cancelling
the “offshore secret” was adopted by 74 deputies. The main provisions
of the document refer to the obligation of the Public Services Agency
to ensure public access to information from the State Register regarding
the actual beneficiaries in the existing resources and platforms
for publishing open data about companies.
104. On 14 July 2022, Law No. 189 was adopted, establishing a mechanism
of prosecution, trial and conviction in
absentia. This law should provide the legal basis for
issuing final court sentences in several high-profile cases related
to corruption, money-laundering and other serious crimes.
105. The Law on the National Anticorruption Centre (NAC) was amended:
its Director will now be appointed for a single 5-year mandate by
a majority of MPs, upon the proposal of at least 20 MPs and the
approval of the Legal Committee. The NAC was also subject to an
evaluation procedure by a special parliamentary commission (composed
of members of National Security, Defense, and Public Order Commission
and the Legal, Appointments, and Immunities Commission), which analysed
the activity of the Centre during the period 2016-2021. On 17 November
2021, the parliament declared the NAC activities as unsatisfactory
and ineffective. The commission's report noted, among other things,
that during this period, “no persons in leadership positions who
co-ordinated corruption schemes were brought to justice”, there
was “a lack of interest on the part of the NAC in high-profile cases,
and in some cases, the NAC obstructs the clarification of the truth and
sabotages the work of prosecutors”; the NAC was “not independent
in its actions and the leadership of the body did not ensure effective
implementation of anti-corruption legislation.” As a result, Ruslan
Flocea, National Integrity Authority Director, was dismissed. He
refuted the evaluation report on the National Integrity Authority prepared
by the parliament as “a deliberate distortion of reality, a gross
manipulation of information and a total lack of understanding of
the processes”.
106. As a result of the evaluation process carried by the parliament,
the Minister of Justice had envisaged to merge the Anti-Corruption
Prosecutor's Office with the National Anti-Corruption Centre into
a single institution that would deal exclusively with corruption
on a particularly large scale.
For the time being,
the authorities have launched consultations to prepare draft laws
on the division of work between the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's
Office and the National Anti-Corruption Centre, as well as on amendments
to the law on special investigation activities. The authorities
also intend to improve the legal framework on whistleblowers.
107. An Independent Anti-Corruption Advisory Committee (CCIA),
consisting of lawyers, economists, and investigative journalists,
was also established in June 2021 by a presidential decree, as a
joint independent international and national body. Its main purpose
is to analyse systemic corruption issues that cut across Moldovan
institutions and improve implementation of anti-corruption measures
by the relevant parties. It will investigate and identify cases
of corruption and submit reports.
108. The appointment of a new Chief Anti-corruption Prosecutor
in June 2022 is also expected to boost the fight against corruption:
Veronica Dragalin was so far federal prosecutor in the United States.
This appointment from “outside the system” is meant to reinforce
the trust in this Moldovan institution which is key to fight corruption.
4.2. Recent findings of GRECO
109. GRECO has assessed the legal
framework related to the prevention of corruption in respect of
members of parliament, judges and prosecutors. It noted a clearly
insufficient progress concerning members of parliament : “still
too many laws are adopted without adequate consultation and at accelerated
speed. A code of conduct for MPs remains to be adopted, including
rules for various situations of conflicts of interest. Clear and
objective criteria on lifting parliamentary immunity are still not
in place.”
A
draft Code of Parliamentary Rules and Procedures should also be
completed beyond the existing provisions on discipline and sanctions, so
that conflicts of interest and related matters (gifts, incompatibilities,
additional activities and financial interests, lobbying etc.) would
be addressed. The implementation of these recommendations could
contribute to greater transparency in political life.
110. The issue of the lifting of parliamentary immunity should
be addressed in a constitutional amendment: GRECO took note of the
referral submitted in September 2021 by 63 parliamentarians to propose
constitutional amendments aimed at making it possible to lift immunity
without prior approval of parliament when parliamentarians have
committed passive or active corruption, abuse of powers, illicit
enrichment and money laundering offences. This referral was accepted
by the Constitutional Court. Therefore, the Law on amending the
Constitution can be examined by parliament after 6 months from the
submission of the draft law.
111. The prevention of corruption in respect of judges and prosecutors
was assessed in light of the 2021 legislative changes: GRECO welcomed
“the significant progress made with the adoption of the new constitutional
framework for the composition of the Superior Council of Magistrates”.
Concerning the external assessment (vetting) of all judges and prosecutors
that was envisaged at the time of the visit of GRECO (in October
2021), GRECO stressed that “anti-corruption efforts should be proportionate
and compatible with the requirements of judicial independence and,
therefore, that the integrity of (candidate) judges should be tested within
the framework of clear, predictable, comprehensive and consistently
applied rules. Indeed, it will be important that steps undertaken
as part of the reforms include the necessary safeguards and respect
the Moldovan constitutional and legal frameworks, as well as the
relevant provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (in
particular Article 6) and the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights”. GRECO has also raised attention to the practical
consequences in case a large-scale assessment is taken forward, encouraging
the authorities “to ensure the legislative framework and operational
capacity are in place to replace those judges and prosecutors who
fail the assessment, or choose not to undergo it, with well-qualified new
candidates whose integrity is checked prior to appointment, also
in a standards-compliant procedure”.
112. GRECO also noted the authorities’ intentions to improve the
legal and operational framework for disciplinary liability of judges,
the new binding Order by the Prosecutor General aimed at ensuring
that all hierarchical interventions regarding a case are properly
documented, in line with GRECO’s previous recommendation. It welcomed
the elaboration and distribution of guidelines to all prosecutors
on the implementation of the Code of Ethics of Prosecutors (with
the support of Council of Europe co-operation project on “Action
against corruption in Moldova”) and noted that the system for the
disciplinary liability of prosecutors is operational, while the
legal framework still needed to be amended.
113. Concerning the National Integrity Authority (NIA), GRECO noted
that the legislation aimed at strengthening the NIA’s independence
and effectiveness and enhancing the rules governing the declaration
of assets and personal interests has been adopted on 7 October 2021.
It also notes that the NIA has further developed its controls of
the declarations of assets and personal interests of parliamentarians,
judges and prosecutors, that these controls have indeed resulted
in administrative sanctions and, when appropriate, referrals to
the criminal investigation bodies. It highlights that the NIA’s
budget has been increased, but that the NIA remains understaffed,
as only half of the staff expected has been appointed so far, and
that no specific training programme has been put in place for strengthening
the inspectors’ professional capacities. Moreover, a global strategy
for NIA is still lacking.
114. The implementation of GRECO recommendations could contribute
to strengthen the anti-corruption mechanisms. In the first place
we hope that the parliament will take the measures expected, namely
the adoption of a code of conduct for MPs and of a Code of Parliamentary
Rules and Procedures.
115. At the same time, during our visits, the President, the Prime
Minister and the Speaker of the parliament stressed that the main
problem was the implementation of the existing legislation, by all
stakeholders. They explained that tackling corruption in the political
sphere required efficient actions from various actors, ranging from
the Central Electoral Commission (which was renewed in September
2021) to other law enforcement and fiscal bodies, which are expected
to exert a better control over the funding of political parties.
The prosecution office would be expected to carry proper investigation
and the judges to deliver sentences. The acting Prosecutor General
acknowledged that the prosecutors had abstained in the past from
investigating allegations of political corruption in order “not
to interfere into politics”. He indicated that allegations of political
corruption would now need to be investigated in order to establish
the facts – or dismiss them.
5. Human rights
5.1. Situation of media
116. The situation of media has
been raised in previous monitoring reports and information notes.
As election observers, we had expressed our concern about “the bias
of major media outlets due to their party affiliation” and underlined
that “democracy can only flourish with a comprehensive media reform
that provides clear rules on transparent media ownership and forms
the basis for balanced and informative journalism.”
117. Reporters Without Borders noted that the country’s media are
diverse but extremely polarised, with an excessive influence by
oligarchs. While freedom of the press and the right to information
are guaranteed by law, in reality laws governing the sector are
applied arbitrarily by politically oriented regulatory agencies. Access
to information is regularly undermined, and frivolous defamation
lawsuits are frequent. However, a positive trend is noted: the country
was ranked, in the World Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders,
at the 40th in 2022 (out of 180 countries),
compared to the 89th position in 2021.
118. Following the July 2021 elections, the Audiovisual Council
(BCC) was subject to a parliamentary evaluation. The parliament
rejected the BCC activity report; all members of the Council were
dismissed by the parliament on 11 November 2021 and the new members
were appointed on 3 December 2021. The BCC comprises seven members,
nominated for a six-year mandate: three ones are put up by the parliamentary factions
(in this case, two were proposed by PAS, and one by the BCS), two
candidates by the civil society organisations, one by the presidency
and one by the government. While the (speed of the) appointment procedure
of the new members of the BCC has raised question, we could note
that the new leadership in the BCC sought to give a new impetus,
which could open up new avenues to strengthen access to pluralistic
and quality information.
119. An amendment to the Code of Audiovisual Media Services adopted
on 4 November 2021 has also restored the parliamentary control over
the BCC and the public broadcaster Teleradio-Moldova which was described
as a “tool of propaganda, serving the interests of the successive
oligarchs on power and instead of working in the interest of the
people”. This amendment however was debated, and criticised by the
opposition and also NGOs: it brought the country back to the situation
that prevailed in 2009, when one party was controlling the parliament,
the government and the presidency, and exerted control over the
public broadcaster. This had been criticised by the ECtHR in the
Manole and others v. Moldova ruling.
The opposition claims that this amendment represents a politicisation
of the media structure and an interference in their activity.
120. Given the current regional context, the country resorted to
measures in the wake of the war in Ukraine to mitigate the effects
of a hybrid war. On 7 April 2022, the Moldovan Parliament banned
the use of war symbols and of the Ribbon of Saint George (measures
challenged by the Gagauz People’s Assembly, see above). In June
2022, the parliament also adopted “the law on information security”
which bans news bulletins and features produced in countries that
did not ratify the European Convention on Transfrontier Television: propaganda
will be penalised harsher and media outlets that disinform will
face gradual punishment, ranging from fines to the withdrawal of
the right to broadcast advertisements.
121. These laws were challenged by the Party of the Socialists
before the Constitutional Court, which requested an opinion from
the Venice Commission on amendments to the Audiovisual Media Services
Code and to some normative acts including the ban on symbols associated
with and used in military aggression actions. While recalling that
any interference with the right to the freedom of expression needs
to comply with the three requirements of lawful restrictions (namely,
the requirements of legality, legitimacy and necessity and proportionality),
the Venice Commission stated that “it is plausible to argue that
the display of the symbols used by the Russian armed forces in the
current war could produce an actual and immediate danger of disorder
and a threat to the national security and the rights of others,
including those of Ukrainian war refugees, and that there is a pressing
social need to impose a ban on such use”.
122. The Venice Commission recalled that the main purpose of Law
No. 143 on Amendments to the Audiovisual Media Services Code was
to provide legal tools to ensure information security and fight
fake news and disinformation. The Venice Commission’s opinion focuses
on two provisions which were criticised by the opposition.
It stresses, again, that these
restrictions to the right of freedom of media and expression needs to
comply the requirements of lawful restrictions (see above) but underscores
that the Law “pursues a legitimate aim and that its adoption responds
to a pressing social need” as the country has been “heavily exposed
to external sources of information and a constant target of disinformation
activities from external sources”. The Venice Commission called
on the Moldovan authorities to ensure that the Law is clear and precise
enough to avoid chilling effects. The amendments to the Audiovisual
Media Services Code were adopted on 3 November 2022. We await further
information to assess whether the revised Code complies with the
Venice Commission recommendations.
123. In addition to the challenges posed by the independence of
media, media representatives also pointed out the economic challenges
they faced, and the need to have transparent information about media
ownership.
5.2. Situation in prisons
124. We have continued to pay attention
to the situation in prisons. In September 2020, the European Committee
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (CPT) noted with regret that, although tangible progress
had been achieved in several areas, several of its long-standing recommendations
had remained unaddressed. This concerned in particular “the persistence
of a prison sub-culture that fosters inter-prisoner violence and
impairs the living conditions of those prisoners who are deemed by
the informal prison hierarchy to be “humiliated”, as well as the
regime offered to both remand and sentenced prisoners and the low
staffing levels in prisons.”
125. NGO representatives reported about the lack of structural
investment, the poor prison conditions, and, above all, the poor
access to medical services in the penitentiary systems, especially
in times of pandemic. The incarceration rate remained high (9 out
of 10 requests for arrest were granted almost automatically). The situation
of prison 13 in Chisinau was especially alarming, due to its overpopulation
and inhuman treatments that leads to condemnations by the Strasbourg
Court.
126. The Minister of Justice was well aware of this situation.
He informed us that a new prison should be built with the support
of the Council of Europe Development Bank. This project has actually
been in preparation for many years, but never materialised due to
unsuccessful tenders and negotiations.
The
Minister mentioned that a compensation mechanism for detention conditions
had recently been approved to compensate inhuman detention conditions,
which should decrease the number of applications lodged to the Strasbourg
Court.
5.3. Situation of national minorities
127. The Republic of Moldova is
a multiethnic State. According to the latest census (2014), Moldovans represent
75,1% of the population, Romanians 7,7%, Ukrainians: 6,6%, Gagauzs:
4,6%, Russians: 4,1%, Bulgarians: 1,9%, Roma 0,3%. The languages
declared to be usually spoken were the Moldovan (54,6%), the Romanian
(24%), Russian (14,5%), Ukrainian (2,7%), Gagauz (2,7%) and Bulgarian
(1%). The country is a party to the Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities since 1996 and is currently exploring
the possibility to ratify the European Charter for Regional or Minority
Languages (signed in 2002).
128. During our visit in June 2022, we met representatives of the
Ukrainian, Gagauz, Russia and Roma national minorities, the Chair
of the Council for the prevention and elimination of discrimination
and the ensuring of equality as well as the Deputy Director-General
of the Interethnic Relations Agency. Given the time of our visit,
our discussions were dominated by the situation in the region and
the impact of the conflict on the coexistence of the national communities.
Despite this difficult regional context, the country had remained stable,
what should be praised.
129. The question of the commend of the Romanian language, which
is crucial to integrate universities or find a job was raised, and
there is a clear demand from the national minorities that needs
to be addressed by the authorities. We also understand that the
authorities are looking into the possibility to increase access
to radio television programmes in minority languages – also to offer
counter-narratives to Russian TV channels broadcast in the Republic
of Moldova. That would also contribute to implement the Strategy
on the Consolidation of Interethnic Relations in the Republic of
Moldova for 2017-2027, as recommended by the Committee of Ministers
in July 2021, “with a view to further developing a civic identity
that is inclusive and firmly based on respect for ethnic and linguistic
diversity as an integral part of Moldovan society”.
6. The Transnistrian conflict settlement
130. In light of the work programme
approved by the Sub-Committee on conflicts concerning Council of Europe
member States and the decision to organise a seminar on “the protection
of human rights in the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova
and the role of the Council of Europe”
, we discussed
the Transnistrian settlement process and related human rights issues
with the Moldovan authorities during our October 2021 visit and
travelled to Tiraspol, in the Transnistrian region of the Republic
of Moldova. This trip was facilitated by Mr Claus Neukirch, then
Head of the OSCE Mission, to whom we extend our thanks for his invaluable
assistance these past years. It is important to note that this visit
took place before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine.
131. The management of the Covid-19 pandemic affected the settlement
process with the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova:
Transnistria declared a “state of emergency” on 17 March, forbade
the entry of non-residents and limited the possibility for local
residents to leave Transnistrian territory. Additional check points
and illegal posts in the Security Zone were established unilaterally
by the de facto “authorities”.
The OSCE Mission encouraged the two sides to facilitate the flow
of medicines as well as food and phytosanitary products intended
for people in Transnistria, the free movement of medical personnel
residing in Transnistria to their respective workplaces, the temporary
accommodation of medical personal (being a high-risk group) on the
Dniester right bank for the period of the Covid-19 crisis or access
for Transnistrian residents holding Moldovan health insurance to
access healthcare facilities and pharmacies on the right bank. The
state of emergency was extended three times until 16 June 2020,
when a “quarantine regime” was introduced. The Bureau of Reintegration
of the Republic of Moldova, however, denounced illegal actions taken
by Tiraspol and worrisome developments, especially as regards human
rights, schools or travel restrictions.
132. In Chisinau, Mr Vlad Kulminski, then Deputy Prime Minister
for Reintegration
,
informed us about the latest developments, in particular the co-operation
established with Tiraspol in times of pandemics. The Deputy Prime
Minister referred to the current case-law of the European Court
of Human right. In 2012, the Court ruled, in the
Catan and others v. Moldova and Russia ruling,
confirmed in subsequent rulings,
that the rights of children,
parents and staff members of Latin-script schools 2002-2004 had
been violated. The Strasbourg Court established “the effective control”
of Russia over the [“Moldavian Republic of Transnistria”]: “by virtue
of its continued military, economic and political support for the
“MRT”, which could not otherwise survive, the Russian Federation
incurred responsibility under the Convention for the violation of
the applicants’ rights.” The implementation of the Catan ruling
is supervised by the Committee of Ministers, which is expecting
the Russian Federation to present an action plan setting out the concrete
measures taken (or envisaged) to implement the judgments. The Russian
Federation however underlined that the European Court’s attribution
to Russia of responsibility for violations which took place on the
territory of another State created serious problems of implementation
and proposed to the Committee of Ministers, in December 2020, to
engage experts to conduct an independent assessment of the situation
in Transnistria.
The Moldovan authorities have expressed
deep concern over the execution of Court judgments arising from
the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova, including the
case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The implementation
of these judgements will deserve particular attention after the
Russian Federation ceased to be a member of the Council of Europe
following its aggression against Ukraine.
133. Ten years after the
Catan and others
v. Moldova and Russia judgment, the Committee of Ministers
held that the Russian Federation had failed to pay the just satisfaction
and to implement the measures for the execution of these judgments,
including “the revocation of the ‘regulatory framework’ at the origin
of the violations, the return of the Latin-script schools to their
former premises or to alternative premises adequate for the educational
process, and measures to eliminate the harassment and intimidation
of the pupils, parents and staff members”.
The
Committee of Ministers reiterated “with firm insistence the unconditional
obligation of the Russian Federation under Article 46, paragraph
1 of the Convention, to execute the final judgment of the European
Court and exhorted the authorities to comply with this obligation,
including by rapidly paying the sums awarded, together with the
default interest accrued, and submitting an action plan with concrete
steps to implement the above measures”.
We
can only support this call and reiterate the need to guarantee the
right of education in the Latin-script schools of the Transnistrian
region of the Republic of Moldova.
134. We were also informed that the Moldovan Parliament may set
up a working group comprising members of the Moldovan Parliament
and members of the de facto “Supreme
Council”.
135. In Tiraspol, our discussion focused on the current sanitary
situation, and the protection of human rights. The
de facto Transnistrian authorities
expressed their availability to participate in the follow-up seminar envisaged
by the sub-committee. We also discussed the situation in prisons
and inquired about the follow-up given to the recommendations issued
in 2018 by Thomas Hammarberg, the then Senior UN Human Rights Expert
in the Transnistrian region after his previous engagement in 2012.
The
de
facto “ombudsman” claimed that the situation had improved
dramatically in prisons (we did not, however, have the possibility
to visit a prison). We remain concerned about a number of political
prisoners in Transnistrian prisons and individuals who have been
prosecuted under the so-called “2020-2026 Strategy for Combating
Extremism”, as it was the case for Ghennadi Ciorba,
sentenced
to three years and three months in prison on 19 July 2021 on extremism
charges and for insulting the
de facto “President”
Vadim Krasnoselsky following a closed trial. There were also concerns
concerning the detention conditions of Oleg Horjan, leader of the
Transnistrian Communist Party: in 2018, the then member of the
de facto “Supreme Council” was sentenced
to 4,5 years for use of violence against a representative of authority.
NGO representatives
met in Tiraspol also reported about the restrictions to freedom
of assembly and expression of dissenting opinions, and the climate
of intimidation prevailing in the area.
136. But the key issue of concern expressed then by all interlocutors
in Tiraspol concerned the free circulation of commercial vehicles.
The issuance of neutral licence-plates had been achieved within
the 5+2 negotiations (“Berlin Plus package”) and allowed citizens
from the Transnistrian region to register their private car in the Vehicle
Registration Points set up in Rîbnița and Tiraspol; they are then
provided with a neutral license plate, allowing them to have access
to international roads. As from 1 September 2021, the Republic of
Moldova and Ukraine agreed that “access to the international road
traffic will be granted only to the means of transport from the
Transnistrian region that will have the license plates of the Republic
of Moldova and neutral plates, including the ‘MD’ sticker”.
As a
result, companies from the Transnistrian region performing a commercial activity
(notably passengers buses and ambulances) could no longer cross
the Ukrainian border.
137. We also paid attention to the situation of Latin-script schools
and children’s right to education. There are currently 8 schools with
teaching in Romanian on the Transnistrian territory (5 high schools,
2 secondary schools and a boarding school)
which have been
facing numerous challenges to operate. The question of the premises
of these schools are now the main concern of the Moldovan authorities:
some schools were re-located, 5 schools are located in unsuitable
buildings. We met the Director of the Grigoriopol Latin-script school,
which in fact is relocated in Dorotcaia (26 km away) in the security
zone, thus obliging the pupils and the teachers to commute every
day and to use the school buildings in shifts. The Director had
been teaching for the past 20 years. She explained that the situation
had improved, however the pupils did not enjoy normal educational
conditions and did not have a school building in Grigoriopol. We
commended the efforts made by the educational community to ensure
the pupils’ education despite the difficult circumstances.
138. Since our visit on the ground in October 2021, the situation
dramatically changed after the Russian aggression of Ukraine, which
reverberated on the Transnistrian conflict settlement. The sub-committee
was informed by Mr Oleg Serebrian, Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration,
at its meeting in Paris on 30 March 2022, about possible developments,
should the conflict be extended to the Western regions in Ukraine, especially
Odessa. The situation remains very fragile and unpredictable. We
noted however that Chisinau and Tiraspol had, especially in the
early stages of the war, showed restrains and call for calm. Channels
of communication remain open, despite a tense situation, aggravated
by provocative statements from Russian officials or de facto authorities in Tiraspol.
139. The Sub-Committee on conflicts concerning member States will
reflect on this new situation following Russia’s expulsion from
the Council of Europe in March 2022 and will have to reflect about
the possible course of action in the present situation.
7. Concluding
remarks
140. This report has attempted to
provide an overview of the major political developments since the
last monitoring report adopted by the Assembly. The Republic of
Moldova has embarked on an ambitious, and difficult, path. Restoring
the rule of law, and in particular an independent judiciary, is
a huge undertaking in a country characterised by “state capture”.
With a stable and comfortable parliamentary majority, the authorities have
entered a race against the clock to overhaul the leadership of the
State institutions and the judiciary and to initiate a process of
profound reforms, especially to restore the independence of the
judiciary, suppress the criminal schemes fuelling the “state capture”
and restore trust in the State institutions. This is a perilous exercise,
in which the imperative of speed must not override respect for the
rule of law.
141. The regional context, the immeasurable pressures generated
by the Russian Federation on energy matters, and then the consequences
of the war, have placed the Republic of Moldova in a very difficult situation,
which the authorities are trying to manage with calm and resilience.
The opening of European Union accession negotiations should help
consolidate the ongoing reform process.
142. In this context, we welcome the close and fruitful co-operation
of the Moldovan authorities with the Council of Europe, in particular
the Assembly and its Monitoring Committee, as well as with the Venice Commission,
which has adopted, since 2019, eleven opinions and six amicus curia briefs. It should be
noted that these opinions were, in the vast majority of cases, requested
by the authorities (parliament, constitutional court, parliamentary
opposition or the High Council of Public Prosecutors) and led to
the revision of the legislation, and very often to the request for
a second opinion of the Venice Commission. We also welcome the commitment
expressed by the authorities to address corruption, in particular
in the justice system. The legal and constitutional steps taken
in that direction, in compliance with the recommendations made by
the Venice Commission and GRECO, are to be welcome. The challenge
now will be to consolidate the institutions with sufficient human
and financial resources. The Assembly should therefore encourage
the authorities to pursue and implement their reform agenda based
on the Council of Europe standards so as to establish solid and sustainable
State institutions, which are a prerequisite for the good functioning
of democratic institutions. The successful continuation of this
process would pave the way to a new phase of post-monitoring dialog
with the country. In the meantime, we will continue to follow the
developments and support the reform process in the framework of
the monitoring procedure.