1. Introduction
1. The attack of Hamas on Israel
launched on 7 October 2023 was a multi-front assault against Israeli towns
and cities, resulting in horrific scenes of violence. The brutality
and unsparing nature of the actions of Hamas terrorists provoked
the highest number of fatalities in a single day in Israel’s history.
This attack was motivated by the unjustifiable aim of destroying
the State of Israel.
2. The whole world was shaken by these chilling images. Children
killed in their sleep, hundreds of young people slaughtered while
attending a concert, families murdered in their homes, homes razed,
women violently raped, and hundreds of citizens kidnapped – taken
as hostages.
3. Nothing can justify the brutal and indiscriminate violence
of Hamas which confirmed, through its deeds, to be a terrorist organisation.
On this, there can be no ambiguity.
4. In the current affairs debate of the Parliamentary Assembly
entitled “Escalation of violence in the Middle East following the
recent Hamas attack on Israel”, held on 11 October 2023, I was clear
on this point: everything must be done to stop Hamas’ aggression
and to obtain the release of the hostages. At the same time, recognising
Israel’s right to defend itself, I appealed to the Israeli authorities
not to make the Palestinian people pay for the acts of these terrorists,
and to ensure that humanitarian aid and essential goods reach those
in need.
5. The military campaign launched by Israel in response to the
attacks of 7 October has the explicit objective to annihilate Hamas
and secure the release of hostages. The scale of this operation
has rendered much of the north of Gaza inhabitable, displaced the
large majority of the population, and led both directly and indirectly
to a loss of life among the Palestinian people. The blockade of
essential resources such as food, water, fuel, electricity and medicine
has created an unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe, as stated
by the United Nations.
6. Aware that the immense tragedy of 7 October and the consequences
of the war that has ensued make the hollow of incommunicability,
resentment, and hatred ever deeper, one should also keep in mind
the long-term perspective. Even despite and during a war, it is
necessary to knit the threads for a solution which will allow for
Israelis and Palestinians to live at peace with each other. Overcoming
distrust and hatred requires extraordinary determination, and efforts
should begin now.
2. Background and scope
7. One cannot fail to note with
alarm that the entire area of the enlarged Mediterranean – from
the Strait of Hormuz to the Strait of Gibraltar – is beset by a
sequence of crises: the criticality of Iran, the fragility of Iraq, the
civil wars in Syria and Yemen, the economic collapse in Lebanon,
the unresolved Cyprus issue, the instability of the Horn of Africa,
and the Libyan crisis. Without forgetting the critical situation
in the Sahel, a region traversed by coups and jihadist presence.
8. Since the Assembly held a current affairs debate on 30 January
2020 on “Recent developments in Libya and in the Middle East: what
consequences for Europe?” the peace process between Israel and Palestine
has remained stalled, with a considerable increase in violence and
negative rhetoric over the last two years. The attacks launched
by Hamas on 7 October 2023 represented an unprecedented escalation
of this dynamic, bringing a scale of death, destruction and instability
that represents a paradigm change in the region.
9. The Assembly has consistently reiterated its support for a
two-State solution based on the 1967 borders and for the legitimate
aspirations of the two sides: Israel’s right to be recognised and
live in safety, and the Palestinians’ right to have an independent,
viable and contiguous State.

In
its latest resolution on the issue, passed in 2018, the Assembly
stressed the need for all parties involved to abide by their legal
obligations and responsibilities under international law and to
refrain from any unilateral measures that undermine the prospects
of peace. It resolved to continue to promote dialogue and confidence-building
between representatives of the Knesset and the Palestinian National
Council.

10. These efforts have been held, in particular, in the framework
of its Sub-Committee on the Middle East and the Arab World. The
Assembly has also established relations with other parliaments in
the region in light of prospects for co-operation offered by the
partner for democracy status.
11. In June 2023, the Sub-Committee on the Middle East and the
Arab World resumed its exchanges with the Israeli observer delegation
to the Assembly, and the Palestinian partner for democracy delegation
following a pause of four years. On 11 October 2023, the respective
delegations addressed the Assembly during the current affairs debate
entitled “Escalation of violence in the Middle East following the
recent Hamas attack on Israel”.
3. Hamas’
terrorist attack of 7 October 2023
12. On the morning of 7 October
2023, Hamas launched an attack from Gaza against Israel. The multi-pronged
infiltration from Gaza saw attacks on soldiers at 22 sites outside
of Gaza, as well as indiscriminate attacks on civilians.
13. The devastation and violence were astonishing in cruelty and
magnitude. Israeli officials estimated that 1 200 Israelis and foreign
citizens had been killed. Individuals from 36 countries from all
continents were killed or missing in the aftermath. The Health Ministry
of Israel indicated that the number of wounded in hospital reached
over 5 500 people. Widespread acts of torture and maiming, burning
alive, beheading, rape, sexual violence and mutilation of corpses
were carried out, and in some cases recorded by the perpetrators.
14. In the course of the attack, over 200 people were taken hostage,
including elderly people and children.
15. The attacks decimated communities, such as in Kibbutz Be’eri,
where 10% of the town, or 108 people were murdered by Hamas.
16. Indiscriminate rocket fire from Gaza on 7 October saw more
than 5 000 missiles launched, and continued into the morning of
8 October, with a hospital sustaining damage in the Israeli town
of Ashkelon. Also on 8 October, Hezbollah forces announced that
they had launched rockets and artillery from the south of Lebanon
at three Israeli positions in the Shebaa Farms “in solidarity” with
the Palestinian people.

17. The continued barrage of rockets towards Israel had seen,
by 14 November 2023, 250 000 Israelis evacuated from communities
near Gaza and along the northern border.

18. In response to the attack by Hamas, Israeli authorities declared
a state of war and called up military reservists. On the afternoon
of 7 October, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched operation
‘Iron Swords’ with strikes on the Gaza strip by air, land and sea.
3.1. Reactions
to the Hamas attack
19. The Prime Minister of Israel,
Benjamin Netanyahu, said that Hamas had started a “brutal and evil
war”; that the IDF would use all its strength to destroy Hamas’
capabilities, and that the war ahead would take time.

20. The Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas said that the Palestinian
people had the right to defend themselves against the “terrors of
settlers and occupation troops”.

The Palestinian authorities released a statement
on 7 October recalling that they had warned of “the consequences
of blocking the political horizon and failing to enable the Palestinian
people to exercise their legitimate right to self-determination”,
adding that the “continuation of the injustice and oppression to
which the Palestinian people are exposed to is the reason behind
this explosive situation.”

President Abbas, speaking in Jordan on
12 October 2023, regretted the loss of civilian lives on both sides,
without however explicitly condemning the Hamas attack.

3.2. International
community
21. The European Union statement
of 7 October condemned in the strongest possible terms the multiple and
indiscriminate attacks across Israel by Hamas. The EU called for
an immediate cessation of the attacks and violence, which it said
would only increase tensions on the ground and seriously undermine
Palestinian aspirations for peace. It recalled the importance of
working towards a lasting and sustainable peace through reinvigorated
efforts in the Middle East Process.

22. The United Nations Secretary-General condemned in the strongest
terms the attack. Appalled by reports that civilians had been attacked
and abducted from their own homes, he noted his deep concern for
the civilian population and urged maximum restraint, calling for
the respect and protection of civilians in accordance with international
humanitarian law at all times. He urged all diplomatic efforts to
avoid a wider conflagration.
23. UN Security Council chair, Brazil, announced it would call
an emergency meeting of the Security Council on 8 October to address
the escalating violence, and urged parties to avoid escalating the
situation.
24. The Arab League chief Ahmed Aboul Gheit urged an immediate
halt to military operations in Gaza and the cycle of armed confrontations
between the two sides, saying the actions of Israel had deprived
the region of any serious opportunity for stability. King Mohammed
VI of Morocco, the country currently holding the presidency of the
Arab League Council, called an urgent meeting of the body on 8 October
to co-ordinate and to find ways to curb the serious escalation.
25. Globally, representatives of approximately a hundred countries
reacted. The tracking of international responses by the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy suggested that by 11 October 2023,
some 44 nations had unequivocally condemned Hamas and explicitly
noted that its deeds amounted to terrorism. Explicit statements
on Israel’s right to defend itself were made by some 20 countries.
Other countries, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria and
Iraq referred to the responsibility of Israel for the attacks without condemning
the Hamas attack.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Iran said that the attack was a spontaneous move by resistance
groups and the Palestinian people in defence of their inalienable
rights, and reaffirmed the right of Palestinians to defend themselves.

4. Israel’s
military response
26. The declaration of Prime Minister
Netanyahu on the evening of 7 October that the country was at war was
followed by the approval of the war situation by the Security Cabinet
of Israel, including the approval of taking “significant military
steps”.

27. The objectives of the military action, as stated by Prime
Minister Netanyahu, are the elimination of Hamas by destroying its
military and governing abilities, and to do everything possible
to bring captives home.

28. Israel initiated efforts to recover hostages, began hundreds
of airstrikes against Hamas sites in Gaza and what the IDF describe
as its “operational infrastructure”, mobilised around 360 000 reservists,
which is between 3% and 4% of Israel’s total population, and repositioned
ground forces close to Gaza. Israel’s government almost completely
halted the supply of electricity, food, water, and fuel to Gaza,
which before the conflict had already faced crisis-level economic
and humanitarian conditions.

29. On 13 October 2023, the IDF announced that it “calls for”
for the evacuation of all civilians in Gaza City in northern Gaza
“from their homes southwards for their own safety and protection”.
30. Israel agreed to the reopening of the Rafah crossing between
Egypt and Gaza for limited humanitarian aid only following negotiations
between Egypt, Israel and the United States, on 18 October 2023.
This did not allow for the movement of people across the border.
Some 1 096 trucks entered Gaza between 21 October and 13 November
2023. On 1 November 2023, the crossing also opened “for time limited
periods” to allow up to 500 foreign nationals and injured Palestinians
to cross into Egypt daily.

31. Israel started the ground operation on 28 October 2023.
32. Following mediation efforts undertaken by Egypt, the United
States, and Qatar, the agreement of a humanitarian pause was announced
on 22 November 2023 which foresaw the release of 50 civilian women and
children hostages held in the Gaza Strip in exchange for the release
of a number of Palestinian women and children detained in Israeli
prisons.

It was to last
for four days, and the Office of the Prime Minister of Israel noted
that the release of every additional ten hostages would result in
one additional day in the pause. It was also foreseen to allow a
larger number of humanitarian convoys and relief aid to enter into
Gaza.
4.1. Humanitarian
situation
33. By 10 November 2023, 11 078
fatalities were reported in Gaza. The data available suggested nearly
half of these deaths (4 506) were children who had been killed following
the military action of Israel.

34. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (UNOCHA) has noted that the UN had so far not been able
to produce independent, comprehensive, and verified casualty figures;
the current numbers have been provided by the Palestinian Ministry
of Health in Gaza and the Israeli authorities and await further
verification. The cumulative casualty figures being provided by
the Palestinian Ministry of Health in Gaza were suspended from 11
November 2023 after the collapse of services and communications
at hospitals in the north.
35. An estimated 1.7 million people in Gaza (some 75% of the territory’s
approximately 2.3 million people) were estimated to be internally
displaced by 20 November 2023, with an estimated 900 000 staying
in some 154 shelters of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Acute issues of
overcrowding are said to exist at the shelters, including access
to sanitation and the spread of diseases.

Lack of capacity
in shelters has also forced thousands of internally displaced persons
to sleep in the open, with the situation aggravated due to exposure
to heavy rains.
36. Attacks on residential buildings and infrastructure have been
frequent. As of 13 November 2023, UNOCHA reported that 45% of Gaza’s
housing units had been destroyed or damaged, 22 hospitals were out of
service, the existence of a catastrophic food, water and sanitation
situation, and the lack of fuel further exacerbating the provision
of health and basic services.

At the same
time, the Gaza Strip has been under an electricity blackout since
11 October 2023 after Israeli authorities cut off the electricity
supply, and the fuel reserves for the sole power plant in Gaza depleted.
37. On 20 November 2023, the World Health Organization (WHO) reacted
to the Indonesian Hospital in Beit Lahiya (North Gaza) coming under
attack for the fifth time since the start of hostilities. It said
that multiple attacks on health facilities had resulted in forced
mass evacuations from hospitals, and multiple fatalities and casualties
among patients and those seeking refuge in hospitals. WHO noted
335 attacks on health care facilities in the Gaza Strip and in the
West Bank since 7 October. These attacks combined with shortages
of fuel, medicine, water, and other essential resources were said
to have reduced hospital bed capacity in Gaza from 3 500 to 1 400
beds. WHO reminded the parties to the conflict of the obligation
under international humanitarian law to respect the sanctity of,
and actively protect, health facilities.

With hospitals
such as Al-Shifa no longer able to function due to the lack of essential
items and fuel, an evacuation of some 30 premature infants to Egypt
was arranged and carried out on 20 November 2023.
38. UN offices globally lowered flags to half-mast on 13 November
2023, mourning the loss of 101 UNRWA staff killed since the start
of the escalation of hostilities in Gaza. The UN Secretary-General
stated that more United Nations aid workers have been killed than
in any comparable period in the history of the Organisation.
39. On 21 November 2023, the Committee to Protect Journalists
preliminarily documented that since the 7 October, 53 journalists
and media workers had been killed during the conflict, including
46 Palestinians, 4 Israelis and 3 Lebanese, making it the deadliest
period for journalists since the Committee to Protect Journalists
began gathering data in 1992.

40. Hamas and Israel have blamed each other for the dire human
cost and atrocious humanitarian conditions in Gaza. The actions
of Israel have inflicted casualties and limited life-sustaining
supplies, while Hamas and other militia groups are contributing
to making civilian areas and facilities, notably hospitals, unsafe by
operating in or near them, using them as shields, in complete disregard
for international law as well as for the safety of Palestinian civilians.

4.2. Reactions
41. Radically different perceptions
of the conflict, its causes and implications have characterised international
reactions.
42. The UN Secretary-General, addressing the UN Security Council,
called for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire on 24 October 2023
to “ease epic suffering, make the delivery of aid easier and safer,
and facilitate the release of hostages.”

Efforts to adopt
a resolution in the United Nations Security Council in October failed to
find common positions on addressing the crisis. Disagreement centred
on calling for an unconditional humanitarian ceasefire, humanitarian
pauses, or for language related to the right to self-defence.

43. The first formal response of the United Nations to the escalation
of violence in Israel and Palestine since the Hamas terror attacks
was the adoption by the UN General Assembly of a resolution on 26
October 2023 by a large majority. The resolution called for an “immediate,
durable and sustained humanitarian truce leading to a cessation
of hostilities”.

44. In light of the spiralling numbers of lives lost since 7 October,
the Principals of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee released a
statement on 5 November 2023 calling for the need for an immediate
humanitarian ceasefire.

45. The UN Security Council was able to adopt a resolution on
15 November 2023 by which it called for urgent and extended humanitarian
pauses and corridors through the Gaza Strip to facilitate the provision
of essential goods and services. The Security Council also called
for the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages held
by Hamas and other groups, and urged the parties to refrain from
depriving civilians in Gaza of life-saving services and humanitarian
assistance. The United States and the United Kingdom abstained on the
vote, saying they were unable to vote yes on a text that did not
condemn Hamas, and the United States further regretted that the
text did not reaffirm the rights of all member States to protect
their citizens from terrorist attacks. The Russian Federation also
abstained, citing the lack of a call for an immediate ceasefire.

46. The International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor spoke from
the Rafah crossing in Egypt on 30 October 2023 to call upon State
parties to the ICC and non-State parties “to help collectively vindicate
the Geneva Conventions, to help collectively vindicate principles
of customary international law and also principles of the Rome Statute,
to share evidence regarding any allegations or any crimes so that
[the ICC] can properly investigate them and prosecute them as appropriate”.
He added that any attack that impacts innocent civilians or protected
objects must be conducted in accordance with the laws and customs
of war.

47. The ICC Prosecutor confirmed on 17 November 2023 the receipt
of a referral of the Situation in the State of Palestine from Bangladesh,
Bolivia, Comoros, Djibouti and South Africa. In response, the Office
of the Prosecutor confirmed that it had been investigating, as from
3 March 2021, conduct that may amount to Rome Statute crimes committed
since 13 June 2014 in Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem,
and that this investigation was ongoing and extended to the escalation
of hostilities and violence since 7 October.

48. On the initiative of President Macron, France organised on
9 November 2023 an international conference on humanitarian aid
for Gaza’s civilians. This sought to promote compliance with international
law and the strengthening of humanitarian access, with calls for
work on protecting civilians made.
49. The Joint Arab Islamic Extraordinary Summit, hosted in Saudi
Arabia on 12 November 2023, demanded the end to the “aggression”
immediately, rejecting that the military action of Israel was justified
under the principle of self-defence, without however condemning
the Hamas attack. It condemned double standards in applying international
law, and said that it undermined the credibility of multilateral
action, and showed selectivity in applying the system of humanitarian
values.

50. The EU adopted a statement on 12 November 2023 expressing
its grave concern about the deepening humanitarian crisis in Gaza.
Re-emphasising the right of Israel to defend itself in line with
international law and international humanitarian law, the EU called
for an immediate pause in hostilities and the establishment of humanitarian
corridors so that humanitarian aid could reach the population of
Gaza. It further condemned the use of hospitals, and the use of
civilians as human shields by Hamas, and recalled the principles
that hospitals must be protected.
5. Repercussions
5.1. Middle
East Peace Process
51. The Assembly has consistently
stated its support for two equally legitimate aspirations – Israel’s
right to be recognised and live in security, and the Palestinians’
right to have an independent and viable State.

The escalation in
violence following the horrors of 7 October 2023 marks a new low
point for the efforts to bring resolution to a history of conflict
between Israel and Palestine.
52. It was September 1993 when Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat
signed an agreement in Washington which in five years should have
led to a peace solution based on the principle of Israel and a viable
Palestinian State living side by side in peace, security, and mutual
recognition. 30 years have passed and the hopes raised by that agreement
have gradually given way to disappointment, disenchantment, frustration
and anger, opening up space for those – Hamas and Islamic Jihad
– who never accepted that agreement, who contest the very idea of
co-existence between two States, and did not hesitate to unleash
atrocious aggression against Israel in an attempt to prevent any
form of coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians, which today
appears even further away. Hamas’ continued commitment to the use
of force against Israel, non-recognition of Israel, and the creation
of an Islamic Palestinian State in Israel’s place has seen Hamas
long designated as a terrorist organisation by the United States,
the EU, the United Kingdom and numerous others.
53. A number of factors have greatly hampered efforts to resolve
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. First, Israel’s continued policy
of building and expanding settlements in the West Bank runs counter
to the two-State solution based on the 1967 borders and is illegal
under international law. Second, the deep political schisms within Palestinian
leadership have weakened aspirations for statehood, and have impeded
any presidential and parliamentary elections from taking place since
2006. Efforts of Fatah and Hamas to come to terms for future elections
and reconciliation have been intermittent over the last decade,
with agreement in Algeria in October 2022 suggesting that legislative
elections would be arranged within a year, and that the Palestine
Liberation Organisation would be the sole legitimate representative
of the Palestinian people.
54. The current conflict has exacerbated all of the tensions,
all of the fault lines running through the peace process. In the
last reporting period of the United Nations Secretary-General on
the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2334, Special
Co-ordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Tor Wennesland, regretted
daily violence in the region. Fatal incidents in the period between
June and September 2023 continued a trend of increased tension,
violence and fatalities that had been witnessed in the preceding
years.
55. The report of 15 March 2023 of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights on Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian
Golan, noted that settler violence was at the highest levels recorded
by the United Nations, and said that repeated failures to protect
Palestinians and their property had contributed to worsening the
coercive environment and discrimination against Palestinians. The
Hamas terror attacks of 7 October were followed by the exacerbation of
settler violence in the West Bank, with incidents which, in the
six weeks after the attacks, surpassed the levels of violence seen
for the entire year. This rise in settler violence and access restrictions
(including permit requirements and the designation of areas as restricted
or closed) has forced the displacement of at least 1 014 Palestinians
in the occupied West Bank in the six weeks leading to 20 November
2023.

This took settler
violence from an already elevated rate of three incidents per day
this year, to seven a day.

The US Secretary
of State called on Israeli authorities on 16 November 2023 to urgently
take steps to de-escalate tensions in the West Bank and the rising
levels of “settler extremist violence”.

Following a visit
to the Middle East, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights noted
his deep concern about the intensification of violence, and said
that he was “ringing the loudest possible alarm bell about the occupied
West Bank”.

56. The Palestinian leadership, by gradually rejecting the proposals
put forward by the Israeli side over numerous years, has undermined
the credibility of the Palestinian National Authority to the advantage
of Hamas. Responsibility is also shared by the Israeli authorities’
approach in accelerating the expansion of settlements in the West
Bank, the refusal to start negotiations, and the rise in inflammatory
rhetoric by government representatives.

57. The international community and its main protagonists have
no less responsibility. The Middle East Quartet, consisting of the
United Nations, the European Union, the United States and the Russian
Federation, has never managed to give real impetus to peace solutions,
and has not met since November 2021.

Iran's strong
influence on Hamas has further reduced the space for mediation initiatives.
58. Alternatives pursued towards peace in the region – such as
through the Abraham Accords which established diplomatic relations
and normalised relations on the basis of mutual recognition between
Israel, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan – now
face huge hurdles, and the prospect of establishing further relations
minimises.
5.2. International
repercussions and concerns about regional enlargement of the conflict
59. The failure to find consensus
and a common position on the conflict in the UN Security Council
until the adoption of the fifth proposed resolution of 15 November
2023 has further exposed the tensions that are blocking effective
action for maintaining international peace and security, outlined
also in the Assembly
Resolution
2515 (2023) “The role of the Council of Europe in preventing conflicts,
restoring credibility of international institutions and promoting
global peace”.
60. Proposals voiced by Emmanuel Macron and Charles Michel to
introduce mechanisms that suspend the right of veto in certain situations
remain as relevant today as they were when they were made during
the high-level debate in the UN General Assembly from 20-26 September
2022.
61. The calls of Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs for UN Secretary-General
Guterres to resign after his comments made on 25 October 2023 which
had noted that “the attacks by Hamas did not happen in a vacuum” showed
the particular tensions that have existed at the international level
in calling for a ceasefire amid the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.
This same tension in calling for a ceasefire has been replicated
at the EU-level, where calls to include wording to the effect of
a “humanitarian ceasefire” was not possible to agree on at the meeting
of the European Council on 26 October 2023.

62. Military, economic, and political ties between Hamas, Hezbollah
and Iran have created fears the current conflict may widen. The
UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, in his
emergency briefing to the UN Security Council on 18 October 2023,
outlined the fear that “we are at the brink of a deep and dangerous
abyss that could change the trajectory of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, if not of the Middle East as a whole”, calling the risk
of an expansion of this conflict as “very real and extremely dangerous”.

63. On 8 October 2023, Hezbollah in Lebanon launched missiles
and conducted artillery attacks on some military sites in northern
Israel “in solidarity” with Hamas. Israel retaliated with artillery
fire. While there have been no large-scale movements, small clashes
have been reported on the border, and Israel has ordered the evacuation
of more than 40 communities in northern Israel.
64. Senior Iranian officials have voiced their support for the
Hamas offensive. While US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, speaking
in October 2023, said there was “nothing” to suggest Iran was “directly
involved in this attack [by Hamas against Israel], in planning it
or in carrying it out”,

long-standing financial
support and training provided by Iran to Hamas has been widely documented.

65. Since 7 October, attacks against US forces in the region have
been reported from Iran-aligned groups in Iraq, Syria and Yemen.
Israel has intercepted a number of ballistic missiles launched from
Yemen by the Houthi movement, who also shot down a US drone on 8
November 2023, and hijacked a cargo ship in the Red Sea.

66. In addition to the risk of regional escalation, the clear
cleavage in the positions of regional and international actors in
response to the conflict have potentially long-term ramifications
for international co-operation and cohesion. The risks of global
insecurity could be enhanced further by risks to energy markets and
commodity price shocks should the conflict escalate, and would add
to the disruptive effects on the global economy caused by the Russian
Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

5.3. Racism,
intolerance and hatred
67. The global impact of the situation
in the Middle East is undoubted. The fierce debate it engenders
is a source of much sensitivity, and citizens across Europe have
responded to the crisis in myriad ways, including public demonstrations
of solidarity and protest. At the same time, these responses have
posed a risk to the fabric of our communities, our cohesion, and
to civil peace. The strain put on both Jewish and Muslim communities
has been deeply concerning, and is all the more intolerable given
that none of the members of these communities bear responsibility
for events in the Middle East.
5.3.1. Antisemitism
68. The Assembly in 2022 noted
how antisemitism is built on harmful stereotypes which makes the
Jewish community a scapegoat for emerging crises.

This
has been the case during the Covid-19 pandemic,

at the beginning
of the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine,

and is again the
case here. It is to be reminded that Jewish people around the world
should not be held responsible for the words and actions of the
Israeli, or any other, Government.
69. Alarming repercussions to the Hamas terrorist attacks of 7
October and subsequent conflict have been traced across the streets
of Europe with an extraordinary spike in antisemitic incidents recorded
across the continent, against a background of repeated warnings
of rising antisemitism for years.
70. The scope of these incidents has been wide-ranging: demonstrations
have been held where the heinous actions of Hamas have been praised,
synagogues and Jewish sites have been attacked, posters of the hostages
taken by Hamas have been defaced or torn down, antisemitic content
has proliferated online, and threats have been made to the physical
integrity of Jewish citizens. Shabbat gatherings have been accompanied
by the presence of armed guards for protection, and the protection
of Jewish schools, community centres, and synagogues is no longer
a precautionary step, but a response to this soaring surge in antisemitic incidents.
71. Figures for antisemitic acts and comments in France reached
1 518 incidents following 7 October, reported the Minister of the
Interior on 14 November 2023. This represented a three-fold increase
compared to the whole of 2022, and led to 571 arrests. In the United
Kingdom, the Community Service Trust, an organisation recording
antisemitic incidents since 1984, saw a 40-day total of 1 324 incidents
across the United Kingdom, representing the highest across a forty-day
period in the organisation’s history. Monitoring bodies have seen
this trend across Europe and North America,

but the effect
has been global, with incidents including the chasing of passengers
arriving on a flight from Israel into Dagestan, Russia, and the
massive proliferation of antisemitic content on Chinese online platforms.

5.3.2. Islamophobia
72. The Assembly has been deeply
concerned by the constant increase in signs of Islamophobia in Europe, with
a dramatic spike in recent years, as denounced by numerous human
rights and equality bodies at European and global levels.

73. The aftermath of the deadly terrorist attacks has created
a deeply hostile environment online and offline for Muslim communities
in numerous European countries. Many countries have seen reports
of growing racist incidents, verbal attacks, attacks on mosques,
and a huge volume of dehumanising, radicalised, and violent language
about Muslims.
5.4. Freedom
of expression and assembly
74. The conflict has had serious
impacts on the safety of journalists in the region. The Committee
to Protect Journalists has reported that at least 53 journalists
and media workers have been killed, 8 injured, and 3 missing as
of 21 November 2023 in covering the conflict.

Journalists
that operate in conflict zones carry out vital work and are protected
under international humanitarian law.
75. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols
set out rules to protect people who are not taking part in the fighting
and those who can no longer fight. Additional Protocol I specifies
that journalists who are engaged in professional missions in areas
of armed conflict must be considered as civilians and must be protected
as such as long as they take no action adversely affecting their
status as civilians. This means that all parties to a conflict must
protect journalists, avoid deliberate attacks against them and uphold
their rights in case they are captured.
76. In Europe, since 7 October, hundreds of thousands of people
have exercised their rights in protests related to the conflict.
A number of incidents related to the freedom of assembly in October
2023 have highlighted the need for proportionality and careful assessment
to guide responses to demonstrations, reporting, and public statements.
States must continue to carefully balance the imperative to public
security concerns and countering antisemitic and anti-Muslim hate
speech, with protecting the freedom of expression and assembly.
77. Bans on protests for fears of the risk of disturbances to
public order, have to be carefully balanced to comply with standards
on freedom of assembly. The decision of the French Conseil d’État,
the country’s highest administrative court, on 18 October 2023 reaffirmed
that prohibitions on demonstrations must be taken on a case-by-case
basis, and local authorities should continue to provide detailed
justifications for any decision to ban protests on their territory.

6. Conclusions
78. We are facing one of the most
challenging moments in Israeli and Palestinian history. It is a
challenge for the region, it is a challenge for the international
community, and it is a challenge for Europe and our societies.
79. The horror of the inhuman and brutal violence of the Hamas
terrorist attacks on 7 October 2023 were inexcusable, unjustifiable,
and shocked the world. Council of Europe member States and the Assembly
must be clear in their condemnation of these despicable acts of
terror and in demanding the liberation of all the hostages as soon
as possible.
80. Israel, in waging a war in response to these attacks must
act within the bounds of international humanitarian law. The lives
of Palestinians who had nothing to do with the terrorist actions
of Hamas should not be collateral damage in this conflict.
81. The risks of regional conflagration remain high. There is
a continued need for engagement with regional and international
partners for preventing further escalation.
82. The dramatic crisis that the Middle East is experiencing is
a confirmation that the pursuit of peace needs timely initiatives,
courageous mediations, and a tireless search for solutions. Ultimately,
the only way to ensure that this crisis never happens again is to
begin setting the conditions for durable peace and security. Parliamentary
diplomacy for the region should work to that end. In Europe, and
in the Assembly, we must also continue to promote this dialogue,
guided by support for the equally legitimate aspirations of Israel
to be recognised and to live in security, and of Palestinians to
have an independent and viable State.