1. Introduction
1.1. Kosovo’s
membership application
1. On 12 May 2022, through a letter
by Ms Donika Gërvalla-Schwarz
, Deputy
Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora, Kosovo
applied
for membership in the Council of Europe. On the same day, the Secretary
General of the Council of Europe transmitted the application to
the Chair of the Committee of Ministers “for possible follow up
by the Committee of Ministers in accordance with the Statute of
the Council of Europe”.
2. Nearly one year later, on 24 April 2023, during an extraordinary
meeting the Ministers’ Deputies took the following decision:
“Recalling
the decision, expressed at the 8th Session of the Committee of Ministers in May
1951, to consult the Parliamentary Assembly before deciding on applications
for membership of the Council of Europe in conformity with the provisions
of the Statute;
Recalling the Brussels Agreement
of 27 February 2023 and the Ohrid Agreement of 18 March 2023 and its
Implementation Annex, reached in the EU-facilitated dialogue led
by the High Representative, and the importance of all parties implementing
them expediently and in good faith;
Decided to transmit to the
Parliamentary Assembly for consultation the letter of 12 May 2022
addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe (document DD(2022)200), without prejudice to the Committee
of Ministers’ future consideration of this application to accede
to the Council of Europe.”
3. As a result of this transmission, on 25 May 2023, on the proposal
of the President, the Bureau of the Assembly appointed Mr Thomas
Markert and Ms Sia Spiliopoulou Åkermark as the two eminent lawyers
who would “draw up a report for the attention of the Bureau assessing
the conformity of the applicant's legal system with Council of Europe
standards”.
4. Following their appointment by the Bureau, the eminent lawyers
prepared a report on the basis of their expertise and of a fact-finding
visit which they carried out from 24 to 28 September 2023. Their
report
was submitted to the Bureau at its
meeting on 27 November 2023, and subsequently declassified. I would
like to thank them for their assessment, which gives me and the
rapporteurs for opinion a very solid basis to carry out our political
work.
1.2. The
admission procedure
5. According to the
Statute of the Council of Europe,
“Article 3
Every member of the Council
of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the
enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights
and fundamental freedoms, and collaborate sincerely and effectively
in the realisation of the aim of the Council as specified in Chapter
I.
Article 4
Any European State which is
deemed to be able and willing to fulfil the provisions of Article
3 may be invited to become a member of the Council of Europe by
the Committee of Ministers. Any State so invited shall become a
member on the deposit on its behalf with the Secretary General of
an instrument of accession to the present Statute.”
6. The procedure for the admission of new member States is governed
by Statutory Resolution (51) 30 A adopted by the Committee of Ministers
on 3 May 1951, which reads:
“The Committee decided that, before inviting
a State to become a Member or an Associate Member of the Council
of Europe, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 4 and 5
of the Statute, or inviting a Member of the Council to withdraw,
in accordance with the provisions of Article 8, the Committee would, in
conformity with established practice, first consult the Consultative
Assembly”.
7. The preparation of Assembly Opinions on applications for membership
is referred to the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy
for report, with other Assembly committees being seized for opinions
on the main report. I was appointed as rapporteur of the Committee
on Political Affairs and Democracy in June 2023. Subsequently, Ms Azadeh
Rojhan (Sweden, SOC) was appointed rapporteur for opinion of the
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights and Ms Béatrice Fresko-Rolfo
(Monaco, ALDE) was appointed rapporteur for opinion of the Committee
on Equality and Non-Discrimination.
8. The Assembly is not constrained to a given schedule when preparing
its Opinion. In fact, in the past this took from a few months to
a number of years. The Opinion will require a two-thirds majority
of the votes cast to be adopted by the Assembly. It will be transmitted
to the Committee of Ministers and will contain a recommendation
whether to invite the applicant to join the Organisation and, if
so, it will include a list of commitments and obligations.
9. The preparation of the Assembly Opinion is to be considered
as a political process during which the Assembly rapporteurs engage
with the authorities of the applicant to clarify concerns, conditions
and expectations which will then be translated into the list of
commitments and obligations to be evaluated under the Assembly’s
monitoring procedure once and if the application is successful.
10. While the Assembly’s Opinion is advisory, the final decision
on any membership application is made by the Committee of Ministers.
If the decision is made by the Committee of Ministers meeting in
the format of the Ministers’ Deputies, unanimity is required; if
the decision is made by the Ministers, in principle a vote with
a two thirds majority is sufficient. In the history of the Council
of Europe, decisions on admissions have always been made at the
level of Deputies, with the exception of the admissions of Armenia
and Azerbaijan which were decided by the Ministers by consensus.
11. I would like to thank the Kosovo authorities, as well as the
representatives of the international community, the Serbian Orthodox
Church, and media and civil society, for sharing with me their views
as regards the situation in Kosovo during the visit I paid to Pristina
and north Mitrovica from 1 to 3 November 2023.
I am particularly
grateful to Mr Albin Kurti, Prime Minister of Kosovo, for his warm
welcome in Pristina and for the in-depth conversation that we had
as a follow up to it in December 2023. I would also like to thank Mr Glauk
Konjufca, President of the Assembly of Kosovo, for addressing the
Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy in Strasbourg on 23
January 2024, and Mr Miroslav Lajčák
, EU
Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and other
Western Balkans regional issues, for meeting me in Brussels on 21 February
2024.
2. Scope of the report
12. Being aware of the complexity
of some of the issues which are crucial for this membership application, I
have tried to streamline the content of this report to highlight
only what is strictly relevant and has not already been addressed
by others. The eminent lawyers’ report provides an extensive analysis
of Kosovo’s compliance with Council of Europe standards in the areas
of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Without repeating
the eminent lawyers’ findings, I endorse their conclusions and recommendations
.
Additional analysis will be provided by the two rapporteurs for
opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, and
of the Committee on Equality and Non-Discrimination.
3. A
sound legal framework with implementation issues
13. As highlighted by the eminent
lawyers, the drafting of Kosovo’s legal framework has been strongly influenced
by the international community, a fact which has contributed to
its general compliance with international standards.
14. The Constitution of Kosovo is a very advanced legal instrument,
which incorporates the key provisions of the Ahtisaari Plan and
has been shaped by the legal expertise provided by the Council of
Europe through the European Commission for Democracy through Law
(Venice Commission). Under Article 22 of the Constitution, the European
Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5) and its protocols, the Framework Convention
for the Protection of National Minorities (ETS No. 157), and some
UN human rights instruments are directly applicable in Kosovo. Following
a constitutional amendment introduced in 2020, the Council of Europe
Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and
domestic violence (CETS No. 210, “Istanbul Convention”) was added
to this list. In case of conflict, the Constitution recognises their
pre-eminence over domestic law. Furthermore, according to Article
53 of the Constitution, “human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed
by this Constitution shall be interpreted consistent with the decisions
of the European Court of Human Rights.”
15. While Kosovo’s legal framework is broadly in line with Council
of Europe standards, there are problems with its implementation.
I would like to recall from the start that, according to the eminent
lawyers, “partly the implementation problems are similar to those
encountered in other countries in the region, partly they are due to
the specific situation in Kosovo and the tensions between the majority
community and the Kosovo Serb community”, coupled with the tensions
between Kosovo and Serbia. These tensions are not only relevant
for the situation with respect to human and minority rights, but
also impact the functioning of the democratic institutions and the
judicial system.
4. The
judgment of the Constitutional Court on the Visoki Dečani monastery
16. The implementation of the judgment
of the Constitutional Court on the land dispute involving the Visoki Dečani
monastery in Deçan/Dečane municipality
has become central
in the consideration of Kosovo’s application for membership of the
Council of Europe. This judgment, dating back to 2016, recognises
the legal ownership of 24 hectares of land to the Serbian Orthodox
Church. Not only was it not implemented for eight years by successive
governments, but it was also harshly criticised by prominent political
figures, thus undermining the role of the Constitutional Court,
who is the guarantor of the Constitution.
17. During my visit to Pristina, I was given different explanations
of the reasons why the judgment had not been implemented, ranging
from its far-reaching consequences should it be used as a precedent,
to the fact that it would legitimise wrongful decisions made by
Slobodan Milošević regime.
18. I discussed the matter with the Prime Minister and the President
of Kosovo as well as with Father Sava, who is the Abbot of the Visoki
Dečani monastery. I was clear that the judgment is a major rule
of law case and must be implemented, as demanded unanimously by
the international community. The monastery is a treasure which belongs
to all communities in Kosovo. Its rights need to be restored. The
monastery needs to be protected, respected and open to all.
19. In the aftermath of the visit, following a phone call with
Prime Minister Kurti, I was informed in writing by the Deputy Minister
of Foreign Affairs, in his capacity as chair of the Coordination
Group, that the issue remained contested before Kosovo courts. When
addressing the Committee on 23 January 2024, President Konjufca
confirmed this explanation, saying that “in 2021, the municipality
of Deçan/Dečane initiated a case before the Basic Court of Pristina
alleging that the documentation in relation to the contested land
is incomplete because the Dečani monastery has never submitted the
land contract and other documents to the local institutions, and
that the earlier judgments have not delineated the specific geographical
size of the contested land”. He added that “government intervention
in this pending case would constitute interference in the judicial process”.
20. Following the written explanation of the Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Kosovo and the oral statement of the President
of the Assembly of Kosovo, I consulted a number of legal experts,
who confirmed the validity and applicability of the Constitutional
Court decision from 2016. They insisted in the nature of res judicata of the decision, meaning
that the decision is final and binding and that any attempt to review
such decision would result in a general climate of legal uncertainty,
reducing public confidence in the judicial system and consequently
in the rule of law.
21. During the meeting of the Committee on Political Affairs and
Democracy on 5 March 2024, I presented an information note in which
I recalled that, on 22 September 2021, the Constitutional Court
issued a Decision on non-enforcement of its judgment related to
the Visoki Dečani Monastery. The Constitutional Court subsequently
notified the State Prosecutor of this new decision, the State Prosecutor
having responsibility for taking the necessary actions as foreseen
by the Criminal Code.
22. Visoki Dečani Monastery was recognised as applicant, and Father
Sava as authorised person on behalf of the Monastery, by the Constitutional
Court decision to assess the referral as admissible. In its decision,
the Constitutional Court clearly explained the reason why the Monastery’s
referral was assessed as admissible. In the motivation, the Constitutional
Court not only referred to previous Constitutional Court practices
in comparable cases, but also explained why the requirement on exhausting
all legal remedies before appealing to the Constitutional Court
had been satisfied.
23. The decision to recognise the ownership of the Monastery over
the disputed parcels was based on a settlement agreement between
the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)
and the Monastery, and recognised by the Special Chamber of the
Supreme Court. The acceptance by both UNMIK and the Special Chamber
of this settlement, de facto recognised
the agreement of a gift from the Republic of Serbia to the Monastery
as non-discriminatory. As a result, in order to comply with the
legal framework and with the rule of law principle, the Cadastral
Agency of Kosovo should have executed the decision and registered
the property in the Monastery’s name.
24. While it is true that neither the President nor the Prime
Minister can interfere in court proceedings, institutions are responsible
for the implementation of court decisions. In this specific case,
the Ministry of Environment, Spatial Planning and Infrastructure
(MESPI) was responsible for pursuing the registration of land parcels
in cadastral records. In fact, while the Kosovo Cadastral Agency
is the central authority for maintenance of the cadastral database,
property registers, mapping and geographic information system, formally
it is subordinated to MESPI.
25. In my information note presented to the Committee on Political
Affairs and Democracy on 5 March 2024, I made it clear that the
non-enforcement of a decision assessed by the Constitutional Court
as res judicata should be
viewed as a political choice and a major failure of Kosovo institutions
to respect the rule of law principle.
26. I am therefore, satisfied that, on 14 March 2024, I was informed
by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora that the Constitutional
Court judgment has been implemented, with the registration of the
24 hectares of land in the name of the Monastery. This is a major
sign, from the part of the Kosovo authorities, of their courage
and willingness to make difficult decisions with a view to complying
with the rule of law. It also testifies to the importance they attach
to Council of Europe membership.
5. The
Association of Serb majority municipalities
27. It is obvious that the establishment
of an inter-municipal association is not a requirement under Council of
Europe standards. In the case of Kosovo, however, the establishment
of the Association of Serb majority municipalities is an indispensable
milestone towards the normalisation of relations between Pristina
and Belgrade, an international obligation, and a way to enhance
the democratic participation of Kosovo Serbs and ensure the protection
of their rights. Needless to say, the establishment of the Association
would weigh very heavily in charting a European path for Kosovo.
28. The First agreement on principles governing the normalisation
of relations concluded between Kosovo and Serbia in 2013 under the
EU-facilitated dialogue reads: “There
will be an Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities
in Kosovo” in accordance with the European Charter of Local Self-Government
and Kosovo law and the Association/Community will have “full overview
of the areas of economic development, education, health, urban and
rural planning”. This agreement, which was signed by the Prime Ministers
of Kosovo and Serbia, was ratified as an international agreement
on 27 June 2013 by the Assembly of Kosovo.
29. A document entitled “Association/Community of Serb majority
municipalities in Kosovo – general principles/ main elements” was
prepared in 2015 to implement the 2013 agreement. The then President
of Kosovo referred this document to the Constitutional Court for
an examination of constitutionality. The Constitutional Court found
that it raised constitutionality issues.
30. The Court’s main concern revolved around the ambiguity of
the term “exercise full overview” which was taken to signify that
the Association would have executive powers, while the Constitution
only provides for two levels of governance: central and local. Furthermore,
the Court noted that the principles regarding the organisational
structure of the Association/Community raised concerns regarding
respect for the diversity of communities who reside within the participating
municipalities, and the reflection of this diversity in the staffing and
structures of the Association/Community as required by the Constitution.
The Court found that the Association/Community alone could not be
vested with full and exclusive authority to promote the interests
of the Kosovo Serb community in its relations with the central authorities.
31. The position of the Constitutional Court was misused by Kosovo
politicians to argue that the establishment of an Association of
Serb majority community was unconstitutional per
se. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court had explicitly
held that “the Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities
is to be established as provided in the First Agreement, ratified
by the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo and promulgated by the
President of the Republic of Kosovo”.
32. The lack of progress towards the establishment of an Association
of Serb majority municipalities has been a major source of dissatisfaction
and distrust amongst the Kosovo Serb community, especially in the north,
and tensions between Pristina and Belgrade.
33. On 27 February 2023, the EU-facilitated dialogue yielded a
major result: the Agreement on the path to normalisation between
Kosovo and Serbia,
which is complemented by an Implementation
Annex,
negotiated in Ohrid on 18 March 2023.
34. According to Article 4 of the 2023 Brussels agreement “[t]he
Parties proceed on the assumption that neither of the two can represent
the other in the international sphere or act on its behalf. Serbia
will not object to Kosovo’s membership in any international organisation”.
According to its Article 7, “[b]oth Parties commit to establish
specific arrangements and guarantees, in accordance with relevant
Council of Europe instruments and by drawing on existing European
experiences, to ensure an appropriate level of self-management for
the Serbian community in Kosovo and ability for service provision
in specific areas, including the possibility for financial support
by Serbia and a direct communication channel for the Serbian community
to the Government of Kosovo. The Parties shall formalise the status
of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo and afford strong level
of protection to the Serbian religious and cultural heritage sites,
in line with existing European models”.
35. The importance of the 2023 Brussels Agreement and the Ohrid
Annex cannot be stressed enough. It should be recalled that, in
its decision to transmit Kosovo’s application to the Assembly, the
Committee of Ministers explicitly referred to them and to the EU-facilitated
dialogue. This is the first time in the history of the Organisation
that, in the consideration of a membership application, a direct
link is made to a political process being facilitated by another
international organisation.
36. A deadlock developed over the sequencing modalities to implement
the Agreement and its Annex. While Belgrade insisted that concrete
steps towards establishing the Association/Community needed to take
priority, Pristina maintained that no article of the Agreement could
be a precondition for the implementation of other articles, and
that articles needed to be advanced “independently”. While the European
Union announced that the Ohrid Annex had been agreed, the President
of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, denied publicly having given his consent.
37. The above situation is described and commented upon in the
report of the eminent lawyers. Since their visit to Kosovo, however,
there have been further developments. In October 2023, Miroslav
Lajčák, the EU Special Representative
for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and other Western Balkans regional
issues, presented a new draft Statute establishing the Association
of Serb majority municipalities. During my meeting with him in Pristina,
Prime Minister Kurti confirmed what had already been reported in
the media: he was ready to sign it.
38. I strongly encouraged him to do so and, I argued, he could
do so without further delay and preconditions, since the establishment
of the Association aims, first and foremost, to the greater democratic
participation of Kosovo citizens. In addition, in my meetings with
the representatives of various parties represented in the Assembly
of Kosovo, I underlined that it would be a sign of political maturity
for all political forces to support the establishment of the Association,
and to prioritise Kosovo’s interests rather than trying to get political
gains for themselves.
39. During my meeting with Mr Miroslav Lajčák, in Brussels, on
21 February 2024, I was informed that no progress had been achieved
towards the establishment of the Association, and that the Dialogue
had been essentially paused. I regret this and I believe that the
establishment of the Association should feature prominently in the
Committee of Ministers’ future consideration of Kosovo’s application
to accede to the Council of Europe.
6. Land
expropriations in Serb majority municipalities
40. Expropriations are an important
rule of law issue which also has broad political repercussions,
which are amplified in Kosovo’s specific context.
41. Since 2022, in the Serb majority municipalities of Leposavić
and Zubin Potok, the Kosovo authorities have initiated cases of
expropriation for 118 parcels of land. Representatives of the international
community, including the European Union, the European Union Rule
of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the United States have expressed
deep concerns about these decisions, arguing that the procedure
did not comply with Kosovo’s own laws and regulations.
42. Among other issues, the decisions did not identify, as required
by Article 44 of the Constitution and the Ahtisaari Plan, the public
purpose or public interest making these expropriations necessary.
This manner of proceeding is not compatible with the rule of law
and further undermines trust between the Serb community and Kosovo
institutions. The authorities should refrain from any expropriations
which are not fully in line with the Kosovo Constitution and legal
system, while also making greater efforts to communicate the reasons
for the expropriations to the parties directly affected as well
as to the general public, especially in the current heightened security
situation of the northern municipalities. It is to be noted that
the well-foundedness of the criticism levelled by the international
community was confirmed by a court annulling the expropriation decision in
January 2024, based on the government’s failure to adequately motivate
its necessity and explain its public purpose.
43. During my visit to Kosovo, I also raised concerns about a
new draft law on expropriation of immovable properties proposed
by the government. This draft law leaves out the provision set out
in Article 3.1 of the current law,
which
reads: “Movable and immovable property and other assets of the Serbian
Orthodox Church shall be inviolable and shall not be subject to
expropriation”. The provision of the current law derives directly
from the Ahtisaari Plan, namely Article 1.4 of Annex V which states:
“Kosovo shall guarantee that the movable and immovable property
and other assets of the Serbian Orthodox Church shall be inviolable
and shall not be subject to expropriation”.
44. As noted also by other international actors, this omission
risks creating legal confusion, may lead to contradictory interpretations
of Kosovo’s legal framework in a particularly sensitive area and
increase the likelihood of legal disputes.
45. It is of the utmost importance that the Kosovo authorities
ensure the scrupulous respect of the Ahtisaari Plan in relation
to the protection of the rights of non-majority communities, including
as regards expropriations. I make, therefore, a strong call for
any new legislation in this field to be fully aligned with the Ahtisaari
Plan and to avoid legal uncertainty. As regards the draft law under
preparation, explicit mention should be added of the protection
of the properties of the Serbian Orthodox Church against expropriations.
7. The
situation in the northern municipalities
46. In recent months, the situation
in the northern municipalities, a region which is currently administered
by Kosovo Albanian mayors who do not enjoy popular legitimacy, and
in which Kosovo Serbs represent approximately 96% of the population,
has given rise to grave concerns. Here, education and health services are
provided by the structures financed by Belgrade. The population
is dependent upon salaries and allowances drawn from the Serbian
State budget. The economy is based on the dinar. Serbian flags and
other Serbian State symbols are displayed in public places, and
the border is porous, allowing for the often uncontrolled passage
of people and goods between Kosovo and Serbia.
47. The integration of Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo institutions in
the north is one of the main achievements of the EU-facilitated
dialogue. The 2013 Brussels Agreement provided for Kosovo northern
municipalities to be integrated into the Kosovo legal system, and
for the integration of Kosovo Serbs in the judiciary and the Kosovo police,
including in leading positions.
48. This process, supported by the international community, has
been overall successful. Recent events, however, have shown that
progress is fragile and greater efforts are necessary to preserve
achievements.
49. Unfortunately, since Kosovo applied for membership of the
Council of Europe, tensions have flared up on several occasions.
I will not describe all the incidents that have occurred, many of
which have resulted in fatalities. For the purpose of this Opinion,
however, I think it is important to mention a few significant events, which
highlighted the magnitude of the challenges.
50. On 29 June 2022, the Kosovo government announced that Serbian
car licence plates would be de-registered and that the use of Kosovo
licence plates would become obligatory. This announcement was met with
concern by the European Union, as a move to address unilaterally
a long-standing bilateral dispute. Even if the entry into force
of this decision was later postponed, it led to violent protests,
provocations and roadblocks by Kosovo Serbs in the North, against
a background of rising inflammatory rhetoric from Pristina and Belgrade. The
Kosovo authorities deployed special police forces in the North,
while Serbia put its military at the border with Kosovo on high
alert.
51. Special police forces are almost exclusively composed of Albanian,
and also only Albanian-speaking, police officers. Because of this,
their attitude, and their equipment, they are perceived as intimidating
by the population in the North, which further aggravates tensions.
52. Against the background of continued protests, in November
2022 Srpska Lista representatives collectively resigned from their
functions in Kosovo institutions – the central government, the Assembly
of Kosovo, as well as mayors and members of municipal assemblies
in the north. Furthermore, Kosovo Serbs in the northern municipalities
left the police, the judiciary and the prosecution service. Various
attempts to recruit new police officers amongst the Kosovo Serb
community, or to transfer Kosovo Serb police officers from the south
of Kosovo, failed because the persons concerned were subjected to
pressure and intimidation by Belgrade or their own community.
53. A new challenge arose, as elections to reconstitute local
governments had to be postponed because of security concerns. They
were finally held on 23 April 2023, with Srpska Lista and Belgrade
calling on the population to boycott them. The very low turnout
(3.47% of voters) led to a situation where four Kosovo Albanians
mayors were elected. They had to be escorted to the municipal buildings
and protected against demonstrators. Dozens of people, including
KFOR personnel, were injured in these protests.
54. Due to the lack of decisive steps to de-escalate, on 1 July
2023 the Council of the European Union introduced restrictive measures
vis-à-vis Kosovo, which also impact high level visits and financial
support. These measures are temporary and fully reversible, depending
on the steps taken to de-escalate the tensions in the north of Kosovo.
According to the European Union, Kosovo has taken steps in the right
direction, but more remains to be done. At the time of writing,
the restrictive measures are still applied.
55. It was apparent from the outset that these elections lacked
legitimacy and that the conditions for the return of Kosovo Serbs
to local governance, policing and the judiciary in the north of
Kosovo should be restored as soon as possible. But the deadlock
lasted for several months, between the elected mayors refusing to resign,
and the collection of signatures to ask for their recall proceeding
unconvincingly. Finally, following the successful collection of
signatures, new elections have been called for 21 April 2024. The
fact remains that new elections will give legitimate results only
if the Kosovo Serb population participates, without interference
and fear of intimidation. The Assembly and the Council of Europe
should attentively follow the situation.
56. On 24 September 2023, a security incident of unprecedented
gravity occurred in Banjska, during which a Kosovo police officer
and 3 Serbian armed gunmen were killed. As the eminent lawyers remarked
arriving in Kosovo on that very date, “the level of resourcing and
organisation of this attack, including the discovery of significant
heavy weaponry and ammunition, and the alleged direct connections
between some of the assailants and the Belgrade authorities illustrated
yet another escalation of tensions and security threat”.
57. The Assembly held a current affairs debate on “The situation
in the North of Kosovo following the recent attack and the need
for de-escalation” during the October 2023 part-session and the
European Parliament adopted a Resolution on the recent developments
in the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, including the situation in the northern
municipalities in Kosovo.
Following a motion for a resolution
on “Responding to the violent attacks in the North of Kosovo”
tabled by Mr Knut Abraham (Germany,
EPP/CD) and other members of the Assembly, in January 2024 the Committee
on Political Affairs and Democracy asked that the motion be referred to
it for report.
58. During my visit to North Mitrovica, I had the opportunity
to meet civil society representatives, the four former mayors of
the northern municipalities who had resigned in April 2022 and the
newly elected leader of Srpska Lista, Mr Zlatan Elek. They described
a situation of heightened tension, excessive use of force by the police,
obstacles to having effective access to justice, and interference
with a number of rights – from the right to health to the right
to education. Their narrative about the situation is the opposite
of the narrative put forward by the authorities. They denounce what
they consider to be a deliberate effort by the Pristina authorities
to drive Kosovo Serbs out of Kosovo.
59. I was struck by the refusal by the representatives of Srpska
Lista to condemn the authors of the attack and their putting all
the responsibility on the Pristina authorities for escalating the
situation.
60. The security situation in northern Kosovo, following the attack
of 24 September 2023, justifies the presence of Kosovar special
police forces in the region for extraordinary operations. Nevertheless,
numerous testimonies and reports, including the reports of UNMIK
to the United Nations Security Council, regret the abusive use of
those special forces in the north for the execution of ordinary
police tasks, also before the events of 24 September.
61. I would like to recall that, in July 2023, at a meeting with
EU Special Representative Miroslav Lajčák in Bratislava, the Kosovo
authorities agreed that the presence of special police forces in
the north should be limited to extraordinary situations and their
presence should follow a joint potential threat assessment with KFOR
and EULEX. These terms, however, are not consistently implemented.
62. The latest source of tensions was, in February 2024, the enforcement
of regulations decided by Kosovo’s Central Bank to prevent banks
and other financial institutions in the North from using currencies
other than the euro in cash transactions. Given that the Serbian
Government is supporting financially critical health and education
institutions in northern Kosovo, these regulations are perceived
as hostile to the survival of the Serbian community in the region.
63. The issue was at the centre of an urgent debate in the United
Nations Security Council called by Serbia, with the participation
of Prime Minister Albin Kurti and President Aleksandar Vučić. Briefing
the Security Council, Caroline Ziadeh, Special Representative of
the Secretary-General and head of UNMIK, said the new regulations
would affect tens of thousands of Kosovo Serbs living in four northern
municipalities and, more broadly, the economy, which depends on
their purchasing power. She added that limited public explanation was
offered, despite the fact that, since 1999, the Serbian dinar has
served as the
de facto primary
currency for cash and commercial transactions in Kosovo-Serb majority
areas. Regardless which side takes them and what justifications
are provided, and in the absence of unambiguous public communications,
such actions predictably exacerbate an environment of insecurity
and mistrust,” she said, adding that unilateral actions are “cause
for great concern”.
64. While the implementation of this decision has been postponed
due to international pressure, I am concerned at the way it was
taken, without considering transitional measures to mitigate its
impact on the population. While the de-escalation of tensions is
not an easy process, decisions of this kind have the opposite effect.
8. Statehood
and recognitions
65. Since declaring independence,
Kosovo has made it a priority of its foreign policy to seek recognition
of its statehood and engage in multilateral co-operation. The programme
of the current government says that “The Republic of Kosovo will
strengthen its international subjectivity. This applies to the efforts
for recognition and mutual diplomatic relations, membership in international
organizations, economic co-operation, cultural exchanges, as well
as to the whole spectrum of bilateral and multilateral cooperation”
.
66. Council of Europe member States do not have a common position
as regards the applicant’s statehood. While 34 of them have recognised
Kosovo as an independent and sovereign State, the remaining 12 have
not. For Serbia, “Kosovo and Methoja” is an integral part of its
territory, and this is even enshrined in the preamble of the Serbian
Constitution.
67. The eminent lawyers confined themselves to the assessment
of the conformity of Kosovo’s legal system with Council of Europe
standards and did not tackle the issue whether Kosovo meets the
requirements to join the Council of Europe under its Statute, which
in Article 4 refers to any “European State”. In their view, the assessment
concerning statehood is a political decision. They highlighted,
however, that the international presence in Kosovo does not have
any executive powers, that the Kosovo authorities exercise jurisdiction
over the territory and the population of Kosovo, and that Kosovo
has international relations.
68. Without explicitly mentioning it, therefore, the eminent lawyers
referred to the Montevideo Convention of 1933 on the Rights and
Duties of States, which according to State practice and doctrine
codifies customary international law, and implicitly said that Kosovo
fulfils the relevant criteria. The lawyers also recalled that the Advisory
Opinion of the International Court of Justice found that Kosovo’s
declaration of independence was not contrary to international law,
including Resolution 1244 of the United Nations Security Council.
69. Recognition is a prerogative of States. As a result, the ultimate
assessment whether Kosovo is “a European State” for the purposes
of the Council of Europe Statute will lay with each member State
when casting a vote in relation to Kosovo’s membership application.
The Council of Europe’s internal rules accept that this decision
does not require unanimity but may be reached by two thirds of its
members.
9. Conclusions
70. The progress made by Kosovo
in the areas of democracy, human rights and the rule of law must
be acknowledged. Its legal system is broadly in line with Council
of Europe standards and membership of the Organisation would help
Kosovo bridge the gap between the law and its implementation by
ensuring the Council of Europe’s greater oversight and influence
on domestic developments. Above all, it would give access to the
European Court of Human Rights to all those who are under Kosovo’s
jurisdiction – irrespective of their nationality or community –
thereby ensuring that their rights are protected by the highest
European judicial institution. Membership of the Council of Europe
would also represent a key milestone in the process of Kosovo’s
further European integration.
71. Kosovo’s aspirations to join the Council of Europe should
be met with a positive response. Welcoming Kosovo into the Council
of Europe’s fold, however, would not be the end but the beginning
of a process. I hope that, on the strength of the climate of trust
which has been established over many years of co-operation and reinforced
through our dialogue in the context of the membership application,
Kosovo will use the opportunity of membership to consolidate its
democracy and democratic culture, to gain the trust and allegiance
of all communities, and to become an agent of stability in the region.
72. In the ongoing dialogue between the Council of Europe and
Kosovo, some issues stand out for their importance. In the first
instance, while welcoming the long overdue implementation, by the
current government, of the 2016 judgment of the Kosovo Constitutional
Court in the case of the Visoki Dečani monastery, the Assembly should
continue to follow this matter and recommend that the Committee
of Ministers should do the same.
73. The Assembly should also expect from the Kosovo authorities
substantial and tangible progress as regards the Association of
Serb majority municipalities, with a view to its establishment as
soon as possible.
74. Furthermore, the Assembly should demand from the Kosovo authorities
that expropriations are conducted in the strictest respect of the
law and that any future legislation in this area is fully in compliance
with the Ahtisaari Plan, including with regard to the protection
of the properties of the Serbian Orthodox Church.
75. In a letter transmitted to me dated 3 March 2024, Prime Minister
Albin Kurti commits Kosovo to signing and ratifying a number of
Council of Europe treaties upon and following accession. These commitments
are reflected in the draft Opinion attached to this explanatory
memorandum.
76. In addition, by a letter dated 22 March 2024 and signed by
the Prime Minister, the President and the President of the Assembly
of Kosovo, the authorities have undertaken a number of commitments,
including to:
- take all measures
to de-escalate tensions in the north of Kosovo and refrain from
unilateral decisions which may lead to a further deterioration of
the security situation;
- take urgent measures to promote the reintegration of Kosovo
Serbs in the police force, the judiciary and the prosecution in
the north of Kosovo;
- refrain from using special police in the north of Kosovo
for ordinary police tasks, ensure that they are deployed only in
case of necessity, and step up co-operation with KFOR and EULEX;
- ensure the effective implementation of the legal framework
for the protection of national minorities;
- allocate sufficient resources to effectively implement
the legislation on the use of languages;
- promote teaching of non-majority languages in schools;
- step up measures to support the socio-economic integration
and political participation of persons belonging to non-majority
communities;
- take visible and meaningful measures to promote reconciliation
between Kosovo’s communities;
- continue to engage in the EU-facilitated dialogue and
honour the commitments and obligations undertaken under its aegis;
- put genuine efforts into the process of normalisation
of relations with Serbia;
- commit to settling international disputes in a peaceful
manner and to promoting good neighbourly relations in the region.
77. After accession, compliance with the above commitments and
obligations should be monitored by the Assembly in the context of
its monitoring procedure.
78. While supporting Kosovo’s membership of the Council of Europe,
the Assembly should call on the Committee of Ministers to take into
consideration the specific circumstances relating to this application,
to ensure that Kosovo’s membership of the Council of Europe is not
only beneficial to Kosovo and its citizens but also a factor of
stability, democratic security and peace in Europe.
79. For the first time in the history of the Organisation, not
all Council of Europe member States consider the applicant as a
State. While admission of a new member does not require unanimity,
admitting a new member following a vote would be an unprecedented
course of action. Diplomacy, dialogue and compromise are necessary
to ensure that the admission of Kosovo does not create a fracture
in the unity of Council of Europe member States, which would be
contrary to the spirit of the Reykjavik Summit.
80. Appropriate safeguards should be introduced in the Committee
of Ministers’ decision to ensure that Kosovo’s membership of the
Council of Europe is without prejudice to individual member States’
positions as regards the statehood of Kosovo beyond the institutional
framework of the Organisation, notably in their bilateral relations.
At the same time, all member States, including those who may vote
against, should respect the decision made by the Committee of Ministers
and collaborate sincerely and effectively in the realisation of the
aims of the Council of Europe, ensuring the smooth functioning of
its institutions, bodies and mechanisms. The Organisation as such
can no longer pursue its status-neutral policy once Kosovo is admitted
as a member. As a result, the use of the asterisk and the footnote
would not be necessary, thereby rendering the current practice obsolete.
81. Finally, the Assembly should stand ready to discuss Kosovo’s
membership application with the Committee of Ministers in the format
of the Joint Committee.