1. Introduction
1. According to the United Nations,
more than 14,6 million people – 40% of the population in Ukraine
– will need humanitarian assistance this year. Supporting the displaced
people of Ukraine is as urgent as ever. The consequences of both
internal and external displacement must be carefully assessed to
design and implement immediate and long-term policy solutions and
support. European countries demonstrated their humanity and solidarity
in the aftermath of the brutal aggression by the Russian Federation,
protecting the lives of millions of displaced Ukrainians, in particular
children, women, and the elderly, and should continue to do so now.
2. The Assembly
Resolution
2448 (2022) “Humanitarian consequences and internal and external displacement
in connection with the aggression of the Russian Federation against
Ukraine” and the earlier
Resolution
2214 (2018) and
Recommendation
2126 (2018) “Humanitarian needs and rights of internally displaced
persons in Europe” provide guidance on some of the issues that need
to be addressed: for the internally-displaced Ukrainians these include
urgent access to housing, education, health care, and for those under
temporary protection in Europe and elsewhere they related to further
evaluation and development of existing arrangements.
3. The Council of Europe member States can lead the way. According
to United Nations (UN) data, the humanitarian response plan covering
the needs of internally displaced persons, as well as the immediate protection
needs for refugees, was only funded at 53% by the end of 2023. The
Assembly should raise awareness of the gap in provision and mobilise
support to ensure that displaced people of Ukraine, wherever they
are, are safe and protected.
4. This report sets the scene for future targeted actions. It
highlights the needs of specific groups of people: the internally
displaced persons, the persons who fled the war of aggression and
are now under temporary protection in Europe, and those who were
forcibly displaced or deported to the Russian Federation and Belarus.
The tragedy of displacement will leave a defining mark on the lives
of the people of Ukraine, and the international community should
do its utmost to ensure that they are protected in the face of adversity, wherever
they are now, and that they can participate in the reconstruction
and recovery of their country at the end of the war.
2. Current situation
2.1. Relevant
Council of Europe actions
5. On 16 April 2024, the Committee
on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons held an exchange of views
with the participation of Mr Bjørn Berge, Deputy Secretary General
of the Council of Europe, Mr Dmytro Lubinets (online), Commissioner
for Human Rights of the Ukrainian Parliament, and Dr Vilde Hernes,
Senior Researcher at the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional
Research (NIBR), Oslo Metropolitan University.
6. The Deputy Secretary General noted that since the beginning
of the Russian Federation's full-scale war of aggression, the Council
of Europe has done its utmost to support Ukraine, starting from
excluding Russia from the Organisation, to putting in place an action
plan for “Resilience recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine”. This
includes actions to ensure accountability, recognising that without
justice there can be no sustainable peace. Measures to ensure accountability
include the Council of Europe’s work to support the Ukrainian prosecutor
general in the investigation of mass human rights violations and
the setting up of a Register of Damage, which became fully operational
in April 2024, and which has already received more than a thousand claims.
This is the first, and necessary, step towards an international
compensation mechanism in which the Council of Europe is ready to
play its role, just as it supports the work of the Core Group in
its discussions on a new international tribunal on the crime of
aggression. Another essential element is the direct result of the Russian
Federation's ongoing aggression, which will continue to require
attention, as the situation on the ground changes, namely the support
for the displaced people of Ukraine. The violence has resulted in
millions of Ukrainians, especially women and children, being uprooted
from their homes as they sought safety.
7. For millions this has meant seeking refuge in other Council
of Europe member states. Much has been done to provide the support
that they need, but there was a great variety in reception capacities
and policies towards this group. The Deputy Secretary General recalled
the actions taken by the Special Representative on Migration and
Refugees (SRSG) to visit bordering countries with high numbers of
refugees and to help design follow up action including capacity
building measures, support in building resilient and long-term migration asylum
and receptions systems, and putting in place the professional psychological
and medical care support that is so often needed.
8. The Deputy Secretary General noted that the number of Ukrainians
displaced to other European countries was close to 4 million, in
addition to the 5 million internally displaced. Addressing the needs
of women victims of conflict-related violence is often carried out
by survival relief centres which are operating throughout Ukraine
with input from lawyers, psychologists, and social workers. The
aim is to create such centres in other countries to support Ukrainian
women there as well. The Council of Europe’s network of migration
focal points has also helped sharing good practices and workable
solutions on the ground, such as confidential counselling in Ukrainian
and Russian, training programmes for labour market integration,
simpler school enrolment, and free school supplies. Online platforms
have been established through which citizens can offer various kinds
of help. The network has also identified remaining and emerging
needs and challenges. These include overcrowded reception facilities
with the lack of staff and resources dedicated to Ukrainians; concerns
about human trafficking; difficulties in assessing the labour market
and finding employment that matches one’s education; integration
challenges, including school attendance, mastery of the language
and housing. Often one also sees a need for better mental health
provisions. There is a particular focus on children. The Deputy Secretary
General welcomed the new international coalition for the return
of Ukrainian children, co-chaired by Canada and Ukraine, as one
of the 10 points in President Zelenskyy's Peace plan.
9. At the Council of Europe's Reykjavik Summit in May 2023, European
leaders issued a specific declaration on the situation of the children
in Ukraine to ensure the rights and best interests of war-affected children.
The declaration sets out concrete recommendations to ensure the
protection of children in Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe. As a
result, the Organisation established the Consultation Group on Children
of Ukraine, which has been fully operational since December 2023.
It provides for a non-political co-operation platform that co-ordinates
action in the field between experts as well as between States, the
European Union, and relevant international organisations. The group
has so far set up 3 thematic dialogue groups of the topics it identified
as the most urgent, namely transnational procedures and co-operation,
guardianship, psychological support and trauma-informed care. The
dialogue groups will continue to meet later this year.
10. Amid the need to design strategies in the midst of a war,
one must never lose sight of the fact that we are dealing with individual
people who have suffered pain and loss in leaving their homes, local
communities and countries. The Deputy Secretary General stressed
the responsibility of host countries to provide adequate support
and care to the displaced persons, and noted that the strong political
will, coupled with technological and other communication means,
meant that good practices and information could be shared between
States in order to ensure the best responses.
2.2. Issues
raised by the Ukrainian authorities
11. At the same hearing of 16 April
2024, Mr Lubinets, the Ukrainian Parliament’s Commissioner for Human Rights,
stressed that the world was facing the largest migration process
since the Second World War. Millions of Ukrainians have been forced
to leave their homes and find refuge elsewhere. Since 24 February
2022, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), more than 5,9 million Ukrainian citizens have moved to
Europe, and more than 500,000 have moved outside Europe. In addition
to that, in Ukraine, there are about 5 million internally displaced
persons.
12. Mr Lubinets noted that the number of refugees may further
increase as the aggression continues. He asked that Europe be prepared
to continue to support Ukraine in this challenge. He highlighted
certain difficulties such as a lack of understanding of EU legislation
as well as problematic aspects of temporary protection, housing,
employment, education. There are some problematic issues. Housing
is reduced or not provided at all in some countries. The issue of
double taxation regarding Ukrainians who are under temporary protection
and continue to work remotely in Ukraine must be addressed. There
is no regulatory framework on several issues, such as the mutual
recognition of disability status and the disability degree or group.
13. The recognition of higher education degrees, including the
Ukrainian university diplomas, also needs to be addressed. Ukrainian
children do not have the access to education that they should. Many
countries do not have the capacity to provide enough classes taught
in Ukrainian language.
14. School age children have to adapt to an entirely new environment
which can be stressful for them. In addition, they are confronted
with language barriers, academic difference, and specifics of curricula.
They may have difficulties in assimilating education which has to
be carried out in two schools – the one of the host countries, and
the Ukrainian one. He referred to the example of attending school
in France, which is compulsory for all children living in France,
while having to study in a Ukrainian school in order to obtain the educational
certificates necessary for a future employment in Ukraine. Due to
the workload in foreign schools not all children can simultaneously
study remotely in Ukrainian schools, which leads to them missing
classes and missing the necessary curriculum for their future.
15. This issue can be addressed through the establishment of Ukrainian
schools abroad, or through “Saturday schools”, where children can
catch up on their Ukrainian education programme and learn the Ukrainian
language and the history of Ukraine, which are subjects that are
not available within the schools of their host countries.
16. He deplored that there were cases when Ukrainian children
were separated from their legal representatives in other countries.
At the end of 2023, Ukraine’s authorities had been informed about
the cases of 255 children who had been separated from their legal
representatives. He was leading 75 proceedings initiated at the
request of Ukrainian citizens, from whom 178 children had been removed
while abroad. Of these, the largest number of children had been
removed in Italy, Germany, Sweden, Poland, and the Netherlands.
He referred to the example of grandparents, who can move freely
with their grandchildren in Ukraine, but who are not considered
legal guardians in Europe, since the legislative base is different
This has led to the social services in some European countries filing
a court application to officially establish a guardian or custodian
from among the citizens of Ukraine on the territory in which these
children are staying.
17. In general, according to the analysis of the information received
from citizens appeals and responses from the competent authorities
on this issue, the most common reasons for the temporary removal
of children from their parents and other legal representatives by
social services are: lack of relevant documents from parents and
other legal representatives, difference in the legislation of Ukraine
and European Union countries, and a low level of material and living
conditions of parents with children. He stressed that evacuated
families often live in refugee centres, in poor conditions for their
children. Adequate social support is needed, therefore, for parents
with children to ensure fulfilments by parents of their childcare
responsibilities under the law of the EU member states.
18. He spoke about the challenges in obtaining Ukrainian documents
in the European Union. Many Ukrainians left abroad in a hurry, with
the documents they had on them. After nearly two years in another country
there is a need to renew documents. The State Immigration Service
of Ukraine has opened several branches in Warsaw, Krakow, Gdansk,
Wroclaw, Istanbul, Prague, Bratislava, Milan, Valencia, Madrid,
Berlin, Cologne and Munich. This might not be enough, since not
all Ukrainians have the opportunity to get to these cities. The
Ombudsman’s office wants to protect the rights of Ukrainians abroad.
It will also conduct monitoring visits to places of temporary residence
of Ukrainians to assess the human rights situation there.
19. Assistance of other countries is sometimes needed. Mr Lubinets
spoke about the need to develop an agreed co-operation mechanism,
based on which people with Ukrainian documents evacuating from the temporarily
occupied territories will be allowed to cross checkpoints of other
countries, after having been obliged to travel through the territory
of the Russian Federation. He called on the EU countries to respect
the rights of those, who suffered from war.
20. Given the challenges he had mentioned, he appealed to the
Assembly members to join forces and adapt their legislation to allow
for an increase in the number of classes with Ukrainian language
instruction and to secure the recognition of Ukrainian diplomas
in order to improve the access of Ukrainian citizens to their labour market.
In addition, he stressed the need for mutual recognition of the
disability status and disability degree of Ukrainians, who are now
in Europe.
21. He also mentioned the need to regulate the issue of double
taxation for Ukrainian citizens. People fled their homes because
of the shelling and violence. Ukraine must first stop the Russian
aggression. This will help Ukraine’s citizens return to Ukraine.
He called upon Council of Europe member States to continue supporting Ukraine,
and President of Ukraine’s peace plan, in particular point 4 on
the return of all prisoners of war and deported people; to assist
Ukraine in restoring justice and punishing those responsible for
crimes; to participate in the rehabilitation of war victims, both
civilian and military. One cannot remain indifferent, he stressed. Ukraine’s
people needed this support now. He concluded by thanking European
countries for helping Ukraine and called to join forces in standing
against the Russian aggression, for democratic values.
22. On 18 April 2024, the Ukrainian Delegation of the Parliamentary
Assembly organised a round table to discuss the situation of the
“Victims of Enforced Disappearances: how Russia captures Ukrainian
civilians and violates international law”. The Assembly President,
Mr Theodoros Rousopoulos, expressed his strong support to the victims
and called for increased efforts to help Ukraine stand strong in
the face of the challenges brought by the Russian Federation’s war
of aggression. As he said at the opening of the April part-session,
Ukraine is now in its third year of its brave fight against the
brutal Russian aggression, which had increasingly targeted, in recent
weeks, critical civilian infrastructure, with no care for international
law governing conflicts, nor for human life. “Ukraine is fighting
this war not just for its own freedom and sovereignty but for the
freedom of all of us. It is fighting for the values of human rights,
democracy and the rule of law, which are the cornerstone and the
pride of our European continent. We must not weaken our resolve
to stand by Ukraine. We must not hesitate, at this critical moment,
in supporting Ukraine”, he said. He called on all European countries
to double and triple their efforts to allow Ukraine to repel the
invader, regain control over its illegally occupied territories and
to restore peace based on justice throughout its land. During the
round table, family members of victims of enforced disappearances
made poignant statements about the tragedy their families went through
and called for Europe’s support to help defend Ukraine and its people.
23. On 29 May 2024, the Committee on Migration, Refugees and
Displaced Persons held an exchange of views with Mr Pavlo Frolov,
Member of the Verhovna Rada of Ukraine and Chair of the Special
Commission on the protection of property and non-property rights
of internally displaced and other persons affected by the armed
aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. He underlined
that by the end of May, more than 4 million people inside Ukraine
were in need of daily subsistence support, but that only one million
received such support. Moreover, internally displaced persons were
living on about €50-70 per month, which is not sufficient to rent
apartments in a new place of residence. The only choices left were
to seek refuge abroad or to accept living in the occupied territories,
putting their lives in danger. He called upon the Council of Europe member
States to continue their support and asked for sufficient funding
to be made available to all internally displaced persons in Ukraine.
3. Member States’ solidarity with Ukraine
in meeting the needs of displaced people
3.1. The fate of internally displaced persons:
the need to meet the humanitarian relief targets
24. According to the UN Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement, Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs) are described as “persons or groups of persons who have been
forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual
residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the
effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations
of human rights or natural or humanmade disasters, and who have not
crossed an internationally recognized state border.”
25. The Guiding Principles affirm that States have the primary
responsibility to prevent displacement, to protect and assist internally
displaced persons under their jurisdiction and to provide durable
solutions to their situation. In order to fulfil this responsibility,
States need to have domestic normative and policy frameworks in place,
with the necessary implementing structures and processes, so that
they can effectively respond to the specific needs and vulnerabilities
of internally displaced persons.
26. In its
Resolution
2214 (2018) and
Recommendation
2126 (2018) “Humanitarian needs and rights of internally displaced
persons in Europe”, the Assembly “welcoming the enormous efforts
in favour of IDPs persons undertaken by the member States affected
by armed conflicts or other causes of forced displacement, ... invites
those States to regularly assess and make public the humanitarian
needs of their IDPs, possibly together with the United Nations,
the European Union and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
in particular regarding the needs of IDPs in terms of housing, education,
health care…”.
27. When Ukraine was brutally aggressed by the Russian Federation,
it rapidly became clear that the fate of millions of people in Ukraine,
including children, was at stake. The Assembly is deeply saddened
by the tragic deaths of over 500 children and the 1195 wounded.
Nearly 20 000 children have been
deported or forcibly displaced by the Russian Federation to the
Russian Federation or to the occupied territories in Ukraine, as
underscored by the Assembly in its
Resolution 2495 (2023) and
Recommendation
2253 (2023) “Deportations and forcible transfers of Ukrainian children
and other civilians to the Russian Federation or to temporarily
occupied Ukrainian territories: create conditions for their safe
return, stop these crimes and punish the perpetrators”.
28. The Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons,
in its opinion on the report on the “Situation of the children of
Ukraine”,
stressed that some children have
today found refuge in Europe, but many others are still in Ukraine,
some of which have been internally displaced. Ukraine needs urgent
and sufficient support to be able to meet their needs.
29. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (UN OCHA) has stressed the hardship of those internally
displaced persons who reside outside collective accommodation sites,
particularly in rural areas across Ukraine, and who are facing problems
in accessing services and assistance. Displaced people may have
been forced to move multiple times, losing their houses and livelihoods,
and relying solely on humanitarian assistance. As displacement becomes
prolonged, most needs have become more prevalent over time.
30. Displaced people have identified financial support and reconstruction
materials as the most prominent needs. The findings from the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) (Displacement Tracking Matrix, General
Population Surveys) indicate that women reported higher needs across
all sectors after being displaced for over a year. People living
in collective sites do not have access to alternative adequate housing solutions
and continue to face significant protection risks, notably due to
overcrowding, eviction risks, as well as sexual abuse and exploitation,
and other forms of gender-based violence. Other risks include limited
access to essential services, socio-economic vulnerability, and
different types of physical and mental harm. Risks in collective
sites are driven by inadequate living conditions and/or sub-standard
site management, with most sites not meeting intersectoral minimum
guidelines. This situation is exacerbated by the dispersed nature
of the more than 2 500 sites across the country, bringing significant
challenges for humanitarian relief organisations in terms of logistical
capacity and allocation of resources. Given the short-term nature
of assistance and that financial support for such initiatives is
gradually decreasing as the crisis becomes protracted, the most
vulnerable people are at risk of resorting to negative coping mechanisms
should their daily needs not be met in collective sites.
31. European countries demonstrated their solidarity toward Ukraine
immediately after 24 February 2022. As stressed by Nadia Hashimi,
“refugees didn’t just escape a place. They had to escape a thousand
memories until they’d put enough time and distance between them
and their misery to wake to a better day.”
Council of Europe
member States deployed great efforts to welcome peoples of Ukraine.
The first steps taken in Europe concerned the protection of children.
32. I should like to recall that in international and non-international
armed conflicts, children are entitled to special respect and protection,
including access to education.
In international armed conflicts,
parties to the conflict must take the necessary measures to ensure
that children under 15 who are orphaned or separated from their
families as a result of the armed conflict are not left to their
own resources and that their education is facilitated in all circumstances.
Moreover, in the case
of a justified evacuation, education – including religious and moral
education, as his(her) parents desire – must be provided to the
child while he or she is away, with the greatest possible continuity.
These provisions are
applicable to displaced children as well as highlighted by the Assembly
members during the meeting of the
ad
hoc committee of the Bureau on the “Situation of the
children of Ukraine” held in Paris on 15 December 2023.
33. Increased humanitarian support to internally displaced children
in Ukraine should be an absolute priority.
The
European Union’s contribution to humanitarian support to Ukraine
is most welcome. On 20 March 2024, the European Commission has paid
the first €4,5 billion of support under the European Union’s new
Ukraine Facility. This payment will ensure that Ukraine can continue
paying salaries, pensions, and providing basic public services,
so that the country can focus its effort on winning the war. Through
this exceptional bridge financing, the European Commission has provided
Ukraine with immediate financial support while the conditions of
the Facility are being put in place.
”
34. In its
Resolution
2448 (2022) “Humanitarian consequences and internal and external
displacement in connection with the aggression of the Russian Federation
against Ukraine”, the Assembly recalled that the situation of children
required specific measures, based on the principle of the best interests
of the child. This concerned
inter alia internally
displaced children affected by the war.
In January 2024, the Assembly adopted
Resolution 2529 (2024) and
Recommendation
2265 (2024) “Situation of the children of Ukraine”. No Ukrainian child
has been spared by the war. The Assembly underscored that all Ukrainian
children have the right to enjoy the rights and freedoms enshrined
in relevant international human rights instruments and that the
rights and best interests of the child must prevail in decision
making concerning them.
35. Council of Europe member States should continue supporting
Ukraine. According to the November 2023 UN data, the humanitarian
response plan was only funded at 53%. On 15 January 2024, the United
Nations and partners asked donors for a combined US$4.2 billion
to support war-affected communities in Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees
and their host communities in the region throughout 2024. The Ukraine’s
specific action plan addressing the needs of internally displaced
persons should be instrumental in meeting the needs of persons displaced
inside Ukraine.
36. As underscored by UN OCHA, despite extreme access challenges,
especially to areas occupied by the Russian Federation, aid workers
reached nearly 11 million people in Ukraine in 2023, with the support
of the international donor community. By the end of 2023, it was
estimated that 1,5 million girls and 1,4 million boys needed humanitarian
support in Ukraine. Humanitarian organisations made every effort
to increase assistance in the front-line communities, including
through 105 inter-agency convoys, complementing the government’s response
and the efforts of volunteers, civil society organisations and other
local groups. Their efforts must be acknowledged and further help
to enable their operations is needed.
37. Council of Europe Member States should continue providing
support for internally displaced persons in Ukraine through its
co-operation programmes set up by the Congress of Local and regional
Authorities, co-operation through the Intercultural cities programme
of the Council of Europe and other local democracy initiatives.
38. Financial assistance to enable access to housing or to help
start a business in Ukraine, including with microfinancing or low
interest rates credit lines, needs to be further supported. Following
Ukraine’s accession to the Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB)
in July 2023, the CEB can provide grant funds for emergency assistance
and support specific actions in Ukraine. In July 2023 the CEB approved
its first grant for a project on the Ukrainian territory. The €2
million grant finances repairs to homes that have been damaged by the
war. The grant aims to improve the living conditions of 500 displaced
and vulnerable households, including single-parent families, the
elderly and persons with disabilities.
39. At the end of 2023, grants approved by the CEB in response
to the Ukrainian crisis, including support to neighbouring countries,
stood at €9.6 million. This amount is expected to continue to increase,
thanks to the generous support of the Bank’s shareholders. During
2023, the Bank mobilised resources for its Ukraine Solidarity Fund,
set up the year before by Ireland, receiving a total of €3 million
from the Czechia, Germany and Lithuania. In addition to grants,
the CEB is committed to using loans to support Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction
and long-term social development, which is one the three overarching
goals of the Bank’s Strategic Framework 2023-2027. In November 2023,
the CEB approved a €100 million loan to Ukraine’s Ministry of Health
for the restoration of health infrastructure damaged by the war.
The CEB loan is part of the Health Enhancement and Life-Saving (HEAL)
project, a US$ 500 million framework operation developed by the
World Bank in collaboration with the Ukrainian authorities. Finally,
in October 2023, the CEB, the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the World
Bank signed a Memorandum of Intent to harmonise procurement practices
for public sector investment financed by multilateral development
banks in Ukraine.
3.2. The European Union Temporary Protection
Directive (TPD) 2001/55/EC
40. The European Union Temporary
Protection Directive (TPD) 2001/55/EC is being applied with the
aim of providing immediate protection and basic standards of treatment
to refugees, including access to housing, labour market, and social
and health services.
41. On 15 December 2023, during the meeting of the ad hoc Committee of the Bureau on
the situation of the children of Ukraine, Ms Anna Schmidt, Policy
Officer, European Commission, DG Migration and Home Affairs, presented
the TPD. She stressed that the European Union provided temporary
protection to some 4.2 million officially registered Ukrainians
across the EU member States with about half of them in Germany and
Poland. One third of those were children. The estimate was that
one fifth of the number of children that had lived in Ukraine before
the war now lived in the EU. The temporary protection is limited
in time (until spring 2025 at this stage). This includes children
who were evacuated from Ukrainian institutions, namely around 5 600
who came in groups, including sometimes children with disabilities.
Member States have their own legislation to give meaning to the
TPD. That means that there is some variation in its application
across the European Union. The European Union has set up a “solidarity
platform”, essential for organising, co-ordinating and harmonising
the EU response across the member States. Co-operation with other
partners, such as the UNHCR, the UNICEF and the Ukrainian authorities
has been strengthened, with regular meetings. These partnerships
have been essential. Civil society organisations also played an
important role in that process.
42. The European Union issued at number of operative guidelines
on the implementation of the TPD, for instance, specifically on
how to access education, on the specific challenges related to the
reception and care of children fleeing from Ukraine, on the recognition
of guardianship decisions. All these guidelines are accessible online.
Ms Schmidt referred to the March 2023 communication of the European
Commission on one-year temporary protection, a document which was
made available for the meeting. The communication gave an overview
of measures taken, with a specific section on children. It underscored
the importance of document recognition, as a first step: recognition
of children’s registration documents and the recognition of Ukrainian
guardianship arrangements by the EU member States, of medical and
disability certificates; of education certification and diploma,
which will all have an immediate impact on children’s integration
in European education systems. The European Union enhanced co-operation
with the Ukrainian authorities on the recognition of guardianship
decisions. Co-operation with Ukrainian parents and legal guardians
will also allow tracing of missing children.
43. Guardianship arrangements may change over time. For instance,
parents could be divorced. Custody arrangements in separated families
would need to be determined either by administrative decisions or
through courts. The co-operation at EU level helps exchange best
practices across member States. Ms Schmidt referred to the issue
of institutionalisation in relation to children who arrive from
Ukrainian institutions as groups. Ensuring quality accommodation
and care in line with the European standards for these children
was a challenge. Some 5 000 children from institutions were hosted
in Poland. The European Union had worked very closely with the Ukrainian
authority to identify the best solutions. A pilot project was set
up between Ukraine and UNICEF on splitting the broader groups and
finding appropriate lodging and care opportunities, also in the context
of the enlargement report on Ukraine and the future accession talks.
44. The TPD provided for immediate access to State education system
at primary and secondary level for Ukrainian children. The European
Union issued policy guidance to promote peer learning across European Union.
Member States have done different things: whether it is the employment
of Ukrainian assistant teachers, or whether it is about trying to
facilitate the access of qualified Ukrainian teachers into their
national systems; or whether it is about trying to combine the learning
that takes place still online based on the Ukrainian curriculum
with the curriculum in that given member State, without overburdening
the child. A practical manual has been published by the European
Commission together with the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine,
citing arrangement for co-operation in education that has been followed
up by the member States. The focus is on the mutual recognition
of academic qualifications and participation in the EU twinning
and Eurydice networks. This should also help provide guidelines
to Ukrainian schools on how to assess learning outcomes of school
attendance abroad upon return, which is also very important. The
core of this work should focus on child well-being. The learning
should become very practical, helping children recover after the
trauma they experienced. Finally, member States will also work more
intensely on the reception of specifically unaccompanied children,
including separated children arriving from Ukraine. Improving reception
capacities in the European Union for unaccompanied migrant children
must be a priority, Ms Schmidt concluded.
45. On 11 April 2024, the Council of Europe, through its programme
on Human Rights Education for Legal Professionals (HELP) held a
seminar on the application of the TPD.
Participants discussed its implementation
and the launch of a new HELP course on Temporary Protection in the
European Union. The information course aimed to increase the knowledge
of legal professionals and other relevant stakeholders on the practical
application of the TPD.
3.2.1. Discrepancies
in the implementation of the EU Temporary Protection Directive
46. On 16 April 2024, Dr Vilde
Hernes, Senior Researcher at the Norwegian Institute for Urban and
Regional Research (NIBR), Oslo Metropolitan University, presented,
at the meeting of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced
Persons, her comparative report on governance and policy changes
during times of high influxes of protection seekers, assessing various
governments’ approaches and solutions, including in the case of
displaced Ukrainians.
Dr Hernes noted that many Ukrainians
live without knowing if they will return to Ukraine, asking difficult
questions. In Europe, mayors were wondering if they should upscale
their general services to be able to cater for the needs of persons
under temporary protection in their cities. Be it at EU level, at
the national, local or personal levels for each individual, choices
have to be made under a high degree of uncertainty and instability.
47. The initial narrative has been that Europe has met this forced
migration flow with unified response, most importantly by implementing
the TPD or other kinds of national legislation largely mirroring
the TPD for non-EU countries. At the beginning, there has been indeed
a more unified response, for example, as regards the type of protection
permits for the Ukrainians, compared to for example in 2015-2016,
when one saw a European race to the bottom in national integration
and asylum policy. Politicians considered that this would prevent making
Europe an attractive destination.
48. Not all European countries are covered by the TPD, however.
Moreover, the TPD listed minimum requirements and it is up to each
EU country to transpose those minimum requirements into the national context.
In the study she carried out, of the rights and restrictions for
Ukrainian refugees in eight European countries, there were very
large differences in overall reception.
49. Dr Hernes gave some specific examples: some countries have
provided Ukrainians with more liberal accommodation and settlement
policies and practices than those available for other groups of
protection-seekers. There have been more liberal rules to settle
wherever one would choose, instead of hard restrictions on free
settlement. There have been financial grants to private hosts to
accommodate Ukrainian refugees. Because of the temporary perspective
of their stay, however, there were generally more restrictive rights
to integration measures.
50. European countries differ when it comes to whether Ukrainian
refugees have rights and obligations to regular integration measures.
In Denmark, and partly in Sweden and Finland, the Ukrainian refugees
get access to language training and integration programmes. In other
parts of Sweden, Poland, Germany, and Austria, they do not have
these rights as other people who are granted protection. Another
example was that in the countries studied, there were very different
rules concerning the financial and public assistance that this group
could get. The study identified four different solutions. In the
UK and Germany displaced persons from Ukraine were included into
the regular social benefits system, similar to the general population.
In Denmark and Norway, Ukrainian refugees get similar rights as
other refugees to financial benefits. In Sweden, Austria and in
Finland (for the first year), Ukrainian refugees continue benefiting
from a financial system equal to that available for other asylum
seekers. In Poland, there is a variety of different customised arrangements.
The main point was that there were very different solutions for
this group and in some countries Ukrainian refugees got substantially
lower benefits, than other groups which were granted protection.
51. The study showed that there were substantial differences in
rights and restrictions for this group across European countries,
contesting the impression of this overall unified resolution. There
was a mixture of both more liberal and more restrictive policies
towards this group. The introduction of the TPD was in itself an easement
of requirement, because it made the decision making of granting
the protection follow a shorter and less intensive path, as it did
not require an individual assessment.
52. There were examples of more liberal policies with this group
and more flexibility in terms of accommodation and settlement, the
possibility for temporary return to Ukraine, and the rapid access
to the labour market. There were also examples of displaced persons
from Ukraine having more restricted rights, compared to other groups.
That was related to integration measures, including, in some cases,
financial assistance. In Sweden, they even had fewer health care
rights. The temporary permit for this group does not qualify as
residence time that may be considered for getting permanent residency,
which is a clear restriction compared to other permits.
53. At this stage one does not know, if the Ukrainians who have
fled will be in the European Union for three months, for three years
or forever. At the EU level, the collective protection for displaced
persons from Ukraine was a temporary solution. Discussions were
held in the EU about the prolongation of the TPD. It is not yet
clear if there will be a unified solution concerning the type of
permits. In future, one needs to see how the implementation at national
level will evolve, concerning the rights and restrictions for this
group. Will the rights for displaced person from Ukraine be expanded
or restricted and how will that play out in different countries? One
needs to be weary of the risk of a new “race to the bottom” in terms
of rights if the war drags on for a long time.
54. Difficult dilemmas had to be faced, namely on how to balance
the good conditions for integration and reception, and the host
countries’ challenge of becoming an attractive destination country,
when the reception capacities were perceived as being stretched
to the limits already. The second dilemma related to the question of
differential treatment between Ukrainian refugees and other groups
that were granted protection. On one hand, there has been criticism
that Ukrainians had been favoured, and that they had been welcomed
better than other groups of protection seekers, and, on the other
hand, the studies have shown that Ukrainian refugees in many countries
got fewer rights than those granted protection. Finally, in many
countries, Ukrainian refugees could be an important source of much
needed labour force.
55. Governments must take measures to meet the needs of municipalities
that welcomed Ukrainian refugees. Provision of services requires
funding at local level, which cannot be assured, given that the municipalities
do not know if the Ukrainian refugees will stay and for how long,
or if they will go back to Ukraine and when. Municipalities do not
know if they should upscale their general services, hire doctors,
teachers, etc. They cannot do this unless there is some certainty
about the future of protection seekers. This can be very costly
for municipalities.
56. Liberal and flexible rules are often viewed in a very positive
light, but they could also lead to less control and in many cases
to fewer rights in public assistance. Moreover, the displaced people
from Ukraine may be at high risk of labour market exploitation in
the long run. Although Ukraine may be a resource to the local labour markets
in need of labour, there is not always a match between the qualifications
the Ukrainians arrive with and the actual needs in the local labour
market, where they are residing temporarily. She suggested that
it would be good to help Ukrainians invest in upscaling their qualifications
and learning the local language, despite this insecure status. She
stressed that those, who have fled abruptly, overnight, had their
lives turned upside down.
57. Although the study found that many Ukrainians were eager to
get some normality in their lives, the insecurity about their stay
in the host country may challenge their motivation to integrate
both socially, and in the labour market. In Norway, for instance,
many Ukrainians have higher education. Should they be doing any kind
of job or should they actually invest in learning the language and
getting a relevant job matching their competency? Next, parents
worried about their children, about their education. They have to
decide whether to have children follow only the Ukrainian curricula
or study in local schools of host countries. Ukrainian children followed
the Norwegian schools during the day and Ukrainian schools (sometimes
online), in the evening, which put a lot of pressure on children.
Many said they needed to create a stable and safe environment for
their children, bearing in mind these challenges.
58. It was important to focus on the effects of living under the
high degree of uncertainty that displaced people from Ukraine experienced.
This was very difficult for children, who saw their lives being
put “on hold”. She stressed there were no “quick fix” solutions.
There were real dilemmas with often conflicting goals. Political and
individual choices have to be made in that context of uncertainty.
Conflicting goals must be discussed and assessed critically and
openly to identify the best suited solutions for all.
3.2.2. Technical
co-operation facilitated by the Consultation Group on the Children
of Ukraine
59. The Council of Europe Consultation
Group on the Children of Ukraine (CGU) held its first meeting in Strasbourg
on 30 November and 1 December 2023, bringing together over 85 participants
(in person and online) to discuss ways to effectively protect the
rights of millions of Ukrainian children residing in Council of Europe
member States, who have been forced to flee their homeland since
the start of Russia’s war of aggression.
60. The CGU was set up to ensure practical implementation of the
2023 Reykjavík Declaration, to facilitate dialogue and the exchange
of information, in a multilateral setting, on applicable legal standards
and policies regarding Ukrainian children residing in Council of
Europe member States. The CGU’s focus will be on developing a common
understanding of some of the most important legal and policy issues
member States are dealing with as a result of the arrival of Ukrainian
children on their territories.
61. Composed of national experts responsible for decision making
and co-ordination of issues related to children of Ukraine appointed
by member States, along with focal points from the European Union,
other key international organisations, and European and Ukrainian
NGOs, the group will identify promising practices and develop guidance for
States and other actors in the field to address some of the concerns
by States in upholding the rights of the children of Ukraine.
62. The first meeting was dedicated to the reception, registration
and care of unaccompanied and separated children in member States,
including those from alternative care facilities. The discussions
focused on issues of jurisdiction and admissible law, guardianship,
as well as the psychological support and trauma-informed care provided
to children affected by war, and/or victims of war. The group also
discussed a roadmap that will guide its work until the end of its
mandate on 31 July 2025.
63. As the Deputy Secretary General, Bjorn Berge, stressed during
committee meeting on 16 April 2024, an additional thematic mix may
also be discussed by the CGU, including access to education for
children of Ukraine in other member States. So far, discussions
have revealed varying practises among member States for schooling
of Ukrainian children but also with different models and innovative
approaches, such as training of Ukrainian teachers, both to integrate
into the host country's education system, as well as to help Ukrainian children
remain connected to their identity, language, and culture.
64. The group will undertake a mapping exercise documenting national
practices and challenges to further identify specific needs and
guide member States to better protection of Ukrainian children's
right to education. The group closely follows the reform of the
Ukrainian childcare protection system, working with others at the national
and international levels. It seeks to provide updates on the progress,
challenges, and next steps on the complex task of the de-institutionalising
the childcare system. This step-by-step approach has already yielded
many good results, notably on effective co-ordination between different
ministries. Many issues, however, remain to be addressed. The current
focus of work has now shifted to co-ordination and capacity building
at the regional level to ensure a gradual, safe, and human rights-based
transition towards family-based alternative care.
3.2.3. The
role of Ukrainian diaspora
65. The Ukrainian diaspora played
a major role in organising the relief work to support the families
of those who stayed in Ukraine to defend the country. The Assembly
noted the importance of diaspora in its
Resolution 2388 (2021) and
Recommendation
2207 (2021) “For a European policy on diasporas”. Many recommendations listed
are valid today. The Assembly underscored that diasporas and their
associations make a positive contribution to the development of
countries of residence and countries of origin by enriching cultural
diversity and building dynamic and constructive relations for the
purposes of economic and cultural exchange and co-development. Strengthening
diaspora policies represents a decisive opportunity for economic,
social and cultural development of both countries of residence and
origin, and a greater cohesion and inclusiveness in society. Countries
can benefit greatly from what diasporas can offer if they engage
with them, examine and respond to their needs, include them in decision
making and co-operate with them in formulating diaspora-oriented
policies. The Council of Europe can play a major role in the process,
bringing together the multiple actors that shape national diaspora
policies, including parliaments, governments, diaspora associations, NGOs,
media and research organisations.
4. Persons forcibly displaced or deported
to the Russian Federation and Belarus: the need to follow the international
humanitarian law provisions
66. Forced displacement is an involuntary
or coerced movement of a person or people away from their home or
home region. The International Humanitarian Law (IHL) expressly
prohibits parties to an armed conflict from forcibly displacing
civilians in both international and non-international armed conflicts,
unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military
reasons so demand.
Like other rules of IHL that
can prevent displacement from occurring in the first place, this
prohibition also protects civilians against the risk of secondary
displacement. Furthermore, internally displaced persons have a right
to voluntary return in safety to their homes or places of habitual
residence as soon as the reasons for their displacement cease to
exist.
67. In 2023, the Assembly reiterated its call to take urgent measures
to liberate persons forcible displaced, as stressed in its
Resolution 2495 (2023) and
Recommendation
2253 (2023) “Deportations and forcible transfers of Ukrainian children
and other civilians to the Russian Federation or to temporarily
occupied Ukrainian territories: create conditions for their safe
return, stop these crimes and punish the perpetrators”.
68. The Assembly, having been informed of cases of forcible transfer
of Ukrainian children from the occupied territories to the Russian
Federation and Belarus, called upon the Russian Federation to immediately
halt these transfers. The Assembly underscored that the forcible
transfer of children from one group to another group, with the intention
to destroy, totally or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious
group is considered as a crime of genocide under Article 2, paragraph
(e), of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide.
69. On 15 December 2023, the Bureau’s ad
hoc committee set up to assess the situation of children
of Ukraine, expressed particular concern about the fate of children
forcibly transferred and deported to the temporarily occupied territories
of Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and Belarus. By January 2024,
the “Children of War” platform run by the Ukrainian Government stated
that it has collected information on more than 19 546 children who
had been signalled to the platform as having been deported or forcibly
transferred from various locations, and only 388 of whom had returned
home.
70. On 13 March 2024, the European Parliament discussed with the
Council and the European Commission how to address the urgent concerns
surrounding Ukrainian children forcibly deported to Russia. Since
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine began in February 2022,
international organisations have documented a wide range of serious
human rights violations affecting children. Reports of children
forcibly deported or displaced by Russian authorities, combined
in many cases with them being subjected to re-education programmes
and forced adoptions, have raised great concern.
71. The danger of the russification processes put in place by
the Russian Federation that illegally occupy the territory of the
neighbouring Ukraine, will be further assessed in the report on
“Countering the erasure of cultural identity in war and peace” (Rapporteur:
Ms Yevheniia Kravchuk, Ukraine, ALDE).
Co-operation between various existing
parties and mechanisms is needed to pool efforts for the return
of children as soon as possible.
5. Prisoners of war: more efforts are
needed to negotiate prisoners’ release
72. As reported on 8 February 2024,
33 Ukrainian soldiers were condemned to long-term sentences in a penal
colony after unlawful trials. The captured Ukrainian soldiers stood
accused of grave crimes under the Russian Criminal Code, but Russia’s
official and sparse description of the soldiers’ alleged “war crimes” suggests
they have been prosecuted for merely taking part in the war as part
of the Ukrainian armed forces. This sentencing by the so-called
“supreme court” of the “Luhansk People’s Republic” in Russian-occupied Luhansk
is unlawful under international humanitarian and human rights law
as it has not met the minimum international standards of fairness.
73. The Russian Federation must refrain from taking measures that
run counter to the Geneva Conventions I-IV and their Additional
Protocols. The Assembly endorses the plea to allow for the exchange
of prisoners of war to prevent further violence. The killings by
the Russian Federation’s military of unarmed Ukrainian prisoners
of war in Avdiivka and the village of Vesele demonstrated the most
cruel and inhuman behaviour by the Russian Federation’s army and
its sub-contracted military groups. The blatant disregard by the
Russian Federation of the IHL should not be overlooked by the international
community.
74. Noting the Assembly members’
Written Declaration No. 778 of 27 June 2023 (
Doc.
15790), “Call on the International Committee of the Red Cross
and the international community to demand that the Russian Federation
fully complies with the international humanitarian law concerning
the Ukrainian prisoners of war”, States should remind the Russian
Federation that the rules and customs of war agreed upon in the
codified international humanitarian law must be respected by all
to ensure that atrocities committed in times of war in the past
are not reproduced. The Assembly should, therefore, carefully consider
the situation of prisoners of war. This issue must be addressed
in its future reports.
6. Future actions
75. Ukraine will have to face conflicting
interests and dilemmas. Different stakeholders will have different interests.
Ukrainian society can remain divided as to how to approach the situation
of people who are now displaced, depending on whom they are talking
about and where displaced persons are now. One set of considerations
could be related to the need to know where the Ukrainians are now.
76. The situation is quite difficult as regards the temporary
protection given to men that can be mobilised to defend the country.
A new law on mobilisation has been adopted in Ukraine, it will come
into force in May 2024. It is assumed that according to the new
rules, the Armed Forces of Ukraine can mobilise up to 500 000 people, but
the exact number of those subject to mobilisation is not spelled
out in the law. Following the adoption of the new law on mobilisation,
Ukrainians of military age are banned from obtaining passports at
consular offices outside the country – they will have to return
to Ukraine for documents.
7. Conclusion
77. Ukraine must be given all the
support necessary to defend itself. Deep societal transformations
will be needed to help build strong partnership between those who
defend Ukraine and those who are abroad under temporary protection.
According to Kristin Sandvik, “the refugee crisis is a humanitarian
challenge that must be collectively owned and collectively solved,
whether we are talking about legal frameworks, institutional responses
or funding. By crafting new humanitarian solutions to this crisis,
critical contributions can be made to international peace and stability.”
78. The tragedy of displacement will leave a definite mark on
the lives of people of Ukraine. The international community should
do its utmost to ensure that the peoples of Ukraine are helped to
strive in the face of adversity wherever they are now, and that
they have the capacity to rebuild Ukraine as soon as this war ends.
79. To rebuild itself, Ukraine will need to be supported in future.
The Assembly
Resolution
2539 (2024) and
Recommendation
2271 (2024) “Support for the reconstruction of Ukraine”, show that
the Council of Europe has led the way in expressing its solidarity
with Ukraine and its people, condemning the Russian Federation’s
war of aggression against Ukraine, and supporting the exclusion
of the Russian Federation from the Organisation. The Council of
Europe has also shown leadership in setting up the Register of Damage
Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine.
Its member States should now play a significant role in supporting
the reconstruction efforts in Ukraine.
80. To conclude, I recall a Warsan Shire poem that says: “No one
puts their children in a boat unless the water is safer than the
land they live on”.
This
is definitely true for people fleeing wars. The modern world is failing
in protecting people, it fails in building peaceful coexistence
of modern nations, in stopping bloodshed caused by territorial disputes
or disputes between those, who cling to the past hegemony against
the modern societies that aspire to live independently, breaking
away from that past. The time has come to pay greater attention
to building long lasting peace in the world.