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A. Draft resolution
(open)
Report | Doc. 16272 | 30 September 2025
Russia: new threats to European democracies
Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy
A. Draft resolution 
(open)1. The Parliamentary Assembly
is deeply concerned by the growing, multi-faceted threat posed by
Russia to Europe’s security and stability. New military and hybrid
threats build upon a long history of repeated and extensive violations
of international law by Russia, including human rights violations
against its own citizens and attempts to assert its de facto control and undue influence
in neighbouring countries. It is imperative that Council of Europe
member States fully grasp the magnitude of the threat posed by Russia
and do everything in their power to strengthen their deterrence,
preparedness and resilience capabilities against it, in order to safeguard
Europe’s democratic security and peaceful future.
2. Russia has responded to diplomatic efforts to end its full-scale
war of aggression against Ukraine by escalating its attacks. In
recent weeks, the intensification of Russia’s missile and drone
attacks on civilian infrastructures in Ukraine, including in Kyiv,
have taken a devastating toll on civilian lives, destroying schools and
residential buildings and damaging diplomatic facilities. The Assembly
strongly condemns this further escalation of the illegal, unjustified
and unprovoked full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine and
reiterates its urgent call for just and lasting peace in Ukraine
to ensure Europe’s long-term security and Ukraine’s European future.
3. Likewise, the Assembly is deeply alarmed by the increasing
number of incursions by unidentified drones and Russian military
aircraft into the airspace of Council of Europe member States. In
September 2025, Estonia, Poland and Romania recorded unacceptable
and intentional violations of their airspace that led Estonia and
Poland to call for consultations under Article 4 of the North Atlantic
Treaty. Drone activity near critical infrastructure and military
sites in Danish and German airspace has also disrupted civilian
aviation, including temporary airport closures in Denmark. These
deliberate provocations are part of a wider strategy to test Europe’s
commitment to supporting Ukraine, Europe’s internal cohesion and
the strength of Euro-transatlantic relations. They recklessly increase
the risk of an enlargement of military operations in Europe.
4. Furthermore, in recent months, Russia has intensified its
hybrid warfare – combining hard and soft power – through sophisticated
cyberattacks, intelligence operations and co-ordinated disinformation
campaigns. Heightened military activities and growing hybrid threats
have significantly challenged the security and stability of the
Baltic Sea region. Russia has particularly increased its hybrid
assault on European electoral processes. It has deployed an unprecedented,
sophisticated combination of covert interference, information warfare
and destabilisation tactics, through large-scale use of social media,
vote buying and cyberattacks. These methods were on full display
in the presidential elections in Romania, and in the Republic of
Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections, where unprecedented foreign
interference and co-ordinated online manipulation networks targeted
institutions and voters to derail the country’s pro-European course
and seek wider destabilisation. On the election day itself, attempted
destabilisation persisted with bomb threats against polling stations
in the Republic of Moldova and abroad. The Moldovan people and institutions
demonstrated exceptional resilience and solidarity in defending
the electoral process against such massive foreign interference,
allowing the people’s pro-European choice to prevail. Persistent
risks caused by disinformation and foreign interference have also
been highlighted in the context of the observation of the 2025 presidential election
in Poland.
5. Referring to its Resolution
2593 (2025) “Foreign interference: a threat to democratic
security in Europe”, the Assembly firmly condemns Russia’s interference
in democratic processes across Europe and its attempts to destabilise
European democracies, increase domestic polarisation and undermine
trust in public institutions.
6. The Assembly also condemns the deployment by Russia of information
warfare through state-sponsored media outlets and Russian cultural
centres, used to destabilise political systems, distort public opinion,
and undermine democratic processes across Council of Europe member
States. It recalls that Russian oligarchs and affiliated actors
residing in Europe have been implicated in exerting financial and
political pressure, underscoring the necessity for co-ordinated,
transparent, and robust responses at national and international levels.
7. In its current warfare, Russia has rewritten the concept of
weaponry. The Assembly has already acknowledged the weaponisation
of migration by Russia, and its attempts to destabilise democratic
societies by exploiting or amplifying alleged minority grievances
and misusing the status of the Russian language. These attacks have
also undermined economic resilience and exacerbated societal divisions
throughout the continent.
8. Furthermore, Russia has intensified its diplomatic activity
worldwide, strengthening ties with non-democratic countries that
tangibly support its aggression against Ukraine by providing weapons,
or troops or by making their territory available for hosting Russian
weapons and launching attacks – such as Belarus, Iran and North
Korea; relying on economic partners – in Europe and outside – to
circumvent the sanctions system; and developing an alliance with
a global player such as China to promote a new world order.
9. The Assembly reiterates that the strategy of Russia, aimed
at destabilising European democracies using force, fear and foreign
influence, should be strongly opposed and defeated. Russia must
stop its unprovoked aggressions and provocations and be held accountable
for its repeated crimes and violations of international law. In
light of accelerating attacks and threats, the Assembly, at this
critical juncture, stresses that enduring peace in Europe will only
be achieved through democratic security and resilience.
10. In the light of these considerations, with regard to the need
for a just and lasting peace in Ukraine, the Assembly:
10.1. referring to its previous resolutions,
in particular Resolution
2588 (2025) “European commitment to a just and lasting peace
in Ukraine”, calls for unwavering European commitment and greater
unity, beyond Europe, in support of Ukraine and a just and lasting
peace, which is indispensable for Ukraine’s European future and
the security of the entire European continent;
10.2. insists that any peace negotiations must involve Ukraine
and respect its right to determine its own future, including its
sovereign right to continue its integration into the European Union,
as well as membership of other international organisations; such
negotiations must also include the necessary security guarantees;
10.3. considers that a just, lasting and effective peace can
only be achieved by anchoring it in the international human rights
framework as stressed by the Council of Europe Commissioner for
Human Rights;
10.4. reiterates that enhanced support to Ukraine is also crucial
in order to strengthen its capacity to effectively uphold human
rights, the rule of law and democracy, which remains key to its
democratic security and recovery and its accession process to the
European Union;
10.5. calls on Council of Europe member and observer States,
as well as relevant European institutions and international partners,
to increase support for the Council of Europe Action Plan for Ukraine “Resilience,
Recovery and Reconstruction” 2023-2026.
11. With regard to the need to ensure accountability, the Assembly:
11.1. referring to Resolution 2605 (2025) “Legal and human rights aspects of the Russian
Federation’s aggression against Ukraine”, welcomes the judgment
of the European Court of Human Rights of 9 July 2025 in the case
of Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia, which held the Russian
Federation responsible for widespread and flagrant abuses of human
rights in Ukraine – including the downing of Malaysian Airlines
flight MH17, torture, rape as a weapon of war, summary executions,
and unlawful and arbitrary detentions;
11.2. welcomes the landmark signing of the agreement between
the Council of Europe and Ukraine on the establishment of the Special
Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine on 25 June
2025, as well as the finalisation of a draft convention establishing
an international claims commission for Ukraine;
11.3. stresses the need to expedite the establishment of a comprehensive
accountability system, bearing in mind that reparations should remain
a core component of any peace settlement;
11.4. asks Council of Europe member and observer States and
like-minded countries, to:
11.4.1. work
without delay towards the establishment of the Enlarged Partial
Agreement on the Management Committee of the Special Tribunal for
the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine and to join the enlarged
partial agreement as soon as possible, in accordance with their
national procedures;
11.4.2. conclude co-operation agreements with the future Special
Tribunal;
11.4.3. work towards the adoption and opening for signature of
the convention establishing an International Claims Commission for
Ukraine, taking into account the Assembly’s Opinion No. […];
11.4.4. intensify efforts to establish the third component of
the international compensation mechanism, an international compensation
fund, which could be funded by repurposing and transferring frozen
Russian State assets;
11.5. recalls the need to ensure accountability for deliberate
and systematic attempts to erase Ukrainian cultural identity and
all war crimes;
11.6. calls on national parliaments to strengthen parliamentary
diplomacy to mobilise broader support for Ukraine, in particular
for accountability mechanisms and its accession process to the European Union.
12. With regard to the need for increased pressure on Russia,
the Assembly calls on Council of Europe member and observer States,
as well as relevant European institutions and international partners
to:
12.1. reinforce the current sanctions
regime against Russia, its allies and their political and military leaderships,
notably by:
12.1.1. renewing efforts
to reduce sanctions circumvention, including through secondary sanctions
against third countries and other economic actors facilitating it;
12.1.2. enlarging the list of targeted individuals and entities,
including all senior financial officers, all Russian banks and all
shadow fleet vessels;
12.1.3. enlarging the sectoral scope of sanctions, by targeting
the supply chain of larger groups of dual-use materials, machineries
and technologies;
12.1.4. lowering further oil price caps and tightening energy-related
sanctions;
12.1.5. strengthening the co-ordination among national authorities
in terms of compliance enforcement of sanctions;
12.2. pursue further diplomatic isolation of Russia through
co-ordinated efforts to exclude Moscow from key forums and rally
global partners in defence of international law; these efforts should
include sport diplomacy, which is widely used by Russia to project
its influence;
12.3. strengthen accountability mechanisms for all Russian violations
of international law and their respective rules.
13. With regard to increased hybrid warfare, the Assembly calls
on Council of Europe member and observer States, as well as relevant
European institutions and international partners, to:
13.1. develop non-military responses
to violations of airspace and related threats – alongside adequate military
responses when needed – through a comprehensive strategy and cross-cutting
action, combining deterrence, preparedness, protection and reactivity
measures, for both infrastructures and populations, in order to
enhance the resilience of democratic societies. Such a comprehensive
resilience strategy should ensure co-ordination among public authorities
across sectors, including legislators, law enforcement, education
and health services, as relevant. It should also seek to preserve
national unity as Russia aims at polarising and dividing European
countries and their societies;
13.2. implement robust countermeasures against foreign interference,
particularly in the context of electoral integrity, including updating
national legal frameworks to criminalise covert foreign involvement in
political funding, electoral campaigns, and information operations,
and enhance transparency and oversight of media and financial flows;
13.3. offer solid counternarratives to Russian propaganda seeking
to undermine European core values, notably by supporting free media
such as Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty;
13.4. operate closely with and provide support to States targeted
by Russian threats to help them to resist covert Russian attempts
to undermine elections and national sovereignty;
13.5. as the current security situation requires a unified response
from like-minded countries, reinforce international co-operation
and co-ordinated measures to defend European democracies and develop
an ever stronger and agile multilateralism that can react quickly
to Russian threats and ensure accountability;
13.6. improve the efficiency and resilience of the European
security architecture.
14. While defence issues are excluded from its remit, the Council
of Europe should contribute to enhancing the comprehensive and long-term
security of its member States within the scope of its mandate, making
them more resilient to countering threats and preventing conflicts.
In this context, the Assembly:
14.1. welcomes
the New Democratic Pact for Europe, launched by the Secretary General
of the Council of Europe, which should help reinforce democratic
security in Council of Europe member States;
14.2. considers that the Council of Europe should strengthen
its work on democratic security, in order to take into account the
rapidly evolving nature of the threats and challenges faced by Europe,
including from Russia. Projects on fighting disinformation should
be further developed, possibly with the support of the Council of
Europe Development Bank. The Council of Europe should also play
a proactive role in the discussions on the European political and
security architecture, within the scope of its mandate;
14.3. invites Council of Europe member States to adopt a strategic,
long-term approach to shaping the Council of Europe’s support for
Ukraine, bringing together the closely related aspects of democratic security,
resilience and reconstruction;
14.4. stresses the need to develop interparliamentary dialogue
and co-operation with relevant security forums, including the Parliamentary
Assembly of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).