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<p align="justify">20 January 1993<b><br><br>Doc. 6739</b></p>



<p align="justify">1403-14/1/93-1-E</p>

<p align="justify"><b>REPORT</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>on population movements between the republics</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>of the former USSR</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>(Rapporteur: Mr ATKINSON,</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>United Kingdom, Conservative)</b></p>

<hr size="1">


<p align="justify"><i>Problem</i></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;As a result of national tensions and conflicts following on the break-up of the Soviet Union, millions of Russians living outside the Federation, including in the armed forces, now feel threatened by prejudice and under pressure to leave. Similarly, millions of non-Russians are seeking to return to the other newly independent republics. More than a million refugees have fled escalating ethnic violence. Uncontrolled movements of population between the republics of the former Soviet Union may become one of the greatest sources of tension in Europe in the future, requiring humanitarian aid exceeding local resources.</p>

<p align="justify"><i>Proposals</i></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The Assembly calls on the republics of the former Soviet Union to make full use of the CSCE mechanism to resolve conflicts, to facilitate the involvement of the international migration and relief organisations in providing assistance and shelter to the refugees, to take measures to restore confidence with a view to their return, and to adopt and harmonise legislation, particularly on refugee status and on the protection of minorities.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The Assembly also recommends that the member states of the Council of Europe enable the international migration and relief organisations to step up their operations in volatile areas and ensure co-ordination between them. The Council of Europe's Social Development Fund should be used in the area. Where necessary, the member states should discuss with the Russian Government a firm timetable and appropriate assistance for the withdrawal of Russian troops. </p>

<p align="justify"><b>I. Draft resolution</b></p>

<p align="justify">1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The break-up of the Soviet Union has seen an unravelling of its complex agglomeration of ethnic groups, nations and republics. Free of the Russian dominated, highly centralised structure which denied national identity, nationalism in all fifteen of the newly independent republics is leading to secessionism and widespread discrimination and antagonism towards minorities.</p>

<p align="justify">2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; As a result of ethnic conflicts in Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, in Ossetia, Ingushetia and elsewhere in the Russian Federation, as well as in several of the republics of Central Asia, more than one million ethnic Russians and non-Russians have been forcibly displaced. Recent and continuing violence in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and Tajikistan has resulted in tens of thousands of families requiring immediate aid and further substantial help to survive the winter.</p>

<p align="justify">3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Twenty-five million Russian-speaking people living in the Baltic states, Moldova, the Ukraine, the Caucasus and the republics of Central Asia are becoming increasingly concerned for their safety and their rights in response to indigenous nationalist and Islamic fundamentalist pressure and prejudice. It is estimated that some two to three&nbsp;million might emigrate to Russia in the near future.</p>

<p align="justify">4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; To this must be added a further million officers and their families of the Russian Army currently residing in the Baltic states, CIS states and in Germany.</p>

<p align="justify">5.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; It should also be noted that, in addition to the migrants, refugees and displaced persons already in the country with valid documents, a growing number from Somalia, other African and Middle Eastern countries are arriving at Russian airports with false documents as a result of inadequate immigration controls.</p>

<p align="justify">6.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In response to earlier inflows, a number of Russian non-governmental organisations were established to provide reception points and programmes of assistance for Russian-speaking migrants, refugees and displaced persons, and to purchase land for self-help settlements. Many of these are finding that they are unable to complete their projects through a shortage of funds.</p>

<p align="justify">7.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; More recently the Russian Government has established the Federal Migration Service to register such migrants, refugees and displaced persons at local offices, to provide initial reception, protection and assistance, and to establish new communities for permanent resettlement in Central Russia for those who do not wish to return home. The absence of federal legislation on migration, refugees and displaced persons is causing complications for these programmes.</p>

<p align="justify">8.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Russian Government has recently signed international agreements to allow the establishment of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to advise, provide expertise and support for such government assistance to migrants, refugees and displaced persons and co-ordinate better the work of the non-governmental organisations.</p>

<p align="justify">9.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; There is emerging a degree of confusion and duplication between these international organisations through a lack of co-ordination and a conflict of mandates. There are also insufficient resources and a lack of planning at a higher level to enable them to undertake programmes necessary to satisfy the needs of migrants, refugees and displaced persons in the areas of arrival and to put into place programmes of assistance to avoid displacement in the areas of conflict. </p>

<p align="justify">10.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In view of President Yeltsin's clear commitment to democracy and reform, the formidable economic and political challenges his government is facing and the distinct danger of a return to communism should he fail, it is essential that Council of Europe member states fully appreciate the growing social burden and destabilisation which the presence of so many migrants, refugees and displaced people now poses Russia and other former Soviet republics and that they are prepared to offer effective assistance - bilaterally, in concert and through international agencies.</p>

<p align="justify">11.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Assembly calls on the Russian Government to:</p>

<p align="justify">i.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; introduce a legal basis for migration, refugees and displaced persons as soon as possible;</p>

<p align="justify">ii.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ratify the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness;</p>

<p align="justify">iii.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; tighten its immigration controls against illegal immigrants and those of Aeroflot and other airlines;</p>

<p align="justify">iv.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; encourage non-governmental organisations and charitable organisations in the establishment of self-help communities for the permanently displaced with the necessary infrastructure, services and financial support;</p>

<p align="justify">v.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; introduce into law the right to own private property without leasehold from the state.</p>

<p align="justify">12.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Assembly calls on the republics of the former Soviet Union, including the Baltic states, to consider as a matter of urgency:</p>

<p align="justify">i.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; the continuing and growing number of ethnic conflicts between and within them and to fully utilise the mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of disputes and conflict prevention of the CSCE;</p>

<p align="justify">ii.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; the situation of the migrants, refugees or displaced peoples arising from these conflicts with a view to utilising the resources of the UNHCR, IOM and ICRC, in accordance with their respective mandates and fields of responsibility,  through the Russian Federal or other republics' Migration Services in the immediate provision of assistance and temporary settlement;</p>

<p align="justify">iii.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; measures to restore confidence so as to encourage as many refugees and displaced persons as possible to return to their homes with appropriate assistance and compensation including the harmonisation of legislation on the rights of citizens and the protection of minorities, and to enter into bilateral agreements which will regularise the position of &quot;stateless persons&quot;, such measures and agreements to be in conformity with the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees and its Protocol of 1967 and the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>II. Draft recommendation</b></p>

<p align="justify">1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Referring to its Resolution ... (1992) on population movements between the republics of the former USSR adopted on ..., the Assembly recommends that the Committee of Ministers:</p>

<p align="justify">i.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;  consider, as a matter of urgency, the growing migration, displaced person and refugee crisis in Russia and the provision of humanitarian assistance in the areas of conflict.</p>

<p align="justify">ii.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; invite the Council of Europe's Social Development Fund to widen its scope to enable appropriate non-governmental organisations in countries whose legislative assemblies enjoy special guest status to benefit from financing by the Fund,  in co-ordination with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM);</p>

<p align="justify">iii.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; invite the governments of all the member states:</p>

<p align="justify">a.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; to join the IOM and to donate generously to its special projects in Russia and the other republics of the former USSR and, as a matter of urgency, to encourage the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to:</p>

  <blockquote><p align="justify">i.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; establish programmes of assistance in potentially volatile situations liable to produce refugees or displaced persons;</p>

</blockquote><p align="justify"> </p>

  <blockquote><p align="justify">ii.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; immediately increase emergency relief in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan;</p>

  <p align="justify">iii.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; put into place a presence to monitor the current situation of refugees and displaced persons in Tajikistan;</p>

  <p align="justify">iv.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; finance existing assistance and training programmes in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Central Asia.</p>

</blockquote><p align="justify">b.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; to discuss with the Russian Government a firm timetable of withdrawal of Russian forces from those countries with whom such agreements have not been made and to consider what assistance it would be appropriate to offer for the settlement of the returning officers and their families;</p>

<p align="justify">c.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; to appeal to the governments of the areas of conflict concerned to enable those wishing voluntarily to resettle elsewhere to be allowed to take their property and savings with them;</p>

<p align="justify">d.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; to ensure that there is maximum co-ordination and co-operation between the international agencies and that their mandates complement rather than conflict to avoid duplication of their work.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>III. Explanatory memorandum</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>by Mr ATKINSON</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; INTRODUCTION</b></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Just as the end of the Soviet Empire in Central and Eastern Europe has released centuries-old tensions between nationalities, so has the end of the Soviet Union itself resulted in conflicts between the newly independent republics as well as within them.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Millions of Russians living outside the Federation, whose ancestors were encouraged or enforced to &quot;Russify&quot; or &quot;Sovietise&quot; non-Slavic republics by the czars, by Stalin and his successors, are now finding themselves threatened by prejudice and pressured to leave, in many cases, the homes of their birth.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Millions of non-Russians, whose ancestors were forcibly exiled to reduce and discourage anti-Russian nationalism or anti-Soviet communism, are seeking to return to their countries of origin, whilst millions more are refugees - displaced either forcibly for the purpose of &quot;ethnic cleansing&quot; or voluntarily for fear of their safety through civil war.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In the absence of any effective international influence to date through the CSCE, the Council of Europe, the United Nations and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), to guarantee minority rights, to provide for the orderly voluntary transfer of peoples and to resolve ethnic conflicts by peaceful means, it is becoming increasingly likely that such uncontrolled movements of population between the republics of the former USSR will provide one of the greatest sources of tension for Europe in the foreseeable future. Such movements are already resulting in the need for humanitarian aid and relief beyond the capabilities and competence of local and national agencies and NGOs. The number of refugees in the former Soviet Union is at least one million and shows every sign of escalation.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Such problems in the &quot;New Europe&quot; come well within the scope of the Council of Europe to analyse and to seek to resolve.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;This report is in response to the Motion for a Resolution (<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc=Doc. 6577">Doc. 6577</a>) of 15&nbsp;February&nbsp;1992 referred to the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, and to the Committee for Relations with European Non-Member countries for an opinion.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; THE DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEM</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>2.1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Russians &quot;Abroad&quot;</b></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;According to the Soviet census of 1989, about 25.5 million Russians live outside Russia in other former Soviet republics (see Appendix I). The majority are those whose ancestors were sent by the Kremlin to form a unified Soviet people or who were attracted by skilled, high paying jobs and whose privileged lifestyle discouraged integration into local society. Many also are of mixed ethnic descent or </p>

<p align="justify">of another &quot;nationality&quot; (for example Jewish) who, according to the rules of the time were able to register themselves as Russian for the advantages then available. Moreover the differences between the three main Slavic groups of Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians are not always great. It is where there is a distinct &quot;Slavic&quot; identity which sets them apart from, for example, &quot;Romanians&quot; in Moldova or Azeris in Azerbaijan, and between ethnic Russian speakers and the indigenous tribal peoples of the Asian Republics, that problems may arise.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>2.2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Non-Russian in the republics</b></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The 1989 census recorded 128&nbsp;ethnic groups in the former USSR, but unofficial ethnographical estimates put the total at several hundred (see Appendix&nbsp;II). The greatest number are to be found in the Russian Federation itself with its myriad of provinces (&quot;Oblasti&quot;) and national territories of varying autonomy of which some nineteen are seeking further self-determination if not outright independence. Other republics include former autonomous regions based on particular minorities, for example, Nagorno Karabakh in Azerbaijan and Abkhazia in Georgia. Frequently these nationalists were outnumbered by ethnic Russians, Ukrainians etc who were to be found in the major cities of every republic and region.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>2.3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &quot;Stateless persons&quot;</b></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;A new phenomenon is now emerging following the independence of the Baltic states last year, most notably in Estonia and Latvia: the Russian speaking population excluded from citizenship.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The introduction of the new laws has led to more than one million ethnic Russian residents becoming &quot;stateless&quot;. To qualify for citizenship including rights to property and to vote, they are required to satisfy a complicated process of naturalisation by a further period of residency in the newly independent state and are subject to examination to a very high standard in the state language and history.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Whilst the majority of these Russian residents wish to remain and to become citizens - many are partners in &quot;mixed marriages&quot; - rising antagonism in the press and hostility on the part of the indigenous population are encouraging many to consider &quot;returning&quot; to Russia.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Meanwhile the Russian Government is seeking bilateral negotiations to strengthen the rights of Russian people, and on 29 October 1992, it indicated that it is prepared to suspend the withdrawal of Russian forces from Baltic soil to &quot;protect&quot; these rights.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ENFORCED MIGRATION DURING THE SOVIET YEARS&nbsp;- A&nbsp;BACKGROUND</b></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The USSR inherited from the Russian Empire a complex agglomeration of ethnic groups, nations and republics, subsequently augmented by Soviet expansionism and incorporated within a nominally federal structure. This was nevertheless highly centralised and served to disguise continuing Russian dominance. Soviet communism denied the value of national identity, which was to be subjugated to class. During Stalin's rule boundaries were manoeuvred in such a way as to create numerous national minorities and ethnic enclaves in an apparent attempt to offset nationalist tendencies. However, this had the opposite effect, adding complex territorial counter-claims to traditional ethnic rivalries and distastes. Later, under Krushchev and Brezhnev, it was claimed the &quot;nationality question&quot; had been solved, though in practice political nationalism remained subject to oppression.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The strategy of the enforced migration policy was effectively to create a &quot;melting-pot&quot; effect, where people were forcibly relocated with the ultimate objective being &quot;Sovietisation&quot; and the formation of a unified Soviet people. It was essential to mix each nation of the Union with others and to establish a cultural base. Enforced migration was initiated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and executed by the Ministries. The influence of the military and industry also affected the policy of enforced migration, as certain ethnic groups were favoured for jobs in the military and industry.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The extent of enforced migration was probably higher than revealed by the Soviet census system, which was relatively unsophisticated and contained several fundamental shortcomings including the practice of intentionally misleading data collection, unreliability of data analysis, and unreliable data coding.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; CAUSES OF RECENT POPULATION MOVEMENTS</b></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;These may be defined broadly as follows:</p>

<p align="justify"><b>4.1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Returning to traditional homes outside of ex-USSR</b></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Best known has been the steady immigration of Jews to Israel and elsewhere, an increasing flow of ethnic Germans to Germany, or &quot;Pontic&quot; Greeks migrating from Georgia and Kazakhstan to Greece. These do not come within the scope of this report.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>4.2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Migration from the Central Asian republics</b></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Nearly ten&nbsp;million Russians live in the five newly independent states of Central Asia. From being the elite of a multiracial empire, today they find themselves an insecure, isolated and suddenly unwelcome minority amid economic chaos, nationalism and rising Islamic fundamentalism.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Today's exodus, already well established during the 1980s as a result of anti-Russian feeling by Muslims following the revolution in Iran and the occupation of Afghanistan, will undoubtedly accelerate encouraged by new laws replacing Russian as the state language. Opinion polls suggest that 1,5 million Russians will leave Central Asia over the next few years.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Non-Russian minorities who feel similarly threatened include Koreans from the Soviet Far East, Meskhetian Turks from Uzbekistan and Dungans, a Chinese related group. Such people will find it difficult, if not impossible, to recover land and property in their traditional homes.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;This year, recent violent communal conflict has prompted 90&nbsp;000 Russian speakers - a quarter of those who have remained - to flee <i>Tajikistan</i> where the civil war is escalating. Even in the most stable, democratic and &quot;pro-Russian&quot; state, <i>Kirghizstan</i>, 185&nbsp;000 Russians have left in the past three years because they see no long-term prospects.</p>

<p align="justify"><i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Kazakhstan</i> has also undergone ethnic conflicts. In 1986 there were riots over the appointment of a Russian to the then all-important post of First Secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party. The leadership was later passed back to a Kazakh, Nazarbaev, who has become the first president of the independent republic, but tension persists over the northern parts of the republic which are mainly settled by Russians, some of whom have raised the possibility of secession and union with the Russian Federation. President Nazarbaev has accused Cossacks (originally communities of freed or escaped serfs who settled in southern Russia and the Ukraine and were granted liberties in return for military service under the Tsars) of fomenting violence.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;There have been many outbreaks of ethnic tension, some violent, in <i>Uzbekistan</i>. For example, in 1989 there were clashes in the Fergana Valley between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks, the latter having been deported to the area from Georgia in 1944. Around 100 people died and many were injured. The Fergana Valley extends into Kirghizstan, but has an Uzbek majority. In 1990 there were Kirghiz/Uzbek clashes in Osh province.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>4.3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Refugees from ethnic violence and demands for self-determination</b></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The largest flows have been associated with the Armenian-Azeri conflict over <i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i>. Precise figures are disputed, but it seems that towards 100&nbsp;000&nbsp;Azeris have been displaced from within Azerbaijan (that is around Karabakh) and about 200&nbsp;000 have fled from homes in Armenia. During the same period (since 1988) around 300&nbsp;000 Armenians have fled from Azerbaijan, and possibly a similar number from Karabakh. (Source: Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 March 1992, and Associated Press, 7&nbsp;March&nbsp;1992). These figures will undoubtedly have been increased by the continuing conflict.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The flare-up of violence in <i>Moldova</i> in mid-June 1992 between the ethnic Romanians and Slavs has also resulted in many refugees. A Russian journalist reported on 23 June that 30&nbsp;000 Slavs had fled from the town of Bendery at the centre of the violence. Most were said to have headed for Tiraspol, the capital of the breakaway Slav (that is Russian/Ukrainian) Dnestr Republic, for Odessa or to other towns in southern Ukraine (Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 June 1992, C3/1). Fortunately there are encouraging signs that the dispute is being resolved peacefully.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Following the withdrawal of autonomy in February 1992 and the failure of negotiations, Georgian forces invaded <i>Abkhazia</i> occupying the capital Sukhum. The continuing conflict has resulted in thousands of civilian casualties and refugees.  Georgia is predominantly Christian whilst its Abkhazian population is Muslim.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Also in June 1992 there was an upsurge of fighting between Georgians and Ossetians around the town of Tskhinvali. The number of refugees is hotly disputed because the Ossetians claim that there is a deliberate attempt to drive their entire community (around 145&nbsp;000 people in <i>South Ossetia</i>, formerly an autonomous region of Georgia Republic, now seeking independence or union with North Ossetia) out of Georgia and into the neighbouring Russian Federation. The real outflow of people before the ceasefire agreement which came into effect on 29 June may have been anything between 40&nbsp;000 and 100&nbsp;000. The Georgian side also claim that 25&nbsp;000 of their people have been displaced by the conflict. In a separate conflict between North Ossetia and <i>Ingushetia</i> within the Russian Federation, President Yeltsin declared a state of emergency on 1 November 1992.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>4.4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Economic migration</b></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;There are few figures for this, but many reports in the Russian media. The differentials in the buying power of the rouble and in the availability of basic consumer goods in different republics have led many people to migrate, at least temporarily. Russian cities, especially Moscow, are also said to have received great influxes of people from the south of the Russian Federation, especially Chechenya, who are attracted by the surge in &quot;mafia style&quot; semi-legal and criminal enterprise, that is to say untaxed trading, prostitution, extortion, theft etc.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>4.5.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The return of the Russian army</b></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;An estimated one million officers and their families &quot;abroad&quot; are requiring or will require resettlement in Russia. This &quot;political&quot; problem of displaced persons equals that of the humanitarian problems of refugees.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;They include some 350&nbsp;000-500&nbsp;000 in the Baltic states and some in Germany with whom a bilateral agreement has led to the German Government contributing some 40% of the cost of rehousing (partly as compensation for the concentration camps).</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The army is planned to remain in CIS member states in a peacekeeping role, except the Ukraine where some personnel, not wishing to join the new army of the newly independent state, are leaving. Some divisions of the 14th Russian army have left Moldova. There are no immediate plans for the withdrawal of Russian forces from Azerbaijan and Central Asian republics.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;It is understood that reports on the continuous presence of the Russian Army on foreign soil are being prepared by the Political Affairs Committee and the Committee on Relations with European Non-Member Countries.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>4.6.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Cossacks</b></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Having been repressed and dispersed under the Bolsheviks, the Cossack people are wishing to return to their area of origin in southern Russia. A draft law is being prepared to provide for land, new communities and employment opportunities.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>4.7.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Tatars</b></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Accused by Stalin of collaborating with the Germans, the Crimean Tatars were dispersed to the Ural region and Kazakhstan and now want to return to the Ukraine with whom they are currently negotiating. Tensions arising from demands for independence for the autonomous Tatarstan republic in Russia represent a potential source of refugees.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>5.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE FOR REFUGEES - RAPPORTEUR'S VISIT TO MOSCOW</b></p>

<p align="justify">5.1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; On 27 June 1992 <i>Izvestiya</i> reported that President Yeltsin had signed a decree creating a new <i>Federal Migration Service of Russia</i> which would replace the Migration Committee attached to the Ministry of Employment (itself only set up six months ago) and take responsibility for all migrants from anywhere in the former USSR, now finding themselves in the Russian Federation. There is as yet no official definition of refugees in Russia (legislation is currently before the Russian Federation Parliament), but the <i>Izvestiya</i> article quotes an estimate of 280&nbsp;000&nbsp;refugees and displaced persons in the Russian Federation, a figure which is expected to rise by the end of 1992 by another 200&nbsp;000. To these it adds half a million people being &quot;repatriated&quot; (many of them ex-military). The article also quotes an estimate that between 400&nbsp;000 and two million people now living in other ex-Soviet republics would like to move to the Russian Federation. Altogether these estimates point to between 1,4 million and three million migrants to be resettled in the Russian Federation in the near future.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The Director of the Federal Migration Service, Tatyana Regent, is quoted as saying that the service will be responsible for the protection and resettlement of migrants and for finding work for them. It has immediate plans to establish twenty-five new settlements in central Russia and has a budget of three thousand million roubles this year. A network of local offices is also planned.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>5.2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Visit to Federal Migration Service (FMS)</b></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Your Rapporteur met with Mrs N. Voronina, Deputy Head and Mr&nbsp;I.A.&nbsp;Khokhlov, Head of External Relations, together with two colleagues from the Department for the Reception and  Resettlement of Refugees. </p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The Federal Migration Service operates under a temporary order and is responsible for the regulation, protection and resettlement of migrants and for finding work for them.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;He was told that the first wave of refugees to Russia was in 1989 - more than 20&nbsp;000 Meskhetian Turks fleeing from ethnic violence and tension in Uzbekistan and Georgia of whom 13&nbsp;000 had been given financial support, assistance in housing and had found work. In 1990 90,000 refugees arrived from Baku and in 1991 100&nbsp;000&nbsp;fled from South Ossetia to North Ossetia. In the absence of legislation, refugee status is given to those in exceptional hardship by administrative order. Today there are 700&nbsp;000 forcibly displaced persons, and an additional 340&nbsp;000&nbsp;refugees in Russia.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>5.3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Department for the Reception and Resettlement of Refugees of the Federal Migration Service (FMS)</b></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The Decree (135) of 30 March 1992 introduced more purposeful aims and assistance for refugees including financial support for their registration, reception, and resettlement.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Refugees are categorised into those who wish to settle temporarily in the hope that they can return to their home when conditions allow, as do, for example, those recently from Abkhazia and Azerbaijan; and those seeking permanent resettlement as do, for example, Armenians, because of the destruction of their homes by the recent earthquake, economic conditions generally, and fear of the draft; and Russian speakers from Tajikistan as a result of the withdrawal of the Russian army.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;This process of registration which commenced on 1 July 1992 is undertaken from a network of local offices at the place of arrival and not in Moscow or St&nbsp;Petersburg which are already overpopulated. 21&nbsp;thousand million roubles have been allocated to establish new settlements in Central Russia with small enterprises, farms and infrastructure to support new village communities and the local economy.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Your Rapporteur was asked to obtain international help for this &quot;Russian reconstruction&quot; in the form of expert evaluation of economic needs, and the efficient distribution of resources. The US Government is providing food aid, warm clothing and heating equipment for the reception centres dealing with refugees from Tajikistan. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM), of which the United&nbsp;States of America is the main donor, is providing experts for work in the FMS, for example, in migration control (see 7.2).</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In November 1991 Russia signed an agreement on co-operation with the UNHCR, which has since held a seminar on legislation problems; and parliament will shortly be asked to support an application to ratify the United&nbsp;Nations Convention on Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>5.4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Department on International Humanitarian Co-operation and Human Rights, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation</b></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Mr Bakhmin, Director, told your Rapporteur of his Department's growing co-operation with the IOM, the UNHCR, with which he had recently signed an agreement, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Bilateral agreements with CIS countries and the Baltic states have been drafted to regulate assistance and compensation for the return of ethnic Russians, and to encourage conditions, such as better protection of minority rights, for them to remain.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;He referred to the problem of &quot;stateless persons&quot; (see 2.3) and urged that it should be solved on the basis of international law and through institutions like the United Nations.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>6.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; NGO ASSISTANCE FOR REFUGEES - RAPPORTEUR'S VISIT TO MOSCOW</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>6.1.</b>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Your Rapporteur met representatives of some of the 30 NGOs which provide programmes of assistance for Russian speaking displaced persons in Russia. One called <i>Hoko</i> was established in 1990 to help those who fled the violence in Tajikistan without any property, possessions or savings. It has purchased land in Borisoqlebsk, a depressed town in the Voronezhoka area, to rehouse 22&nbsp;000 people and to establish a self-help/supporting community by providing building materials.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>6.2.</b>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Another, <b>The Russian Fund for Aiding Refugees,</b> is an autonomous government trust funded by individual emigrés from Tajikistan providing low interest loans to the FMS for infrastructure programmes to be paid back over fifteen&nbsp;years. It is well short of the resources it needs.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>6.3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Committee of Russian Refugees</b> was established following the displacement of Russian speaking people from Baku in 1990 by Azeri refugees from Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh, to provide reception points for rehabilitation - a service now being undertaken by the FMS. It provided modest assistance including food aid and the purchase of land for a new community in the Kaluga area but has since had its funds frozen because it could not afford 80% interest on credit from the Central Bank of Russia. It also organises an Institute of Information Technology to sell refugee expertise and services.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>6.4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The All-Russian Charity Social Foundation &quot;Sodruzhestro&quot;</b> was originally established by the Interregional Group of Reformist Soviet Deputies in 1989 and is now actively engaged in charitable activities and humanitarian assistance such as the organisation of festivals and religious feasts and concerts for children, the receiving, storage and distribution of international aid such as food and clothing to Russian cities, the provision of free canteens and the establishment of a database of poor people and large families in need. Its aim is to avoid conditions which will encourage the return of Communism.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>6.5.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Church</b></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;His Eminence Metropolitan Kyrill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, Chairman of the Department of External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church, told your Rapporteur of his church's work, in co-operation with other churches, most notably the Roman Catholic, to discourage the flow of refugees from Tajikistan. Unfortunately, relations in the Central Asian republics and the Caucasus had deteriorated since the end of Communism and the rise of nationalism.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Two principal problems are the lack of trained staff at a time of great expansion for the church (7&nbsp;500 parishes had been re-opened during the past three years) and a lack of finance for material assistance to the refugees.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>7.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE - RAPPORTEUR'S MEETINGS</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>7.1.</b>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;  The <b>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</b> (UNHCR) has so far had little involvement in the former USSR, partly because of its very limited resources and concentration on the acute problems arising in the former Yugoslavia. In December 1991 it was reported that the UNHCR still had no permanent representative in Russia (The Times, 10 December 1991). In March 1992 one of the UNHCR co-ordinators visited Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan (Associated Press, 20 March 1992).</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Your Rapporteur met the UNHCR representative in Moscow, Mr William Clarence, during a recent visit to London. Earlier this year he had visited the Caucasus and the Asian Republics to assess the situation.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;His current staff in Moscow - one senior and two juniors with two more &quot;promised&quot; - cannot adequately meet the challenge presented by the current refugee situation. Thus, his office is only monitoring it and reporting back to Geneva and advising on refugee law and procedure.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;A clear lesson from Yugoslavia is to anticipate more accurately a potential refugee situation and to put in place an assistance programme which will avoid displacement. This would make international aid more cost effective.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;His recommendations are:</p>

<p align="justify">a.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Immediate emergency relief programme for Armenia and Azerbaijan;</p>

<p align="justify">b.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Immediate presence and monitoring of the deteriorating situation in the Central Asian Republics, particularly, Tajikistan; </p>

<p align="justify">c.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Closer co-ordination and co-operation with the ICRC to avoid wasteful duplication in competing mandates.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>7.2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The United Nation's International Organisation for Migration (IOM)</b></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The IOM is an intergovernmental body separate from the United Nations but established at the same time as the UNHCR under the Geneva Convention 1951, and Protocol 1967. Supported by forty-six states and thirty-five observers and financed by subscriptions from NGOs and international donations, its wider mandate is to obtain and provide information, expertise, technical and material support and to establish projects financed by individual states. It also provides support for returning exiles.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Mr G. Sanikidze, IOM's Adviser for External Relations, told your Rapporteur that its Moscow office was established in March 1992 following agreement with the Russian Government. It was providing expertise to the Federal Migration Service and was seeking large scale financing from other countries for particular projects. </p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;A new Chief of Mission was expected shortly - a former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia. The IOM had conducted a feasibility study for the Council of Europe with a view to the setting up of a migration information system designed to improve understanding of migratory flows in Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS and to promote the more effective use of information. This might help to avoid duplication with the ICRC and mistrust between NGOs and Government agencies.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;A widening of the scope of the Council of Europe's Resettlement Fund was recommended to your Rapporteur so that it could be made available for Russia and other former Soviet republics with refugee problems to be channelled through the IOM. Generous donations from individual member states were also called for (see below sections 7.5 and 8).</p>

<p align="justify"><b>7.3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The International Red Cross Movement</b> </p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Your Rapporteur had meetings with Mr Stephen Richards, Head of Regional Delegation, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Moscow, and Mrs Benedicte Berner, staff member, and a separate meeting with Dr.&nbsp;Oleg&nbsp;Sidorov, Chairman of the Department of Refugees and Migrants, Russian Red Cross Society, Moscow, and Mr A. Sokolov, Head of Assistance for Emigrants and Refugees.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The main purpose of the Red Cross is humanitarian and impartial protection and assistance without discriminating as to ethnicity, religion or politics. However, the Russian Federation has not yet signed the United&nbsp;Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees of 1951 and Protocol of 1967 which is causing political and legal complications. It is working closely with the UNHCR in Moscow.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Your Rapporteur was told that there are over 460&nbsp;000 ethnic refugees officially registered with the Russian Federal Migration Service. These are Russians who lived outside Russia and non-Russians who had fled ethnic conflicts and civil wars in Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Ossetia, Ingushetia, Abkhazia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Further refugees are anticipated from the Baltic states, from areas of new ethnic conflict and arising from the deteriorating economic situation.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In addition there are refugees from Africa and the Middle East, for example: 6&nbsp;000 Afghans, 2&nbsp;500 Iraqi Kurds, and 2&nbsp;500 Ethiopians. A recent situation is the growing number of Somalis arriving in Moscow via Syria where they buy fake visas, and who travelled by Aeroflot, the Polish airline LOT, and others, who sell flight tickets for hard currency without checking visas.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The ICRC is actively involved in Nagorno Karabakh and Baku in providing humanitarian assistance, protection for civilians and visiting prisoners under the terms of the Geneva Convention. Here, as elsewhere, it provided a one-off lump sum equivalent to three months salary to the most vulnerable families and untertakes programmes of assistance through local branches of the Russian Red Cross. It remains frustrated by the lack of international concern for the situation in the former Soviet Union because of the attention being paid to the situation in Yugoslavia.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>7.4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; International NGOs</b></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Your Rapporteur was also informed of the recent establishment of the <b>Salvation Army</b> in Russia which is distributing assistance to refugees, and the <b>Order of Mercy</b> (formerly the Sakharov Foundation) which runs a rehabilitation centre for orphan children from the areas of conflict.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>7.5.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Council of Europe Social Development Fund</b></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The Social Development Fund, originally known as the Council of Europe Resettlement Fund for National Refugees and Overpopulation, was set up in 1956 to &quot;help in solving the problems with which European countries are or may be faced as a result of the presence of surplus elements of population, including national refugees&quot; (Articles of Agreement, Article II). Although the original purpose of the Fund was to help its member countries to resettle refugees and migrants, its operations have widened to include natural disaster relief, aid for disadvantaged regions, job creation, vocational training, the rehousing of low-income groups and schemes relating to public health, education and culture.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The Fund operates as an intergovernmental financial institution which grants or guarantees loans to member governments of the fund, or, through their intermediary and with their guarantee, to approved borrowers. Loans are generally granted at market interest rates but may be made on a preferential basis at one per-cent. On joining the Fund, members subscribe a certain number of participating certificates, of which currently 11% has been paid up. The Fund's capital was recently increased sixfold to 1&nbsp;273&nbsp;000&nbsp;000 ECUs to provide a firmer basis for future&nbsp;assistance to the countries of central and eastern Europe, although they are not yet members. The total lending potential of the Fund in 1991-95 is some 6&nbsp;000&nbsp;000&nbsp;000&nbsp;ECUs, amounting to approximately two-thirds of the total loans granted since the Fund's inception. In addition, the Fund's structure allows it &quot;to receive contributions offered for specific purposes which come within its stated aims&quot;, for example to provide provisional housing for displaced persons.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The Fund was established on the basis of a Council of Europe Partial Agreement. So far all Council of Europe member states have joined except Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Ireland, Poland and the United Kingdom. The then Yugoslavia signed an association agreement for five years as from 15&nbsp;January&nbsp;1986. Although none has yet done so, governments of states which are not Council of Europe member states may join on conditions prescribed by the Fund, presumably similar to those required of all members.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In 1989-90, conscious of its potential role in assisting the social development of the emerging democracies in eastern and central Europe, the Fund decided not to seek special association agreements with those countries in so far as they had good prospects of becoming members of the Council of Europe relatively quickly. Thereafter, it would be only a short step to membership of the Fund itself. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland are now in this intermediate position, although none has yet decided to join the Fund. This reasoning applies also the the Baltic states, which may be expected to join the Council of Europe in the relatively short term.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;There remain those republics of the ex-USSR whose prospects for Council of Europe membership are good, although possibly longer-term (Belarus, Moldova, Russia and the Ukraine), those with which the Council of Europe wishes to make a &quot;significant rapprochement&quot; (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) and those with which it would like to develop links with a view to technical co-operation (Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). Clearly these countries are facing enormous problems connected with the movement of populations between them as a result of political changes or conflicts. Assistance in the resettlement of such refugees and displaced persons would be in line with the original purposes of the Social Development Fund, and it may now be time for the Fund to reconsider its policy vis-à-vis these countries with a view to negotiating association agreements or even membership, as provided for in the Fund's Articles of Agreement. This would also be justified in so far as it would help facilitate the transition to full democracy and a sound economy.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>8.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; CONCLUSIONS</b></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;All of the information gathered by the Rapporteur points to the fact that migration within the former USSR stems from a variety of motives and that there is no straightforward solution. Some of the flows are the direct result of ethnic conflicts, and some are linked to a less urgent, but still powerful realisation on the part of peoples who now constitute minorities in their home territory that they no longer feel as secure and comfortable as before.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The Soviet Union operated as a vast support system for Russians living within the Union, but away from the traditional areas of Russian settlement. Russian was spoken everywhere; education in Russian was available everywhere; Russians were protected against discrimination and abuse by the whole weight of the Soviet civil and military structure. Now that all of the former Union republics have become independent states, this support structure is crumbling. Some of the republics are politically unstable and their governments no longer able to suppress inter-ethnic conflict and violence; most are already forging close links with their immediate neighbours and cutting their links with Russia. Thus, for example, Moldova moves steadily closer to Romania, the Baltic states to Scandinavia and Germany, Central Asia to Turkey and Iran.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The UNHCR favours regional solutions to refugee problems whenever feasible, ie. it is desirable to house and care for refugees as close as possible to the homes which they have left. In some circumstances this approach may be adopted in the former Soviet Union. For example, South Ossetians fleeing from Georgia can be looked after in North Ossetia.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;For many migrants, or would-be migrants, this solution is not appropriate: Russians forced to leave Tajikistan will not want to settle, even temporarily, in Uzbekistan. For most there will be only two options: either a return to Russia, though their ancestors may not have lived there for decades, or even centuries, or else complete migration, to North America, South America, South Africa, or wherever will offer them the opportunity of a new life.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;For this reason, the estimates quoted of twenty-five million Russians outside the Russian Federation and seventy-two million people in total outside their &quot;home&quot; republic may be misleading as a guide to potential movements of population. Looking at the map of the former Soviet Union and at the figures for minorities in the republics, one can identify two major categories: people who are remote from their historical or cultural home and people whose &quot;homeland&quot; is a neighbouring state. Russians in Belorussia and Ukraine are in the second catagory, as are Belorussians in Ukraine and Ukrainians in Belorussia. Despite the differences which have emerged between the Russian and Ukrainian governments over the Crimea, it is unlikely that in the foreseeable future there will be large movements of population between the three big Slavic republics.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Similarly in Central Asia, the borders do not correspond exactly to ethnic distinctions and, despite local conflicts, for example in the Forgana Valley, there is no reason why there should be wholesale movements between one republic and another unless hostilities break out on the scale of those between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Slavs, Germans and others scattered across the southern republic of the former USSR present a quite different case and a much higher likelihood of mass migration. The conflicts, or potential conflicts, between Slavs and Romanians over Moldova and between Slavs and Balts (especially in Latvia) could also lead to substantial flows of people. Indeed the Baltic governments are keen to reverse the heavy migration of Slavs into their republics during and since the second world war by emphasising the use of the Baltic languages in their new laws and practices and by requiring tests of loyalty to the new states when Russians apply for naturalisation as Baltic citizens.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The USSR was a large and effectively unitary state in which migration over large distances was often encouraged, sometimes enforced. Many families, even in the Russian heartlands, have experienced migration in the present or the previous generation. Few families, even in the countryside, can claim generations of unbroken settlement in one locality. For these reasons one might expect a pre-disposition to move again should people find their security or livelihood threatened. In his survey of prospects for emigration from the former USSR (rather than within it) Klaus Segbers finds evidence that up to one-sixth of the population (that is forty-five&nbsp;to fifty&nbsp;million people) are receptive to the idea of emigration and therefore that &quot;the potential number of migrants is very high&quot; (Segbers, p. 14).</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;It is unlikely that even a fraction of these people would find countries abroad willing to accept them as immigrants. How many would seek to migrate within the former USSR as an alternative is impossible to guess. Much will depend, no doubt on the future political stability of the various republics and on economic developments. Given the scale of these potential movements and the forces involved, western assistance is unlikely to have a decisive effect.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;However, it is the movements of peoples displaced by recent and current conflicts of ethnic origin in the former Soviet republics which are the principal concern of this report.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Whilst migration from the Caucasian and Central Asian republics has been apparent for several years, the current &quot;flood&quot; of refugees has occurred since elections in republics of nationalist governments which preceeded their independence last year (1991).</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In response, the churches and the newly established Russian NGOs attempted to provide reception facilities, hardship relief and plans for resettlement into permanent self-help communities for those not wanting to return home. Clearly such organisations should be given as much encouragement and support as possible.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Earlier this year the Russian Government established the Federal Migration Service to officially register migrants at local offices in the areas of their arrival and to take on much of the burden of assistance and resettlement. Today, it is receiving increasing support and expertise from three international agencies: UNHCR, IOM and the ICRC, although it is clear that these require greatly increased resources and commitment from a higher level to agreed programmes if they are to make a significant contribution to relieving and resolving the problems of more than one million refugees in Russia and elsewhere.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The absence of appropriate legislation and Russian ratification of the United&nbsp;Nations covenants create additional burdens on the work of all these agencies whilst the continued lack of opportunity to own private property denies incentive to the displaced to establish new roots.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Your Rapporteur is clear that everything possible should now be done to restore peace in the areas of conflict and to introduce measures of protection which will encourage refugees to return home. Where this is neither realistic nor wanted permanent resettlement in new communities in underpopulated or depressed areas of Russia is the only practical alternative.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Thus he urges all the republics of the former Soviet Union, including the Baltic states, to accept on urgent humanitarian grounds the need to work more closely together to resolve such refugee-creating conflicts using all the appropriate mechanisms of the CSCE, to deploy all the expertise and assistance available through the international agencies, and to negotiate bilateral agreements to protect the rights of minorities which will encourage the refugees to return home with confidence.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;He also calls on the Council of Europe to demonstrate greater awareness and concern for the growing refugee crisis in Russia in considering how its Social Development Fund can be adapted to apply to special guest states, in urging member states to donate generously to IOM projects, to offer assistance for the withdrawal of the Russian Army, and to urge the UNHCR to treat the situation as seriously as that in the former Yugoslavia.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;It is clear that without such assistance and support the social pressures and potential for destabilisation caused by the presence of so many refugees could effectively sabotage President Yeltsin's courageous attempts at reform and risk the restoration of reactionary forces which will have immense and tragic consequences for Europe and the world. </p>

<p align="justify"><b>APPENDIX I</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>ETHNIC RUSSIANS LIVING OUTSIDE RUSSIA</b> </p>

<p align="justify">(From the <i>Europa</i> regional survey of <i>Eastern Europe and the CIS</i>)</p>
<p>
<table border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="4" width="100%">
<tr>
<td bgcolor="#FFFFFF" valign="top">
<p align="justify"><b>STATE</b></p>
</td>
<td bgcolor="#FFFFFF" valign="top">
<p align="justify"><b>RUSSIANS</b></p>
</td>
<td bgcolor="#FFFFFF" valign="top">
<p align="justify"> <b>% LOCAL   POPULATION</b></p>
</td></tr>
<tr>
<td bgcolor="#FFFFFF" valign="top">
<p align="justify">Armenia</p>
<p align="justify">Azerbaijan</p>
<p align="justify">Belarus</p>
<p align="justify">Estonia</p>
<p align="justify">Georgia</p>
<p align="justify">Kazakhstan</p>
<p align="justify">Kirghizstan</p>
<p align="justify">Latvia</p>
<p align="justify">Lithuania</p>
<p align="justify">Moldova</p>
<p align="justify">Tajikistan</p>
<p align="justify">Turkmenistan</p>
<p align="justify">Ukraine</p>
<p align="justify">Uzbekistan</p>
<p align="justify"><b>TOTAL</b></p>
</td>
<td bgcolor="#FFFFFF" valign="top">
<p align="justify">50&nbsp;000</p>
<p align="justify">390&nbsp;000</p>
<p align="justify">1&nbsp;210&nbsp;000</p>
<p align="justify">470&nbsp;000</p>
<p align="justify">400&nbsp;000</p>
<p align="justify">6&nbsp;250&nbsp;000</p>
<p align="justify">920&nbsp;000</p>
<p align="justify">910&nbsp;000</p>
<p align="justify">360&nbsp;000</p>
<p align="justify">560&nbsp;000</p>
<p align="justify">410&nbsp;000</p>
<p align="justify">340&nbsp;000</p>
<p align="justify">1&nbsp;480&nbsp;000</p>
<p align="justify">1&nbsp;720&nbsp;000</p>
<p align="justify"><b>25&nbsp;470&nbsp;000</b></p>
</td>
<td bgcolor="#FFFFFF" valign="top">
<p align="justify">1,6   </p>
<p align="justify">5,6   </p>
<p align="justify">11,9   </p>
<p align="justify">30,3   </p>
<p align="justify">7,4   </p>
<p align="justify">37,8   </p>
<p align="justify">21,5   </p>
<p align="justify">33,8   </p>
<p align="justify">9,4   </p>
<p align="justify">13,0   </p>
<p align="justify">7,6   </p>
<p align="justify">9,5   </p>
<p align="justify">22,1   </p>
<p align="justify">8,3   </p>
</td></tr></table>

<p align="justify">Insert map</p>

<p align="justify"><b>APPENDIX II</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>MINORITIES IN THE REPUBLICS</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>(EXCLUDING RUSSIANS)</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>ARMENIA</b></p>

<p align="justify">56&nbsp;000 Kurds</p>

<p align="justify"><b>AZERBAIJAN</b></p>

<p align="justify">394&nbsp;000 Armenians (1989 - now largely gone); 167&nbsp;000 Lezghis; 44&nbsp;000 Avars; 32&nbsp;000&nbsp;Ukrainians; 28&nbsp;000 Tatars</p>

<p align="justify"><b>BELORUSSIA</b></p>

<p align="justify">428&nbsp;000 Poles; 245&nbsp;000 Ukrainians; 143&nbsp;000 Jews; 12&nbsp;000 Tatars</p>

<p align="justify"><b>ESTONIA</b></p>

<p align="justify">49&nbsp;000 Ukrainians; 28&nbsp;000 Belorussians; 17&nbsp;000 Finns</p>

<p align="justify"><b>GEORGIA</b></p>

<p align="justify">49&nbsp;000 Armenians; 278&nbsp;000 Azeris; 174&nbsp;000 Ossetians; 104&nbsp;000 Greeks; 93&nbsp;000&nbsp;Abkhazians; 52&nbsp;000 Ukrainians; 32&nbsp;000 Kurds; 29&nbsp;000 Jews</p>

<p align="justify"><b>KAZAKHSTAN</b></p>

<p align="justify">958&nbsp;000 Germans; 896&nbsp;000 Ukrainians; 332&nbsp;000 Uzbeks; 328&nbsp;000 Tatars; 185&nbsp;000&nbsp;Uighurs; 183&nbsp;000 Belorussians; 10&nbsp;300 Koreans</p>

<p align="justify"><b>KIRGHIZSTAN</b></p>

<p align="justify">554&nbsp;000 Uzbeks; 197&nbsp;000 Ukrainians; 103&nbsp;000 Germans; 69&nbsp;000 Tatars; 37&nbsp;000&nbsp;Kazakhs; 37&nbsp;000 Dungans; 37&nbsp;000 Uighars; 34&nbsp;000 Tajiks; 21&nbsp;000 Turks; 18&nbsp;000 Koreans</p>

<p align="justify"><b>LATVIA</b></p>

<p align="justify">121&nbsp;000 Belorussians; 91&nbsp;000 Ukrainians; 62&nbsp;000 Poles; 35&nbsp;000 Lithunians; 23&nbsp;000&nbsp;Jews</p>

<p align="justify"><b>LITHUANIA</b></p>

<p align="justify">257&nbsp;000 Poles; 63&nbsp;000 Belorussians; 45&nbsp;000 Ukrainians; 12&nbsp;000 Jews</p>

<p align="justify"><b>MOLDOVA</b></p>

<p align="justify">599&nbsp;000 Ukrainians; 152&nbsp;000 Gaguaz; 87&nbsp;000 Jews; 65&nbsp;000 Bulgarians</p>

<p align="justify"><b>RUSSIAN FEDERATION</b></p>

<p align="justify">5,3 million Tatars; 4,0 million Ukrainians; 1,8 million Chuvash</p>

<p align="justify"><b>TAJIKISTAN</b></p>

<p align="justify">1.2 million Uzbeks; 75&nbsp;000 Tatars; 64&nbsp;000 Kirghizians; 41&nbsp;000 Ukrainians; 33&nbsp;000&nbsp;Germans; 20&nbsp;000 Turkmens; 13&nbsp;000 Koreans; 14&nbsp;000 Jews</p>

<p align="justify"><b>TURKMENISTAN</b></p>

<p align="justify">326&nbsp;000 Uzbeks; 90&nbsp;000 Kazakhs; 39&nbsp;000 Tatars; 36&nbsp;000 Ukrainians; 33&nbsp;000 Azeris; 32&nbsp;000 Armenians; 28&nbsp;000 Baluchis</p>

<p align="justify"><b>UKRAINE</b></p>

<p align="justify">Belorussians,&nbsp;Moldovians, Poles,&nbsp;Jews (significant, but figures not immediately available)</p>

<p align="justify"><b>UZBEKISTAN</b></p>

<p align="justify">973&nbsp;000 Tajiks; 849&nbsp;000 Kazakhs; 497&nbsp;000 Tatars; 412&nbsp;000 Karakalpaks; 189&nbsp;000&nbsp;Crimean Tatars; 183&nbsp;000 Koreans; 175&nbsp;000 Kirghizians; 153&nbsp;000 Ukrainians; 122&nbsp;000 Turkmens; 106&nbsp;000 Turks; 93&nbsp;000 Jews</p>

<p align="justify">According to the Minority Rights Group (November 1990) the peoples in the former Soviet Union could be divided into the following six grades of statehood:</p>

<p align="justify">1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Russians. They are 145 million (50,6%) and Russian is the official language for the whole former Soviet Union.</p>

<p align="justify">2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The other fourteen nationalities with their own republics.</p>

<p align="justify">3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The nationalities living in the twenty autonomous republics.</p>

<p align="justify">4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The nationalities living in eight autonomous regions</p>

<p align="justify">5.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The nationalities occupying the ten autonomous districts</p>

<p align="justify">6.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The sixty peoples of the former Soviet Union who have no autonomous region of their own. These include the two million Germans who were ranked as the fifteenth largest nation in the former Union.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>APPENDIX III</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>RAPPORTEUR'S PROGRAMME IN MOSCOW: </b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>14-16 OCTOBER 1992</b></p>

<p align="justify">Your Rapporteur met with the following:</p>

<p align="justify">Mr Abradimov. Department of Reception and Resettlement of Refugees of the Russian Federal Migration Service (FMS)</p>

<p align="justify">Mr E.A. Ambartsumov, Member of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation&nbsp; and Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Economic Relations</p>

<p align="justify">Mr V. Bakhmin&nbsp; Director of the Department on International Humanitarian Co-operation and Human Rights, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation</p>

<p align="justify">Mrs B. Berner&nbsp; Member of the Regional Delegation, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (ICRC)</p>

<p align="justify">Mr W. Clarence, UNHCR Representative in Moscow (whom your Rapporteur met in London)</p>

<p align="justify">Mrs L. Grafova, Journalist &quot;Literature Gazette&quot;</p>

<p align="justify">Mr P. Hiteev, Chairman of the Committee of Russian Refugees</p>

<p align="justify">Mr L.A. Khokhlov, Head of External Relations of the FMS</p>

<p align="justify">Mr V. Komchatov, Representative of the President of Russia in Moscow, and People's Deputy of Russia</p>

<p align="justify">His Eminence Metropolitan Kyrill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, Chairman of the Department of External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church</p>

<p align="justify">Mr A.F. Molochkov, Head of Non-Government Organisations of the FMS</p>

<p align="justify">Mr V. Podoprigora, Chairman of the Committee on Problems of Inter-Republican Relations, Regional Policy and Co-operation of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation</p>

<p align="justify">Mr T. Ramishvilli, Head of the Department on International Humanitarian Co-operation and Human Rights, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation</p>

<p align="justify">Mr S. Richards, Head of Regional Delegation of the ICRC</p>

<p align="justify">Mr G. Sanikidze, Adviser for External Relations, International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Moscow Office</p>

<p align="justify">Dr O. Sidorov, Chairman of the Department of Refugees and Migrants, Red Cross Society of the Russian Federation</p>

<p align="justify">Mr A.B. Sokolov, Head of Assistance for Emigrants and Refugees, Red Cross Society of the Russian Federation, Elected Member of Moscow City Council, Deputy Director of the Department of the Mayor, Chairman of the Russian Welfare Community Fund</p>

<p align="justify">Mr Tishkov, Minister of Committee of Nationalities, Chairman of the State Committee on Nationality Policy of the Russian Federation</p>

<p align="justify">Mr S.E. Troube, Member of the Russian Movement for Democratic Reform, and of the Democracy and Stability Foundation, Elected Member of the Moscow City Council</p>

<p align="justify">Mrs N. Voronina, Deputy Head of the FMS</p>

<p align="justify">In addition to thanking all the above for their willingness to meet him and for the extremely valuable information they provided, your Rapporteur wishes to place on record his personal appreciation to Mr&nbsp;Stanislav Shustov, a member of the Russian special guests Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and Secretary of the Human Rights Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, who accompanied him throughout his visit, and without whose presence and assistance his full programme would not have been so successfully fulfilled.</p>

<p align="justify">Reporting committee: Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography.</p>

<p align="justify">Budgetary implications for the Assembly: None.</p>

<p align="justify">Origin: <a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc=Doc. 6577">Doc. 6577</a> and Reference No. 1778 of 11 March 1992.</p>

<p align="justify">Draft recommendation and resolution: Unanimously adopted by the committee on 12&nbsp;January&nbsp;1993.</p>

<p align="justify">Members of the committee: MM. <i>Flückiger (Chairman)</i>, <i>Cucó</i>, <i>Gassner (Vice-Chairmen</i>, Mrs <i>Aguiar</i>, Mrs Arnold, Mrs Astgeirsdottir, MM.&nbsp;Attard&nbsp;Montalto, Biefnot, <i>Billing</i>, <i>Böhm</i>, Brennan <i>(Alternate: O'Brien)</i>, <i>Brito</i>, <i>Eisma</i>, Fava, Fiorini, <i>Foschi</i>, Fuhrmann, Galanos, Galley, Ghesquière, Grussenmeyer <i>Alternate: Worms)</i>, Mrs&nbsp;Hacklin, Mr <i>de Hoop Scheffer</i>, Sir <i>John Hunt</i>, MM. <i>Iwinski</i>, Karcsay, <i>Kiliç</i>, <i>Kiratlioglu</i>, Lord <i>Kirkhill</i>, Mr Konen, Mrs Mascher, Mr <i>Pahtas</i>, Mrs Persson <i>(Alternate: Mr Franck)</i>, Mrs <i>Robert</i>, MM. Sarafopoulos, Siwek <i>(Alternate: Piskorski)</i>, <i>Skaug</i>, Ms Szelényi, Mr Vásquez <i>(Alternate: Rodriquez Gomez)</i>.</p>

<p align="justify"><i>NB.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The names of those members present at the meeting are printed in italics.</i></p>

<p align="justify">Secretaries to the committee: Mr Newman and Ms Nollinger.</p>

<p align="justify"> </p>


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