Report | Doc. 16417 | 02 June 2026

Protecting democracy from disruptions caused by artificial intelligence

Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy

Rapporteur : Ms Deborah BERGAMINI, Italy, EPP/CD

Origin - Reference to committee: Doc. 15978, Reference 4814 of 24 June 2024. 2026 - Third part-session

A. Draft resolution

(open)

1. The development of artificial intelligence (AI) technology is advancing at an unprecedented rate, holding the promise of improving many aspects of human life and accelerating social and economic development. Indeed, AI may represent the most transformative revolution in human history. However, efforts to ensure that AI systems are safe and regulated by democratic governance frameworks are falling short of keeping up with the pace of innovation.

2. The Parliamentary Assembly is deeply concerned about the potentially disruptive impact of AI on democracy in Europe and beyond. At the same time, the Assembly acknowledges that this technology should not be demonised, but can be instrumental in innovating democratic systems, provided that all stakeholders understand what is at stake and take immediate action.

3. With the right governance framework in place, AI can be harnessed to strengthen democratic processes and institutions, as emphasised in the Roadmap Towards a New Democratic Pact for Europe. AI can facilitate public participation by providing citizens with access to information, explaining complex policies, mediating deliberations, and identifying patterns and common positions among large groups of people. On the other hand, it could also enable politicians and public authorities to gather proposals and information about citizens’ aspirations. In this sense, AI can be a powerful tool for participatory and deliberative democracy.

4. AI can promote inclusiveness by eliminating socio-economic barriers and providing disadvantaged groups with better access to public services, education and job opportunities. Furthermore, AI can enhance the protection of human rights, improve the efficiency with which public administration delivers services to citizens and detect the malicious use of other AI tools.

5. In this context, the Assembly believes that Europe should not restrict itself to a regulatory role, while cutting-edge AI developments are mostly taking place in the United States and in China. Guided by the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, Europe should take the lead in shaping the development of new AI applications, placing strong emphasis on their human dimension. The risks associated with AI technologies must be effectively identified, addressed and mitigated. In this regard, the Council of Europe has a critical responsibility to ensure that the relationship between humans and AI remains firmly oriented towards the common good.

6. AI technology relies on large datasets to train its systems and produce outputs. Sensitive personal data, often collected infringing on citizens’ privacy, can be exploited by malevolent individuals, companies or governments, for mass surveillance purposes, predictive policing, risk and social scoring, and censoring political opinions. This has chilling effects on civil participation.

7. The datasets used to train AI systems can be polluted by politically based disinformation content. They can also contain biases, as they might reflect or even amplify inequalities already present in societies in the outputs produced. When AI is used for policy-making purposes, these biases can lead to ill-informed decisions or discrimination against certain groups, such as women or minorities. Additionally, AI systems can sometimes “hallucinate”, generating incomplete or misleading information.

8. Personal data can be misused to create fake identities or produce synthetic content, such as deepfakes in the form of texts, images, audio files or videos, which essentially impersonate others for the purpose of harassing, scamming, blackmailing or committing other frauds.

9. Deepfakes and other synthetic content can also be used to spread fake news, hate speech, and divisive content. Even with limited time and resources, well-co-ordinated disinformation campaigns can be launched on a large scale to interfere with political debates and elections. Through “bot farms” and “troll farms”, namely networks that create fictitious profiles programmed to automatically spread disinformation, these operations can reach a wide audience extremely quickly, in stark contrast to the time and resources needed to “debunk” them.

10. Malevolent agents, including foreign actors, are increasingly exploiting these opportunities as hybrid methods to interfere with democratic processes and institutions in Europe. The Assembly therefore welcomes the ongoing work of the Committee of Experts on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference, particularly with regard to the feasibility study on the possible elaboration of a legal instrument on foreign information manipulation and interference, including disinformation.

11. An increasing number of citizens are relying on social media platforms as their main source of information. In turn, data gathered from citizens is also used to profile them, identify their preferences and micro target them with specific content, ultimately with the aim of manipulating their opinions. Micro targeting contributes to the creation of echo chambers, in which users are exposed to a limited range of ideas and beliefs and do not have the opportunity to engage in a meaningful political dialogue with people who hold different opinions. Chatbots, which are software designed to simulate a conversation, can also be programmed to censor specific content and provide biased answers, thereby further contributing to the manipulation of citizens’ choices and beliefs.

12. The business model of large social media platforms aims to monetise user engagement through advertisements. This leads to algorithms prioritising controversial and polarising content. Although most of these platforms include fact-checking and moderation tools, these are not always efficient or quick enough to prevent dangerous content from being disseminated. In addition, polluted information ecosystems and biased AI outputs can erode citizens’ trust in traditional media and in democratic processes and institutions, further contributing to democratic backsliding.

13. In the near future, AI systems may be entrusted with more decision-making responsibilities, which could lead to misjudgements regarding AI capabilities, lower human cognitive standards, and limit diversity of perspectives. New developments could even lead to the creation of a “super” AI, which would surpass human abilities, potentially develop its own consciousness and escape human control, with disastrous consequences.

14. Controlling large datasets, energy grids, computing capacity and the human skills needed to develop and deploy AI systems has become a crucial strategic geopolitical asset. This control can lead to dangerous concentrations of power in the hands of a few private actors and to increased global inequalities and tensions between competing States.

15. In line with these considerations, the Assembly affirms that democratic oversight must be maintained throughout the entire lifecycle of AI systems, from development to deployment, to safeguard human dignity, transparency and accountability. This must be achieved in collaboration with all the relevant stakeholders, starting from the private actors operating in the field of AI, to ensure that AI systems are truly human-centred and empower humans without replacing them.

16. To this end, the Assembly urges member and observer States of the Council of Europe to sign and ratify the Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law (CETS No. 225) in order to allow its rapid entry into force and encourages non-member States worldwide to request to accede to this international treaty, the first of its kind in this field, as soon as they have the opportunity to do so.

17. Furthermore, the Assembly calls on member and observer States of the Council of Europe to:

17.1. engage in a comprehensive reflection on the need to regulate the development and deployment of all new AI technologies, including those specifically intended for national security and defence purposes, while at the same time eliminating the barriers to innovation in Europe;

17.2. take active action in response to threats of foreign interference and to strengthen resilience against disinformation and misinformation, in line with Assembly Resolution 2593 (2025) and Recommendation 2292 (2025); this should include adopting specific measures to counter the misuse of AI tools for spreading deepfakes, for example by introducing mandatory content fact-checking, debunking and watermarking on social media platforms;

17.3. strengthen the transparency, explainability, accessibility and inclusiveness criteria required by AI technologies, including those used by the public sector or to deliver public services, as well as the algorithms and content moderation tools used by social media platforms;

17.4. encourage the use of diverse languages in the development of AI technologies, to ensure their diversity and representativeness;

17.5. support and promote the development of open-source environments;

17.6. ensure that AI developers, providers and social media platforms are held accountable for any harm caused by their services;

17.7. establish clear, effective and appropriate redress measures that are easily accessible to victims of harm caused by AI;

17.8. incorporate risk and impact assessment and mitigation procedures throughout the entire lifecycle of the AI systems, focusing on human rights, democracy and the rule of law, for example by involving national human rights institutions, and adopting the Methodology for assessing the risk and impacts of artificial intelligence systems from the perspective of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (HUDERIA) of the Council of Europe;

17.9. strengthen AI and media literacy at all levels of education, including informal education, for all age groups (with a specific focus on older people), to enhance pre-bunking skills, coding capabilities, ethics, critical thinking and general knowledge of how AI technologies work, ensuring that no one is left behind in the digital transition;

17.10. dedicate sufficient resources to ensure that civil society and citizens participate in all debates around AI technologies, and that all relevant stakeholders, particularly young people, participate in co-developing new regulations, standards and oversight mechanisms;

17.11. tackle discrimination and bias against women generated by AI and ensure equal opportunities for women and men in the development, deployment and use of AI technologies;

17.12. dedicate resources to foresight and research into the multi-layered impact of new AI technologies on individuals’ psychology, information ecosystems, democratic institutions and processes, energy production, the environment and society at large, to be able to respond whenever necessary through regulation, oversight and other preventive or mitigating measures;

17.13. define clear frameworks for their relations with big tech corporations, so that their influence on democratic societies can be properly scrutinised and regulated whenever necessary, including through appropriate antitrust laws to prevent oligopoly formation and concentration of power;

17.14. consider defining clear red lines on the development of certain technologies and a moratorium on the development of super AI.

18. To fully harness the potential benefits of AI and strengthen democratic security, the Assembly also calls on member and observer States of the Council of Europe to:

18.1. explore all possible uses of AI technologies to strengthen democracy, particularly to improve the delivery of public services, increase the protection of human rights and reduce all forms of discrimination;

18.2. encourage and support the development of innovative ways to engage citizens, particularly through large-scale AI-powered consultations on difficult issues, to strengthen their involvement in policy- and decision-making processes;

18.3. encourage and support the development of AI-powered tools to detect, investigate and eliminate AI-generated malicious content and cyber-attacks.

19. To strengthen Europe’s digital sovereignty and reduce the continent’s dependency on external providers, the Assembly calls on member States of the Council of Europe to:

19.1. adopt robust cybersecurity measures to protect European algorithms, models, applications, relevant networks, datasets and critical infrastructure from malicious hackers;

19.2. focus on education, upskilling, as well as retaining and attracting talent to create the next generation of leaders and innovators knowledgeable about the latest technological developments and capable of achieving sustainable socio-economic growth through them;

19.3. develop pan-European, structured “sandboxes” in which to conduct stress tests for new technologies and tools in safe, closed environments, under strong governance frameworks;

19.4. identify areas in which Europe still has a comparative advantage (for example quantum computing, green technology, or the development of specialised applications) and exploit these by allocating sufficient financial resources and incentives, streamlining the regulatory framework and strengthening innovation ecosystems (universities, research centres, start-ups) and infrastructure (data centres, sovereign clouds, high-performance computing, and chip production);

19.5. scale up responsible innovation, through the involvement of all stakeholders, and strengthened public-private partnerships, in parallel with regulation;

19.6. stimulate a cultural shift towards greater tolerance of controlled risk-taking.

20. Acknowledging the global nature of the challenge posed by the rise of AI technologies, the Assembly calls on all States worldwide to consider establishing a multilateral body dedicated exclusively to overseeing AI technologies. This body could define a common language, standards and a regulatory framework, involving all interested stakeholders, and co-ordinate the various ongoing initiatives launched by different multilateral organisations.

21. Furthermore, the Assembly calls on private companies to co-operate in good faith with multilateral organisations, national and local governments, civil society and academia, in ensuring that the development and deployment of AI technologies, in all fields, are guided by the respect of democratic principles, human rights and the rule of law.

22. The Assembly also encourages national parliaments to prioritise AI in their deliberations. This should not only include legislation and regulation, but also fostering general debates on its uses and keeping up with relevant societal and institutional changes. One way to achieve this could be to establish and institutionalise dedicated parliamentary committees on AI.

23. Finally, the Assembly resolves to continue working on this matter, through the reports prepared by its different committees and by organising dedicated events on AI, also in relation to the New Democratic Pact for Europe.

B. Explanatory memorandum by Ms Deborah Bergamini, rapporteur

(open)

1. Introduction

1. Digital technologies have developed more rapidly than any other innovation in human history.

The pace of progress has become so fast that national and international attempts to regulate their use, harness their benefits and mitigate the threats they pose to society are in constant danger of becoming prematurely obsolete.

2. This is particularly true in the case of Artificial Intelligence (AI). The use of AI systems raises concerns, in particular because of their potentially negative impact on fundamental freedoms and democratic processes and institutions.

3. Implications include the violation of citizens’ privacy; the use of their personal data to control, coerce, censor or punish their decisions and behaviour; the spread of misinformation and disinformation to influence their opinions and choices; and the risk of cyber-attacks on sensitive public websites and databases, among other issues.

4. There are also significant implications for what concerns the democratic security and sovereignty of countries, as AI tools can become effective weapons in the hands of malicious foreign parties who seek to destabilise democracies.

5. As stated in the International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI, however, “AI does not happen to us: choices made by people determine its future. The future of general-purpose AI technology is uncertain, with a wide range of trajectories appearing to be possible even in the near future, including both very positive and very negative outcomes. This uncertainty can evoke fatalism and make AI appear as something that happens to us. But it will be the decisions of societies and governments on how to navigate this uncertainty that determine which path we will take.”

6. The Parliamentary Assembly must assess these concerns, by analysing the potential misuses of AI systems, their impact on democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and how these can be mitigated or neutralised.

7. In preparing this report, the Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy held different hearings throughout 2025:

on 5 March, with the online participation of Mr Daniel Innerarity, Chair in AI & Democracy of the School of Transnational Governance – European University Institute (who also further contributed with some additional considerations on geopolitical implications of AI, drafted by him and other colleagues of the European University Institute);

on 24 June, with the participation of Mr Courtney Bowman, Global Director of Privacy & Civil Liberties Engineering of Palantir; Ms Audrey Herblin-Stoop, Vice-President and Head of Global Public Affairs and Communication of Mistral AI (online); Ms Julie Lavet, Head of Policy and Partnerships for Europe of OpenAI; and Mr Ben Nimmo, Principal Threat Investigator of OpenAI (online);

on 10 December, with the participation of Ms Francesca Fanucci, Senior legal advisor of the European Center for Not-For-Profit Law (ECNL), and representative of the Conference of International NGOs of the Council of Europe at the Committee on Artificial Intelligence of the Council of Europe.

8. The rapporteur wishes to thank all the above-mentioned participants for their contributions, as well as the Committee members for their comments and support in preparing this report.

2. Previous and current work of the Parliamentary Assembly

9. The Council of Europe is addressing the impact of AI technologies on human life in a comprehensive manner and as a cross-cutting priority. The Assembly is an important contributor to this work. In particular, it has a dedicated Sub-Committee on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, and in October 2020 it adopted a series of resolutions and recommendations on the matter

: among these, I was rapporteur for the report on “Need for democratic governance of artificial intelligence”.

10. In a common Appendix to these reports, the Assembly outlined the ethical principles that it believes should be applied to AI systems: transparency; justice and fairness; responsibility; safety and security; privacy.

11. In Opinion 303 (2024), the Assembly also welcomed the finalisation of the Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, and stated that it would continue to work on AI-related issues.

12. More recently, the Assembly adopted Resolution 2628 (2025) and Recommendation 2300 (2025) on “Artificial intelligence and migration”, and Resolution 2654 (2026) on “Copyright enforcement in the artificial intelligence environment”.

13. Furthermore, the Assembly co-organised a Parliamentary Conference on Artificial Intelligence with the Parliament of the United Kingdom, in London, on 15-16 December 2025. This Conference provided an opportunity to exchange best practices and define parliamentary roles in AI governance, and it yielded several relevant elements for this report.

14. Finally, it is also worth mentioning that the Parliamentary Assembly is currently working on a number of other relevant reports on:

“Digital transformation: the role of the OECD in evaluating the impact of artificial intelligence on the future of work”;

“The need to modernise International Humanitarian Law” (which will also take into account the use of AI in warfare);

“Use of artificial intelligence by parliaments: risks and opportunities”;

“Safeguarding human rights in the artificial intelligence-driven public sector”;

“Safeguarding creativity and education in the age of generative artificial intelligence”;

“Artificial intelligence and gender equality: risks and challenges”.

15. The ongoing work of the Assembly underscores the importance it attaches to analysing the impact that AI is having on multiple levels throughout European countries, with the aim of identifying critical areas and defining solutions for this significant challenge. The Assembly will continue to prioritise this matter and support efforts to address the evolving implications of AI.

3. The threats of artificial intelligence to democracy

16. The Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law (CETS No. 225) defines an “AI system” as “a machine-based system that, for explicit or implicit objectives, infers, from the input it receives, how to generate outputs such as predictions, content, recommendations or decisions that may influence physical or virtual environments”.

In other words, AI systems simulate cognitive abilities and perform tasks that are normally associated with humans: these include the analysis and treatment of data, problem-solving, decision-making, and, most importantly, learning.

17. Current AI technologies are defined as “narrow” or “weak” AI: they can perform specific, limited tasks, under certain instructions, and often do so faster and more efficiently than humans. It is possible that future developments might lead to “general” or “strong” AI, which would be capable of applying what it has learned to different contexts and matching human abilities. There is even the possibility of “super” AI, which would be able to surpass human abilities and potentially have its own “consciousness”.

18. The idea of a dystopian future in which democracy could be replaced by 'algocracy', or rule by algorithms, through a conscious super AI rather than elected representatives, is currently just a hypothesis. However, given the pace of technological development and its multiple implications for geopolitics, human rights, democracy, the economy and the environment, it is crucial to monitor the very real threats and disruptions that narrow AI is already causing to democratic countries.

19. ChatGPT, a “generative” AI system and one of the most popular AI chatbots

available to the public today, shares the same view. When asked the question: “Do you think you are a threat to democracy?”, the chatbot gave the following answer:

“As an AI, my primary function is to assist and provide information, not to influence decision-making or engage in actions that could threaten democracy. However, the way AI systems are used can certainly have implications for democratic processes. AI can be misused by individuals or organisations to manipulate public opinion, spread misinformation, or infringe on privacy. I’m designed with ethical guidelines to promote positive interactions, transparency, and respect for privacy. But AI systems like mine are only as ethical and accountable as the policies, frameworks, and people that govern them. The true threat to democracy would arise if AI systems were exploited in ways that undermine trust, equity, and fairness. That’s why it’s important for society to establish clear regulations and safeguards around AI to prevent such risks.”

20. It is obviously important to consider how this response was generated: AI chatbots are software capable of “interacting” with human language, using sophisticated algorithms to process the request made to them and produce results based on their access to very large databases. In other words, the answer given by ChatGPT is based on reports, articles, statements and publications of various kinds available in its databases and on the Internet.

21. The way in which the algorithms are designed, however, can greatly influence the results produced. For example, in the answer provided above, ChatGPT states that it is “designed with ethical guidelines” – but who defines these guidelines as ethical? And who ensures that they are followed? As a result, the lack of transparency of certain algorithms, as well as the fact that self-regulation by the companies developing AI systems does not seem to be sufficient, are additional issues that need to be assessed.

22. This is also reflected in public sentiments towards AI and its governance: according to data from the Pew Research Centre, a median of 34% of adults surveyed across 25 countries say they are more concerned than excited about the increased use of AI

; according to the Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), only 41% of respondents in 30 countries thought it was likely that their national governments would adequately regulate new technologies, such as AI and digital applications, and help businesses and citizens use them responsibly;

and according to a research from the Ada Lovelace Institute, a very large majority of people surveyed in the UK believes that safety should take priority over speed, and that the ability to ban AI on ethical grounds matters more than competitive advantages.

23. According to Stanford University, AI capability is now outpacing the benchmarks designed to measure it, exceeding established human performance. Furthermore, while benchmarking for responsible AI (i.e. the set of practices and governance mechanisms designed to ensure AI systems are safe, fair, and beneficial and that they perform as intended) is increasing, it is not keeping up with AI advances and deployments. Stanford University also reported that AI companies have grown less transparent in 2025, increasing concerns about the ways in which systems are developed, trained, tested and monitored.

3.1. It all starts from data

24. AI systems and tools rely heavily on the ability to collect, store, and analyse large datasets, which may include personal data. These large datasets are then used to “train” many types of AI tools. Large-language models, for example, are neural networks working on a probabilistic way, thus generating their outputs based on patterns they identify in the datasets.

25. The misuse of AI systems by governments, private companies, and other entities to access personal data without consent is one of the most significant threats, due to its potential implications.

26. Personal data can be used for mass surveillance through public video cameras, citizens’ mobile phone GPS locations, or their credit card usage.

This is already widely implemented in China, for risk scoring and predictive policing purposes, i.e. to forecast possible future crimes and unrest, based on previous police reports, surveillance data, and social media activity – with a chilling effect on civil society activism.

27. Furthermore, malicious actors can use personal data to create fake identities for fraudulent purposes and scams. AI technology can also be used to create deepfakes by cloning a person’s image or voice to create fake images, audio files or videos (also known as “synthetic media”), These can then be used to blackmail or harass victims, or given high visibility and distributed by bots on large social media platforms, to spread fake news. Among the worrying recent examples, it is worth mentioning the hundreds of sexually explicit deepfakes targeting women generated by Grok, the AI tool integrated into the social media platform X.

28. Datasets can be imbalanced and contain biases that are then replicated in the outputs produced by AI systems. This can lead to or reinforce discrimination, particularly against women and minorities, when the systems are adopted for public policy-making purposes.

The algorithms used to analyse the data and produce outputs can also be biased and lead to discrimination. In this sense, AI systems and tools are seldom neutral; they often inherit the biases of the societies in which they are built and deployed.

29. Furthermore, individuals may be affected by potentially biased algorithmic decision-making based on AI without their knowledge. This undermines their right to an effective remedy, especially since these systems often operate as “black boxes”, and responsibility becomes almost impossible to attribute.

30. It is important to note that, according to some estimates, the available pool of high-quality data for training AI models might be fully utilised between 2026 and 2032, also raising concerns about the possibility to scale up models and expand their capabilities.

3.2. Disinformation and the media

31. The World Economic Forum Global Risks Report 2026 ranks “misinformation and disinformation” as the second short-term most severe risk, just after “geoeconomic confrontation”.

32. While misinformation and disinformation are not new phenomena, the accelerating development and deployment of AI systems and tools is certainly a major contributor to this risk. AI can be used to fabricate fake news and disseminate them on a large scale with limited resources and skills, and very quickly. As fake news travel faster online than the truth,

and considering the costs, resources and time needed to debunk them (often without managing to effectively counter them), this represents yet another major threat to democracies.

33. Malign foreign actors are using large-scale disinformation campaigns, such as the Russian “Portal Kombat” network identified by French authorities in February 2024.

By flooding the information ecosystem with thousands of fake news stories, false statements and deepfakes, these networks are poisoning the datasets on which large language models are trained, therefore also influencing the outputs that these models produce.

34. Similarly, “bot farms” and “troll farms” are increasingly being used to disseminate fake news on social media platforms, by creating fictitious profiles that are programmed to automatically spread disinformation, hate speech and disruptive content. Platforms, in turn, are not always efficient in moderating and removing fake content – and in some cases, it is not in their interest to do so either: their algorithms are structured in a way that prioritises the most engaging content, allowing them to monetise it. Most of the times this happens to be exactly the disruptive, divisive fake content that should be removed. Therefore, platforms can exercise a very strong gatekeeping power over political discourse, through their content moderation capabilities.

35. On the other hand, information manipulation is also used to distract individuals and generate distrust on institutions, activating anti-democratic feelings and behaviours. Digital technologies and generative AI are enabling the proliferation and fragmentation of perceived realities, which poses a vital threat: democracy cannot survive without some degree of shared reality.

36. Furthermore, the rise of social media platforms and the more recent deployment of AI tools are also affecting the business model of traditional media. These platforms often feed on content without any guardrails to protect intellectual property, which has serious implications for the diversity and quality of information.

A concerning estimate suggests that, in November 2024, the number of AI-generated articles on the internet was larger than the number of articles produced by humans.

3.3. Political persuasion and micro-targeting

37. AI technology appears to have surpassed the capacity to persuade people better than humans do.

Digital technologies and AI systems can therefore be used to influence citizens’ behaviour, particularly with regard to their political attitudes, with increasing threats appearing during elections. Foreign information, manipulation and interference (FIMI) pose a significant threat to European democracies.

38. Recent examples include the first round of the Romanian presidential elections on 24 November 2024, which were annulled by the Constitutional Court due to sophisticated digital manipulation techniques reportedly deployed on large social media platforms (in particular TikTok), most probably by a foreign power

; and the Moldovan parliamentary elections held on 28 September 2025, during which Russia undertook a massive disinformation campaign, spending the equivalent of over 1% of Moldova’s GDP in the effort.

39. AI systems and tools can be used to micro-target specific groups of citizens, for marketing purposes, as well as to influence their political opinions and choices. This can involve reducing their access to certain sources of information while magnifying their exposure to others, and it is achieved through the psychological profiling of users, who then receive highly tailored messages and content. Paid influence may also be incorporated into AI-generated outputs, in a way that is indistinguishable from neutral content.

40. Micro-targeting contributes to the creation of echo chambers, in which citizens are not exposed to a variety of opinions and are unable to engage in a political dialogue with those who think differently. Instead, they are passive recipients of information and ideas that reinforce their own beliefs.

41. Chatbots, in particular, can be highly effective in political persuasion. A recent study in Canada and the US showed how they could be used to persuade people to change their vote orientation.

Similarly, ahead of the parliamentary elections held on 29 October 2025, the Dutch data protection authority warned that AI chatbots were unreliable and clearly biased when offering voting advice.

42. In an increasing number of countries, “softfakes” are also being used: these are synthetic images created to make political candidates more appealing. While they are often created by the candidates themselves (or their teams), their use in electoral campaigns still raises ethical concerns.

43. Finally, AI can also be used to censor specific content. The Chinese AI chatbot DeepSeek (which has an overall performance comparable to that of ChatGPT and other US-made chatbots, but costs significantly less)

, is censoring or biasing answers to questions related to the Chinese government. This clearly demonstrates how these tools can be used to influence users.

3.4. Other threats

44. The threats described above can have an additional detrimental effect on democracy, through the increased deployment of AI systems and tools, as they increase people’s distrust of the media, public institutions and the integrity of democratic processes. Not only is there a risk of people being deceived by false content, but they may also become more cynical. News fatigue might appear, and people may be led to rely on social media platforms rather than traditional media (already a reality for most young Europeans)

, or not believing any source of information altogether. This further fuels polarisation and social unrest, thus contributing to the backsliding of democracy.

45. An additional threat is posed by AI “hallucinations”, whereby AI generates outputs containing false or misleading information. These can reinforce discrimination and spread disinformation, further polluting datasets and the information ecosystem. They can also lead to defamatory results for individuals: in a recent case, a Norwegian man asked ChatGPT for information about himself, and received the false claim that he had murdered his two sons in reply.

46. Furthermore, there is a risk that over-reliance on AI tools could reduce people’s ability to think critically and innovate, setting lower standards and limiting the diversity of perspectives. Citizens might use AI to address questions to their elected representatives, who might also use AI to provide their answers. Similarly, students might use AI to produce their work, and teachers might then use AI to correct it.

47. If incompetent AI is given decision-making responsibilities, on the basis of unjustified forms of techno-optimism or misjudgements about AI’s real capabilities, there is an additional risk of “incompetence elevation”, which could lead to catastrophic results.

48. Using AI tools can also lead to loneliness and the erosion of social skills, particularly when users anthropomorphise the tool and use it as a synthetic substitute for real-life relationships, including romantic ones.

49. Ownership of datasets, coupled with control over the most powerful AI systems and computing technology, can lead to dangerous concentrations of power in the hands of private tech corporations, especially in the absence of proper oversight.

50. In addition, different levels of access to technology and to the skills required to use it fully can exacerbate existing inequalities between citizens. Women, older people, and marginalised groups with lower access to education may be the most vulnerable. While it is too early to foresee the net effects of AI on the labour market, it is possible that certain groups might be left behind in the digital transition: those who will lose their jobs due to the increased automatisation of tasks might become more alienated and inclined towards political extremism.

51. Finally, the increasing demand for AI services, and the related need for ever-larger data storage and computational capabilities, can seriously impact energy production and the environment, particularly with regard to CO2 emissions and water consumption.

4. How can artificial intelligence strengthen democracy?

52. AI should not be demonised, however, as it can also strengthen democratic processes, if properly developed, deployed, and monitored. Although there are risks, AI also offers opportunities. With the right governance, standards and rules in place, these opportunities could offset the threats, converting AI in a formidable vehicle to strengthen democratic institutions and processes, making them more resilient and ready for the challenges of the future. There is still time to make this change happen.

53. The most obvious application of AI systems in politics is to encourage public participation. In particular, AI could provide citizens with access to specific information; analyse and explain otherwise technically complicated policies; mediate and summarise discussions, identify patterns and common positions among large groups of people involved in consultations and deliberative processes; and facilitate their interaction with their elected representatives and public authorities.

In this sense, AI could in a near future be used to facilitate international consultations and identify shared solutions to global issues.

54. Similarly, AI could also be used by elected representatives and public authorities to gather feedback, proposals, and information about the needs and desires of citizens in their community. This would support policy- and decision-making processes, making them more focused and effective.

55. Furthermore, AI tools can have a positive impact on inclusiveness, as they could provide people from all backgrounds, and especially disadvantaged groups, with better access to public services, education and job opportunities, thereby levelling the playing field and eliminating barriers.

56. AI could therefore encourage citizens to participate more in the public sphere, bringing them closer to the politicians who take decisions that affect their lives. This could, in turn, reverse the trend of abstention, as citizens would regain trust in institutions by feeling that their voices are heard and considered.

57. AI can also be used to strengthen the protection of human rights (e.g. by countering human trafficking)

or to automate and speed up certain public administration procedures, thereby increasing productivity, responsiveness, accountability,

and in turn improving citizens’ satisfaction with the work and performance of their local and national governments.

58. Several parliaments in Europe are already piloting AI tools to improve their internal work, including the Assembly. In September 2025, Albania launched Diella, an “AI minister” responsible for public procurement, with the aim of making the process transparent and incorruptible.

59. Finally, AI technology could be used to monitor and detect attempts to influence citizens with the help of AI itself, e.g. by identifying AI-generated content, and in general, it could be used to strengthen democratic oversight of the development, testing and application of AI systems and tools.

5. Geopolitical implications

60. The race to develop and control AI technology, its infrastructure and the relevant resources will determine the course of geopolitical relations at global level in the years to come.

61. The first implication concerns the “digital sovereignty” of countries. Ownership and control of datasets and data centres, cloud computing capabilities (including quantum computing), human skills, AI research and development hubs, and sufficient energy grids will become increasingly valuable assets for national security and state relations: countries with this control will be able to manipulate and selectively “shut down” AI services used by countries lacking it, as a foreign policy instrument.

62. The second implication refers to the clash between competing visions of society and political regimes, which also influence different “models” for AI development. The United States is still leading the way in AI research and development, thanks to their model characterised by an innovation ecosystem grounded on free markets and competition, and in which their tech corporate giants operate. China, on the other hand, is catching up through its single-party, state-centralised planning, and it is shaping a model through which the strong presence of the central government in citizens’ lives is reflected in the development and deployment of AI systems and tools.

63. In turn, the EU is criticised of lagging behind because of its focus on regulation – based on the fallacious argument that regulation is an impediment to innovation. It is important to note that this is a false dichotomy: appropriate regulation can facilitate technological development, by providing innovators with a safe and predictable environment. Europe’s real challenges may lie in its fragmented capital markets, the lack of a single digital market, punitive bankruptcy laws and higher risk aversion, which all contribute to having less incentives for the creation of an innovation ecosystem, especially for what concerns start-ups.

64. The “EU model”, however, particularly emphasises digital rights and an effort to project normative leadership globally, in order to shape international regulatory norms (the so-called “Brussels effect”).

65. The relevance of AI as a geopolitical asset lies therefore in its ability to reshape power relations, international norms and the very existence of democracy. It also represents a domain of ideological competition, with authoritarian regimes and democratic countries competing for the prevalence of their AI systems, which will in turn embed different sets of values.

66. In addition, the concentration of control over AI technologies in the hands of a small number of tech giants, which have greater financial resources than many States, is concerning for two reasons. Firstly, the imbalance of power between private companies and countries with fewer resources is significant and has geopolitical implications. Secondly, the transnational nature of these companies makes it more difficult to ensure accountability.

67. One recent example is the case of Anthropic’s cyber security model Mythos, whose release was limited to a number of tech companies and organisations: while the model seems to be outperforming humans in identifying cyber vulnerabilities, companies and even government bodies which are not granted access find themselves at a disadvantage. An additional concern is raised by the fact that such technology, in the hands of a malign actor, can also become a threat.

68. Furthermore, some observers are indicating that the rapid commercialisation of products to ensure a fast return on current investments poses a major risk for 2026. This could lead some companies to deploy AI tools that have not yet been properly tested.

69. Finally, it should be noted that a country capable of achieving general or super AI would pose an unprecedented threat to its rivals. This may eventually lead to “Mutual Assured AI Malfunction” deterrence frameworks (similar to the Mutual Assured Destruction deterrence framework ensuring stability during the nuclear era).

Even worse, super AI may be impossible to control, with consequences that are even difficult to imagine at this stage. One possible way to handle this could be to follow the model of Nuclear Treaties.

70. In September 2025, the AI Red Lines Initiative was launched, warning that it could become increasingly difficult to exert meaningful human control over unchecked AI systems in the coming years, and urging governments to “reach an international agreement on red lines for AI – ensuring they are operational, with robust enforcement mechanisms – by the end of 2026”.

71. Similarly, a Statement on Superintelligence was published in October 2025, collecting signatures from hundreds of public figures, calling “for a prohibition on the development of superintelligence, not lifted before there is broad scientific consensus that it will be done safely and controllably, and strong public buy-in”.

6. Current international efforts

72. Although technological advancements have a global impact, the regulations governing them seldom transcend national borders. This highlights the need to strengthen international, multi-stakeholder cooperation.

6.1. Council of Europe

73. The Council of Europe is contributing to this international effort in different ways. Its Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law was opened for signature in Vilnius on 5 September 2024, and represents the first-ever international legally binding treaty in the field of AI.

74. Article 4 of the Framework Convention states that the signatory Parties “shall adopt or maintain measures to ensure that the activities within the lifecycle of artificial intelligence systems are consistent with obligations to protect human rights”. Furthermore, Article 5 provides that “[e]ach party shall adopt or maintain measures that seek to ensure that artificial intelligence systems are not used to undermine the integrity, independence and effectiveness of democratic institutions and processes”, and “that seek to protect its democratic processes in the context of activities within the lifecycle of artificial intelligence systems, including individuals’ fair access to and participation in public debate, as well as their ability to freely form opinions”.

75. Furthermore, in November 2024, the Committee on Artificial Intelligence (CAI) established by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted the Methodology for the risks and impacts of artificial intelligence systems from the perspective of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (HUDERIA Methodology)

, a non-legally binding guidance document intended to be used by public and private actors. As of 1st January 2026, the work of CAI is carried on by the newly established Steering Committee for New and Emerging Digital Technologies (CDNET) as the CAI’s successor committee.

76. In November 2025, the Steering Committee for Human Rights adopted the Handbook on Human Rights and Artificial Intelligence, designed to support government officials and policymakers in Council of Europe member States in applying the European Convention on Human Rights (ETS No. 5), the European Social Charter (revised) (ETS No. 163) and other human rights standards to the use of AI.

77. In April 2026, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted Recommendation CM/Rec(2026)4 on online safety and empowerment of users and content creators, calling for greater transparency, accountability and oversight regarding how platforms hosting user-generated content design their interfaces and algorithms, and assess and manage the risks they pose to users’ human rights and democratic processes.

78. Overall, AI is being treated as a transversal priority matter by the Organisation; other relevant work includes the Guidance note on the implications of generative artificial intelligence for freedom of expression, adopted in December 2025 by the Council of Europe Steering Committee on Media and Information Society.

79. The Committee of Experts on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (PC-FIMI), established as a sub-committee under the European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC), has prepared a Feasibility study on the possible elaboration of a legal instrument on foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), including disinformation, presented at the Ministerial session of the Committee of Ministers in Chişinău (Republic of Moldova), on 14-15 May 2026.

80. Furthermore, the Steering Committee on Democracy is currently finalising a draft Study on the advantages and risks of the use of generative artificial intelligence in public debate relating to democratic processes and on AI literacy for democratic life.

81. The Council of Europe has been paying close attention to the participation of young people and their organisations in AI governance. In April 2025, it held a consultative meeting which resulted in a Roadmap on Artificial Intelligence, Youth Policy and Youth Work.

82. The Council of Europe also launched in 2025 the New Democratic Pact for Europe, to boost solutions that work and create new responses to democratic backsliding in the continent.

AI will be at the core of this effort, particularly for what concerns its Pillar 3 “Innovating for Democracy”, which aims at harnessing digital technologies for good – including AI – while combating their misuse and harmful impacts. This report and the other relevant ones currently being prepared by the Assembly will be a crucial contribution.

6.2. United Nations

83. The United Nations (UN) have integrated a Global Digital Compact in the Pact for the Future adopted in September 2024,

in which member States had set as an objective to close all digital divides and enhance international governance of AI for the benefit of humanity.

84. Through the Compact, member States also decided to establish a multidisciplinary Independent International Scientific Panel on Artificial Intelligence

and initiate a Global Dialogue on Artificial Intelligence Governance. The first session of the UN Global Dialogue will be held in July 2026.

85. Furthermore, the UN Secretary General warned in a public message against the dangers of unchecked AI for democracy, and called for AI to serve humanity equitably and safely.

86. Different UN Agencies and entities are working on AI from various angles. UNESCO

is tackling issues related to ethics of AI, AI in education, gender equality and capacity building for governments and judiciary. It also produced a dedicated report on “Artificial intelligence and Democracy”

. UNWOMEN also provides a gender focus on AI, and last year launched an AI School which allows participants to learn, build and govern safe, gender-inclusive AI.

6.3. G7 and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

87. The G7 is paying close attention to AI developments; in particular, through the G7 Hiroshima AI Process, it developed in 2023 the Guiding Principles and a Code of Conduct for AI actors.

88. The OECD is also intensively working on AI-related issues; the scope of its work, especially for what concerns AI’s impact on the labour market, will be thoroughly revised through a dedicated report currently being prepared by the Assembly. It is however worth to mention that the Council of the OECD adopted in 2019 (and amended in 2024) a Recommendation on Artificial Intelligence.

Furthermore, the OECD cooperates with the Global Partnership on AI.

6.4. European Union (EU)

89. The EU has undertaken several relevant initiatives. In 2025 it adopted an AI Continent Action Plan, to develop trustworthy AI technologies to enhance Europe’s competitiveness while safeguarding and advancing democratic values.

90. In 2024 it adopted Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (AI Act)

, which sets out a risk-based approach for AI developers and deployers regarding specific uses of AI, defining 4 level of risks for AI systems: unacceptable, high, limited and minimal. In particular, the AI Act prohibits AI systems aimed at establishing social ratings, profiling individuals to predict their risk committing a crime, or exploiting peoples’ vulnerabilities to distort their behaviour.

91. Furthermore, the EU adopted in 2022 Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act), introducing rules for online services used by European citizens in their everyday life, including marketplaces, social media networks, app stores, and online travel and accommodation platforms.

92. Finally, the EU also launched the European Democracy Shield initiative in November 2025, containing a series of concrete measures to empower, protect, and promote strong and resilient democracies across the EU.

6.5. Other initiatives

93. Other relevant initiatives include the AI Safety Summit, held in Bletchley (UK) in November 2023;

the Paris AI Action Summit held in February 2025;

and the AI Impact Summit held in New Delhi in February 2026.

94. In November 2024, the AI safety institutes and government-mandated offices that facilitate AI safety and evaluation from the European Commission, France, the United Kingdom as well as Canada, Japan and the United States, among other countries, launched the International Network of AI Safety Institutes. The aim is to facilitate a common technical understanding of AI safety risks and mitigations, and to encourage a general understanding of and approach to AI safety globally.

95. In addition, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) created in 2017 the standardization subcommittee “ISO/IEC JTC1/ SC 42 Artificial Intelligence”, focusing on the entire AI ecosystem, to enable mass deployment and adoption of AI in a large number of fields.

96. Finally, it is also worth mentioning the mapping of public-interest initiatives leveraging AI to support democratic governance online, prepared by the civic tech organisation Make.org.

7. Conclusions

97. In 1955, Isaac Asimov published the short story “Franchise”, which imagined a future in which the United States has become an “electronic democracy”. In this future, a supercomputer selects a single individual to represent the entire electorate and respond to a set of questions. The machine would then use these answers to determine the election results. “The machines grew bigger and they could tell how the election would go from fewer and fewer votes. Then, at last, they built Multivac and it can tell from just one voter”. Although this troubling scenario currently seems to be confined to the realms of science fiction, it is worth noting that in September 2025 a new political party in Japan identified AI as its leader.

98. Meanwhile, the most recent developments in digital technology and AI pose very real threats to democratic institutions and processes, demanding immediate action from Council of Europe member and observer States.

99. Although the digital transition may bring many benefits to humankind, the risks to democracy cannot be underestimated. The Council of Europe is a pioneer: its Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law is the first-ever legally binding treaty in this field.

100. This is, however, not enough. Member and observer States must adopt measures to ensure that democratic oversight is maintained throughout the entire lifecycle of all AI systems, from development to deployment, to safeguard human dignity, transparency, and accountability. This must be achieved in collaboration with all the relevant stakeholders, starting from the private actors operating in the field of AI, to ensure that AI systems are truly human-centred AI and empower humans without replacing them.

101. Initiatives to counter foreign interference and strengthen resilience against disinformation should be prioritised.

102. AI developers, providers, and social media platforms should be held accountable for any harm caused by their services, and victims should have access to redress measures.

103. It is equally important to dedicate sufficient resources to AI and media literacy, and to involve all relevant stakeholders in developing new standards and regulations.

104. Member States should seek to define clear frameworks for their relations with big tech corporations, while also taking steps to strengthen European digital sovereignty.

105. A multilateral body dedicated exclusively to overseeing AI technologies could be established, to define a common language, standards and a regulatory framework, involving all interested stakeholders.

106. Ultimately, it is important to recognise that AI technologies can also be a powerful tool to strengthen democratic security in Europe. Member States must be prepared to seize this opportunity and enjoy the resulting benefits, while ensuring that proper governance frameworks are in place.