1. Introduction
2. Contrary to the
Council
of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (CETS No. 197), which provides a complementary legal
framework to the existing international instruments on preventing
and countering trafficking in human beings, no instrument on the
smuggling of migrants has yet been adopted by the Council of Europe
which would cover the various necessary human rights protection
and fight against crime aspects that the reality of this crime involves.
3. At the 4th Summit of the Heads of State and Government on
16 and 17 May 2023, European leaders recommitted to the fight against
the trafficking and the smuggling of migrants through international
co-operation “while continuing to protect the victims and respect
the human rights of migrants and refugees, as well as supporting
frontline States, within the existing Council of Europe frameworks”
(
Reykjavik
Declaration).
4. In 2023, the European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC) was
mandated by the Committee of Ministers to “within the existing Council
of Europe frameworks, consider and explore concrete ways to improve international
co-operation in fighting the smuggling of migrants, thereby also
considering the protection from aggravated instances of migrant
smuggling, with full respect for their human rights and taking into
account the relevant legal framework, and prepare a report assessing
the need for and feasibility of a possible instrument in this field”.
5. Against the background of the discussions among the EU institutions
on the revised “Facilitators’ Package” and ahead of the CDPC’s feasibility
study to be published by the end of 2024, I was honoured to be appointed
rapporteur on this issue. This report aims to give the Assembly’s
political input in a timely fashion to the current discussions on
migrant smuggling across Europe.
6. This report does not aim to be exhaustive but to draw together
the main elements of the elements to be considered in shaping a
rational and pragmatic political and legal response to the smuggling
of migrants. It will aim to demonstrate that preparing this response
in alignment with the rule of law and with the Council of Europe’s
framework of related standards will allow all member States to reconcile
the two aspects often – and erroneously – considered as mutually
exclusive or even in conflict: States’ sovereign right to control
their borders, and the rights of people on the move.
2. Conceptualising migrant smuggling:
shaping the scope of a criminal act
2.1. A
crime intersecting with many others: procedural and co-operation
challenges
7. Taking action against the smuggling
of migrants requires a transversal approach, both to ensure that preventive
measures are effective against the main drivers of this crime and
also because the committing of this criminal offence is enabled
and facilitated through the perpetration of many interrelated crimes
such as money laundering, document fraud, counterfeiting and illegal
attempts to obtain citizenship of a State.
8. One of the challenges at stake is to stop this business from
being profitable: co-operation is needed to allow for the freezing
and even the seizing of assets in a context where the benefits may
be financial or non-financial, and which may be kept or invested
in a way that may not be easily traceable by State authorities. Indeed,
the role of corrupt officials in facilitating the conduct of this
act has unfortunately been documented in some instances.
9. Another challenge is the confusion which is often evident
between the smuggling of persons and the trafficking in human beings.
Although both are considered as a form of international organised
crime in the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT), and although the two
crimes may be interrelated in some instances (smuggled migrants
are at risk of being victims of human trafficking), these crimes
are distinct in nature. Contrary to the trafficking in human beings,
which does not necessarily involve the crossing of an international
border, and where victims are persons subjected to deceit, violence
and exploitation for the purpose of profit making, it is the State
which is affected by the smuggling of migrants.
10. In its latest General Report, the Group of Experts on Action
against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) regretted that trafficking
in human being cases “are requalified as other offences which carry
lighter penalties, such as pimping, procurement, facilitation of
irregular migration (migrant smuggling) or labour law violations,
either due to a lack of evidence or to the fact that the alternative
offences are easier to prove.”
11. In the case of an investigation of an instance of migrant
smuggling with aggravated circumstances, a protection-oriented environment
may help restore the rights of the migrant who is the victim of
such abuse and build trust with potential witnesses during the investigation
and possible prosecution process.
12. The crime of migrant smuggling is, by its very nature, a cross-border
matter and any attempt by nation States to solve this issue individually
is therefore likely to fail. A clearly articulated and legally sound
definition that would ensure a common understanding and interpretation
of what the crime of migrant smuggling does and does not entail
is therefore highly desirable to facilitate and encourage cross-border
co-operation on this phenomenon.
2.2. International
standards
13. In 2000, the United Nations
adopted the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) which
was complemented by three protocols, targeting specific areas and
manifestations of organised crime: the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children;
the
Protocol
against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (hereafter the “Palermo Protocol”); and the Protocol
against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms,
their Parts and Components and Ammunition.
14. The Palermo Protocol entered into force in 2004 to support
State parties to prevent, investigate and prosecute the crime of
migrant smuggling, understood as a form of organised crime which
is transnational in nature and involves organised criminal groups
(Article 4). It provided the first international response to the “significant
increase in the activities of organized criminal groups in smuggling
of migrants and other related criminal activities set forth in this
Protocol, which bring great harm to the States concerned” and “can
endanger the lives or security of the migrants” (Preamble).
15. It defines the crime of migrant smuggling as “the procurement,
in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other
material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State
Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident”
(Article 3).
16. Migrants are not considered victims of smuggling but as “objects”
of criminal acts which challenge the sovereignty of States and whose
safety and rights are put at risk when such criminal acts are committed.
This rationale provides justification for Article 16 of the Protocol
to focus on the protection and assistance measures to safeguard
the rights of persons who have been the object of the conduct criminalised
pursuant to Article 6 of the Protocol. It also explains why the
Protocol considers that a criminal law response to the crime of
migrant smuggling should be more severe if the life, the dignity,
or the safety of migrants are deliberately put at risk during or
for the purpose of the conduct of the criminal act, including for
exploitation. These are thus to be considered as aggravating circumstances
(Article 6.3).
17. In the same logic, Article 5 clarifies that smuggled migrants
shall not be liable to prosecution “for the fact of having been
the object of conduct set forth in article 6 of this Protocol.”
State parties should co-operate to ensure the prompt return of smuggled
migrants who have no legal leave to remain, exercised in compliance with
international refugee law and in particular the fair assessment
that return would not infringe the rights of the person returned,
in line with the principle of non-refoulement.
18. Article 17 of the Palermo Protocol encourages State parties
to conclude bilateral or regional agreements or operational arrangements
or understandings aimed at implementing the Palermo Protocol, and
also at “enhancing the provisions of this Protocol among themselves”
if they so wish. This is the case for example with the Bali Process
on people smuggling, trafficking in persons and related transnational
crime, established in 2002: co-operation between 45 countries is
structured in working groups, one of them dedicated, for instance, to
the “Disruption of Criminal Networks involved in People Smuggling
and Trafficking in Persons.”
As
of January 2024, 45 member States of the Council of Europe had signed
the Palermo Protocol (Andorra has not) and 43 had ratified it (Iceland
and Ireland have only signed up to it).
19. On connected crimes but also on protection standards that
have some relevance to preventing and addressing the crime of migrant
smuggling, international standards offer a wide range of instruments
and tools such as the UN Convention against Corruption, to which
all member States of the Council of Europe are party, and the International
Labour Organization’s Conventions protecting the rights of migrant
workers (Conventions No.143 and No.105), the International Convention
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members
of their Families, as well as the UNCAT, the UN Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees, and the UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child.
20. State Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees cannot impose penalties, on account of their irregular
entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory
where their life or freedom was threatened, enter or are present
in their territory without authorisation, provided they present themselves
without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal
entry or presence (Article 31(1)). Indeed, the right to leave any
country, including one’s own, is recognised in international human
rights law under Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, in Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the European
Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 46) which has a binding force
for all State Parties.
2.3. The
Council of Europe’s standards
21. The European Convention on
Human Rights (ETS No. 5) imposes positive as well as negative obligations
on all State Parties which, if fulfilled, should ensure that smuggled
migrants are not criminalised for a crime that they have not committed
(Article 6) and that any situation of vulnerability arising from
being smuggled may be prevented or addressed so they can fully enjoy
their right to liberty (Article 5), be protected from labour exploitation,
inhuman and degrading treatment (Article 3).
22. A conference convened in 2017
laid the ground for
the adoption in 2020 of the Action Plan on Fostering International
Co-operation and Investigative Strategies in Fighting the Smuggling
of Migrants (
CDPC(2019)9fin) by the European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC).
The final observations published as an outcome of the conference
clearly state that “criminal justice measures in response to smuggling
must ensure that the human rights of smuggled migrants are protected
at all times while present in Council of Europe member States and
during their return to countries of origin or transit countries,
in compliance with Articles 2, 3, 5, 8, 13 of the ECHR and Article
4 of Protocol 4 of the ECHR.”
23. As of today, two of the activities of the action plan have
been realised: the establishment of
the
Council of Europe Network of Prosecutors on Migrant Smuggling in December 2021, composed of 26 country representatives;
and the publication of country profiles on the legal and judicial
framework on migrant smuggling in member States. The Network has
met twice since its establishment, mostly providing a forum for experts
to exchange on their practices and challenges faced. As to the country
profiles, 25 member States have contributed their input, available
online.
26. The European Social Charter in its original version (
ETS
No. 35) and the European Convention on the Legal Status of
Migrant Workers (
ETS No. 93) provide for the protection of migrant workers who are
nationals of a contracting party. The latter convention, signed
by 11 member States, posits that “every migrant worker accepted
for employment [to] be provided prior to departure for the receiving
State with a contract of employment or a definite offer of employment”
(Article 5) and the issuance of emigration papers in a prompt fashion
and which are “free of charge or on payment of an amount not exceeding
their administrative cost” (Article 4).
27. The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (
ETS
No. 126) ratified by all member States, and the Council of Europe
Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and
domestic violence (
CETS
No. 210) which 35 member States have ratified so far, lie at
the crossroads between the available preventive tools and sanction
mechanisms for human rights violations. Their enforcement is reinforced
by the ability of the European Court of Human Rights to act in cases
of alleged breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human
Rights.
28. Finally, it is important to highlight the recent Recommendation
CM/Rec(2022)211 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on preventing
and combating trafficking in human beings for the purpose of labour exploitation.
Indeed, the risk of abuse of smuggled migrants, including for the
purpose of labour exploitation, is greater if the risks of exploitation
are not prevented, and if victims of exploitation are not identified.
2.4. The
European Union standards
29. In 2002, the Council Directive
2002/90/EC defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit
and residence (the 2002 Directive) was adopted to “combat the aiding
of illegal immigration both in connection with unauthorised crossing
of the border in the strict sense and for the purpose of sustaining
networks which exploit human beings”, together with the Council
Framework Decision
2002/946/JHA on the strengthening of the penal framework to prevent
the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence.
30. Article 1 of the 2002 Directive does not limit the offence
to the making of profit by smugglers from the facilitation of entry
or stay of migrants; it also considers as a crime the intentional
assisting “of a person to enter, or transit across, the territory
of a Member State in breach of the laws of the State concerned on
the entry or transit of aliens” (Article 1(a)).
31. Although the European Union has signed the Palermo Protocol
in 2000 (and approved it in 2006), no reference is made to the UN
framework in these instruments. Pursuant to Article 1(2), the 2002
Directive leaves it to EU member States to decide whether to criminalise
humanitarian assistance or not.
32. In 2015, the European Commission adopted the first EU Action
Plan against migrant smuggling (2015 – 2020) (
COM(2015)
285 final). Two of the main outcomes of this Action Plan were
the establishment of the European Migrant Smuggling Centre and its
Information Clearing House, inside Europol (European Union Agency
for Law Enforcement Cooperation), as well as the structuring of
inter-agency co-operation between Europol, Eurojust (European Union
Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation), Cepol (European Union
Agency for Law Enforcement Training), OLAF (European Anti-Fraud
Office), EU-Lisa (European Union Agency for the Operational Management
of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice)
and Frontex (European Border and Coast Guard Agency) on organised
and serious international crime through the EU Policy Cycle. It
led to the formal establishment of the European Multidisciplinary
Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) which became a permanent
instrument in 2021.
33. A renewed action plan was adopted for the period 2021-2025
(
COM(2021)591
final) in the context of what the European Commission described
as “the increasing role of State actors in facilitating irregular migration
and using human beings to create pressure at the EU’s external borders.”
The aim of the plan is mainly to reinforce the means dedicated to
stop the employment of illegally-staying third-country nationals,
and to collect intelligence on irregular migration routes through
external co-operation.
3. Overview
of the situation in Europe
3.1. Migrant
smuggling in Europe
34. The magnitude of migrant smuggling
in Europe is difficult to assess. First, there is usually a confusion between
the number of irregular migrants in Europe and the number of people
who entered irregularly. Fact-based research has demonstrated for
some time now that most irregular migrants have entered Europe legally and
subsequently overstayed their visa.
Second, not all
people who entered irregularly were smuggled into Europe.
35. As to the statistics available, a figure often put forward
is that “over 90% of irregular migrants and asylum seekers are being
smuggled to the EU”. However, this figure is an estimate based on
1 500 debriefings of migrants collected by Frontex and EU member
States in 2015
which
is methodologically insufficient to draw an analysis on all irregular
arrivals in Europe. Regarding the trends, in 2023, Eurojust investigated
425 cases of migrant smuggling compared to 217 cases in 2019. Over
these five years, new investigated cases open each year represented
approximately 40% of the total number of cases and 60% were ongoing
investigations from the previous years (except in 2021 where 58%
of the cases were newly opened).
According to the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Europe is both
a destination and a transit point for transit routes.
36. Smugglers are very diversified in their profile, from structured
and organised criminal rings to individuals paid for the crossing
of a border in an irregular fashion. In the worst-case scenario,
smugglers do not hesitate to lower their costs as much as possible
to maximise their profits, including by providing malfunctioning lifejackets
on unseaworthy vessels, thus putting the lives of men, women, and
children even more at risk. Since 2015, the UNODC and the European
Union have joined efforts to tackle this issue.
37. The profile of smuggled migrants is equally diversified and
may include families and unaccompanied children. Many smuggled migrants
will find work in the informal sector, which is why many experts
and organisations providing services to undocumented migrants call
for any action to combat smuggling to be articulated with protection-sensitive
measures.
38. The country profiles compiled by the CDCP provide some information,
albeit not exhaustively. It is striking to note that many smuggled
migrants come from war-torn countries which they are most likely
refugees from including Afghans, Syrians and Ukrainians, who benefit
from temporary protection.
39. Calculating how much profit is made through migrant smuggling
is very challenging because the money flows are particularly hard
to follow. Besides, not all financial transactions involve criminal
organisations: they can involve money remittances, channelled through
registered companies, or which are used to launder the proceeds
of crime.
Evidence-based research
also shows that profits may be “immediately recirculated into the
communities of smuggling facilitators – often working-class, elderly,
disabled, native and indigenous men, women and children.”
40. The UNODC provided low estimates in a 2018 study according
to which at least 2.5 million migrants were smuggled for an economic
return of up to 7 billion US dollars in 2016. This study estimated
that at least US$375 000 migrants were smuggled into Europe through
the Mediterranean, generating a profit for the migrant smuggling
business of at least US$320 – 550 million.
3.2. Legal
and judicial responses in member States
41. Legislation aiming to counter
the smuggling of migrants varies across the globe.
In many member States, the
crime of migrant smuggling is not singled out as a specific offence
but is part of a broader offence aiming to sanction any unauthorised
crossing into the territory in either criminal or administrative
law. The same problem is sanctioned in different ways: some countries
do not single out migrant smuggling from illegal immigration, others
conflate facilitation of entry for the purpose of humanitarian support
with the act of making material or financial benefit in exchange
for the facilitation of irregular entry into a State’s territory.
Two country examples epitomise such lack of consistency. The Slovak
Republic refers to the notion of “unconscious smuggling” for example
where carriers are unaware that they are transporting migrants irregularly,
which is a contradiction in terms (smuggling is the conscious facilitation
of the entry, transit or stay in a country irregularly to make profit
out of it). In Ireland, the criminalisation of irregular entry rather
than migrant smuggling itself is used because arresting smugglers
is too difficult.
42. Among the country profiles available on the CDPC website,
few countries refer to “migrant smuggling” in their legislation
and rather refer to the support to illegal entry or stay. Most countries
foresee gradual sanctions depending on the severity of the offence.
In cases involving the abuse of the rights of migrants, aggravating
circumstances usually apply.
43. In 18 cases, the definition of migrant smuggling makes the
element of profit-seeking a constitutive element of the crime, in
line with the definition in the Palermo Protocol. In at least six
member States, this notion is absent from the definition of the
crime of aiding irregular entry or stay, with the very crossing
of a border without authorisation being itself criminalised in some
instances; in at least nine member States, the notion of profit
is part of the elements justifying the aiding of irregular border
crossing or irregular stay to be sanctioned. However, across these
15 legislations, no reference is made to exemptions for humanitarian
assistance.
44. Assistance for humanitarian purpose with no profit seeking
is safeguarded and exempted from criminal liability in only nine
member States (Belgium, Croatia, Finland, France, Greece, Italy,
Malta, Poland, and Spain). Most of the countries thus criminalise
any facilitation of irregular entry, even if not for profit.
45. The general strategy to counter migrant smuggling falls under
the aegis of either the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of
Justice, or both. Conversely, some member States have established
a horizontal approach to the issue of migrant smuggling, leaning
on the competences of various administrations. In Armenia, cases of
smuggled migrants are redirected to the Social Affairs Ministry
when required.
46. On vulnerable profiles at the border, at least three countries
have explicitly protected asylum seekers from any sanction related
to irregular border crossing. None of legislation available in the
country profiles shared with the CDPC indicates the need for particular
safeguards with respect to the identification and non-criminalisation
of unaccompanied children or victims of trafficking.
47. Reviews conducted by the UNODC have indicated that it is usually
low-profile smugglers who are charged rather than the instigators
heading the most structured rings.
Besides,
it may also be that migrants themselves end up criminalised for
having driven the vehicle or boat carrying irregular migrants across
a border illegally. A nuanced approach is therefore required. In
the United Kingdom, a court of appeal overturned three of four convictions
of asylum seekers who had been charged with assisting unlawful immigration
because of their role in steering inflatable boats filled with a
number of migrants from France in 2021. By contrast, cases involving
aggravating circumstances leading to death were heavily sanctioned.
In 2019 in Belgium, individuals
accused of migrant smuggling because they had provided accommodation
to irregular migrants for free were eventually found not guilty
in appeal.
3.3. Counter-intuitive
policies and their consequences
48. The adverse consequences of
applying anti-smuggling legislation to ill-suited situations are
many. Most of the time, border management measures aiming to counter
the smuggling of migrants result in a restriction of access to the
territory for all migrants, including refugees. This trend is common
to many if not all European countries, as documented in the report
by our colleague Stephanie Krisper (Austria, ALDE) on “Ensuring human
rights compliant asylum procedures.”
49. Stopping the business of smugglers cannot be equated with
making the journey of migrants impossible. Not only do such measures
fail to counter the very profit making of smugglers (usually the
fares have been paid, at least partly, before departure), but they
put the security, if not the life, of migrants at risk. Recent measures
by nation States to discourage migrants from crossing the border
irregularly and to ruin the business of smugglers are having a very
limited effect on the persistence, and even growth,
of irregular
border crossings into member States. There has even been an increase
in the number of deaths at border-crossing points where such co-operation
has been deployed (see for instance in the Channel
).
50. The absence of any safe and regular means to travel internationally,
coupled with economic, environmental and political push factors
are the main drivers of irregular migration from which smugglers
are profiting. In its communication entitled “A renewed EU action
plan against migrant smuggling (2021-2025)”, the European Commission
recalled that “there is emerging evidence that smugglers are facilitating
the unauthorised movements of beneficiaries of international protection.”
51. Undue criminalisation of migrants
and their defenders, or people providing
migrants in an irregular situation with humanitarian support, has
significantly grown in scale and has been documented for years.
In February 2024, the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council
of Europe renewed her warning to member States, unequivocally denouncing
the use of the anti-smuggling legislation to hamper freedom of assembly
and association.
3.4. Good
practices at regional level
52. A few member States have structured
their approach to counter migrant smuggling by involving the various
departments which may facilitate the investigation of this crime,
and the location of perpetrators. This cross-department approach
can be found in Cyprus, in Belgium and in Serbia.
The European Union is
also facilitating such a transversal approach through the EMPACT
(european multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats) initiative.
53. A complex network of international co-operation schemes in
the field of migrant smuggling has also developed over the years,
to ease judicial and police co-operation on a crime which is inherently
of a transnational in nature. Joint investigative teams (JIT) and
European Investigation Orders (EIO) are particularly useful to States
to trace smuggling networks and identify perpetrators.
54. Interpol hosts a Specialized Operational Network (ISON) against
Migrant Smuggling. This organisation is facilitating secure information-sharing
between 196 States and provides access to databases, especially some
used to detect stolen, lost or fraudulent travel documents. The
organisation also provides training workshops and operational support
during cross-border investigations. A pilot project was launched
for the period 2022-2024 to address the criminal use of new technologies
in migrant smuggling and human trafficking from Asia into Canada.
55. Some member States have developed co-operation with countries
sharing geographical, linguistic or cultural commonalities. This
is the case for instance for the Ibero-American Network for International
Legal Cooperation, and the Conference of the Ministries of Justice
of Ibero-American countries of which Spain, Andorra and Portugal
are members. The year 2021 saw the entry into force of the Treaty
on the Electronic Transmission of Requests for International Judicial
Cooperation between Central Authorities, applicable in the context
of combatting transnational crime notably of people smuggling as
defined in the Palermo Protocol.
56. The Southeast European Law Enforcement Center (SELEC) brings
together Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary,
the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia
and Türkiye. SELEC especially co-operates with the International
Organization for Migration (IOM), with the UNODC and with Europol
in the field of migrant smuggling, and a series of cross-border
police co-operation have been successfully led through such joint
efforts recently.
57. The establishment of the Network of Prosecutors on Migrants
Smuggling
by
the Council of Europe and of the Focus Group for Prosecutors on
Migrant Smuggling by Eurojust are part of these efforts to facilitate exchange
of information and also to identify avenues for further harmonisation
of standards in the field of mutual legal assistance (MLA).
3.5. Good
practices at national level
58. As emphasised by the Slovak
authorities, migrants should not be criminalised for being smuggled. Rather,
the migrants are in the position of being witnesses, and they are
not the victims/harmed persons, unless specific circumstances occur
and the migrants themselves are the subject of physical violence,
threat, some form of slavery.
In
the Netherlands, a “free-in, free-out”’ policy enables migrants
to report a crime to the police without being checked for their
administrative or criminal status. This is meant to encourage the reporting
of exploitation cases but may also incentivise migrants willing
to report situations of abuse by smugglers, including aggravating
circumstances to which they may have been subjected.
59. In 2022, the Belgian Parliament appointed an
ad hoc committee to review Belgium’s
legislation and policy in the field of the trafficking and the smuggling
of human beings. The outcomes of these parliamentary proceedings
have resulted in the adoption, in May 2023, of a set of 100 recommendations
aiming to better prevent and sanction the crime of migrant smuggling
and the crime of trafficking in human beings.
Among the
six recommendations on migrant smuggling, the Parliament asked to
assess whether the notion of direct or indirect material benefit
should be clarified to avoid any risk of undue criminalisation of
migrants or persons providing support to them without seeking any
form of profit. The Parliament also recommended to raise humanitarian
workers’ awareness of the form of abuse which smuggled migrants
may face, and how to report such cases to the competent authorities.
60. Belgium establishes an explicit distinction between people’s
smuggling and “assistance to illegal immigration.” Moreover, Belgian
law considers that there cannot be any illegal entry if a migrant
comes from another Schengen State, because this is a free movement
area. Any offence of migrant smuggling should therefore involve
facilitating the irregular crossing of a non-Schengen border for
the purpose of making profit. The Belgian authorities have structured
a multidisciplinary approach to migrant smuggling and trafficking
in human beings since 2016.
An
interdepartmental co-ordination unit for action against trafficking
in and smuggling of human beings was set-up, under the authority
of the Ministry of Justice.
4. Recent
EU developments in the European Union
4.1. The
scope of criminalisation at stake
61. The possibility left for EU
member States to criminalise humanitarian assistance, rather than
an obligation imposed on them not to do so, has further encouraged
the interpretation of the 2002 Directive and of the Framework Decision
very broadly, leading to undue criminalisation and forms of intimidations
against migrants and their defenders. This was recognised by the
European Commission which, in a study published in 2017 to evaluate
the existing framework, spoke of “unintended consequences” and euphemistically
referred to reports on “fears about perceived risks of criminalisation.”
62. Regarding the distinction to be made between migrant smuggling
and the facilitation of irregular migration for humanitarian assistance,
the same study asserted that “added value brought by the EU framework
pertaining to legal certainty as regards this distinction ... is
limited” without further substantiation. The European Commission
was unable to assess the efficiency of the legislation in place.
However, it acknowledged the possible need to offset the risk of
unintended consequences, and in particular the risk that no assistance
is provided to those in need, in breach of the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights, the non-refoulement principle and other international human
rights commitments.”
63. In 2020, following growing criticism on the criminalisation
of humanitarian assistance, including from the European Parliament,
a non-binding guidance
was issued positing that “humanitarian assistance that is mandated
by law cannot and must not be criminalised.”
Yet, as noted by
the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders, “the laws most
frequently used to criminalise defenders in these cases stem from
the EU's ‘Facilitators Package.”
64. In July 2023, a reference for a preliminary ruling was sent
to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) by the Tribunale
di Bologna in Italy, asking whether such criminalisation without
a legally binding obligation to exclude humanitarian assistance
from criminal sanctions was compatible with the Charter on Fundamental
Rights of the European Union.
The examination
of this reference is pending.
4.2. A
new “Facilitators Package”: stated objectives of the European Commission
65. In November 2023, the European
Commission put forward a new proposal to revise the “Facilitators Package”
(
COM(2023)755
final). This proposal aims to revise the 2002 Directive and
Framework Decision, and to associate these with a new regulation
on enhancing police co-operation and Europol’s mandate to prevent and
combat migrant smuggling and human trafficking in Europe.
66. Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the revised Directive define what constitutes
migrant smuggling according to EU law. This definition is broader
than that in the Palermo Protocol. Article 3.1(a) defines the criminal
offenses as the act of intentionally assisting the entry, transit
or stay irregularly associated with the request, the receiving, the
acceptance or the aim to receive financial or material benefit directly
or indirectly.
67. The inclusion of the notion of profit seeking is welcome.
Moreover, even if no material or financial benefit is involved,
any facilitator may be sanctioned if there is a high likelihood
of causing serious harm to the person whose entry, transit or stay
is facilitated (3.1(b)). However, it is uncertain what will be the
elements considered by a court to rule that the person “carried
out the conduct in order to obtain such a benefit” and what constitutes “a
high likelihood of causing serious harm to a person”.
68. The proposed Directive also introduces new offences. First,
the “public instigation of third-country nationals” to enter, transit
or stay in the European Union unauthorised, for instance through
digital tools or social media (Article 3.2). During an exchange
of views with the Assembly’s Sub-Committee on Migrant Smuggling
and Trafficking in Human Beings on the new proposal by the European
Commission, EU migration law expert Marianna Gkliati said that this
provision may be interpreted in a disproportionally broad way, for instance
against people informing refugees of the safest itinerary. Second,
Article 5 introduced the criminal offence of “incitement, aiding
and abetting, and attempt” to commit any of the above-mentioned
crimes.
69. Article 16 of the proposed revised directive provides for
the use of “special investigative tools such as those which are
used in countering organised crime or other serious crime cases”
to investigate and prosecute the crimes defined in Articles 3 to
5.
4.3. Human
rights considerations
70. The European Data Protection
Supervisor and the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights
defenders have expressed concern regarding this new definition and
the promotion of “special investigative tools” with regard to the
principles of necessity and proportionality.
71. As raised by Ms Gkliati, “even with the limited scope of the
offence of smuggling, these persons contributing one way or another
to the process of border crossing could still be held criminally
liable”, including, for example, by interpretating search and rescue
operations as posing a high likelihood of causing harm.
The EU
Fundamental Rights Agency has denounced existing cases of this kind.
72. Indeed, although Article 4 clarifies what should be considered
as aggravating circumstances of migrant smuggling, it also includes
the fact that “the third-country nationals who were subject to the
criminal offence were particularly vulnerable, including unaccompanied
minors” (Article 4.d): in theory, any person paying a smuggler may
fall under this definition, which again contributes to aligning
the notion of irregular border-crossing with the smuggling of migrants
as being equal in nature.
73. Moreover, recital 8 of the Regulation aiming to amend the
mandate of Europol, provides for the possibility of transferring
personal data to third countries even though the third country does
not provide adequate or appropriate data protection safeguards,
including biometric data as indicated in Article 9 of the proposed
draft Regulation.
The framework
of the draft Regulation as proposed may, according to the European
Data Protection Supervisor, run counter to the obligations laid
down in the existing
Europol Regulation which, especially, imposes that the processing of biometric
data shall “be subject to appropriate safeguards laid down in [Europol]
Regulation with regard to the rights and freedoms of the data subject”.
5. Human
rights and the rule of law: the two sides of a coherent approach
5.1. Stop
the business
74. Migrant smuggling is a cross-border
crime finding some of its roots in the attractiveness of irregular channels
of mobility and stay for foreign nationals. The key to combating
migrant smuggling is to make the business of smugglers unprofitable.
75. Alternatives to irregular migration: denying access to the
European territory through various mechanisms and policies has not
proved effective, and has diversified irregular migration routes,
sometimes rendering them riskier. Similarly, the effectiveness of
information campaigns to warn against the risks of irregular mobility
is not conclusive.
It
has been suggested that an alternative approach could be to redirect migrants
from smugglers to official channels of mobility.
It
should also be borne in mind that many smuggled migrants need international
protection, with no effective alternative other than paying a smuggler
to access safety.
76. Focus transnational co-operation on threats to international
public order: stopping the business of migrant smugglers requires
authorities to focus more efforts on tracing the money sent by migrants
in order to identify and arrest the original instigators of such
crimes. The low risk of detection is considered as one of the reasons
why criminal networks keep making growing profit out of the smuggling
of migrants.
As mentioned earlier,
the profile of smugglers may vary widely and not all of them are
acting with a view to exploiting migrants, including financially,
to make a profit.
77. Conversely, the threat which criminal organisations represent
for State authorities is real, in the sense that they generate illegal
profits outside of any financial regulation framework, constituting
a threat to the international financial system in itself and also
because profits are re-injected into other forms of illegal criminal activities
such as trafficking in human beings, the illicit manufacturing and
trafficking of firearms and drugs and potentially the financing
of terrorism. The aim of State Parties to the UNTOC is to enhance
judicial and police co-operation transnationally to bring perpetrators
of serious organised and transnational crime to justice.
78. What is more, criminal organisations are likely to abuse migrants,
extort extra money along the way or even put human lives at risk
to minimise the risks of detection or to lower the running costs
of their business. Contrary to low-profile migrant smugglers, these
organisations are well-structured and are extremely difficult to
trace and to stop. Transnational co-operation should aim to target
these organisations and bring their impunity to an end. Reviews
conducted by the UNODC have indicated that it is usually low-profile
smugglers who are charged, rather than instigators heading the most
structured rings.
79. Judicial and police co-operation should focus their efforts
on what is commonly referred to as the “follow the money” approach
to apprehend the instigators, in addition to promoting the role
of regulatory financial authorities, to ensure that money remitters
or money value transfer services comply with international standards
on combating fraud and money laundering.
The Council of Europe is
equipped to support member States face these challenges in the field
of criminal law, providing instruments aiming to address the contemporary
forms which such serious organised crimes may take, for example
cybercrime.
5.2. The
need for harmonised standards
80. Police and judicial co-operation
can be enabled by a dense fabric of regional and international organisations,
including the Council of Europe, which is positive. However, strong
discrepancies are noted in the way in which migrant smuggling is
criminalised by member States. As highlighted by the CDPC there
is no consistency in the physical and mental elements of the offence,
aggravations and penalties.
As a result, experts consider that
“the lack of a harmonised system works to the advantage of migrant
smugglers, who can exploit existing loopholes to avoid criminalisation.”
81. Thus, it is essential that the crime of migrant smuggling
is clearly defined by member States through a common definition
focusing on the crime of smuggling of people as defined in the Palermo
Protocol, explicitly exempting humanitarian assistance and support
to migrants in accessing their fundamental rights from any form
of criminal liability, when such acts are conducted without the
seeking of any financial or material benefit.
82. An overarching definition through a multidisciplinary approach
to migrant smuggling would complement the organised-crime oriented
definition provided in the Palermo Protocol. Indeed, it should be
clarified that not all smugglers belong to organised crime groups:
targeted and proportionate responses, including non-criminal responses
to such perpetrators would be worth considering, perhaps in co-operation
with countries of origin and of transit. This may help to better
apprehend the specificities of some of the root causes of migrant smuggling
and to explore ways to stop this phenomenon, including by considering
penalties outside of criminal law and a nuanced approach to criminal
sanctions.
83. It is also important that unauthorised entry into a country
is explicitly distinguished from the crime of migrant smuggling.
Driving a vehicle as part of smuggled group may be part of the circumstances
enabling border-crossing for refugees and people seeking protection
but should never be sanctioned for entering a country irregularly
(Refugee Convention). Moreover, unlawful acts committed as a consequence
of being trafficked, including immigration-related offences, should
not be criminalised, in line with the European Convention on Action
against Trafficking in Human Beings and as recently recalled by
the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations on trafficking in persons,
especially women and children.
This does not mean
that smuggled migrants should be immune from criminal sanctions
if found guilty of committing a crime: any arrest and investigation
following irregular border crossings that reveals that inhumane
or degrading treatments have been perpetrated, sometimes leading
to death, should be prosecuted as criminal acts distinguished from
that of migrant smuggling.
5.3. Complement
the approach through non-criminal measures
84. Some member States have opted
for a transversal approach to migrant smuggling. The vulnerability which
may be experienced by smuggled migrants indeed requires that the
State authorities to be vigilant to the risks of exploitation and
abuse which may happen on their territory.
85. The protection of migrant workers and the increase in the
resources of labour inspectorates are of particular importance.
The Assembly has made specific recommendations aimed to further
protect migrant workers, including undocumented workers in Resolution
2536 (2024) “Precarious and irregular work situations of migrant
seasonal and domestic workers” and
Resolution 2504 (2023) “Health and social protection of undocumented workers
or those in an irregular situation.”
86. The possibility for migrants to report, safely, any form of
abuse and to possibly share information on possible organised criminal
groups profiting from the business of people smuggling, without
fear of being checked for their administrative status, should be
considered as good practice. It may indeed not only support investigation
efforts but may also incentivise migrants to report situations of
abuse and vulnerability which they or some of their community members
may face.
5.4. The
Council of Europe’s expertise
87. For a concerted approach to
migrant smuggling to succeed in Europe, there must be an equal understanding
and interpretation of its legal definition and an equal interpretation
of this definition by the courts. This could have a positive effect
on the current way in which the notion of migrant smuggling is used
rather loosely, and even weaponised, in political discourse.
88. International mutual legal assistance frameworks designed
to promote judicial and police co-operation have demonstrated their
ability to maintain States’ sovereignty while ensuring that the
transnational nature of the issue is effectively addressed. The
risk for nation States of engaging in co-operation without any binding and
sound definition and monitoring tool is greater if they do not define
and shape their co-operation within the basis of a proven model
such as the Palermo Protocol. Trying to go it alone can lead to
legal confusion and challenge in international courts which can
have the unintended consequence of diverting public policies (and resources)
away from the international efforts needed to combat serious transnational
criminal organisations.
89. The Council of Europe is experienced in working with and assisting
member States in domains where legislation and its interpretation
vary. A relevant example is the long discussions around the notion
of “counterfeiting” of medical products: some member States were
reluctant to agree to terms which might have hampered the manufacturing
of generic drugs at an affordable cost in some member States.
Eventually, it was
agreed that the legal instrument should focus on public-health related
stakes without reference to intellectual property rights in relation
to manufacturing or supplying of medical products.
The resulting agreement
provided European States with the first international treaty against
counterfeit medical products and similar crimes involving threats
to public health, in 2011: the Council of Europe Convention on the
counterfeiting of medical products and similar crimes involving
threats to public health (
CETS No. 211). Another relevant example is the adoption of the Convention
on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings in 2005 which has since
demonstrated that the addition of a victim-oriented approach to
the prosecution of the crime committed, has resulted in more easy
and effective co-operation between States to combat but also prevent
trafficking in human beings as indicated in the GRETA’s reports.
90. The Council of Europe would provide a meaningful space in
which to discuss and define the elements of a common definition
on migrant smuggling. Various conventions and standards are already
in place to accompany member States towards greater alignment and
co-operation on judicial matters directly connected with the crime
of migrant smuggling or intersecting with this crime.
91. These conventions and standards include; the Council of Europe
Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the
Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (
CETS Nos.
198); the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters and its protocols (ETS
Nos. 30,
99 and
182); the Criminal and Civil Law Conventions on Corruption.
The Convention on Cybercrime (
ETS
No. 185, “Budapest Convention”) is also of particular interest:
it provides a legal framework for international co-operation not
only with respect to cybercrime (offences against and by means of
computers) but also with respect to any crime involving electronic
evidence. With 93 States either party or observer to this Convention
committee, the Budapest Convention is open to ratification of all
States and regarded as the most comprehensive and coherent international
agreement on cybercrime and electronic evidence to date.
92. Additionally, the various tools available to identify vulnerable
persons and protect them may be considered relevant during the interception
of smuggled migrants: the Convention on Action against Trafficking in
Human Beings, the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture
and Inhumane of Degrading Treatment or Punishment (ETS No. 126),
the Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women
and Domestic Violence (CETS No. 210), and the
Convention
on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual
Abuse (CETS No. 201).
5.5. Co-operation with the EU: the urgent
need for policy coherence
94. The European Union is a strategic
partner which, unlike the Council of Europe, legislates in the field
of migration and asylum law. The efforts made by the EU institutions
to explore concrete policy pathways to enhance access to its territory
regularly, whether it is for international protection purposes,
or for labour migration purposes, are welcome and should be encouraged.
95. Co-operation frameworks already in place to promote synergies
between the judicial authorities should be encouraged and the forthcoming
meeting with the Council of Europe’s Network of Prosecutors on migrant smuggling
and the Eurojust’s Focus group on migrant smuggling is positive.
96. The harmonisation, if not the alignment, of norms along commonly
shared human-rights standards is paramount, not only for the sake
of coherence in the laws applying in EU member States which are
also members of the Council of Europe, but also because of the influence
which EU law is having on non-EU member States, especially in the
field of migration and border management, and which are, for the
most part, bound by the Council of Europe standards.
97. In the context of the recent proposal by the European Commission,
particular attention should be paid to procedural rights guaranteed
pursuant to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human rights.
The severity of sanctions envisaged against people found guilty
of the crime of migrant smuggling should be accompanied by the appropriate
legal and procedural safeguards which the Convention provides for.
A common definition of the criminal offences to be applied across
member States, including EU member States, would ensure that the
principles guaranteed by the Convention under Article 6 can fully
apply and cases before the European Court of Human Rights can be
deemed admissible.
98. According to the Court’s case law, the assessment of the applicability
of the criminal aspect of Article 6 of the Convention is based on
three criteria:
the
classification in domestic law; the nature of the offence; and the
severity of the penalty that the person concerned risks incurring.
On the three criteria, the legislations across member States of
the Council of Europe vary widely. The current definition of the
criminal act of facilitating unauthorised entry, transit and stay
contained in the 2002 Directive may lack sufficient safeguards against
undue criminalisation and cannot, therefore, be considered as fit
for purpose, at least not before the CJEU has ruled on Kinshasa
litigation.
99. Moreover, as it stands, any adoption of the draft EU Regulation
without any prior thorough fundamental rights impact assessment
confirming its alignment with the applicable international data
protection and fundamental rights standards may lead to the adoption
of conflicting norms in EU member States bound by the Council of
Europe’s norms, in particular Convention 108+.
100. Although cross-border co-operation may be valid, the pre-requisites
for such co-operation to align with the international standards
necessary to avoid any adverse consequences on the human rights
of migrants and on States’ security (exchange of data) should be
given due consideration and perhaps be considered as a separate
piece of legislation requiring proper time and examination.
101. The “package approach” may be counter-intuitive and runs the
risk of pushing for an overarching policy agenda in a domain where
there is policy incoherence with other regional instruments and
a consequent risk to human rights safeguards.
6. Conclusion
102. The profits generated by migrant
smugglers are a challenge for States in three respects: the thriving
of a business which is connected to other criminal activities such
as counterfeiting, money laundering and trafficking in human beings;
border management and border control; and the need to protect the
fundamental rights of people whose vulnerability may be heightened
because of their informal mobility.
103. The response to migrant smuggling involves establishing the
conditions for transnational co-operation between the police and
judiciary of States affected by this crime, notably through harmonised
definitions and practices and procedural standards enabling the
sharing of police and judicial information in line with data protection
requirements.
104. Such co-operation requires harmonised standards and, above
all, a common definition and understanding of what the criminal
act of people smuggling is, and what it entails. The tendency, in
national and in regional legislations, to approach the institutional
response to migrant smuggling through the single prism of States’
legitimate right to control their borders risks of overshadowing
other elements constitutive of the crime of the smuggling of migrants
and leading to its undue criminalisation. In fact, criminal law
is not the only angle which the issue of migrant smuggling should
be tackled from, and this is where the Council of Europe can provide
a meaningful input to support inter-State co-operation and policy
co-operation, even beyond its own membership.
105. In this effort, the Council of Europe can provide valuable
expertise through its existing instruments and tools and through
initiating a reflection on the need for specific norms or guidelines
to support member States in fighting against the real perpetrators
of the crime and the drivers which make it possible, rather than
against the migrants themselves.