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<hr size="1">

<p align="justify">12 April 1995<b><br>
<br>Doc. 7280</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>REPORT </b> <b>on the general policy of the Council of
    Europe</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>(Rapporteur: Mr MASSERET,</b> <b>France, Socialist Group)</b></p>

<hr size="1">




<p align="justify"><i>Summary</i></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Simultaneous enlargement of the Council of Europe and the European Union presents a challenge.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;For its part, the Council of Europe seeks to develop regular and effective monitoring of commitments and obligations undertaken by all its members. To this end, its assistance and co-operation programmes must be strengthened.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The Intergovernmental Conference of 1996 (IGC) will be of real importance, not only for the European Union but for the whole of Europe.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The Council of Europe needs to prepare as soon as possible proposals for the IGC as regards its place amongst the European institutions, in particular vis-à-vis the European Union and the OSCE.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>I. Draft recommendation</b></p>

<p align="justify">1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The various European institutions are currently facing the same problem of welcoming new member states.  This necessarily carries implications for their respective fields of action.  This, in turn, raises the question of their mutual inter-relations.</p>

<p align="justify">2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; For the Council of Europe and the European Union, continued enlargement presents a particular challenge.</p>

<p align="justify">3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; For its part, the Council of Europe seeks to develop - in addition to its existing mechanisms (convention on human rights, the social charter and convention against torture)  -  regular and effective monitoring of commitments and obligations undertaken by all member states, both of long standing and new.  The Committee of Ministers should frame a monitoring and verification procedure of its own, in parallel with and along the lines of the mechanism established by the Assembly.</p>

<p align="justify">4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In order to best meet the problems identified during accession and monitoring procedures, the Council of Europe's assistance and co-operation programmes should be extended.</p>

<p align="justify">5.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In order to play its role to the full, the Assembly  -  which contributes already to the identification of these problems  -  intends to hold regular debates to assess the implementation of programmes of assistance and co-operation.</p>

<p align="justify">6.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The acceptance of these programmes by candidate states will continue to be an element in the opinions of the Assembly on their requests for membership.</p>

<p align="justify">7.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Inter-Governmental Conference of 1996, which concerns the European Union, as well the next OSCE &quot;summit&quot;, will be of real importance for the future of the whole of Europe.  The Council of Europe is bound to be affected by what is proposed.  Accordingly, the Assembly must make known its position and proposals as soon as possible.</p>

<p align="justify">8.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; As a general rule, the Assembly requests henceforth to be associated with all the co-ordination meetings to be held regularly between the Council of Europe and other international organisations.</p>

<p align="justify">9.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Accordingly, the Assembly recommends that the Committee of Ministers:</p>

<p align="justify">i.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; establish an effective procedure for monitoring commitments and obligations on the basis of its Declaration of 10 November 1994;</p>

<p align="justify">ii.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; transmit to the Assembly, for opinion, proposals concerning its programmes of assistance and co-operation, together (and in due course) with an assessment of their results;</p>

<p align="justify">iii.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; to substantially reinforce these programmes and to aim them more specifically at the democratic reforms which are (depending on the country concerned) the most necessary and the most relevant for the protection of human rights;</p>

<p align="justify">iv.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; start preparing immediately, in close co-operation with the Assembly, proposals for</p>

<p align="justify">the Council of Europe's contribution to the Inter-Governmental Conference of 1996;   </p>

<p align="justify">v.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; to recognise the absolute and permanent requirement of associating the Assembly with all co-ordination meetings between the Council of Europe and the European Union, the OSCE and the United Nations.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>II. Explanatory memorandum</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>by Mr MASSERET</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>CONTENTS</b></p>

<p align="justify">Paragraphs</p>

<p align="justify">I.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Introduction&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 1 - 3</p>

<p align="justify">II.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Council of Europe&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 4 - 15</p>

<p align="justify">III.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Other international organisations </p>

  <blockquote><p align="justify">A.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The European Union&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 16 - 27</p>

  <p align="justify">B.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Western European Union&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 28 - 35</p>

  <p align="justify">C.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OSCE&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 36 - 48</p>

  <p align="justify">D.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; United Nations&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 49 - 55</p>

  <p align="justify">E.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; NATO&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 55 - 65</p>

</blockquote><p align="justify">IV.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Conclusions&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 66 - 72</p>

<hr size="1">

<p align="justify"><b>I. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Introduction</b></p>

<p align="justify">1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;  Under Rule 16.3 of the Assembly's Rules of procedure, the committee has the possibility to present reports on general policy during each part-session. Indeed, for many years the committee availed itself of this opportunity.</p>

<p align="justify">2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In view of its increased workload the committee decided in 1993 that it would henceforth only present one general policy report per Session. In 1994, the committee did not present a general policy report, as it was concentrating almost exclusively on examining requests for membership.</p>

<p align="justify">3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Since the committee's last report, this membership has increased to 34 member states, and the Assembly has grown to 239 members (plus 239 substitutes), representing some 528 million Europeans. Major changes have also taken place in other international organisations in Europe. It would therefore appear timely to take stock and update the analysis of these on-going developments so as to enable the Assembly to take a position and make proposals. </p>

<p align="justify"><b>II. The Council of Europe</b></p>

<p align="justify">4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The future policy of the Council of Europe was set out by Heads of State and Government during the Vienna Summit in October 1993. Europe was said to have the possibility to become a vast area of democratic security. The accession of the new democracies to the Council of Europe being a central factor. Since the Vienna Summit, Andorra and Latvia have joined the organisation and seven requests for membership are currently pending : Albania, Belarus, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Russia and the Ukraine. While the procedure on Russia's request was suspended in the light of the crisis in Chechnya, it is likely that several of the other applicant countries will join in the near future. </p>

<p align="justify">5.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Council's continuing enlargement to embrace countries which recently emerged from Soviet oppression presents a major challenge to the Organisation.</p>

<p align="justify">Doubtless out of a concern to enable certain states which had already embarked on a process of reforms aimed at establishing the rule of law to join the Organisation, the Assembly decided to approve their accession before the completion of this process.  However, if the Organisation is to maintain its identity and credibility, it cannot afford to sign blank cheques: it has to ascertain that its trust is well placed by monitoring specific acts on the part of the applicant country concerned.  In order to monitor these undertakings and commitments, the Assembly established the so called &quot;Halonen procedure&quot;, by the adoption of Order 488 (1993).  As the Assembly stated in<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 1031"> Resolution 1031</a> (1994), on the basis of my report, this monitoring process &quot;should be regarded as a stimulus and guidance for the consolidation of democracy&quot;. </p>

<p align="justify">6.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; At the same time, the Assembly made it clear that persistent failure to honour commitments freely entered into would have consequences.</p>

<p align="justify">7.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The implementation of the monitoring procedure has since demonstrated a number of shortcomings. A new text is therefore being prepared by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (Rapporteur: Mr Columberg, Switzerland, EPP) and is to be debated by the Assembly in the near future.</p>

<p align="justify">8.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; With the same concern for credibility, the Council of Europe Assembly must ensure that it only grants special guest status to those states which appear to be seriously committed to democratic change and must not hesitate to make use of the possibility of suspending or revoking this status in the event of obvious backsliding.</p>

<p align="justify">9.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In order to help new members and applicant states to reach the required standards, and to promote complementary reforms, the Council of Europe has developed several assistance and co-operation programmes at intergovernmental level.<a href="#P123_7782" name="P123_7783">1</a> These activities are funded from a specific vote in the Council of Europe general budget (vote IX) with a total of nearly 40 million French Francs in 1995. It represents about 5% of the organisation's total budget. In addition, activities are financed by voluntary contributions from a number of member states and, since 1993, agreements with the European Commission, have been included for the implementation of certain joint programmes of co-operation, largely financed through the PHARE programme. </p>

<p align="justify">10.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Secretary General has proposed that a new, larger scale, effort be made in the coming years, <i>inter alia</i> in view of the difficult transition to democracy in certain countries.</p>

<p align="justify">11.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; However, it is noted with regret that the Parliamentary Assembly has not been associated with these assistance programmes, although it was given a small budget (totalling 3.5 million French Francs) in order to finance its own programme of interparliamentary co-operation and assistance. This inadmissible situation even leads to sometimes deplorable results. In the case of Croatia, for instance, the European Commission and the European Parliament decided not to go ahead with the PHARE programme, pending the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly's assessment of the situation of human rights in Croatia. Yet, the Committee of Ministers included Croatia in its intergovernmental assistance programme without consulting the Parliamentary Assembly. Assistance programmes are only referred to in a very succinct manner in the Committee of Ministers' Statutory Reports to the Assembly. More emphasis should be given to them in the future.</p>

<p align="justify">12.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; With its membership of delegates from national parliaments, the Assembly is an outstanding example of the democratic system and, as such, has a unique contribution to make to the assistance programmes, whose aim is precisely to extend the rules of parliamentary democracy to those states which are emerging from single-party dictatorship.  Moreover, in view of the visits which its committees make to applicant countries in order to ascertain the progress of reforms, the Assembly is one of the principal monitors of these reforms and is therefore able to identify the general areas in which assistance would be desirable, under the Halonen Order.  An evaluation of the effect of the assistance provided would also appear to be a useful complement both to the assessment of requests for membership and to the monitoring of commitments.</p>

<p align="justify">13.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The increased interest of the Committee of Ministers  in the Assembly's procedures on requests for membership and the monitoring of commitments is to be welcomed. Co-operation between the two organs has improved in recent years and could be even further improved if the Committee of Ministers were to reciprocate by inviting greater Assembly involvement in its procedures, such as on the assistance programmes.</p>

<p align="justify"> </p>

<p align="justify">14.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Committee of Ministers, on 10 November 1994, adopted a Declaration on compliance with commitments accepted by member states. Following the example set by the Assembly, the Committee of Ministers should now elaborate a regular procedure of monitoring of commitments.</p>

<p align="justify">15.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; As regards the practical implications of enlargement and their effect on the structure of the organisation, I would refer to the proposals of the Ad Hoc Committee on the committee structure of the Assembly which are currently being examined. A parallel effort is being carried out in Working groups of the Committee of Minister's Deputies. </p>

<p align="justify"><b>III. Other International Organisations</b></p>

<p align="justify"><i>A. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The European Union</i></p>

<p align="justify">16.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Since I have been asked by the committee to present a specific report on the European Union's 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) the following is intended as a preliminary introduction.</p>

<p align="justify">17.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; At the meeting in Corfu on 24-25 June 1994, the European Council created a reflection group consisting of representatives of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Commission as well as two representatives of the European Parliament. </p>

<p align="justify">It is regrettable that representatives of national parliaments are not associated in this working group. Moreover, observers of the Parliamentary Assemblies of the Council of Europe and the Western European Union should be invited to participate.</p>

<p align="justify">Three institutions of the Union (Council, Commission and Parliament) have also each started their own preparations.</p>

<p align="justify">18.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Council of Europe should also start to prepare its own position as early as possible, for it is clear that the outcome of the Intergovernmental Conference will have a direct impact both because of the Union's enlargement and its internal reforms, on our organisation.</p>

<p align="justify">19.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Though reserving a more detailed analysis for my forthcoming report, attention could perhaps usefully be drawn to the following aspects.</p>

<p align="justify">20.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; At a time when the European Union is going through veritable institutional contortions to define other structures and debates, in addition to the single market, with which states which are not members of the Union but which do belong to the European Economic Area (EEA) or EFTA, as well as the countries of central and eastern Europe, could be associated - in other words, when it is more or less attempting to reinvent the Council of Europe, it is high time for the Organisation of the 34 (plus the 8 special guests) to assert itself as <i>the</i> framework for defining policy in such areas as a European Pharmacopoeia, co-operation in combating drug abuse and illicit trafficking (agreements with the Pompidou Group), regulations on copyright and the protection of European audiovisual works, the protection of the built and moveable heritage, including the fight against illegal trafficking, and the drafting of common rules on bioethics, so that the &quot;lowest bidders&quot; in these various areas will not lower standards or poach clients, by taking advantage of their situation at the centre of the old continent.  Although the economic disciplines of the single market and the inter-regional support mechanisms of the European Union cannot yet be extended to all forty or so European states, at least co-operation among all these states, which have now recognised that they share the same civilisation and democratic aspiration, can and must be developed.</p>

<p align="justify">21.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Treaty of the European Union (&quot;Maastricht&quot;) refers directly to another international organisation, namely the Western European Union to elaborate and apply Union actions and decisions with defence implications. In a Declaration annexed to the Union Treaty, the WEU member states agreed that WEU should become the defence component of the European Union.</p>

<p align="justify">22.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; As the specific competence of the WEU in the field of defence was recognized, some ask whether the specific competence and comparative advantage of the Council of Europe in the fields of human rights, protection of democracy and culture co-operation could not be equally recognized by the Union.</p>

<p align="justify">23.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; It is already politically recognized that no state could join the Union if it is not already a member of the Council of Europe. It would appear timely to have this requirement explicitly included as a legal condition in the new Union Treaty.</p>

<p align="justify">24.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Respect for the European Convention on Human Rights should be encouraged: the Convention must remain the principal benchmark, applying not only to the member states of the European Union but also to the Union's institutions.  Explicit reference to this principle should be made in the new Union Treaty to be drafted by the Intergovernmental Conference in 1996.  The same applies to the Council of Europe's Social Charter.  On the other hand, we must be careful not to further complicate the current control procedures for the European Convention on Human Rights or to provoke conlicts of law and jurisdiction between the Strasbourg Court and the Court of Justice of the European Communities, particularly with regard to the power to decide on the application of Union Treaties.<a href="#P160_15863" name="P160_15864">2</a></p>

<p align="justify">25.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Many sectors of public opinion are now aware of the democratic deficit in European construction.  One possible answer is to strengthen the role of national parliaments in the Union's decision-making machinery. Several proposals to this effect have already been put forward.  Whilst avoiding the proliferation of institutions and the complexity of procedures which would result, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe can boast the dual advantage of being an existing forum for exchange and harmonisation of national legislation and of having a particular membership of delegates from parliaments in all the member states of the Council, whether from the European Union, EFTA or the central European countries which are currently in the process of joining the European family.  In view of its experience and membership, our Assembly obviously has a role to play in the Union's decision-making process and more generally in a fully democratic process of European construction.</p>

<p align="justify">26.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Periodic presentations of activity reports from the OECD, EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development), the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe or the European Conference of Transport Ministers are an opportunity for wide-ranging debates during which delegates from national parliaments can express the views of the peoples of Europe on the direction taken by organisations which would otherwise act in a completely technocratic manner.</p>

<p align="justify">27.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In my forthcoming report on the IGC, I will make detailed proposals as to which role the Assembly could play, given its particular membership and areas of competence. Already at this stage, however, it could be proposed that the Committee of Ministers and the Assembly co-operate closely in preparing the Council of Europe's contribution to the 1996 IGC, as regards the respective roles of the different organisations.</p>

<p align="justify"><i>B.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Western European Union (WEU)</i></p>

<p align="justify">28.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In Article J.4 of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty, titled Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the objective of building up WEU in stages as the defence component of the European Union was laid down. At the Intergovernmental Conference in 1996 the relations between EU and WEU will be re-examined. The IGC and the expiry of the period of fifty years mentioned in the Brussels Treaty of 1948 will have important consequences for the future of WEU.</p>

<p align="justify"><i>Membership</i></p>

<p align="justify">29.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Besides WEU members (Belgium, French, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, The United Kingdom), many other states are closely linked with WEU. Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden (non-WEU members of the EU) are Observers. Iceland, Norway and Turkey (non-EU members of NATO) are Associate members. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia are Associate Partners.</p>

<p align="justify"><i>Role in the framework of the European Union</i></p>

<p align="justify">30.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; There are differences of opinion within the WEU Council of Ministers regarding the role of the WEU in the framework of the European Union and the consequences of the expiry of the period laid down in the Brussels Treaty of 1948.  Some governments would like to see a merger of the WEU and the European Union, along with the &quot;<u>communitarisation&quot;</u> of the CFSP, whilst others share the opinion of the majority in the WEU Assembly regarding a possible prorogation of the Brussels Treaty and maintenance of the specific role and procedures of the WEU organs.</p>

<p align="justify"><i>The WEU Assembly</i></p>

<p align="justify">31.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In recommendation 558 of 14 June 1994, the WEU Assembly recommended the Council &quot;to improve the information communicated to the Assembly on developments in the CFSP and the Council's activities in the framework of the Union&quot;. The Assembly considered that the practical arrangements concerning the sharing of responsibility between WEU and the Union restrict the areas of action for WEU in a way which is not compatible with WEU's far-reaching obligations stemming from the modified Brussels Treaty. It recommended the Council &quot;to seek, in conjunction with the authorities of the European Union, to clear up the ambiguities of Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty with a view to obtaining a general mandate to elaborate and implement decisions and actions on behalf of the Union in WEU's area of responsibility&quot;. The WEU Assembly recommended the Council to &quot;carefully prepare the IGC and to associate the Assembly with the Council's reflection on its preparation for the 1996 Conference&quot;. The Council was further asked &quot;to retain the modified Brussels Treaty so that all the  members of the European Union will be able to accede to its provisions&quot;.</p>

<p align="justify">32.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Given that the member states of the European Union do not all hold the same status with respect to the WEU (some being member states and others having signed the Maastricht Treaty on the <u>express condition</u> of not joining the WEU), the Assembly should take decisions on defence matters according to Community procedures.  In view of the particular sensitivity of defence matters (which can involve the sending of troops,etc..), it is vital to reassert the validity of the WEU structures, which are the only means of guaranteeing the enforcement of the CFSP's decisions on defence and security and ensuring that they are accepted by the populations of the member states.</p>

<p align="justify"><i>The Council of Ministers</i></p>

<p align="justify">33.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In the Kirchberg Declaration of 9 May 1994, the WEU Council of Ministers tasked the Permanent Council to begin work on the formulation of a common European defence policy. The preliminary conclusions were examined by the WEU Council of Ministers on 14 November 1994 in Noordwijk. In the Noordwijk Declaration it is stated that the Ministers decided that WEU should make a timely contribution to the work of the Conference on the basis of its own review of the provisions of the Declaration on the role of the WEU and its relations with the EU and with the Atlantic Alliance of December 1991. It is the aim of the WEU ministers that the preliminary conclusions evolve into a comprehensive Common European Defence Policy Statement in the perspective of the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996. On the consequences of the expiration of the period of fifty years, the Noordwijk Declaration is completely silent. The ministers stressed the importance of developing closer relations with the European Union.</p>

<p align="justify">34.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In its Resolution (A3-0041/94) on the future relations between the European Union, WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, adopted on 24 February 1994, the European Parliament emphasised &quot;that the basic principle of a coherent single institutional framework also implies that the primacy of the European Union over the WEU should be confirmed unambiguously, with the European Union taking the political decisions concerning security and defence, with the WEU implementing the decisions which have defence implications, and with the WEU being incorporated into the European Union by 1998 when the period of fifty years mentioned in Article XII of the Modified Treaty of Brussels comes to an end&quot;. The European Parliament wants to replace the WEU Assembly in its entirety at plenary and committee levels and considers that the member of the Commission responsible for the CFSP should assume the powers of the WEU Secretary-General.</p>

<p align="justify">35.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; It is clear that the debate on the future of WEU is a part and panel of the wider discussion of the role of national parliaments in the future European Union. It is therefore prepared to deal with this issue in more detail in my following report on the IGC.</p>

<p align="justify"><i>C.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe)</i></p>

<p align="justify"><i>The process of institutionalisation</i></p>

<p align="justify">36.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The process of institutionalisation, initialized on the Paris Summit in November 1990 and further developed during the Helsinki Summit in July 1992, has continued at the Budapest Summit in December 1994. At this last summit the CSCE was transformed into the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), reflecting the fundamental changes that have taken place within the CSCE. The next Summit will take place in 1996 in Lisbon.</p>

<p align="justify">37.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Budapest Document reaffirms that the OSCE will be a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management. The significance of the Human Dimension in all activities of the OSCE is confirmed. The OSCE institutions, bodies and mechanisms have been strengthened. </p>

<p align="justify">38.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Ministerial Council (formerly the CSCE Council), the central decision-making and governing body, will meet towards the end of every term of chairmanship at the level of Foreign Ministers. The Senior Council (replacing the Committee of Senior Officials) will discuss and set forth policy and broad budgetary guidelines and will meet at least twice a year. The Permanent Council (formerly the Permanent Committee) will be the regular body for political consultation and decision-making. Overall responsibility for executive action will remain with the Chairman-in-Office, who will be assisted by the Troika. The Secretary General will be more actively involved in all aspects of the management of the OSCE and participate in Troika ministerial meetings. The resources of the High Commissioner on National Minorities will be enhanced and the participating states will increase their efforts to implement his recommendations. The work of OSCE missions will be given political support and follow-up from the Permanent Council. The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights will be strengthened in playing an important role in OSCE activities.</p>

<p align="justify"><i>The OSCE and the Council of Europe</i></p>

<p align="justify">39.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; At the Budapest Summit, it was stated that the OSCE institutions will explore possibilities for joint work with the Council of Europe, as well as the UN and other international organisations, in the field of racism, xenophobia, anti-semitism and intolerance.</p>

<p align="justify">40.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Co-operation between the two organisations includes the following activities. The Council of Europe and the CSCE have co-operated in organizing Human Dimension Seminars, such as the Human Dimension Seminar on Roma in the CSCE Region (Warsaw, 20-23 September 1994). The Council of Europe has contributed to several other CSCE Meetings, such as the First Meeting of the CSCE economic forum (Prague, 16-18 March 1993).</p>

<p align="justify">41.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Co-operation between the Council of Europe and the OSCE should be developed on the basis of a clear definition of the tasks of each organisation, in order to avoid any duplication which would have a deleterious effect on the rationalisation of work, budgetary efficiency and, above all, the image of the European institutions, which would be perceived as unecessarily numerous and superfluous.</p>

<p align="justify">42.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Therefore certain tasks, such as observing elections in states which are either full members of the Council of Europe or have been granted special guest status by its Assembly, should be clearly entrusted to the Council of Europe, on the understanding that the latter would communicate the results to the OSCE.  The European Union should be kept informed in the same way, in order to avoid  overlapping initiatives (and the resulting expenditure).</p>

<p align="justify">43.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Meetings between officials from the two organisations should be held and concluded in accordance with this clarification, duly set out in an inter-institutional agreement, and should lead to a confirmation of the Council of Europe's expertise, at the very least with regard to its own member states or special guests when considering requests for membership, observing elections, in the process of ratification and supervision of its conventions (above all the Convention on Human Rights) and implementation of the Halonen procedure for monitoring the undertakings entered into.  Since the majority of these tasks fall to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Assembly should be fully involved in meetings to discuss co-operation between the OSCE and the Council of Europe.</p>

<p align="justify"><i>Tripartite meetings OSCE - Council of Europe - United Nations</i></p>

<p align="justify">44.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Since July 1993 four Tripartite Meetings have taken place. The most recent, taking place in Budapest on 17 February 1995, was attended by the Under Secretary General of the United Nations, the Political Director of the Council of Europe, representatives of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, representatives of the Troika of the OSCE (Hungary, Italy and Switzerland, respectively the current, the former and the next Chairman of the Ministerial Council), the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre, the Director of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross. At this meeting it was agreed that meetings with a specific objective will be organised to allow for concrete and precise co-ordination, including allocation of tasks between the relevant organisations, in a given country, area or crisis situation. Such &quot;target meetings&quot; were agreed concerning Chechnya and former Yugoslavia.</p>

<p align="justify">45.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Again, given the direct link with Assembly activities, the necessity of its involvement in such meetings should be recognized by the Committee of Ministers.</p>

<p align="justify"><i>OSCE and United Nations</i></p>

<p align="justify">46.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; At the Helsinki Summit in 1992, the Heads of State and Government declared their understanding of the CSCE as a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. In the United Nations General Assembly Resolution of 16 November 1993 (48/19) the UN General Assembly noted the crucial role of the CSCE in efforts to forestall aggression in the Conference area and reiterated the need for enhanced co-operation between the UN and the CSCE. In the OSCE Budapest Decisions the participating states declared their political will to provide, with an appropriate resolution of the UN Security Council, a multinational OSCE peacekeeping force, following the agreement among the parties for cessation of the armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.</p>

<p align="justify"><i>OSCE and European Union</i></p>

<p align="justify">47.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The pact on Stability in Europe, adopted in Paris on 21 March 1995, at the initiative of the European Union, was formally transmitted to the OSCE which was entrusted with its implementation. This is in line with the decision of the Budapest Conference that the OSCE was &quot;ready to act as repository for freely negotiated bilateral and multilateral arrangements and agreements and to follow their application if requested by the parties&quot;. It is regrettable, however, that the Council of Europe was not considered for this purpose.</p>

<p align="justify">48.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Council of Europe takes note of the undertakings entered into by several of its member states and special guests in the context of the Pact on Stability in Europe.  The Council of Europe will ensure that progress is made with respect to dialogue with the OSCE so as to ensure respect for the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, taking full account of the Pact on Stability.</p>

<p align="justify"><i>D.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; United Nations</i></p>

<p align="justify">49.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Council of Europe will contribute to the open debate on prospects for reforming the current UN structure with a view to enabling the Organisation to fulfil its mandate more effectively.  It remains to be seen what specific measures will be taken to achieve this aim.   Possible internal changes to the United Nations have already been mentioned in Mrs Err's report of October 1994 (<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc=Doc. 7178">Doc. 7178</a>).  A more detailed report will be presented by the Political Affairs Committee during the current session (Rapporteur: Mr Jeszensky).</p>

<p align="justify"><i>Council of Europe and the United Nations</i></p>

<p align="justify">50.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The above mentioned report of Mrs Err focused on the relations between the UN and the Council of Europe and led to Order No. 500 (1994),<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 1048"> Resolution 1048</a> (1994) and<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendation 1252"> Recommendation 1252</a> (1994) on relations between the Council of Europe and the United Nations being adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 10 November 1994. The Parliamentary Assembly recommended the Committee of Ministers to take specific measures to improve the co-operation between the two organisations. So far no reply has been received from the Committee of Ministers. </p>

<p align="justify">51.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; On 9 December 1994 the UN General Assembly adopted<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 49"> Resolution 49</a>/57: Declaration on the Enhancement of Co-operation between the United Nations and Regional Arrangements or Agencies in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security. In this declaration the General Assembly encourages regional arrangements or agencies &quot;to consider, as appropriate, in their fields of competence, ways and means for promoting closer co-operation and co-ordination with the UN with the aim of contributing to the fulfilment of the purposes and principles of the Charter including in the field of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, post-conflict confidence-building, and where appropriate, peacekeeping&quot;.</p>

<p align="justify">52.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Another recent development concerning the Council of Europe is the preparing of a Programme Framework for strengthening democracy, governance and participation (DGP) in Central and Eastern Europe including the CIS, on the basis of preparatory assistance programmes since 1994, by the <b>United Nations Development Programme</b> (UNDP). The Council of Europe has already contributed to some of the preparatory programmes. The Council of Europe has been invited to </p>

<p align="justify">participate in the &quot;DGP Task Force&quot;. An official of the Secretariat attended a meeting of a &quot;Task Force on Democracy, Governance and Participation&quot; from 16-18 January in Geneva. </p>

<p align="justify">53.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Dialogue between the Council of Europe and the United Nations should be strengthened with a view to establishing a clear division of powers, the Council of Europe being prepared to contribute, on the basis of its own experience, to programmes outside Europe, once mandated by one of the specialised United Nations  bodies.</p>

<p align="justify">54.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Tripartite Meetings between the Council of Europe, the United Nations and OSCE, are referred to in paragraph 40 above.</p>

<p align="justify"><i>The fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations</i></p>

<p align="justify">55.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; On 24 October 1945 the United Nations Charter entered into force. In 1995, many events will take place to celebrate the UN's fiftieth anniversary. From 22-24 October 1995 a special commemorative meeting of the General Assembly will take place. That meeting, which will be attended by world leaders, is expected to adopt a Declaration reaffirming the principles of the UN Charter and setting guidelines for the future work of the Organization. Should the Council of Europe be invited to make a contribution, the Assembly ought to be involved.</p>

<p align="justify"><i>E.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; NATO</i></p>

<p align="justify"><i>Partnership for Peace</i></p>

<p align="justify">56.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In January 1994 the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance  in order to respond to the security concerns of the countries of East Central Europe without isolating Russia, launched the Partnership for Peace initiative. The states participating in the NACC<a href="#P258_34888" name="P258_34889">3</a> and other CSCE countries able and willing to contribute to the programme, were invited to join the Partnership. The Partnership envisages new, closer security relations between the North Atlantic Alliance and its partners for peace based on individual agreements. The individual participating states determine the frequency and intensity of co-operation. The agreements cover transparency of military budgets, common planning of military exercises and co-operation with NATO forces in fields such as peacekeeping and emergency aid. NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership that perceives a direct threat to it territorial integrity, political independence or security. So far 25 countries have signed the framework document.<a href="#P259_35705" name="P259_35706">4</a></p>

<p align="justify"><i>Enlargement</i></p>

<p align="justify">57.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Closely linked with the Partnership for Peace project is the question of enlargement. Participation in the Partnership for Peace project demonstrates the degree to which states are willing and able to move towards the commitments that NATO membership requires. At the summit in January 1994 it was reaffirmed that the Alliance remains open to the membership of other European Countries, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe. At the Ministerial Meeting Brussels in December 1994 it was decided &quot;to initiate a process of examination inside the Alliance to determine how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide this process and the implications of membership&quot;. The North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session was tasked to begin this examination. The ministers agreed that it was &quot;premature to discuss the framework for enlargement or which particular countries would be invited to join the Alliance&quot;.</p>

<p align="justify"><i>Russia</i></p>

<p align="justify">58.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Russia has objected strongly against a future enlargement of NATO to its former allies. NATO's plans to extend membership to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, caused Russia's Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev to decline to sign two documents defining Russia's future relationship with NATO in December 1994. One of these documents is Russia's individual programme under the Partnership for Peace mechanism, elaborating the Framework Document signed in June 1994. It is noteworthy that also Belarus is opposed to a future enlargement of NATO. Although it has joined the Partnership for Peace Programme, it does not want to become a NATO member.</p>

<p align="justify">59.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Throughout the negotiations with NATO on Partnership for Peace, Russia has pressed for recognition of its special status as a great power and requested co-operation with NATO as an equal partner. (When NATO attacked the Serbian positions in Gorazde on 10 and 11 April 1994 without informing Russia beforehand, Russia felt that NATO ignored its status as an equal partner and postponed the signing of the Partnership for Peace Framework Document.) Russia wants to subordinate NATO's role to the OSCE, which should form the basis of the security framework in Europe. </p>

<p align="justify">60.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; To improve relations between NATO and Russia it has been suggested to establish a specific treaty between NATO and Russia or to establish a standing consultative commission. Recently Russia has requested the establishment of a permanent consultative authority and it has posed a specific condition on future enlargement: it wants a formal commitment of NATO not to place nuclear arms or additional military forces on the territories of its new partners.</p>

<p align="justify"><i>NATO and other institutions</i></p>

<p align="justify">61.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The changes taking place in Europe have also affected NATO's relation with other international organisations. The final communiqué of the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo in June 1992 stated that &quot;stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area will increasingly be built on the framework of interlocking and mutually reinforcing institutions: NATO, the CSCE, the European Communities, the WEU and the Council of Europe&quot;.</p>

<p align="justify">62.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; NATO has repeatedly stated that the CSCE has a vital role to play in achieving a more peaceful and co-operative Europe and that it welcomed and wanted to contribute to the process of reinforcing the CSCE. At the Ministerial Meeting of the NAC in Oslo in June 1992 NATO expressed its preparedness to support, on a case by case basis in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available NATO resources and expertise. At the Helsinki Summit in 1992 the CSCE invited NATO and other competent international organisations to assist the CSCE meetings and to contribute to its activities. The NATO members have actively contributed to the discussions in the CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation.</p>

<p align="justify">63.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; At the Ministerial Meeting in Brussels in December 1992 NATO confirmed its preparedness to support UN and CSCE peacekeeping operations. In Bosnia Herzegovina NATO for the first time had a chance to perform this new task. NATO's actions take place under the authority of the United Nations Security Council, within the framework of the relevant UNSC resolutions, and in support of UNPROFOR as it carries out its overall mandate. </p>

<p align="justify">64.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; NATO has repeatedly stated that it supports the development of the WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as a means of strengthening the European Pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Also the development of an European Security and Defence Identity has NATO's full support. The WEU Secretariat and Council were transferred to Brussels in 1993 and the Secretaries General of both organisations started to participate in respective Council meetings. In the war in former Yugoslavia for the first time an operation under the joint direction of both NATO and the WEU took place: on 15 June 1993 operation SHARP GUARD began under a single command structure in order to enforce compliance with UN sanctions in the Adriatic. At the Brussels summit in January 1994 NATO agreed to the <i>Combined Joined Task Forces</i>. Under this plan, NATO assets can be made available for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy. It is even possible that non-NATO countries -for example Co-operation Partners- participate in these operations.</p>

<p align="justify">65.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; NATO has recognised the Council of Europe's contribution to stability and security in Europe. It is also clear that a link exists between the two organisations as regards their enlargement, in particular as regards the possible accession to the Council of Europe of Russia and Ukraine. It is often said that this would be a substantial contribution to stability in Europe (and could, according to some, have a positive influence on these countries' position with regard to NATO). However, the Council of Europe can only continue to make its contribution to democratic security if it maintains high standards for membership.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>IV. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Conclusions</b></p>

<p align="justify">66.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; All European institutions in Europe are faced with the question of enlarging their membership. To the Council of Europe and the European Union this presents a challenge. </p>

<p align="justify">67.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; For the Council of Europe to maintain its identity and its credibility the commitments and obligations of all its member states should be regularly and effectively monitored.</p>

<p align="justify">68.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Assembly should improve the &quot;Halonen&quot; (Order N° 488) procedure on the basis of the experience acquired so far, and the Committee of Ministers should be asked to follow the Assembly's example and establish an effective monitoring procedure, based on its Declaration of 10 November 1994.</p>

<p align="justify">69.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In addition to monitoring, the Council of Europe's co-operation and assistance programmes should be expanded. Moreover, they should specifically concentrate on problem areas identified during accession and monitoring procedures. Since the Assembly has the most elaborate and detailed mechanisms in this respect, it is particularly well placed to identify these problem areas and should therefore be enabled to give its opinion on proposals for assistance programmes and be informed of the evaluation of their results.</p>

<p align="justify">70.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Acceptance by a state of certain assistance programmes is already an element which the Assembly will continue to take into account during its accession and monitoring problems.</p>

<p align="justify">71.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The European Union's 1996 Intergovernmental Conference will also have a major impact on Europe and on our organisation. Therefore, the Assembly and the Committee of Ministers should, in close co-operation, present proposals regarding the Council of Europe's future relations with the Union as soon as possible.</p>

<p align="justify">72.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Committee of Ministers should recognize the absolute and permanent requirement to associate the Assembly with regular co-ordination meetings between the Council of Europe and other international organisations, such as United Nations and OSCE.</p>

<p align="justify">Reporting committee: Political Affairs Committee.</p>

<p align="justify">Budgetary implications for the Assembly: to be assessed by the Committee on the Budget and the Intergovernmental Work Programme.</p>

<p align="justify">Reference to committee: standing mandate.</p>

<p align="justify">Draft recommendation unanimously adopted by the committee on 3 April 1995.</p>

<p align="justify"> </p>

<p align="justify">Members of the committee: Mr Kelchtermans (Chairman), <i>Lord Finsberg (Vice-Chairman), MM. Bàrsony (Vice-Chairman)</i>, Alvarez-Cascos, <i>Antretter</i>, <i>Mrs Baarveld-Schlaman</i>, <i>Mr Baumel</i>, Mrs Belohorska, MM. <i>Bergqvist</i>, Bernardini, Björn&nbsp;Bjarnason, Björck <i>(Alternate: Hagard)</i>, Bloetzer, <i>Bokov</i>, Büchel, <i>Bühler</i>, Cerqueda Pascuet, Eörsi, Fassino, Galanos <i>(Alternate: Christodoulides)</i>, Gjellerod, <i>Gotzev</i>, <i>Gricius</i>, Güner, Mrs Halonen, MM. <i>Hardy</i>, Irmer <i>(Alternate: Mrs Fischer)</i>, <i>Iwinski</i>, <i>Kalus, Kaspereit</i>, Kelam, Kirsteins, La Loggia, Mrs Lentz-Cornette <i>(Alternate: Mrs Err)</i>, MM. van der Linden, Machete, <i>Martins, Masseret</i>, Mimaroglu, <i>Mitchell, Muehlemann, Pahor</i>, Mrs Papandreou <i>(Alternate: Vrettos)</i>, MM. <i>Pavlidis</i>, Pozzo, de Puig <i>(Alternate: Mrs Fernandez Ramiro)</i>, <i>Radulescu Botica</i>, Schieder, <i>Schwimmer</i>, Seeuws, Severin, Sir Dudley Smith <i>(Alternate: Atkinson)</i>, Mr <i>Spacek</i>, Mrs Suchocka, MM. Thoresen, Vella.</p>

<p align="justify">NB. <i>The names of those members who took part in the meeting are printed in italics.</i></p>

<p align="justify">Secretaries to the committee: Mr Hartland, Mr Kleijssen et Ms Chatzivassiliou.</p>


<hr align="left" size="1" width="200" noshade>

<p align="justify"><a name="P123_7782" href="#P123_7783">1</a> <sup>1</sup>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Demosthenes is the democratic assistance programme for Member States, Demosthenes-Bis covers candidate and other States. Themis deals with legal cooperation and LODE promotes local democracy.</p>

<p align="justify"><a name="P160_15863" href="#P160_15864">2</a> <sup>2</sup>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Our Assembly has at several times (i.a. through its<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendations 1193"> Recommendations 1193</a> (1992) and 1214 (1993), as well as through its Opinion n° 185 (1995)) called for the Union to accede to the European Convention of Human Rights, as well as to the European Cultural Convention and the European Social Charter. The Community has already adhered to seven Council of Europe conventions.</p>



<p align="justify"><a name="P258_34888" href="#P258_34889">3</a> <sup>3</sup>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; North Atlantic Cooperation Council, constituted in December 1991.</p>



<p align="justify"><a name="P259_35705" href="#P259_35706">4</a> <sup>4</sup>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Signing of Partnership for Peace Framework Document by Cooperation Partners: Romania, Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Hungary, Ukraine, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Albania, Czech Republic, Moldova, Georgia, Slovenia, Azerbaijan, Sweden, Finland, Turkmenistran, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Russia, Uzbekinstan, Armenia, Belarus and Austria.</p>

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