25 September 1995

Doc. 7395

REPORT

on the situation in some parts of former Yugoslavia

(Rapporteurs: Mr BLOETZER,

Switzerland, Group of the European People's Party and

and

Mr van der LINDEN,

Netherlands, Group of the European People's Party)


Summary

      Major developments, both military and diplomatic, have recently altered the situation in the former Yugoslavia.

      The Assembly welcomes recent progress towards a negotiated solution which maintains the integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

      With regard to Croatia, its government's response to a number of concerns voiced by the Assembly will be an important factor in the further examination of its request for membership.

      The Secretary General should already now make proposals for the Council of Europe's contribution to eventual reconstruction.

I. Draft resolution

1.       Major developments, both military and diplomatic, have recently altered the situation in former Yugoslavia. Genuine negotiations on a peaceful and lasting settlement have finally become a real possibility.

2.       With regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Assembly notes that the military operations decided by the United Nations and carried out by NATO and the UN Rapid Reaction Force, in order to guarantee the protection of Sarajevo and other UN 'safe areas', have brought the warring parties to the negotiating table.

3.       It welcomes the strong initiatives taken by certain European states such as France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Spain to set up a Rapid Reaction Force, as well as the US diplomatic action, and supports the Agreed Basic Principles resulting from the Ministerial Conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina held in Geneva on 8 September 1995. Major efforts are at last being made to convince all sides to accept a negotiated solution, which maintains the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It calls on all parties to implement the Agreed Principles in good faith.

4.       In case all peace efforts in the region fail, the creation of an international coalition, similar to the one set up during the Gulf War in 1990, should be considered.

5.       The Assembly would welcome the accession to the Council of Europe of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as of other countries which emerged after the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, once a peace agreement has been reached and is respected.

6.       The Assembly,

i.       condemns the attacks on and the conquest of the United Nations Protected Areas Srebnica and Zepa in Bosnia-Herzegovina;

ii.       vigorously condemns the violent expulsion and persecution of civilians from Srebnica and Zepa;

iii.       demands information about the whereabouts of 4,000 Bosnian moslems, who were expelled from Srebnica and of 1,000 male Bosnian moslems, who were detained in a football stadium near Srebnica;

iv.       demands that UNHCR, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other humanitarian organisations be given access to Bosnian-Serb prisoners' camps where the refugees of Srebnica and Zepa are held;

v.       criticizes the violent expulsion (ethnic cleansing) of ethnic Croatians in the area of Banja Luka.

7.       It strongly condemns all human rights violations committed since the beginning of the tragic events which devastated the area and cost the civilian population so dearly. It insists that the perpetrators of such offenses be brought to justice with the fullest possible co-operation of those representing the sides concerned. Member states of the Council of Europe should co-operate in exchanging information to assist the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in carrying out its task in an efficient manner.

8.       The Croatian Government should respect the agreement concluded with the UN on 6 August 1995 and demonstrate, by providing full information on recent events, and by admitting international observers, that it ensures the protection of basic human rights of everyone within its jurisdiction.

9.       The Croatian military action led to the departure of about 150,000 Croatian Serbs, most of whom sought refuge in Serbia and Montenegro. The Croatian Government should enable a rapid return of these people to their homes.

10.       As regards the situation in UNPA Sector East (Eastern Slavonia), the Assembly calls on all parties to exercise maximum restraint, to refrain from using third countries' territory for any kind of action, and to pursue negotiations on a peaceful settlement.

11.       The response of the Croatian Government to these concerns will be an important factor in the further examination of Croatia's request for membership.

12.       The Assembly calls on the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to refrain from altering the ethnic balance in Voivodina, Kosovo and in the regions on the Bulgarian border through the settlement of Croatian Serb refugees and to respect the rights of the ethnic minorities in the country.

13.       The international humanitarian organisations working on behalf of the refugees and displaced persons throughout former Yugoslavia should be given increased support. An international conference, aimed at co-ordinating the efforts of governments and non-governmental organisations should be organised.

14.       Once negotiations on a peaceful solution have produced some real progress, the Council of Europe should make a major contribution to reconstruction in the fields of its expertise. The Secretary General should already make proposals for such a contribution now.

II. Explanatory Memorandum

       by the Rapporteurs

I.       Introduction

1.       At its meeting in Prague on 18 September 1995, the Political Affairs Committee agreed to consider the memorandum contained in document AS/Pol (1995) 35 as basis for the explanatory memorandum on the situation in some parts of former Yugoslavia. It further authorised the Rapporteurs to update it in the light of on-going events.

2.       The revised version of the memorandum is presented herewith. In view of the accelerating developments, the Rapporteurs will present an oral up-date during the debate.

II.       The break-up of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)

3.       As elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe developments in the 1980's led to a revival of - sometimes extreme - nationalism within the constituent parts of the SFRY.

4.       Mr Slobodan Milosević came to power in Belgrade in September 1987 as leader of the Serbian Communist Party. Exploiting the political circumstances of the SFRY at the time, namely a deteriorating economy, an inefficient administration and a population which under Tito had not come to terms with the events of World War II (because of highly biased historical accounts), he exploited Serb nationalist feelings and fears to put an end to the autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo and proclaim their reunification with Serbia.

5.       In February 1989, Mr Franjo Tudjman, after having become a symbol of national resistance to communism (for which he spent two terms in prison) founded the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). The party's nationalist platform, and use of old Croatian symbols kindled local Serb fears - manipulated by Belgrade - of a revival of the Croatian fascist (Ustasha) state, which had existed during World War II.

6.       In June 1989, Mr Milosević delivered a major speech at Kosovo Polje, so mark the 600th anniversary of the battle against the Turks, deliberately leaving open the possibility of armed struggle to achieve Serbian aims. Shortly afterwards, Serbs in Croatia demand their own autonomous province.

7.       These developments resulted in the end of the Yugoslav Communist Party in January 1990 when the Slovenian and Croatian delegations left its 14th Extraordinary Congress.

III.       Croatia

8.       Croatia, with an area of 56,538 square kilometres, had about 4,700,000 inhabitants before the war in 1991. About 78 % of them were Croat and 12 % ethnic Serb (600,000). Many other minorities are also present, but in relatively small numbers.

9.       About half the Serb population lived in the border ("Krajina") area between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had also been the border between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires. This because in the period following the Serb defeat by the Turks in 1389, many Serbs moved North and were recruited by the Habsburg rulers as border troops.

10.       Apart from in the original Krajina (the mountainous area of Lika and East-Dalmatia), Serbs settled in the Kordum and Banija regions (today also referred to Northern Krajina) as well as in Western and Eastern Slavonia.

11.       Croatia was the second richest and most developed area of the SFRY after Slovenia. It accounted of about one quarter of the SFRY's GSP (Gross social Product), and industrial output.

12.       In spring 1990, the first post-communist elections in Croatia saw the victory of the HDZ and Mr Franjo Tudjman was elected as President. Propaganda from Belgrade and the discriminatory policies as well as a general lack of understanding by the new Croatian authorities of the sensitivities of especially the rural Serb population resulted in violent incidents in the Krajina in August 1990. The Yugoslav National Army (JNA), under Mr Milosevic's control, prevented the Croatian authorities from restoring law and order.

13.       In May 1991, Serb leaders prevented that the Croatian Mr Stjepan Mesić, in accordance with the rotation procedure, became Yugoslav President and Commander-in chief of the Yugoslav National Army.

14.       The referendum held in Croatia on 19 May 1991 resulted in overwhelming support for independence. The outcome, however, was not accepted by leaders of the local Serb population, who proclaimed the independent "Republic of Serb Krajina" ("RSK) and asked for unification with Serbia.

15.       Croatia declared itself independent on 25 June 1991. Part of the Serb population began an armed rebellion, with the support of the JNA. Heavy fighting broke out in the region of Vukovar as well as in Pakrac. The Yugoslav Navy shelled the Croatian coast including medieval Dubrovnik. The newly-formed Croatian National Guard was at an enormous disadvantage vis-à-vis the professional JNA. The siege and the destruction of Vukovar in November 1991 proved to be a grim prelude of what was to follow in the coming years in Bosnia.

16.       Croatia was recognised by Germany on 19 December 1991 and by the other members of the European Union on 15 January 1992. The Union's efforts to obtain a ceasefire, however, proved fruitless. It was the special UN envoy Mr Cyrus Vance who obtained an agreement on 3 January 1992. It left about 23 % of Croatian territory under control of the "RSK". A United Nations protection force (UNPROFOR) was established which divided the contested territories into United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs): Sector North (Northern Krajina) ; Sector South (Southern Krajina); Sector West (Western Slavonia) and Sector East (Eastern Slavonia).

17.       UNPROFOR was given the following mandate :

      a. supervise the ceasefire;

      b. ensure the demilitarisation of the UNPAs through the withdrawal of the JNA and the Croatian National Guard, as well as the disarmament of local Serb militia;

      c. create the circumstances under which the demographic composition could be returned to pre-war conditions (that is, enable the return of displaced persons);

      d. ensure the safety of the population by UN troops;

      e. supervise the local police;

      f. administer the UNPAs.

18.       Although UNPROFOR managed to obtain a ceasefire and prevent further escalation, it proved unable to carry out the other elements of its mandate. Although Croatian and JNA forces left, the local Serb militia were not disarmed, and, instead of displaced persons being allowed to return, the remaining Croatian population was forced to leave.

19.       As a result of the fighting and subsequent ethnic cleansing, about 250,000 Croatian displaced persons had to seek refuge in Croatia. Nearly 3,000 persons were listed as missing.

20.       Continued tension resulted in military operations such as in January 1993 when Croatian forces successfully took the Maslenica Bridge and several others strategic areas from rebel Serb forces. A ceasefire agreement was only signed a year later by representatives of the Croatian government and "RSK" on 29 March 1994. The agreement foresaw an end to all hostilities, withdrawal of heavy weapons from confrontation lines and the deployment of UNPROFOR troops in the area between the lines of separation. It also foresaw the establishment of joint commissions.

21.       On 2 December 1994, an agreement was signed between Croatia and "RSK", which foresaw the reopening of the Zagreb-Lipovac motorway and economic cooperation.

22.       Following repeated earlier protests about UNPROFOR's inefficiency, President Tudjman announced in January 1995 that Croatia would not accept the renewal of UNPROFOR's mandate. In a letter to the United Nations Secretary General of 12 January 1995, he stated that the continuous presence of UNPROFOR was "significantly counter-productive to the peace process". The letter also mentioned that despite its endeavours, UNPROFOR had been unable to implement most important provisions of the Vance plan and subsequent Security Council resolutions, in particular failing to establish control of Croatia's international borders.

23.       Widespread international pressure resulted in a joint statement by President Tudjman and US Vice-President Gore in Copenhagen, on 12 March 1995, indicating Croatia's acceptance of continued UN presence but with a new name and modified composition and mandate.

24.       Following further negotiations, on 31 March 1995, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 981 creating the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO) to consist of 8,750 UN peace keepers. The details of the operation however were not decided upon. Croatia in particular insisted that UNCRO's main task should be the control of Croatia's external borders. It also, initially, insisted that these troops only come from NATO countries, but dropped the latter demand in view of the UN's insistence on the multi-ethnic composition of its peacekeeping forces.

Western Slavonia

25.       UNPA Sector West was unique in that it contained both Croats and Serbs with a confrontation line running through the middle of the Sector. In addition, the municipality of Pakrac was divided in two parts ("Pakrac pocket"). The Croatian army officially did not have forces in the area, although it must be noted that its special police are indistinguishable from regular army elite units. The Serbs did keep armed units in the UNPA. The Zagreb-Lipovac motorway was controlled by Serbs.

26.       The Agreement referred to above included the re-opening of the motorway. However, incidents concerning the use of this motorway resulted in several deaths and led to it being closed again by the Serb authorities at the end of April 1995.

Operation "Flash"

27.       On 1 May 1995, at 5.30 a.m., the Croatian special police, supported by artillery, began an operation to reopen the motorway. With the help of regular Croatian army forces, the operation was concluded on 2 May at 2 pm with the surrender of about 600 armed Serbs.

28.       On 2 and 3 May, the "RSK" forces fired several rockets carrying cluster bombs on Zagreb, killing 9 people and wounding nearly 200. Other Croatian towns such as Sisak, Karlovac, Novska, Nova Gradiška, Zupanja and Dubrovnik were shelled. The Croatian Government showed great restraint by not taking any retaliatory action.

29.       Immediately after the military operation, Croatian forces arrested around 1,400 men (the data given by respectively the Croatian authorities, the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Serb representatives differ somewhat) who were taken to different centres for screening. Most of these men were subsequently released, however without ICRC being notified despite the latter's formal request. According to the Croatian authorities, 182 men are still being detained and ICRC has been informed of their names and whereabouts.

30.       Figures given by the Croat authorities as to the number of Serb fighters killed (188) differ substantially from the figures given by the Serb representatives (400 killed). The Croatian authorities have stated that 127 casualties have been identified and that the process of identifying the others is continuing. International observers were not in a position to say which figures were exact.

31.       Uncertainty also exists as to the fate of the wounded Serb fighters, reportedly numbering about 1,000. It would appear from information received from the ICRC that a considerable number of wounded took refuge in Serb-held Bosnian territory and were treated in local hospitals there.

32.       I received no reply to specific questions about the various missing persons put directly to President Tudjman and Foreign Minister Granic. It was said that these matters should be seen "in context". The question arises whether the Croatian authorities want to link giving information about missing Serbs to receiving news about Croatian persons missing since 1991.

33.       Meanwhile, about 11,000 civilians (according to ICRC data) left Western Slavonia in order to seek refuge in Northern Bosnia and in Sector East. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) which helped with the transport of many of these people has been criticised for having acted too soon and having in fact contributed to an - unwanted - ethnic cleansing of Western Slavonia. Mr Akashi, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, stressed that the UN agencies had been under enormous pressure from the "RSK" authorities, which threatened further attacks on Zagreb, to assist the Serb population in leaving the area.

34.       About 2,000 Serbs are said to have remained in the area, mostly elderly people, and the Rapporteur was able to speak to number of them by visiting them in their own houses. A deep-seated mistrust vis-à-vis the Croatian authorities continues to exist, despite the latter's assurances, and it would seem that many Serbs do want to leave the area.

35.       As to the return by Serbs who fled at the beginning of the fighting, 270 formal requests have been made and the Croatian authorities have stated they intend to grant these. It remains to be seen whether these requests are incidental or the beginning of a general return. The Croatian authorities expressed their firm intention to promote further returns.

IV.       Bosnia-Herzegovina

36.       On 3 March 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina, ethnically the most complex republic (44 % Muslim, 17 % Croats, 31 % Serbs) within the former Yugoslav Federation, declared its independence, following a referendum. Soon afterwards, fighting erupted between rival Muslim and Croatian irregulars on the one hand and Yugoslav People's Army (YNA) troops and Serbian irregulars on the other. The main reason for the conflict has been the will of the Serbian community to maintain Bosnia-Herzegovina within the Yugoslav state.

37.       Leaders of the three main ethnic groups signed an agreement on 18 March 1992, negotiated under the auspices of the European Community, on the future of the Republic which provided for its division into three autonomous units along ethnic lines. However, as violence continued to escalate, the agreement was abandoned.

38.       On 6 April 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognised by the European Community, and on 22 May 1992 it was admitted to the United Nations. The parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina obtained special guest status with our Assembly on 29 January 1994. On 10 April 1995, Bosnia-Herzegovina applied for Council of Europe membership. The Committee of Ministers, on 12 September 1995, decided to consult the Assembly.

39.       Although a formal alliance, and several agreements were concluded between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in July 1992, the situation on the ground between Bosnian Croats and Muslims rapidly deteriorated. A bitter war ensued, dramatically symbolised by the destruction of Mostar and its world famous Old Bridge. The Bosnian Croats proclaimed their own state of Herceg-Bosna. This entity was mainly supported by the Croats living in Herzegovina and to a much lesser extent by Croats living elsewhere in Bosnia, was favoured cooperation with the Muslims.

40.       These events gave rise to grave concern in our Assembly. The fear was voiced that a deal had been made between Croatia and Serbia to divide Bosnia. The Assembly joined most Western governments to put pressure on both sides to end this conflict. The realisation by both parties that the Serbs were the main problem, as well as a desire not alienate to West resulted in two separate agreements signed in March 1994 in Washington. One established a Confederation between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. The second set up a Croatian-Muslim Federation within Bosnia-Herzegovina itself. Whereas the Confederation essentially envisaged closer cooperation between two independent states, the second created a complex federal system based on Swiss-style cantons.

41.       The Croatian government has admitted that there had been difficulties in the implementation of the agreements but added that there should be regarded as a result of previous events. According to the Croatian government the existence of two entities, namely the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the resulting institutional difficulties also had to be taken into account. It was expected that an international Arbitrator, appointed at the beginning of 1995 would facilitate progress.

42.       Following the Serb conquest of the United Nations Protected Areas of Srebnica and Zepa and the combined offensive of "RSK" and Bosnian Forces against the Bihac enclave in July 1995, an agreement was signed by President Tudjman of Croatia, President Itzebegović of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Mr Zubac, President of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 22 July 1995. Military assistance by Croatia and cooperation between the Croatian army, the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) - Bosnian Croats forces - were established.

V.       Recent developments

43.       At the beginning of August, Croatia launched a massive military attack in UNPA Sectors North and South. After only a few days of fighting, these areas were brought under Croatian government control. The Croatian decision to use military force must also be seen in the light of the failure of the international community to protect the population of "safe areas" in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

44.       The Croatian action caused a massive flow of Serb refugees, numbering between 150- and 200,000, to Serb-held Bosnian territory and to Serbia proper. There have been reports of these refugees having come under attack by the Croatian army, as well as by Croatian civilians.

45.       In retaliation, Croats were driven out of areas held by the Bosnian Serbs. However, the events also increased pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to accept a political solution to the conflict.

46.       There have been divergent reports about the behaviour of the Croatian military during and after the operations. There is also much uncertainty about the present situation in the area.

47.       At the time of writing, the situation around UNPA Sector East, and near Dubrovnik, remained very tense. A new Croatian offensive near the Dalmatian coast was reported to be under preparation.

48.       In accordance with the decisions of the London Conference of 22 July 1995,

to ensure the protection of all the United Nations 'safe areas', NATO planes and the UN Rapid Reaction Force, at the UN's request, attacked Bosnian Serb military targets, at the end of August, after a mortar attack on Sarajevo which left over 30 people dead.

49.       In the light of events, the Committee on Relations with European Non-Member Countries decided to cancel a visit to Croatia foreseen for early September.

50.       On 8 September 1995, a Ministerial Conference between the parties to the conflict resulted in a set of Agreed Basic Principles (see Annex 1).

51.       At the time of writing, regular Croatian Army units, HVO, and the Bosnian Army had made substantial territorial gains in Western Bosnia, at the expense of Bosnian Serb forces.

VI.       Conclusions

52.       Major developments, both military and diplomatic, have recently altered the situation in the former Yugoslavia. Genuine negotiations on a peaceful and lasting settlement have finally become a real possibility.

53.       With regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Rapporteurs support the military operations decided by the United Nations and carried out by NATO and the UN Rapid Reaction Force in order to guarantee the protection of Sarajevo, and other UN 'safe areas'.

54.       They also welcome the strong US diplomatic initiatives, and support the Agreed Basic Principles resulting from the Ministerial Conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina held in Geneva on 8 September 1995. Major efforts are at last being made to convince all sides to accept a negotiated solution, which maintains the integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina. All parties should implement the Agreed Principles in good faith.

55.       The Rapporteurs would welcome the rapid accession of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Council of Europe once a peace agreement has been reached.

56.       As regards Croatia, which has applied for Council of Europe membership, they regret, but understand, that its authorities felt compelled, in the absence at the time of any diplomatic progress and in the light of the international community's failure to protect the populations of the UN safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to take military action to restore government control first over UN Protected Area Zones West (Western Slavonia) as well as North and South ('the Krajina').

57.       They strongly condemn all human rights violations committed since the beginning of the tragic events in the area. They expect that the perpetrators of such offenses will be brought to justice.

58.       The Croatian Government should respect the agreement concluded with the UN on 6 August 1995 and demonstrate, by providing full information on recent events, and by admitting international observers, that it ensures the protection of basic human rights of everyone within its jurisdiction.

59.       The Croatian military action led to the departure of about 150,000 Croatian Serbs, most of whom sought refuge in Serbia and Montenegro. The Croatian Government should enable a rapid return of these people to their homes.

60.       As regards the situation in UNPA Sector East (Eastern Slavonia), the Rapporteurs call on all parties to exercise maximum restraint and to pursue negotiations on a peaceful settlement.

61.       The response of the Croatian Government to these concerns will be an important factor in the further examination of Croatia's request for membership.

62.       Once negotiations on a peaceful solution have started in earnest, the Council of Europe should make a major contribution to reconstruction in the fields of its expertise. The Secretary General should already make proposals for such a contribution now.

Annex 1

      The attached Basic Principles have been agreed upon today by H.E. Muhamed Sacirbey, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia and Herzegovina), H.E. Mate Granic, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Croatia (Croatia) and H.E. Milan Milutinovic, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia), and witnessed by Representatives of France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, and by the European Union Special Negotiator for the Former Yugoslavia.

AGREED BASIC PRINCIPLES

1.       Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue the legal existence with its present borders and continuing international recognition.

2.       Bosnia and Herzegovina will consist of two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as established by the Washington Agreements, and Republica Srpska (RS).

2.1       The 51:49 parameter of the territorial proposal of the Contact Group is the basis for a settlement. This territorial proposal is open for adjustment by mutual agreement.

2.2       Each entity will continue to exist under its present constitution (amended to accommodate these basic principles).

2.3       Both entities will have the right to establish parallel special relationships with neighbouring countries, consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2.4       The two entities will enter into reciprocal commitments (a) to hold complete elections under international auspices; (b) to adopt and adhere to normal international human rights standards and obligations to allow freedom of movement and enable displaced persons to repossess their homes or receive just compensation; (c) to engage in binding arbitration to resolve disputes between them.

3.       The entities have agreed in principle to the following:

3.1       The appointment of a Commission for Displaced Persons authorized to enforce (with assistance from international entities) the obligations of both entities to enable displaced persons to repossess their homes or receive just compensation.

3.2       The establishment of a Bosnia and Herzegovina Human Rights Commission, to enforce the entities' human rights obligations. The two entities will abide by the Commission's decisions.

3.3       The establishment of a joint Bosnia and Herzegovina public corporation, financed by two entities, to own benefit of both entities.

3.4       The appointment of a Commission to Preserve National Monuments.

3.5       The design and implementation of a system of arbitration for the solution of disputes between the two entities.

Reporting committee: Political Affairs Committee.

Budgetary implications for the Assembly: To be examined by the Committee on the Budget and the Intergovernmental Work Programme.

Reference to committee: Reference No. of 25 September 1995

Draft resolution unanimously adopted by the committee on 18 September 1995.

Members of the committee: Mr Kelchtermans (Chairman), Lord Finsberg (Vice-Chairman), MM. Bàrsony (Vice-Chairman), Alvarez-Cascos, Antretter, Mrs Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr Baumel, Mrs Belohorska, MM. Bergqvist, Bernardini, Björck, Bloetzer, Bokov, Büchel, Bühler, Cerqueda Pascuet, Eörsi, Fassino, Galanos (Alternate: Christodoulides), Gjellerod, Gotzev, Gricius, Güner, Hardy, Irmer (Alternate: Feldmann), Iwinski, Kalus (Alternate: Trojan), Kaspereit, Kirsteins, La Loggia (Alternate: Arata), Mrs Lentz-Cornette, MM. van der Linden, Machete, Martins, Masseret, Mimaroglu, Mitchell, Mühlemann, Paasilinna, Pahor, Mrs Papandreou, MMr Pavlidis, Pozzo, de Puig (Alternate: Mrs Fernandez Ramiro), Radulescu Botica, Mrs Ragnarsdottir, MM. Schieder, Schwimmer, Seeuws, Severin, Sir Dudley Smith (Alternate: Atkinson), Mr Spacek, Mrs Suchocka, MM. Thoresen, Mrs Veidemann, Vella, N..... (Albania), N..... (Moldova).

NB. The names of those members who took part in the meeting are printed in italics.

Secretaries to the committee: Mr Hartland, Mr Kleijssen et Ms Chatzivassiliou.