Nuclear power plants in Central and Eastern Europe
REPORT
Doc. 6736
15 January 1993
Rapporteur: Mr BASSINET, France, Socialist
Summary
No sooner had they come to terms with the collapse of the communist regimes in the East than West European countries had to take on board a danger which threatened populations and the environment alike: the dilapidated condition of nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe, made worse by the lack sometimes of the most basic safety measures. When news broke of this potential danger a few initiatives were set up, but they soon ran out of steam because a real political commitment was lacking.
We need to find solutions which are politically realistic, economically viable and take the various technical options into consideration. Possibilities range from operating improvements and modernisation of reactors to the immediate shutdown of the most dangerous plants. It goes without saying that alternative sources of supply will have to be found for the populations of these countries, where the nuclear industry currently meets up to 50% of energy needs.
To be effective, action must be twofold. First, we need more efficient co-ordination of international efforts, including if necessary the creation of a top-level decision-making machinery. Second, we need an unequivocal financial commitment. Leaving business contracts aside, it will be necessary to increase the current flow of funds almost tenfold if we are to achieve the target of bringing all nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe up to international standards.
I. Draft recommendation [link to adopted text]
1. The Parliamentary Assembly is aware of the welter of political, ethnic and economic problems which descended upon the countries of Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of the communist regimes. As a result, the problems of run-down nuclear installations are not at present seen as an absolute priority by the public in those countries. Some of these power plants are, however, veritable powder-kegs and pose a threat to all the peoples of Europe as well as the environment.
2. In this field, complacent optimism is just as dangerous as scaremongering. In interested circles, astronomical figures have been put forward for the cost of refurbishing some sixty reactors in current use. The situation must be examined with technical precision and political and economic realism, bearing in mind the fact that in some countries nuclear power supplies sometimes up to 50% of all electricity production.
3. The safety of a power plant is very often determined by a set of parameters, poorly understood by the general public, and there are no clear-cut international standards whereby a nuclear plant can be classified as safe or not. Nevertheless it is now generally accepted that certain types of Soviet-designed reactors present shortcomings and that this situation is often compounded by new problems such as a shortage of qualified labour, a lack of spare parts, etc.
4. Much is at stake not only because of the potential danger of the situation but also because another accident would compromise the future of nuclear energy as a whole, at a time when it provides about 25% of electricity production in the industrialised countries of the West.
5. In the last two years some initiatives have been taken internationally to remedy this state of affairs. Certain projects have been set up by the European Community and the G7 Munich Summit of June 1992 where an action programme was launched. Nevertheless, the initiatives currently under way present a confused picture and political will seems to be lacking.
6. The Assembly believes that the West is faced with an awesome challenge which cannot be met without a huge commitment by all governments. The time which has lapsed since the Chernobyl accident has shown the limits of isolated actions taken at commercial level. In this exceptional period of European history a surge of solidarity is called for.
7. Moreover it seems necessary to set up machinery for parliamentary supervision of nuclear energy management in countries of Central and Eastern Europe still without this facility. Such parliamentary supervision must be accompanied by total transparency, providing for public awareness of the governments' energy policy decisions.
8. The Assembly therefore calls on the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to invite the governments of the member states as well as the governments of the other member states of the OECD to step up international co-operation on improving the state of nuclear power plants in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This co-operation must cover the following measures:
i. Cultivating safety. Firstly, there are inexpensive measures which could be taken quite quickly, such as making good the shortcomings in legislation and standards. Motivating and training staff are essential further measures. Bilateral projects, "twinning" between nuclear power stations in East and West as well as the special programmes devised by the International Atomic Energy Centre (IAEA) to enable staff for instance, to react more efficiently in emergencies should help this goal to be achieved.
ii. Operating improvements. The potential for human error must be offset by a more sophisticated computerised system. In this context, the restrictions on strategic exports imposed by COCOM should be further reviewed. Moreover, better operation and monitoring can only be exercised by independent regulatory and licensing agencies which did not exist under the communist regime. Such agencies are the only safeguard against accidents' being concealed from public knowledge.
iii. Reactor modernisation. One of the most difficult aspects is an assessment by country/plant/unit taking account of both technical and economic aspects. Safety and viability criteria must be applied. As regards safety all reactors currently under construction must comply with international safety standards. As regards viability account should be taken of cost-efficiency comparisons with other alternative energies as well as of energy efficiency measures. Even temporary stoppages for modernisation purposes would lead to considerable problems of energy supply, with economic repercussions, and these would have to be offset.
iv. Shut-downs. Considering that at present, there is no agreement between the different authorities on this issue nor an international authority with ultimate decision-making powers and that the figure of 15-20 dangerous reactors has been mooted, including all RBMKs, urgent studies should be undertaken in order to determine those which ought to be and can be shut down.
v. Setting up a high-level decision-making mechanism with extensive powers. The difficulties set out in paragraphs iii. and iv. demand the setting up of an ad hoc central mechanism with clear-cut powers. It would decide on priorities and give the green light to various programmes in close co-operation with national authorities and possibly recommend shut-downs. It should include representatives from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) - to give advice on the economic viability of a given project - and the IAEA. The latter would provide technical assistance and act as a clearing house to gather and circulate information on all assistance programmes.
vi. The organisation of "energy aid and technology transfer" in Europe. A serious programme of permanent and/or temporary shut-downs cannot be contemplated without creating the necessary conditions for making good any energy-supply shortfalls in the countries concerned, whether for industrial or domestic needs. The setting-up of a European energy charter, essentially aimed at promoting the exchange of raw materials and technology is a definite step in the direction of recognising an "Energy Europe". It would also require the creation of a European emergency electricity-supply network by interconnecting even temporarily national networks.
vii. Strengthening the resources of the IAEA. The assistance provided to countries of Central and Eastern Europe constitutes a considerable extra burden for this Agency. The programmes for diagnosing problems and helping national nuclear safety authorities to cope call for increased financial resources.
viii. International convention on nuclear safety. The medium-term aim should be the creation of an international legal framework namely a convention, which should spell out the principles governing the allocation of responsibility between designers, contractors, operators and sub-contractors while defining the obligations on governments.
9. The Assembly calls on the Committee of Ministers to launch an appeal to the governments of member states to reassert their political commitment and speed up their efforts to reach rapid solutions. The objective of refurbishing Eastern Europe's arsenal of nuclear plants cannot be attained without increasing the proportion of direct contributions by member states as opposed to commercial contracts with or without preferential terms. This requires an almost ten-fold increase in the financial commitment made to date.
10. The Assembly calls on the Committee of Ministers to transmit the present recommendation to the governments of the states concerned, non-members of the Council of Europe, as well as to the competent international organisations.
II. Draft order [link to adopted text]
The Assembly, referring to its Recommendation ... (1993) on nuclear power plants in Central and Eastern Europe, instructs its Committee on Science and Technology to consider in a long-term perspective the whole energy situation in Europe and particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, in order to secure a sound and sustainable economic growth; various energy sources should be considered and particular attention should be paid to safety, health and the environment.
III. Explanatory memorandum
by Mr BASSINET
I. Introduction
1. In the deluge of political, ethnical and economic problems that descended on the countries of Eastern Europe after the collapse of the communist regimes, one was somewhat overlooked initially: the safety of these countries' nuclear power plants. The experts were slow to react to this potential threat, and it was not until there had been a number of incidents and in particular an appeal by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) in July 1991 that the first organised responses emerged.
2. The valuable contribution of the international press should also be noted in this context. It quickly and effectively roused public awareness - albeit, as is often the case, with some inaccuracies and exaggerations, leading on occasion to alarmist attitudes.
3. The following must be emphasised at the outset: in this field, complacent optimism is just as dangerous as exaggerated alarmism. The situation must be meticulously examined on the technical level, and calmly and realistically on the political and economic level. Solutions should be tailored to individual cases and a delicate balance must be found between short-term improvements and long-term solutions, which are liable to be more radical.
4. The estimated cost of refurbishing Eastern Europe's arsenal of nuclear plants ranges between ECU 5 thousand million and 30 thousand million, depending on the source and on how ambitious the projects concerned are. To date, however, only a minute proportion of these resources has been forthcoming. Despite the recent proliferation of summits, meetings of experts and fact-finding visits, the political will needed to release large sums seems to be lacking.
5. The stakes, however, are high - and concern not only the safety of nuclear reactors in the countries of Eastern Europe and the potential threat to the peoples of the entire continent, but also the future of nuclear energy as a whole. It is clear that a repeat of the Chernobyl accident would halt the development of nuclear energy at a time when it accounts for about 25% of electricity production in OECD countries. Renewed interest in nuclear power, due mainly to the greenhouse effect caused by CO2, could also be undermined.
6. Presenting a report on nuclear power plants in the East does not mean that things are perfect in an ideal western world. Besides the most pressing problems such as the design and operation of installations, nuclear safety includes such things as the transport of plutonium, radiation protection, nuclear waste and a whole host of other aspects. We must therefore be constantly on our guard. Safety is not a state that is attained once and for all, but rather something that constant vigilance can improve every day, and this demands the active participation of all those concerned; that is what is lacking in the East at the moment.
This report attempts to respond to an urgent need and is limited to a given geographical area - the countries of Eastern and Central Europe. At this point, I should like to thank wholeheartedly all participants to a parliamentary hearing organised by the Committee on Science and Technology in Budapest on 1 July 1992. This meeting between political decision-makers and of high-level experts and governmental authorities was a real eye-opener. The presentations made during the hearing contributed to the drafting of this report.
II. The situation and the risks
7. To our knowledge, there is no single and clear-cut international standard whereby a nuclear plant can be classed as safe or unsafe. On the other hand the experts use parameters, often poorly understood by the general public, which taken together determine the quality and safety of a nuclear plant. Similarly, statistical data on the number of minor or relatively serious incidents that have occurred in a power station over the years, reactor design, the age and the condition of the plant, maintenance, discharge of radioactivity and staff training are factors that go into delivering a verdict on a particular power station.
8. It is customary to divide Soviet-designed power plants into two categories[1]:
- RBMK[2] graphite-moderated reactors (Chernobyl type)
- VVER[3] pressurised water reactors
At present, there are fifty-seven reactors, including fifteen RBMKs, scattered in different countries. Sixteen reactors are being built, all of them VVERs, with the exception of one unit.
9. RBMK reactors do not have a containment structure. Their design is somewhat outmoded and has virtually no equivalent in the West. Many uncertainties remain about their functioning and safety. As RMBK reactors were very likely also used for military purposes, until 1992 the IAEA had never been able to inspect them. Since the Chernobyl disaster, these reactors have become a source of international concern and many experts are recommending that they be shut down in the medium term.
10. VVER reactors can be divided into three groups:
- VVER 230s (440 MW). These ten first-generation reactors have the most serious design faults: no containment structure and very limited core cooling capacity in the event of failure. They should only remain in service for a limited period and at reduced output unless major reconstruction is undertaken.
- VVER 213s (440 MW). Although the fourteen second-generation reactors are better designed, there are still shortcomings with regard to instrumentation and fire safety. Considerable improvements will be required if they are to remain in operation.
- VVER 320s (1000 MW). These reactors, of relatively recent design (number 18) and come closest to matching the quality of reactors in Western countries. They are surrounded by a containment structure. At first sight they appear to be technically reliable and economically viable. The quality of manufacture of certain components, however, leaves something to be desired and some VVER-1000 have a bad operation history (units 5 and 6 in Kozloduy) in particular relating to power supply and steam generator performance.
11. On top of these faults inherent in the design of the reactors and in the construction of the plants, there are a number of fresh problems that serve to make the issue even more complex. They can be summarised as follows:
- most of the nuclear power plants were formerly under strict KGB surveillance, thereby reducing the risks of insecurity linked to terrorist attacks etc. Today this is no longer the case and the plants, scarcely protected even by old barbed wire fencing at best, are dangerously accessible;
- nuclear plants located in the former Soviet republics are faced with a shortage of specialist personnel brought about by the departure of Russian technicians - particularly in those places where nationalist feelings have been running high - and a lack of spare parts;
- the economic upheavals in these countries are encouraging the best technicians to leave, thereby depriving the power stations of their most valuable staff. Apart from a few very special cases, such as the Kozloduy power plant in Bulgaria where the authorities have had to increase salaries tenfold in order to keep the plant in operation, this state of affairs is beginning to present real problems.
- last but not least there exists also the possibility of social unrest, or even civil war in some areas, in which case the power plants might become extremely vulnerable and attractive targets.
12. Public opinion in the countries concerned is currently marked by relative indifference to nuclear safety, despite the fact that some of the power plants at risk are located close to cities such as St Petersburg or Kiev. Clearly this lack of public pressure on the authorities is a factor that influences discussions between the governments of East European countries and those of countries that would like to see the existing plants improved. It explains why East European leaders are reluctant to use hard currency - which is so precious and essential to economic survival - to replace reactors, and instead tend to negotiate direct Western assistance.
13. Shutting down a large number of reactors in Eastern Europe does not appear to be a realistic option given that these countries need a reliable supply of energy in order to secure economic growth. The current proportion of electricity generated by nuclear power is 12% in Russia, 25% in Ukraine, 51% in Hungary, 28% in Czechoslovakia, 35% in Bulgaria and 45% in Lithuania. At the above-mentioned hearing, the assistant director of atomic energy safety in Ukraine stated that the country "would not have made it through the winter" without nuclear energy. Elsewhere there is a temptation to recommission closed-down power stations, such as Oktemberyan in Armenia, situated in a earthquake zone less than 30 km from Yerevan.
14. Finally, it should also be noted that if there were mass closures, it is likely that the shortfall in electricity production would be made up, at least initially, by thermal power stations (using fossil fuels), which are badly maintained and fall a long way short of current ecological standards.
III. What is being done?
15. There are various options. Action must be taken on a technical, human and regulatory level. The main thing is to determine priorities and find the necessary finance. A number of countries have already taken steps to solve the most pressing problems pending the start-up of an international assistance programme. In Russia, for example, annual reports have been submitted since 1991 on safety conditions in each type of unit, and since April 1992 a quality control programme identical to those in the West has been established. None of this existed before. Ukraine has decreed a five-year moratorium until 1995 and thus the four VVER units under construction are not being brought on line. In addition, the parliament has voted in favour of shutting down all the Chernobyl RBMK units in 1993. In the new German Länder, the operation and construction of all three power stations has been suspended, including the VVER 1000 Stendal power plant.
16. The Chernobyl accident led to the creation of WANO (World Association of Nuclear Operators), a body of experts which exists to organise seminars, training courses and exchanges between technicians from East and West. It thus pursues a limited objective. On the other hand, recent concern about the safety of Eastern European power stations has led to a veritable flood of initiatives, somewhat chaotic and not always rational, as the Assistant Deputy Director General of the IAEA, Mr Rosen, said at the above-mentioned parliamentary hearing. These initiatives can be summarised as follows:
i. The issue was discussed for the first time at the London G7 Summit in July 1991 and there was agreement on the principle of greater multilateral co-ordination among the twenty-four industrialised countries (G24);
ii. At the International Conference on Nuclear Safety held in September 1991, a proposal was accepted for an international project to determine the shortcomings of RBMK reactors and recommend an improvement programme. The IAEA might soon begin preparing a report.
iii. In December 1991 a G24 co-ordination meeting was held in Brussels, chaired by the Commission of the European Communities and attended by the IAEA, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, the EBRD and the World Bank. A nuclear safety working party was set up. The participants reaffirmed the principle that nuclear safety is first and foremost a matter for national authorities. Consequently, international monitoring was still a long way off, nor was there any significant progress in the matter of assistance;
iv. In June 1992 the EC Council, meeting at the level of heads of state and government, decided to increase the resources devoted to technical co-operation with the countries of Eastern Europe (PHARE programme - Action plan for co-ordinated aid to Poland and Hungary). It also decided to put the question of nuclear power plant safety to the G7 Summit in order to set up multilateral financing. At the time, American and Japanese reluctance could be clearly felt;
v. Since then the Community has defined a programme of around ECU 200 million (until the end of 1992) to respond to the most urgent cases, including Kozloduy in Bulgaria. Questions have been asked in the European Parliament criticising the delays in the implementation of the projects. The recipient countries complain about excessive bureaucracy and about the time taken to finalise contracts between the Community and the companies doing the work;
vi. More serious progress was made at the G7 Munich Summit in June, at which it was decided to set up an action programme that would also include the former Soviet republics. The G24 working group, which is charged with the practical implementation of these decisions, met in September 1992 with representatives of the countries of Eastern and Central Europe and set up three joint technical working groups to co-ordinate (a) training assistance, (b) aid to Kozloduy and (c) improvement of the control and operating systems of the RBMK reactors. The IAEA acts as technical adviser to the G24 working group and has begun a survey to evaluate every VVER 230 reactor in operation.
vii. There is also a consortium of safety research institutes active in the East, comprising NII (United Kingdom), GRS (Germany), IPSN (France) and AIB Vingotte (Belgium).
17. The IAEA has a special place in this range of activities. It is an organisation that has access to technical data and has experience to interpret it. Even before the public-awareness campaign on the subject of power plants in Eastern Europe got under way, it was running several programmes on safety, the main ones being NUSS (Nuclear Safety Standards), OSART (Operational Safety Review Teams), ASSET (Assessment of Safety Significant Events Team) RAPAT (Radio-protection Assessment Teams). The IAEA also performed a useful function in drawing up a scale of gravity of nuclear accidents for information purposes and to protect the public. Whilst it has at times in the past been reproached for being somewhat easy-going with national authorities, that should be seen against the background of the cold war, when information about certain reactors was extremely difficult to come by and depended on the goodwill of governments, if not of the military authorities.
18. Apart from the above-mentioned multilateral efforts, there are of course bilateral initiatives. For the most part they are aimed at immediate problems such as improving operating methods, but also, in a more limited fashion, at investment for the upgrading of reactors. Proposals have been made for twinnings between nuclear power stations in East and West, designed to step up technical assistance in safety matters.
19. To conclude, the initiatives currently under way present a confused picture. Absence of proper analysis and any coordinating authority has led to duplication of effort. The resources of the recipient countries are scarcely taken into account and evaluation work is proceeding at a very slow pace. The political orientation of Western countries in this regard seems to be largely dictated by their own nuclear power plant construction lobbies rather than by a clear analysis of the future requirements and capacities of the requesting countries.
IV. Future action
20. First and foremost, there must be thorough and objective consideration of whether the reconstruction or repair, depending on the individual case, of all existing reactors is the best possible solution. Other options should also be examined. Mr Yeltsin's personal adviser on nuclear questions, Mr Yablokov, made a striking statement on a television programme in which he explained that all the nuclear power stations in Russia could be replaced within five to seven years by improved gas turbines and that he found it difficult to understand the West's determination to upgrade the nuclear plants. In spite of the high cost (his estimate was 50 thousand million Ecus), his remarks should give us food for thought.
21. Nevertheless, although nuclear energy represents only one tenth of electricity production in Russia, the situation is quite different in other Eastern European countries and consequently reactor upgrading takes on a more urgent nature. International co-operation could cover the following aspects:
i. Operating improvements: operation is one of the elements of safety. The Chernobyl accident made us realise that in the eastern countries far too much responsibility had been left to human beings. The potential for human error must be offset by a highly sophisticated computerised system. Restrictions on high-tech exports imposed by the United States (COCOM), however, still present an obstacle in this sphere. On the other hand, programmes should be speeded up in order to improve the procedures enabling staff to react better in emergencies.
ii. Creation of independent regulatory and licensing agencies: one of the problems in the ex-communist countries was the state monopoly of construction, operation and monitoring alike. As a result, numerous accidents were hushed up and defective equipment was allowed to remain in service. Reports by Western experts occasionally make reference to such horrors as pipes blocked with handkerchiefs.
iii. Making good the shortcomings in legislation and standards: promoting a safety "culture" depends not only on staff training and motivation but also on setting and enforcing standards. These are inexpensive measures that could be introduced fairly quickly.
iv. Reactor modernisation: this is the most difficult part. An evaluation by country/plant/unit should be carried out first, followed by an economic viability study for each reactor. We are told that the EBRD intends to carry out such a study and has already began to send out its teams (it is doubtful whether EBRD is technically well equipped to carry out such studies). The determining criterion for keeping a reactor should logically be that the cost of upgrading is lower than that of replacement by other sources of energy.
v. Shut-downs: at present, the experts cite 15 reactors that should be shut down immediately for safety reasons. There is not necessarily agreement on closures between the national authorities of the countries concerned and the sponsor countries. This is true of the RBMKs in particular, which Western constructors are demanding be shut down immediately, notably Asea-Brown Boveri (ABB) among the largest. The present consultative structures are not empowered to take and implement such decisions. There is clear need for a very high-level group of experts armed with wider powers.
V. New prospects for international co-operation
A. Financing
22. The question of burden sharing invariably poses an acute problem. To date, the Community has provided more than 60% of the financial effort, which only represents a tiny proportion of the sums needed for a real improvement in safety. As was pointed out at the beginning, estimates vary greatly: the G7 set the mark at around 20 billion dollars for Russia and Ukraine. The same sum will certainly be necessary for the other countries of Eastern and Central Europe, as well as the former Soviet republics. These sums must cover various kinds of contributions, the bulk of them to be channelled through international financial institutions.
23. The spending that will be needed to remedy the most serious and most urgent shortcomings is put at some 200 million dollars per power station/per year for power stations equipped with first-generation reactors and 150 million for second and third-generation reactors. Private companies' calculations are much the same. The German company Siemens would like to see a fund of around 8 billion dollars set up to rebuild all Soviet-built reactors. The EBRD puts the cost at 5 billion dollars for the VVER, 400 million for the RBMKs (most urgent improvements) and 3 billion for power stations that are still being built. It is thought that around 1/6 of this could be financed by direct aid or by preferential loans and the rest by commercial contracts.
24. It has still to be ascertained which reactors warrant technical and economic investment, and this is where things become more complicated. Investors are obliged to make highly sophisticated cost/effectiveness calculations, taking into account the lifetime of the power station, the electricity that will be produced, possibilities for sales and exports, that is to say recouping the investment and repayments. In addition, Western experts have suggested that the costs as set out in the previous paragraph are still less than the estimated cost of replacing nuclear plants with gas turbines.
25. I feel bound to emphasise that these estimates do not take into consideration a major phenomenon linked to nuclear energy in the countries of the East, but above all in the former Soviet republics, namely the processing of waste. Communist leaders committed real crimes over many years against their populations and the environment alike, both by nuclear experiments of a military nature, by military dumpings as in Barents and Kara Sea (under investigation) and to a lesser extent by dumping waste from power stations in unprotected sites or in rivers. The time has now come to devise environment decontamination programmes as well as health monitoring of populations in the form of epidemiological studies. These programmes, which deserve a separate study and should be brought to the attention of the public in the same way as the operation of nuclear power plants, could double or even triple the estimates, with some experts talking of figures up to ECU 80 to 90 thousand million.
B. Co-ordination
26. The co-ordination mechanism set up through the G24 has served as a framework for discussion. Effective co-ordination requires
a. technical assistance
b. a well-defined strategy
c. a high-level body with decision-making powers
To this must be added the political will, expressed in unambiguous terms, of both the donor countries and the recipients. Some countries are still resisting the idea of massive aid until the countries of Eastern Europe have developed a credible economic programme. This is a vicious circle, because the economy is inextricably linked to energy policy. Western equivocation is also accompanied by reservations in some countries of Eastern and Central Europe who are afraid of technological interference, or even a foreign takeover of their energy resources. They demand that the upgrading of their power plants be carried out by a consortium comprising companies from at least two or three countries instead of just one. Such arrangements are obviously not likely to speed up the progress of work.
27. "Technical assistance" can be provided by the IAEA, which can serve as a clearing house to gather, review and circulate information on assistance programmes. This support is essential to enable financial bodies, the regulatory and training authorities etc. to decide their strategies with regard to safety assistance.
28. The key element in successful co-ordination seems to be the creation of central machinery with a clear mandate and empowered to give the go-ahead to the various programmes. It must also act as the final arbiter of the priority to be accorded to particular types of reactor, investment etc. It is obvious that such a machinery can only function in close co-operation with the national authorities in the recipient countries, which must also be represented. A financial institution such as the EBRD could usefully advise the central body on the economic viability of the various projects. Furthermore, this structure - whose composition methods of operation have still to be worked out - must function on the basis of clearly established criteria when choosing between closure and upgrading of the reactors it will be called upon to investigate.
VI. Conclusion
29. All the obstacles and difficulties described above are just one of the awesome challenges with which the West has been faced since the disintegration of the communist bloc. At the moment, the seriousness of the stakes does not appear to have been fully understood. Different countries and organisations continue to pass the buck. Few Western leaders have expressed an unequivocal wish for direct state aid to finance projects in the East.
30. Europeans are literally sitting on a powder keg of run-down nuclear installations. Should we count on industrial decline in these countries, leading to a reduction in the demand for energy, for the most dangerous reactors to be taken out of service? Or should we not, in a surge of solidarity, but also in the interests of all Europe's peoples, show generosity on a historic scale ? A careful analysis of the initiatives under way shows that what can be done on a commercial level is limited. Without a massive commitment from the governments of Western Europe, public health and the survival of the environment will be at the mercy of a overheating reactor and of radiation blown hither and thither by the wind. Is this what they call Russian roulette?
Reporting committee: Committee on Science and Technology.
Budgetary implications for the Assembly: None.
Reference: Doc. 6563, Reference No. 1769 of 7 February 1992.
Members of the committee: MM. Bassinet (Chairman), Roseta, Mészáros (Vice-Chairmen), Aarts, Mrs Arnold, MM. Bauer, Berger (Alternate: Mühlemann), Bohl, Borderas, Bosco, Fulvio Caccia, Paolo Caccia, Caldoro, Cunliffe (Alternate: Lord Newall), De Decker, Dees, Dimmer, Dincerler, Draus (Alternate: Bartodziej), Fourré, Hagard, Hjelm-Wallen, Kalos, Karakas, Albrecht Konecny, Korakas, Lenzer, Leyden (Alternate: Fahey), Lopez Valdivielso (Alternate: Palacios), Lotz, Luczak, Moran, Mrs Nybakk, MM. Panov, Pecriaux, Poças Santos, Albert Probst, Mrs Ragnarsdottir, Schädler, Mrs Terborg (Alternate: Scheer), Sir Donald Thompson, MM. Jack Thompson, Tiuri.
N.B. The names of those who took part in the vote are printed in italics.
Secretaries to the committee: Mr Perin and Mrs Meunier.
[1]. See Appendices I-XII for more details on reactors.
[2]. Also LWGR: Light water, high power, graphite-moderated pressure tube reactors.
[3]. Also WWER: Water-cooled, water-moderated energy reactors.