1. Introduction
1. The right to freedom of expression,
including freedom of information protected by Article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5, “the Convention”), is a fundamental
constituent element of any democracy. However, this freedom can
be abused, and propaganda can be used to manipulate public opinion
and threaten the proper functioning of our democratic systems as
well as our common values and human dignity.
2. Propaganda’s manipulative effect has become even stronger
with the development of social media, creating a phenomenon of information
pollution on a global scale.
3. Propaganda is especially dangerous when emanating from state-owned,
state backed or state-run, also by proxy, media outlets. If dominant
in a given country, propaganda becomes an instrument for establishing authoritarianism
thus destroying not just media pluralism but also other basic foundations
of a democracy.
4. After the start of the war of aggression against Ukraine,
some Russian media outlets accused of “conducting disinformation
and information manipulation” aimed at the “destabilisation of neighbouring countries”
were sanctioned in March 2022 by the European Union by suspending
their broadcasting activities. Certain Council of Europe member
States (including Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Ukraine,
and the Republic of Moldova) imposed further sanctions or bans on
additional media outlets, either Russian or domestic, on the basis
of propaganda or disinformation.
5. One of the indicators of the legal approach to restrictive
measures is the state-of-origin consideration, namely the overt
or covert involvement and influence of a State that ultimately creates
a problem for the international community by being an aggressor
or sponsor of terrorism.
6. An example can be found in part of Ukraine’s sanctions model,
where following its Parliament’s declaration labelling Russia as
an “aggressor State” in 2015, an all-encompassing ban for the duration
of aggression and the 5-year transitional period afterwards was
introduced on ownership or participation in broadcasting entities
that are registered in countries formally recognised as an aggressor
State along with other restrictions.
7. Several neighbouring countries and the European Parliament
have declared Russia a “state sponsor of terrorism”, another label
instrumental in this approach.
Outlets that are under the permanent
direct or indirect control of such a State lose their claim to qualify
as independent media and present their output as quality journalism.
How and under whose authority such declarations or labels come into
being and which procedural safeguards are in place to prevent their
arbitrary and abusive application, remains a point of contention
that warrants close scrutiny.
8. I would like to recall here that any such restrictions on
freedom of information in Europe must be motivated by a legitimate
aim in accordance with the Convention, and must comply with international
human rights law. Legislation designed to combat propaganda and
the possibility to sanction media or individuals can lead to disastrous
consequences in the absence of an independent judiciary and independent
media regulators.
9. Censoring “problematic” media as well as content from certain
groups, can also reinforce the public perception that media regulation
is corrupt, and engineered to hide the “truth”. This could reinforce
conspiracy narratives and strengthen extremist voices.
10. The committee on Culture, Science, Education and Media has
already adopted numerous reports tackling the issues of information
disorders and propaganda.
My report will elaborate on these
issues in more detail, with a particular focus on how to treat harmful
propaganda, while preserving freedom of information. It is articulated
around the following axes:
- understanding
the problem and defining the concepts;
- analysing trends and challenges of propaganda in Europe;
- proposing responses and good practices to confront propaganda.
11. My analysis builds on the baseline report from Dr Andrei Rikhter,
Professor Researcher at the Comenius University in Bratislava, and
contributions from several other experts we heard from.
2. Understanding the problem and defining
the concepts
2.1. Freedom
of information and its limits
12. The basic universal standards
of freedom of expression, which include freedom of information,
are to be found in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR):
“Everyone shall have the right
to hold opinions without interference. Everyone shall have the right
to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless
of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form
of art, or through any other media of his choice”.
13. The right to freedom of expression is, however, not absolute;
its exercise “carries with it special duties and responsibilities”,
and it may be subject to restrictions (Article 19(3) and Article
20 ICCPR). The United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) noted
that “two limitative areas of restrictions on the right are permitted,
which may relate either to respect of the rights or reputations
of others or to the protection of national security or of public
order or of public health or morals. However, when a State Party
imposes restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression, these
may not put in jeopardy the right itself.”
In particular such restrictions
should meet the three-part test on legality, legitimacy and necessity/proportionality:
admissible restrictions must be prescribed by law, must be applied
only for those purposes for which they were prescribed and must
be directly related to the specific need on which they are predicated.
14. The three-part test is also implemented in Europe by the European
Court of Human Rights when assessing if an interference to freedom
of expression can be justified under Article 10.2 of the Convention.
The Court examines whether the interference was “prescribed by law”,
whether it had a legitimate aim and whether it was “necessary in
a democratic society” for the aforesaid aim. Concerning the “necessity”,
the Court determines whether a restriction corresponded to a “pressing
social need”, whether it was proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued and whether the reasons given by the national authorities
to justify it are relevant and sufficient (
Sunday Times v. the United
Kingdom, § 62).
15. The Court has stressed that the human right to impart information
and ideas “of all kinds” may not be limited to statements deemed
“correct” by the authorities: it extends to information and ideas
that may shock, offend and disturb (
Feldek v. Slovakia, § 83). Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance
and broadmindedness without which there is no democratic society
(
Oberschlick
v. Austria, § 57). Moreover, there is little scope under the Convention
for restrictions on political speech or on the debate of questions
of public interest as “freedom of political debate is at the very
core of the concept of a democratic society” (
Lingens v. Austria, § 42).
16. However, Article 10 of the Convention does not guarantee a
wholly unrestricted freedom of expression, even with respect to
press coverage of matters of serious public concern. Its exercise
carries with it “duties and responsibilities”, which also apply
to the media, for example, when endangering the national security
and the territorial integrity of a State (
Han v. Turkey, § 32). These “duties and responsibilities” apply to
media that are acting professionally, providing “accurate and reliable
information”, in accordance with the ethics of journalism (
Goodwin
v. the United Kingdom, § 39).
2.2. Propaganda
v. disinformation
17. Over the past century, propaganda
has been studied and defined by many scholars.
A recent legal review aimed at
defining propaganda agreed that it includes an element of manipulation
or distortion of the rational will of a person, and that it must
also have both persuasive power and a persuasive effect.
Most
of the modern academic definitions ascertain that propaganda aims
to control the flow of information and intentionally manipulates
and/or misinforms the public to change attitudes and behaviours,
to benefit the source over all others and/or to spread ideology.
18. Some authors clearly define propaganda referring to an
unethical (namely untruthful, inauthentic, disrespectful,
or unequal) intent.
Dictionary definitions of “propaganda”
also put an emphasis on systemic aspects such as influence and manipulation.
19. The term “propaganda” is not defined in international law.
Still, definitions can be found
in authoritative intergovernmental texts. In a 2015 Opinion, the
European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission)
of the Council of Europe stated that “‘propaganda’ usually makes
reference to an activity aimed at proselytising people to certain
ideas and opinions.”
The 2017 Joint Declaration by the
intergovernmental special rapporteurs on freedom of expression defined
propaganda as “designed and implemented so as to mislead a population,
as well as to interfere with the public’s right to know and the
right of individuals to seek and receive, as well as to impart,
information and ideas of all kinds”.
20. European institutions frequently use “propaganda” in their
public communication, sometimes interchangeably with “disinformation”,
and sometimes together with it.
This confuses the means with the ends,
since disinformation is just a tool – though a major one – in the
propaganda kit. Propaganda may use disinformation or half-truths,
be based on conspiracy theories or on truthful facts.
21. The term “disinformation” is defined by the EU institutions
as “verifiably false or misleading information that, cumulatively,
is created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally
deceive the public and that may cause public harm. Public harm then
includes threats to democratic processes as well as to public goods
such as EU citizens’ health, environment, or security”.
22. Propaganda relies on manipulation, which I would describe
as the intentional use of indirect or hidden tactics to control,
exploit or otherwise influence human behaviour, emotions, and relationships.
Nevertheless, social influence is not necessarily negative. For
example, it can operate to persuade people to change clearly unhelpful
habits and behaviours. “Social influence is generally perceived
to be harmless when it respects the right of the influenced to accept
or reject it, and is not unduly coercive”, however, “depending on
the context and motivations, social influence may constitute underhanded
manipulation”.
23. While I do not wish to assign to “propaganda” a negative connotation per se, this report will focus
on harmful propaganda which I would define as a systematic communication
activity of a massive scale, aimed to steer a particular thinking
and behaviour, through unethical methods and tools of psychological
manipulation, and with an intent contrary to human dignity and values
as defined by international treaties and our democratic constitutions.
2.3. Illegal
propaganda according to international law
24. Certain uses of propaganda
have been found impermissible in international law. Article 20 of
the ICCPR stipulates that any “propaganda for war shall be prohibited
by law” and that “any advocacy of national, racial or religious
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility
or violence shall be prohibited by law”.
25. Propaganda for war is defined by the UN General Assembly as
“all forms of propaganda, in whatsoever country conducted, which
is either designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression”.
The criteria
for the illegal act thus include an intent or a threat of hostilities.
26. Propaganda for a war of aggression (also called “propaganda
against peace”) are “measures tending to isolate the peoples from
any contact with the outside world, by preventing the press, radio
and other media of communication from reporting international events,
and thus hindering mutual comprehension and understanding between
peoples”.
27. The only exception is the “advocacy of the sovereign right
of self-defence or the right of peoples to self-determination and
independence in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.”
In the
current context in Europe, it is important to keep an eye on attempts
to include in the scope of this exception propaganda and the conducting
of an “ideological war”, “information warfare” or a “hybrid war”.
28. The General Court (Grand Chamber) of the European Union pointed
out in 2022
that
propaganda for war included: (1) propaganda “in favour of the military
aggression against Ukraine targeted at civil society in the [European]
Union and neighbouring countries”; (2) broadly understood propaganda
at war, described as propaganda being “part of the context of an
ongoing war”, started by an aggressor State, “in breach of the prohibition
on the use of force”; and (3) “not only incitement to a future war,
but also continuous, repeated and concerted statements in support
of an ongoing war”, unleashed contrary to international law, “especially
where those statements come from a media outlet under the direct
or indirect control of the aggressor State.”
29. The text of the Convention contains no reference to “propaganda
for war” and so far, the Court has referred to propaganda for war
only incidentally in the case of the characterisation of atrocities
committed by the Ottoman Empire against the Armenian people in 1915
as “genocide” (
Perinçek v. Switzerland).
30. International law also bans propaganda leading to incitement
of hate crimes. Article 20(2) of the ICCPR demands that States Party
ban in their law, national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. Like propaganda,
incitement is directed towards a non-defined group of people. “Incitement”
to hate crimes, denotes activity that requires the prior creation
of a certain climate in which the commission of such crimes is possible.
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg stated that hate propaganda
leads to the creation of such a climate.
31. Some UN instruments relate to the prohibition of racial discrimination,
which includes the prevention of propaganda of racist views and
ideas. For example, Article 4 of the 1965 International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
declares that “all propaganda” based
on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons
of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote
racial hatred and discrimination in any form, constitutes an international
offence.
32. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Article 3(c)) defines as a separate crime “a direct
and public incitement to commit genocide”.
The Additional Protocol to the Convention
on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe (ETS No. 185) calls for the
criminalisation of online dissemination of “racist and xenophobic
material”, that is “any written material, any image or any other representation
of ideas or theories, which advocates, promotes or incites hatred,
discrimination or violence, against any individual or group of individuals,
based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, as well
as religion if used as a pretext for any of these factors” (Article
2(1)), as well as “distributing or otherwise making available, through
a computer system to the public, material which denies, grossly
minimises, approves or justifies acts constituting genocide or crimes
against humanity” (Article 6(1)).
33. According to Article 17 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, “any act aimed at the destruction or excessive limitation
of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention” falls
outside the scope of the rights enshrined by the Convention, including
freedom of expression. This provision has seldomly been used by
the Court, except in “extreme” cases, for speeches denying the holocaust
and racist propaganda. However, limitations on the right to freedom
of expression because of illegal propaganda have been an issue in
several judgments of the Court, including the propaganda of terrorist
organisations.
34. The Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism
(CETS No. 196) calls for the criminalisation of “public provocation
to commit terrorist offences”: “the distribution, or otherwise making available,
of a message to the public, with the intent to incite the commission
of a terrorist offence, where such conduct, whether or not directly
advocating terrorist offences, causes a danger that one or more
such offences may be committed”.
EU legislation bans distribution,
or otherwise making available by any means of a public message,
with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist offence,
including the glorification of terrorist acts, and advocating the
commission of terrorist offences.
35. It is important to emphasise the distinction between mere
propaganda and materials intended to incite acts of terrorism. To
be held liable for incitement to terrorism, a demonstration of the
requisite intent and a direct causal link between alleged propaganda
and an actual plot or execution of a terrorist act may be required.
36. In 2022, certain European institutions elaborated their opinions
on foreign propaganda that constitutes a threat to democracy and
security, in particular to informational security. The Venice Commission
found it to be “legitimate [for the Republic of Moldova] to ban
the broadcast of content that clearly and directly endangers democracy
and poses a threat to national security.”
Such programmes were namely those
spreading disinformation, extremist ideas or justifying international
crimes.
It concluded,
that all the terms used in the provisions of the Republic of Moldova’s
law under its review (“hatred“, “disinformation“, “propaganda of
military aggression“, “extremist content“) have in common the fact
that programmes with this content, regardless of the country of
origin, “run counter to the fundamental values of the ECHR and are
detrimental to democracy”.
37. A Decision and Regulation of the Council of the European Union
was directed against certain media actors in Europe, that were engaging
in manipulative propaganda narratives related to the war in Ukraine
and directed by Russia.
These measures were taken on the
basis of the sanctions regime of the EU Treaties.
The recitals of both the Decision
and the Regulation pointed out that the Russian Federation “has
engaged in a systematic, international campaign of media manipulation
and distortion of facts in order to enhance its strategy of destabilisation
of its neighbouring countries and of the Union and its Member States”,
whereby it is of particular importance that “[t]hese propaganda
actions have been channelled through a number of media outlets under
the permanent direct or indirect control of the leadership of the
Russian Federation.” The legitimising factor is attributed to the
observation that “[s]uch actions constitute a significant and direct
threat to the Union’s public order and security” and “are essential
and instrumental in bringing forward and supporting the aggression
against Ukraine, and for the destabilisation of its neighbouring
countries.”
38. These EU sanctions received their share of criticism
but were confirmed by the General
Court of the European Union, which concluded that “the news reporting
at issue, which covers propaganda activity, (…) cannot be said to
have been of a kind calling for the enhanced protection afforded
to press freedom under Article 11” of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (“Freedom of expression and information”).
Although in both national and European
cases, the sanctions against “anti-democracy” propaganda were substantiated
by Russian aggression in Europe and are considered as temporary
special measures, such propaganda may constitute other grounds for
being prohibited under international law.
39. Summing up, several forms of public speech may be found illegal
in Europe. They require judicial action by the State Parties to
the relevant international conventions and serious consideration
by the States in other contexts, with their responses appropriate
and in line with international human rights law standards. They
are:
a. propaganda for war;
b. incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence based
on national, racial or religious identity;
c. propaganda based on ideas or theories of superiority of
one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin;
d. a direct and public incitement to commit genocide or other
international crimes;
e. dissemination of racist and xenophobic materials;
f. public provocation to commit a terrorist offence;
g. foreign propaganda that clearly and directly endangers
democracy and poses a threat to stability and national security.
2.4. Harmful
propaganda, which international law does not prohibit
40. There is a need to distinguish,
at the level of law and policy, propaganda prohibited by international
law from other forms of harmful propaganda.
41. Harmful propaganda uses aggressive practices. Those include
divisive political advertising, highly targeted political advertising
aimed at exploiting personal vulnerabilities, fears and beliefs,
leaking private information, verbal abuse perpetrated by hired “trolls”
and through the use of artificial intelligence (AI) systems, fomenting
social divisions and creating mistrust towards public institutions
and society.
42. Such propaganda may be manipulating people and distorting
public opinion. Freedom of information, and in particular freedom
of individuals to obtain and circulate information on current affairs
without hindrance, as well as to take part in public dialogue and
have a say in politics and decisions on matters of public interest, may
thus fall prey to propaganda.
43. Furthermore, when it is pervasive, massive, and systematic,
harmful propaganda is detrimental to freedom of the media as it
corrupts and destroys the core of the profession of journalism,
affecting public trust in a free media.
44. One ultimate aim of manipulating people – through indoctrination,
“brainwashing”, or content curation – may be to infringe their freedom
of opinion, often without their knowledge and consent. Propaganda
can cause serious and lasting harm to public mental health through
experiencing trauma, fear or grief, or through severe paranoia caused
by conspiracy theories.
45. Certain cases of harmful propaganda may be declared illegal
by national legislations and therefore subject to limitations, since
respect of the rights of others and protection of public health
can serve as legitimate reasons to restrict freedom of information.
However, the limitations must be consistent with the “three-part
test”.
46. Several States in Europe and European institutions tackled
the issue of propaganda of certain ideologies, by banning propaganda
of Nazi ideology and symbols. Some Central and Eastern European countries
also have laws banning communist propaganda. Several other countries
have banned the use of totalitarian or unconstitutional propaganda
without specifying whether or not the regulation extends to a particular
ideology.
47. In 2015, the Venice Commission and the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) gave an opinion on the practice
of prohibition of propaganda of ideologies and symbols of the communist
and Nazi regimes,
which emphasised the issue of
necessity when applying a prohibition
of propaganda of “totalitarian ideologies”, highlighted flaws in
applying other elements of the three-part test, and noted that the laws
under consideration were not in conformity with European standards.
In 2022, however, the Venice Commission reconsidered its conclusion
in the specific context of the Russian aggression against Ukraine
by saying that the national (Moldovan) authorities were entitled
to argue that “the display of the symbols used by the Russian armed
forces in the current war produces an actual and immediate danger
of disorder and a threat to the national security and the rights
of others”, and that there is a pressing social need to impose a
ban on such use.
48. Propaganda of totalitarian ideologies has also been subject
to considerations by the European Court of Human Rights. In
Vajnai v.
Hungary, the Court stressed, that “the potential propagation”
of “offensive, underlying, totalitarian ideology”, “obnoxious as
it may be, cannot be the sole reason to limit it by way of a criminal
sanction.” In the Court’s view, a legal system which applies restrictions
on human rights in order to satisfy the dictates of public feeling
– real or imaginary – cannot be regarded as meeting pressing social
needs recognised in a democratic society, since a society must remain
reasonable in its judgement. To hold otherwise would mean that freedom
of speech and opinion is subject to the heckler’s veto. The Court
also noted the importance that the propagandist in question had
been qualified as one without “known totalitarian ambitions”.
3. Trends
and challenges of propaganda in Europe
49. Russian propaganda is at the
origin of this report and is at the centre of the concerns of Council
of Europe member States, in neighbouring countries of Russia, but
also in Western Europe.
50. Because of the Russian attack on Ukraine, European States,
especially in Central and Eastern Europe, now have legitimate reasons
to be concerned for their national security. Russia’s aggression
against Ukraine and the arrival of a large number of war refugees
have also exacerbated internal political, economic and social tensions.
Under these exceptional conditions, certain propaganda that would
be considered acceptable in times of peace, would produce today
an immediate danger of disorder and a threat to national security
and the rights of others, including those of Ukrainian war refugees,
thus creating a pressing social need to impose a ban on its use.
In
Kirkorov v.
Lithuania, the Court accepted that the entry in Lithuania of a
famous Russian singer posed a threat to national security since
“various means of propaganda, including […] popular music singers,
such as the applicant, […] had been employed by the Russian Federation
against the Baltic States”.. Similarly, in
Zarubin
and Others v. Lithuania, the Court concluded that the expulsion of Russian journalists
for their aggressive and provocative behavior that could undermine
national security was compliant with freedom of expression.
51. As mentioned above, the Council of the European Union banned
Russian media outlets in the framework of EU sanctions against the
Russian Federation. Some European Union member States (Bulgaria,
Germany, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland) did not wait, however,
for the European Union to act on Russian media outlets. While some
measures were taken on the basis of the European Union’s Audiovisual
Media Services Directive (AVMSD),
in some cases, the national regulatory
authority in question or the relevant State body banned channels
on the basis of previous EU sanctions against Russian legal or natural
persons.
52. Some non-EU countries have also taken measures against Russian
channels. A key instrument in this regard is the European Convention
on Transfrontier Television (ECTT),
which creates a legal framework
for the free circulation of television programmes in Europe. Since
Russia never ratified the ECTT and Belarus is not a party to it,
some countries have introduced restricting measures for broadcasters
from countries that have not ratified the ECTT. Actually, the ECTT
could be a useful tool to co-ordinate measures against propaganda throughout
Europe. Unfortunately, the Council of Europe decided to discontinue
work on transfrontier television in 2011 and, as a result, there
is no longer a body overseeing the application of the ECTT.
Moreover, the ECTT does not include
VOD services and video-sharing platforms in its scope. Therefore,
a revision of the ECTT, or a new convention, could have a beneficial
impact in the fight against propaganda on European screens. This
was already recommended by the Assembly.
53. Despite all these sanctions, Russian propaganda continues
to operate in Europe. In Italy, reports show that Russian propaganda
managed to access mainstream media,
partly “because TV producers wanted
to increase their share of certain shows with heated debates”. In
France, an intelligence report published by the Office of the Prime
Minister in February 2024 brought evidence of “structured and co-ordinated
propaganda networks” in the country,
with the aim of covering the Russian-Ukrainian
conflict by presenting the “special military operation” positively
and denigrating Ukraine and its leaders.
54. In a resolution adopted on 8 February 2024, the European Parliament
expressed its concerns over Russia supplying narratives to far-right
political parties and actors in Germany and France with the aim
of “subverting public support for Ukraine”, and over the widespread
disinformation and illegal content spread on the social media platform
X, formerly known as Twitter.
55. Disinformation and propaganda are often shared outside of
the mainstream media, and influencers play a really important role
in how people will obtain information about conflicts and politics.
Russian bloggers have really grown in profile, have an extraordinary
access to the frontline of the war and are playing a key role in
how people get and interpret information about it.
56. Internet shutdown is increasingly used by States in times
of conflict.
This can partly be a consequence of
the increasing use of online platforms by the parties to an armed
conflict, including States and non-State actors, to spread war propaganda
or state-sponsored propaganda. This trend has become prominent in
the illegal invasion of Ukraine. As a response to such propaganda,
platforms are constantly adjusting their policies. These private
actors must interpret and enforce very complex legal standards.
This may lead to shortcomings in terms of protection of fundamental
rights, since platforms are not subject to transparency in every
country. Also, in countries where there is no legal scrutiny, platforms
allow illegal content such as propaganda for war or incitement to
genocide, in contrast to countries where scrutiny and public pressure
are much tougher.
57. The 2nd “Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference
Threats”
of the European External Action
Service (EEAS) found five main targets of propaganda in Europe:
information consumption, citizens’ ability to vote, candidates and
political parties, trust in democracy, and election-related infrastructure. For
example, months before the 2023 Polish elections, Belarusian state-affiliated
media created Polish-language channels on social media targeting
audiences in Poland with daily content. Such channels were used to
spread Belarusian and Russian manipulated information in Polish
throughout the entire period leading up to the elections.
58. Another report produced by the European Digital Media Observatory
(EDMO)
in November 2023, which was based
on 900 fact-checking articles published in the context of 11 elections
in 10 different European countries, showed that literally all potential
topics were subject to disinformation and propaganda narratives: the
war in Ukraine, climate change, the EU institutions, gender issues
and LGBTIQ+ community, immigration, refugees, religion, health and
Covid-related policies.
59. LGBTIQ+ people are specifically targeted by propaganda. In
a report published in October 2023,
the EEAS identified 31 cases of
foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) against
LGBTIQ+ people between June 2022 and July 2023. “The reach of FIMI
cases targeting LGBTIQ+ goes beyond this community. (…) FIMI actors
aimed to provoke public outrage not only against named LGBTIQ+ individuals,
communities, or organisations, but also against government policies,
the concept of democracy as such, and local or geopolitical events.
While undermining LGBTIQ+ people was a common theme in many of the
FIMI cases identified, the overarching narrative in many of them
was that “the West is in decline”.
60. “Medical propaganda” has been a major concern in Europe since
the Covid-19 pandemic. In some member States, doctors and scientists
are calling for such disinformation to be considered as manipulative propaganda,
which leads to “disturbance of the public peace” and “endangering
public health”.
This would build on previous
legislative examples, like the case of France, where since 2017
disseminating false information on abortion on digital platforms
is considered a specific offence.
61. Climate change is also subject to propaganda, sometimes with
the clear intent of political manipulation on social media. According
to a study carried out in 2023,
“the proportion of Twitter accounts
with inauthentic behaviours [about climate change] has increased
significantly since 2019 on a global scale, pointing to possible astroturfing
operations”. Most of these accounts have also shared pro-Kremlin
propaganda about the war in Ukraine.
62. There is a correlation between receptiveness to propaganda
and trust in government. According to surveys covering central and
eastern Europe,
in countries with low trust in
government such as Poland, Bulgaria and Slovak Republic, the idea
that “democracy does not exist because hidden elites rule the world”
is more likely to be spread among the population, with over 50%
of respondents in Slovak Republic and Bulgaria agreeing with this
idea.
4. Conclusion:
constructive approaches to counter propaganda in Europe
63. Countering propaganda requires
international, multidimensional, and multi-stakeholder responses
that are in compliance with freedom of information, and the proactive
engagement of intergovernmental organisations, States, business
enterprises, civil society, including the media and all other stakeholders.
64. The desire to find an international solution to the challenges
of propaganda intensifies today with the cross-border role that
online and broadcast media, as well as social networks and digital
platforms, play in informing the public. Propaganda threats have
led to a wider intervention by European governments and institutions
in freedom of information matters for example through licensing,
regulation of cross-border broadcasting and of political advertising,
co-regulation of oversight of social networks, and direct sanctions
on foreign media. Today, these tools are tested against global commitments
on freedom of expression, freedom of information, and media freedom.
Responses to propaganda should
vary according to its type.
4.1. Countering
illegal propaganda
65. Article 17 of the European
Convention on Human Rights is a strong instrument to counteract propaganda,
though it must be used carefully and exceptionally.This
norm impedes an activity aimed at the destruction of any human right
guaranteed by the Convention (such as the right to life and non-discrimination) from
relying on the protection the Convention affords. In particular,
a “remark directed against the Convention’s underlying values” is
removed from the protection of Article 10 by Article 17 (
Lehideux
and Isorni v. France). For example, in a case concerning the denial of crimes
against humanity perpetrated by the Nazis against the Jewish community,
the Court found the applicant’s complaint under Article 10 incompatible
with the fundamental values of justice and peace, and inferred from
that observation that he had attempted to deflect Article 10 from
its real purpose by using his right to freedom of expression for
ends which were contrary to the text and spirit of the Convention
(
Garaudy
v. France). In the context of propaganda of terrorist organisations, Article
17 was applied in
Roj TV A/S
v. Denmark where the withdrawal of licenses from the broadcaster
which promoted Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terror operations
was considered compatible with the Convention.
66. However, in
Perinçek
v. Switzerland, which concerned the denial of the Armenian genocide,
the Court considered that “it was not necessary, in a democratic
society, to subject the applicant to a criminal penalty in order
to protect the rights of the Armenian community at stake in the
present case.” Under Article 17 of the Convention, the decisive
point was whether the applicant’s statements sought to stir up hatred
or violence, and whether by making them he attempted to rely on
the Convention to engage in an activity or perform acts aimed at
the destruction of the rights and freedoms laid down in it. According
to the Court, this issue was “not immediately clear” and overlapped
with the question of whether the interference with the applicant’s
right to freedom of expression was “necessary in a democratic society”.
67. The question whether propaganda incites the population “to
hatred and hostility” is fundamental in this regard. In
Zana
v. Türkiye, the Court found that the criminal penalty imposed by
the national courts answered a pressing social need. The judgment
said, in particular that, “at a time when serious disturbances were
raging in south-east Türkiye”, a statement on the Kurdish question
coming from a political figure well known in the region during an
interview with journalists in which he indicated his support for
the PKK national liberation movement, and which coincided with the
murders of civilians by PKK militants, "could have an impact such
as to justify the national authorities’ taking a measure designed
to maintain national security and public safety.”
69. For example, in
Ceylan v. Türkiye, the applicant, a trade union leader, was imprisoned
with the further loss of certain political and social rights for
the “offence to incite the population to hatred and hostility by
making distinctions based on ethnic or regional origin or social
class.” The Court found the applicant’s conviction disproportionate
as the messages, despite their virulence, did not encourage the
use of violence or armed resistance or insurrection. In the Court’s
view, this is a factor which it is essential to take into consideration.
70. For restrictions on propaganda to be compatible with freedom
of information they must be enforced consistently with the rule
of law. This should also be the case when our democracies face propaganda
as a form of hybrid war employed by an “aggressor State” or a “State
sponsor of terrorism”: to be effective, any restriction to counter
this propaganda should firmly rely on clear-cut definitions and
a solid basis in normative acts.
4.2. Dealing
with harmful, but not illegal, propaganda
71. Propaganda can be harmful without
being illegal. This does not mean that it should not be countered. Over
the past year, several “media resilience-building measures” were
created, such as “strategic communication” which consists of balancing
the information space with pro-democracy / positive narratives, “debunking”
and fact-checking (including concerning politicians),
in
addition to minimising the spread of disinformation by blocking
and banning harmful websites, social media accounts and content
pieces.
However,
temporary internet shutdowns and/or “government counterpropaganda”
are not always appropriate, nor efficient. Ukrainian counterpropaganda
efforts have still been found to be less effective than Russian propaganda.
74. In the past eight years, EU institutions have consistently
adopted and implemented several resolutions, strategic communications,
and action plans, directed in particular, at countering harmful
but legal propaganda. They comprised perhaps the most comprehensive
political response among all intergovernmental organisations.
75. A fundamental pillar of the EU strategy is the 2022 Digital
Services Act (DSA).
The DSA “harmonises the rules applicable
to intermediary services in the internal market with the objective
of ensuring a safe, predictable and trusted online environment,
addressing the dissemination of illegal content online and the societal
risks that the dissemination of disinformation or other content
may generate”.
76. Illegal content is defined by member States and EU legislations.
The DSA only creates the rules on how to tackle illegal content
through a number of provisions, for example on orders to act against
illegal content, transparency reporting obligations, internal complaint
handling and obligations to reverse decisions, trusted flaggers
status for expert bodies etc. The rules concerning the individual
handling of potentially harmful (but not illegal) content are quite
limited because they refer only to the terms of service. For example,
if there is some kind of internal rule against harmful information,
it can be dealt with via internal complaint handling, but there
are no other obligations under the DSA.
77. The DSA applies to four types of services: intermediaries,
hosting services, online platforms, and Very Large Online Platforms
and Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOPSEs), with increasing
obligations depending on the type of service. It has a risk-based
and systemic approach. Nothing in the DSA calls for removal of a
content that is not strictly illegal, but it aims at the mitigation
of risks. When it comes to users, it is very protective of their
freedom of expression, but it is also very protective of the freedom
to conduct the business of the platforms themselves.
78. The DSA has a special focus on VLOPSEs due to their reach
in terms of recipients. VLOPSEs must assess the systemic risks stemming
from the design, functioning and use of their services, as well
as from potential misuse by the recipients of the service, and should
take appropriate mitigating measures in the observance of fundamental
rights (Article 34 DSA). This risk assessment must include the following
systemic risks: (a) the dissemination of illegal content through
their services; (b) any actual or foreseeable negative effects for
the exercise of fundamental rights; (c) any actual or foreseeable
negative effects on civic discourse and electoral processes, and
public security; (d) any actual or foreseeable negative effects
in relation to gender-based violence, the protection of public health
and minors and serious negative consequences to a person’s physical
and mental well-being.
79. VLOPSEs must put in place reasonable, proportionate and effective
mitigation measures, tailored to the specific systemic risks referenced
above, with particular consideration to the impacts of such measures
on fundamental rights (Article 35 DSA).
80. The DSA has also introduced a “crisis response mechanism”
(Article 36 DSA) which enables the European Commission to require
VLOPSEs to “initiate a crisis response as a matter of urgency" when “extraordinary
circumstances lead to a serious threat to public security or public
health in the Union or in significant parts of it”. Moreover, the
European Commission may initiate the drawing up of voluntary crisis protocols
to co-ordinate a rapid, collective and cross-border response in
the online environment (Article 48 DSA).
81. Another pillar in the EU strategy against disinformation is
the 2022 Strengthened Code of Practice on Disinformation,
which sets out 44 extensive and
precise commitments by platforms and industry to fight disinformation
and 128 specific measures, in the following areas: demonetisation;
transparency of political advertising; ensuring the integrity of
services; empowering users; empowering researchers; empowering the fact-checking
community; transparency centre and task force; and strengthened
monitoring framework.
82. Regarding electoral processes, the European Commission published
on 26 March 2024 guidelines for VLOPSEs to mitigate systemic risks
online that may impact the integrity of elections, with specific
guidance for the European Parliament elections in June 2024.
Among others, VLOPSEs should: implement
elections-specific risk mitigation measures tailored to each individual
electoral period and local context; adopt specific mitigation measures
linked to generative AI; facilitate the use of adequate mitigation
measures, including in the areas of foreign information manipulation
and interference, disinformation and cybersecurity; adopt specific measures,
including an incident response mechanism, during an electoral period
to reduce the impact of incidents that could have a significant
effect on the election outcome or turnout; assess the effectiveness
of the measures through post-election reviews.
83. The EDMO works to strengthen and enable collaboration among
a multidisciplinary community of stakeholders tackling online disinformation.
It can count on a network of 14 national or multinational hubs active across
28 countries in the European Union and European Economic Area, which
bring a unique potential to understand and act upon specific digital
media vulnerabilities in the areas they cover.
84. The European Media Freedom Act
could be of interest to the non-EU
Council of Europe member States as a model for national governments
to handle the threats of propaganda. It proposes quality media as an
antidote against propaganda, including foreign information manipulation
and interference.
85. This notion of “quality media” involves several elements such
as editorial independence from political parties and foreign countries,
independence of governance structures of public service media, increased transparency
of media ownership and transparent, objective, proportionate and
non-discriminatory criteria for the allocation of public funding
to purchase advertising.
86. Europeans’ relationship with the media varies across the continent,
but in most countries, citizens have low trust in the media and
perceive many mainstream outlets as partisan and biased. This perception
of the media is important, because not only does it determine which
news sources people seek out but it also influences their likelihood
of consuming “alternative media” or avoiding news altogether, both
of which may make them more vulnerable to propaganda.
Recommendation
CM/Rec(2022)4 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
on promoting a favourable environment for quality journalism in
the digital age includes guidance on verification and quality control
to regain credibility and public trust in the media, but also explicitly recognises
the role of media and information literacy in building social resilience
against disinformation.
87. To differentiate between independent
bona
fide news media from (State) propagandists, it is advisable to
look into indicators that reflect the core of independent media
and quality journalism,
such as the adherence to and
actual use of editorial guidelines, journalistic professional standards,
self-regulation mechanisms, the extent of public control and transparency
of media ownership. These are not exhaustive, but they provide an
insight into the level of opaqueness that is irreconcilable with
independent media and quality journalism.
88. Forms of self-regulation, such as independent press councils,
(digital) ombudspersons or organised peer reviews, may assist in
finding the balance between independence and keeping political censorship
at a distance. In addition to independence and ensuring professionalism,
they also serve as a tool for media accountability. Decisions of
self-regulation bodies can also lay the grounds for the courts and
national regulatory authorities to distinguish
bona fide journalists from propagandists
who operate under the alias of media actors. In 2016, the media
councils of the countries of the EU Eastern Partnership (as well
as that of Russia) even approved specific and practical criteria
to distinguish between propaganda and journalism in the mass media.
89. A special focus should be put on AI content, which can be
a very powerful instrument for propaganda, especially through so-called
“deepfakes” (an image or recording that has been convincingly altered
and manipulated to misrepresent someone as doing or saying something
that was not actually done or said). In order to counter this phenomenon,
both the
Council
of Europe and the
European
Union are finalising ground-breaking legal instruments regulating
many aspects of AI. In particular, the European Union’s AI Act states
that content that is either generated or modified with the help
of AI – images, audio or video files need to be clearly labelled
as AI generated. Ensuring data transparency is certainly necessary
in this regard, but transparency alone will not have a substantial
impact without rules on how algorithmic systems have to be designed.
In that sense, regulatory authorities in charge of overseeing such
systems will play a fundamental role.
90. In the meantime, the tech industry is already self-regulating
itself. As an example of this, in February 2024, several leading
technology companies agreed on a “Tech Accord to Combat Deceptive
Use of AI in 2024 Elections,”
with commitments to “deploy technology
countering harmful AI-generated content meant to deceive voters”.
The signatories pledged to work collaboratively on tools to detect
and address online distribution of such AI content, drive educational
campaigns, and provide transparency. The digital content addressed
is AI-generated audio, video, and images that are “deceptively fake
or alter the appearance, voice, or actions of political candidates,
election officials, and other key stakeholders in a democratic election,
or that provide false information to voters about when, where, and
how they can vote”.
91. There are additional, classic tools that deal with propaganda.
These include rules on balance and accuracy in broadcasting; independence
of media regulators endowed with proper competencies and financial means;
prominence of public service media with a special mission to include
all viewpoints; a clear distinction between fact and opinion in
journalism; transparency of media ownership, etc. As stated in the
Assembly report entitled “Guaranteeing media freedom and the safety
of journalists: an obligation of member States”,
the defence of public service media
and the fight against media capture are two key elements to counter propaganda,
as well as professional media ethics. An important feature of propaganda
media, for example, is that they avoid making publicly available
their editorial guidelines (if these exist at all) or programming principles,
statutes (by-laws) of the outlets, their professional codes, codes
of ethics for their journalists, or any other professional standards.
92. Good practices to counter propaganda exist within the media
sector. Some public broadcasters such as the BBC have set up a special
“Anti-disinformation unit”.
France
Télévisions launched a dedicated “News MediaLab” to tackle propaganda
and disinformation.
Numerous other major
media, including traditional print media and news agencies, now
include “debunking” and “fact-checking” in their activities.
93. A last element to take into consideration is the engagement
of citizens in countering propaganda. In the fight against disinformation
and propaganda, it is crucial to equip the public with the skills
and knowledge they need to recognise, use and value quality information
and journalism, and to discern and interact with information critically.
Media and information literacy programmes should help contextualise
current affairs and human rights, improve understanding of the importance
of free media and debunk accusations of bias that undermine faith
in the media, and eventually assist in the development of critical
thinking and encourage people to become interested in the news,
particularly the educationally disadvantaged and young people. A key
part of these programmes should aim to put vulnerability to propaganda
high on the public agenda followed by support to the participants
in independently discerning facts from opinion, recognising bias
in reporting and conspiracy narratives, corroborating, and verifying
the accuracy of news, and responding to problematic content and
actors. Moreover, other useful initiatives include community-building
activities that get people off social media and target loneliness,
participatory democracy initiatives to increase trust in local/regional governance,
and the use of psychology and behavioural science in targeting vulnerable
communities with messaging in language they understand.
4.3. Summing
up
94. Solutions against propaganda
content must necessarily be multifaceted. Propaganda should be addressed
in view of safeguarding media pluralism and freedom of information.
States, however, should not focus on fighting against propaganda,
but rather on acting in favour of
fundamental rights such as freedom of expression and freedom of
information. They must distinguish between responses to illegal
and legal but harmful forms of expression and should only restrict
the distribution of illegal content. Similarly, platforms should
use content removal as a measure of last resort.
95. In view of these conclusions, concrete action is proposed
in the draft resolution.