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11 September 1995
Doc. 7372
REPORT
on procedure for an opinion on
Russia's request for membership of the Council of Europe
(Rapporteur: Mr MUEHLEMANN,
Switzerland, Liberal, Democratic and Reformers' Group)
Summary
Procedure for an opinion was interrupted on 2 February 1995. This was because of the use of force in Chechyna, in the manner and in the circumstances set forth in Resolution 1055 (1995). Following various fact-finding missions, the Political Affairs Committee considers that Russia is now seeking a political solution. A process of disarmament and withdrawal of military forces has been initiated. Assurances have been given at the highest level to the rapporteurs (Moscow and Grozny, from 21 to 24 August) that allegations of human rights violations reported to the Sub-Committee on Human Rights (Moscow, Chechnya and neighbouring republics, from 5 to 11 June) will be investigated. The committee recommends that procedure for an opinion be resumed.
I. Draft resolution
1. Procedure for an Assembly opinion on Russia's request for membership was interrupted on 2 February 1995. This was because of the use of force in Chechnya by the Federal authorities, in the manner and in the circumstances set for in Resolution 1055 (1995).
2. In compliance with this resolution and with Order No. 506 (1995), which instructed the committees concerned "to follow developments ... and report at the first appropriate opportunity":
i. the Sub-Committee on Human Rights (of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights) visited Moscow, Chechnya and neighbouring republics from 5 to 11 June 1995;
ii. the Chairman of the Political Affairs Committee and the Chairman of the Committee on Relations with European Non-Member Countries held talks in Moscow on the occasion of the 20th anniversary conference of the OSCE (ex-CSCE) on 17 and 18 July 1995;
iii. the rapporteurs of the three committees held further meetings in Moscow and Grozny from 21 to 24 August 1995, with the full co-operation of the Russian authorities and the OSCE Mission. They were thus able to put questions to those responsible on either side for implementation of the 30 July peace agreement in Chechyna.
3. The purpose of the Assembly has been, through this programme of visits and meetings:
i. to appraise the situation in Chechnya in terms of human rights;
ii. to assess prospects for improvement of this situation, in the light of developments in the Russian Federation as a whole;
iii. to determine when and whether procedure on Russia's request for membership could be resumed.
4. Russia is now seeking a political solution to the Chechnya conflict. As of late 1994 and early 1995, the difficulties and implications of a solution through the use of force were underestimated, as were the international repercussions. The 30 July peace agreement is the outcome of a clear shift of policy towards the concerns set forth in Resolution 1055. The agreement is fragile. Violations may continue. But a process, however imperfect, of disarming and withdrawal and preparations for an election and a new constitution have begun. Assurances have been given by the authorities that allegations of human rights violations reported to the Sub-Committee on Human Rights are under investigation, and that the report as a whole will be responded to.
5. The democratic process in Russia continues. Elections to the State Duma will be held on 17 December 1995. The new law provides for appeal and review procedures. International observers will be invited. A presidential election is foreseen for June 1996. Constitutional provisions are thus being observed.
6. Russia has repeatedly expressed its wish to be integrated with international and European structures. Fact without precedent in Russian history: a role for an international organisation, the OSCE, in mediation of the Chechnya conflict, has been accepted. An interim trade agreement with the European Union has been signed. An application has been made to join the World Trade Organisation.
7. Members of Russia's special guest delegation have continued to ensure a constructive dialogue with the Assembly and its committees. A special communication will bring up to date the replies (to the questions of the rapporteurs) which are in annex to the Message of 18 January 1995 of the Preside, the Prime Minister, the Chairman of the Federation Council and the Chairman of the State Duma of the Russian Federation. There will thus be available an updated Russian perception of progress towards the rule of law and the protection of human rights, as pre-conditions of an open society, a pluralist democracy and a market economy.
8. Russia is in a state of radical transition. The timescale of this transition is in quinquennia, even decades. Its pace will vary. Policies of the state authorities will fluctuate. This is because of immense social and economic difficulties, including the fight against organised crime. Tragic errors of policy in dealing with the Chechnya conflict have been recognised. Accordingly, the Assembly has no wish to throw in doubt the long-term direction of this transition: towards democracy, the rule of law, and human (including social) rights and freedoms. Great personal risks have been taken by those who have steered the transition towards these values, with support (which must continue) from international and European institutions. The international financial institutions should re-assess their policies regularly to ensure balanced progress.
9. There are positive signs of improvement in the constitutional and legislative basis for human rights protection. The actual state of this protection across the country depends on a broad awareness of, and respect for, the rule of law. Such a "culture" must be developed in all its aspects: political, legal and administrative — and at all levels: national, regional and local. Progress measurable against the highest European standards will not be constant and will take many years. However, despite the tragic experience of Chechnya (as reflected in the report of the Sub-Committee on Human Rights), the Assembly recognises the dynamics and direction of many positive developments across the Russian Federation, which are being supported by programmes of co-operation with the Council of Europe as well as with the European Union.
10. For these reasons, the Assembly resolves to resume procedure for an opinion on Russia' request for membership, and instructs the Political Affairs Committee to act accordingly, in co-operation with the other committees concerned.
II. Explanatory memorandum
by the rapporteur
Part A: Notes on the draft resolution (see addendum — to be issued later)
Part B: Rapporteurs' visit to Moscow and Grozny
21 to 24 August 1995
Introduction
1. Following official visits in 1994 (12-15 June and 30 October-2 November) the three rapporteurs — MM. Atkinson, Bindig and Muehlemann — officially visited Moscow and Grozny from 21 to 24 August 1995. In the interval, certain informal visits were made. Mr Bindig went to Chechnya with the Sub-Committee on Human Rights (of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights) from 5 to 11 June 1995.
2. The rapporteurs were under instructions to follow the situation in Russia — in particular, the situation in Chechnya — by Resolution 1055 and Order No. 506 of 2 February 1995.
3. In the light of their visit to Moscow and Grozny this August, which included talks with important political leaders, the rapporteurs agreed that a draft resolution should be presented to the Assembly, proposing to resume procedure for an opinion on Russia's request for membership.
4. Warm tribute is due to the Czech Ambassador in Moscow, Mr Slansky, for his help — on behalf of the Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in organising the visit (and for his hospitality), as also to the Russian authorities and to Russia's special guest delegation for their excellent co-operation.
Programme
Monday 21 August
Working dinner with Czech Ambassador Slansky (on behalf of the Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers) for contacts with the diplomatic community.
Tuesday 22 August — Chechnya
Departure by military plane and helicopter to Grozny.
Meeting with the head of the civilian administration, the Russian joint forces commander, the chairman of the committee for reconstruction and the chairman of the committee for elections and a new constitution.
Lunch hosted by Mr Zorin, special representative of the Ministry of the Interior (nationalities department).
Meeting at OSCE Office for exchange of views with:
— Ambassador Meszaros, head of mission;
— General Romanov, Russian joint forces commander;
—Ge neral Maskhadov, chief of staff to Dudaev and Co-Chairman, with General Romanov, of the Commission for Implementation of the July 30 Peace Agreement.At
At the end of the afternoon: return to Moscow.
Wednesday 23 August
—Mr Ryabov, Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission.—
—Mr Kulikov, Minister of the Interior.Wo
Working lunch at the Council of the Federation.
Host: Mr Podroprigora Chairman, Committee for International Affairs
Guest: Mr Sergei Kovalyov.
—Mr Filatov, Head of the President's Administration.—
—Ju dge Rudkin, Acting President of the Constitutional Court.Bu
Buffet-dinner hosted by Ambassador Slansky for contacts (arranged in co-operation with the British Chargé d'affairs) with members of the Duma, Mrs Elena Bonner and other personalities in the field of human rights.
Thursday 24 August
—Mr Mikhailov, Minister for Nationalities and Regional Policy.—
—Mr Ivanov, First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs [Chairman of Inter-Agency Committee for Relations with the Council of Europe].—
—Mr Kokoshin, First Deputy Minister of Defence.Wo
Working lunch at the Duma.
Host: Mr Lukin, Chairman of the Committee for International Affairs.
Guest: Mr Dzasokhov, member of the special guest delegation.
—Mr Nikonov, Chairman of the Duma Inquiry, Committee on Chechnya.—
—Ms Denber, Human Rights Watch, Moscow.Qu
Questions raised in discussion during the programme
Czech embassy dinner
Moscow's underestimation of the challenge by Dudaev
Chechnya
Signs of return to normal life despite physical devastation — Russian forces' claim to control 95% of territory — non-payment of pensions, wages and salaries under Dudaev now being remedied — prospect of an election and of a new constitution — return of (and help for) refugees — commitment of chief commanders on both sides to implementation of 30 July peace agreement — difficulties arising from unruly Chechen field commanders for example attack on Argun 20-21 August) and Russian use of heavy weapons in response (but with prior warning to civilian population) — role of OSCE — treatment, release and exchange of prisoners — investigation of allegations of violations of human rights, notably in filtration camps: twenty convictions — intense mistrust on either side, but some weapons now handed over and some troops withdrawn — problem of establishing legitimacy of political authority in Grozny.
Ryabov
Duma election to take place 17 December 1995, including Chechnya — claim that new legislation reflects concerns of international observers of December 1993 election — international observers again to be invited.
Kulikov
Approval in Moscow of heavy-weapon response to Argun incident — supplies of weapons from neighbouring republics and from abroad — problem in Chechnya of protecting those currently representing the civil authority — investigation of filtration point alleged atrocities — conditions in prisons and transfer of prisons from Ministry of Interior to Ministry of Justice — provisions of the new law on security and intelligence services.
Kovalyov
Independence as an option for the future of Chechnya — a stronger role for OSCE in the Caucasus — better for Russia to join Council of Europe in coming months, subject to peaceful resolution of Chechnya crisis and clear timetable for human rights reform.
Filatov
Value to reforming forces of recognition by Europe of progress achieved in Russia on eve of Duma elections — roles of Ministry of Justice and of Prosecutor's Office in investigation of allegations of human rights violations, notably in Chechnya filtration points — ruling of Constitutional Court on President's decisions for use of force in Chechnya.
Rudkin
Functioning and independence of Constitutional Court — balance of constitutional and political considerations in ruling on Chechnya — ratification of European Convention on Human Rights: state of domestic appeal procedures and mechanisms — project for a CIS human rights convention.
Mikhailov
Disarmament process and control of territory in Chechnya — attempts to resolve the crisis peacefully 1992-94 — human rights violations and weapons build-up under Dudaev — what if new political structures lead to a vote for independence? — prospects for a relatively early election and a constitutional referendum — shift in ethnic balance as a result of Dudaev's rule: from 57% to 58% Chechen in 1991 to 80% to 81% today — transmission to Council of Europe of results of investigations into allegations of human rights violations.
Ivanov
Needed for Europe/Russia partnership — value of signal from Council of Europe to reformers as election now approaches — Moldova/Transnistria situation — Russia's ability to accept Council of Europe standards and conventions in fields other than human rights — response to Bindig report — updating of January 1995 replies to rapporteurs' questions.
Kokoshin
Use of Ministry of Defence units in support of Ministry of Interior forces in Chechnya — ill-treatment of recruits and conscripts in Russian army: toleration of brutalities: prospects for alternative forms of national service — investigation of allegations of human rights violations in the armed forces: action against those found responsible.
Nikonov
Political solution as only option for Chechnya — risk of institutionalising crisis through new constitutional initiative — difficulties of disarmament process — difficulties of fighting in mountain regions.
Human rights watch
State and means of investigation of allegations of human rights violations.
The conflict in Chechnya
5. On 5 March 1994, Nationalities' Minister Shakhrai warned that the Chechnya crisis would become of paramount importance to the Russian Federation in the course of the year.1 In a debate in the Duma end-March, political group leaders echoed these views. In consideration of the recently concluded negotiations with the Tatarstan Republic, they urged the government to seek a similar solution with representatives of Chechnya. Talks were arranged between the Head of the Presidential Administration, Mr Filatov, and the Chechnyan Secretary of State, Mr Akbulatov. They were soon broken off because Grozny, according to Mr Filatov, was not prepared to regard Chechnya as a subject of the Russian federation.
6. In May and June, the armed struggle between Dudaev's supporters and his opponents intensified. The latter were led by the leader of an "opposition government", Mr Mamodayev, and an "interim council" led by Mr Avtorchanov, with headquarters in the northern town of Znamenskoye. They were later joined by the former Speaker of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, Mr Khasbulatov. He established a centre in Tolstoy Yurt and tried from the start, unsuccessfully, to act as a mediator. As a result, he soon ceased to play a major role.
7. Dudaev's decree on disarmament of all armed units of the opposition (11 June 1994) caused an escalation which led to civil war. In a statement of 29 July 1994, the Russian Government admitted that the situation was out of control but denied its military involvement on the side of the opposition. President Yeltsin and several members of the government maintained this position up to end-November, although as from early September combat helicopters were observed in support of the opposition forces. It was clear that Mr Avtorchanov could count on more from Moscow than just financial support.
8. Troops in Chechnya were mobilised in August and September. Bitter fighting broke out in Argun and Znamenskoye. Dudaev called for the United Nations to exclude Russia from the Security Council and made threats to assassinate President Yeltsin. On 29 August, Chechnyan television presented a Russian Federation counter-intelligence collaborator who alleged that Russian plans for an attack were being prepared. The Russian Defence Minister immediately denied this.
9. On 5 September, Defence Minister Grachev confirmed that several units of the military district of Northern Caucasus were on "high alert" to respond to any possible provocation. On 16 September, Minister Shakhrai called on Russian television for President Dudaev to resign. Martial law was proclaimed on 12 October. An offensive by Dudaev's opponents failed the following week. It seemed that Dudaev was in control of the situation.
10. This was probably the time when the advocates of Russian military force prevailed in Moscow. A number of captured soldiers had said on television that they had been sent to Chechnya by the Russian military leadership. It was thus clear to the Russian public how deeply Moscow had become entangled in the conflict.
11. The decision on military action was taken early December. Attacks on railways and pipelines would no longer be tolerated. Attacks on the Russian population were to be forestalled. Pressures from some sources to seek a political solution were ignored. A brutal war was initiated. After violent combat, Russian forces occupied about 66% of Chechnya's territory and advanced into part of the mountainous regions, while leaving about 20% of the country untouched. From other parts of these mountainous regions, Dudaev seeks today through infiltration to conduct a partisan war in the cities of the Chechnyan valley. Threatening statements and calls for a peaceful solution continually alternate.
The general situation in Russia
12. Apparently it was hoped in some circles in Moscow that war against rebel Chechnyans would enhance the prestige and popularity of the government of President Yeltsin. This proved wrong. Following his intervention to resolve the hostage crisis in the southern Russian city of Budennovsk end-June 1995, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin is now actively seeking a political solution.
13. Freedom of expression by individuals and in the mass media played an important role in this change of policy. Courageous positions were taken up by many parliamentarians of both Houses, supported by reformers on the staff of the President, in the government and in the army itself. The open criticism of high army officers, who thus risked their careers, was astonishing. Notwithstanding the fact that great progress must still be made in the field of human rights, it is noteworthy that no restrictions were placed on this freedom of expression in a time of crisis. Because the constitutional position of the parliament is relatively weak, opponents of the war did not immediately influence policy. But their statements in the media and to parliamentary committees of inquiry have certainly had significant impact.
14. It now seems certain that a new Duma will be elected on 17 December 1995. Recent polls suggest that many people aspire to national and traditional values. This could strengthen the parties of the "centre-left". Meanwhile, the "centre-right" parties seek to present their reform policies in a more populist manner. The two parties created by President Yeltsin, led respectively by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and Duma President Rykbin, are having difficulties in establishing themselves. In view of the powers exercised by the presidency under the constitution, presidential elections in June 1996 will be equally decisive.
15. Modest economic progress has been achieved, in particular through infrastructural improvement. But "black markets" continue to flourish; and direct foreign investment is slight because the rule of law cannot sufficiently be relied on in daily life. Organised crime is now being curtailed by energetic action by the authorities.
16. The dissolution of the Soviet Union has caused a number of border disputes of varying intensity — for example in Moldova, the Caucasus, Tadjikistan and the Baltics. Other conflicts within Russia itself cannot be discounted. Such is the heritage of dictatorships.
Conclusions
i. Unlike the former Yugoslavia and despite the Chechnyan conflict, the Caucasian gun-power barrel has not exploded because, in Moscow, sensible politicians working for peace have prevailed.
ii. The fragile cease-fire in Chechnya requires Chechnyan forces to hand over their weapons and the Russian forces to withdraw, and the establishment of a civilian administration.
iii. The intended political solution should lead to parliamentary and presidential elections and the drawing-up of a new constitution for the republic.
iv. Dudaev appears still to be pursuing a double policy, by negotiating but continuing a partisan war in urban areas.
v. Russian forces seek to take the necessary counter-measures without hurting the civilian population, but do not always have the necessary degree of control.
vi. It is now publicly acknowledged that violations of human rights should be fully investigated, and that those responsible should be brought to justice.
vii. It is clear that the population wants an end to the fighting, towns and villages rebuilt, and a return to normal life.
viii. Defining a political status for Chechnya which corresponds to the aspirations of its population to independence will be difficult.
ix. Reform in Russia appears to be irreversible.
x. Legislation in the field of personal freedoms is progressing, but is translated only with difficulty into daily practice.
xi. Human rights standards must be improved: in particular, prisons present a serious problem.
xii. The sharing of powers, in the move from a monolithic to a pluralist political system, is becoming established.
xiii. The political prerogatives of the President are considerable: the constitution may need to be adjusted.
xiv. An independent judiciary is indispensable. This has to be achieved throughout the country and at regional and local levels.
xv. Legislation must be enacted to encourage direct foreign investment, which depends also on a sense of security.
xvi. The fight against organised crime must be intensified.
xvii. Preventive measures should be taken to prevent border disputes becoming conflicts.
xviii. Where a risk of civil war exists, peace-keeping forces should be stationed until a political solution is found.
xix. The OSCE should be enabled to pursue and develop its mediating role in areas of crisis or conflict.
xx. The Council of Europe should pursue and strengthen its long-term co-operation programme for human rights, for the strengthening of democracy and for the building of legal order which will inter alia enable a free market economy to flourish.
Reporting committee: Political Affairs Committee.
Committees for opinion: Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights and Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography.
Budgetary implications for the Assembly: to be examined by the Committee on the Budget and the Intergovernmental Work Programme.
Reference to committee: Resolution 1055 (1995) and Order no. 506 (1995).
Draft resolution adopted by the committee on 4 September 1995 by 15 votes to 4 and 5 abstentions.
Members of the committee: Mr Kelchtermans (Chairman), Lord Finsberg (Vice-Chairman), (Alternate: Atkinson), MM. Bársony (Vice-Chairman), Ávarez-Cascos (Alternate: Mrs Fernández Ramiro), Antretter, Mrs Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr Baumel, Mrs Belohorská, MM. Bergqvist, Bernardini, Björck, Bloetzr, Bokov, Büchel, Bühler, Cerqueda Pascuet, Eörsi, Fassino, Galanos (alternate: Christodoulides), Gjellerod, Gotzev, Gricius, Güner, Hardy, Irmer, Iwinski, Kalus, Kaspereit, Kirsteins (Altrnate: Pantelejevs), La Loggia, Mrs Lentz-Cornette, MM. van der Linden, Machete (Alternate: Roseta), Martins (Alternate: Mrs Aguiar), Masseret, Mimaroǧlu, Mitchell, Muehlemann, Paasilinna, Pahor, Mrs Papandreou, MM. Pavlidis, Pozzo, de Puig, Radulescu Botica, Mrs Ragnarsdóttir, MM. Schieder, Schwimmer, Seeuws, Severin, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr Spaček, Mrs Suchocka, MM. Thoresen (Alternate: Berg), Mrs Veidemann, Vella, N... (Albania), N... (Moldova).
N.B. The names of those members who took part in the meeeting are printed in italics.
Secretaries to the committee: Mr Hartland, Mr Kleijssen and Ms Chatzivassiliou.
1 1 Article in the Nezavisimaya Gazeta.