1. Introduction
and context: the Holodomor and Russia’s genocidal warfare against
Ukraine today
1. Between 1932 and 1933, the
“Holodomor”, the great famine in Ukraine and other parts of the
former Soviet Union, killed millions of Ukrainians, many of them
villagers, living as independent farmers. These individuals formed
a pillar of the Ukrainian national revival that was initially encouraged
and then feared by the Soviet regime in Moscow. The other pillar
of Ukrainian nationhood, the intellectual elite, the “intelligentsia”
in Kyiv and other cities, had previously been decimated following
mass executions based on “show trials” finding them guilty of treason
or other trumped-up charges.
2. The official Soviet and Russian narrative is that the victims
of the Holodomor were “collateral damage” of the Soviet regime’s
ill-advised economic policies such as industrialisation at all costs,
exports of scarce foodstuff to pay for imports of machinery, and
the rushed forced collectivisation of agriculture on mistaken ideological
grounds. The proponents of the official narrative point out that
millions died of hunger also in other parts of the Soviet Union,
including the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan.
3. Meanwhile, historians have had access to a large volume of
hitherto secret archival materials made available during a “thaw”
between Ukraine’s independence and the Russian-dominated Yanukovych
regime, which was ended by the “Revolution of Dignity”. These materials
were made available and in part even translated into English in
co-operation between the State security authorities of Ukraine and
Poland. In view of this treasure trove of newly available material,
the official Russian narrative has been strongly undermined and a
consensus has emerged far beyond Ukraine that the Holodomor was
not an accident, but part of a genocidal campaign intended to wipe
out Ukrainian national identity as such, by destroying the above-mentioned
two pillars of Ukrainian national culture: the independent farmers
(“kulaks”) and the urban intelligentsia. The proponents of this
view point out that the Russian regions hit by the same famine were
also heavily populated by ethnic Ukrainians, whereas the people
of Kazakhstan may well have been the target of another, separate genocide
attempt similarly motivated by the resurgence of a Kazakh national
movement spurred by Lenin’s early 1920s policies intending to win
over national minorities.
4. Interestingly, the issue of the Holodomor was on the Parliamentary
Assembly’s agenda once before. In
Resolution 1723 (2010) “Commemorating the victims of the Great Famine (Holodomor)
in the former USSR”, the Assembly followed to a large extent the
official Russian narrative. During the preparation of the resolution, the
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights drew attention to the
apparent targeting of the Ukrainian people and stressed that the
historical truth must be recognised.
5. The committee’s conclusions back in 2010 are worth recalling:
The Committee on Legal Affairs
and Human Rights welcomes the strong condemnation, as a crime against
humanity, of the Soviet regime’s policies in 1932-1933 aimed at
the physical annihilation of the peasant population in Ukraine and
other regions populated by ethnic Ukrainians, but also in Kazakhstan and
other parts of the former Soviet Union. These policies resulted
in millions of deaths by starvation. However, the report of the
Political Affairs Committee does not highlight clearly enough that
the criminal policies in question specifically targeted the Ukrainian
people. In the interest of true reconciliation, this historical
truth must be fully recognised and not hidden among other crimes
committed by the Soviet regime against other ethnic and social groups.
6. Sadly, the issue of a genocide led by the Russian Federation
against the Ukrainian people has gained terrible new relevance.
The way Russia is waging war – massively targeting civilian infrastructures
such as electricity and water supply, flooding an entire region,
abducting and putting up for adoption by Russians large numbers
of Ukrainian children and tracking down, arresting and “disappearing”
Ukrainian patriots such as locally-elected officials, teachers,
lawyers, civil servants and their families – shows that the statements
by Kremlin propagandists, including former President Medvedev,

that the Ukrainian nation does not
have a right to exist are meant seriously. In a chilling article
published by the State news agency Ria Novosti in April 2022,

Russian
“political technologist” Timofey Sergeytsev speaks of the need to
“eliminate” the “Banderist elites” and of the “educational” effects
on the general population of a harshly conducted war. The
ad hoc sub-committee of the Assembly,
which visited Kyiv, Bucha and Irpin in June 2022 soon after the
discovery of the atrocities committed by the Russian forces before
they were pushed back, received a shocking first-hand impression
of what Russian occupation really means.

Furthermore, as described
in a report presented by the Committee on Culture, Science, Education
and Media debated in the June 2024 part-session of the Assembly,
Russia has deliberately targeted the cultural heritage of Ukraine,
destroying churches, theatres, museums and historical monuments
throughout the country, including monuments to the victims of the
Holodomor in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. In
those territories, the occupation authorities also forcibly conscript
men into the Russian armed forces – a clear violation of international
law. Furthermore, the inhabitants of the temporarily occupied territories,
especially schoolchildren, are subjected to massive propaganda aimed
at undermining their Ukrainian identity and are strongly pressured
to accept Russian passports.
7. In view of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian
Federation and the brutal manner in which the war is being conducted,
it was particularly appropriate to commemorate the 90th anniversary
of the Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine, in November 2023.

8. In this report, I intend to sum up the known facts concerning
the Holodomor (Chapter 2) and to examine on the basis of available
information whether these facts justify the classification of the
Soviet policies as “genocide” within the meaning of the 1948 Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

(Chapter 3). In Chapter 4, I will
sum up the main takeaways from our hearing with experts on 21 June
2024, before presenting my conclusions reflected in the draft resolution.
2. Known facts surrounding the Ukrainian
Holodomor
9. The objective facts surrounding
the Ukrainian Holodomor are quite well-established now, despite decades
of elaborate policies of obfuscation and disinformation by the Soviet
regime and later under Vladimir Putin: between 3,9 and 10 million

villagers died of
hunger and hunger-related diseases as a consequence of Stalinist
policies of forced collectivisation of agriculture involving the
systematic confiscation of all foodstuffs targeting the rural areas
of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and certain areas of Russia – hardest-hit
were the Kuban region and parts of the North Caucasus, which back
then also had large ethnic Ukrainian populations.
10. It must be said that in terms of the percentage of the population
that perished, Kazakhstan, whose traditionally nomad population
also put up strong resistance against forced collectivisation, suffered
even worse losses than Soviet Ukraine. The famine in Kazakhstan
may well also have genocidal character. In Kazakhstan too, the rural
population was the backbone of a national revival movement that
Stalin saw as a threat to the unity of the Soviet Union. But this
falls outside the scope of this report.
11. As of the autumn of 1932,

regions,
villages and collective farms unable to fulfil grain delivery quotas which
the authorities knew perfectly well were unreachable were “blacklisted”
and punished by collective “fines in kind”. This meant in practice
that they were surrounded by armed NKVD units, cut off from any
deliveries of goods and from seeking food elsewhere and that all
food and other basic necessities were confiscated from stores and
private homes, after searches carried out at gunpoint. There are
harrowing reports by officials involved in these searches describing
how they ripped up wooden floorboards to find hidden food preserves, whilst
the family looked on, too weak to even beg them to stop, with some
of the children already dead. Under the so-called “Law of Five Ears
of Grain”, any “theft”, however minimal, of food by starving villagers
was severely punished, by execution or deportation for ten years.

Especially
in the second year of the cruel artificial famine, starving villagers
were prevented from leaving the affected regions,

and any “smuggling” of food into
the starvation zone was prohibited. Entire villages and large rural
areas ended up being completely depopulated. They were resettled
by farmers from Russia, Belarus and other parts of the former Soviet Union.

12. The human suffering caused by this outrage has been described
in horrible detail in many testimonies of survivors. Western journalists
(including Gareth Jones) and diplomats were also aware of the large-scale famine,
though their observations were mainly limited to the larger cities,
which were not hit as hard as the sealed-off rural areas. Their
reports sadly did not trigger a strong reaction in Western public
opinion. Western countries were preoccupied by their own financial
and economic crisis and the political turmoil arising from it. Mass
media were also divided along ideological lines – those on the left
did not wish to criticise the Soviet Union or simply did not believe
or refused to believe these reports. Nonetheless, humanitarian assistance
was offered to the Soviet Union by several Western countries. It
was turned down by Stalin.
3. Legal
assessment of the facts: was the Holodomor an act of genocide against
the Ukrainian people?
13. As to the legal assessment
of the facts, two main schools of thought

oppose
each other:
- Many Russian historians
and political observers consider the artificial famine as the consequence
of ideologically-motivated erroneous or even criminal policies targeting
independent farmers as a class, whose resistance against forced
collectivisation was broken in this way. The fact that Ukraine and
other Ukrainian-populated areas of the Soviet Union were hardest
hit was in their view due to the fact that these were the main agricultural
regions in which resistance against collectivisation had been strongest. In
sum, the victims were killed in a “class war” launched by the Communist
regime because they were independent farmers.
- The overwhelming majority of historians and political
observers from other countries
consider
these facts as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people,
which was not only objectively the hardest hit in terms of population
loss, but specifically targeted: in sum, the victims were killed
because they were Ukrainians. In my own view, it is appropriate
to review the arguments in favour of both schools of thought in
order to reach a sound assessment built on historical fact.
14. The “official Russian” view stresses the considerable number
of famine victims who were not ethnic Ukrainians, but included Russians,
Belarusians, Tatars, Germans and others, who happened to live in
the main agricultural regions of the Soviet Union targeted by Stalin’s
forced collectivisation policies. They point out that Ukrainian
city dwellers did not suffer from mass starvation, though it should
have been relatively easy for the Soviet regime to cut off food
supplies to cities surrounded by starving agricultural regions if
it had been their intention to exterminate all Ukrainians. In addition,
the forced collectivisation policies were carried out on the ground
by ethnic Ukrainians. They were ruthless Stalinists but would surely
not have participated in the intentional destruction of their own
ethnic group. Extreme economic hardship for the group of independent farmers,
even its partial destruction by starvation, was considered by Stalin
and his entourage as an acceptable price to be paid for the rapid
industrialisation of the USSR, but not as an objective in itself.
15. The proponents of the “Ukrainian” view, shared by most Western
historians, stress that in parallel with the starvation policy against
the Ukrainian peasantry, a savage terror campaign against Ukrainian
intellectuals and independence-minded political leaders took place,
which preceded similar “purges” in Moscow by several years. This
is well illustrated by the evolution of the number of arrests In
Ukraine before, during and after the Holodomor years. The number
increased from about 30 000 per annum in 1929 and 1930 to 50 000
in 1931, 75 000 in 1932 and 125 000 in 1933 to drop again to 30 000
in 1934.

The combined effect of the two campaigns
was clearly designed to break the backbone of the Ukrainian national
movement, without the need to depopulate the whole country and in
particular to kill all city dwellers (other than key intellectuals
and politicians), who would become easy targets for russification
policies after the destruction of the pillars of the Ukrainian national
revival.

The well-established fact that
peasants belonging to other ethnic groups also starved in large
numbers, to the extent that they also resisted forced collectivisation,
has no bearing on the classification of the particularly harsh measures
taken against the Ukrainian peasantry and the Ukrainian “intelligentsia”
as genocide. Finally, Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term “genocide”,
referred to the Holodomor as a “classic example of Soviet genocide”.
He later significantly influenced and formulated the UN Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948
(the Genocide Convention).
16. Personally, I feel that the stronger arguments are those in
favour of classifying the Holdomor as an act of genocide. In view
of the strong evidence, I am quite surprised that the Assembly resolution
of 2010 did not properly acknowledge the arguments in favour of
the internationally recognised perspective on the Holodomor. In
my report, it is my intention to fairly present the arguments speaking
in favour and against the recognition of the Holodomor as an act
of genocide, albeit in summary form – notwithstanding the recent
recognition of the genocidal character of the Holodomor by the Assembly
in Resolution 2516 (2023) “
Ensuring
a just peace in Ukraine and lasting security in Europe”, which deliberately left the presentation of the factual
and legal justification of this assessment to the present report.
17. As a rapporteur for the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights, I should like to begin by recalling the definition of genocide:
Under Article 2 of the Genocide Convention, genocide is “any of
the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm
to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions
of life, calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole
or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group; forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”.

18. The definition of genocide thus requires the presence of an actus reus (i.e., the destruction,
at least in part, of a group of the kind included in the definition,
by one of the acts listed therein) and of specific criminal intent
(mens rea), i.e., the intent
to at least partially destroy that group as such.
19. The actus reus is clearly
present in the case of the Holodomor: the killing of a considerable
percentage of the Ukrainian people is well established. In particular,
there is no reasonable doubt that Ukrainians in 1932/33 did indeed
form a distinct “national or ethnical group” within the Soviet Union.
What is still disputed is whether the specific intent to destroy
concerned a part or the whole of the targeted group, as well as
which group was targeted: independent farmers or Ukrainians?
20. A general “intent to destroy” can hardly be doubted, given
the massive scale of the famine, its long duration and the brutal
enforcement of the seizure not only of grain, but of all foodstuffs.
It is important to note that the latter practice was limited to
Ukraine and Ukrainian-populated areas of Russia. Stalin’s and his henchmen’s
“intent to destroy” is also established by numerous documents (reports
at all levels of the party and State machinery and correspondence
between the main proponents themselves), which have been made public
in recent years, and which prove that the leadership was well informed
of the extent of the famine at a time when the Soviet Union was
still exporting huge quantities of grain and turned down offers
of international assistance. These documents also prove that the
leadership deliberately prohibited starving farmers to leave their
villages, let alone Ukraine in search of food. Another indication
of the intent to destroy and of the fact that the famine was intentional
is the speed with which it was ended in the second half of 1933,
after its purpose was achieved and before it destroyed the food
production capacity of the Soviet Union for good.
21. The main question is whether Stalin intended to partly destroy
the peasantry in the regions affected by the Holodomor because they
were independent farmers, or because they were Ukrainians – or,
as I tend to believe, because they were Ukrainian independent farmers,
who were the backbone of the Ukrainian national revival movement,
which was so feared by Stalin.
4. Conclusions
of the hearing with experts on 21 May 2024
22. The question whether or not
the Holodomor fulfils the definition of genocide

is
unlikely to ever be decided by a court of law: the perpetrators
are long dead, and so are almost all direct witnesses.
23. Where judicial proceedings can no longer hold to account the
actual perpetrators, it is up to the “Court of History” to establish
and preserve for posterity the true facts and their legal qualification.
The Assembly should make a strong contribution to this process,
taking into account all evidence, including that made available
more recently and that collected by the investigation carried out
by the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Security Service of Ukraine
(SBU).
24. In order to draw our conclusions formulating the Assembly’s
contribution to the “Court of History”, I invited two eminent historians,
Professor Hrytsak of the Catholic University of Lviv and Professor
Schulze Wessel of the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, along
with the Ukrainian Prosecutor General Andriy Kostin to address our
committee at its meeting in Paris on 21 May 2024.
25. Prosecutor General Kostin presented the two criminal investigations
carried out by his office and the SBU. The first investigation (2009-2019)
exposed the horrific scale of the crime and the brutal methods used, and
identified the top-level instigators and organisers, in particular
Josef Stalin. Finally, it established their motive – to destroy
the Ukrainian people as a national group, in order to ensure unfettered
Russian domination of the Soviet Union.
26. In its investigation of the crime of genocide (Article 442
of the Criminal Code of Ukraine) – investigation carried out jointly
with the SBU between 2009 and 2019 – the Prosecutor General’ Office
has gathered extensive materials from archives (including under
a joint co-operation project with its Polish counterparts analysing
hitherto unknown documents from the archives of the special services,
in the framework of which the 7th volume of documents concerning
the Holodomor in Ukraine in 1932-33 was published, on the occasion
of the 75th anniversary of the Holodomor),
and has collected testimony from numerous Holodomor survivors, other
witnesses, and family members. According to a summary of the SBU
dated 25 November 2009 made available to me, the “pre-trial investigation”
in question came to the conclusion that the Holodomor in 1932-1933
constitutes genocide, based
inter alia on
the analysis of 3 456 documents of the Communist party and other
executive organs and 400 documents from the SBU’s archives, 3 186
folios of death registration acts and 857 mass burial sites, as
well as the testimony of 1 730 witnesses. The investigation involved
requests for judicial assistance addressed to the law enforcement
bodies of Austria, Belarus, Germany, Italy, Kazakhstan, the Republic
of Moldova, Poland, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and
the United States. It resulted in the indictment of Stalin (Dzhugashvili)
Y.V., Molotov (Skryabin) V.M., Kaganovich L.M., Postyshev P.P.,
Kosior S.V., Chubari V. I. and Khataevich M.M. The Court of Appeal
of the City of Kyiv ruled that the pre-trial investigation “fully
and comprehensively established [their] special intent to destroy
a part of the Ukrainian (and not any other) national group, and
it has been objectively proven that this intention concerned a part
of the Ukrainian national group as such.” The court decided to close
the criminal case against these persons on account of their death
whilst ruling that the above-mentioned accused “with the aim of
suppressing the national liberation movement in Ukraine and preventing
the construction and establishment of an independent Ukrainian State,
by creating living conditions designed for physical extermination
of a part of Ukrainians with the planned Holodomor of 1932-1933,
deliberately organized the genocide of part of the Ukrainian national group,
as a result of which 3 941 000 people were killed, that is, they
directly committed the crime provided for in part 1 of Article 442
of the Criminal Code of Ukraine”.

The
Prosecutor General pointed out that at the high point of the famine,
in June 1933, 28 000 people died of hunger every day. He reminded
us of the silent suffering the Ukrainian people went through for
decades after the Holodomor. While the Soviet regime tried to stamp
out the memory of the crime, survivors felt guilty and ashamed for
not having been able to save those who died all around them. He
noted that an additional criminal investigation has begun in 2019
and is still ongoing. Its purpose is to identify all those who executed
the genocidal policies decided by Stalin and his inner circle in
order to help families of victims find a degree of closure.
27. The two historians recalled the facts related to the Holodomor,
in harrowing detail. I attempted to sum up the most important facts
below.
28. Professor Schulze-Wessel placed the Holodomor in the historical
context of long-standing anti-Ukrainian policies aimed at ensuring
Russian domination starting in the 1860s, including attempts to
ban the Ukrainian language. In the early 1920s, the Bolshevik regime,
under Lenin, attempted to win over national minority populations
to the Bolshevik cause by accommodating their national aspirations,
granting them large cultural autonomy. But starting in 1928, under
Stalin, the Kremlin returned to its “greater Russia” policies. The persistent
Ukrainian resistance became Stalin’s obsession. In April 1932, Stalin
noted that “Soviet power had apparently ceased to exist” in Ukraine
and made the restoration of Communist Party rule in Ukraine at all
costs an absolute priority. In terms of anti-Ukrainian policy, a
continuity could indeed be found between the tsarist period, the
Soviet period (with the short interruption in the early 1920s) and
Vladimir Putin’s policies since 2014 culminating in the current
full-scale aggression whose genocidal dimension was clear from the
outset. Vladimir Putin made it clear from the beginning that he
would not accept an independent Ukrainian nation and culture. This
was a war not only against the Ukrainian army, but against the Ukrainian
people.
29. Professor Hrytsak noted that the famine could be divided into
two stages. The first, with about one million victims, from 1931
until the spring of 1932, could be seen more like a “class genocide”.
Independent farmers resisting forced collectivisation suffered in
many regions of the Soviet Union, including outside of the Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic and the settlement areas of ethnic Ukrainians.
When Stalin was informed in early 1932 that the resistance against
collectivisation was by far the strongest among Ukrainians, whose
acts of resistance also had patriotic Ukrainian undertones, he decided
on the second phase of the Holodomor, introducing special measures
such as the confiscation of seed grain and any foodstuff in house-to-house searches,
and the sealing off of hunger-stricken villages and regions in order
to prevent victims from escaping or food to be brought in from outside,
which were only applied in Ukrainian-populated regions. This second phase
of the Holodomor, from April 1932 through the first half of 1933,
could indeed be called a genocide against the Ukrainian national
group as such, according to Professor Hrytsak.
5. Conclusions
30. In my view, the experts’ findings
fully confirm the view taken by many national parliaments and the Assembly
in its Resolution 2516 (2023), namely that the Holodomor, the artificial
famine in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and other mainly
Ukrainian-populated regions of the Soviet Union was an act of genocide. It
was carried by a double genocidal intent: in its first phase, the
artificial famine was directed against independent farmers as a
class, to punish them for resisting collectivisation. It was designed
to stamp out this resistance by brutally punishing and decimating
these farmers. This first phase of the Holodomor, until 1932, which
cost about one million lives, could thus be called a “class genocide”

–
the deliberate killing of a large number of members of a social
class the regime wanted to destroy. The second phase, in 1933, which
caused the majority of the approximately four million victims, was
directed against Ukrainians as a national group. Stalin, noting
that the resistance against collectivisation was strongest in the
Ukrainian-populated regions and was underpinned by the Ukrainian
national movement, decided to destroy the Ukrainian national group
as such by targeting in parallel the Ukrainian cultural elites,
arresting well over 200 000 persons, most of whom were deported
and killed, and the rural population, intensifying house-to-house
searches to confiscate all foodstuffs and cordoning off starving
villages and entire regions in order to prevent people from escaping
or food to be brought in from outside. This second phase can therefore
be called a genocide against the Ukrainian people.
31. In sum, to answer the question asked earlier, the vast majority
of the victims of the Holodomor were killed not only because they
were independent farmers, or because they were Ukrainians, but because
they were Ukrainian independent farmers. In my view, this should
be the verdict of the “Court of History” I referred to before.
32. The “Court of History” shall establish the whole truth, however
shocking; because for the victims and their descendants, the denial
or minimisation of the crimes committed against them constitutes
a permanent, painful and insulting reminder of the past, which stands
in the way of true reconciliation and friendship among nations.
33. The “Court of History” should also uphold the principle that
all crimes, even the worst, are committed by individuals, not peoples,
even if the criminals were able to magnify the scale of their crimes
due to their positions of power and to the willing assistance of
numerous accomplices and not least due to the passivity of those
who knew about the crimes but failed to speak out, let alone took
action against them, because they were afraid or because they did
not want to risk their comfortable careers under the criminal regime.
34. The world must also learn from history. A genocide orchestrated
by the Russian leadership against the Ukrainian people must never
be allowed to happen again. In fact, our member States and all States
having observer status with the Council of Europe or whose parliaments
enjoy partner for democracy status with the Assembly, as contracting
parties of the Genocide Convention, have a legal duty to prevent
any genocide, or attempted genocide.
35. The war led by Russia against Ukraine which the world is looking
at with dismay since February 2022 is clearly directed at destroying
Ukraine as an independent State, as well as eradicating the Ukrainian
people’s identity and culture. The methods used today are different
than in the early 1930s: instead of hunger, Russia uses attacks
against civilian infrastructures aimed at making normal life impossible,
compelling millions of Ukrainians to flee abroad and to safer regions
in Western Ukraine. In the areas under their – hopefully – temporary
control, Russian forces track down Ukrainian patriots – local politicians,
intellectuals, priests, in short, the pillars of the Ukrainian national
identity. They are tortured into submission or disappear in so-called “filtration
camps”, often never to be seen again. Ordinary Ukrainians become
victims of random violence designed to intimidate them and soften
them up for “russification” by a massive propaganda campaign targeting,
in particular, school children. The Ukrainian cultural heritage
is systematically destroyed. Last but most certainly not least,
tens of thousands of Ukrainian children have been abducted and transferred
to Russia.
36. This new genocide in the making is what makes the remembrance
of the Holodomor so important. The global community, which until
recently had barely taken note of the horrors of the Holodomor,
must remember, and it must act in solidarity to prevent any repetition
of this “crime of crimes” against humanity.