1. Introduction
1. On 15th March
2022, Vladimir Kara-Murza gave a speech to the Arizona House of
Representatives, which led to his imprisonment upon his return to
the Russian Federation. During the speech, he said the following:
I wish
we had been wrong on this, but today the whole world sees what the
Putin regime is doing to Ukraine. The cluster bombs on residential
areas, the bombings of maternity wards, hospitals, and schools,
and the war crimes. These are war crimes that are being committed
by the dictatorial regime in the Kremlin against a nation in the
middle of Europe. This is, unfortunately, where all the years of
Putin’s rule have led us. But as much as it’s difficult for any
of us to be a little bit optimistic and even a little bit hopeful
about the future, I also want to speak about the other side of Russia
to you. Very often, people in the West only see the official side.
They see Putin, the repression, the aggressive actions, and the
war that is now happening. The other side is very often lost. The
other side, of course, is that there are millions of people in my
country who fundamentally reject and fundamentally disagree with
everything that the Putin regime stands for and represents, from
the kleptocracy to the abuses, repressions, and crimes against humanity
that are being committed.
2. Vladimir Kara-Murza was arrested just over one month afterwards,
a few days after he made a similar statement before the Committee
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights at its May 2022 meeting in Paris.
The charge was “deliberately spreading false information” about
the Russian armed forces. After being charged with additional offences
of “co-operating with an undesirable foreign NGO” and “high treason”,
on 17 April 2023 Mr Kara-Murza was sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment.
3. This report
is about Vladimir Kara-Murza. But
it is also about the “other side of Russia” that he spoke of in
March and April 2022: the people who do not believe in Putin’s war
of aggression, and how we can do more to help them.
4. Section 2 describes the severe repression of individuals with
an anti-war stance in the Russian Federation. Almost 20 000 people
have been detained for their anti-war views, leading to thousands
of prosecutions and lengthy prison sentences for criticism of the
war (sections 2.1 and 2.2). Civil society and media organisations
have also been eviscerated, notably through a significant growth
in the application of “foreign agent” and “undesirable organisation”
designations that make the running of thus designated groups almost
impossible (section 2.3).
5. The crackdown on individuals and organisations has been facilitated
by a series of amendments to Russia’s already draconian legislation,
which have effectively criminalised even the most trivial criticism
of the war or the Russian military (section 2.4). The dystopian
crackdown on anti-war views has been widely condemned by international
organisations (section 2.5). Nevertheless, the anti-war movement
has not been destroyed: it has instead gone underground. Russians
who oppose the war have adapted their activities, so that they can
continue expressing anti-war dissent, without risking immediate
arrest and indefinite imprisonment (section 2.6).
6. The Russian Federation and Belarus are different countries
– with different histories, traditions, cultures, and governments.
Sadly, the populations of both have been subjected to severe repression
for any opposition to the war of aggression against Ukraine. In
Belarus, authoritarian legislative changes following the 2020 protest
movement had already significantly expanded the capacity of the
government to carry out politically motivated repression. This has
been used to severely repress anti-war protest and speech. There
have been harsh, violent crackdowns on anti-war assemblies; over
1 600 detentions for people showing an anti-war stance; and prosecutions
under terrorism charges against individuals spreading information
about military equipment or sabotaging it (section 3).
7. I am convinced that we can and must do more to support the
Russian and Belarusian anti-war movements. A significant part of
this report is devoted to this subject (section 4), setting out
how member and observer States can provide more recognition and
practical assistance to the anti-war movement, pursue the efforts
to obtain the release of prisoners detained for their anti-war views,
intensify initiatives to hold the Russian Federation and Belarus
to account at the United Nations, facilitate the entry and stay
of Russians and Belarusians with an anti-war stance who are trying
to flee their oppressive regimes, and introduce restrictive measures
against individuals involved in the brutal repression as detailed
in this report. Imprisoning people for voicing their opinion is
a lethal weapon against democracy. It sends a chilling message to
all that see it and kills democratic debate, freedom of expression
and indeed, democracy itself. We must do what we can to fight back.
8. During the preparation of this report, I have benefited from
information provided directly by Russian and Belarusian civil society,
as well as prominent experts, during two hearings before the Committee
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights held on 22 May 2023 and 4 March
2024; 10 meetings with 28 lawyers, journalists and activists during
a fact-finding visit to Vilnius on 20-21 September 2023; an online
meeting with the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation
of human rights in the Russian Federation, Mariana Katzarova, on 11
December 2023; participation in the Helsinki Dialogue conference
with Belarusian democratic forces held on 11-12 January 2024; and
input throughout from Vladimir Kara-Murza’s wife, Evgenia Kara-Murza.
2. The
systematic persecution of anti-war protesters in the Russian Federation
9. For the purposes of this report,
an anti-war “protester” is anyone who speaks out against the Russian war
of aggression against Ukraine. The means through which the “protest”
is exercised can be varied and can include personal social media
activity, authoring an article, or participating in a public demonstration.
2.1. Statistical overview
10. The statistics below rely on
the research of OVD-Info, a prominent Russian civil society organisation
now operating from outside the country. They were updated in February
2024, when data was released to mark the two-year anniversary of
the war – and they apply to persecution in the territory of the
Russian Federation and the occupied territory of Crimea.
11. Following the launch of the war of aggression against Ukraine
on 24 February 2022, several anti-war public demonstrations took
place. From the very beginning, the protests were subject to extensive
repression by the Russian authorities. On 25 February 2022, 437
detentions took place across 26 cities.
Over the following
two days, the number of people detained reached 5 500.
12. There have now been 19 850 detentions of individuals who have
expressed an anti-war stance. There have been 848 criminal prosecutions,
with 267 people currently imprisoned. Criminal prosecutions of anti-war protesters
constituted 67% of all politically motivated prosecutions in 2022
and 64% in 2023. Over half of the criminal prosecutions (444) have
been carried out for activities on the internet (such as posting
a video, comment, or even chat message). In 2022, the average prison
sentence for anti-war activity was 36 months; the average in 2023
was 70 months.
Vladimir Kara-Murza’s
25 years sentence is seen as revenge not only for his anti-war stance,
but also for his support for the campaign of William Browder calling
for “Magnitsky laws”, facilitating targeted sanctions on human rights
violators enjoying impunity in their own countries.
13. The above data relates to criminal prosecutions. However,
a huge amount of repression is carried out through the application
of administrative law. Article 20.3.3 on “discrediting the military”
is the main provision used to prosecute anti-war protesters, with
8 693 cases since the offence was created in March 2022. Individuals
have been prosecuted for holding up blank sheets of paper or a placard
with an asterisk, saying general pacifist slogans, and for comments
or reposts on social media. The main punishment for administrative offences
is a fine, with a mean average of 2.5 minimum monthly Russian salaries.
Repeated prosecution for administrative offences can lead to many
years in prison.
14. Finally, in addition to the criminal and administrative prosecutions,
extrajudicial methods are also used to put pressure on individuals.
Non-state actors are following general trends led by the authorities
and act with impunity against those with anti-war views. Examples
include cancelling events (34 reported cases), harassment at work
(41), threats (112), expulsion (16), and exclusion from universities
and other organisations (3). Such methods are used as intimidation
techniques, which can be applied flexibly without administrative
or legal processes. OVD-Info has collected 579 examples of cases
of extrajudicial pressure, but this is likely to be significantly
less than the true scale of pressure. The real scale of this form
of repression is very difficult to estimate, as most people who
are subjected to pressure shall not communicate it to others beyond
a close circle.
2.2. Individual examples
15. Among the early arrests was
opposition politician, historian, human rights defender, co-founder
of the Russian Anti-War Committee and Václav Havel Prize laureate
Vladimir Kara-Murza. A few days after he addressed the Committee
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights concerning political prisoners
in the Russian Federation, he was arrested and sentenced to 15 days’
administrative detention for allegedly “disobeying a police officer”
(on 12 April 2022). On 22 April 2022, he was charged under Article
207.3 of the Criminal Code for allegedly spreading “deliberate false
information” about the actions of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine. Mr Kara-Murza
was charged for the contents of a speech at the Arizona House of
Representatives which he had made in March 2022, in which he criticised
Vladimir Putin’s policies, deplored the West’s “appeasement” of
the Kremlin, highlighted the importance of the protest movement
in the Russian Federation, and denounced the war of aggression against
Ukraine. In July 2022, he was also charged with “organizing the
activities of an undesirable organisation” (under Article 284.1(1)
of the Russian Criminal Code) over his alleged involvement with
the Free Russia foundation, an NGO that is labelled by the Russian
authorities as “undesirable”. In October 2022, the authorities charged
Vladimir Kara-Murza with “high treason” under Article 275 of the
Russian Criminal Code. According to the authorities, Mr Kara-Murza
co-operated with a NATO country, as “proven” by his critical public
speeches in Lisbon, Helsinki and Washington DC.
16. Vladimir Kara-Murza was forbidden from calling or seeing his
family during his pretrial detention. His health deteriorated drastically,
particularly after having been placed in a disciplinary cell on
multiple occasions and on spurious grounds. Mr Kara-Murza has barely
survived two poisoning attacks linked to the Russian authorities
which have had lasting negative effects on his health, including
the development of polyneuropathy in both feet. His condition necessitates
regular exercise; however, after almost a year in pre-trial detention, including
one week in solitary confinement (in a cell measuring 3 meters by
1.5 meters) and being deprived of his right to daily walks, his
polyneuropathy deteriorated.
17. His trial was held behind closed doors in April 2023. The
secrecy was justified on the ground that “Mr Kara-Murza wants to
use the courtroom as a tribune to publicly discredit the existing
regime”. The court that tried him included judge Sergei Podoprigorov,
who is on the “Magnitsky list” and has been sanctioned by the United
States and the United Kingdom. During the submissions, Mr Kara-Murza
stated his conviction that “[Russian] society will open its eyes
and be horrified by what terrible crimes were committed on its behalf
… even today, even in the darkness surrounding us, even sitting
in this cage, I love my country and believe in our people.”
18. On 17 April 2023, Mr Kara-Murza was sentenced to 25 years
in prison for “spreading false information about the Russian military”,
“co-operating with an undesirable foreign NGO” and “high treason”.
One of Vladimir Kara-Murza’s lawyers, Vadim Prokhorov, reported
receiving multiple threats from the State prosecutor and the presiding
judge at the trial, forcing him to leave the country.
19. Since September 2023, Mr Kara-Murza has been moved to a maximum-security
prison facility in Siberia. His location was not known until three
weeks after his transfer. On 24 September 2023, his lawyers announced that
he had been located and was being held in a punishment cell. For
the last six months, Mr Kara-Murza has been held in complete solitary
confinement in a cell measuring approximately 3 by 4 metres, first
in a strict-regime prison colony and then in a Siberian “special-regime”
prison colony, which is the harshest grade in the Russian Federation’s
penitentiary system. Since September 2023 he has not been receiving
medical treatment and his polyneuropathy is slowly deteriorating.
20. After the death of Alexei Navalny on 16 February 2024, there
have been widespread concerns that Vladimir Kara-Murza and other
Russian political prisoners will similarly face death at the hands
of the Kremlin regime. Mr Kara-Murza said that he reacted with despair
to the death of Mr Navalny but that he would not give up the fight
to make the Russian Federation a normal, free, European, democratic
country.
21. Thousands of others have also been persecuted. The most minor
acts of peaceful speech or protest now incur hefty fines, detention,
and lengthy prison sentences. Long terms of imprisonment have been
handed out for repeatedly creating, sharing, “liking” or otherwise
commenting on social media posts (such as the postings of student
activist Dmitry Ivanov), or displaying an anti-war placard on television
(TV presenter Marina Ovsyannikova). A notable example is Alexey
Gorinov, a Moscow local councillor who, during a council meeting, said
that “children were dying” and that “all efforts of Russian civil
society should be aimed at stopping the war and withdrawing troops
from the territory of Ukraine”. He was the first to be sentenced
under the amendments to the law to almost 7 years’ imprisonment
for spreading knowingly false information about the Russian army. Mr Gorinov’s
health is very poor and deteriorating in detention. Prison authorities
have placed him on a preventative register as prone to escape and
as a result they check on him every two hours, including by waking
him at night. Artist Aleksandra Skochilenko was sentenced to 7 years’
imprisonment for having replaced supermarket price tags with anti-war
slogans and information on the activities of the Russian Armed Forces
in Ukraine in April 2022. On 9 December 2022 politician Ilya Yashin
was sentenced to 8 years and six months( imprisonment for posting
a video about the Bucha massacre. According to Amnesty International, 43 journalists
have faced prosecution for their anti-war stance.
22. Oleg Orlov, the co-Chair of the Memorial Human Rights Defence
Centre, has been convicted for “repeatedly discrediting the Russian
Armed Forces”. On 27 February 2024 he was sentenced to 2 years and six
months’ imprisonment. The conviction was based on a social media
post in November 2022 in which he shared an article titled “Russia:
they wanted fascism, they got it”, and for holding a sign in March
2022 that read “Peace for Ukraine, Freedom to Russia”. Multiple
criminal charges have been brought against the lawyers of Alexei
Navalny, including Vadim Kobzev, Igor Sergunin, Alexei Lipster (all
of whom have been arrested), and Olga Mikhailova (who has been charged
in absentia).
23. The effects of the repression may even impact the parental
rights of those subject to persecution for opposing the war. For
instance, Alexei Moskalyov’s daughter, who had drawn an anti-war
picture at school, was kept in an orphanage after her father was
detained in March 2023 for “discreditation” of the Russian army. Whilst
the teenager is now with her mother, Mr Moskalyov faces a two-year
sentence in a penal colony along with a ban from using the internet.
2.3. Suppression of
civil society and media organisations
24. Human rights organisations
and independent media have been systematically liquidated, seen
their employees face criminal and administrative charges, and/or
been put in a position where they had to put an end to their activities.
This crackdown started before the full-scale invasion, but significantly
intensified after it.
25. One of the most highly regarded Russian human rights organisations,
Memorial, had their appeal against liquidation orders turned down
by the Russian Supreme Court on 3 March 2022. In April 2022, the Russian
authorities revoked the registration of 15 foreign NGOs and foundations,
including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, forcing
them to shut their offices in the Russian Federation. The Moscow Helsinki
Group, Russia’s oldest human rights organisation, was ordered to
shut down in January 2023. In March 2023 police raided the homes
of nine board members and staff of Memorial, which had continued
to operate in an
ad hoc manner
after its formal liquidation. In April 2023 the authorities also
liquidated “Sova”, a think-tank working on xenophobia and extremism.
In August 2023, the Sakharov Center was also liquidated.
26. A key tool used by the authorities has been designation of
organisations as “foreign agents” and “undesirable”. These designations
have been in place for many years. However, the scope of the relevant legislation
was significantly broadened in December 2022, and the laws have
been applied far more extensively.
27. NGOs labelled as “foreign agents” are faced with a diverse
array of restrictions that make their day-to-day activities extremely
difficult. These include intensive government controls (such as
audits), significant administrative barriers to raising funds, an
obligation to mark publications with their designation as “foreign agents”,
and bans on public events. Ignoring these restrictions can incur
significant individual criminal liability. There were more registrations
of “foreign agents” in 2022 than the cumulative total for 2019 to
2021.
Between February
2023 and February 2024, 56 organisations and 162 individuals were
designated as “foreign agents”. Of the new registrations, 109 had
“opposed the special military operation in Ukraine”. At least 30
people are being prosecuted for criminal offences related to their
registration as “foreign agent” made since 24 February 2023. Examples
include members of the “Golos” movement, the editor in chief of
the Pskovskaya Gubernia (Pskov Province) newspaper Denis Kamalyagin,
and the editor of the Tatar-Bashkir service of Radio Liberty, Alsu
Kurmasheva.
28. If an organisation is designated as “undesirable”, running
or financing the organisation can lead to immediate prosecution.
Meanwhile, participation in any of the organisation’s activities
can lead to administrative charges incurring large fines (and a
criminal prosecution if a second offence is committed within a year).
“Participation” can include actions as minor as reposting on social
media. Between February 2023 and February 2024, 66 organisations
were labelled as “undesirable”, of which 41 designations were related
to the war. Examples include the Moscow Free University, due to
its teaching of Russian history, and the student news outlet Doxa.
29. Finally, since 24 February 2022, the Russian censorship service
Roskomnadzor blocked 66,061 resources, including the website of
OVD-Info.
Social media and digital
companies such as Meta have been found by a Russian court to be
exercising “extremist activities” under Federal Laws 374-FZ and
375-FZ and Facebook and Instagram have been blocked.
2.4. Legal situation
30. Prior to the full-scale war
of aggression, the Russian Federation had a long history of violations
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5) relating
to freedom of assembly,
freedom of expression and information,
freedom
of association,
and
the right to liberty.
Judgments
of the European Court of Human Rights identifying these systemic
problems were left unimplemented by the Russian Federation, leading
to a dire situation for rights relating to the exercise of political
freedoms even before the start of the war. Legal developments from
March 2022 have further facilitated the devastating crackdown outlined
above.
31. On 2 March 2022, the Russian Parliament introduced a series
of amendments to the Criminal Code. Article 207.3 was amended to
criminalise the “public dissemination of knowingly false information
about the use of the Russian Armed Forces” (5 to 10 years’ imprisonment,
15 years for offences entailing “grave consequences”); Article 280.3
to criminalise “public actions aimed at discrediting the Russian
Armed Forces” (up to 5 years’ imprisonment); and Article 284.2 to
criminalise “calls to introduce restrictive measures against the
Russian Federation, its citizens or legal entities” (monetary fine
and up to 3 years’ imprisonment). The bill was passed by both houses
of the Russian Parliament, signed by President Putin and entered
into force within two days, on 4 March 2022. On 25 March 2022, Article 207.3
of the Criminal Code was further amended to criminalise the “dissemination
of knowingly false information” not only about the Russian Armed
Forces but also any Russian State bodies acting abroad.
In
February 2024, a new law was approved to allow the confiscation
of property, money, and assets of people convicted of spreading
“deliberately false information” about the military.
32. In regard to administrative offences, an amendment to Article
20.3.3 of the Russian Code of Administrative Offences entered into
force on 4 March 2022. Mirroring Article 280.3 of the Criminal Code
for “discrediting the armed forces” but used for less serious offences,
the amendment led to 556 protesters being fined for thousands of
roubles within a month and a half of the law coming into force.
33. These laws represent an unmasking of the Russian regime. Before
the full-scale invasion, the authorities would use made-up charges
for politically motivated prosecutions, like bringing drug possession
or corruption charges against journalists and activists. Since March
2022, the authorities no longer care to cover up political motivation
behind prosecutions – they have explicitly criminalised dissent
in criminal and administrative law.
34. On 1 December 2022, amendments to the administrative law on
so-called “foreign agents” entered into force. These broadened the
requirements that warrant listing as a foreign agent from receiving
“foreign funding” to being “under foreign influence” and widened
what qualifies as “political activity” to include any activity related to
“the rights and freedoms of man and citizens”, the “targeted collection
of information in the field of military activities of the Russian
Federation”, the public distribution of any messages and materials
or partaking in the creation of such messages and materials.
Consequently, organisations
or individuals who challenge the Russian administration’s narrative
of the war by, for example, reporting on activities of the Russian
army in Ukraine or advocating against human rights abuses, can easily
be qualified as a “foreign agent” and therefore face administrative
sanctions and liquidation.
35. Other articles of the Criminal Code have frequently been used
to arrest and detain anti-war protesters. Some of the most frequently
used include Article 205.2.2, under which public calls for the commission
of terrorist activity or public justification of terrorism or propaganda
committed through the use of mass media or electronic or information-telecommunication
networks, including the internet, are punishable by detention between
five and seven years. For example, the involvement of Andrey Boyarshinov
in calls for mass riots in Telegram chats resulted in detention.
Another frequently used provision
is Article 214.2 on vandalism committed by a group or persons and
motivated by political, ideological, racial, ethnic or religious
hatred or animosity, or by hatred or animosity towards any social
group, punishable by deprivation of liberty, forced labour or imprisonment
for up to 3 years. By way of example, after Alexander Martynov wrote
“Ukraine, forgive us” on the back wall of a store he was convicted
of politically motivated vandalism and given a sentence of six and
a half years in a penal colony, when compounded to a violation of
Article 207.3.
Lastly, Article 280.2 concerns
public appeals for the performance of extremist activity, committed
with the use of the mass media or information-telecommunication
networks including the internet. This is punishable by compulsory
labour or by deprivation of liberty for up to 5 years. As an example,
after Oleg Belousov accused Putin of war crimes in a video, he was
sentenced to five and a half years in a prison colony under this
article.
Abuses of prosecutions under terrorism-related
laws have also been reported. Over the past two years, minimally
violent anti-war protests actions (such as small-scale arson which
did not harm individuals), have been disproportionately prosecuted
with terrorism-related charges.
Journalists and
others are also falsely charged with a wide variety of other criminal
offences, such as drug possession, treason, espionage, separatism
and insulting government officials.
36. The majority (if not all) of the previously mentioned amendments
to the Russian Criminal and Administrative Codes since March 2022
violate human rights standards, including the European Convention on
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Considering that the European Court of Human Rights will
be hearing and deciding upon cases regarding potential Convention
violations that took place until 16 September 2022 involving the
Russian Federation,
the Court’s judgments on
such human rights violations as a result of the crackdown on anti-war
protesters are to be expected in due course. Meanwhile, Article
284.3 of the Criminal Code, adopted in April 2023 criminalises co-operation
with international bodies to which the Russian Federation is not
a party. The law is broadly worded, leading to concerns that it
can be used to prosecute attempts to enforce judgments of the European
Court of Human Rights. According to Human Rights Watch, the law
quickly led to the dropping of some claims.
2.5. Assessments by
the Assembly and other international bodies
37. Since the start of the unlawful
and unprovoked military aggression against Ukraine on 24 February
2022, the Assembly,
its President,
its committees,
and its rapporteurs,
as well as the
Commissioner for Human Rights,
alongside their unequivocal
denouncement of the invasion, have continued to react to the repression
of political opponents and civil society activists in the Russian
Federation, in particular persons opposing the war. The repression
of anti-war activism has also been regularly condemned by United
Nations Special Rapporteurs and experts,
United Nations
treaty bodies mechanism
and
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
2.6. Adaptation: how
anti-war work continues in a repressive environment
38. Of the 19 850 individuals who
have been detained for an anti-war stance, 15,355 were detained
during the first month of the full-scale aggression. The number
of monthly arrests have been steadily decreasing since that time,
except for a spike between August and October 2022, to coincide
with mobilisation in the Russian Federation. Between November 2023
and February 2024, OVD-Info recorded less than five detentions of
anti-war protesters per month. In my view, the data indicates that
there was (and there still is) a substantial level of public opposition
to the war of aggression; but that the extensive repression of anti-war
protesters has been successful in muting public expressions of this.
39. This does not mean that the anti-war movement has been destroyed:
it has just gone underground. Russians that oppose the war have
adapted their activities to the current situation, so that they
can continue expressing some forms of anti-war dissent, without
risking immediate arrest and unpredictably long imprisonment. Organisations
which have been liquidated continue to operate informally. Journalists
continue to post independent content on websites hosted abroad.
Lawyers provide support and legal advice to defendants. In addition
to legal initiatives, human rights education projects are continuing
their activities. For example, the Yelena Bonner School on Human
Rights organised by the Russian Sakharov Centre now takes place
online and is regularly attended by hundreds of participants living
within the Russian Federation and participants who recently emigrated.
Memorial continues to organise guided tours in various Russian cities, discussing
State terror and human rights issues. These have become important
meeting points for people that share similar views for the protection
of human rights.
Memorial and other human rights projects
have opened a hotline and online consultations for people who want
to avoid military mobilisation. Another solidarity initiative launched
in October 2023 is the “30 October Foundation”, aimed at aiding
Russian political prisoners and their families. The first donation
was made by Mr Kara-Murza, using the amount he received in 2022
as part of the Václav Havel Human Rights Prize and the Axel Springer
Award for courage.
40. The members of Russian civil society I spoke with now live
outside of the Russian Federation and are among the hundreds or
perhaps thousands who are working outside of the country to support
elements of society that oppose the war. Lawyers who have left the
Russian Federation work with colleagues within the country to provide
legal assistance to anti-war protesters; independent journalists
based outside of the Russian Federation work with sources and contacts
within the State to publish accurate information about the war;
and activists abroad work with local contacts to help provide material
support to people who have been persecuted. All of these activities
involve working with a civil society that continues to exist within
the Russian Federation and providing support to people with anti-war
views living in the Russian Federation.
41. These activities are not subject to collective organisation
under a single leader. They are also often carried out by organisations
that have a semi-formal or entirely informal existence within the
Russian Federation itself. Most importantly, there is usually little
news about the activities of such groups: both because the Russian
authorities suppress coverage of them within the country, and because
those carrying out the activities may not want the authorities to
be made aware of them. However, none of this means that anti-war activities
and opinions have been eradicated in the Russian Federation. When
there is a legal and safe way for people to express them, they do
so: for example, the campaign for the anti-war presidential candidacy
of Boris Nadezhdin reportedly collected over 100 000 signatures.
42. The Russian anti-war movement has been put under incredible
pressure. However, it has not been broken, and we must not echo
the Kremlin’s propaganda by saying that no Russians oppose this
unjustified and unconscionable war of aggression.
3. Situation in
Belarus
43. The crackdown which followed
the Belarusian election of 2020 led to a series of draconian legislative changes,
which significantly expanded the capacity of the government to carry
out politically motivated repression. The changes introduced new
criminal and administrative offences (often for vaguely defined
acts), increased penalties, extended the application of the death
penalty, and further limited freedoms of expression, assembly and
association.
44. Of particular note, changes to the Law on Countering Extremism
in May 2021 broadened the definition of “extremist activities” to
include actions like spreading “false information” about Belarus,
insulting authorities, or discrediting the government. These amendments
expanded the scope of a law which had already been used widely to
repress dissent, leading to increased prosecutions and harsher penalties.
“Extremist” materials were set out in official lists, and included
websites, media, human rights publications, books, songs, podcasts, Telegram
channels, and hashtags. Additionally, six other laws related to
"extremism" were enacted between 2021 and 2023, imposing additional
criminal consequences for vaguely defined behaviours.
Seven other laws
were either amended or newly introduced during this period, further
curtailing freedoms of expression, association, and assembly. Notably,
a January 2022 amendment to the Criminal Code criminalised involvement
in unregistered associations. Amendments to the Criminal Code made
internet resource owners accountable for sharing prohibited content
(Article 198-1) and imposed penalties of up to three years for defamation
or six years if directed at the President (Articles 188 and 367).
Changes to the Law on Mass Events in May 2021 imposed stringent
event authorisation procedures, holding individuals personally responsible
for unauthorised gatherings, and prevented journalists from covering
such events (by treating them as participants).
45. Furthermore, the definition of “terrorism” in Belarusian legislation
is excessively broad and is not consistent with the cumulative characteristics
of acts of terrorism (as proposed in the United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1566 (2004) and the model definition promoted by the
United Nations Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human
rights).
In
May 2022 legislative changes were enacted permitting Ministry of
the Interior personnel to disperse public protests by using combat
weapons and special military equipment.
Finally,
criminal proceedings in Belarus are routinely undermined by a lack
of protections of the right to fair trial, as well as the absence
of judicial independence.
46. This background enabled a severe and immediate repression
of anti-war protesters in Belarus after the beginning of the full-scale
invasion. The invasion coincided with a Belarusian constitutional
referendum on 27 February 2022. One of the proposed amendments allowed
the presence of nuclear weapons on Belarusian soil, thereby linking
the referendum to the military aggression. Protesters gathered spontaneously
outside polling stations to contest the war, continuing the day
after the vote. These assemblies were severely repressed, with around
1 500 arrests. Even the most minor acts could lead to detention,
including wearing a “No War” t-shirt, laying flowers at the Ukrainian
embassy, or wearing blue and yellow. Most arrests were carried out
under Article 24.23 of the Belarusian Code on Administrative Offences
for “violation of the procedure for organising and holding mass
events”. There were widespread reports of people who were arrested
at rallies being subjected to torture.
47. Subsequently, any expression of sentiments against the war
has been met with prosecution – often applying “extremism” legislation.
Individuals have been detained and convicted of administrative offences
for calling a police station to say “Glory to Ukraine”; congratulating
Ukraine for its Independence Day on TikTok; singing the national
anthem of Ukraine in a karaoke bar; or posting a photo of the Ukrainian
flag on social media. Actions such as posting anti-war tags on social
networks or giving interviews criticising the government’s position
on the war, have led to charges such as “inciting enmity” under
Article 130 of the Criminal Code.
48. Many brave Belarusians have gone further, by disseminating
information about military subjects. Actions which have led to multi-year
prison sentences have included filming aircraft (leading to charges
of “aiding extremist activities” under Article 361-364 of the Criminal
Code) and photographing military installations (leading to charges
of high treason under Article 356). Some Belarusians have gone even
further, by damaging railway tracks to slow-down Russian military
movements or sabotaging Russian military installations. In the first nine
months of the war, 30 criminal cases were opened for “acts of terrorism”,
which can lead to many years in prison and even the death penalty.
49. The prosecution of “railway partisans” with terrorism charges
has led to absurdly disproportionate punishments. For example, the
Homiel Regional Court handed down sentences to three individuals
on 27 December 2022, with prison terms spanning from 21 to 23 years.
Similarly, on 8 February 2023, the same court sentenced two individuals
to 16 and 14 years in prison, respectively. Reports indicate that
the two men were apprehended prior to causing any harm. In July
2022 modifications were made to Article 468-27 of the Belarusian
Criminal Procedure Code, to permit special criminal proceedings
to be held
in absentia for individuals
located outside Belarus alleged to be involved in acts such as terrorism,
treason, sabotage, establishing or participating in extremist groups,
engaging in mass unrest, and advocating for sanctions.
50. According to the Belarusian human rights organisation Viasna,
more than 1 600 people in Belarus have been detained for their anti-war
stance. 94 of them were sentenced to prison sentences ranging between
1 and 23 years. At least 5 people have been prosecuted for alleged
co-operation with Ukrainian special services. 13 prisoners in Belarus
were convicted of sabotage of railways (for a total of 199.5 years’
imprisonment); at least 37 people for transmitting photos of Russian
military equipment to the media; 15 people for intending to fight for
Ukraine; at least 38 for publicly condemning the Russian aggression
and supporting Ukraine; and 14 were convicted for collecting donations
in favour of Ukraine. Viasna reports that there are over 1 400 political prisoners
in Belarus overall, of whom 101 have serious health issues.
51. I am appalled by the numerous credible reports of unnecessary
use of force against anti-war protests in Belarus, as well as widespread
use of punishment cells (without any blankets, clothes, books, or
amenities), refusals of access to medicine, ill-treatment, and torture
by the Belarusian authorities against those who have expressed an
anti-war stance. The use of incommunicado detention, whereby political
prisoners are completely cut off from the outside world, has become
particularly common. This is an incredibly cruel and inhumane practice,
punishing not only the prisoner but their loved ones too.
4. How the international
community can further support anti-war protesters
52. Throughout the meetings and
events listed in the introduction, I had the benefit of hearing
extensively from individuals involved in supporting the anti-war
movement in the Russian Federation and Belarus. They expressed gratitude
for the support that they received from the international community,
particularly from States which had received them following their
flight from their home country. I was grateful to hear their proposals
about how the international community can show solidarity with anti-war
protesters in the Russian Federation and Belarus.
53. Drawing on these discussions, I have set out a list of proposals
below. Whilst the proposals apply to some extent to both the Russian
Federation and Belarus, it would be wrong to treat the problems
(or solutions) for these countries as the same. Therefore, I emphasise
below which particular proposal is most relevant for each State.
4.1. Greater international
recognition of the anti-war movement in the Russian Federation
54. One of the main concerns raised
to me was the prevalence of a mistaken narrative in European countries about
the state of the anti-war movement in the Russian Federation. Many
members of exiled Russian civil society expressed dismay at a view
that they had seen put forward in European media and political discourse, that
the anti-war movement in the Russian Federation had been extinguished
by the Russian Government, or that independent civil society “no
longer existed”.
55. For the reasons set out in section 2.6 above, this narrative
is wrong. The anti-war movement has not been destroyed – it has
adapted to a repressive environment. However, in addition to being
wrong, the narrative about the destruction of the Russian anti-war
movement is also damaging.
56. It is dispiriting for members of the anti-war movement to
be told that no such movement exists. Russians working to oppose
the war often do so at great personal cost. Those with whom I spoke
repeatedly emphasised that the real victims were Ukrainians and
that any problems faced by Russian civil society were tiny in comparison.
Nevertheless, it is still important to note that those who have
left the country have had to leave family, friends, work, and community.
Those remaining within the country live under constant risk of prosecution
for an arbitrary and ever-expanding list of “crimes” – and many
of them are imprisoned already. Members of Russian civil society
reported that the morale of those engaged in the anti-war movement
was harmed by stories that no such movement existed. Such claims
might make them feel their work is unrecognised, unimportant, or
ineffective.
57. However, I was also told that the most damaging effect of
the discourse of there being no Russian anti-war movement is on
wider Russian society. This is because it reinforces the narrative
advanced by the Russian Government, that the nation is united behind
the war – that there is no point in opposing the war, because nobody
else disagrees with it.
58. Participants in discussions also often raised concerns about
Russians and Belarusians being shut off from Europe – and the long-term
effect this would have on their support for European values. Members
of Belarusian civil society noted that Belarusian students were
increasingly going to the Russian Federation to study rather than
the rest of Europe, because of increasing restrictions to their
entry and stay; and that the numbers of Belarusians participating
in conferences, exchanges, workshops, and study visits in Europe
in all different fields were falling. Russian participants also
spoke about their concerns that ordinary members of the public had
less and less access to European ideas, particularly given the lack
of opportunities to travel to Europe.
59. Given this, the Assembly should publicly distinguish between
the Russian and Belarusian Governments and their people, as well
as the continued and extensive Russian and Belarusian anti-war movements
– and call on others to do so too. Member and observer States should
be called on to implement programmes of international solidarity
with the Russian and Belarusian anti-war movements, including events,
promoting media coverage, academic research, conferences and roundtables,
and supporting artistic endeavours.
4.2. Diplomatic efforts
to obtain the release of political prisoners – including prisoner
swaps
60. Many of my discussions touched
on the terrible situation of political prisoners in the Russian
Federation and Belarus, particularly those suffering from health
conditions that put them at acute risk. These include Vladimir Kara-Murza,
as well as others such as Alexandra Skochilenko, Igor Baryshnikov,
and Alexei Gorinov.
61. In my discussions with civil society, I was often asked to
highlight the need to secure the release of such political prisoners.
This would be important first and foremost for humanitarian purposes,
to secure the life and liberty of individuals who have shown exemplary
bravery in standing up for values that we hold most dear. Meanwhile,
such releases would also provide reassurance and encouragement to
the anti-war movement. It is widely felt that publicly and repeatedly
opposing the war will almost inevitably lead to imprisonment, the
release of prisoners would therefore raise morale among the anti-war
movement in general.
62. The Assembly should call on the Russian Federation to release
all political prisoners who have opposed the war of aggression against
Ukraine. It should call on member and observer States to deploy
diplomatic efforts to obtain these releases, prioritising individuals
who are suffering from health conditions. The Assembly should join
other international actors in calling on the United States of America
to recognise Mr Kara-Murza as a “wrongfully detained person” under
the Levinson Act, which would support an intensification of the
activities of the Government of the United States to secure Mr Kara-Murza’s
release.
63. The means to secure the release of political prisoners most
commonly raised by civil society was that of prisoner exchanges,
notably for captured spies. This proposal has also been made by
members and experts in the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights for the benefit of Vladimir Kara-Murza, in the context of hearings
for the report “Sanctions of persons on the ‘Kara-Murza list’”.
These proposals focused in particular on the Government of the United
Kingdom (as Mr Kara-Murza has dual Russian and UK citizenship).
The British
Government has since insisted that it will not consider prisoner
exchanges, on the grounds that they reward the taking of hostages.
I disagree wholeheartedly with this approach since it disregards
the life of UK citizens in dire need of such exchange.
64. Following the death of Alexei Navalny, it was widely reported
that a prisoner exchange had been imminent, involving Mr Navalny
and FSB hitman Vadim Krasikov, convicted by a German court for the
murder of an exiled Chechen in Berlin (and possibly also involving
two other US citizens held in the Russian Federation, journalist
Evan Gershkovich and veteran Paul Whelan). Discussions were reportedly
at an advanced stage between the governments of the USA, Germany,
and the Russian Federation. This demonstrates that such prisoner
exchanges are in principle possible.
65. The Assembly should call on member and observer States, particularly
the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Germany, to
urgently pursue prisoner exchanges in order to obtain the release
of political prisoners who have opposed the war of aggression against
Ukraine, prioritising Vladimir Kara-Murza and others who have serious
health conditions.
4.3. Better support
for cutting through the Russian information blockade
66. The Russian Government prevents
more of its people from opposing the war, by enforcing an information
blockade with a mixture of direct control of media and punitive
crackdowns on dissenting voices.
67. We should do everything we can to support those Russians who
are working to overcome this blockade and provide accurate information
to their compatriots. During the preparation of this report, I was
fortunate enough to meet with many such independent Russian journalists
and media outlets, operating from outside the country. They highlighted
the following problems in their work.
4.3.1. A hardening of
the stance of Western governments to hosting Russian media organisations
68. A particular example given
of a certain hardening of the stance towards hosting Russian media organisations
is the situation in Latvia. The Latvian Government has been praised
by Russian journalists for providing excellent support for independent
Russian media organisations to move to Riga and continue their work.
However, many interlocutors criticised the treatment of TV Rain
by the Latvian authorities. TV Rain has been labelled as an undesirable
organisation by the Russian authorities and it has been described
as an opposition media outlet. In December 2022 the channel was
heavily criticised in Latvia, after a single anchor referred to
Russian military personnel as “our troops” and called for “equipment
and basic provisions” for soldiers (he later denied that he was
calling for military material). On other occasions, the channel
did not provide subtitles in Latvian and it used a map graphic showing
Crimea to be part of the Russian Federation. After these incidents,
the Latvian authorities decided, in December 2022, to revoke TV
Rain’s licence citing “threats to national security and public order”
and the channel relocated its main headquarters to the Netherlands.
4.3.2. Issues around
relocating outside of the Russian Federation
69. Russian journalists and influencers
who openly question the war often need to leave the country in order to
avoid persecution. If they are to continue their work they must
be given the opportunity to live and work outside of the Russian
Federation. This issue is addressed more broadly further below.
4.3.3. The prioritisation
of Kremlin-controlled media outlets by large internet search engines
70. The Russian State enforces
its parallel information space in part by ensuring that most online
news searches do not return independent news sources. The two most
popular search engines in the Russian Federation are Yandex and
Google, which are reportedly responsible for 60% and 35% of web
searches respectively. Suppose that a Russian resident were to watch
a State-controlled television news report denying an atrocity by
the Russian military in Ukraine. Any subsequent internet search
on Yandex for information on the incident would be likely to prioritise
Kremlin-friendly sources – seemingly confirming the State television’s version
of events by multiple sources.
There is a difference
in opinion about how this control is achieved, with suggestions
that it is carried out by a mixture of banning independent news
websites (using the laws set out in this report), high spending
by the Kremlin on search engine optimisation for supportive news
outlets, and steps to ensure that only Kremlin-approved news outlets
can be listed in the “top news items” on the landing page of the
most popular search engine, Yandex. It is not possible to change
the search returns of Russian search engines to make them more objective.
However, it is possible to offer Russians greater access to alternatives, through
addressing the other issues set out below.
4.3.4. A shortage of
advertising revenue for independent media organisations
71. Independent Russian news outlets
face a dilemma with their funding model. It is difficult to receive subscription
payments from Russian residents, given that legal measures set out
in this report have criminalised payments to many independent news
organisations. In regard to advertising revenue, many independent
news websites can only be accessed using VPNs (Virtual Private Networks).
This leads to problems with the placement of advertising, as the
use of VPNs make the user more anonymous and appear to be situated
in a different country. For example, if the reader is living in
the Russian Federation but using a French VPN, this would affect
their IP profile, such that they may be provided with French adverts.
This random and untargeted advertising is not very attractive for
companies considering whether to pay for advertising on media sites.
Consequently, member States should be encouraged to support independent
media outlets financially in order to facilitate their ongoing efforts
to inform the Russian public in a factual and impartial way.
4.3.5. A lack of access
of many Russians to VPNs
72. VPNs allow users to establish
an internet connection outside of the country they are in, thus
allowing Russians to bypass the internet restrictions in place in
the Russian Federation. There are some limitations to the effectiveness
of VPNs, as Yandex still returns predominantly pro-Kremlin search
results even when with a VPN outside of the country, due to the
issues raised above. Nevertheless, greater access to VPNs would
allow Russians to access independent news websites which are blocked
within the Russian Federation (such as Meduza or TV Rain). It would
also facilitate free engagement with Google, Facebook, Instagram,
X, and other sources of independent information which are normally
banned or restricted in the Russian Federation.
4.3.6. Proliferation
of Russian social media influencers supporting the war
73. Since the start of the war
of aggression, “Z-bloggers” have received millions of followers
on sites such as Telegram. They enjoy enormous reach and influence,
helping to maintain the public’s support for the war and encourage
enlistment of soldiers. Pro-war influencers are often embedded with
Russian military units, can be rewarded with important roles relating
to government control of the information space, and are very well
paid for their propaganda. President Putin held an extended meeting
with key pro-war bloggers and reportedly told them, “The fight in
the information space is a battlefield. A crucial battlefield.”
It is not possible
to limit the reach of such influencers. However, member and observer
States should be called on to support Russian influencers who have
taken a stand against the war.
4.3.7. Breaking the
information blockade – proposed measures
74. Russians must be better informed
about the true cost of this war, its dire consequences for Ukranians
in particular but also the Russian population as a whole. They should
know of the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in
this unprovoked war, and the possibility for it to end. The Assembly
should therefore call on member and observer States to examine whether
any steps can be taken to provide the following:
- a welcoming environment for
hosting independent Russian news outlets, including their registration
as legal entities and ongoing regulation;
- facilitation of the entry and stay of independent Russian
journalists and influencers;
- any necessary financial support to independent Russian
news outlets;
- free and stable VPNs for the Russian population;
- financial and other support to Russian anti-war social
media influencers.
4.4. Greater practical
support for anti-war protesters within the Russian Federation and
Belarus
75. People who have been brave
enough to make their anti-war views public often need practical
support. This might include legal assistance to defend against criminal
charges, or even direct financial support for the individual or
their family, as the conviction may involve a fine, a loss of income
during imprisonment, and loss of employment.
76. The most effective way to provide such support would be to
provide additional resources to civil society organisations that
are based outside of the Russian Federation and Belarus, but which
provide legal and financial support to individuals within those
States.
4.5. Protection of
independent civil society organisations from international sanctions
77. Even prior to the start of
the war of aggression in February 2022, Belarusian and Russian civil
society organisations experienced significant barriers to their
operation, through the application of national legislation. Following
the start of the war of aggression, international businesses and
national governments also took a series of steps to withdraw goods
and services from Russian and Belarusian entities – including civil
society organisations. This had a negative effect on civil society’s
ability to work, as their operations were simultaneously undermined
by their own government, but also in part by foreign governments
and businesses.
78. The reported experience of OVD-Info provides an illustration
of this. In 2021 the Russian courts blocked OVD-Info’s website and
Yandex removed it from search results. Roskomnadzor, Russia’s media communications
and censorship agency, demanded that social media block OVD-Info’s
accounts, leading to the organisation being blocked on major Russian
social media platforms. Russian online payment platforms stopped
servicing donations for organisations whose websites had been blocked
or which had been designated as foreign agents. After the start
of the full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine, international businesses
also withdrew services, including web domain hosts and charity payment
platforms. The blocking of such services can not only prevent future
work, but also erase much previous work (such as the deletion of mailing
lists or lists of regular donors). Financial sanctions also restricted
Russian civil society organisations’ use of online payment platforms
such as Stripe.
79. According to OVD-Info, the combination of an intensified crackdown
by the Russian authorities, coupled with sanctions by international
actors, put Russian civil society in “an exceedingly challenging
position”.
80. Member and observer States are not in a position to directly
reverse the crackdown by the authorities of the Russian Federation
and Belarus. However, they are in a position to mitigate or avoid
the negative impact of international sanctions on independent Russian
and Belarusian civil society. The draft resolution includes some
recommendations on how to achieve this, to the extent possible.
4.6. Increased efforts
to hold the Russian Federation and Belarus to account at the United Nations
81. Following the exclusion of
the Russian Federation from the Council of Europe on 16 March 2022,
it became increasingly important for States to work through the
United Nations to hold the Russian Government to account for its
authoritarian treatment of its own people. The draft resolution
includes some concrete recommendations to this effect.
4.7. Greater practical
support for individuals fleeing the Russian Federation and Belarus
82. Many members of Russian and
Belarusian civil society were very positive about the record of
particular member States in welcoming those who had to flee the
Russian Federation and Belarus to avoid persecution. Many of these
conversations took place in Vilnius, and Lithuania was held up as
a particularly strong example. Participants also pointed to the
positive example of Iceland issuing an emergency passport to a Belarusian activist
who was in urgent need of foreign documentation in order to escape
imminent persecution.
83. However, members of civil society also stressed that, in general,
it was becoming increasingly difficult for people with anti-war
views fleeing the Russian Federation and Belarus to enter neighbouring
countries and settle there. Problems were highlighted in Council
of Europe member States regarding emergency entry, obtaining visas,
temporary and long-term residence permits and refugee status. It
is also important to note that Russians and Belarusians who have
left their home countries can find themselves under threat of extradition back
to their home State. For example, I wrote to the Kyrgyzstan authorities
about an alleged threat of extradition of Russian anti-war protesters
in July 2023; and reports have emerged of conscientious objectors being
deported from Hungary to the Russian Federation.
The risk that anti-war protesters
cannot leave the Russian Federation and Belarus to reside safely
in another country may well discourage anti-war speech in the Russian
Federation and Belarus.
84. Whilst it is vital that member States take the appropriate
steps to protect their national security, they are also duty-bound
to protect vulnerable individuals who have had to flee their countries
for standing up for our shared values. We cannot refuse sanctuary
to Russians and Belarusians who risk imprisonment, torture, or death
because they have stood up for these values. Recalling
Resolution 2446 (2022) “Reported cases of political prisoners in the Russian
Federation” and
Resolution
2499 (2023) “Addressing the specific challenges faced by the Belarusians
in exile”, the draft resolution proposes some concrete measures
in this respect.
5. Conclusion
85. Near the end of the speech
that led to his imprisonment, Vladimir Kara-Murza said the following:
These
are very dark times in Russia today. These are times when we have
hundreds of political prisoners. That number is only going to grow
now as people are arrested for taking part in anti-war demonstrations.
All the major opposition organisations have been crushed and destroyed;
all the remaining independent media outlets have been liquidated
by the authorities since the start of the war in Ukraine in the
past three weeks; every day, we hear of new arrests, detentions,
and new repressions against our friends. But we know, and we remember
that lesson, that night is darkest before the dawn. We know the
dawn will come. We know that there are many people in Russia who
share our views and our values.
86. A new dawn in the Russia and Belarus might not be next week,
next month, or even next year. But I do believe that a new dawn
will come and that we should prepare for this day. As Vladimir Kara-Murza
said, there are many people in the Russian Federation and, as I
might add, Belarus, who share our views and our values. We must
do what we can to help them.