1. Introduction
1. As the motion for a resolution
at the origin of this report (
Doc. 15564) highlights, after Russia’s occupation of Crimea and
Ukraine’s eastern provinces of Donbas and its full-scale invasion
in February 2022, “conventional targeting is accompanied by: removal
of archives; confiscation or replacement of history textbooks; indoctrination,
including through militarisation, of education; impeded access to
education in native, including indigenous, languages; de-contextualisation
of artefacts through relocation or changing narratives around them;
narrowing the diversity of commemorative practices; intentional
refusals to preserve cultural heritage to showcase certain layers
of history and erode others; distortive and ethnically-biased restoration
of cultural objects; and neo-imperial renaming of geographical sites.”
2. Though less visible, such hybrid infringements on culture,
history, language, education, and heritage sites create the basis
for gradual cultural erasure and denial of cultural identity. Such
deeply corrosive policies require “holistic action across the fields
of culture, education, heritage management, mass media, criminal accountability,
and remembrance policies.”
3. In the context of criminal accountability and compensation
for war damage, the Summit of Heads of State and Government in Reykjavik
in May 2023 decided to set up a Register of Damage Caused by the
Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine as a first
step towards an international compensation mechanism. It will therefore
be crucial to record accurately damages to cultural heritage and
cultural infrastructure (including museums, archives, libraries,
cultural centres, etc.) in Ukraine and to establish comprehensive
lists of looted objects and artefacts that were taken from museums
and archaeological sites, including in Crimea.
4. In my report, I therefore seek to contribute to this process,
by building on
Resolution
2057 (2015) “Cultural heritage in crisis and post-crisis situations”,
in
which the Parliamentary Assembly recommended that member States
together with the United Nations, consider reviewing and strengthening
the provisions of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and the Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and
its protocols.
5. I also pursue the idea expressed in the motion for a resolution
to “envisage Council of Europe guidance to develop an international
legal and policy response to such new forms of gradual cultural
erasure in the context of existing Council of Europe conventions
and international treaties.” It would be vital to legally consolidate
the notion that targeted actions to erase cultural identity are
considered a crime against humanity. The human rights approach has
a key role to play in transitional justice and reconciliation in
terms of specific legal obligations for respecting and protecting
cultural heritage in times of war and for all groups and communities,
including the prohibition of discrimination based on cultural identity.
6. My report examines issues concerning the erasure of cultural
identity in war and peace, with a focus on the present situation
in Ukraine, while referring also to the situation in the Western
Balkans, Belarus, and the South Caucasus region.
7. I wish to thank all the experts
we
have heard from during the preparation of the report, for sharing information,
and thoughts on required action, and in particular Dr Robert Pickard,
who has assisted me in preparing a detailed and well-documented
report and accompanying bibliography.
2. Damages and threats to culture and
heritage
2.1. The
situation in Ukraine
8. Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014,
occupying the Crimean Peninsula and parts of Eastern Ukraine.
Numerous
violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian
law followed,
including
those affecting cultural heritage, namely the unlawful and wanton
appropriation of public, municipal and private property, unauthorised
archaeological excavations, unlawful transfer of artefacts, apparent
and disguised destruction of cultural sites. These violations also
included the reshaping of curatorial narratives so that they do
not show Ukrainian and indigenous Crimean Tatar layers of a particular
site, changing education curricula to represent a Russia-centric
vision of history of Ukraine’s occupied territories, and persecution
of those opposing these and other occupation policies.
9. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February
2022, UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization) has monitored the situation on the ground, regularly
updating statistics on the number of journalists killed, educational
institutions and cultural sites damaged.
As
of 10 April 2024, UNESCO has verified damage to 351 sites – 129
religious sites, 157 buildings of historical and/or artistic interest,
31 museums, 19 monuments, 14 libraries, and 1 archive. Russia’s
indiscriminate targeting of Ukraine’s civilian objects, including
cultural property, and the suppression of manifestations of Ukraine’s
cultural identity have been confirmed by the United Nations – Report
of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine
to the Human Rights Council (A/HRC/55/66, 18 March 2024).
10. On 1 March 2024 in Kharkiv, Ukraine, President of Ukraine,
Volodymyr Zelensky, and Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Mark
Rutte, signed the Agreement on security cooperation, recognising
that the armed conflict has damaged the cultural heritage of Ukraine,
through negligence, disregard or even purposeful attack, motivated
by malice or malign intentions.
11. Article 9 of the Second Protocol (1999) to the Hague Convention
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
(1954) prohibits the modification of cultural property in occupied
territory in a way which is “intended to conceal or destroy cultural,
historical or scientific evidence”.
This
is well illustrated by the destructive reconstruction of the 16th
century Khan's Palace in Bakhchisaray, comprising a compact architectural
ensemble of 17 buildings and 9 inner closed courtyards – a symbol
of spiritual significance to the indigenous Crimean Tatar community
and placed on UNESCO’s tentative list for World Heritage status
in 2003. The occupying power began works in 2017, which are expected
to continue until 2024, involving dismantling of roofs with heavy
equipment causing structural damage by vibration, damage to authentic
appearance by removal of original roof tiles and oak beams and modern
replacements, damage to frescoes and ancient stained-glass windows
and loss of artefacts in the ground through the installation of
modern engineering networks without proper archaeological investigation.
The so-called restoration works have caused significant harm by
not considering historic value and the principle of reversibility,
and impact on identity by destroying layers of Crimea’s history
of particular significance to the Crimean Tatar community.
12. Since 2017, a Russian opera and ballet festival has been held
annually on the ruins of the ancient (5th century BC) Greek city
of Tauric Chersonese and its Chora (inscribed on the World Heritage
List 2013). Large-scale installation work has caused damage to the
site including destruction of archaeological artefacts. In March
2023, the Korsun Children’s Centre (a large art school building)
was opened. This was the first part of a five-stage large-scale
construction plan for further development around the walls of the
ancient city, including a Museum of Christianity and car parking.
As such, it provides evidence of further mismanagement and the impact
on the site. More significantly, the development plans are aimed
at transforming the site into a Russian place of pilgrimage. This
is based on the false premise that the site is the cradle of Russia’s
Orthodox Christianity from which a unitary Russian national State
and the Russian nation emerged,
and
therefore further denigrating its historic value. In May 2023 it
was reported that gold artefacts from the Byzantine period had been
taken from Chersonese and illegally “exported” out of Crimea for
the first time for a museum exhibition.
13. Unlawful archaeological investigations (including underwater)
have taken place without verifying context sensitivity or the presentation
of findings, such as in relation to the construction of the Tavrida
highway to connect the Kerch Bridge with Crimea for Russian military
occupation of the peninsula, resulting in the destruction of Muslim
burial places. The UN General Assembly has stressed that the construction
of the Kerch Bridge enhanced the militarisation of the occupied
peninsula.
Such conclusions add nuance to the
security reverberations of violations affecting cultural heritage,
including cultural erasure.
14. Widespread looting has occurred in Crimea since 2014, including
of objects and paintings of the Crimean Tatar people. Many Russian
occupiers are allegedly leaving Crimea with cultural objects and
over 1 000 such artefacts from Crimean Museums have been traced
to Russia between 2014-2020. Over 500 000 Crimean museum items have
been included in Russian museum catalogues. In addition, more than
12 000 monuments of Crimean history and culture have been included
in the State register of objects of cultural heritage in Russia.
15. Religious communities having or assumed to have a pro-Ukrainian
position have been subjected to persecution and aggression in Crimea.
Ten mosques, which are important for Muslim Crimean Tatars, are
no longer operable, and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine is suffering
similarly with a seven-fold decrease in functioning parishes. The
occupying administration supports “loyal” public and religious organisations,
but they remain under Russian control; religious communities that
refuse to obey are subjected to political persecution and harassment.
16. In a rare case, it has been reported that the Spanish police
made arrests, including an Orthodox priest alleged to be the leader
of a criminal network for trafficking artefacts from occupied Ukraine,
namely over 11 pieces of ancient gold jewellery that had been smuggled
out of Crimea after the annexation in 2014. In its import declaration,
the suspect had used false documentation to claim that they belonged
to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which can be differentiated from
the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Parliament has given
initial approval to a law that would ban the Moscow-linked Ukrainian
Orthodox Church.
17. After 24 February 2022, Russian forces have decimated cultural
infrastructure and heritage across Ukraine: destruction and damage
to museums, libraries, archives, theatres, places of worship and
cemeteries, historic buildings, and locations where people access
culture. Four days after the invasion, Russian shelling damaged
the Ivankiv Museum (Kyiv region); one day later Kyiv’s Holocaust
Memorial at Babyn Yar, and shortly after, the Drobitsky Yar Holocaust
Memorial outside of Kharkiv, were severely damaged.
18. There is evidence of widespread looting of cultural objects
from public and private collections in the occupied territories.
In April 2022, Ukrainian officials from Mariupol reported that Russian
forces stole and moved more than 2 000 unique items from museums
across southern Ukraine, including works by the 19th-century Mariupol
native Arkhip Kuindzhi, the painter Ivan Aivazovsky, a unique handwritten
Torah scroll, and the Gospel of 1811 made by the Venetian printing
house for the Greeks of Mariupol. Later in 2022, looting of over
1 700 objects from Melitopol Museum of Local History, including
198 Scythian gold artefacts, and of 15 000 objects from the “Oleksiy
Shovkunenko” Kherson Art Museum, the Kherson Regional Museum and other
cultural venues was reported.
19. Following the inscription of Odesa's historic centre on the
World Heritage List in January 2023, Russian missile attacks in
July 2023 caused significant damage. Parts of the Transfiguration
Cathedral were reduced to rubble, 25 historic buildings were damaged,
as well as Odesa’s Archaeological, Maritime, and Literary Museums.
While Russian forces denied responsibility, UNESCO Director-General,
Audrey Azoulay, strongly condemned the brazen attack and urged Russia
to comply with its international obligations.
This
followed condemnation of an attack in the buffer zone of the World
Heritage site of Lviv and 19 attacks recorded by October 2023 on
Chernihiv, placed on the Tentative List in 1989. To spotlight the
ongoing cultural damage, the historic centres of Odesa and Lviv
and the inscribed sites in Kyiv were placed on UNESCO’s “in Danger”
list in September 2023.
20. Apart from the above examples, Russia is targeting cultural
heritage for ideological reasons to force cultural assimilation
and expansion of the Russian sphere of influence (often referred
to as “Russian World” or “Russkiy mir”): destruction of memorial
plaques written in Ukrainian, renaming of cities, villages and other administrative
units, changing Ukrainian road signs of cities, villages and streets
to Russian ones, and requiring cultural events and expression at
schools, universities, and local history museums to reflect Russian
history and narratives. Russia further expands its one-dimensional
historical narratives among its own youth and the wider population
in Russia itself, parallel to and intertwined with intense militarisation.
This cleansing approach has been witnessed in many other conflicts,
for example in the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.
2.2. The
situation in Belarus
21. The problem in Belarus is more
cultural suppression than damage to cultural heritage. The government has
been implementing a consistent policy of Russification since 1994,
which has begun to take on a clearly- expressed punitive character
for speakers of the Belarusian language and creators of Belarusian
culture since 2020, when mass peaceful protests took place against
the disputed results of the presidential election.
22. The repression has not ceased even after three years. Thus,
even in 2023, there were no less than 1 499 violations of cultural
rights and human rights against workers in Belarus’ cultural sector.
Censorship
in the country is being implemented through “black lists” of politically
“unreliable” writers, artists, photographers, actors, musicians,
tour guides, and museum workers. The State controls the number and
location of cultural events, required by law to obtain permissions
from the relevant authorities, as well as theatre repertoires, film distribution,
museum exhibitions, musical works, etc. The Department of Ethnology
and Folklore was abolished at the Belarusian State University of
Culture. In 2023, another 35 non-profit organisations dealing with
dance, local history, ethnic minorities, those working in the field
of heritage protection and other areas of culture were forcibly
liquidated. In total, since 2020, at least 218 NGOs related to the
cultural sphere of Belarus have been subjected to forced liquidation.
23. Belarusian theatres are reducing productions based on the
works of Belarusian authors to a minimum. A similar situation exists
in the field of exhibitions, music and concerts, where international
and specifically Belarusian works and creators are being replaced
by Russian actors, directors, musicians and corresponding repertoires,
thus destroying Belarusian works and lives of creative artists as
much as possible. Many Belarusian intellectuals, artists, musicians,
journalists, philosophers, writers and public figures who spoke
out against the violence in the country and the war in Ukraine have
been perceived as part of the political opposition and forced to
leave the country.
24. One of the main outcomes of closer integration with Russia
is the erasure of Belarusian culture. Numerous “roadmaps” of co-operation
in the cultural sphere have been signed between cities and regions
(for example between Minsk and Murmansk, Minsk and Saint Petersburg,
Mahilioŭ region and Bryansk region, Belarus and Rostov, Novosibirsk
regions, Tatarstan, etc.), and co-operation agreements between museums, theatres,
houses of creativity and other cultural and educational institutions
(for example Days of the Union State – a supranational entity of
Russia and Belarus, Days of Culture of Russia in Belarus, of Tatarstan
in Belarus, of the Pskov region in Viciebsk, of Saint Petersburg
in Minsk, etc.). As a result of these activities, the cultural sphere
of Belarus, while continuing to suffer huge professional losses
due to dismissals and banning of professionals disloyal to the regime,
is increasingly being filled with Russian cultural workers. Special attention
is paid to young people: for the year 2024, Belarusians have been
allocated 1 300 places in Russian universities according to the
quotas of the Government of the Russian Federation. In
December 2023, it became known that the new integration package
of Belarus and Russia for 2024-2026 would include 120 events, with
an emphasis on the cultural and humanitarian sphere.
25. On 12 September 2023, the Ministry of Culture announced the
timeline for a public discussion on the draft Concept of Developing
the National Cultural Space in All Spheres of Social Life in 2024-2026.
The document, among other things, contains the ideas of “traditional
value orientations of the Belarusian people”, “traditional Belarusian-Russian
bilingualism”, “revision of museum exhibitions dedicated to the
period of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth”, “creation of works of fine art by Belarusian authors
on State orders”, “protecting the domestic publishing market from
foreign competition”, “forming a repertoire policy for professional
and amateur creative teams”, a specific selection of content in
the academic subjects of “Belarusian Language”, “Belarusian Literature”,
“Russian Language”, “Russian Literature”, “World History”, “History
of Belarus”, “Social Studies” and other concepts that primarily
refer to the Soviet past and demonstrate the servile attitude of
officials to the issue of the role of culture for society as a whole.
2.3. The
situation in the South Caucasus
26. The South Caucasus is a region
with immense cultural, ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity. However,
the erasure of cultural monuments was already widespread in the
Soviet era. Initially in the name of modernity and anti-religious
propaganda and later in the post-Stalin era, national identities
were consolidated in the 15 republics of the Soviet Union which
favoured the “titular” majority at the expense of minority populations.
In the 1990s, the three republics in the South Caucasus became independent
States and ethno-territorial conflicts broke out. In addition to
threats to physical architectural heritage, there was also a trend
to suppress the culture of the other side through the deliberate
omission of historical facts in history coursebooks and the erasure
of literature and music written by “the other side” in the conflict.
27. In the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, culture is
still a sphere of contestation and battle. On the Armenian side,
damage was done to the few remaining mosques in the Armenian capital
Yerevan. However, the destruction of Armenian monuments in Azerbaijan
was on a much larger scale. The Azerbaijani Republic of Nakhchivan
had a large Armenian population historically, right up until the
early 20th century. In the last 30 years, almost all of its Armenian
cultural heritage has been destroyed. In particular a very famous and
beautiful medieval Armenian cemetery near the town of Julfa with
thousands of khachkar cross-stones which were destroyed in the early
2000s. Foreign visitors were denied access.
28. Since Azerbaijani forces gained control of the Karabakh region
in September 2023, almost the entire Armenian population has fled.
The region is home to some of the richest surviving Armenian heritage,
such as the famous Armenian medieval churches of Gandzasar and Amaras.
The historical viewpoint held in the Soviet era still prevails in
Azerbaijan that the monuments in Karabakh are not actually Armenian
but “Caucasian Albanian” and therefore Armenian-language inscriptions
are not considered genuine and can be erased. This represents a
serious threat to Armenian monuments in the region, especially since
an international presence and visits of UNESCO heritage experts
are denied. Caucasus Heritage Watch tries to monitor the situation through
satellite photography and has recorded damage to several monuments.
In March 2022, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the
destruction of cultural heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh and strongly condemned
the actions of Azerbaijan as it had violated international law and
had participated in the denial of the Armenian cultural heritage.
2.4. Lessons
from other conflicts
29. Deliberate attacks, resulting
in damage and destruction to cultural heritage, have been recorded elsewhere,
notably during the wars in the former Yugoslavia, which provide
lessons for the post-conflict situation for Ukraine. The Dayton
Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina was the first such agreement to
have heritage as a key aspect (Appendix 8). The establishment of
an independent Commission to Preserve National Monuments of Bosnia
and Herzegovina has had an important role in designating tangible
heritage and protection zones, endorsing the message of a “common
heritage”, and working especially with the younger generation. However,
its work has been diminished through the subsequent politicising
of the roles of Commissioners, lack of co-ordination between heritage
protection at different levels of government, especially spatial
planning (with a strong construction lobby in favour of new buildings),
lack of effective criminal sanctions, lack of finance and co-ordination
of funding agencies to support heritage rehabilitation, and the direct
focus on tangible cultural heritage without due consideration of
intangible issues and natural heritage.
30. The decision to reconstruct war-damaged sites serves the broader
community, fostering mutual recognition of heritage values and reconciliation.
However, it has often been fraught with difficulties, for example,
in terms of gathering relevant documentation about a site’s history
and how the remnants can be reused. There is also a need for guidelines
and technical assessments on the approach before works begin, for
monitoring during, and maintenance actions after. There is often
a lack of skilled craft workers and a need for traditional skills
development/training to fill gaps in knowledge (especially if there
is a post-war shortage), as well as for licensed and trained contractors
to ensure that the work respects the inherent heritage values. There
are issues concerning how to involve the community and religious
authorities in the process. There is also a need to focus on the
potential of heritage resources as a factor of sustainable development
and social and economic regeneration, including tourism, as well
as the diversification of funding to support heritage through other
sectors: tourism, development strategies, climate change, disaster
management, etc.
31. There are many examples from the wars in the former Yugoslavia
where the reconstruction process has not been satisfactory. For
example, the reconstruction of Prizren and Novo Brdo Fortresses
in Kosovo*
suffered
from a lack of documentary information, poor design and inadequate
implementation of works, lack of expertise and poor management,
damaging the authenticity of the fabric. The reconstruction of destroyed mosques
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo through Saudi funding led to
a more austere approach towards the decorated interiors which existed
in the Balkans. Many donors and stakeholders had different approaches
and requirements and were insufficiently co-ordinated. There was
a lack of capacity to manage processes through inadequate laws and
professional skills. However, there are some good examples, notably the
reconstruction of the destroyed Mostar Bridge and City Hall, and
Sarajevo’s National Library, as “symbols of reconciliation” and
civic pride, anchoring the community by restoring a “sense of place”.
The reconstruction of the Bazaars of Gjakova and Peja, Kosovo, whilst
not ideal in its approach, created a sense of identity in the urban
ensemble through the memory and history which they embodied.
32. The many war-damaged traditional Kullas (fortified houses)
in Kosovo, posed a particular challenge necessitating specialised
training in stone conservation. The actions of the NGO, ‘Cultural
Heritage without Borders’ (CHwB), have been exemplary in this context:
involving the community in building bridges in the reconciliation
process, providing training camps for young people (“learning by
doing”), using local foundations to channel funding properly, and
recognising heritage as a resource for development. In addition,
the RPSEE programme was significant in building a good approach
to the reconstruction process: developing preliminary interventions,
technical assessments, integrated rehabilitation actions and local
development pilot projects, co-ordinating institutional and legislative
frameworks, etc.
33. The Balkan experience also provides lessons on looting and
illicit trafficking and the difficulty of establishing procedures
for the return of stolen artefacts. The need for registering movable
artefacts associated with particular heritage sites and maintaining
that link through digital means has been emphasised as a way to stop
their movement to other religious sites and elsewhere, for example
in relation to icons. Inventory systems therefore need to be verified
and maintained. Emergency storage procedures for movable items at
risk and “Red Lists” (presenting categories of cultural objects
that can be subjected to theft and traffic) can assist in the recovery
process. The difficulty for police and customs officials in co-operating
across borders is increased by a lack of training on recognising
which items are of important heritage. Moreover, without proper
procedures for criminalising and dealing with trafficking, the work
to repatriate stolen goods is very difficult. Publicising evidence
of the movement of cultural objects can assist in raising the profile
of criminal investigations.
3. Erasure
of cultural identity through education, use of language and history
teaching
3.1. The
situation in Ukraine
34. On 12 July 2021, the Kremlin
website published an article by President Putin in which he claimed there is
no historic basis for the “idea of Ukrainian people as a nation
separate from the Russians”, that Russians and Ukrainians are “one
people”, and that no Ukrainian nation existed prior to Soviet Russia’s
creation of it. In other words, in Vladimir Putin’s view, everyone
and everything identified as Ukrainian is effectively fictitious. This
is the false premise for attacks on the culture, education, languages,
and history of Ukraine.
35. The Russian authorities have taken various steps to eradicate
Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar culture in Crimea since 2014. Apart
from damaging sites, they have harassed and threatened people who
produce and protect culture, and prevented the use of the Ukrainian
and Crimean Tatar languages in schools and in the media. Before
the occupation of Crimea, 7.2% of secondary school students studied
in Ukrainian, but after one year of occupation this had fallen to
0.1% and was only on a voluntary basis. The figure for those studying
in Crimean Tatar has remained at around 3%, however this is regarded
by the Ukrainian authorities as an overestimate and is unconfirmed
by the Crimean Human Rights Group. More critical is the situation
in Sevastopol where, out of over 43 000 students, just 149 study
in Crimean Tatar and only 5 in Ukrainian.
36. Russian authorities have banned access to independent media
including Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar language broadcasts, replacing
them with Russian programmes and a pro-Russian Crimean Tatar language station,
and have blocked online media, television, and radio stations.
37. Freedom of expression has declined in Crimea since 2014; by
August 2023, 186 Ukrainian citizens of Crimean origin had been imprisoned
for political motives, 129 being representatives of the indigenous
Crimean Tatars. Substantial fines have been imposed on people for
displaying clothing or tattoos representing Ukrainian identity and
16 journalists have been imprisoned with long sentences for highlighting
oppression by the occupying authorities.
38. Russian occupying authorities have not complied with the International
Court of Justice’s (ICJ) 2017 Provisional Measures Order requesting
that they ensure access to education in the Ukrainian language and the
functioning of independent representative institutions of Crimean
Tatars.
39. Russia expanded its campaign to erase Ukrainian culture, history,
and language in occupied territories through the so-called Donetsk
People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR). The
Russian language, curriculum and grading system have gradually replaced Ukrainian, combined
with courses on Russian and Soviet history and military training
preparations. While teachers in general were given the option of
retraining in Russian, teachers of Ukrainian language and literature
in the so-called DPR and LPR lost their jobs. At university level, rectors
have been dismissed and departments of Ukrainian history eliminated.
The campaign has also involved destroying Ukrainian history books
and literature, deemed as “extremist”, in public libraries in the
occupied territories of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. Occupying
forces have replaced seized books with books from Russia, which
teach students that Russia is their homeland and deny any distinct Ukrainian
cultural identity.
40. Since the invasion of other areas of Ukraine in February 2022,
a similar situation can be evidenced, for example in the Chernihiv
and Sumy regions. Decrees titled “On the Removal of Literature”
were applied in the Kharkiv region ordering the removal of school
textbooks and literature. Teachers were forced to re-register and sign
new contracts in compliance with Russian law. In Melitopol the occupying
authorities detained educators for their refusal to implement the
Russian curriculum. Many teachers from Russia have been recruited
by offering lucrative pay and cheap accommodation. The UN Commission
of Inquiry on Ukraine has documented the testimony of a former detainee
who said that Russian occupying authorities provided them “with
Ukrainian books to use as toilet paper”.
41. The picture is also well illustrated by Viktor Pendalchuk,
a school principal in Kakhovka, Kherson region, in a speech delivered
at the hearing of the committee on Culture, Science, Education and
Media in June 2023. When he refused to co-operate with the Russian
occupying authorities, a new head of education arrived “accompanied
by two stocky men and a woman …introduced as the new principal of
my school”. Furthermore, when he refused to hand over documents,
keys to offices and a description of school property, “men began
to threaten me and my family (quote: “The health of your wife and
daughters is not worth it … You have been here all the time from
the children of the Nazis and taught to hate the Russian people”).
“After taking everything they needed, they kicked me out of school
and told me not to show up there”. Subsequently, “armed men came
to my house, handcuffing me, throwing a hood [over] my head and
tying it with duct tape, threw me on the floor in a minibus face
down, putting an assault rifle to my back”. He was imprisoned in
a small cell where he was “threatened with electric shock torture”
and abused mentally and physically by the military and police officers. On
his last day of captivity over a period of more than five months,
he was questioned before being released and recalled being asked
“Why don't you want to cooperate? Why don't you recognise our authority?
We are here forever. If you wait for Ukraine, you will get here
again, but you will not come out again”.
42. From the start of full-scale invasion of Ukraine until 10
April 2024, UNESCO has identified 3 793 education institutions that
have suffered from bombing (3 428 damaged and 365 destroyed). Russian
attacks have also caused damage and destroyed many libraries including
the Youth Library in Chernihiv, the Central Scientific Library of
the Kharkiv National University and Korolenko Kharkiv State Scientific
Library and many other libraries including in Mariupol, Rubizhne,
Zaporizhzhia, Chasiv Yar and Kyiv. Archives have also been damaged
such as the Security Service archives in the Chernihiv region, which
included the former Soviet secret police documents related to the
Soviet repression of Ukrainians, and the archives of Vyacheslav Chornovil,
a defender of Ukrainian rights and freedom of expression.
43. The Education Ombudsman for Ukraine has also highlighted a
number of significant issues. From the start of the full-scale invasion
until 6 June 2023, 642 appeals have been received from citizens
of Ukraine in the occupied territories concerning the rights of
participants in the educational process. Some of the issues relate
to damage to educational institutions, but also of concern are:
the use of educational institutions for the needs of the Russian
military (accommodation, temporary dislocation); registration of
these institutions as legal entities in Russia; looting of equipment,
furniture, valuables; militarisation of education and Russian propaganda;
threats to teachers suspected of teaching Ukrainian programmes,
including being forcibly sent to 'training courses'; pressure on
parents to make their children study according to Russian programmes;
use of children as a source of information about their parents and
relatives; the problem of accessing help for children with special
education needs; and the requirement to have a passport of the Russian
Federation in order to receive medical treatment, pensions and employment.
The Ombudsman further viewed Russia’s actions as cultural and educational
genocide by violation of students’ human rights, depriving Ukrainian
children from studying in their “mother tongue” and cultural identity.
3.2. The
situation in Belarus
44. According to the results of
the general population census in 1999, 85.6% of Belarusians considered Belarusian
their native tongue, and in 2019 – only 61.2%. However, as of 2019,
28.47% of Belarusians (or 2 275 243 people) spoke Belarusian; 70.96%
spoke in Russian (or 7 990 719 Belarusians). Independent researchers
emphasise that such indicators do not reflect a natural process,
but are a consequence of a consistent policy of Russification and
discrimination against the Belarusian language and its speakers
by the State.
45. Over the past 5 years, the number of secondary school pupils
studying in Belarusian decreased from 128 900 people (in 2016/2017)
to 107 600 (in 2020/2021); and Russian, on the contrary, increased
from 851 700 pupils (in 2016/2017) to 949 200 (in 2020/2021). Belarusian-language
schools are mainly located in rural areas, while Russian-language
schools are located in the city and therefore have an incomparably
larger number of students. The number of Belarusian-language teachers
in full-time general secondary education institutions decreased
from 8 574 to 6 732 from 2005 to 2020. Only 9% of children receive
pre-school education in Belarusian. Only about 200 out of the 254 400
high school students are being educated in Belarusian. There is
not a single higher educational institution or special secondary
school where all subjects are taught in Belarusian, which interrupts
the full educational cycle and forces parents to send their children
to Russian-language kindergartens and schools.
46. UNESCO experts have recognised that the Belarusian language
is threatened: in the Atlas of the World's Languages in Danger,
Belarusian is designated as vulnerable. There are numerous cases
of repression against individuals for public use of the Belarusian
language.
47. For the period from 2020 to 2023, in Belarus, three independent
Belarusian-language publishing houses – “Januskievic”, “Knihazbor”
and “Zmicier Kolas” – officially ceased to work. The government
has published regulatory obstacles for the distribution of Belarusian-language
books within the country and for their export abroad. In 2022, only
12.43% of books were published in Belarusian. Curricula and textbooks
are being adjusted by orders of the Ministry of Education in accordance
with the political situation. Works of classic Belarusian literature
are being labelled as extremist and removed from educational programmes.
48. In accordance with an order from the Head of State, the authorities
exclude the practice of using the Belarusian Latin script in the
names of streets and topographic objects, returning to the transliteration
of Belarusian names and surnames from the Russian language.
49. Until 2020, the history of Belarus was presented in a distorted
way in the State-run education system, and after the revolution
of 2020, there has been a complete revision of history textbooks,
which now praise the Soviet period of the country's history. Under
the patronage of Russian ideologues, references to wars with the Russian
State are deleted from textbooks, and liberation movements are presented
as being imposed by external Western forces. On 2-3 June 2023, the
first Russian-Belarusian Forum of Historians was held in Minsk,
and opened by Sergei Naryshkin, Director of the Russian Foreign
Intelligence Service, who gave recommendations to Belarusian historians
on how to write Belarusian history correctly, observing that “a
tragic page in the history of the Belarusian lands is their existence
as part of the Commonwealth of Nations (Rzecz Pospolita) for two
centuries, when these lands were separated from Russia”. The historical
ties of Belarusians with Poles and Lithuanians were depicted as
“stories of the oppressors”.
50. Since 2021, secondary school pupils have already been studying
the new Russian-language textbook “History of Belarus, the 19th
— early 21st centuries.” In this textbook, there is not a word about
the Gulag and the Holocaust, but the collapse of the USSR is called
the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. School
textbooks entitled “Genocide of the Belarusian People” – which were
developed with the help of the General Prosecutor's Office – teach
Belarusian children in younger grades a distorted version of historical events
and directly equate current Belarusian nationalism with Nazism;
similarly to Russian propaganda attempts to equate modern Ukrainian
nationalism with Nazism. During 2023, a revision of Belarusian history was
carried out. As a result, Belarusian historiography lost nation-building
and nation-centric elements.
4. Future
measures for holistic action
51. This chapter examines possible
measures for holistic action across the fields of culture, education, heritage
management, mass media, criminal accountability and transitional
justice, including remembrance policies. Specific challenges to
relevant international legal instruments are outlined in the Appendix
to this report.
52. The main provisions of international law concerning armed
conflict and tangible cultural heritage overlap and are not fully
aligned. In response, UNESCO has launched an initiative entitled
“Heritage for Peace”, to provide practical responses to the needs
of States Parties to the 1954 Hague Convention and its Protocols, which
is aimed at the effective protection on a global scale of movable
and immovable cultural property during peacetime, armed conflict
and in post-conflict situations.
However, it is unclear if much progress
has been made.
53. The International Law Association (ILA) has identified a number
of gaps in international law and has established a committee on
“Safeguarding Cultural Heritage in All Stages of Armed Conflicts”
to look into three key aspects: gap analysis of the international
legal regime, identification of good practices to redress harm caused
to cultural heritage, and recommendations for addressing issues
comprehensively, including the aspect of cultural erasure.
54. The ILA’s initial gap analysis reflects on the Hague Convention’s
focus on peace-time activities (inventories, emergency measures,
removal of movable items for safeguarding, designation of competent authorities,
etc. per article 5 of the Second Protocol), and the prosecution
of violations. However, whilst there is some consideration as to
the close of hostilities regarding the return of cultural property,
the convention does not properly consider the challenges posed by
post-conflict situations, beyond an obligation to prosecute or return.
Furthermore, armed conflict has become more complex since the Hague
Convention including the use of cyberwarfare, for which the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) recently published rules of engagement
for civilian hackers involved in conflicts, apart from the fact
that cultural heritage can be a major contributor to the causes
of armed conflict: the “Russification” which has occurred, for example
by the destruction of memorial plaques and “cleansing” of signs
and place names.
55. Moreover, apart from tangible cultural heritage which may
have been damaged, destroyed, or displaced, intangible heritage
should also be the object of measures before, during, and at the
end of conflict. Both the European Parliament and the ILA have stated
that international law does not address intangible heritage in armed
conflict despite the fact that the impact is likely to be significant.
One isolated example is the decision to fast-track the inscription
of the “Culture of Ukrainian Borscht cooking” on the UNESCO List
of Intangible Heritage Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding.
However,
this approach cannot be taken for all aspects of Ukrainian intangible
heritage, and may be more political than practical.
56. The interconnectedness between tangible and intangible heritage,
as demonstrated by the definition of cultural heritage and heritage
communities in Article 2 of the Council of Europe Framework Convention
on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society (CETS No. 199, “Faro
Convention”, 2005) and in EU and UNESCO documents,
means that they should not be considered
in isolation: impacts on tangible heritage also have impacts on
individual and group identity and, therefore, are violations of
cultural human rights. Large numbers of internally displaced persons
and refugees from Ukraine have been separated from their communities
and their ability to have access to their heritage and participate
in cultural life has been impacted.
57. Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (1966)
– which
both Russia and Ukraine are Parties to – provides for the right
to take part in cultural life including the right to benefit from
cultural heritage. There are no exemptions in times of conflict
or emergency: human rights must be respected.
Citing the Faro Convention, the
first UN Special Rapporteur on cultural rights concluded that the right
of access to and enjoyment of cultural heritage forms part of international
human rights law.
58. A report of the second UN Special Rapporteur on cultural rights
stated that the “intentional destruction of cultural heritage” during
armed conflict could amount to cultural cleansing or erasure and
other violations of cultural rights, including the wilful neglect
of cultural heritage and letting others destroy heritage, for example by
looting. Furthermore, the report indicated that “sites may be destroyed
as part of a policy of removing from public spaces, symbols of past
events, of preventing the expression of narratives deviating from
official discourses regarding such events” and, thus, may provide
evidence of a policy of cultural cleansing. The Special Rapporteur
indicated that the human rights approach emphasises accountability
and the combating of impunity, noting that the International Criminal
Court (ICC) has made the destruction of cultural and religious sites
a stand-alone war crime.
In addition, the European Court
of Human Rights has found that, whilst there are no specific provisions
on cultural rights and cultural heritage, there are several rights
with cultural content or concerned with cultural heritage such as
the right to maintain the cultural identity of minorities and their associations.
59. The conceptualisation of heritage (in all forms), as a living
intangible heritage of social and cultural practices which underpin
the tangible aspects of sites, monuments and objects, should be
considered in a holistic way in terms of armed conflict. This should
be broader than simply legal responses, and consider heritage management
issues as well. Thus, not just protection, but also encompassing
safeguarding and recovery measures, including learning lessons from
other conflicts where cultural heritage has been a key factor. Recalling
the Assembly
Resolution
2057 (2015), the protection of cultural heritage during and immediately
after conflict is a human rights issue and should involve international
responsibility. However, from an international law perspective,
violations of human rights raise a number of issues in terms of
who is involved in the process and how matters are to be dealt with.
60. Transitional justice can play a part in the process to deal
with cultural heritage governance issues both amid, and in the aftermath
of, armed conflict including through legislative, administrative,
institutional, educational and technical measures. Acts of deliberate
destruction of cultural heritage should be addressed through holistic
strategies for promoting human rights and peacebuilding amongst
other things truth and reconciliation processes, including guarantees
of non-repetition. Indeed, it is arguable that the process of transitional
justice should be proposed and devised prior to a transition as
part of the efforts to end an ongoing conflict and to build peace
and not simply be seen as justice solutions. In this respect, whilst
the Government of Ukraine has initiated actions on conflict-related
issues via international adjudication and arbitration platforms,
and civil society has been instrumental in these justice efforts,
a need for broader considerations for truth-seeking, institutional
reform, reparations, memorialisation and preventative actions has
been recognised. This commenced through the establishment of a working
group on the reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories
(established in 2019) to develop a transitional justice roadmap
to identify approaches beyond the courts, which includes issues
relating to damage to Ukraine’s environment and cultural heritage.
61. Apart from collecting and preserving evidence of human rights
violations, and other crimes, to facilitate prosecutions, transitional
justice necessitates the consultation of people who have particular
connections to heritage in its various forms, such as cultural heritage
defenders who have recorded damage and safeguarded items during
conflict, and ensuring participation in the decision-making processes
of recovery and reconstruction of the communities concerned, including
religious communities, and marginalised groups, such as the Crimean
Tatar community. The Assembly
Resolution
2057 (2015) calls for the depoliticisation of the process
of reconstruction and for a non-discriminatory approach, to ensure
confidence building through intercultural dialogue.
62. The need for guidelines for the protection and reconstruction
of damaged or destroyed cultural heritage as part of a broader strategy
for preserving cultural identity and diversity in crisis and post-crisis
situations, for use by national and local authorities and international
donor organisations, has also been advocated. Lessons learned from
post-war former Yugoslavia regarding problems associated with the
facilitation of the reconstruction process, such as the need for
management plans and for co-ordination of external funding through
official channels, including for future maintenance, should also
be examined.
63. There have been some recent developments in identifying best
practices in this sphere. The Warsaw Recommendation on Recovery
and Reconstruction of Cultural Heritage (2018) proposes a set of
principles: values, conservation and reconstruction approaches,
documentation and authenticity conditions, reflection, memory and
reconciliation, etc. ICCROM’s PATH – Peacebuilding Assessment Tool
for Heritage Recovery and Rehabilitation (2021)
centres on four stages: the conflict
context, heritage in conflict, mapping stakeholders and peacebuilding,
as well as risk management for heritage recovery. However, the ILA
has found that these initiatives require additional theorising and
consideration in terms of international law, particularly as, without
proper safeguards, they may hinder the reconciliation process.
64. The use of remembrance policies and memorials should be an
essential part of reconciliation, post-conflict reconstruction and
transitional justice. It allows for a ‘multi-perspective approach’:
overcoming denials that fuel hatred, providing symbols for reparation
and public recognition of victims in conflict, developing reconciliation
policies between opposing groups and educational policies to assist
in preventing further conflict, redefining national identity through
policies on pluralism to acknowledge different communities, and encouraging
civic engagement and democratic citizenship.
The
memorialisation dimension of recovery is important for helping people
overcome the traumatic events of conflict, including the destruction
of their cultural heritage, providing a shared narrative of those
events that led to destruction, which can assist in fostering mutual
recognition, social cohesion and reconciliation. It can take many
forms, such as reconstructed heritage becoming places of commemoration.
Intangible heritage can be useful in changing discourse and perceptions, using
history teaching in formal and informal education, archives and
oral history projects reflecting personal histories, publications
and “memory walks” to address past mastering. In establishing memorialisation
policy, it is useful to draw on other experiences such as the “Mapping
Inclusive Memory Initiatives in the Western Balkans” (2020) and
the “Kosovo Memory” (2017) projects, as well as the work of the
International Coalition of Sites of Conscience worldwide network
covering over 350 sites.
65. However, memorialisation can be fraught with problems, as
exemplified by the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina where competing
narratives, historical accounts and antagonistic memorialisation
have been used to affirm and legitimise the respective identities
of different groups.
Initiatives that involve memorials and
“new heritage” can carry a risk of politicisation. Dominant narratives
must be balanced with the need to heal, as well as to commemorate.
66. The human rights approach should focus on education on the
importance of cultural heritage and cultural rights and teaching
of history that stresses its complexity, particularly in post-conflict
situations and especially for young people,
but also in other circumstances such
as in relation to Belarus. This has significance in the context
of the coercive educational policies under Russian occupation and
influence (educating Ukrainian and Belarussian youth in the Russian
language, reinterpreting Ukrainian and Belarussian history as Russian, militarisation
of education to eradicate Ukrainian identity through the
Yunarmia, etc.), which have an impact on
the younger generations’ connection with its cultural heritage.
Action could include the development of local networks (civil society
organisations, local communities and religious associations) for
awareness-raising, promoting peacebuilding efforts around cultural
heritage and truth and reconciliation processes for all stakeholders,
and educational programmes on cultural rights for all.
67. Digital technologies and mass media (including social media)
have been used by Russian propaganda as a means of disinformation.
However, in the right context,
mass media can be a positive tool for education (involving history
teachers, curriculum planners, designers of teaching material and
media professionals), enable critical analysis of the origin and
content of images and also contribute to the assessment of damage and
oppression. For example, monitoring and recording of damage done
to cultural sites and educational institutions all over Ukraine
are being continually updated by UNESCO,
using a cultural heritage monitoring platform
to geo-reference and visualise the results, with staff on-the-ground
verifying satellite and media reports. The CISS
NGO for
Crimea (based in Kyiv) involving academics and heritage professionals
uses satellite technology to record sites and monitors Russian databases
for movable heritage that has been transferred, including by web
interfaces. The SUCHO initiative
was launched in 2022 to safeguard
the digital cultural heritage of Ukraine at risk of destruction (including
photographs and other files stored on servers) with the assistance
of local volunteers. Independent monitoring and investigation of
attacks on cultural heritage, in all its forms, assist in providing
accountability, as well as post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding
efforts.
68. Ukraine is becoming a test ground for new ideas and tools.
However, there are many different media and digital systems in operation,
with different information from different sources. There is therefore
a need for more co-ordination and commonality in terms of centralised
data collection and presentation to assist with the management of
this information. The Council of Europe’s call for international
partners to co-operate with the Register of Damage Caused by the
Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine
may be a means to co-ordinate such
action. However, whilst cultural and religious heritage is identified
in this process, the remit is wider including the environment, civilian
infrastructure and attacks against civilian objects in a wider sense. Apart
from retaining a specific focus on cultural heritage, among all
the vast damage, it is also important that the Register and all
other similar initiatives apply to the whole scope of Russia’s aggression
since 2014 and not just since the full-scale invasion.
69. Finally, there is a need to raise awareness among, train,
and involve military personnel regarding the issues relevant to
the implementation of the Hague Convention and the requirements
of its Second Protocol governing the protection of cultural heritage
during armed conflict. Also, other actors must be given material and
technical assistance: from heritage professionals to ordinary people,
who act as defenders of cultural heritage, providing evidence of
damage on the ground, securing collections and maintaining cultural
memory for their communities, often in difficult and threatening
circumstances. From a human rights perspective, they should be supported
through the provision of safe locations and, if necessary, political
asylum.
5. Conclusions
70. Cultural erasure and the intentional
destruction of heritage can amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity
and solidify evidence of genocidal intent. The ICC may prosecute
encroachments on cultural heritage and, indeed, prioritises them.
However, amid the persistent lack of resources, the ICC might prioritise
other, even more devastating crimes, which implicate directly the
high-level commanders. Establishing an international tribunal such
as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) requires consensus which may be difficult to reach. Ukraine
is realistic in its demands and seeks the establishment of a special
tribunal with respect to just one crime, which is not covered by
the jurisdiction of existing courts – the crime of aggression. Therefore,
from a criminal justice perspective, there are two main avenues
to address violations affecting cultural heritage committed in Russia’s
aggression: in Ukraine’s domestic courts and in foreign domestic
courts, pursuant to the principle of universal jurisdiction.
71. The procedure of opening investigations under the principle
of universal jurisdiction differs in every State. Some States have
so-called “absolute universal jurisdiction” which allows them to
investigate a case against a person regardless of their nationality,
the nationality of the victim, the location where the offence was committed,
or the location of the suspect, because it is so egregious and poses
a threat to the international rule-based order as a whole. To launch
investigations into cultural heritage violations under absolute
universal jurisdiction, States need to have such violations criminalised
in their domestic legislation in the first place. This underscores
the importance for States to ratify international conventions including
the 1954 Hague Convention and its two Protocols, to implement their
provisions in domestic criminal law and to have the means to undertake
prosecutions domestically. However, as of February 2023, only 28
States had absolute universal jurisdiction.
Most States maintain
certain requirements, such as nationality or residency of a victim
and/or perpetrator, in order to prosecute. This means that prosecutions
can only start when a perpetrator is present in that country and
is a national or legal resident. It is important that States amend
their existing domestic legislation to enable swift and effective
jurisdiction over all international crimes.
72. Further guidance is also needed regarding the interpretation
of the term “imperative military necessity” (Article 6 of the Second
Protocol). While the destruction of cultural heritage may be necessary
to achieve a legitimate military purpose, the “imperative” necessity
requires consideration of “proportionality” which different courts
may interpret in different ways. In addition, the requirement not
to alter or change the use of cultural property (such as in the
case of Khan's Palace in Bakhchisaray and the ancient site at Chersonese)
may need re-examination to better consider the impact such an action
can have in terms of “cultural erasure”.
73. In general terms, the international legal framework concerning
cultural heritage in armed conflict remains fragmented, has overlaps
and gaps including in relation to new types of warfare and particularly
concerning the safeguarding of cultural heritage after conflict.
This includes how the reconstruction process should be conducted,
the safeguarding of intangible heritage, the responsibility of State
actors and the role of non-State actors. Lessons from the post-war
in Western Balkans indicate that the lack of proper safeguards and
accepted guidelines to shape approaches, can lead to inappropriate
actions or hinder reconciliation.
74. International and European heritage conventions have a part
to play, but this also requires States to ratify them and co-ordinate
the means to take action including with other States, such as cross-border
controls and involvement of international agencies in the case of
illicit trafficking of cultural objects. Raising awareness of looted
objects, standards for trade and creating safe havens for collections
can mitigate risks.
75. There is a need for further ratifications of some conventions,
more enhanced global co-operation and concrete measures including
through continued work to develop the synergies between the Hague
Convention and other conventions covering related fields in the
sphere of armed conflict and cultural heritage. In the meantime,
there is a need to raise awareness in the art market, for example
through the Red Lists developed by ICOM, which launched an Emergency
Red List of Cultural Objects at Risk for Ukraine (November 2022),
in co-operation with 11 museums, to help protect Ukraine’s endangered
cultural objects.
76. Independent monitoring of damage/destruction of heritage is
important, but efforts by different agencies should be co-ordinated
centrally. Registers of damage should focus more directly on cultural
heritage at risk, as well as on the wider aspects of damage or destruction.
All types of inventories and records should be digitalised to aid
cultural heritage management for safeguarding immovable, movable
and intangible heritage and particularly to address emergencies.
Cultural heritage “defenders” must be fully supported. Additionally, monitoring
is needed for accountability purposes in relation to heritage-related
crimes to help prepare forms of justice, either through criminal
prosecutions or other forms of transitional justice.
77. The intentional destruction of cultural heritage and prevention
of access to heritage can amount to a violation of human/cultural
rights. The human rights approach goes beyond preserving and safeguarding heritage
and has a key role to play in transitional justice and reconciliation
in terms of specific legal obligations for respecting and protecting
cultural heritage in times of war and for all groups and communities,
including the prohibition of discrimination based on cultural identity.
The living connections between tangible
and intangible heritage must be interrelated in this context.
78. Transitional justice requires broader considerations for truth
seeking, institutional reform, memorialisation, and reparations,
including guarantees of non-repetition, which can be regarded as
a category independent from reparation, focusing on prevention rather
than redress. Such guarantees could include relevant actions to
prevent the recurrence of violations concerning the erasure of cultural
identity and destruction of cultural heritage. This could include,
for example, the protection of cultural heritage defenders, promoting
mechanisms for preventing social conflict based on identity and
reviewing and reforming laws contributing to violations of international
human rights law and international humanitarian law regarding access to
and protection of cultural heritage.
79. Community participation is also all important in the decision-making
processes of the recovery and reconstruction phase. Memorialisation
has a role to play in fostering mutual recognition and reconciliation,
so long as the process does not become politicised and one-sided.
Education and awareness raising, including the use of media and
digital technology, are essential for ensuring that the right messages
are delivered, especially to the younger generation. The Council
of Europe’s education programme working towards trust building and
reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, aimed at enhancing common
understanding, capacity building and awareness raising, may provide
a useful example in this respect.
80. A revival of institutional capacity in culture, heritage and
education is necessary to implement heritage management, reconstruction
and post-conflict reconciliation actions including the management
of reconstruction processes and funding provided by external agencies
and donors. This will have to be supported by a clear strategy to
promote the post-conflict recovery of cultural heritage in the framework
of Ukraine’s National Recovery Plan (2022), priority action 14.
81. Finally, it should be stated that the apparent main goal of
the Vladimir Putin’s regime in Ukraine and Belarus is the colonisation
and formation of a single neo-imperialistic space. In Ukraine, this
is being achieved through military operations and forced Russification
in the occupied territories. In Belarus, colonisation is taking place
with the support and consent of the Belarusian regime that suppresses
any manifestations of civil freedom. The erasing of Ukrainian and
Belarusian identities and the widening of the borders of the “Russian World”,
pose a constant threat to neighbours, and in turn, may threaten
the stability of Europe as a whole.