1. Introduction
1. Following the adoption by the
Parliamentary Assembly of
Resolution
2482 (2023) “Legal and human rights aspects of the Russian Federation’s
aggression against Ukraine” on 26 January 2023, based on a report by
Mr Damien Cottier (Switzerland, ALDE), the Bureau of the Assembly
decided to seize the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights
for a new report to follow up on the same subject.

The committee appointed me
as rapporteur at its meeting in Strasbourg on 25-27 April 2023.
2. Since the adoption of Mr Cottier’s report, the Assembly has
adopted several resolutions on the political or other consequences
of the Russian Federation’s war of aggression, prepared by other
committees.

The Council of Europe as a whole
has also taken numereous initiatives to implement some of the Assembly’s proposals,
including those contained in
Resolution
2482 (2023) and in Mr Cottier’s report, in order to ensure the Russian
Federation’s comprehensive and full accountability for violations
of human rights and serious violations of international law arising
out of the aggression. In May 2023, at the Reykjavik Summit, the
Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe created the
Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation
against Ukraine (as an enlarged partial agreement of the Council
of Europe), as a first step towards an international compensation
mechanism for the victims of the Russian aggression, in line with
the Assembly’s call in
Resolution
2482 (2023). So far, 43 countries and the European Union have joined the
Register as members or associate members. As regards the establishment
of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression committed against
Ukraine by the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation,
an idea first supported by the Assembly in
Resolution 2436 (2022) (report by Mr Aleksander Pociej, Poland, EPP/CD), as
the first international body to do so, and later in
Resolution 2482 (2023), progress has been unfortunately slower. In Reykjavik,
the Heads of State welcomed the international efforts and progress towards
the establishment of such a tribunal and acknowledged that the Council
of Europe should play a role in supporting this process. Since then,
the secretariat of the Council of Europe has been participating
in the ongoing consultations within the Core Group composed of 40
States prepared to support the creation of a special tribunal (Core
Group).
3. In this report I will focus on the progress made on the different
components of a comprehensive system of accountability for the Russian
Federation’s aggression against Ukraine and its legal and human
rights consequences, with a view to making further proposals to
member States, the Council of Europe as a whole and different international
actors. I will examine the measures being implemented or still needed
in order to ensure accountability for the crime of aggression (section
2) and other international crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity
and genocide) (section 3) as well as the issue of compensation for
the damage caused by the aggression, in particular the possible
legal venues to ensure that compensation claims submitted by the State
of Ukraine and individual victims will not only be registered, but
also adjudicated and enforced vis-à-vis the Russian State (section
4). I will also deal with the need to ensure that the Wagner Group
and other Russian proxies are held to account for their crimes,
taking into account a motion for a resolution on this subject which called
for their designation as a terrorist organisation (section 5).

4. For the preparation of this report, the Committee on Legal
Affairs and Human Rights has held two hearings and two exchanges
of views with experts. On 8 September 2023, we heard from Ms Jelena
Aparac, former Chairperson of the United Nations Working Group on
the use of mercenaries, and Ms Nathalia Dukhan, Senior investigator
focusing on war crimes and transnational criminal organisations
at The Sentry (Washington). They both spoke about the challenges
in qualifying the Wagner Group under international law and the need
to adopt targeted measures to ensure accountability of the group
for its crimes and human rights abuses, including those committed
in other parts of the world (in particular in Africa) and not only
in Ukraine. On 12 October 2023, the committee held an exchange of
views with Mr James Goldston, Executive Director of Open Society
Foundations, who presented an update on recent developments regarding
the establishment of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression.
During the January 2024 part-session, the committee held an exchange
of views with Mr Markiyan Kliuchkovskyi, Executive Director of the
Register of Damage. Finally, on 4 March 2024, the committee held
a hearing on the topic of compensation with three experts: Dr Anton Moiseienko,
lecturer at the Australian National University; Ms Yuliya Ziskina,
senior legal fellow at Razom for Ukraine (Washington); and Mr Rupert
Skilbeck, Director of Redress (London). I would like to thank all
the experts for their extremely valuable contributions. The secretariat
of the committee has also attended different conferences related
to these topics and met with a Ukrainian delegation of the Office
of the Prosecutor General, National Police, State Bureau of Investigation
and Security Service visiting the Council of Europe in Strasbourg (November
2023).
2. The special tribunal for the crime
of aggression against Ukraine
5. In its
Resolution 2436 (2022) “The Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine:
ensuring accountability for serious violations of international
humanitarian law and other international crimes”, adopted two months
after the launch of the full-scale invasion, the Assembly unanimously
supported the establishment of an
ad
hoc international criminal tribunal to investigate and
prosecute the crime of aggression committed against Ukraine by the
political and military leadership of the Russian Federation. The
Assembly was thus the first body of an international character to
support the creation of such a tribunal. As regards the modalities
of its establishment, the resolution recommended that the tribunal
be established by a group of like-minded States in the form of a
multilateral treaty.

6. In its
Resolution
2482 (2023) “Legal and human rights aspects of the Russian Federation’s
aggression against Ukraine”, the Assembly explicitly stated that
the acts of aggression committed by the Russian Federation meet
the threshold of the crime of aggression as set out in the Statute
of the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Article 8 bis). Given
that the ICC has no jurisdiction over the current crime of aggression
(in the absence of a referral by the UN Security Council, and Russia
not being party to the ICC Statute), the Assembly reiterated its
call on all member and observer States to set up a special international
criminal tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine, which
should be endorsed and supported by as many States and international
organisations as possible, and in particular by the UN General Assembly
(UNGA). It also asked the 4th Summit of Heads of State and Government
to give its political support to the creation of a such a tribunal and
offer the Council of Europe’s concrete expert and technical support
to its establishment, in close co-ordination with other interested
organisations and States. According to the Assembly, the Council
of Europe should have an active, leading role in the establishment
of the special tribunal and participate in relevant consultations
and negotiations. The resolution set out the main features that
the special tribunal should have (jurisdiction
ratione materiae,
ratione temporis, address the issue
of personal immunities, list of fair trial rights, complementarity
with the ICC, and seat). As regards the type of tribunal (purely
international or internationalised hybrid) and its legal basis (multilateral
treaty or agreement between an international organisation and Ukraine),
the resolution left these questions open. While favouring a fully
international model, the rapporteur thought that the final legal
form of the instrument should be decided pragmatically, aiming to involve
the largest possible number of States, ideally representative of
different regions of the world.
7. In May 2023, at the Reykjavik Summit, the Heads of State and
Government recognised the role played by the Assembly in providing
a robust response to Russia’s war of aggression. As regards the
special tribunal, they welcomed the international efforts to hold
to account the political and military leadership of the Russian Federation
for its war of aggression and the progress towards the establishment
of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression. In line with
the Assembly’s proposals, they stated that the Council of Europe
should participate, as appropriate, in relevant consultations and
negotiations and provide concrete expert and technical support to
the process. Since then, the secretariat of the Council of Europe
(Directorate of Legal Advice and Public International Law, DLAPIL)
has been participating in the consultations within the Core Group.
8. More recently, in
Resolution
2516 (2023) “Ensuring a just peace in Ukraine and lasting security
in Europe” (Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy), the Assembly
called on the Core Group “to come to an agreement [on its] legal
form as soon as possible, taking into account the need to maximise
the international legitimacy and to minimise possible legal issues,
in particular regarding the possible reliance of key suspects on
personal or functional immunity”.
9. James Goldston, at the exchange of views that the committee
held on 12 October 2023, noted that a purely international tribunal
established by the UNGA, possibly through an agreement between the
UN and Ukraine, would be the best solution. This model would likely
have the strongest claim to being recognised as an “international
tribunal”, which would facilitate denying personal and functional
immunities of the most senior Russian officials. However, he said
that States supporting a strictly international model (including
Ukraine and much of Eastern Europe) were increasingly in a minority
within the Core Group. Other models should therefore be explored.
A fully regional model could be created through an agreement between
Ukraine and the European Union or the Council of Europe. This model
would also have some legitimacy as an “international tribunal”, especially
if endorsed by most or all of the Council of Europe member States.
A multilateral model could be created through a multilateral treaty
between Ukraine and one or more other States. Its legitimacy as
an “international tribunal” would depend on how many States would
ratify the treaty. An internationalised hybrid model, supported
by G7 States, including Germany, the UK and the US, would involve
a tribunal rooted in Ukraine’s justice system, but with international
judges. This might also raise problems, as the Ukrainian Constitution
does not allow foreign judges and expressly prohibits the creation
of special courts; and it might not be able to overcome personal
immunities because of its ties to the Ukrainian domestic system.

According to Mr Goldston, a potential
compromise between the purely international model and the hybrid
option supported by the G7 would be an internationalised (hybrid)
model hosted in a third State and not in Ukraine. It seemed that
although clearly not its first choice, Ukraine would be willing
to accept this model, as long as it is based in another State’s
judicial system and that system inspires confidence. Within the
Core Group, the European Union External Action Service (EEAS) had
also made a proposal for a “transfer of proceedings” (a Ukrainian
court sitting in another country, for instance in the Netherlands).
10. On 14 November 2023, in my capacity as rapporteur I sent the
following message to the Core Group of countries, in view of their
meeting in Berlin on 16 November: “To maximise the future tribunal’s
international legitimacy and authority, and to minimise potential
legal risks linked to issues of the personal and functional immunity
of senior officials, the tribunal should be as international as
possible – ideally set up by an agreement between the UN and Ukraine
based on a majority vote of the UN General Assembly, or by a multilateral
treaty between the “Core Group” countries endorsed by as many international
bodies as possible, including the Council of Europe, or even as
a strongly internationalised hybrid Ukrainian tribunal, located
in The Hague and staffed by Ukrainian and international judges and
prosecutors. The Council of Europe could make a substantial contribution
to the future tribunal. It could host a diplomatic conference to
negotiate a multilateral treaty establishing the tribunal and make
available its legal expertise and experience in negotiating international agreements,
with the participation of interested non-member States. After adoption
of the treaty, it could act as depositary so that no participating
State needs to be singled out for this task. And the Council of
Europe could also help to generate synergies with compensation mechanisms,
including the newly established Register of Damage, and with the
European Court of Human Rights.”
11. In the past months, participants in the Core Group have expressed
an interest in exploring the idea of establishing a special tribunal
via a bilateral agreement between Ukraine and the Council of Europe.
Although no decisions have yet been taken and an alternative proposal
based on a freestanding multilateral treaty remains on the table,
the “Council of Europe bilateral agreement” option seems to be gaining
traction. DLAPIL has been examining its legal feasibility and what
an agreement and statute could look like. This momentum must also
be seen against the broader political context that the UN and its
General Assembly have become less likely to act in this matter,
in particular since the outbreak of the Gaza conflict. Furthermore,
the option of a multilateral treaty is seen by some as a more cumbersome
procedure due to the need to go through numerous ratification procedures
by national parliaments and also raises the issue of legitimacy
(how many States parties are needed for a sufficiently international
tribunal?).
12. On 10 April 2024, a Seminar on the Special Tribunal was organised
in the margins of the 66th CAHDI (Committee of Legal Advisers on
Public International Law) meeting.

Its title was “What role for regional organisations
such as the Council of Europe?”. In his keynote speech, Professor
Claus Kreß recalled the important role of the Assembly (particularly
through Resolution 2482 (2023)

)
and the Council of Europe’s suitability for this endeavour. In his
view, this should not be seen as a European solution to what is
a global challenge but should be understood in the sense that “Europe
places the Council of Europe in the service of the international
community as a whole”. In this regard, he strongly advocated for
applying the definition of the crime of aggression in Article 8
bis of the ICC Statute instead of relying on the national criminal
law of Ukraine, and at the same time criticised the idea of basing
the special tribunal’s jurisdiction on a transfer of Ukrainian national
proceedings. He also proposed, for the purposes of international
legitimacy, that non-European judges be also elected to the special
tribunal and that its institutional design be endorsed at some point
by the UNGA (in line with the Assembly’s position). Professor Chiara
Giorgetti gave an overview of the role of regional organisations
in the pursuit of international criminal justice, with a particular
focus on three recent examples (the Extraordinary African Chambers
established via an agreement between the African Union and Senegal
to try international crimes committed in Chad; the Kosovo*

Specialist Chambers under an agreement
between Kosovo and the European Union; and a possible hybrid court
being discussed between ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African
States and The Gambia). She concluded that “creating a tribunal
would work especially well within the context of the Council of
Europe, a regional multilateral organisation with a varied and numerous
membership, which would also provide substantial legitimacy to the
Tribunal”. Professor Anne Peters argued that the Council of Europe
enjoys treaty-making powers and that a tribunal that seeks accountability
for the crime of aggression clearly falls into the mandate of the
Council of Europe, whose Statute (Preamble) indeed refers to “the
pursuit of peace based upon justice” and the rule of law. Finally,
the chair of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Lord
Keen, presented the Assembly’s contribution to date and concluded
that “if there is sufficient political will for the Council of Europe
to fill the gap left by other international organisations and take
the lead, the Assembly will certainly support this, to be coherent
with its previous positions and its unwavering support for Ukraine
and accountability.”
13. On 30 April 2024, the Committee of Ministers adopted by an
overwhelming majority a decision which authorises the Secretary
General “to prepare any necessary documents to contribute to consultations
within the Core Group on a possible draft Agreement between the
Council of Europe and the Government of Ukraine on the Establishment
of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression of the Russian
Federation against Ukraine, including its Statute, and on a possible
draft enlarged partial agreement governing the modalities of support
to such a Tribunal, its financing and other administrative matters”.

While
we cannot prejudge at this stage the outcome of the Core Group consultations
and the final decision of the Committee of Ministers on any further
steps, the Assembly should strongly welcome this decision, which
gives an explicit mandate to the Secretary General (and DLAPIL)
and reflects a very large majority among member States in favour
of an increasingly leading role of the Council of Europe in this
process, including by possibly establishing the tribunal under its
institutional framework.

This would be fully in line with
the Assembly’s previously expressed aspirations.
14. If the “Council of Europe bilateral agreement” model was to
be retained by the Core Group, there is a wide range of legal issues
that would still need to be addressed in detail in the negotiations
of the agreement and the statute of the tribunal. The Assembly should
reiterate some of the features that the tribunal should have that
were already mentioned in its Resolution 2482 (2023) and are still
valid: definition of the crime of aggression in line with Article
8 bis of the ICC Statute and customary international law;

temporal jurisdiction covering
the conflict since the beginning of the aggression against Ukraine
in February 2014

;
personal jurisdiction covering the role and complicity also of Belarusian
leaders;

seat in The Hague; rights of the accused,
in line with the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5);
complementarity with the ICC, which has jurisdiction over other
international crimes committed in Ukraine. Whether some of these
elements should be regulated in the agreement itself or in the statute
of the future tribunal (annexed to the agreement) does not seem
so crucial at this stage.
15. As regards the challenging issue of immunities, some maintain
the position that personal immunities would in any event apply to
the Troika (incumbent Head of State, Head of Government and Minister
of Foreign Affairs), regardless of the model chosen (free-standing
multilateral treaty or bilateral agreement between a regional organisation
and Ukraine). This reflects in my view a very restrictive interpretation
of the international case law and practice. The Assembly should
continue to support the position that “personal immunities would not
apply to incumbent State officials, in line with the practice of
other international criminal tribunals, and that functional immunities
would in any event not be applicable to the crime of aggression”
(Resolution 2482 (2023), paragraph 7.3 and explanatory memorandum,
paragraphs 26-27). We should consider that a tribunal established
through an agreement between a regional organisation such as the
Council of Europe (representing 46 States) and Ukraine, with international
judges (also from non-European States), with support and financial
contributions from non-member States and other international organisations
(including observer States and the European Union through an enlarged
partial agreement that would support the special tribunal), with
an international definition of the crime of aggression, would clearly
qualify as a sufficiently “international” criminal tribunal. The
special tribunal would not be acting only on behalf of Ukraine or
Council of Europe member States, but on behalf of the international
community as a whole, in order to uphold the international legal
order and the prohibition of the use of force laid down in Article
2.4 of the UN Charter. With such a status and applying the precedents
of the ICC

and
the Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone,

personal immunities of the Troika
would not be applicable nor constitute a bar to prosecution.

In any event, given the lack
of unanimity on the issue of immunities among potential supporters
of the tribunal, I am of the view that the best option would be
not to deal with this issue explicitly in the statute but to leave
it to the interpretation by the judges of the future tribunal, as
Philippe Sands has argued.

16. Some have argued that the issue of personal immunities of
the Troika is not so crucial given that it is very unlikely that
Vladimir Putin or Sergey Lavrov will be arrested and prosecuted
while still in office. I tend to disagree with this view. The special
tribunal should have jurisdiction from the outset over the political
and military leaders who waged the war of aggression against Ukraine.
This would include the power to investigate, issue arrest warrants,
indict, try and finally sentence. Even if trials
in absentia were not to be accepted
in the future statute (in line with precedents of other international
criminal tribunals

and
the legal traditions of some member States), one could envisage
a nuanced model of
in absentia proceedings
before a pre-trial chamber, where a confirmation of charges hearing
could be held in the absence of the suspect, with the presentation
of evidence, hearing of witnesses, victims, etc. This could be similar
to the model of Article 61.2 b) of the ICC Statute, which allows
for
in absentia confirmation
hearings when the suspect has fled or cannot be found, and all reasonable
steps have been taken to secure his or her appearance.

Arrest
warrants against Vladimir Putin and other leaders issued by the
future tribunal could have further delegitimising and deterring
effects apart from the more concrete limitation on their freedom
of movement.

Advancing
investigations and proceedings in absentia up to the trial stage
could also serve truth-finding, by assessing the evidence while
it is still fresh, and the interests of the victims of the aggression
(first and foremost the Ukrainian State and people) and, last but not
least, it would serve deterrence purposes.
17. It should also be recalled that the Assembly no longer recognises
the legitimacy of Vladimir Putin as President of the Russian Federation,
given that the abolition of presidential term limits for his benefit
violated not only well-established international legal principles,
but also the Russian Constitution itself (Resolution 2519 (2023),
based on findings of the European Commission for Democracy through
Law (Venice Commission). It has therefore called on member States
to no longer recognise Vladimir Putin as the legitimate President
of the Russian Federation, after the end of his previous presidential
term, following the March 2024 sham election.

Similarly, with regards to Belarus,
the Assembly refuses to recognise the results of the 2020 elections
and considers Mr Lukashenka as self-proclaimed
de facto president (Resolution 2519
(2023)). While it is not the object of this report to examine the
legal consequences of these considerations, including for the recognition of
immunities of MM. Putin and Lukashenka under international law,
the Assembly could invite the Committee of Ministers, the international
community and the future special tribunal to further explore these
issues.
18. In any event and at this stage, the Assembly should strongly
support the consultations within the Core Group with a view to finding
a final compromise on the model of the special tribunal as soon
as possible, while at the same time showing its clear preference
for the Council of Europe bilateral agreement option. As the experts
eloquently showed at the CAHDI seminar, the Council of Europe is
particularly well placed to set up a special tribunal for the crime
of aggression against Ukraine. The pursuit of accountability for
the violations of international law and the international crimes
committed in and against Ukraine clearly falls within the mandate of
the organisation, as reflected in its Statute (and preamble): “the
pursuit of peace based upon justice and international co-operation”,
the protection of the rule of law and respect for human rights.
The protection of the rule of law (including the international legal
order) and of the human rights of the Ukrainian citizens justifies
the Council of Europe’s action to ensure that the “supreme international
crime”, that is the crime of aggression, does not go unpunished.
The Council of Europe would be acting on behalf of the international
community, filling a gap in the international legal order. We should
not forget that when Russia began its aggression against Ukraine
in 2014 and when it launched its full-scale invasion in 2022 the
Russian Federation was still a member State of the Council of Europe.
This justifies all the more the competence of the Council of Europe
to take action in order to ensure justice for such a crime, which
was and is still being committed against one of its member States
by a former member State. This unprecedented step for the Council
of Europe would be in line with the priority given to accountability
by the Heads of State and Government in Reykjavik.

It
would also confirm that the Organisation is willing and able to
innovate and face the legal challenges posed by the Russian aggression, as
shown already by the creation of a Register of Damage for Ukraine
through an enlarged partial agreement. Time is of the essence in
view of some political developments in 2024 (elections to the European
Parliament, US elections). There is a risk that further delays in
deciding on the model of the tribunal, or on the outstanding legal
issues, lead to a loss of momentum.

The Council of Europe option has
a sound legal basis and strong legitimacy, we just need the political
will to seize the opportunity and make it happen.
19. Finally, the Assembly should reiterate its call on member
and observer States to strengthen the existing international criminal
justice system, its legitimacy and universality. This means, in
parallel to the creation of the special tribunal, supporting and
moving forward with the amendment to the ICC Statute, with the aim
of bringing the jurisdictional regime on the crime of aggression
in line with the other international crimes. It also means urging
all member and observer States, including Ukraine, to ratify the
ICC Statute and the Kampala amendments.

I note with interest that since our
call last year, there have been several proposals in the direction
of amending the ICC Statute, including by parliamentarians and high-ranking
government officials.

3. Other
international crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity and possible
genocide) and human rights violations committed in the context of
the aggression
3.1. Alleged
international crimes and human rights violations
20. The Assembly should again condemn
all the other international crimes committed in the context of the war
of aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, including
the ill-treatment and even execution of prisoners of war, the use
of chemical weapons, unlawful attacks on civilians and humanitarian
and medical personnel, as well on civilian objects such as medical
facilities, schools, electric power plants, infrastructure and cultural
heritage sites; the illegal abduction and detention, enforced disappearance,
torture, ill-treatment and extrajudicial killings of Ukrainian citizens
in the Russian Federation and the territories temporarily occupied or
controlled by Russia; the unlawful transfer of Ukrainian children
within those territories and/or their deportation to Russia or Belarus;
all forms of conflict-related sexual violence and gender-based crimes;
and unlawful attacks causing widespread, long-term and severe damage
to the environment. I will never forget my own visit to the Kyiv
suburbs of Bucha and Irpin, as a member of the
ad hoc sub-committee set up to visit Ukraine

back
in June 2022, shortly after the Russian occupants were driven from
the Kyiv region.

What
we saw and heard about first-hand was simply horrific.
21. Since the adoption of Mr Cottier’s report in January 2023,
there have been numerous international reports documenting war crimes,
crimes against humanity and human rights violations that appear
to have been committed by Russian forces during the ongoing war
of aggression. For example, the OSCE (Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe) Moscow Mechanism report published on
24 May 2023 entitled “Report on Violations and Abuses of International
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity, related to the Forcible Transfer and/or Deportation of
Ukrainian Children to the Russian Federation”, concluded that a
large number of Ukrainian children have been, since 24 February
2022, displaced from the territory of Ukraine to the temporarily
occupied territories and to the territory of the Russian Federation.

While being
placed in various institutions, Russian families, or being adopted,
Ukrainian children are being exposed to pro-Russian propaganda campaigns
amounting to targeted re-education. The report also established
that no functioning mechanisms facilitating family reunification
have been put in place. Practices of non-consensual evacuations,
transfers and prolonged displacement of Ukrainian children constitute violations
of international humanitarian law, and in certain cases amount to
grave breaches under the Fourth Geneva Convention and war crimes,
or even crimes against humanity.

They
also violate numerous provisions of the UN Convention on the Rights
of the Child.

22. On 4 October 2023, the Secretary General of the Council of
Europe presented to the Committee of Ministers a report on the human
rights situation in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City
of Sevastopol since the beginning of the full-scale invasion.

The report indicates
that, while the peninsula has not witnessed large-scale hostilities
during the last year, the Russian forces have extensively exploited
Crimea for their ground offensive and air attacks, including by
the Black Sea Fleet headquartered in Sevastopol. The Russian military
effort has also relied on unlawful conscription and military enlistment
of the peninsula’s population, logistics and healthcare capacities,
as well as the tapping of other resources of the temporarily occupied
territory. Many of these abusive human rights practices and violations
appear to have been replicated and scaled up in the illegally temporarily
occupied territories of the regions of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk
and Zaporizhzhia since 2022. The Committee of Ministers therefore
invited the Secretary General to further examine the human rights
situation in all territories of Ukraine temporarily controlled or
occupied by the Russian Federation and encouraged the Commissioner
for Human Rights to do the same.

23. The UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment conducted an official visit
to Ukraine between 4 and 10 September 2023 and published a report
on 15 February 2024. The report discloses credible allegations of
torture and inhuman treatment of Ukrainian civilians and prisoners
of war by the armed forces of the Russian Federation and potentially
other actors supporting the Russian war, treatment such as the use
of electric charges on ears and genitals, the use of dogs, mock executions
and “humiliation ceremonies” where detainees were required to run
while being beaten. The report also mentions abusive detention conditions
and alleged sexual torture against both men and women. On the basis
of interviews and other documentation, the rapporteur found, “a
repetitive and continuing situation whereby torture and other ill-treatment
or punishment was carried out in an organized and systematic manner, within
the framework of a higher order policy”.

24. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine,
whose mandate was extended by the UN Human Rights Council for a
further period of one year in April 2024, published its last report
on 15 March 2024, detailing continuous violations of international
humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL).

The
Commission found further evidence showing that in the context of
the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian authorities have committed
a wide array of violations of IHRL and IHL, including war crimes. These
include indiscriminate attacks affecting civilians and civilian
objects, medical institutions and cultural objects, in violation
of IHL, and the war crimes of torture, wilful killing, rape and
sexual violence and the forcible transfer of children. These actions
also violate international human rights. The evidence gathered reinforced the
Commission’s findings that Russian authorities used torture against
both Ukrainian prisoners of war and civilians in a widespread and
systematic way. The Commission provided in this report an initial
assessment of the impact of the heavy fighting and siege of the
city of Mariupol at the outset of the full-scale invasion (from
1 March to 20 May 2022), which led to large-scale death, injury,
destruction, and unbearable suffering. Residents from the city of
Mariupol described a lack of access to necessities, as well as attacks
with explosive weapons and air strikes on populated areas causing
the destruction of buildings, houses and medical facilities. The Commission
concluded that the attacks against medical facilities were indiscriminate,
constituting war crimes.

The
Commission will continue to investigate whether the conduct of hostilities
and the siege of Mariupol, as well as the widespread use of torture,
may also constitute crimes against humanity. With regard to genocide,
the Commission examined allegations on whether the rhetoric transmitted
in Russian State and other media constitutes direct and public incitement
to commit genocide. While recommending continued investigations
into this matter, it expressed special concerns about statements
by individuals supporting the invasion calling for the killing of
a large number of persons.
25. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
has recently published a report focusing on the human rights situation
during the Russian occupation of territory of Ukraine and its aftermath from
24 February 2022 until 31 December 2023, based on the work of the
UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine.

The report describes
persistent patterns of violations of IHRL and IHL by the Russian Federation
in occupied territory. The focus is on territory of Ukraine that
fell under Russian occupation following the full-scale invasion,
specifically areas of the Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, Mykolayiv
and Zaporizhzhia regions. The report finds a systematic dismantling
of fundamental rights and freedoms; cross-sector measures to stifle
dissent; the subversion of Ukrainian systems of governance, administration,
justice and education; the imposition of Russian systems and legal
frameworks; and the suppression of expressions of Ukrainian culture
and identity. Russian armed forces conducted widespread arbitrary
detentions, including enforced disappearances, in the initial months
of occupation, first targeting veterans of the Ukrainian Armed Forces
(UAF), then persons suspected to have links to the Security Service
of Ukraine and their families. This practice then broadened to different
categories of civilians whom they perceived as opposing the occupation. During
their detention, many detainees experienced torture or ill-treatment
(beating, kicking, mock executions, waterboarding, and electric
shocks), and were kept in inhumane conditions of detention (overcrowded
cells, lack of medical care, extreme temperatures). The Mission
also documented conflict-related sexual violence in occupied areas
and in detention, with practices such as rape, gang rape, threats
of rape, genital mutilation, beatings and electric shocks to genitals
and breasts, forced nudity and sexual touching. The report mentions the
widespread pillage of private property, as well as of equipment
of educational and medical facilities. While conducting frequent
searches of persons and property, Russian armed forces used elements
of physical violence and degrading treatment such as verbal abuse,
forced stripping, threats and destruction of property. The high
number of such acts resulted in the creation of a climate of fear
for the residents, in an atmosphere of generalised impunity. As
of 31 December 2023, Russian authorities had initiated criminal
investigations in only four instances of alleged misconduct. In
June 2023, the Russian Federation adopted a law which effectively
granted amnesty to Russian servicepersons for a wide range of crimes,
potentially including gross violations of IHRL or serious violations
of IHL. The Fourth Geneva Convention requires the occupying power to
minimise changes to the
status quo ante,

however the report discloses
numerous violations of its provisions. This is apparent in the imposition
of Russian systems of governance and administration, compelling public
workers to continue working in key positions and to show allegiance
to Russian institutions, and through the application of Russian
law, touching all spheres of political, social, cultural and economic
life. Following the illegal annexation of the occupied areas, the
Russian Federation intensified pressure on local residents to obtain
Russian passports, discriminating non-passport holders by denying
them access to healthcare and humanitarian aid, freedom of movement,
or payment of salaries. The report also describes how the Russian system
sought to suppress expressions of Ukrainian culture and identity,
with policies targeting children (for example, children are studying
in Russian language with an imposed Russian curriculum including
narratives justifying the aggression). The Mission documented violations
concerning the enlistment of children, via the use of Russian youth
groups where they are taught Russian patriotism and prepared for
serving in the Russian Armed Forces.

Large
movements of population, including the fleeing or evacuation of
Ukrainian civilians from areas affected by hostilities and the forced
transfer or deportation of protected persons by Russian authorities, have
resulted in substantial demographic changes in the occupied territories
of Ukraine.
26. In its latest updated report on the situation in Ukraine (1
December 2023-29 February 2024), OHCHR reported an increase in civilian
casualties due to an intensification of attacks by Russian armed
forces with missiles and loitering munitions during this period,
with at least 128 civilians killed and 584 injured.

In Kharkiv city, one
of the locations most targeted, the OHCHR documented attacks that
struck residential areas, boarding schools, different hotels, educational
and healthcare facilities. Since the beginning of the full-scale
armed attack on 24 February 2022, OHCHR has verified that the conflict
has killed at least 10 675 civilians and injured 20 080.

The report
also discloses violations of provisions on the treatment of prisoners
of war. Prisoners of war continued to experience widespread and
routine torture and ill-treatment (beating, electric shocks, threats of
execution, mock executions, positional torture, sleep deprivation),
and were being held in poor conditions (lack of food, limited access
to medical assistance, lack of basic personal hygiene items, spread
of diseases). Some prisoners of war were subjected to sexual violence
during their detention, including attempted rape, threats of rape
and castration, and electric shocks to genitals. OHCHR received
reports that 32 Ukrainian prisoners who had been captured, were
summarily executed. It verified three of these incidents in which Russian
servicemen executed seven Ukrainian servicemen hors de combat. In
occupied territory, Russian authorities continued imposing Russian
political, legal and administrative systems in violation of their
IHL obligations as an occupying power. Contrary to the prohibition
against compelling inhabitants to swear allegiance to the occupying
Power, the Russian authorities systematically exerted pressure on
residents to acquire Russian Federation citizenship and passports,
and to engage in other “patriotic” activities to demonstrate loyalty.
OHCHR expressed concerns about a draft law registered in Ukraine
which would provide for the possibility of being stripped of Ukrainian
citizenship in case of voluntary acquisition of the citizenship
of an “aggressor State”.

Since
many people in the occupied territories acquired Russian citizenship
under duress from the occupation authorities, or because of fear,
OHCHR noted that such acquisition of citizenship should not be considered
“voluntary acquisition”.
27. Allegations that the Russian Federation and its State officials
are committing genocide in Ukraine have continued to be made, mostly
by political leaders and national parliaments.

As
mentioned above, the UN Independent International Commission of
Inquiry has expressed concerns about the rhetoric of Russian media, which
may constitute incitement to genocide, and will continue to look
into this issue.
28. The Assembly has expressed similar concerns. In its Resolution
2482 (2023) “Legal and human rights aspects of the Russian Federation’s
aggression against Ukraine”, it emphasised that the official Russian rhetoric
used to justify the aggression against Ukraine, the so-called “de-Ukrainianisation”
process, carries characteristics of public incitement to genocide
or reveals a genocidal intent to destroy the Ukrainian national group
as such or at least part of it within the meaning of the 1948 Genocide
Convention. It also noted that some of the acts committed by Russian
forces against Ukrainian civilians could fall under Article II of
the Genocide Convention (to which both the Russian Federation and
Ukraine are parties), such as killings and forcible transfer of
Ukrainian children for russification purposes.
29. Similarly, in its Resolution 2495 (2023) “Deportations and
forcible transfers of Ukrainian children and other civilians to
the Russian Federation or to temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories:
create conditions for their safe return, stop these crimes and punish
the perpetrators”, the Assembly expanded on these concerns, supporting
the need for thorough recording, gathering and assessment of evidence
of the crime of genocide. In addition, the Assembly invited the
International Criminal Court to examine the possible prosecution
of the crime of genocide as regards the State policy of the Russian
Federation towards Ukrainian children.

30. The updated edition of the 2022 report produced by New Lines
Institute and the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights (referred
to in Mr Cottier’s report), was published in July 2023, establishing
that there are: (1) reasonable grounds to believe that Russia is
responsible for direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(2) reasonable grounds to believe that Russia is responsible for
the commission of genocide against the Ukrainian national group,
on the basis of a pattern of atrocities from which an inference
of intent to destroy the national group in part can be drawn and
documented evidence of one or more of the prohibited acts in violation
of the Genocide Convention; and (3) signs of serious, escalating
genocide and genocidal incitement in Ukraine.

The report relies on the official
Russian propaganda campaign to establish the incitement to genocide.
It analyses the renewal and resurgence of the slogan “we can do
it again”, an historical allusion to some of the darkest periods
of Ukraine’s 20th century history. Russian State actors appear to
believe that past atrocities “can be repeated”. The report also
mentions five key narratives and dynamics that are used to incite genocide:
(1) the denial of the Ukrainian identity, (2) accusation in a mirror
(whereby perpetrators accuse the targeted group of similar atrocities
that the speakers envision against them), (3) the use of dehumanising rhetoric
about Ukrainians, including that Ukrainians must be “denazified”
or “de-Satanised”, (4) the construction of Ukrainians as an existential
threat, and (5) conditioning the Russian audience to commit or condone atrocities.
The incitement to genocide comes from the highest level of the Russian
State authorities, and Russian State occupation authorities with
direct control over Ukrainians in occupied territories.
31. The report argues again that there is evidence of the existence
of a “general plan” and a genocidal intent, which are key subjective
elements to qualify the specific crime of genocide. According to
the report, those elements are visible by the striking patterns
or methods of atrocities, which suggest systematic State and military
policy. It lists examples of acts directed towards the Ukrainian
national group, that may constitute at least one of the five material
acts constituting the crime of genocide under Article II of the
Genocide Convention, such as killing members of the national group,
causing serious bodily or mental harm and deliberately inflicting
conditions of life that are calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part. The report also documents acts
intended to prevent births within the group, such as the widespread
use of rape and sexual violence against women and testimonies of
castration of male Ukrainians in Russian detention centres. The
report also presents evidence of systematic, co-ordinated forcible
transfer of large numbers of Ukrainian children to Russia with signs
of attempts to eradicate their Ukrainian identity and obstructing
their return home. The report concludes that in view of the increasing
evidence showing that Russia’s attempts to commit and incite genocide
against Ukrainians have intensified and evolved, States Parties
to the Genocide Convention need to step up their efforts to fulfil
their obligation to prevent genocide under Article I of the Convention.

3.2. Existing
accountability mechanisms
32. On 2 March 2022, the ICC Prosecutor,
Karim Khan, announced that he had opened an investigation into the
situation in Ukraine on the basis of referrals received from 39
States Parties to the ICC Statute (including 34 Council of Europe
member States).

The scope
of the situation being investigated encompasses any past and present
allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide committed
on any part of the territory of Ukraine by any person from 21 November
2013.

33. In the context of this investigation, on 17 March 2023, ICC
Pre-Trial Chamber II issued
warrants
of arrest for two individuals: Vladimir Putin, and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, Commissioner
for Children’s Rights in the Office of the President of the Russian
Federation. Pre-Trial Chamber II considered that there were reasonable
grounds to believe that each suspect bears responsibility for the
war crime of unlawful deportation of population (children) and that
of unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas
of Ukraine to the Russian Federation, in prejudice of Ukrainian
children.

As regards more
specifically Vladimir Putin, the chamber considered that he could
bear responsibility for having committed the acts directly, jointly
with others and/or through others, and for his failure to exercise
control properly over civilian and military subordinates who committed
the acts or allowed for their commission. On 5 March 2024, ICC Pre-Trial
Chamber II issued two further warrants of arrest for two individuals:
Sergei Ivanovich Kobylash, a Lieutenant General in the Russian Armed
Forces who at the relevant time was the Commander of the Long-Range
Aviation of the Aerospace Force, and Viktor Nikolayevich Sokolov,
an Admiral in the Russian Navy, who at the relevant time was the Commander
of the Black Sea Fleet. Pre-Trial Chamber II considered that there
were reasonable grounds to believe that each suspect bears responsibility
for the war crime of directing attacks at civilian objects, the
war crime of causing excessive incidental harm to civilians or damage
to civilian objects, and the crime against humanity of inhumane
acts.

It is also important
to note that a field office of the ICC has been opened in Kyiv.
34. In Ukraine, the Criminal Code criminalises the violation of
laws and customs of war and genocide, but not crimes against humanity.
As of 31 December 2023, according to the Prosecutor General’s Office
figures, 138 044 crimes relating to the full-scale invasion had
been registered, out of which 119 071 war crimes. As regards specifically
war crimes (Article 438 of the Criminal Code), 472 suspects had
been notified, 314 persons had been indicted and 73 persons had
been convicted.

As
of 6 May 2024, there were 131 325 crimes of aggression and war crimes
registered, out if which 127 432 war crimes.
35. There are other investigations apart from those led by the
ICC Prosecutor and the Prosecutor General of Ukraine. Already at
the end of March 2022, a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) was set
up by Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine under the auspices of Eurojust.
It is aimed at exchanging evidence and information in connection with
the ongoing investigations in these countries on alleged core international
crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide) committed
in Ukraine. It also allows investigators to operate in the partner countries,
with the consent of the State involved. The ICC Prosecutor and Europol
have joined the JIT, as well as Estonia, Latvia, Slovak Republic
and Romania.

The JIT’s
seven national authorities have also signed a memorandum of understanding
with the US Department of Justice.
36. The Assembly should welcome and acknowledge the work of all
the existing accountability mechanisms for international crimes
committed in Ukraine and call on all member and observer States
to continue supporting them, through expertise, capacity-building,
financial resources, secondments of staff and co-operation. It should
call on all States to take note of the arrest warrants issued by
the ICC and enforce them should any of the suspects come within
their jurisdiction. The Assembly should strongly condemn the attempts of
the Russian Federation to prosecute the ICC Judges and Prosecutor
involved in the issuing of these arrest warrants, as a flagrant
interference with judicial independence and the mandate and integrity
of the ICC.

The Assembly should also invite
the ICC to consider examining the reported allegations of genocide,
generally in respect of the situation in Ukraine and more specifically
regarding the transfer of Ukrainian children.
37. The Council of Europe should strengthen and develop its assistance
and co-operation activities with the Ukrainian authorities, particularly
with the Prosecutor General’s Office, within the context of its
Action Plan for Ukraine, entitled “Resilience, Recovery and Reconstruction”
(2023-2026).
38. Finally, we should not forget other existing international
mechanisms that may adjudicate and ultimately establish the international
responsibility of the Russian Federation (as a State, not its officials)
for the numerous human rights violations committed in the course
of the aggression. First and foremost, the European Court of Human
Rights, which is still competent to deal with applications against
Russia concerning violations of the European Convention on Human
Rights which occurred until 16 September 2022. Ukraine lodged an
inter-state case against Russia (Ukraine v. Russia (X) (No. 11055/22))
which concerns allegations of mass and gross human rights violations
committed by the Russian Federation in the context of the war against
Ukraine since 24 February 2022. The Court has joined this case to
the previously lodged inter-state case
Ukraine
and the Netherlands v. Russia concerning warfare in eastern
Ukraine since 2014 and the downing of flight MH17, which was declared
partly admissible on 30 November 2022.

39. Ukraine also brought proceedings under the Genocide Convention
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), claiming that Russian
accusations against Ukraine of committing genocide in the Luhansk
and Donetsk oblasts were unfounded and could not justify the large-scale
invasion in 2022. After having indicated provisional measures to
the Russian Federation to immediately suspend the military operations
commenced in February 2022, which were blatantly disregarded, the
ICJ delivered a judgment on preliminary objections which can be
seen as rather disappointing for Ukraine. The ICJ held that it does
not have jurisdiction to entertain two of Ukraine’s claims, namely
that (i) the Russian Federation’s use of force in and against Ukraine beginning
on 24 February 2022 violates Articles I and IV of the Genocide Convention;
and that (ii) Russia’s recognition of the independence of the so-called
“Donetsk People’s Republic” and “Luhansk People’s Republic” on 21
February 2022 violates Articles I and IV of the Genocide Convention.
The ICJ considered that even if those actions undertaken by the
Russian Federation were based on a bad faith application of the Genocide
Convention, it did not automatically bring the Convention obligations
into play. The ICJ accepted its jurisdiction only in respect of
one claim submitted by Ukraine, namely, to declare that there is
no credible evidence that Ukraine is responsible for committing
genocide in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

While the judgment on the
merits, should it be favourable to Ukraine, may serve in the future
to debunk one of Russia’s arguments to justify its war of aggression,
the ICJ will not be able to determine whether Russia itself has violated
the Genocide Convention or order reparations for Ukraine. However,
it cannot be excluded that Ukraine or other States bring new proceedings
under the Genocide Convention against Russia before the ICJ, for
concrete allegations of genocide committed against the Ukrainians,
at least in the form of incitement to genocide or attempt to commit
genocide. The Assembly should invite them to do so, considering
that the prohibition of genocide is an
erga
omnes obligation under international law and that any
State Party to the Convention may bring a dispute concerning another
State Party’s responsibility for genocide to the ICJ by virtue of
its Article IX.
4. Compensation
for the damage caused by the aggression
40. The legal
principle that a country should “make full reparation for the
injury caused by [an] internationally wrongful act” is well established.
There is also a recent precedent of a State doing so, after the
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990.

The UNGA said
already in 2022 that an international reparation mechanism was needed.

It also called on members
to set up a register of claims against Russia. In response, the
Council of Europe has set up such a register. While there has been
so far no decision on which body should adjudicate the registered
claims, the UNGA’s support gives legitimacy to actions to hold Russia
accountable for the war damages caused by its aggression.

41. The Register of Damage was established at the Reykjavik Summit
in May 2023, under the auspices of the Council of Europe (in the
form of an enlarged partial agreement). It will serve as a record,
in documentary form, of all claims and supporting evidence of damage,
loss or injury caused by Russia’s full-scale aggression against
Ukraine (on or after 24 February 2022) on the territory of Ukraine.
The Register is mandated to receive and process claims for damages
submitted by individuals, legal entities and the State of Ukraine,
and any evidence supporting these claims; it will categorise, classify
and sort such claims; assess and determine the eligibility of claims
for inclusion in the Register and record the eligible claims for
the purposes of their adjudication by a future compensation mechanism.
The Register has its seat in The Hague and a satellite office in
Kyiv. To date, 43 countries (all member States of the Council of
Europe except Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary,
Serbia and Türkiye; in addition, Canada, Japan and the United States)
and the European Union are participating in the Register, either
as full members or associates. Its Board, chaired by Robert Spano,
former President of the European Court of Human Rights, held its
inaugural meeting in The Hague on 11-15 December 2023. According
to the Board, the categories of claims shall include,
inter alia: loss of life, torture
and sexual violence, as well as personal injury; involuntary displacement,
and forcible transfer of individuals; loss of property and revenue,
and other forms of economic loss; damage to critical infrastructure and
other governmental facilities; damage to the historic and cultural
heritage; and environmental damage. The submission of claims was
opened on 2 April 2024. Currently, and since the Register will be
launched in stages, only claims related to damage or destruction
of residential immovable property can be submitted.

42. During the Conference held in Riga on 11 September 2023, the
Ministers of Justice of the Council of Europe adopted a declaration
that outlines the principles (
Riga
Principles) for member States of the Register of Damage to consider,
to ensure the efficient functioning of the Register. These include:
a victim-centered approach; a firm legal basis in international
law on State responsibility; authority and legitimacy, including
by taking due account of the case law of the European Court of Human
Rights; support to the Ukrainian national authorities to facilitate
co-ordinating the domestic efforts to support the Register; coherence,
complementarity and interoperability; civil society engagement;
and work towards effective and full reparation of all damage.
43. As the Assembly has already said, the Register can only be
the first step of a comprehensive international compensation mechanism,
which should include an international commission for the examination and
adjudication of claims recorded in the Register, and a compensation
fund to pay the damages awarded by the commission.

The
legal instrument establishing the compensation mechanism should
regulate matters such as the funding of the compensation fund, the
enforcement of awards and how decisions by other international bodies
and courts, including those of the European Court of Human Rights,
could also be enforced through this mechanism.

In the resolution establishing
the Register, the participants agreed to continue working in co-operation
with Ukraine and relevant international organisations and bodies
towards the establishment, by a separate international instrument,
of a future international compensation mechanism. The Register shall
participate in and facilitate, as appropriate, the work aimed at
the establishment of such a compensation mechanism, and take the
necessary steps to prepare its transfer to the future fully-fledged compensation
mechanism.

States should
therefore continue working on the establishment of this mechanism,
and the Council of Europe, as the organisation that created its
first component (the Register), should be ready to play a leading
role in setting up and managing it. Most recently, in its Recommendation
2271 (2024) “Support for the reconstruction of Ukraine” (Committee
on Political Affairs and Democracy, rapporteur; Mr Luzlim Basha
(Albania, EPP/CD); with an opinion by our committee prepared by
myself), the Assembly called on the Committee of Ministers to “proceed
towards the establishment of an international compensation mechanism
under the auspices of the Council of Europe …; establish an international
trust fund, where all seized Russian State assets will be deposited
…; endorse the establishment of an international commission of claims
for the damages recorded in the Register, under the auspices of
the Council of Europe”. Our committee successfully proposed to add
in the recommendation that the Committee of Ministers should consider
including in the scope of the future international compensation
mechanism, once established, the damage caused by the Russian Federation’s
internationally wrongful acts committed in the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea and the temporarily occupied territories of the Donetsk
and Luhansk oblasts before 24 February 2022 (date established in
the Register’s Statute), in line with the Assembly’s constant position
recalling that the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine
has in fact started in February 2014, with the annexation of Crimea
and the proxy warfare in eastern Ukraine.
44. With regards to the potential options for the effective payment
of the compensation that may be awarded to the victims of the aggression
(the Ukrainian State as well as natural and legal persons), the
Assembly had already held that confiscated Russian assets should
be used to pay for war damages in Ukraine.

Mr Cottier’s earlier report did not
adopt a final position on this but rather referred to the different
legal questions that the confiscation of Russian assets could raise
under the law of State immunities and IHRL, including the European Convention
on Human Rights.

45. At our hearing of 4 March 2024, Dr Moiseienko defended the
possibility of seizing and transferring the frozen Russian State
assets to Ukraine on the basis of the doctrine of collective or
third-party countermeasures, in accordance with the International
Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts (ARSIWA). Third party or collective countermeasures are envisaged
in Article 54 of the ARSIWA, which refers to “the right of any State,
entitled under Article 48, paragraph 1, to invoke the responsibility
of another State, to take lawful measures against that State to
ensure cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest of
the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached”.
Article 48, paragraph 1, foresees the right of non-injured States
to invoke the responsibility of another State when the obligation
breached is owed to the international community as a whole (
erga omnes).

Dr Moiseienko argued that these countermeasures
would be lawful and meet the requirements of temporariness and reversibility.
In reply to the objection of it being an unprecedented measure,
he noted that the circumstance that hundreds of billions of frozen
Russian assets are available across the States that pledge their
commitment to the principle that Russia must pay the damage it caused
by its aggression was also unique and unprecedented. Ms Ziskina presented
the US and Canadian perspectives on “repurposing” frozen Russian
assets. The US Government had endorsed the use of countermeasures
to unlock the 300 billion frozen assets and use them to support Ukraine;
a bipartisan bill named the REPO Act (applicable only to Ukraine)
was explicitly based on the doctrine of countermeasures. It would
empower the President to confiscate the Russian assets and instruct
him to work with US allies to establish an international compensation
mechanism that would pool together all the frozen assets.

Canada was also supportive of asset
confiscation, since it had passed in June 2022 groundbreaking legislation
authorising the government to confiscate and repurpose private or
State assets and use them for the reconstruction of a foreign State
adversely affected by a grave breach of international peace and
security, as well as for the compensation of victims. The UK was
also supportive of the seizure option. However, since about two
thirds of the reserves were frozen in the European Union, these
three countries were offering to act in concert with the EU countries
to seize the reserves and thereby eliminate any danger to the stability
of the euro. Mr Skilbeck noted the importance of reparations going
along with reconstruction, while admitting that there are currently
no principles or guidance on how to balance the two. He recommended
to follow a survivor-centered approach in the work of the Register
of Damage and other mechanisms, and to consider how reparation fits
with international criminal justice. He also recommended considering
alternative solutions to provide funds for reparation, such as asset
confiscation following penalties imposed for sanctions violations.
46. In my view, as already expressed in my opinion, Mr Basha’s
report on “Support for reconstruction of Ukraine” persuasively defends
the legality of transferring frozen Russian assets to an international compensation
mechanism for Ukraine on the basis of collective countermeasures.

The prohibition of aggression is
a norm of international law which has been recognised as an obligation
erga omnes by the International
Court of Justice. Therefore, third States not directly injured by
the aggression are entitled to take countermeasures against a serious
breach of international law such as a war of aggression recognised
by the UNGA as a violation of the UN Charter. For their legality,
they must comply with conditions analogous to countermeasures by
an injured State, including proportionality, temporariness and reversibility.

Given the enormous damage caused
by the aggression, estimated by the World Bank at USD 411 bn

already in March 2023, even the
freezing of the USD 300 bn does not seem to raise any proportionality
issues. The mere freezing of assets also does not raise an issue
of reversibility. The question remains whether the doctrine of countermeasures
can also justify the “repurposing” of the frozen assets to help
Ukraine fight off the aggression and to obtain compensation for
the damage caused by it. It can be argued that the subsequent possibility
of a set-off against a claim for reparations owed under international
law as part of a future peace settlement would qualify as “reversing”
the freezing and repurposing of the funds, which are after all fungible.
The question as to what part of the frozen assets would be repurposed
for the compensation fund and what proportion for Ukraine’s immediate
reconstruction and recovery would also need to be addressed.

47. It has also been argued that the frozen funds can be treated
as “collateral” for loans granted to Ukraine by its allies and confiscated
only if and when Ukraine does not obtain the reparations due under
international law that would allow it to pay back these loans.

A more sophisticated version
of this proposal is the suggestion for Ukraine to issue “reparation
bonds” backed by future claims for war damages against Russia. Since
the reserves are accruing interest, they could be used to pay both
the bonds’ principal and coupons. This would be different from confiscation,
because the assets would only be transferred if a legitimate compensation mechanism
first ruled that damages were due to Ukraine. Arguably, the legal
basis for using Russia’s foreign currency reserves to pay off the
reparation bonds would be particularly strong if Ukraine assigned
claims for damages against Russia to the Western States which bought
the bonds. The governments could rely on the common law principle
of “set-off”, under which an entity’s assets can be used to pay
its debts.

48. While the legal debate on full asset seizure and transfer
continues, governments and scholars have explored additional options
such as: asset confiscation following a criminal conviction for
sanctions violations and repurposing of monetary penalties; or introducing
windfall taxes/contributions on the interest or profits derived
from frozen assets.

The Council of the European Union
adopted in February 2024 a decision and a regulation clarifying
the obligations of Central Securities Depositories (CSD) holding
assets and reserves of the Central Bank of Russia that are immobilised.
According to this decision, Central Securities Depositories holding more
than 1 million EUR of Central Bank of Russia’s assets must account
extraordinary cash balances accumulating due to EU sanctions separately
and are prohibited from disposing of the ensuing net profits. This decision
paves the way for a possible financial contribution to the EU budget
raised on these net profits to support Ukraine and its reconstruction
at a later stage.

The European Commission is preparing
further legislation to seize the profits that will be set aside,
and then transfer them to a fund for Ukraine. This option raises
issues as to the ownership of the profits (Russia or the Central
Securities Depositories) and the effects on the reputation of the
euro. Some argue that the legal justification should be similar
to that needed for confiscating the principal assets.

Furthermore, in practical terms,
the sum that this proposal would produce would be small compared
to the estimated damage caused to Ukraine.

New legislative
proposals within the European Union to use the windfall profits
from Russian assets to finance the purchase of weapons for Ukraine are
also being discussed.

49. Although the Assembly should pursue the seizure and transfer
of assets to the future compensation fund as the preferred option,
it could still leave the door open to other complementary or alternative
proposals to ensure compensation. Like with the special tribunal
for the crime of aggression, confiscation and transfer of assets
are legally feasible but require determination and political will
from all actors involved, including the G7 and the European Union.
The main political argument against confiscation is that this may
affect the trust in the euro and its stability. But what if the
opportunity to confiscate these assets is missed and the Western
taxpayers grow tired of paying for supporting Ukraine? What will
happen to the stability of the euro if and when Russia wins in Ukraine
and then threatens the Eurozone? The trust issue can be addressed
by making it very clear that the precedent set by the freezing and
confiscation of State assets justified as countermeasures applies only
to egregious violations of international law such as a war of aggression
recognised as such by the UNGA. States that do not intend to attack
their neighbours have nothing to fear and no reason to shun the
euro or the dollar, to be replaced by which other currency, actually?
50. In addition to the USD 300 bn in Russian State assets (mostly
currency reserves), Western States have also frozen approximately
USD 80 bn in assets owned by Russian oligarchs supporting Vladimir
Putin’s regime. These assets are private property, protected by
Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the European Convention on
Human Rights (ETS No. 9). But the protection of private property
is not absolute. The European Court of Human Rights has accepted
the “Irish model” of non-conviction based confiscation of illegal
assets, with the reversal of the burden of proof regarding the legality
of the origin of the assets in question. Italy, the United Kingdom
and other countries have introduced similar legislation for purposes
of combating organised crime. The Assembly has recommended the use
of non-conviction based confiscation of illegal assets with reversal of
the burden of proof in its
Resolution
2218 (2018).
Mutatis mutandis,
a (rebuttable) presumption could be made that the huge assets owned
by Russian oligarchs were illegally acquired – in essence, stolen
from the Russian people, whose natural riches Vladimir Putin’s regime
illicitly gave away to the oligarchs to buy their support. These
assets could thus also be transferred to Ukraine, which could offset
them against part of the debt owed by Russia to Ukraine, as envisaged
by the Assembly in
Resolution
2434 (2022).

51. I have not examined in this report the possible use of frozen
Russian assets for the enforcement of just satisfaction judgments
of the European Court of Human Rights against the Russian Federation.
This issue is currently being considered by the CAHDI and will also
be the topic of a hearing before the Sub-Committee on the implementation
of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights of the Committee
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights. Furthermore, the Court will take
time in delivering judgments (on the merits and on just satisfaction)
concerning the consequences of the aggression against Ukraine and
we need to find more short-term solutions to secure compensation.
In any event, my position is that the future international compensation mechanism
should also include within its mandate the enforcement of any future
Court just satisfaction judgment relating to the aggression against
Ukraine (since 2014).
5. The
role of the Wagner Group 
52. Since 2014, the private military
company Wagner (commonly known as the Wagner Group) has become the
most notorious Russian private military company (PMC). Although
initially shrouded in secrecy, it became known that it was founded
by a Russian oligarch and former convict, Yevgeny Prigozhin

and a former GRU (Russian military
intelligence service) and Spetsnaz operator, veteran of the Chechen
wars and Nazi sympathiser Dmitry Utkin

(whose nom de guerre was “Wagner”,
intended as a reference to Hitler’s favourite composer).
53. The world first glimpsed Wagner fighters during the illegal
annexation of Crimea in 2014 and then during the war in eastern
Ukraine, where “Wagnerites” would not only further Russia’s goal
of undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity but were also involved
in assassinating disobedient leaders of the self-proclaimed peoples’ republics.

Since then, the Wagner Group also
established a firm presence in Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic,
Mali, Sudan and other African States,

often exploiting these States’ natural
resources in order to boost its own and Russia’s revenues and allow
Russia to circumvent economic sanctions. Despite strong evidence
of the Wagner Group’s reliance on the Russian armed forces’ infrastructure
and the support of the top Russian political and military leadership,
the Russian Government had consistently denied any links. Russian
law explicitly prohibits the operation of private military companies,
hence the PMC Wagner did not formally exist, allowing Russia to
deploy it under the cover of (more or less plausible) deniability.

54. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February
2022, the PMC Wagner fought alongside regular Russian troops, sustaining
heavy losses

and committing numerous war crimes.

In order to provide reinforcements
and avoid a further partial mobilisation, Wagner’s leadership turned
to recruiting convicted criminals. According to our expert, Jelena
Aparac, prisoners in various facilities have allegedly been offered amnesty
or presidential pardon after six months of service with the Wagner
Group, and a monthly payment of between EUR 1 600 – 3 200 to be
paid to the prisoners’ relatives. The information provided suggests
that by the end of October 2022 Wagner Group recruiters had visited
approximately 63 correctional facilities in 34 Russian regions,
and that around 7 130 prisoners had been recruited. In some cases,
the recruiters offered financial compensation of up to EUR 68 000
to the relatives if a prisoner was killed in action and around EUR 4
000 in case of an injury. Furthermore, members of the Wagner Group
were said to be primarily recruiting prisoners convicted of murder
or robbery and being in good physical condition, while those convicted
of sexual offences or terrorism seemed to be excluded. Bellingcat,
an independent investigative journalism group, reported that several
convicted murderers and former gang leaders (referred to as “volunteer
detachments” by the Russian media) sentenced to lengthy imprisonment
died during their service with Wagner.

Other news outlets shared stories
of pardoned Wagnerites, including those openly admitting to having
committed war crimes, who returned to their communities, terrorising
the local population.

Wagner personnel used Russian fighter
jets, planes, helicopters, artillery pieces and other advanced weaponry,

not even attempting to hide its
dependence on, and symbiosis with, the Russian Army. The Russian
Ministry of Defence openly acknowledged the role of the Wagner Group
in specific military actions in Ukraine, for instance in capturing
the cities of Soledar and Bakhmut.

The
Russian Government also granted the status of combat veterans to Wagner
contractors who took part in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

55. In June 2023, a large contingent of Wagnerites marched practically
unopposed to Moscow. The apparent mutiny was stopped by a deal with
Vladimir Putin that allowed the Wagner fighters to relocate to Belarus.

Shortly thereafter, Vladimir Putin
admitted that the PMC Wagner had been financed with tens of billions
of roubles from the State budget,

thus confirming what has long been
known by the international community and fervently denied by the
Kremlin.

According to a leaked document that
was characterised as the founding document of the Wagner Group,
Wagner’s founding principles were to fight Russia’s war in Ukraine
in loyal service to Vladimir Putin and “the Russian nation”.

56. Two months later, the Wagner Group’s top leaders (including
Y. Prigozhin and D. Utkin) perished in a plane crash, which is widely
assumed to be an assassination ordered by Vladimir Putin as a form
of retribution for the above-mentioned mutiny. According to the
official version of events, presented by Mr Putin himself, the plane
was brought down by its passengers having become intoxicated and
playing with hand grenades.

The deaths of Wagner’s leaders resulted
in some of their fighters being incorporated into the Russian military
and Rosgvardiya (National Guard) or hired by other Russian PMCs,
such as Redut.

On 26 August 2023, Vladimir Putin
signed a decree, obliging paramilitary fighters to sign an oath
of allegiance to the Russian State, thus tying them more closely
to its armed forces. The decree applies to all members of “volunteer
formations” – a term used to describe private military companies,
whose existence is still formally illegal under Russian law.

In September 2023, the Ukrainian
military reported that around 500 Wagner Group fighters returned
to fight in the Donetsk oblast for the first time since its failed
mutiny.

The following months saw an expansion
of the Russian PMC activity in Africa. Media reported that the Wagner
Group, now under a strict supervision of the Russian Ministry of
Defence, underwent “rebranding” of its African operations and was
renamed “Africa Corps” – another obvious reference to Nazi Germany.
57. From mass murders of civilians and other war crimes in Ukraine

or Mali

to brutally murdering its own militants

– everywhere Wagner Group has shown
up, a long trail of evidence of atrocities followed (often voluntarily
shared by their perpetrators to brag and intimidate; they enjoyed
absolute impunity). Ukrainian intelligence services uncovered a
plot where a special operations unit, consisting of some 400 militants belonging
to the Wagner Group, had been deployed to Kyiv to assassinate Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky and his cabinet.

58. In the face of mounting evidence of serious violations of
human rights law and international crimes, the Russian Government
consistently denied the existence of the Wagner Group, allowing
it to operate with impunity in various conflict zones around the
world. This has raised serious concerns about accountability for these
actions and the need for an international legal response to ensure
justice for victims. To this end, the Parliamentary Assembly of
the OSCE adopted a resolution in which it determined “that the actions
of the Wagner Group on behalf of the Russian Government can rightly
be characterized as terroristic in nature and intent, and that designation
of the Wagner Group as a terrorist organization by national authorities
is therefore justified”. It further called on its member States
to take action against the Wagner Group, including through “its designation
as a terrorist organisation”.

A similar call was made by the European
Parliament in its resolution of 23 November 2022.

The
Council of the European Union has sanctioned the Wagner Group for
its actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity,
sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.

The Parliamentary
Assembly also invited national parliaments of Council of Europe
member States to designate the Wagner Group (as well as Kadyrov’s
Guard) as terrorist organisations and to call for the full accountability of
all military and paramilitary groups that participate in the Russian
aggression against Ukraine (Resolution 2506 (2023) “Political consequences
of the Russian Federation’s war of aggression against Ukraine”,
based on a report prepared by Mr Emmanuelis Zingeris (Lithuania,
EPP/CD) for the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy).

59. Several national parliaments of the Council of Europe member
States also resolved to designate the PMC Wagner as a terrorist
organisation (including Lithuania,

Estonia,

France

and the United Kingdom).

The United States Treasury Department
sanctioned it as a transnational criminal organisation, resulting
in disruptions of its global operations.

60. As noted by our expert, Jelena Aparac, due to the narrow scope
of Article 47, paragraph 2, of Protocol Additional I to the Geneva
Conventions, the Wagner Group is unlikely to fulfil the six cumulative
criteria set out therein, that would allow to qualify its fighters
as “mercenaries” under international humanitarian law. I agree with
that position, especially given that most Wagnerites are believed
to be Russian nationals

and there is not
enough evidence to conclude that they are being promised “material
compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to
combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces”.
61. Considering that personnel of Russian PMCs are believed to
serve under a private contract rather than as formal members of
the Russian armed forces, they are not regular soldiers either.
62. Although new information has surfaced as to the PMC Wagner’s
former leadership, its actual structure and evolution following
the 2023 events remain largely unknown. Ms Aparac and the research
conducted by the UN Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a
means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the
right of peoples to self-determination found no evidence of commercial
registration of the Wagner Group, making it unlikely that it would
formally qualify as a “private military and security company” (whose
operation would in any event be illegal under Russian law).
63. In the light of the foregoing and the scarcity of evidence
concerning the internal organisation of the PMC Wagner and its actual
command structure, the question arises as to whether its fighters
meet or met the criteria necessary to be qualified as “combatants”,
as defined in Article 43, paragraph 2, of Protocol Additional I
to the Geneva Conventions.

If they cannot be qualified as “combatants”,
this would of course not deprive them of basic guarantees of international
humanitarian law applicable to civilians; however, such “unlawful” combatants,
upon capture, could be tried and punished under domestic law for
their unprivileged belligerency (that is mere participation in the
hostilities) as they could not enjoy combatant immunity that is
applicable to prisoners of war.

In
any event, they could be prosecuted for the commission of alleged
international crimes committed in Ukraine, before the ICC or in
another State with jurisdiction, including Ukraine or any other
State under the principle of universal jurisdiction.

64. Regardless of the legal classification of Wagnerites under
IHL, Russia should bear full international responsibility for the
actions of its private military or paramilitary companies in Ukraine
and elsewhere. In order to establish the international responsibility
of States for conduct of private persons or groups of persons, we need
to refer to the ARSIWA. Article 8 requires that the acts be committed
under the State’s instructions, direction, or control to be attributable
to that State.

In its judgment in the case of Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (
Nicaragua v. United States of America),
the ICJ established the so-called “effective control” test, under
which actions of a non-State actor may be attributable to a State
itself, if that State “directed or enforced the perpetration of
the acts contrary”

to
international law. Although this establishes a rather high threshold
for attribution of private party’s unlawful conduct to a State (as
it requires effective control to be exercised “in respect of each
operation in which the alleged violations occurred, not generally
in respect of the overall actions taken by the persons or groups
of persons having committed the violations”),

I think that this threshold was
met in the case of Wagner Group and its participation in the war
of aggression against Ukraine. We should also not forget that State
responsibility could potentially be determined also on the basis of
acknowledgment and adoption of the conduct of Wagner as its own
(under Article 11 of ARSIWA).

65. In any event, what is clearly attributable to Russia is its
utter and complete disregard for its obligations stemming from international
humanitarian law and human rights law. According to Article 1 of
the Geneva Conventions “[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake
to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all
circumstances.” This obligation clearly includes a duty to prevent
and prosecute war crimes. In this context I also note that a case
against Russia is pending before the European Court of Human Rights, concerning
the alleged murder of a Syrian journalist by members of the Wagner
Group, in which the Court will have to examine Russia’s State responsibility
under the Convention.

66. I want to stress that neither a corporate veil, nor a “fog
of war” should prevent us from making sure that every single damage
caused by fighters of the Wagner Group and other Russian proxies
in the hostilities in Ukraine is included in the Register of Damage
for Ukraine, as already requested by the Assembly.

The international community must
hold Russia to account for actions of all troops under its control
or fighting on its behalf, be it regular soldiers, PMCs or fighters
in clandestine operations.
67. Before those responsible for their crimes face justice, we
must also address the risk that the Wagner Group and other Russian
PMCs continue to pose to the international community. Barbaric actions
perpetrated in Ukraine, Africa and the Middle East leave no doubt
that Wagnerites and other Russian PMCs will stop at nothing to further
the Kremlin’s political agenda. In this context, I commend the Parliamentary
Assembly of the OSCE and several of our member States who have already
designated the Wagner Group as a terrorist organisation. There is
no doubt in my mind that acts such as the indiscriminate killing
of innocent civilians

and booby-trapping children’s toys

with the purpose to provoke a state
of terror among the civilian population justify designating them
as such. The International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism of 1999 includes in the definition of terrorism
(for the purposes of criminalising the financing of terrorism) “any
other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a
civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the
hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of
such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population,
or to compel a government or an international organization to do
or to abstain from doing any act.”

This
definition was also incorporated in the Council of Europe Convention
on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds
from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (ETS No. 198, Warsaw,
2005). Both conventions oblige State Parties to seize, forfeit or
confiscate any funds used for the purpose of committing terrorism
or the proceeds of the crime. Given the nature of some of the atrocities
committed by the Wagner Group, I consider it fully justified to
designate its crimes against the civilian population as terrorism
(in addition to their qualification as war crimes

) and the group as a terrorist organisation.
Our experts on the Wagner Group seemed to consider that this would
not change much.

We should however not underestimate the
symbolic importance of such a designation. It would further confirm Russia’s
status as a State-sponsor of terrorism and have an additional deterrent
effect on those States and private entities that would consider
co-operation with Wagner or similar Russian PMCs.
68. Finally, the Assembly should invite the ICC to consider examining
the individual criminal responsibility of members of the Wagner
Group and other Russian PMCs and where appropriate issue arrest
warrants against them, in the context of the different investigations
and preliminary examinations opened in relation to Ukraine and different
countries in Africa. With a view to enhancing accountability and
truth-finding, it should also recommend to the UN bodies, in particular
the Human Rights Council, to set up an independent commission of
inquiry into all alleged violations of IHRL and international crimes
committed by members of the Wagner Group in different conflicts
around the world, including Ukraine and many countries in Africa.
This could also serve the purpose of examining more widely the role
that the Wagner Group has had in furthering Russian’s aggressive
foreign policy, focusing on its transnational dimension.
6. Conclusions
69. Since the beginning of the
Russian Federation’s large-scale aggression against Ukraine, the
Council of Europe, and in particular the Parliamentary Assembly,
have set an ambitious agenda to support Ukraine and its people and
ensure justice and accountability for all violations of international
law committed. A Register of Damage for Ukraine was established
in 2023 at the Reykjavik Summit and has recently started to receive claims
from Ukrainian victims. Although it will take time to deliver justice
and reparations, more needs to be done to meet the expectations
of the Ukrainian people and our own ambitions.
70. The Assembly should therefore urge member and observer States
to continue working on a comprehensive system of accountability
for all violations of international law arising out of the aggression, including
the crime of aggression committed by Russia’s political and military
leaders. The Assembly should strongly support the current consultations
within the Core Group with a view to finding a compromise on the model
of special tribunal for the crime of aggression, and as soon as
possible. The model based on a bilateral agreement between the Council
of Europe and Ukraine seems to be gaining traction and we should
support this as the best feasible option, while insisting on the
characteristics that would make the tribunal as international as
possible (for example, definition of the crime of aggression in
line with the ICC Statute, composition, etc.). As some have said,
by setting up a tribunal through an agreement with Ukraine, the
Council of Europe would not be acting only on behalf of its member
States. It would be placing itself in the service of the international
community as a whole, in order to uphold the international legal
order that was deliberately attacked by Russia.
71. Furthermore, the Assembly should strongly condemn all the
other international crimes committed in the context of the aggression,
including war crimes, crimes against humanity and most probably
genocide. It should welcome the ongoing work by all existing accountability
mechanisms, in particular the ICC and the Ukrainian authorities,
and invite all member States to contribute to such work through
their expertise, assistance, capacity-building and resources. With
regards to compensation, and in line with previous resolutions,
the Assembly should call on the Committee of Ministers to proceed,
as soon as possible and in consultation with the Register of Damage,
towards the establishment of an international compensation mechanism
under the auspices of the Council of Europe. Such a mechanism would
include an international claims commission and an international
trust fund, where all seized Russian State assets currently frozen would
be transferred. The Assembly should clearly support the seizure
and transfer of these assets as a completely valid legal option
under international law, as shown by many international law experts,
including some that our committee and other committees of the Assembly
have heard. This would be the best solution if we want to ensure
compensation for all the damage caused to Ukraine as a consequence
of the aggression and if we want to avoid placing an unfair burden
on the taxpayers of our countries. In addition, the Assembly should
express its support for all other options currently being examined
to make use of the frozen State assets and reiterate its call on
the international community to also repurpose the frozen assets
of Russian oligarchs for assisting Ukraine.
72. Finally, the Assembly should address the role of the Wagner
Group and its participation in the Russian aggression against Ukraine.
Individual criminal responsibility for the crimes committed in Ukraine
should be investigated, by the ICC or other States under the principle
of universal jurisdiction. A newly established UN-mandated commission
could look into the role of the Wagner Group in different conflicts
around the world and its multiple human rights violations. The Russian
Federation should bear full responsibility for the violations committed
by the Wagner Group in Ukraine and the related damage should be
covered by the future compensation mechanism.