1. Introduction
1. Albania joined the Council
of Europe on 13 July 1995. Upon its accession, Albania undertook
to honour the obligations incumbent on all member States under Article
3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe (ETS No. 1) with regard
to pluralist democracy, the rule of law and human rights. In addition,
it undertook to honour a number of specific commitments listed in
Opinion
189 (1995) on the application by Albania for membership of the
Council of Europe, adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 29 June
1995.
2. The previous report on the honouring of obligations and commitments
by Albania
was debated by the Assembly on 2
October 2014 and led to the adoption of
Resolution 2019 (2014). Since then, as we will outline in this report, Albania
has made considerable and tangible progress in honouring its membership
obligations and accession commitments to the Council of Europe.
At the same time, a number of issues and concerns remain, some of
which are serious, that the country should strive to address.
3. This report is based on the findings and observations of several
fact-finding visits to the country and on extensive discussions
with the Albanian authorities, political parties, civil society,
and relevant other stakeholders. In addition, a number of exchanges
of views were organised in the Committee on the Honouring of Obligations
and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring
Committee) on various developments in the country. During the preparation
of this report, the global covid-19 pandemic broke out, as a result
of which the co-rapporteurs could not visit the country for nearly
3 years. However, that did not interrupt the monitoring process,
which continued unabatedly from a distance. During that period,
a series of online meetings were organised with experts and civil
society representatives as well as members of the Albanian Parliament.
We wish to express our gratitude to the Albanian authorities and
its delegation to the Assembly, as well as to all other stakeholders
that assisted us in our work, for their co-operation and availability to
meet with us and share their views on the developments in the country.
4. Since the adoption of the last report, the co-rapporteurs
have visited the country six times and prepared seven information
notes. In the reporting period, a number of co-rapporteur changes
took place. On 29 January 2015, Mr Grigore Petrenko (Republic of
Moldova, UEL), who had left the Assembly, was replaced by Mr Andrej Hunko
(Germany, UEL). Following the completion of his five-year term,
Mr Hunko was replaced, on 30 January 2020, by Mr Petter Eide (Norway,
UEL). Mr Eide left the Assembly and was replaced on 14 December
2021 by Mr Asim Mollazada (Azerbaijan, EC/DA).
On 28 January 2016, Mr Jonathan
Evans (United Kingdom, EPP/CD) left the Assembly and was replaced
by Mr Cezar Florin Preda (Romania, EPP/CD). Following his resignation
as co-rapporteur, Mr Preda was replaced six months later, on 23
June 2016 by Mr Joseph O’Reilly (Ireland, EPP/CD). Mr O’Reilly completed
his term, which had been extended twice, on 23 December 2022. He was
replaced, on 21 March 2023, by Mr Ionuţ-Marian Stroe (Romania, EPP/CD).
2. Main political developments
5. The systemic political crisis
outlined in the previous report on Albania has continued to plague
the country for most of the reporting period and only recently started
to subside although its root causes have not yet been resolved.
The political climate and especially the relations between the main
political forces, the ruling Socialist Party (SP) and the Democratic
Party (DP) that is currently in opposition, are extremely polarised
and contentious. As a result, the political environment is characterised
by zero sum political policies, a lack of respect and accommodation
between opposition and ruling majority to play their rightful roles
in the governance of the country, and often harsh and confrontational
political rhetoric. Despite the noticeable improvements over the
last couple of years, in particular following the parliamentary
elections in 2021, the political environment remains a point of
concern as it impedes parliamentary oversight and hinders the proper functioning
of the system of checks and balances in the country. All the main
political forces bear responsibility and have a duty to overcome
this polarisation in order to create a political environment that
is truly conducive to democratic interaction.
6. On 21 June 2015, local elections took place for all new 61
local government units (municipalities) that were created by the
territorial and administrative reform. These elections, which took
place in a fragile political climate following this politically
sensitive reform, were observed by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities
of the Council of Europe in the framework of an international election
observation mission (IEOM) with the Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE/ODIHR). The IEOM concluded that, while fundamental
freedoms of expression and assembly had been respected, the lack
of political will to implement electoral legislation effectively
by the main political parties, as well as the politicisation of
State institutions, undermined the electoral process. The election campaign
was overshadowed by mutual accusations of gerrymandering, some of
them proven, including pressure on voters and abuse of administrative
resources.
7. The 2015 local elections results gave a clear victory to the
ruling majority coalition. The ruling majority saw this as a signal
of citizens’ trust and support for the reforms it had initiated,
while the opposition saw this as a confirmation of its belief that
the territorial and administrative reform had in reality focused
on changing the administrative division of the country and less
on the functional aspects of local self-government. As a result,
polarisation mounted and on 10 July 2014, the main opposition party,
the DP, started a boycott of the parliament. Following mediation
by the European Parliament, the opposition returned to the parliament
on 24 December 2014, after having received guarantees that the ruling
majority would seek consensus and not bypass the opposition with
its three-fifths majority in parliament.
8. Despite the agreement, polarisation continued and soon started
escalating in the runup to the 2017 parliamentary elections. These
tensions had a serious impact on the implementation and pace of
the reforms and hindered the democratic consolidation as well as
European integration process of the country. In a welcome exception
to this trend, the polarisation between ruling majority and opposition
was temporarily overcome in July 2016 when the parliament unanimously
adopted a package of constitutional amendments to facilitate a wide-ranging
reform of the judiciary and in particular the vetting of all judges
and prosecutors in Albania, which was a requirement of the European
Union to open accession negotiations with Albania.
9. On 7 February 2017, the DP announced that it would boycott
the work of the parliament and started a permanent demonstration
in front of the Prime Minister’s office, alleging that the ruling
majority would manipulate the upcoming elections. When the DP’s
demands that, inter alia,
Prime Minister Rama resign and a technical government of national
accord be formed, were not met, Mr Lulzim Basha, the DP party leader, announced
that the DP led opposition would boycott the parliamentary elections
that were originally foreseen for 18 June 2017.
10. Following intensive international mediation, spearheaded by
the European Parliament and the European Commission, an agreement
between the DP and the SP was reached on 18 May 2017. In line with
this agreement, the DP ended its boycott of the parliament and elections,
in return for obtaining a Deputy Prime Minister and five ministerial
posts in the government until the election. It was agreed that the
opposition would obtain the chairing of the Central Electoral Commission
and several other key public positions, including the Ombudsperson.
Some questions were raised about the conformity of this agreement
with existing legislation in Albania.
In
line with the agreement, parliamentary elections took place on 25
June 2017, a week later than they had been originally called for.
In addition, the agreement allowed for the creation of the vetting
bodies for the judiciary, which are an essential part of the justice
reform. The members of these bodies were appointed with the votes
of both majority and opposition in an extraordinary session of the
Parliament on 17 June 2017.
11. These elections were observed by the Assembly as part of an
IEOM that also included the OSCE/ODIHR long term election observation
mission as well as delegations from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
and the European Parliament. The IEOM highlighted the overall calm
election campaign in which all contestants could campaign freely
and which respected fundamental human rights. At the same time,
the IEOM also noted,
inter alia,
the continued politicisation of the electoral administration and
the widespread allegations of vote buying and pressure on voters,
which undermined public trust in the electoral process.
12. The SP obtained an absolute majority of 74 out of the 140
mandates in the 2017 parliamentary election. The DP obtained 43
seats, seen as a rebuke by the Albanian voters of its strategy of
confrontation and boycotting the work of the parliament, which was
seen as hindering the implementation of the reforms needed by the
country to start accession negotiations with the European Union.
The Socialist Movement for Integration (LSI, for Lëvizja Socialiste
për Integrim)
obtained
19 seats and lost its traditional King-maker’s role that had allowed
it to be part of the government, alternatively with DP and with
SP, since 2009. For its part, its absolute majority allowed the
SP to govern without consultation or co-operation with the opposition,
raising concerns about a more autocratic style of governance, especially
given Prime Minister Rama’s tight control over the party. As a result,
the systemic political crisis and deep political polarisation continued
unabated following these elections.
13. Unfortunately, the political crisis escalated significantly
in February 2019, turning into a full-blown constitutional crisis,
when the DP and the LSI decided to call upon their MPs to rescind
their parliamentary mandates. This call was headed by all but two
members of these parties. Albania has a proportional election system
with regional constituencies. According to Albanian law, any mandate
that has become vacant will be automatically offered to the first
non-elected person on the list of that party in that constituency
during the last election. While the opposition parties called upon
their members not to accept any mandates, several persons ignored
the position of their party leadership and entered parliament. The
opposition members that refused to give up their mandates, and those
that accepted any rescinded seat, were de
facto disowned by their parties, therewith becoming a
third political vector. Questions regarding the constitutionality
of this situation could not be resolved at that time as the Constitutional
Court was not functioning as a result of the ongoing vetting process
of the judiciary.
14. The fact that the main opposition parties were outside of
the parliament, and the emergence of a political environment characterised
by the – difficult – interaction of three political vectors (extra-parliamentary opposition,
parliamentary opposition, and ruling majority) deepened the political
crisis and hindered the reform process. As a result, the oversight
function of the parliament suffered and the appointment of representatives on
independent regulatory bodies was often delayed, raising questions
about the proper functioning of the country’s system of checks and
balances.
15. On 5 November 2018, President Meta called for local elections
on 30 June 2019. However, the main opposition parties DP and LSI
announced that they would boycott the local elections unless a series
of conditions would be met, including new parliamentary elections
and the formation of a technical government of unity. Not surprisingly,
these demands were firmly rejected by the ruling majority. After
the opposition parties continued their boycott of the elections,
President Meta offered to postpone the elections to give all parties
time to find a compromise solution. This was rejected by the ruling
majority which argued that this would create a dangerous and undemocratic
trend
. On 10 June
2019, citing concerns for public safety and his constitutional responsibility
to protect the pluralist nature of the election process, President
Meta issued a decree cancelling the elections for 30 June 2019.
However, the Central Election Commission (CEC) considered this decree
illegal and with the support of the Albanian Parliament, maintained
the original date of 30 June 2019 for the local elections. The CEC
decision was confirmed by the Electoral College on 24 June 2019.
Again, the constitutionality of neither the presidential degree,
nor the CEC decisions could be ascertained in the Constitutional
Court as it was not functioning as a result of the vetting procedure.
16. Local elections therefore took place on 30 June 2019 without
participation of the main opposition parties. As a result, the SP
ran unopposed in 31 out of the 61 municipalities, while in the other
municipalities, it only faced candidates proposed by small opposition
parties and groups or independent candidates. According to the OSCE/ODIHR
“The 30 June local elections were held with little regard for the
interests of the electorate. The opposition decided not to participate,
and the government determined to hold the elections without it.
In the climate of a political standoff and polarisation, voters
did not have a meaningful choice between political options.”
All but one of the mayoral races
were won by the SP, which also obtained the majority in 59 out of 61
municipality councils. The turnout announced by the CEC was 21.6%,
less than half that of the local elections in 2015, indicating that
a considerable number of opposition voters had indeed heeded the
call to boycott these elections.
17. The constitutional crisis evolved further when the ruling
majority in the parliament started impeachment proceedings against
the President of the Republic over his original decree to cancel
the local elections for 30 June 2019. These proceedings were complicated
by the fact that, if the parliament were to decide to impeach the
President, the next step would be a trial by the Constitutional
Court, which would have to decide if the President was guilty or
not of the violations contained in the impeachment decision. However,
as noted above, the Constitutional Court was at that moment not
functional as a result of the vetting procedure. The Speaker of the
Albanian Parliament asked for an opinion of the Venice Commission
on “the scope of the power of the President to set dates of elections.”
In its opinion,
the Venice Commission concluded
that under the Albanian Constitution, the right of the President
to cancel or postpone elections without specific legal basis was questionable,
unless a state of emergency had been declared, which was not the
case.
The Venice Commission implicitly concluded
that therefore the continuation of the conduct of local elections
on 30 June had been legally correct. However, at the same time the
Venice Commission considered that the President, when postponing
the elections, had pursued the legitimate aim of seeking a compromise
solution in an evolving political crisis, and that therefore his
decree to cancel the local elections, “might not meet the requisite
criteria of sufficient seriousness in the circumstances to warrant
an impeachment of the President.”
The
Albanian Parliament voted on 9 June 2021 to impeach President Meta
on the ground that he had carried out actions contrary to the Constitution
by,
inter alia, openly supporting
a political party during the elections. However, on 17 February
2022, the Constitutional Court of Albania, which in the meanwhile
had become functional, overturned the decision of the parliament
to impeach President Meta on the grounds that the evidence against the
President did not amount to a “grave violation of the Constitution”,
necessary to impeach him.
18. In a welcome development, following the 2019 local elections,
in order to resolve the deep political divisions in the country,
the different parties and groupings in the opposition agreed with
the ruling majority to engage in a reform with a view to establishing
an electoral framework that would have the support of all electoral
subjects and stakeholders. We will outline the electoral reform
process in detail in one of the next sections in this report. In
this context it should be noted that elections in Albania have often
been followed by calls for a change of the election system while
opinions of the Venice Commission on the legal framework for elections
in Albania have observed that the existing legal framework at that
time, while open for improvement, was in principle adequate for
the conduct of democratic elections if implemented fully and in
good faith.
19. As we will describe in detail below, on 5 June 2020, following
lengthy negotiations and considerable pressure from the international
community, the political stakeholders reached an agreement on electoral reform.
In addition, on 30 July 2020, on initiative of 28 MPs that hailed
mostly from the parliamentary opposition,
the parliament adopted a series
of constitutional amendments that changed the election system to
an open list electoral system in multiple regional constituencies.
In addition, the threshold was lowered to 1% and electoral coalitions
were replaced by joint electoral lists. Following the adoption of
these reforms, President Meta called for parliamentary elections
on 25 April 2021.
20. These elections were observed by the Assembly in the framework
of an IEOM bringing also together the OSCE/ODIHR, the OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly.
The IEOM concluded that the voters
were provided with a choice of candidates who could campaign freely.
The legal framework for the elections that respects fundamental
freedoms was considered adequate for the conduct of democratic elections
and generally trusted by the stakeholders. However, the IEOM also
concluded that the ruling SP had derived undue advantage from its
incumbency, including through its control over local administrations
and by its abuse of administrative resources, including reported
pressure on civil servants. Regrettably, allegations of vote buying
remained widespread, affecting the public trust in the outcome of
the elections.
21. These elections were won by the incumbent ruling SP which
obtained 48.7% of the votes or 74 seats. The DP won 39.4% of the
vote or 59 seats, the LSI won 6.8 % of the votes or 4 seats, and
the Social Democratic Party of Albania (PSD) 2.5% or 3 seats. No
other parties passed the 1% threshold. The results of these elections
seem to confirm the trends observed in the 2017 parliamentary elections
that the Albanian electorate is rewarding political stability over
strategies of confrontation and boycotting the work of the parliament
which are seen as undermining the reform and European integration
processes of the country.
22. The new parliament only convened on 10 September 2021 with
all members elected accepting their mandates and entering into the
parliament. With the return of the main opposition to the parliament
and its work, the political and constitutional crisis outlined above
seems largely resolved, although not its underlying causes.
23. The term of President Meta ended on 24 July 2022. The President
of Albania is elected indirectly, by the parliament, for a five-year
term. The constitution limits the term in office to two consecutive
five-year terms. President Meta was first elected in 2017. However,
given the contentious relationship between him and the ruling majority,
as evident from the two attempts to impeach him, he was not considered
to be a candidate for a second term. The President is elected by
the parliament with a three-fifths majority of all members. If no candidate
achieves such a majority in the first three rounds of voting, the
majority needed to elect the president is lowered to an absolute
majority of 50%+1 votes in the subsequent rounds of voting. On 10
May 2022, the parliament agreed to start the voting for a new President
on 16 May 2022. Regrettably, as a sign of the continuing deeply
polarised political climate, no candidate was proposed in the first
three rounds of voting. For the fourth round of voting the SP proposed
as a candidate General Major Bajram Begaj, who until that moment was
the Chief of General Staff of the Albanian Armed Forces. He was
elected with 78 votes in favour, 4 against and 1 abstention, with
the majority of the opposition boycotting the vote. We deeply regret
that opposition and ruling majority were not able to agree on a
joint consensual candidate. We wish to emphasise that the three-fifths
majority requirement was built into the Constitution to ensure that
a President has broad support among all political forces and can
stand above them. The wilful resort to the anti-deadlock procedure
without even attempting to find a compromise candidate for the first
three rounds clearly goes against the spirit of the constitution.
24. Regrettably, this positive development of the opposition returning
to the parliament was somewhat overshadowed by an internal split
in the DP which is affecting the functioning of the work of the
parliament. Following a decision by the DP party leader Lulzim Basha
to expel former Prime Minister and party leader Sali Berisha from
the Democratic Parliamentary faction, the latter initiated a leadership
challenge to Mr Basha. Both Mr Basha and Mr Berisha convened rival
party conventions claiming that the convention called by their rival was
illegal, which deepened the ensuing crisis within the party. Mr Basha
subsequently challenged the legality of the convention that was
convened by Mr Berisha before the Court. On 25 March 2022, the first
instance Court of Tirana adjudicated in favour of Mr Berisha’s “Commission
for the re-establishment of the Democratic Party” and ruled that
the 11 December convention called by Mr Berisha was legal and valid.
However, this judgment was appealed by Mr Enkelejd Alibeaj, leader
of the parliamentary group of the Democratic Party loyal to Mr Basha.
On 3 March 2023, the Court of Appeals in Tirana adjudicated in favour
of the appeal by Mr Alibeaj and ordered a retrial on the question
of the legality of the national convention called by Mr Berisha’s
Democratic Party. Unfortunately, this decision did not resolve internal
split and left the Democratic Party in limbo with regard to its
leadership crisis, which continues unabated with both men claiming
to be the legitimate leaders of the Democratic Party.
25. This situation further complicated as a result of a standoff
regarding the leadership of the parliamentary faction of the DP.
Following the resignation of Mr Alibeaj as Chair of the parliamentary
faction of the DP, Mr Gazment Bardhi was elected, on 23 May 2023,
as the new Chair of the parliamentary group. However, on 4 September
2023, the “Official DP” announced that Mr Basha, who had been confirmed
as the chairperson of the “Official DP” would be the new leader
of the faction, this was rejected by Mr Bhardi and the majority
of the DP faction members who considered that it was the faction
that elected its chair and not the party. These developments
de facto split the DP in three rival
factions
. Mr Bhardi,
mindful of the fragmentation of the DP, called upon the three factions
to unite, at least within the parliament. At the moment of writing,
this was rejected by Mr Basha, while Mr Berisha, while not wishing
to join Mr Bhardi’s faction, expressed his will to co-operate.
26. This leadership crisis in the main opposition party has substantially
fragmented the opposition in the country and is affecting the effectiveness
of the existing system of checks and balances, especially with regard to
parliamentary oversight and accountability. It also affected the
participation of the opposition in the local elections.
It is important that this internal
leadership crisis within the DP is not evolving into a national
political crisis. Any democratic State needs a viable opposition
functioning within its parliamentary framework. It is therefore
essential that the rival factions and their leadership set aside
their differences with a view to ensuring parliamentary oversight
and constitutional counterpart to the ruling majority.
27. Local elections took place on 14 May 2023, which were widely
seen as a barometer for the political sentiment on the national
level. The local elections concerned the mayors and municipality
councils of all 61 municipalities in Albania. The Congress of Local
and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe observed these
elections in the context of an International Election Observation
Mission (IEOM) that also included the European parliament and the
OSCE/ODIHR. In the statement of preliminary findings and conclusions
the IEOM
concluded that these elections “were generally well administered,
competitive and held with the participation of the key political
forces”. At the same time, the IEOM concluded that these elections
had been characterised by continued deep polarisation between the
main political forces and that national issues had dominated the
campaign, which had very little focus on local government issues.
Similar to what had already been noted in the 2021 parliamentary
elections, abuse of administrative resources and persistent allegations of
vote buying and pressure on public-sector workers were to be deplored.
This is a trend that is of serious concern.
28. From a national perspective, these elections were won by the
SP coalition. The SP won the mayoral vote in 53 of the 61 municipalities
and emerged as the largest party in 57 municipality councils. The
“Together We Win” coalition won the mayoral races in 7 municipalities
and was the largest party in 4 municipality councils. The election
for the post of mayor of the municipality of Himarë (Vlorë district)
took on a special character, marked by the issue of minorities,
which has taken on an international dimension. We will outline this
case in more detail in one of the sections below.
29. The priority given to further European integration, and especially
European Union membership, have continued to drive the political
agenda in Albania, as well as, albeit to a lesser extent, the dynamics
in the political environment in the country. Albania applied for
EU membership on 28 April 2009. As we outlined in our previous report,
the European Commission,
while endorsing the request, considered that considerable progress
was needed in the fields of stability of institutions, democratic
governance, and the rule of law before candidate status could be
considered for Albania.
30. Albania embarked on wide ranging reforms to achieve this objective.
While there had been considerable delays in the implementation of
the reforms needed, also as a result of the systemic political crisis
in the country, progress was such that the European Council granted
Albania candidate status in June 2014. However, the candidate status
was granted under the clear understanding that accession negotiations
would only be started after marked progress was achieved by Albania
in five priority areas: public administration reform; the independence,
efficiency and accountability of judicial institutions; fight against
corruption; fight against organised crime; protection of human rights
(including of Roma, anti-discrimination policies, and implementation
of property rights); and that a constructive dialogue between ruling
majority and opposition on the implementation of these reforms be
established. On 26 June 2018, the European Council reasserted this position
and confirmed that “the path towards opening the accession negotiations
in June 2019” would depend on “further consolidated progress made
on the judicial reform in particular through vetting” and “further
tangible results in the fight against corruption at all levels and
in the fight against organised crime”. On 29 May 2019, the European
Commission recommended that “[i]n light of the significant progress
achieved” the European Council opens accession negotiations with
Albania. However, on 18 October 2019, following formal objections from
France, the Netherlands and Denmark
,
the European Council decided not to open membership negotiations
with Albania at that moment.
31. In a welcome development, the European Council decided, on
25 March 2020, to open the accession negotiations with Albania.
When agreeing to open the accession negotiations, the European Commission
set five conditions
for the organisation of the first
intergovernmental conference on accession negotiations. When these
five conditions were met, the EU-Albania intergovernmental conference
on accession negotiations took place in Tirana on 19 July 2022.
After this conference, the acquis screening process was started
by the European Commission. As co-rapporteurs, we have consistently
supported Albania’s European integration process and we therefore
strongly welcome the start of the EU accession negotiations with
Albania. In this context, we remain convinced that the full honouring
of Council of Europe accession obligations and commitments, and
addressing the remaining recommendations and concerns outlined in
this report, will be a clear impetus for the successful conduct
of the EU-Albania accession negotiations.
32. Previous reports have already acknowledged the constructive
foreign policy role played by Albania within the framework of its
relations with its neighbouring States as well as with regard to
co-operation within the wider region. This has continued during
the current reporting period.
3. Democratic
institutions
3.1. Electoral
reform
33. In its reports, the Assembly
consistently emphasised that the electoral reform and the systemic
political crisis in Albania are closely interlinked. In its view,
electoral reform based on a wide consensus between all electoral
stakeholders, followed by elections, would be key to resolving the
systemic political crisis in Albania. In a welcome development,
considerable and tangible progress has been made in this respect
in the run up to the 2021 parliamentary elections which, to a considerable
extent, resolved the ongoing political and constitutional crisis,
albeit not the deeply polarised political climate.
34. While welcoming the progress made, it should be noted that
elections in Albania are often followed by calls for a change of
the Electoral Code, and even of the election system, in what several
election observation reports have called a tendency by Albanian
political forces to play with the rules as much as playing by the rules.
Successive opinions of the Venice Commission on the legal framework
for elections in Albania have observed that the existing legal framework
at that time, while open for improvement, was in principle adequate for
the conduct of democratic elections if implemented fully and in
good faith. It should be stressed that repeated changes to the electoral
system do not provide the required stability of the electoral framework
that is essential for a genuinely democratic election process. Therefore,
while the Electoral Code should be strengthened and amended to address
Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR recommendations, we urge the political
forces to move away from using constant changes to the Electoral
Code as a mechanism to alter the balance of power or as an alternative
to normal political interaction in the framework of the parliament.
35. On 14 January 2020, the ruling majority as well as the parliamentary
and extra-parliamentary opposition agreed on the establishment of
a Political Council for Electoral Reform which was composed of the
co-chairs of the parliamentary ad hoc Committee
on electoral reform as well as a representative of the two extra parliamentary
opposition parties. For its side, the ruling majority committed
itself to adopt any consensual proposal developed by the Political
Council. This allowed the electoral reform to be debated in an inclusive process
with the participation of all relevant political stakeholders.
36. The Political Council reached an agreement on the electoral
reform on 5 June 2020. This agreement replaced the Central Election
Commission by a three-tiered structure consisting of a State Election Commissioner
responsible for the logistical aspects of the organisation of the
elections; a Deputy Commissioner appointed by the opposition; a
five member Regulatory Commission which is responsible for adopting
and reviewing all normative and legal acts of the election administration;
and a five member Complains and Sanctions Commission that considers
administrative complaints concerning the election administration.
Moreover, the Political Council agreed to,
inter
alia, depoliticise all lower-level election commissions
immediately after the 2023 local elections;
to
introduce out of country voting; and specified that the Electoral
College, which rules on elections complaints, will be composed of
judges that have passed the vetting process (see below). However,
no agreement could be reached within the Political Council on a
change of the election system itself, as requested by the parliamentary
opposition, or the establishment of a caretaker government before
each parliamentary election, which was requested by the extra-parliamentary
opposition. The recommendation of the international community to
establish a non-partisan professional election administration was
considered impossible to implement in the lights of the lack of
trust in the impartiality of the Albanian civil service which is
widely considered to be extremely politicised. On 23 July 2020,
the Albanian Parliament adopted the required amendments to the electoral
legislation to implement the Political Council agreement of 5 June.
37. Furthermore, on 30 July 2020, on proposal of 28 individual
MPs hailing from the parliamentary opposition, the parliament adopted
a series of constitutional amendments that introduced a regional proportional
system based on open lists and removed the constitutional link between
constituencies and the administrative regions, leaving the demarcation
of electoral constituencies to lower-level electoral legislation. In
addition, these amendments moved the election threshold from the
Constitution to the election legislation and prohibited election
coalitions.
These
amendments were criticised by the extra-parliamentary opposition as
they had not been agreed, and some even rejected, by the Political
Council. However, this disagreement did not result in a breakdown
of the co-operation on the implementation of electoral reform.
38. Legislation to implement the constitutional amendments was
adopted on 5 October 2020. The threshold was set at 1%, and the
impact of preferential votes on the ranking of a list clarified.
With
regard to demarcation of electoral districts, it was agreed that
for the 2021 elections, the old demarcations (linking the constituencies
to administrative districts) would be maintained. The demarcation
of election districts for future elections is a sensitive issue
that can easily become a vehicle for future political contention
and controversy. We therefore call upon all political forces to
commit themselves to a demarcation of the new electoral districts based
in an inclusive process that fully adheres to international standards.
39. On 23 October 2020, the President vetoed the amendments to
the Electoral Code of 5 October 2020, citing their unilateral adoption,
without wide consensus. In addition, he expressed his concern that
these amendments would create “unequal and discriminatory positions”
for different stakeholders. On 27 October 2020, without waiting
for the Venice Commission opinion, the parliament overturned the
presidential veto. In its opinion,
drafted
jointly with the OSCE/ODIHR, the Venice Commission regretted the
hasty adoption of the constitutional amendments and changes of the
Electoral Code. However, it did not consider the changes to the election
system so fundamental that they would violate the principle of stability
of the election legislation.
40. Given the size of the Albanian diaspora (approximately 57%
of the Albanian population is living abroad)
out
of country voting is both an important and a sensitive issue, as
it could change the political balance in the country. As part of
the political agreement of 5 June 2020, the political parties agreed
to introduce out of country voting for the parliamentary elections.
However, referring to the sheer size of the task, the CEC announced
that it lacked the time to make the necessary preparations to introduce
out of country voting in time for the 2021 parliamentary elections.
On 22 December 2022, the Constitutional Court ruled that the parliament
had the obligation to introduce the necessary legislation to introduce
out of country voting for the next parliamentary elections.
41. In addition, despite the improvements noted by the IEOM, a
number of concerns remain regarding the conduct of elections, not
the least with regard to party and campaign financing, and the abuse
of administrative resources. The Albanian authorities and electoral
stakeholders have committed themselves to addressing these concerns
in line with international standards and well before the next elections
take place. Following previous practice, the opposition and ruling
majority set up an ad hoc committee
on electoral reforms, co-chaired by both opposition and ruling majority,
to adopt the necessary changes to the electoral legislation to address
these concerns as well as to implement out of country voting. However,
also due to the ongoing tribulations within the opposition, this
committee, has, at the moment of writing, not yet start functioning.
42. In addition to the above-mentioned changes, the electoral
stakeholders will have to agree on the demarcation of the new electoral
districts. This demarcation should take place in an inclusive and
consensual manner involving all electoral stakeholders based on
clear and objective criteria that are in line with international
standards and principles. Failure to do so will only lead to allegations
of gerrymandering and introduce a new source of tensions and contention
in the political environment.
43. While emphasising the importance of the above-mentioned electoral
reforms, we wish to reiterate the importance of stability of the
electoral legislation which is essential to ensure the trust of
the stakeholders and wider public in the electoral process and the
elections outcome. The current electoral system and legislation have
proven themselves clearly adequate for the conduct of democratic
elections, if implemented by all stakeholders in good faith both
according to their spirit and letter. There should be no return
to the situation where the main political forces engage in repeated
cycles of electoral reforms with the main purpose of trying to obtain
an electoral advantage in the next elections. Moreover, the situation
where negotiations over the electoral system and its implementation
substituted normal parliamentary interaction between ruling majority and
opposition are in our view a key weakness of Albania’s political
environment and source of its polarisation, and therefore should
not be repeated.
3.2. Functioning
of Parliament
44. As we have already mentioned,
the extreme polarisation of the political environment, compounded
by the fragmentation of the opposition, have limited the capacity
of the parliament to provide proper parliamentary oversight over
the executive. Opposition and majority often fail to engage with
each other in a constructive manner, while its parliamentary majority
allows the ruling majority to govern without the need for consultation and
dialogue with the opposition. The urge to win an election or political
argument often seems to supersede the importance of the quality
and wide acceptance of legalisation and policies.
45. Regrettably even for those issues where a qualified majority
is necessary, co-operation and agreement between opposition and
ruling majority seems impossible, as a result of which appointments
cannot be made or are made by simple majority using anti-blocking
mechanisms built in the legislation. The parliament has not been
able to appoint a new Ombudsperson or Commissioner for the Protection
from Discrimination, whose terms have ended. While this does not
cause legal problems, as the law foresees that the incumbent Ombudsperson
and Commissioner can continue to execute their functions while no
new candidate has been appointed, both incumbents informed us that
it affected the legitimacy and thus effectiveness, of their statements
and actions. As we already mentioned, during the election of the
President of Albania by the parliament, no candidates were proposed
in the first three rounds of voting which require a three-fifths
qualified majority. Only in the fourth round of voting, where a
simple majority is sufficient, did the ruling majority field a candidate
which was elected with the votes of the ruling majority alone, undermining
the spirit of a consensual election of the President as enshrined
in the Constitution.
46. Resolving this vulnerability in the functioning of the system
of checks and balances will mostly, albeit not solely, entail changing
prevailing behaviours and attitudes by both opposition and ruling
majority. Most interlocutors estimate that the rules of procedure
are in general adequate to ensure parliamentary oversight and a
functional system of checks and balances, if implemented in good
faith. We therefore urge both opposition and ruling majority to
overcome their antagonistic relationship and to respect each other’s
rightful role and place in the governance of the country.
3.3. Territorial
and administrative reform and local self-government
47. As outlined in the previous
report, the implementation of a territorial and administrative reform,
with a view to strengthening local self-government, was one of the
priorities for the country. In 2015 a new territorial administrative
map was adopted which created 61 municipalities, reduced from 374,
and 12 regions. The principle of merging of municipalities and regions
had wide cross-party support inside Albania and was strongly welcomed
by the country’s international partners, including the Congress
of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, as it
allows for the establishment of strong local government institutions.
However, a number of stakeholders felt that the reform process itself
had not been inclusive and that the rezoning had taken place along
partisan lines while mostly ignoring the specifics of minority-populated
areas.
An appeal to the Constitutional
Court by the DP regarding the proposed administrative map was dismissed.
The authorities indicated that they intended to carry out a comprehensive
evaluation of the territorial and administrative reform, in co-operation
with the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council
of Europe, with a view to addressing shortcomings that have emerged
following the implementation of this reform. This should be welcomed.
48. The exact number of municipalities, as well as the municipal
boundaries, continues to be a point of debate between opposition
and ruling majority. The opposition has indicated that they would
like to increase the number of municipalities to 90, which the ruling
majority opposes. In our meeting with the Mayor of Tirana, the latter
indicated that he would favour a further reduction in the number
of municipalities which, in his view would increase the efficiency
of local self-government. Whatever the outcome of that debate, we
wish to emphasise the need for wide consensus among all political
forces about the administrative territorial map of Albania, while
at the same time, respecting the logic of the reform, namely the
creation of strong and effective local government structures that
are close to the Albanian citizens.
49. As we will outline in more detail below, the territorial and
administrative reform has had a direct impact on the enjoyment of
minority rights in Albania. As a result of the merger of local authorities,
several previous municipalities where minorities formed the majority
of the population ceased to exist and these minorities are now only
a small part of the population of the municipality. This was notably
the case in Himarë and Sarandë. This is especially problematic given
the fact that a number of key minority rights – such as the right
to education in minority languages and the right to use minority
languages in local government affairs – are only legally guaranteed
when a given minority makes up more than 20% of the population of
a municipality. As noted in the most recent report of the Advisory
Committee on the framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities,
while efficient local government is important, this should not be
at the cost of national minorities being “crowded out” of their
rights. The Advisory Committee therefore reiterated its call on
the Albanian authorities to review, in consultation with representatives
of national minorities, the impact of the territorial and administrative
reform on minority rights and to remedy any shortcomings identified.
50. Local self-government at municipality level is composed of
directly elected mayors and municipality councils. The number of
members of each city council is determined by the size of the municipality.
Mayors are elected on the basis of a first-past-the-post system
for a period of four years. They are the leaders of the municipality’s
executive and can be assisted by one or more deputy mayors that
are directly appointed by them. The municipality councils are elected
for the same four-year term of office on the basis of a closed list proportional
system. The President and Vice-Presidents are elected by the members
of the Council at their inaugural meeting. As a result of their
functions, mayors have powerful positions that in small municipalities can
outweigh the powers of the municipality council, which should ensure
democratic oversight of the executive at the local level. At the
central level, the council of ministers is responsible for decentralisation
and local self-government. The central authorities are represented
at the local and regional levels through prefects that are appointed
by the council of ministers in each of the twelve administrative
regions of Albania.
51. The territorial and administrative reform increased the number
of services these municipalities can and should provide in their
own right and strengthened the financial autonomy of local governments
including through raising their own taxes as well as through charging
fees for services provided. The reform also increased the number
of delegated powers to municipalities. These delegated powers are
subsidised by budget transfers from the central government which
at the same time continues to supervise and co-ordinate these delegated
powers. Local authorities for the largest part remain dependent
on the funding from the central government. Reportedly more than
70% of the local authorities are dependent on the central government
for more than 50% of their budget, which limits their autonomy.
52. The application of the European Charter of Local Self-Government
(ETS No. 122) in Albania is monitored by the Congress of Local and
Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe. Its most recent report was
adopted on 22 September 2021. While welcoming the reforms, the Congress
noted that the transfers of power from central to local levels had
not yet resulted in a sufficiently clear allocation of functions
and responsibilities, while delegated powers remained controlled
and supervised too closely by the central authorities. In addition,
according to the Congress, most local authorities, including the
largest ones, still lacked sufficient funding to implement their
own functions, and funding varied greatly between local authorities.
In this context, it should be emphasised that financial autonomy
of municipalities is a key – and therefore sensitive – aspect of
local self-government. While noting that the financial situation
of local authorities had considerably improved with the reforms,
the Congress considered that the financial autonomy of most municipalities
was too low and insufficient to fully implement their statutory
competences and tasks.
53. As mentioned, the territorial and administrative reform established
12 administrative territorial regions that are composed of municipalities
that share a geographic, historical, and cultural interest. However,
while the 2015 reforms considerably strengthened self-government
at the local level, this was not the case for the regional level.
Regions continue to have very few powers or scope for initiative
and regional government remains underdeveloped. This is also reflected
by the regional councils, which are not directly elected, but composed
of mayors and (indirectly elected) representatives of the city councils
in that region. We would like to support the recommendation of the
Congress that the regional councils be directly elected. This would strengthen
their democratic legitimacy, which in turn could help strengthening
regional governance. However, the role of the regions was further
diminished when, in 2020, the central government established four administrative
regions that are responsible for regional economic development and
cohesion policies. During our talks in Tirana, it was clear that
the current authorities view the current number of regions as too
large for effective regional governance and therefore do not prioritise
the strengthening of the twelve administrative regions.
54. In a welcome development, in 2016, a Consultative Council
composed of representatives from local and central government was
set up, which is the main consultation body between government and
local self-government, including on draft legislation that affects
municipalities. The Consultative Council meets several times each
year. While dialogue and co-operation between central government
and local government have reportedly been strengthened by these
reforms, the Congress report noted that the relations between central government
and municipalities are still influenced by partisanism and national
political strategies of the main political forces in the country.
This is also evident from the continued existence of two local municipality organisations,
reported formed along political party lines.
55. Municipality decisions are supervised by the prefects who
can appeal to the courts to annul decisions and actions of local
government. Similarly, decisions and actions by the prefect can
be appealed to the courts by the municipalities. As supervision
of local self-government is by nature a potentially sensitive issue,
it should be welcomed that the Congress has concluded that the supervision
structures are in line with the obligations of the country under
the Charter and that municipality organisations have not reported
any interference with the decision-making rights of local authorities
in this respect.
56. During our last visit, a number of interlocutors raised the
issue of the high turnover of municipality staff, especially following
elections. In some municipalities, politically appointed staff reportedly
amounts to more than 50% of the municipality staff, which can affect
the continuity and quality of services provided by the municipalities.
This should be addressed.
57. In the context of the strengthening of local regional self
-government, it will be impossible not to shortly touch upon the
developments in Himarë in the context of the 2023 local elections.
The mayoral candidate for the opposition, Mr Fredi Beleri, who hails
from the Greek minority, was arrested just before the election for alleged
vote buying. The arrest of Mr Beleri was decried by the opposition
as an attempt to influence the election results by the ruling majority.
However, Mr Beleri still won the elections but was prevented from
being sworn in as Mayor of Himarë due to the ongoing criminal investigations
into his alleged vote buying. As long as Mr Beleri has not been
sworn in, the previous mayor, who lost in the previous elections
to Mr Beleri, continues to function as acting mayor of Himarë.
58. While the case seems to be mostly of a political nature, according
to a number of interlocutors related to the development of the rich
touristic resources of the municipality
,
it soon affected minority relations when the Greek minority considered
that it had been illegally disenfranchised when Mr Beleri was not
allowed to take his oath as new Mayor of Himarë.
This in turn soon developed
an international aspect, when the Greek Government formally protested
against the, in their view, undue violations of the right of representation
of the Greek minority. They argue that, had Mr Beliri been sworn
in, he would be replaced in his functions by one of the deputies
appointed by him during his trial and not by the previous mayor
from another party who continues to function in acting capacity.
59. We do not wish, nor are we in a position, to comment on the
criminal charges that have been filed against Mr Beliri. However,
in our view it is important to differentiate between the criminal
charges filed against him and, on the other hand, his democratic
right to be elected. It is our understanding that under Albanian legislations,
a term of a mayor would end in case the person holding this position
would be found guilty, in final judgment, of a criminal offence.
Until
a final conviction by a court of law,
the principle of presumption
of innocence should be respected. It is important that this situation
does not escalate. We therefore reiterate our call to all relevant
stakeholders to fully respect the principles of rule of law and
due process in their treatment of this case.
4. Rule
of law
60. The reform of the judiciary
with a view to assuring its independence and efficiency, including
by combating the widespread systemic corruption within the judiciary,
has been a long-standing priority for the Assembly within the monitoring
procedure for Albania. Considerable progress has been made in this
respect during the reporting period and tangible results are evident.
61. In June 2015, the parliamentary ad
hoc Committee on the Justice Reform and the High-Level
Group of Experts produced an “Analysis of the justice system in
Albania – 2015”. On the basis of this analysis, the authorities,
in consultation with relevant stakeholders and the different political
forces, produced a proposal for a holistic judicial reform for the
country with a view to ensuring the independence and impartiality
of the judiciary as well as to improving the efficiency of the legal
process and administration of justice.
62. On 21 July 2016, following 18 months of intense negotiations
and consultations with the international community, the parliament
unanimously adopted the judicial package paving the way for the
long-awaited judicial reform. The reform package included changes
to 46 articles of the Constitution (nearly a third of its articles).
Following
the adoption of the constitutional amendments, work started on the
preparation of implementing legislation, around 40 pieces in total.
Regrettably, the co-operation between opposition and ruling majority
soon broke down. Nevertheless, the most important pieces of legislation,
7 in total
were adopted
by the parliament with the participation of the opposition.
63. The reform package adopted aimed to address a wide range of
issues regarding the judicial system, including eradicating the
widespread corruption in the judiciary, preventing political interference
in the work of judges and prosecutors, and eliminating links with
organised crime. In addition, the constitutional amendments provided, inter alia, for the complete reorganisation
of the High Court, the Constitutional Court and several other judicial
institutions and created new appointment mechanisms for high judicial
functions. A High Judicial Council (HJC) and a High Prosecutorial
Council (HPC) were established, as well as a special prosecutor
and a special court for the fight against corruption and organised
crime (see next section).
64. The HJC is composed of six judge members, elected by their
peers, and five lay members. The five lay members are to be elected
by a qualified majority of 3/5 of the votes. The HPC is composed
and appointed along the same lines. While the HJC and HPC are responsible
for the appointment process of prosecutors and judges, including
for the High Court,
disciplinary processes against judges
and prosecutors is the responsibility of a newly established body,
the High Justice Inspector (HJI), who, like the Prosecutor General, is
appointed with a 3/5 qualified majority by the parliament. The establishment
of these institutions and the appointment process have contributed
to the depoliticisation of the judiciary which should be lauded.
However, while growing, trust in the (political) independence of
the judiciary is still relatively low and should not be taken for
granted
. Constant vigilance
is required in this respect and, when required, legal provisions
should be strengthened, and vulnerabilities addressed. This all
the more important as the 3/5 majority is not a fool proof guarantee
against politicalisation, as in recent times ruling majorities have
had sufficient mandates to obtain such majorities in parliament
without the votes of the opposition.
4.1. Vetting
of the judiciary
65. One of the most important components
of the judicial reform was the establishment of a re-evaluation process
(also known as vetting process) of all judges and prosecutors in
Albania, including Prosecutor General, Constitutional and High Court
judges and members of the newly established institutions for combating corruption
and organised crime. The vetting law has been challenged before
the Constitutional Court by the Democratic Party. However, on 22
December 2016, the Constitutional Court ruled that the law was in accordance
with the Albanian Constitution. It should be emphasised, the appeal
by the DP to the Constitutional Court notwithstanding, that the
vetting process could and can count on strong bi-partisan support,
which has been key to its success.
66. The vetting of judges and prosecutors is conducted by the
Independent Qualification Commission (IQC), which consists of 12
members, appointed by the parliament based on recommendations by
the International Monitoring Operation which is led by the European
Commission in close co-operation with the United States. In addition
to the IQC, there is one Specialised Qualification Chamber (SQC),
consisting of seven judges appointed in the same manner as the IQC,
to which decisions of the IQC can be appealed. There are two Public Commissioners
(PCs) who represent the public in these proceedings and who can
appeal IQC decisions to the SQC. The International Monitoring Operation
monitors the proceedings in the IQC and can recommend the PCs to
appeal IQC decisions. The IQC works in four panels of three members.
All judges and prosecutors are assessed on the basis of three criteria:
justification of assets, background check and legal proficiency.
If a candidate does not pass the analysis of his or her assets,
he or she will not be subjected to a background check or assessed
for legal proficiency. Similarly, a candidate that fails the background
check will not be assessed for legal proficiency.
67. The vetting process started, on 26 October 2017, with the
nine so-called priority cases: the seven members of the Constitutional
Court, the President of the High Court and the Prosecutor General. Subsequently,
on 30 November 2017, 48 cases that form the second priority list,
consisting of the four other members of the High Court, as well
as the prosecutors and judges that are candidates for the High Judicial Council,
the High Prosecutorial Council, and the Council of Appointments
at Justice, were distributed among the chambers of the IQC.
68. In total 805 judge and prosecutor positions will be subjected
to the vetting procedure. According to the data provided by the
IQC, by 30 September 2023, the IQC had vetted 694 positions leading
to 303 confirmations in office of the judges or prosecutors concerned,
the dismissal of 238 judges and prosecutors and the termination
of the vetting procedure due to resignation or withdrawal of the
candidates in 153 cases.
It should be noted that in
the vast majority of dismissals, over 80%, the candidates were dismissed
because of failure to justify their assets.
69. When the vetting process was established, it was limited in
time on the advice of the Venice Commission, as an open-ended vetting
process would contradict international standards and norms. The Constitutional
provisions that established the vetting process therefore foresaw
a five-year mandate for the IQC and PCs, ending on 17 June 2022,
and a 9-year mandate for the SQC, ending on 17 June 2026. However, given
the sheer number of cases and the complexity of them, it soon appeared
that these deadlines were too tight, something about which we, as
co-rapporteurs, have repeatedly raised our concern. The delay was exacerbated
by the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, and by July 2021, it was
clear that by the end of its original mandate, the IQC would only
have completed around five hundred cases, leaving approximately
three hundred cases unfinished. According to the constitutional
provisions, these cases would then need to be finalised by the HJC
and HPC with appeals heard by the constitutional Court. However,
given the estimated number of unfinished cases, this would de facto mean different vetting
procedures, and thus unequal treatment, for a large number of judicial
positions, which would run counter to international standards and
affect the legitimacy of the vetting procedure as such.
70. In order to address this issue, following a positive opinion
of
the Venice Commission, the Albanian Parliament adopted, on 10 February
2022, the necessary constitutional amendments that allowed the extension
of the mandate of the IQC and PCs to 31 December 2024. In our meetings
with the IQC, we were informed that the extension of the deadline
was sufficient for the vetting bodies to vet the remaining positions, which
mostly concern lower-level positions that would take less time to
consider than the high-level positions at the start of the process.
The extension of the mandate of the vetting bodies has safeguarded
this important process and should be welcomed.
71. The results of the vetting process have been outright dramatic.
Over 62% of the persons vetted, either were dismissed – mostly because
these persons could not justify their assets – or resigned. To underscore
the impact of the vetting process, it should be noted that these
cases included the General Prosecutor of Albania, as well as 8 of
the 9 sitting Constitutional Court judges, and 15 out of the 18
High Court judges. The very high rate of dismissals and resignations
underscores both the importance and the necessity of the vetting
process. At the same time, it has also had a considerable impact
on the functioning of the judiciary, with a number of key judicial
bodies lacking the required quorum to function for an extended period
of time. Only by the end of 2020 did the Constitutional Court obtain
its quorum of 6 judges needed to hold plenary sessions. Similarly,
the High Court only became operational in July 2021 when 6 new High
Court judges were appointed. Their appointment brought the number
of High Court judges to 9 – out of 19 – which gave the High Court
the required quorum to operate. The vetting process also delayed
the appointment of persons to the new bodies established by the
reforms, including to SPAK. The new HCJ and HPC only started functioning
on 20 December 2018. The HPC then sent, on 22 November 2019, the
list of ranked candidates for the position of Prosecutor General
to the Albanian Parliament, allowing the latter to finally appoint
the Prosecutor General on 5 December 2019.
On 18 December 2019,
the HCJ formally established the two Special Courts against Corruption
and Organised Crime and on 19 December 2019, the first 8 SPAK prosecutors
were sworn in by the President of Albania.
4.2. New
judicial map
72. As a result of the vetting
process, not only appointments to the High Court, but also to first
instance and second instance courts were delayed, resulting in understaffed
courts. This contributed to the excessively large backlog of cases
at all levels of the judiciary. On 31 December 2022, the total backlog
for all courts was 132 769 cases, an increase of nearly 6% in comparison
to December 2021. The High Court has a backlog of 35 822 cases.
However, following the appointment of new judges to the High Court,
the clearance rate has increased considerably. We were informed
that by September 2023, the backlog was reduced to around 12 000
cases. However, at the level of the appeals court, the backlog increased
more than 43% between 2019 and 2022, with an average time for a
case at the appeals level of approximately 900 days, going up to
nearly 5 800 (!) days for criminal cases at the Tirana Appeals Court.
This backlog and very slow clearance
rate are of serious concern as they contradict the right to trial
within a reasonable time as enshrined in article 6 of the European Convention
of Human Rights (ETS No. 5). The Albanian Parliament is currently
considering a number of amendments to the Civil Procedure Code and
the Law on Administrative Courts to simplify and accelerate judicial
process. Their adoption, which requires a 2/3 majority, is expected
to lead to a considerable reduction in the backlog of cases.
73. A number of reforms have been initiated by the authorities
with a view to increasing the quality and efficiency of the justice
system. A key component of these proposals has been the drafting
of a new judicial map, with the aim of creating fewer, but more
efficient and better resourced courts that can address more effectively
the number of cases before them. As a result of this reform, the
six courts of appeals were combined into a single Court of Appeals.
Two administrative courts of first instance were created instead
of the previous six. This new administrative map was initially somewhat
controversial. A considerable number of interlocutors feared that
this new map would increase the distance between citizens and the
courts and therewith diminish their access to justice. However,
until now this seems not to have borne out. In addition, a system
of free legal aid is put in place to help ensure citizens access
to justice. This is an issue that needs to be followed closely to
ensure proper access to the justice system by all citizens. In that
context, it is welcomed that the HJC is regularly evaluating the
functioning of the judicial map, which can be updated by the Council
of Ministers every five years on the basis of a joint proposal of
the HCJ and Minister of Justice
74. While the reforms have improved the framework for a more independent
and efficient justice system, concerns remain. External and internal
interferences in the judiciary have not yet been fully eradicated
and will need additional efforts that go beyond the vetting system.
In this context, the random case assignment system, which has recently
been strengthened is reportedly still not fully robust against interference.
Moreover,
the adjudication of cases is still too slow, the length of court
proceedings too long, and the execution of court decisions too slow,
which needs to be addressed as a priority.
4.3. Fight
against corruption and organised crime
75. The fight against the still
widespread and systemic corruption in Albania, and persistent allegations
of intertwinement of organised crime with economic and political
interests in the country remain important concerns, the addressing
of which has been a key priority for the authorities over the reporting
period during which marked progress was recorded. It has been an
important focal point in the monitoring procedure and key requirement
for accession to the European Union by Albania
76. As we have outlined above, the vetting process of judges and
prosecutors, aimed at addressing the persistent corruption within
the Albanian judiciary has been one of the key components of the
strategy to combat corruption and organised crime in the country.
To a large extent, it is the foundation on which the other components
of the strategy are built and supported.
77. The constitutional amendments adopted in 2016 included the
establishment of three new, integrated bodies to combat corruption
and organised crime. The Specialised Structure for Anti-Corruption
and Organised Crime (SPAK) is comprised of the Special Prosecution
Office (SPO), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and two
Specialised Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime Courts. SPAK is
tasked with investigating and adjudicating high-level cases of corruption
and organised crime. Currently, the monetary threshold for cases to
fall within SPAKS’s mandate, around € 500, is very low and risk
inundating SPAK which would affect its effectiveness in investigating
high level corruption in the country. We strongly recommend that
this monetary threshold is raised. Similar remarks were made by
the Head of the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutors Office in
his address to the National Council for European Integration on
17 October 2023, where he underscored that the current low-level
threshold was creating an overload of cases for SPAK.
78. The SPAK is now fully operational, with the last 32 of the
60 special investigators of the NBI having been appointed in 2022.
SPAK has initiated a number of cases against officials for corruption,
including at the highest government level, which sends an important
signal. If the results of the vetting procedure give rise to suspicion of
corruption, the case is forwarded to SPAK, which has initiated a
number of investigations, including against 10 former High and Constitutional
Court Judges. Given the high number of dismissals as a result of
failure to justify assets in the vetting procedure, we expect the
number of investigations to increase. While the number of convictions
is still too low, there has been an increase in tangible results,
including on high-level cases such as the so-called “incinerator
scandal” which resulted in a former minister of environment being
sent to jail for corruption. It is important that these tangible
results are becoming a non-reversable trend, and that the anti-corruption
structures have all the resources they need, to send a clear signal
at all levels of society that there is no impunity for corrupt behaviour.
79. Initially SPAK did not have access to all relevant State databases
and registers, but we were informed that this has now been resolved.
In addition, both the SPO and NBI have highlighted the fruitful
and effective co-operation and support they receive from similar
institutions in Europe and the USA.
80. The High Inspectorate of Declaration and Audit of Assets and
Conflicts of Interest (HIDAACI) is a key instrument in the fight
against corruption. All elected officials, judges and high-level
civil servants must declare their assets to the HIDAAC, as well
as those of their spouses, children, and cohabitating persons, I
which are then audited. In its last resolution on Albania, the Assembly
expressed some concerns about the availability of resources for
HIDAACI in comparison to its extensive tasks, which could undermine
its efficacity. The very high number of dismissals as a result of
the vetting process due to undeclared and unexplained assets of
candidate judges and prosecutors underscores the validity of these
concerns and we encourage the authorities to evaluate what lessons
can be learned from the vetting process for the functioning of HIDAACI.
In a welcome development, the work of HIDAACI has been strengthened
by a whistle-blower protection law and the Group of States against
Corruption (GRECO) has noted that financial and human resources
for HIDAACI have steadily increased. In order to assist HIDAACI
with the auditing of the considerable number of asset declarations
it receives each year, an e-declaration system has been developed
that, after a long delay, was brought online on 1 January 2022.
This should be welcomed. While recognising the progress made, it
is important that HIDAACI continues to improve its audit and verification
capacity of asset declarations in order to be an effective tool
in the prevention and combat of corruption.
81. While Albania’s legal framework allows for the confiscation
of proceedings from corruption and (organised) crime, in practice
the confiscation and recovery of criminal assets is minimal, even
if progress is being made. In 2021 approximately € 21.5 million
were seized and confiscated in corruption related cases as well
as € 50 million worth of proceedings from organised crime and money
laundering. Another € 21 million worth of assets have been seized
– but not confiscated – under the provisions of the anti-mafia law.
Albania has established an Agency of Administration of Seized and
Confiscated Assets (AASCA-AMO) under the Ministry of Interior and
is planning to establish new asset recovery mechanism under the
State Police to expedite the identification and tracking of proceeds
of criminal activities. It is hoped that these efforts will substantially
increase the seizure and confiscation of assets and proceeds resulting
from corruption and organise crime which is an important deterrent
to counter the attractiveness of such actions.
82. On 25 September 2020, GRECO published the addendum to the
second compliance report on Albania, in which it concluded that
Albania had implemented satisfactorily nine of the ten recommendations
contained in the fourth-round evaluation report. The fourth evaluation
round is now considered closed.
83. On 3 March 2023, GRECO published its compliance report in
the framework of the fifth evaluation round (Preventing corruption
and promoting integrity in central governments (top executive functions)
and law enforcement agencies). In this report, GRECO concluded that
only 5 of its 24 recommendations had been satisfactorily addressed.
13 recommendations had been partially addressed and 6 had not been
implemented at all. In the light of this low level of compliance,
GRECO concluded that “further progress is necessary to demonstrate
an acceptable level of compliance.”
84. According to GRECO, the institutional and legal framework
for the integrity of public officials and Persons Entrusted with
Top Executive Functions (PTEFs) has been strengthened. The names
of ministerial advisors are published online and covered by the
regulations concerning gifts and ethics. A Directorate General Against Corruption
was set up under the national Anti-Corruption Coordinator (currently
the Minister of Justice) which will closely co-operate with SPAK
and HIDAACI.
85. While welcoming the adoption of the Ministerial Code of Ethics,
GRECO has great misgivings about the composition of the Ethics Committee
set up to oversee the implementation of, and adherence to, this
Code of Ethics. This committee is composed of high-level civil servants
as well as members of the government itself, which undermines its
independence. In addition, legal provisions and regulations that
would ensure the accountability of the Prime Minister himself to
the Code of Ethics are still lacking. In a welcome development, integrity
plans have been developed for all ministries with the involvement
of the public administration itself as well as of civil society.
Unfortunately, only five ministries have appointed the foreseen
integrity co-ordinators that are tasked with monitoring and ensuring
compliance of “their” ministries with these integrity plans. While rules
on contacts with lobbyists have been adopted to ensure the transparency
of the interactions of the ministers and PTEFs, they only cover
physical meetings and not contacts by other means such as telephone and
e-mail. Moreover, while post-employment restrictions apply to ministers
and PTEFs, exceptions are possible and decided upon by the Ethics
Committee which, as mentioned, cannot be considered independent. These
are important concerns expressed by GRECO that need to be addressed
as a matter of urgency by the authorities.
86. In addition to the vetting process for judges and prosecutors,
the Albanian authorities decided to also implement a vetting procedure
for the law enforcement structures that are widely perceived as
being prone to corruption. In 2018, the Albanian Parliament adopted
a law on the transitional vetting of the Albanian State Police.
All State Police officers, including border guards, were to be vetted
on the basis of the legitimacy of their assets; contacts with persons
involved in criminal activity and their interests in relation to
these people; and on professional proficiency. Unlike the vetting
process for the judiciary, there is no international involvement
in, or oversight over, the vetting process for the police. In its
evaluation report, GRECO has expressed misgivings about the feasibility
and impact of this vetting process, which was supposed to cover
more than 12 000 positions. In addition, GRECO has expressed reservations
about the objectivity of the process as, unlike the vetting of judges
and prosecutors, the different verification processes have far less
safeguards than those deployed for the judiciary. In response, the
Albanian authorities have drastically reduced the number of law enforcement
personnel that is subject to vetting, which is now restricted to
senior management functions. In addition, these persons will now
be subjected to vetting every five years, which is to be welcomed.
The External Evaluation Commission
that
was conducting the vetting has been replaced by a new Police Oversight Agency,
whose members themselves have been vetted before they took function.
87. Police in Albania is allowed to receive funding
from private sources
and can perform paid services such as providing security at private
mass events. While the rules have been strengthened, safeguards
and risk assessment analysis of this possibility with regard to
corruption are according to GRECO still lacking. In general, we
have some misgivings about the possibility of law enforcement agencies
being able to receive private funding and contributions, which is
inherently an open door for corruption. We were informed that the State
police has implemented a number of measures to improve the transparency
of the donations it received and their sources. In addition, in
order to address GRECO recommendations, the State police is in the
process of the evaluation of the current legislation and standard
working procedures for the donations, in order to avoid conflict
of interest and opportunities for corruption. Nevertheless, in line
with GRECO recommendations, we strongly recommend the authorities
to end the practice of police being funded by private sources or
being paid for services provided.
88. In May 2022, Moneyval published its third enhanced follow
up report on the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing
measures in Albania. While concluding that Albania had reached the
general expectation to address most of the technical compliance
deficiencies noted in the evaluation report, it decided, for the
moment, to keep the country under enhanced follow-up. On 28 October
2023, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) decided to remove Albania
from the list of countries under increased monitoring, the so-called grey
list.
4.4. Execution
of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights
89. In 2022, the Court considered
116 applications concerning Albania of which it declared 107 inadmissible and
found a violation of at least one article of the Convention in the
remaining nine cases. On 1 July 2023, a total of 393 cases against
Albania were pending before the Court. Key judgments of the Court
have dealt with, inter alia,
inhumane prison conditions, lack of investigation of allegations
of mistreatment in prisons; lack of effective remedy and non-enforcement
of domestic court judgments, especially affecting restitution of
property cases; as well as excessive length of proceedings.
90. In the case Luli and others v.
Albania, the Court noted that the excessive length of
proceedings was becoming a serious deficiency in domestic legal
proceedings in Albania. It explicitly called for the introduction of
an effective domestic remedy against the undue length of proceedings.
Regrettably, the execution of this judgment remains under enhanced
supervision of the Committee of Ministers.
91. A number of applications have been filed before the Court
concerning the vetting procedure for judges and prosecutors, that
we outlined in a previous section. In the case of
Xhoxhaj v. Albania,
the
Court ruled that in the case of Mr Xhoxhaj, who had been dismissed
as Constitutional Court judge as a result of the vetting procedure,
there had been no violations of Article 6, paragraph1, as the vetting
bodies had been independent and impartial and the proceedings fair.
It also ruled that the dismissal from office had been proportional
to the serious ethical violations committed. However, in the case
of
Thanza v. Albania,
the
Court held that there had been a violation of Article 6, paragraph
1, as Mr Thanza – who had been dismissed as High Court judge as
a result of the vetting procedure – had not been given an adequate
opportunity to defend himself concerning his failure to disclose
contact with organised crime elements. However, in the same case,
the Court did not find any violations under Article 8 concerning
the assessment of Mr Thanza’s assets which had served as a legal basis
for his dismissal.
92. As outlined in the previous Assembly report, the restitution
of properties expropriated by the communist regime that ruled Albania
from 1944 to 1992, has been a long and protracted legal issue. The
lack of legal remedies and execution of domestic court judgments
in these cases led to the judgments of the Court in the group of
cases Manushaqe Puto and others v. Albania (judgment
of 31 December 2012). These cases concern the structural problem
of failure to enforce final domestic judicial and administrative
decisions relating to the right of the applicants to restitution
or compensation (whether pecuniary or in kind) for property nationalised under
the communist regime (violations of Article 6, paragraph 1, and
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR (ETS No. 9)) and the lack
of an effective remedy in this respect (violations of Article 13).
93. In order to address the shortcomings outlined in the judgments,
the parliament adopted, on 5 December 2015, the Law on the treatment
of property and finalisation of the process of compensation of property.
This law established a Compensation Fund (a Financial Fund and a
Land Fund) to ensure the availability of the necessary resources
to compensate former owners. Furthermore, the law set out explicit
provisions for an annual allocation from the State budget to the
Compensation Fund, calculated to finalise the process of payments
within 10 years. Binding deadlines have been fixed for the various
stages of these processes. The law entered into force on 24 February
2016 and the first three by-laws were adopted on 23 March 2016.
94. A constitutional complaint was lodged against the law by the
President of the Republic, a group of MPs, the Ombudsperson, the
Republican Party of Albania, and associations of ex-owners. On 7
July 2016, the President of the Constitutional Court of Albania
requested an amicus curiae brief
from the Venice Commission on the conformity of the law with the
requirements of Article 1, Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention
on Human Rights. On 14 October 2016, the Venice Commission adopted
its amicus curiae brief on
the restitution of property, in which it gave a positive assessment
of the new legal mechanisms put in place. On 9 November 2016, while
declaring two paragraphs of the law as unconstitutional, the Constitutional
Court accepted the legal mechanisms put in place by the law. As
a result, the Committee of Ministers decided in 2020 to close its supervision
of the execution of the set of cases in Manushaqe
Puto and others v. Albania.
95. The number of cases before the Court and under supervision
by the Committee of Ministers is still too high and more efforts
are needed to ensure prompt execution of the judgments of the Court,
especially with regard to the execution of domestic court judgments
and the excessive length of proceedings.
5. Human
rights
5.1. Freedom
of the media
96. The media environment has been
a long-standing concern for the Assembly. Regrettably, while Albania has
overall made considerable progress in honouring its obligations
and commitments, the media environment has continued to deteriorate
during the reporting period. This backsliding is of serious concern
as a free and pluralist media environment is a quintessential requirement
for a well-functioning democracy.
97. Albania has a diverse media environment, that, while overall
pluralistic, is split along party-political lines, with many of
the private media being supportive of one or the other of the main
political parties, in line with the political preferences of the
economic interest behind these media. In
Resolution 2019 (2014) “The honouring of commitments and obligations by Albania”,
the Assembly already expressed concern about the polarisation of
the media environment. Threats and harsh rhetoric against journalists
by political actors, including the Prime Minister, have increased
over the recent years and treats of defamation lawsuits, which can
carry heavy fines infringe on press freedom.
98. In the 2023 World Press Freedom Index by Reporter without
Borders, which was published on 3 May 2023, Albania moved up seven
places in comparison to 2022 and is now ranked 96 out of 180 countries
(1 being the best), recovering slightly from its 20-place drop in
ranking in 2022. According to Reporters without Borders, press freedom
is threatened by partisan media regulation, while “journalists are
victims of organised crime and, at times, police violence, spurred
on by the government’s failure to protect them.”
The Council of Europe Platform to
promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists has,
for 2023, recorded six alerts, three of them without reply by the
authorities and the killing of one journalist.
99. A key concern during the reporting period was the so-called
anti-defamation package that was introduced in the parliament by
the authorities in December 2018. This package consisted of a series
of amendments to the Law on Audio Visual Media and to the Law on
Electronic Communications that would have given the authorities
disproportionate power over online media content and could have
led to increased self-censorship by journalists. In reaction, the
Monitoring Committee, during its January 2020 meeting, decided to request
an opinion of the Venice Commission on this package of draft amendments.
100. The Venice Commission adopted its opinion on the draft amendments
on 19 June 2020,
in which it expressed serious concerns
with regard to the draft amendments which it considered “are not
ready for adoption in their current form. The law suffers from vagueness
and would likely to have a “chilling effect” suppressing free discussion
and political speech in the Albanian sector of the internet”. While
recognising the legitimacy of trying to address the issue of defamation
by online media, the Venice Commission recommended the authorities
to reconsider “the adoption of the draft amendments to Law no. 97/2013
(and the related draft amendments to Law no. 9918/2008), in their
current form, as voted by the Parliament in December 2019.”
101. Following the publication of the opinion, the authorities
withdrew the draft amendments from parliament and announced that
they would revise them in line with the Venice Commission recommendations
before tabling them again. The authorities requested assistance
from the Council of Europe in the process of revising these amendments.
Regrettably, advise given seems not to have been followed. The expertise
provided by the Council of Europe on the revised amendments, concluded
that, while containing some improvements, these revised amendments
did not address satisfactorily the main and most crucial recommendations
of the Venice Commission and could not be considered compliant with
international standards. Subsequently, the authorities announced
that they were no longer interested in adopting these amendments
and, following calls to this extent from the international community,
including the Assembly, have removed these draft amendments from
the agenda of the parliament.
102. While the withdrawal of the so-called defamation package from
the parliamentary agenda should be welcomed, the continued criminalisation
of defamation remains a point of serious concern. The Criminal Code still
foresees very hefty – in our view disproportional – fines for defamation,
while the Civil Code does not
set a limit to the amount that can be awarded as compensation for
defamation. In combination, these legal provisions have a chilling
effect on journalists who reportedly increasingly resort to self-censorship
as a result of the possibility of defamation lawsuits. A related
item of concern is the increasing use of so-called strategic lawsuits
against public participation (SLAPPs), not only against media outlets
and journalists, but reportedly also against civil society organisations
and activists. We therefore call upon the authorities to fully decriminalise defamation,
to set upper limits to the amount of compensation that can be rewarded
for defamation under civil law and to enact proper legislation to
counter the use of SLAPPs against journalists, media outlets as
well as civil society organisations.
103. Journalists have been banned by Prime Minister Rama from government
press conferences for extended periods of time (up to 3 months)
after asking questions that were not to his likening. This was criticised
by international press organisations, and other actors, including
our Assembly, as it undermines the possibility for critical reporting
by journalists and could encourage self-censorship. This in turn
is detrimental to transparency of governance. During our last visit,
we were informed that this practice had subsided, and we strongly
hope that there will be no return to such measures.
104. The impartiality of, and political control over, the Albanian
Media Agency (AMA) has remained a point of controversy over the
reporting period. On 8 July 2021, after the parliamentary elections,
but before the new parliament was convened, the Albanian Parliament
appointed Armela Krasniqi as chairperson of AMA. Ms Krasniqi has
been a communication officer in the Socialist Party and was the
director of communications for Prime Minister Rama, which led to
questions among stakeholders about her impartiality. The European Union,
who had called for the appointment process to be delayed until the
new parliament was convened, expressed concern about her appointment.
However, on 17 February 2022, the Albanian filled six vacancies on
the board of AMA in a reportedly bipartisan manner and with the
support of more than three-fifths of the votes. During our last
visit, we noted that the independence of the AMA seemed to have
become less of a concern for the media stakeholders we met. This
is to be welcomed but constant vigilance is needed as an independent
and impartial Media Authority is a key prerequisite for a free and
pluralist media environment.
105. On 18 September 2021, the Albanian Government established
the Media and Information Agency (MIA). The stated aim of this agency
is to ensure transparency and centralisation of the communications
about activities and policies of the government. In addition, the
Agency is tasked with monitoring domestic and foreign (social) media
with a view to informing the government of public opinion regarding
its activities. Immediately after its establishment, there were
fears that individual ministries would no longer communicate directly
with the media and that all requests for public information would
be centralised which raised considerable concerns among a wide range
of domestic and international stakeholders. However, to our satisfaction,
these fears seem to have been unwarranted. Journalists continue
to have full access to individual ministers and their ministries and
requests for public information continue to be made directly to
the responsible government body or agency.
106. With regard to access to public information by citizens or
journalists, we were informed that, in contradiction to the legal
provisions regulating the access to information, official requests
for information are often refused without reason or take so long
to fulfil that the request is no longer topical or relevant. This
affects the transparency of governance and is an issue that should
be addressed by the authorities.
5.2. Minorities
107. Albania is a diverse and multicultural
society with a strong historic tradition of interreligious dialogue
and tolerance. However, as noted by the Advisory Committee of the
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Advisory
Committee) and also highlighted in our previous report, reliable
disaggregated data on national minorities is lacking which makes
the analysis of the situation of minorities, as well as the planning
of effective policies, challenging. The integration of national
minorities, with the exception of Rom, and to a lesser extent Egyptians,
is generally considered to be good, but tensions with and between
national minorities do exist. Roma and Egyptians are two national
minorities that face serious marginalisation and discrimination
which hinder their integration. The Fifth Opinion on Albania by
the Advisory Committee was adopted on 6 June 2023. The most recent
report of ECRI on Albania in the framework of the sixth monitoring cycle
was adopted on 7 April 2020.
108. The main legislative framework governing the rights and protection
of national minorities is the Law on the Protection of National
Minorities that was adopted on 13 October 2017. In this law, Albania
recognises nine national minorities: Aromanian, Bosnian, Bulgarian,
Egyptian, Greek, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Roma and Serb. While this
law in general provides for an adequate legal framework for the
protection of minorities, it depends on secondary legislation for
its implementation. While nine out of twelve by-laws have been adopted, three
by-laws, which are considered the most important, and sensitive,
have not yet been adopted. These are the by-laws governing the right
to self-identification; the right to education in minority languages
and their use in communication with authorities; as well as the
procedure for the recognition of national minorities.
109. The Advisory Committee has expressed serious misgivings about
the draft legislation dealing with self-identification, which relies
upon so-called objective criteria, which are based on official documentation.
The Advisory Committee considers this approach to be fundamentally
flawed given the “notoriously unreliable historical collection of
data relating to national minorities in Albania.”
In addition,
this ignores the principle of free self-identification as meant
in article 3(1) of the Framework Convention, which is of concern.
110. This problematic approach to self-identification should be
seen in the context of the fact that a number of the rights provided
for in the Law on National Minorities in the municipalities where
minorities have a considerable presence, such as the right to education
in minority languages, or the use of minority languages in interactions
with the local authorities, are conditional on the minority in question
amounting to more than 20% of the population in that municipality.
However, the 20% threshold constitutes an insurmountable barrier
in practically all 61 municipalities, preventing effective access
to these rights. Only in three municipalities does the number of
persons belonging to national minorities meet the 20% threshold
(Dropull, Finiq and Pustec). No other national minority outside
of those three municipalities, can benefit from these rights provided
in the Law on the Protection of National Minorities. The strict
observation of the 20% threshold in the context of the merger of
municipalities actually means that in many areas, minority rights
have
de facto been reduced
in comparison to 2014. We therefore wish to fully support the recommendation
of the Advisory Committee that the authorities reconsider the 20%
threshold in favour of a more flexible system that takes better
into account the needs of minorities traditionally residing in substantive
numbers in different localities.
The
authorities have informed us that they are co-operating closely
with the Advisory Committee to address these issues in the hopefully
very near future.
111. The education in minority languages is an important tool for
minorities to protect their culture and ensure their rights. Education
in the Greek language takes place in the Gjirokastër, Sarandë, Delvina
and Korçë districts where the Greek minority has a very sizable
population. Similarly, teaching in the Macedonian language is conducted
in schools in the Korçë district. In addition, there are a limited
number of schools that provide education in the Romani language.
As mentioned, the strict interpretation of the 20% threshold is
an obstacle to the provision of education in minority languages.
However, a decision of the Council of Ministers adopted in 2018
allows local authorities, on their initiative, to establish classes
in minority languages when they see a perceived need. In addition,
these classes are exempted of the normal threshold of minimally
fifteen pupils before a class can be established. These measures
strengthen the possibilities for education in minority languages
which should be welcomed. Regrettably, the law does not foresee
minority language education beyond the level of compulsory education
(ninth grade). We would recommend that the possibility for education in
minority languages at higher grades is considered in those areas
where minorities have historically a compact presence.
112. During our meetings with minority representatives, including
from the Roma community, it was generally felt that political representation
of minorities is very limited. This was also observed by the Advisory Committee. There
are no ministers hailing from national minorities and only one member
of parliament belongs to a minority. In Vlorë, which has a sizable
Roma minority, there is only one Roma member in the municipality council,
although the Mayor of Vlorë informed us that the municipality had
employed a special advisor for Roma issues hailing from that community.
On the national level, the 2017 Law on the Protection of National
Minorities has established a Committee on national minorities under
the office of the Prime Minister as the body protecting national
minorities as well as to be the interface between them and the central
government. The chair and vice-chair of this committee are appointed
by the Prime Minister on recommendation of NGOs working in the field of
minorities. The other members represent each of the nine recognised
national minorities and are appointed by a special
ad hoc committee set up for this
purpose. The Advisory committee recommended to revisit the appointment
procedures and rules of procedure of the Committee on Minorities
in order to strengthen its (perceived) independence and efficacy.
113. The law on protection from discrimination, as amended in 2020,
provides for protection of minorities against discrimination and
hate speech. There are two institutions in Albania dealing with
equality: the People’s Advocate (Ombudsperson) and the Commissioner
for the Protection from Discrimination (CPD) that are well regarded
by minorities. Fears that the mandates of these two entities would
overlap and clash have not borne out and an effective and cordial
working relation and division of tasks has been established between
the two entities. However, financial and human resources for both
entities, especially for the Ombudsperson, are not sufficient to
conduct their numerous tasks. In addition, follow up by the authorities
of the reports and recommendations of these two institutions is,
according to these officials, still unsatisfactory.
114. Roma and Egyptians face considerable discrimination and obstacles
to their full integration in the Albanian society. The national
Action plan 2021-2025, which was developed in consultation with
these minorities, focussed on education, housing and healthcare,
but it was largely dependent on foreign funding, limiting ownership
and effectiveness of the action plan. Reportedly it has a funding
gap of over € 2 million. The Roma representatives we met complained
that the action plan mostly consists of strategies and intentions
but that little or no funds were available for their implementation
at the local level, which renders the national action plan, in their
view, largely ineffective. With regard to education, enrolment of
Roma children has improved but the enrolment and – particularly
– attendance rates are still very low in comparison to those of
the rest of the population. While the Albanian authorities have
stated that segregated schools no longer exist, ECRI and the Advisory
Committee have indicated that de facto segregation
still happens in some localities. This is an issue that needs to
be addressed by the authorities.
115. The housing situation of Roma is still difficult and characterised
by a widespread lack of ownership or tenancy titles. As a result
of the increase in real estate developments, Roma are often subject
to forced evictions that do not always fully adhere to international
standards and legal requirements, including with regard to prior
warning and alternative accommodation.
116. Roma and Egyptians continue to face elevated levels of unemployment
and are for a large part active in the informal economy. As a result,
they are often not registered as unemployed, which takes them out
of the reach of support programmes, including vocational training.
In a positive development, most Roma and Egyptians are now included
in the national registry and have access to identity documents.
117. As it is the case for many other groups, official data with
regard to the LGBTI+ population is largely lacking. However, this
community faces discrimination and stigmatisation in the Albanian
society which prevents persons belonging to this community from
obtaining effective equality. In 2015, in a development that should
be welcomed, the Albanian Parliament adopted a resolution on the
protection of the rights and freedoms of the LGBTI+ communities
that led to the adoption of the 2016-2020 action plan on LGBTI+
issues. This action plan was developed with involvement of the LGBTI+
community. While this action plan notably led to the adoption of
amendments to the Labour Code that prohibit discrimination on sexual
orientation or gender, ILGA Europe, in its 2023 comments, on the
EU enlargement report, noted that de
facto only one ministry concerned (Ministry of Health
and Social Protection) co-operated with the LGBTI+ community, which
limited the effective implementation of the action plan. This should
be addressed in the implementation of the next action plan. Albania,
contrary to European standards, still does not allow for the registration
of same sex partnerships or allow people to change their name and
gender in the civil registry, which prevents these persons from
obtaining their civil rights. This should be addressed as a priority
by the authorities.
118. Hate speech continues to be an issue of concern in Albania.
While hate speech and hate crimes are aggravated crimes under Albanian
legislation, very few cases are actually brought to trial and effective
data collection for hate speech and hate crimes is still lacking.
The authorities have informed us that the Ministry of Justice had
started to collect statistical data on an annual basis from the
courts of general jurisdiction regarding the number of criminal
offenses, hate crimes included, and the number of convicted persons.
Cases of hate crime and hate speech
are often underreported to and by the police. As an example, while
hate speech and hate crimes for sexual orientation are aggravated
crimes under Albanian legislation, representatives of the LGBTI+
community still report a very high number of cases of hate speech
and acts of violence, which often go unreported to avoid further
stigmatisation.
119. The Ombudsperson has made hate speech a priority working area
and parliament has adopted a Code of Ethics that forbids MPs from
using racist and homophobic speech or any other forms of discrimination
and stereotyping in both parliamentary as well as extra parliamentary
activities. While this should be welcomed, public condemnation and
counteracting of hate speech coming from high-ranking political
figures is, according to ECRI, extremely rare and apparently continues
to be an acceptable and regular feature of public debates.
120. Hate related violence is reportedly rare in Albania, although
accurate official statistics are lacking. Regrettably, ILGA, in
its above-mentioned input to the enlargement report, noted that
members of the LGBTI+ community in Albania had reported a substantial
number of hate related violence against them.
121. As for religious minorities, Albania rightly prides itself
for its inter-religious co-operation and tolerance. However, the
Jehovah’s Witnesses have indicated that, while they are generally
free to meet for worship and to share their faith, their community
in Albania often faces discrimination in the media or by official
bodies. They have been refused registration as a religious community
and are registered as a non-governmental organisation, which is
not adequate. According to the Albanian Constitution it is up to
the Council of Ministers to decide which community can register
as a religious organisation. The Council of Ministers, which seems
to have been given large discretion in this matter by the Constitution,
has until now refused registration. The Jehovah’s Witnesses appealed
to the Albanian courts which have ruled against them in first instance.
The appeals process is ongoing.
122. A population census was conducted in Albania at the moment
of the writing of this report. It is important that this census
helps the Albanian authorities obtain reliable data regarding minorities
in the country, collected on the basis of the principle of self-identification.
The 2011 census was controversial in this regard and failed to address
this issue. Last minute amendments to the census law of 2000 introduced
a fine for an “incorrect” reply to the question on ethnic affiliation
and stated that an incorrect reply would be a reply that did not correspond
to data contained in the civil registry. As a result, a large part
of the population chose not to respond the question and the results
of the 2011 census with regard to nationality/ethnicity are widely
regarded as unreliable and inaccurate. It is therefore to be welcomed
that the possibility for fines for “incorrect” answers has been
removed from the law before conducting the 2023 census. Nevertheless,
some minority representatives we met felt that the manner in which
the questions were asked in the census process seemed at times unclear or
to imply a “correct” answer which could undermine the reliability
of the data collected, especially with regard to minority issues.
123. Albania has not signed the European Charter for Regional or
Minority Languages. Given the extent of the presence of minority
languages in Albania we would like to call upon the authorities
to consider signing and ratifying this charter as a matter of priority.
6. Concluding
remarks
124. Albania has been under a full
monitoring procedure since 1995. During most of this period, the
country has experienced a protracted systemic political crisis,
which has hindered its European integration process. In a welcome
development, this crisis recently has started to subside and can
now be considered largely overcome, although its root causes have
not yet been resolved. Constant vigilance in this respect is necessary and
all political forces should continue to work incessantly to overcome
the systemic polarisation of the political environment, which affects
the system of checks and balances and remains the Achillis heel
of the proper functioning of the country’s democratic institutions.
125. At the same time, as we have outlined in this report, in the
recent period, the country has made great, albeit with varying speeds,
progress in honouring its obligations and commitments to the Council
of Europe. It has implemented far reaching reforms to strengthen
the independence of the judiciary and increase the efficiency of
the administration of justice. It has continued its fight against
the still prevalent corruption and organised crime that have plagued
the country for so long. The vetting of the judiciary, and the establishment, of
a series of viable institutions to combat corruption are having
marked results and tangible progress has been recorded. In the drafting
and implementation of these reforms it has co-operated and consulted
closely with the Council of Europe whose recommendations and advise
have been followed and implemented in the majority of cases. During
our visits and contacts with the authorities at the highest level,
as well as with the opposition, the political will was clearly present
to continue working with the different Council of Europe bodies
to address the remaining concerns, as we outlined in this report.
126. We therefore recommend that the committee proposes to the
Assembly to close the monitoring procedure in respect of Albania
and to engage in a post-monitoring dialogue in line with
Resolution 2018 (2014) with the objective of addressing the remaining concerns
outlined in this report. At the same time, we recommend that the
committee considers returning Albania to the full monitoring procedure
in the first report under the post-monitoring dialogue if no marked
and tangible progress is made by Albania with regard to addressing
the concerns and recommendations made in this report and the draft
resolution with regard to the fight against corruption, the protection
of minorities as well as media freedom and freedom of expression.