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22 December 1995
Doc. 7444
REPORT1
on Albanian asylum-seekers from Kosovo
(Rapporteur: Mr CUCÓ,
Spain, Socialist Group)
Summary
The report expresses concern about human rights violations against the ethnic Albanians who make up ninety per cent of the population of Kosovo, the southern province of Serbia whose autonomy was suppressed by the Serbian Parliament in 1989. This led to the organisation of passive resistance and «parallel» systems of government, education, health and welfare by the Kosovo Albanian leadership. The latter hope for some kind of independent status for Kosovo, while the Serbian Government refuses to contemplate even a return to autonomy.
In this context, some 340 700 Kosovo Albanians have sought asylum in several western European countries, some of which are negotiating with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for the return of those whose applications have been rejected. However, the Belgrade authorities are reluctant to take them back. The report calls on the Council of Europe member states not to forcibly return the rejected asylum-seekers pending an improvement in the human rights situation in Kosovo. It also suggests how the confrontation between the Kosovo Albanians and the Serb Government could be overcome.
I. Draft resolution
1. The Assembly is seriously concerned by persistent reports from many reliable sources of continuing systematic human rights violations against the Albanian population in Kosovo, including torture, police brutality, violent house searches, arbitrary arrests, political trials and irregularities in legal proceedings.
2. The Assembly deplores the ethnic persecution and discrimination which appears to be directed mainly at those Kosovo Albanians engaged in passive resistance to the Serb authorities, which suppressed Kosovo's autonomous status within the former Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia in 1989, and at those active in the «parallel» Kosovo Albanian assembly, government, education, health and welfare systems. Such discrimination has also resulted in the dismissal of over a hundred thousand Kosovo Albanians from their jobs and the ejection of hundreds from their homes.
3. Evoking such persecution, some 340 700 Kosovo Albanians have sought asylum in several Council of Europe member states in recent years, for example 230 000 in Germany and 60 000 in Sweden. Between three and fifteen per cent of these, depending on the country, have been given refugee status under the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol. The remainder, considered to have migrated mainly for economic reasons, are subject to voluntary or forced repatriation.
4. When international sanctions interrupted air travel to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), some Council of Europe countries organised the forced mass repatriation of rejected asylum-seekers from Kosovo via Bulgaria, Hungary and «the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia». However, the restoration of air travel has not permitted direct mass deportations since the Federal Yugoslav authorities refuse readmission unless certain conditions are met. These conditions, relating mainly to the validity of identity documents, financial assistance and the lifting of sanctions, are the subject of bilateral negotiations with the countries concerned, which have of necessity postponed planned mass repatriation pending their outcome.
5. Consequently, the Assembly, recalling its Recommendation 1237 (1994) on the situation of asylum-seekers whose asylum applications have been rejected, as well as United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/204 of 23 December 1994 on the situation of human rights in Kosovo and the resolutions on the subject adopted by the European Parliament in 1990, 1991 and 1992:
i. calls on the governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and of the Republic of Serbia:
a. strictly to respect and safeguard human rights in Kosovo;
b. to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross immediate access to all detainees;
c. to guarantee the return to their homes of rejected Kosovo Albanian asylum-seekers in safety and dignity;
d. to renounce their plans for the systematic mass resettlement of Serbs in Kosovo and to respect the principle of proportionality in deciding where to locate Serb refugees so as to avoid aggravating tensions between the Serbs and the Albanian majority in Kosovo;
e. to accept the good offices of the Council of Europe and the European Union in the organisation of a population census in Kosovo;
f. to resume negotiations with the representatives of the Kosovo Albanians with a view to finding a suitable framework for co-existence based on full recognition of, and respect for, the political, cultural, social and economic rights of the Kosovo Albanians in accordance with Council of Europe principles and instruments;
ii. calls on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro):
a. to adopt an amnesty for deserters and draft evaders;
b. to fulfil its obligation to readmit rejected asylum-seekers from Kosovo in accordance with international law;
iii. calls on the representatives of the Kosovo Albanians to explore every opportunity to find a suitable framework for co-existence between the Serbian and Kosovo Albanian populations based on full recognition of, and respect for, their political, cultural, social and economic rights in accordance with Council of Europe principles and instruments;
iv. invites the governments of the member states of the Council of Europe:
a. to renounce their intention forcibly to return rejected Albanian asylum-seekers from Kosovo, and to grant them temporary protection until such time as the human rights situation in Kosovo allows them to return in safety and dignity;
b. to organise any voluntary returns in groups under the aegis of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), directly to Priština airport and after informing local human rights organisations;
c. to discuss the problems of the Kosovo Albanian asylum-seekers and refugees directly with the representatives of these groups;
d. to exert pressure on the governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and of the Republic of Serbia to respect and safeguard the human rights of the Kosovo Albanians;
e. to promote the resumption of dialogue between the Kosovo Albanians and the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Serbia in the framework of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia with a view to agreeing confidence-building measures and to reaching a mutually acceptable political settlement;
v. invites the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to allow the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to resume participation in its work with a view to fostering dialogue between the Serb authorities and the Kosovo Albanians and to sending a long-term international observer mission to Kosovo in cooperation with the Council of Europe;
vi. calls on the governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, «the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia» and Romania to refuse to allow their countries to serve as transit points for the forced return of rejected Albanian asylum-seekers from Kosovo.
II. Draft recommendation
1. Referring to its Resolution ... on Albanian asylum-seekers from Kosovo, the Assembly recommends that the Committee of Ministers:
i. offer to the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and specifically its Working Group on Ethnic and National Communities and Minorities, the good offices of the Council of Europe with a view to:
a. proposing a full range of measures designed to build confidence between the ethnic Albanian and ethnic Serb populations in Kosovo, as well as between the Kosovo Albanians and the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Serbia, with a particular focus on human rights, civil, political and cultural rights, minority rights, education, health, youth, sport and media;
b. the organisation of a population census in Kosovo in co-operation with the European Union;
ii. ensure, in any negotiations between the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Social Development Fund of the Council of Europe, that no use is made of Fund resources to finance the resettlement of Serbs in Kosovo;
iii. invite the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe to study the feasibility of establishing a Local Democracy Embassy in Kosovo.
III. Draft order
1. Referring to its Resolution ... and Recommendation ... on Albanian asylum-seekers from Kosovo, the Assembly instructs its Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography to monitor the situation in Kosovo with a view to promoting a mutually acceptable political settlement between the Kosovo Albanians and the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Serbia and to report to the Assembly as necessary.
IV. Explanatory memorandum
by Mr CUCÓ
Contents
Page
1. Introduction 9
2. Historical background 9
3. Post-war political evolution 11
4. Economic and demographic development 14
5. Hearing on Albanian asylum-seekers from Kosovo
(Paris, 2 June 1995) 16
5.1. Position of the Kosovo Albanians 16
5.2. Situation of Kosovo Albanian asylum-seekers in Western Europe 18
5.3. Position of the Intergovernmental organisations 19
5.4. Position of non-governmental organisations 20
6. Rapporteur's visit to Belgrade, 6-8 June 1995 22
6.1. Meeting with Diplomatic Representatives of France, Germany,
Hungary, Spain, Sweden and the European Commission 22
6.2. Meeting with representatives of humanitarian organisations and
the European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM) 24
6.3. Meeting with a delegation of the Federal Parliament 26
6.4. Meeting with Mr Slobodan Jovanović, Chairman of the Committee
on Foreign Relations, National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia 28
6.5. Meeting in the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs 29
6.6. Meeting with Mr Aleksa Jokić, Head, «District» («Okrug») of
Kosovo, Government of the Republic of Serbia 31
6.7. Meeting at the Federal Ministry of Labour, Health and
Social Affairs 32
7. Rapporteur's visit to Priština, 8-9 June 1995 34
7.1. Meeting with representatives of the «parallel» Parliament
of Kosovo 34
7.2. Meeting with the Rector of the «parallel» University of
Priština, Prof. Dr Ejup Statovci, and the President of the
Academy of Arts and Sciences, Dr Idriz Ajeti 36
7.3. Meeting with Mr François Stamm, ICRC Representative in
Priština 37
Page
7.4. Other information gathered from various contacts in Priština
with representatives of international organisations 37
7.5. Meeting with Mr Miloš Nešović, Deputy Head, «District»
(«Okrug») of Kosovo, Government of the Republic of Serbia, and
Mr Boško Drobnjak, Secretary, Kosovo Secretariat for Information 38
7.6. Meeting with the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and
Freedoms (CDHRF) and the Kosovo Helsinki Committee (KHC) 40
7.7. Meeting with Dr Ibrahim Rugova, President of the «Republic of
Kosovo» and of the Democratic League of Kosovo 42
7.8. Meeting with representatives of the Roman Catholic Church and
the «Mother Teresa» Society 43
7.9. Meeting with representatives of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees and the International Federation of
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 44
7.10. Meeting with Mr Skënder Kastrati, member of the Democratic
League of Kosovo 45
8. Conclusions 46
Appendix 1 UNHCR Information Note (31 January 1995) on asylum-seekers
from the Kosovo and Sandžak regions of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 49
Instruction by the Yugoslav Federal Ministry of Transport and
Communications on the issue of return to the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia dated 16 November 1994 51
1. Introduction
1. This report has been written in response to the motion for a resolution on Albanian2 asylum-seekers from Kosovo (Doc. 7007), presented in January 1994 by Mr Flückiger and other members of the Assembly. The signatories expressed concern about reported human rights violations against the Albanians in Kosovo, about the difficulties put in the way of monitoring the situation there, and about the plight of the Kosovo Albanians who had sought asylum in several western European countries, some of which were organising their forced repatriation.
2. For the purpose of writing the report I have drawn mainly on the information provided by representatives of governments, of the Kosovo Albanians, of international governmental and non-governmental organisations and experts at a hearing on the subject organised by the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography in Paris on 2 June 1995, as well as on my own fact-finding visit to Belgrade and Priština (Kosovo) from 6 to 10 June 1995. I would like to thank all those who have provided information, assistance or hospitality, including the Yugoslav authorities, the Kosovo Albanians, and especially the staff of the Spanish Embassy in Belgrade, who facilitated my visit with unfailing courtesy.
3. Understanding the problem of the Albanian asylum-seekers from Kosovo requires some grasp of the turbulent contemporary history of the region, one of the poorest in the former Yugoslavia. Its population is 90% ethnic Albanian, hence non-Slav, 8% Serb and Montenegrin, and the remainder Muslim, Turk, Rom and others. Until 1989 Kosovo was an autonomous province of the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia within the Republic of Serbia. Now the region is formally a «district» («okrug») of the Republic of Serbia, for which the Albanians demand independence but to which the Serbs claim ancestral rights. Kosovo has been subject to unusual migratory movements among both the minority Serb and the majority Albanian populations for economic, political and socio-cultural reasons.
4. My conclusions and recommendations are intended not only to help reach a consensus among Council of Europe member states on the question of the Kosovo Albanian asylum-seekers but also to lead to a reduction in the tension that undoubtedly reigns in Kosovo, often referred to as a time-bomb threatening to spark a Balkan conflagration wider and more bloody than the war which has raged over the past four years in former Yugoslavia.
2. Historical background
5. Like the rest of the Balkans, the history of Kosovo is one of the ebb and flow of peoples and empires — Byzantine, Bulgarian, Serbian, and Ottoman — and of rival nationalisms. The Albanian inhabitants of Kosovo claim descendance from the ancient Illyrians (Albanoi). The Serbs' presence in the area dates from the Slav migration to the Balkans in the 6th and 7th centuries. In the middle of the 14th century Kosovo was the centre of the medieval Serbian Empire forged by Stefan Dušan, which extended from the Danube almost to the Gulf of Corinth, and from the Adriatic, including Albania, to the Aegean. The significance of Kosovo for the Serbs may be grasped from the fact that their national day is 28 June, commemorating the losing but heroic stand of the Christian confederacy led by Dušan's son Lazar against the Ottoman Turks at the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389. The confederate forces under his command included not only Serbs but also Albanians, Bosnians, Bulgars, Hungarians, Mongols and Poles.
6. For the next five hundred years, Kosovo was part of the Ottoman Empire. Rather than abandon their religion, a great many Serbs migrated northwards. Albanians moved into Kosovo in greater numbers from the surrounding areas together with settlers brought from Turkey. They were largely Islamicised, especially following Albania's incorporation into the Ottoman Empire towards the end of the 15th century.
7. The second reason why the Serbs consider Kosovo to be an essential part of their national heritage is that Peć (actually in the adjacent area known as Metohija, a Serbian word derived from the Greek expression for «religious community») was the seat of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and that many ancient monasteries dot the land. It was the Patriarch of Peć who led the mass flight of Serb refugees whom the Habsburg Emperor offered protection in the Empire's borderlands at the end of the 17th century following the Emperor's unsuccessful military campaign, supported by the Serbs, to oust the Ottoman forces from south-eastern Europe. Further such unsuccessful attempts in the beginning of the 18th century gave rise to similar migration movements. The Ottoman Turks encouraged the settlement in Kosovo of Albanians from Northern Albania.3
8. The decline of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of Serbian nationalism in the 19th and early 20th centuries brought about a corresponding Albanian national renewal movement which sought autonomy in a single ethnic Albanian territory, including Kosovo. Alarmed by the Serbian occupation of Kosovo during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, the Albanians founded the «League of Prizren» (Kosovo) in 1878 to oppose any cession by the Great Powers of territory inhabited by Albanians. In the event, it was only after the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 that most of Kosovo was ceded to Serbia (along with Vardar Macedonia) as a consolation for being barred access to the Adriatic by the creation of the «sovereign principality» of Albania. As a result, about half of the Albanian population remained outside Albania, giving birth to Albanian irredentism.4
9. There followed a period of forced assimilation of Albanians to Serbian culture, interrupted by the First World War when Kosovo was occupied for a time by Bulgaria. Thereafter Serbia resumed its oppressive policy in Kosovo within the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, renamed Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929. This policy involved establishing complete control over the administration, settling Serbs and Montenegrins so as to strengthen the Slav element in the population, introducing agrarian reform designed to weaken the Albanians economically and to encourage them to emigrate, and refusing to allow Albanian autonomous cultural development. The policy of re-colonisation met with some success: it has been estimated that Orthodox (essentially Serb and Montenegrin) immigrants numbered 111 000, while 77 000 Muslims (essentially Albanians) left.5
10. With Yugoslavia's disintegration in 1941, Kosovo was divided between Italian-occupied Albania, German-occupied Serbia, and Bulgaria. The inter-war Serb and Montenegrin colonists were driven out again, and numbers of both Serbs and Albanians were massacred.6 There was considerable Albanian resistance to the re-incorporation of Kosovo into Yugoslavia after the war.
3. Post-war political evolution
11. The 1946 Federal Yugoslav Constitution designated Kosovo-Metohija as an «Autonomous Region» of the Republic of Serbia. The region was represented in the Federal Parliament. The Albanian population, also present in Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia proper, were recognised as a «national minority of Yugoslavia» (subsequently termed "nationality"), just below the status of «nation» enjoyed by Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs and Slovenes (together with Muslims from 1963 onwards). Under the Serbian Constitution, Kosovo's autonomy was restricted to administrative, budgetary, economic, social and educational matters. The Serbian Government could invalidate any decision deemed contrary to Serbian law.
12. During the post-war years the Serbs, under the direction of the notorious head of the state security police, Aleksandar Ranković, suppressed all manifestations of Albanian resistance or separatist nationalism in Kosovo. Serb suspicions redoubled following Tito's break with Stalin and the chilling effect this had on Yugoslavia's relations with Enver Hoxha, the die-hard Stalinist leader of neighbouring Albania. The Kosovo Albanians were largely excluded from key posts and official positions. In 1956, for example, whereas Serbs and Montenegrins made up some 27.5% of the population, they accounted for 86.6% of the security forces and 68.7% of the regular police.7
13. In 1963, although the region was promoted to «Autonomous Province» on a par with Serbia's northern territory, Vojvodina, and the regional council was elevated to a provincial assembly, the province lost its independent representation in the Federal Parliament and was henceforth represented within the Serb delegation.
14. After the fall of Ranković in 1966 the Kosovo Albanians demanded greater liberalisation and autonomy. Some Albanian circles claimed republican status for Kosovo and even union with Albania. Large-scale demonstrations and violent anti-Serb riots took place. Perhaps as part of Tito's strategy to contain Serb power, constitutional changes were made, and the situation of the Kosovo Albanians improved. Under Kosovo's constitutional law of 1969 the provincial assembly was given the power to enact laws, implemented by the provincial executive council. The province's borders could not be changed without its consent. A constitutional court was set up, while conflicts of prerogatives had henceforth to be settled at federal level. The province was again independently represented in the Federal Parliament. The Albanians could also fly their national flag.8 In 1970 the University of Priština was founded. The Albanian language and culture, including the media, flourished. The Albanians took control of the police and the judiciary and their share of employment improved.
15. The 1974 Federal Constitution, the last adopted for the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia and constantly referred to by the Kosovo Albanians as the high point of their constitutional development in the SFRY, confirmed and extended Kosovo's autonomy, placing it on a virtually equal footing with the republics. The main and fundamental remaining difference was that while the republics had the theoretical right to secede, the autonomous provinces did not.9
16. Despite these concessions, or perhaps in part because of them, unrest continued and even intensified, the demand for a «Kosovo republic» becoming more vocal. Separatist political groups were uncovered and suppressed. There were student demonstrations, prison riots and outbreaks of spontaneous violence. Many Kosovo Albanians were imprisoned for sedition. The Albanian leadership tried to give Belgrade the impression that they were firmly in control. Finally, Kosovo exploded into violence in spring 1981, a year after Tito's death, with rioting by students, miners and factory workers. The Patriarchate of Peć was the object of an arson attack. Again there were demands for republican status and secession. A state of emergency was declared. Army and police reinforcements were brought in. The demonstrators were massively arrested and denounced as counter-revolutionaries and separatists.
17. The riots resulted in a purge of the Albanian leadership and a backlash of Serbian nationalism and ethnic hatred, intensified by the continuing exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo. The Serbs accused the Albanians of seeking to expel the Serb and Montenegrin minorities in Kosovo through human rights abuses and genocide, an accusation heard in Belgrade even today (see the account of my discussions in paragraphs 84 and 107 below). Without excluding human rights abuses, harassment and insecurity as causes for the Serb and Montenegrin emigration, dispassionate observers cite mainly economic reasons and point to a steady net outflow from the province, not only of Serbs and Montenegrins, going back to 1961. In any event, there appears to be little evidence to sustain the charge of a systematic Albanian campaign to compel the Serbs to leave.10
18. The ethnic violence in Kosovo gave the Serb nationalists their chance, which Slobodan Milošević exploited as a means to power in 1987. Once installed, he set about re-establishing Serb control over the autonomous provinces, beginning with Vojvodina, advancing as justification the need to stabilise the situation. Milošević set up the Committee for the Protection of Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins, which organised mass demonstrations. In 1988 he engineered the resignation of the Kosovo Albanian leadership, replacing them with those loyal to him. Serbo-Croat was made the sole official language in Kosovo. On 23 March 1989, surrounded by army tanks and in a procedure described by the Albanians as illegal, the Kosovo Assembly approved Serb-proposed constitutional amendments designed to do away with the province's autonomous status. Further constitutional changes would henceforth require only a two-thirds majority in the Serbian Parliament. These events were accompanied by violent protest, strikes and large-scale arrests. They also began the slide towards the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation, since most of the other republics, beginning with Slovenia and Croatia, saw in the resurgence of Serb nationalism and centralist tendencies a direct threat to the delicate federal balance. The ending of the communist era in Eastern Europe further sapped any cohesive force left in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, opening the way to free elections in 1990, the exploitation of nationalist feeling, and eventually to Slovenian and Croatian secession.
19. In March 1990 the Serbian Parliament adopted the so-called «Programme for the Establishment of Peace, Liberty, Equality, Democracy and Prosperity in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo», providing among other things for discrimination in favour of Serbs and Montenegrins wishing to return to Kosovo or to settle there and for the possibility of employing Albanians in other areas of Yugoslavia. In April 1990 the Ministry of the Interior of Kosovo was abolished, and in June the Kosovo police were integrated into the Serbian police-force, resulting in the replacement of Albanians by Serbs and Montenegrins.
20. When in July 1990 the Kosovo Assembly responded to the Serb suppression of their autonomy by declaring Kosovo an «independent and equal unit» within Yugoslavia and announcing its secession from Serbia, the Serbian authorities suspended the Assembly, disbanded the provincial government and other organs and set up a «special administration». They also took steps to muzzle the Albanian-language media and, following a general strike, dismissed Albanians from jobs in the public sector.
21. In September 1990 the Albanian «official» class joined with the Albanian opposition (Democratic League of Kosovo, Association for the Democratic Initiative, Committee for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms) in proclaiming a Constitution for the «Republic of Kosova». The Serbian Parliament adopted a new Constitution reducing Kosovo and Vojvodina to the status of «district» («okrug»). Troops and police reinforcements were sent to Kosovo to quell the protest.
22. The Kosovo Albanian response was to organise passive resistance and «parallel» systems of government, education and health care. They boycotted the 1990 elections and the 1991 population census, refused to attend school since education was henceforth to be subject to Serb control, and developed their own health clinics run by ethnic Albanian medical staff dismissed from hospitals. In 1991 an unofficial referendum held among the Kosovo Albanians on the question of Kosovo independence resulted in an overwhelming vote in favour, while clandestine parliamentary and presidential elections in 1992 resulted in a landslide victory for Dr Ibrahim Rugova and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). The «parallel» government appointed by Dr Rugova operates partly in exile and partly on a semi-clandestine basis in Kosovo. It is headed by Prime Minister Dr Bujar Bukoshi, who lives in exile.
4. Economic and demographic development
23. Kosovo has always been one of the very poorest regions of Yugoslavia, dependent on agriculture, although it has significant deposits of coal, lead, zinc, pyrite, silver, gold, and nickel. Energy production and metallurgy have been features of post-war development. However, industrial growth has been hampered by the serious lack of investment. Average investment per head from 1952 to 1983 (SFRY=100) was 93.2 in Serbia proper and 57.2 in Kosovo.11 Every development indicator shows similar or worse differentials. In 1984 the number of employed per 1000 (SFRY=426) was 409 in Serbia proper and 222 in Kosovo. Despite the operation of a Federal Development Fund designed to even out regional disparities, of which Kosovo has been the main beneficiary, the better-off republics were increasingly reluctant to contribute to this Fund as their own secession became more likely. Moreover, the federal authorities, while recognising that the discontent in Kosovo was in large part attributable to the latter's under-development, were hesitant about investing in a region subject to such political instability.
24. The generally low level of education and qualification has put Kosovo at a further disadvantage. Even in 1971, 36 % of Kosovo Albanians were officially illiterate.12 The present dislocation of education in Kosovo can only make matters worse.
25. Of course the demographic situation and trends in Kosovo have to be taken into account, the more so since this is a matter of considerable controversy and conflict between the Kosovo Albanians and the Serbs. The last Yugoslav census (1991) put the total population of Kosovo at 1 956 000, of whom 81,6% were ethnic Albanians and 9,9% ethnic Serbs. This was an estimate since the census was boycotted by most Albanians. The proportion of Albanians has risen steadily since the first post-war census in 1948 from 68,4%, while the proportion of Serbs has fallen from 23,6%.13 The 1991 Kosovo population figure represented a 345% increase over that obtained in the 1921 census (439 000), the biggest rise of any region in Yugoslavia. This increase was undoubtedly due in part to the fact that the birth rate among Kosovo Albanians was 45,9 per thousand in 1953, 46,3 in 1961 and 42,3 in 1971, the highest for any population group in the former Yugoslavia.14 The Serbs accuse the Albanians of engineering the take-over of Kosovo by means of their fecundity, a «demographic time-bomb». What they overlook is that the birth-rate for Serbs in Kosovo is also high, 41,2 per thousand in 1953, 31,3 in 1961 and 22,4 in 1971, especially in comparison to the Serbs in Serbia proper and Vojvodina, at 25,4 per thousand in 1953, 16,0 in 1961 and 14,6 in 1971.15 This would seem to confirm the accepted correlation between high birth rates on the one hand, and poverty and low educational levels, irrespective of ethnic grouping, on the other. The average age of the population in Kosovo is young: 24.2 in 1953 and 24.9 in 1989 for males, and a little higher for females, compared to 28,5 in 1953 and 36,2 in 1989 for males, again a little higher for females, in Serbia proper.16 Population density is higher in Kosovo than anywhere else in the former Yugoslavia, at 180 inhabitants per km삲 in 1991 as compared to 103 in Serbia proper and 94 in Vojvodina.17
26. Migration also affected the demographic picture in Kosovo, although it is impossible to give precise net figures and the subject has given rise to controversy, as already seen (see paragraph 17). Serb sources tend to emphasise the extent of Serb emigration and Albanian immigration, while Albanian sources emphasise the reverse18. One foreign expert estimates net emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins at 4 000 to 5 000 between 1953 and 1961 and at 40 000 to 50 000 for each of the inter-census periods 1961-1971 and 1971-1981, while ethnic Albanian emigration was much smaller.19 Between 1981 and 1991, the same expert gives an estimated net emigration of 35 000, while the migratory balance for Kosovo Albanians was virtually nil.20 The latter did, however, continue to leave to work abroad, the total number of Albanians from the territory of the former Yugoslavia, especially Kosovo, being estimated at 400 000 in 1993, for the most part in the main industrial countries of Western Europe.21
27. The controversy over Serb migration to and from Kosovo was recently stirred by the arrival in Serbia of some 185 000 Krajina Serbs who fled the advance of the Croatian army during «Operation Storm» in the summer of 1995. Some 10 000 of these have been settled in parts of Kosovo (according to Serb Government sources mainly Kosovo Polje, Kosovska Mitrovica, Peć, Prizren and Priština). However, it would seem that they do not do so willingly. Certainly it would be unwise for the Serb Government to upset the already delicate ethnic balance in Kosovo, where the density of population is already the highest of any part of the former Yugoslavia.
5. Hearing on Albanian asylum-seekers from Kosovo
(Paris, 2 June 1995)
28. The overall situation in Kosovo, as it emerged from the testimony given at the hearing outlined in this section, was one of grave human rights violations to which the Council of Europe must react. This was not altogether surprising, since the United Nations Commission on Human Rights has consistently condemned the Serb authorities for their policies and practices, as have the European Parliament and other international and humanitarian bodies such as Pax Christi International, Caritas, the Confederation
of Free Trade Unions, etc.22 Some of these had been invited to the hearing. I regret that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not take part in response to the Committee's invitation.
5.1. Position of the Kosovo Albanians
29. The crisis in Kosovo had started in 1989, when Serbia had unconstitutionally abolished Kosovo's autonomy, and culminated in July 1990 with the suppression of Kosovo's parliament and executive bodies. The Serbian authorities had destroyed all legitimate institutions and were applying the policy of apartheid. The result was that some 400 000 Kosovo Albanians had left the region to seek refuge in the countries of western Europe.23
30. Kosovo was experiencing an unbearable form of tyranny that left no hope for the future. The Serbian regime's policy was designed to alter Kosovo's demographic structure and destroy the Albanian ethnic group. Regarding Serbs' historic claims, Kosovo had always been inhabited by Albanians. The main forms of oppression used by the Serbian regime included:
—po litical assassinations, arbitrary arrests and searches, torture, convictions for political reasons;—
—de priving Albanians of their legal system, education and medical care;—
—de nying the right to use Albanian in the media;—
—ru ining the economy and ransacking its resources;—
—wi thdrawing passports;—
—ex pelling Albanians from their homes and installing Serbian families in their place;—
—en forced recruitment into the army;—
—ar bitrary dismissals;—
—pr eventing Albanians who had resided temporally abroad from returning.31
31. The Serbian authorities were conducting an outright policy of ethnic cleansing and encouraging Serbs from other regions to settle there. There were some 350 Serbian laws that discriminated against Albanians. In schools, walls had been constructed to separate Serbian from Albanian children.
32. Kosovo Albanians often had no alternative to seeking refuge in other European countries. The "Government of the Republic of Kosovo (GRK)" was well aware that the flight of Albanians was helping the Serbian policy of altering the region's ethnic structure. The GRK had therefore called on the authorities of neighbouring countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, «the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia» and Romania) to refuse to serve as transit points in case of forced repatriation.
33. The Government of Kosovo proposed the following measures to assist the refugees:
a. allowing Kosovo Albanians who were working illegally and had not requested refugee status to regularise their stay;
b. granting work permits to long-term asylum-seekers from Kosovo;
c. paying particular attention to the situation of draft evaders and deserters and offering them training with a view to their return to the country.
34. The exodus of Albanians from Kosovo was the result of the political situation there. The Council of Europe should exert pressure on the Serbian authorities to grant Kosovo Albanians the right to self-determination. In view of the separation of Slav nations from the former Yugoslavia there was no reason for the Albanians to remain in the present Yugoslav Federation. The creation of an independent state was in the best interests of the Kosovo Albanians. However, the latter had never sought to make the independence question a precondition for negotiations with the Serbs. There had been negotiations between the Kosovo Albanians and the Serbian authorities in the framework of the Geneva International Conference on former Yugoslavia but the latter had suspended them.
35. Any repatriation should be conducted in an atmosphere of security and dignity. In particular, the return of deserters and draft evaders should be supervised by international institutions with all the necessary safeguards.
36. As to the question whether there had been an influx of Albanians from Albania into Kosovo, there remained 732 Albanians from Albania who had sought refuge in Kosovo in the post-war period. The frontier between Kosovo and Albania was now practically shut and was guarded by the Yugoslav army.
5.2. Situation of Kosovo Albanian asylum-seekers in Western Europe
— General
37. According to the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) in Vienna, western European countries had taken in 1,4 million people from the former Yugoslavia even before the conflict had broken out and 0,9 million thereafter. In June 1995, 4,3% of the population in Switzerland, 4% in Austria, 1,9% in Sweden and 1,4% in Germany came from ex-Yugoslavia. 650,000 of them were of Kosovo origin and 550,000 from Bosnia-Herzegovina.
38. According to ICMPD's estimations, the following number of asylum-seekers from Kosovo had arrived in recent years:
— Germany23 0,000—
— Austria2, 000—
— Denmark1, 700—
— Norway4, 000—
— Netherland15 ,000—
— Sweden60 ,000—
— Switzerland28 ,000To
Total: 340,700
39. The rate of recognition of Kosovo Albanians' refugee status varied between 3 and 15% according to country and approximately 80 000-90 000 had had their applications refused. Receiving countries were currently giving priority to refugees from the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
40. In refusing to readmit Albanians from Kosovo, the Yugoslav Federation was violating international law. Albanian asylum-seekers were being used by the Serbs as a means of putting pressure on the countries of western Europe. This was the context in which some of these countries had entered into bilateral negotiations, in which the UNHCR ought to be able to take part.
41. Nor was it absolutely correct to say, as some governments claimed, that enforced repatriations had been suspended; they simply could not take place because Belgrade refused to accept Albanians whose asylum applications had been rejected. Nevertheless, governments were aware of the highly explosive situation in Kosovo and were proceeding to repatriation of individuals only on a case by case basis.
— Austria
42. Between 1 June 1992 and 1 June 1995, Austria recorded 1 672 asylum-seekers from Kosovo, including 729 men aged 18 to 30. In 1995, 324 asylum applications had been lodged by citizens of former Yugoslavia, of which 23 had been accepted. Currently, 300 000 persons from the Yugoslav Federation were registered as permanently resident in Austria. The Serbian authorities refused to produce identity documents for the Albanians from Kosovo who were resident in Austria.
— Germany
43. Germany was carrying the heaviest burden of Albanian asylum-seekers from Kosovo. The German federal administrative court had decided that refugee status would not be granted automatically to persons from regions where there was ethnic persecution. Nevertheless, the German government recognised the extreme gravity of the situation in Kosovo. Germany was therefore liaising closely with the UNHCR as well as maintaining contacts with the Albanian opposition. However it was difficult to deal directly with the Government of the Republic of Kosovo, which it did not recognise.
44. No government could tolerate the continued presence of persons whose asylum applications had been rejected and Germany had initiated negotiations with Belgrade on their repatriation. However, these negotiations were technical rather than political.
— Sweden
45. Sweden's position regarding Albanian refugees from Kosovo was the same as that of the UNHCR (cf. Appendix 1). At present, there were 68 000 asylum-seekers from Kosovo in Sweden, of whom 20 000 had a permanent residence permit. Approximately 5 000-6 000 asylum applications were currently being considered and there had been 4 000 rejections. However the last deportation had been in September 1993. There was a total freeze on repatriations to Kosovo.
— Switzerland
46. In Switzerland asylum-seekers from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia represented 20% of the total in 1993, 25% in 1994 and 27% in the first four months of 1995. Among these, the Kosovo asylum-seekers were the most numerous (about 95%). The rates at which asylum applications from Kosovo Albanians were granted were 6,8% in 1993, 8,9% in 1994 and 10% in the first four months of 1995. In accordance with a federal decision, Switzerland had also accepted 5 500 deserters from former Yugoslavia, the majority from Kosovo. As for repatriations, because of obstacles raised by the Serbian authorities, the final departure date had been put back to 31 January 1996.
5.3. Position of the Intergovernmental organisations
— Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
47. The situation in Kosovo had unfortunately been somewhat neglected owing to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The UNHCR point of view on these problems was set out in its information note of 31 January 1995 on asylum-seekers from Kosovo and Sandžak (cf Appendix 1). With regard to the repatriation of Kosovo Albanian refugees, the UNHCR thought that their return should be conducted with dignity and accompanied by the necessary guarantees of safety. Some unsuccessful asylum-seekers from Kosovo who had not been readmitted by the Yugoslavs authorities had ended up in very difficult conditions from a humanitarian standpoint.
— International Organisation for Migration (IOM)
48. As part of its programmes to assist unsuccessful asylum-seekers to return voluntarily, IOM had entered into negotiations with one of the countries concerned with a view to establishing a test return programme for Albanian refugees from Kosovo. However, IOM's good offices had been refused, since the country in question had decided that it should first successfully conclude its bilateral negotiations with the Serbs before becoming involved in the technical aspects of repatriation, to which IOM could contribute.
5.4. Position of non-governmental organisations
— International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights
49. The ethnic persecution in Kosovo was the worst in Europe. Every Kosovo Albanian was at permanent risk of being persecuted. Among the worst affected groups were intellectuals and trade union activists, who were subject to various political and economic pressures to leave. Draft evaders and deserters from the Yugoslav army were also in a particularly difficult situation. Asylum-seekers in genuine need of protection could not always provide proof of persecution.
50. Given these circumstances, European governments should review their asylum practice and legislation and offer Albanian refugees from Kosovo a more generous reception, with a view to their repatriation when the situation allowed. Serious discussions should take place on a fair apportionment of these refugees among the various European countries.
51. The only lasting solution to the problems of refugees from Kosovo was to improve the region's human rights situation. Until political solutions were forthcoming, European countries should accept refugees from the region. Politicians had a duty to persuade their voters of the need to accept their humanitarian obligations towards persons in need of international protection.
52. Certain European countries had entered into bilateral negotiations with the Serbian authorities on the readmission of Albanian refugees from Kosovo in exchange for payment. This was a real humanitarian scandal.
53. The competent authorities of the host countries should agree to discuss the problems of Albanian refugees with the representatives of the Kosovo Albanians.
— Assembly of Helsinki Citizens
54. Human rights violations had increased in Kosovo in 1995. The Serbian authorities were trying to establish an atmosphere of fear to encourage Albanians to flee and prevent Albanians abroad from returning. European states had to put pressure on the Serbian government to change its policy in Kosovo and enter into dialogue with the Albanian representatives.
— Amnesty International
55. Acts of police violence against Kosovo Albanians had risen greatly in 1995. Numerous human rights infringements had been reported, such as police brutality, including torture, political arrests and trials, irregularities in legal proceedings, home searches (on the pretext of looking for arms) and so on. The main targets of such brutality and harassment were those active in the organisation of the parallel society — political militants, teachers, trade unionists, journalists and former policemen and soldiers. The main feature of this daily violence was that the police acted with impunity. Policemen were only brought to court if a victim died, and then not systematically.
56. Regarding the situation in the countries of asylum, the majority of asylum applications from Kosovo Albanians were rejected. In certain cases, Albanian asylum-seekers could benefit from temporary protection. For example:
a. in Germany, the federal administrative court had decided in July 1994 that the Kosovo Albanians were not being persecuted as a «group». However, certain municipal administrative courts still considered that there was group persecution.
b. in Austria, the number of asylum-seekers from former Yugoslavia had fallen. This was very much the consequence of the new legislation since those who had not arrived directly from their country (and there was no common frontier between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Austria) could not secure a residence permit.
57. The rejection of asylum applications did not signify that those concerned were not at risk following their return to their country. The choice of whether to return or remain in the host country should be left to the refugees.
— European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE)
58. ECRE was paying close attention to the human rights situation in Kosovo and had observed massive and systematic violations of them by the Serbian authorities. The objective of the policy was clearly the enforced expulsion of the Albanian population. In these circumstances, the influx of asylum-seekers from Kosovo would probably continue, despite the restrictions imposed by the majority of west European countries.
59. As far as the latter's asylum policies were concerned, only a small number of refugees from Kosovo were actually granted refugee status, the majority of applications being rejected. Certain European countries had also tried, unsuccessfully, to repatriate failed asylum-seekers in very humiliating conditions.
60. ECRE therefore put forward the following recommendations:
a. European countries must bring concerted pressure to bear on the Serbian government to ensure respect for human rights in Kosovo;
b. European countries must guarantee Kosovo Albanians full access to asylum procedures and consider their applications in a generous and humanistic spirit;
c. repatriation must not take place until the security of those returning was fully safeguarded;
d. pending repatriation in such conditions, refugees should be granted residence permits for humanitarian reasons, including entitlements to housing, education and work;
e. the monitoring of the situation in Kosovo should be improved;
f. European countries should consider providing aid to improve living conditions in Kosovo.
61. According to an independent Swiss expert at the Hearing, Mr Ueli Leuenberger, repatriation was the best solution for Albanian asylum-seekers from Kosovo. However, return would not be possible if human rights were not respected in Kosovo. European countries were committing a major error in failing to associate the Albanian communities already established in their countries with the reception of Albanian refugees. The negative consequences of this policy were clearly evident, in both human and social terms and with regard to the various costs incurred.
62. The European countries had to adopt a preventive approach and put enormous pressure on the Serbian government to enter into negotiations with the representatives of the Kosovo Albanians. Unless respect for human rights was re-established in the region, thousands more Kosovo Albanians would join those already in western Europe. Similarly, if a conflict did break out in Kosovo, European countries would probably also be faced with serious internal security problems.
63. Deserters and draft evaders faced a particularly difficult situation, since they were often unable to provide the necessary documentation in support of their asylum applications. The result was that many of them produced forged papers, and were consequently punished by having their asylum applications rejected.
64. Switzerland's new immigration policy made it impossible for those granted residence permits to work. The policy deprived Kosovo of significant financial remittances from immigrants and tended to marginalise the latter.
6. Rapporteur's visit to Belgrade, 6-8 June 1995
6.1. Meeting with Diplomatic Representatives of France, Germany, Hungary, Spain, Sweden and the European Commission
— Mr Jean-Luis Puig, 1st Counsellor, French Embassy
— Dr Gerhard Enver Schrömbgens, Chargé d'Affaires, German Embassy
— Mr Andras Vincze, Chargé d'Affaires, Hungarian Embassy
— Mr José Antonio Bordallo, Chargé d'Affaires, Spanish Embassy (host)
— Dr Göran Jacobsson, Chargé d'Affaires, Swedish Embassy
— Mr Aldo Cricchio, Chargé d'Affaires, European Commission Delegation
65. The purpose of this meeting was to obtain a general briefing on the current situation with regard to Kosovo. Although human rights organisations reported increased pressure on the Albanian population by the Serb authorities, the situation was described as «stable», with as little official attention paid to the subject as possible by the government. It was thought that any heightened pressure was designed to demonstrate firmness to the increasingly militant and organised representatives of the Serb minority in Kosovo («Serbian Resistance Movement») and the nationalist hard-liners in Belgrade.
66. The Serb attitude to Kosovo was exemplified by the final declaration adopted at a conference of Serb intellectuals and demographic experts held in Priština at the end of March 1995 on the subject of the population of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with special reference to Kosovo. Among other recommendations designed to «improve» demographic trends in Serbia and re-establish a demographic balance in Kosovo, justified by reference to the example of Bulgaria's expulsion of a large part of its Turkish minority, were the following:
—ex pel the 400 000 Albanian illegal immigrants present in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;—
—ca rry out a census in Kosovo to establish the true population figures;—
—re view all property transactions between Serbs and Albanians from 1941 to 1990;—
—ad opt a law on the permanent settlement of refugees from the former Yugoslavia in Kosovo;—
—ad opt a law providing employment in Kosovo for highly qualified people presently unemployed elsewhere in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;—
—gr ant loans on advantageous terms to graduates wishing to settle in Kosovo.67
67. At the same time, the Serbian Resistance Movement (SRM) had organised a number of meetings which concluded that a «National State of Serbians» should be created through a revision of the Serbian Constitution to eliminate the concept of regional autonomy altogether and to reorganise Serbia into twelve regions. Two of these would cover the present Kosovo-Metohija so as to be able to separate Serbs from Albanians and weaken the latter's influence. The purpose of these meetings, according to the organisers, was to reach consensus among the Serbs around a solution to the problem of Kosovo, since the Government's policy could not be considered as a serious strategy in the face of the alleged Albanian objective to rid Kosovo of its Serb minority. It was not true, according to the SRM, that Albanians had been dismissed from their jobs. They had been put under pressure by the Albanian leadership to leave, on pain of being accused of collaboration.
68. A further «Serbian national consultation» had taken place on 20 May 1995 at the monastery of Gračanica for the purpose of appointing a «Serbian National Council» which was to adopt a programme on the above lines. Representatives of the SRM and the Serbian Orthodox Church had predominated. Support from the mainstream Serb parties had not materialised. Basically, however, the only difference between the Serbian Government's approach to Kosovo and that of the SRM was that the latter believed that the Serbian Government should institutionalise the measures being applied in Kosovo to do away with the Albanian independence movement and to discriminate in favour of the Serbs in an effort to re-establish a demographic balance.
69. Meanwhile the Kosovo Albanian movement, still led by the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) presided by Dr Ibrahim Rugova, continued to maintain publicly that its objectives were the liberation of the Albanian people outside Albania; the possible unification of all Albanians in a single state; and the democratic development of society within such a state. At the end of April, following his meeting with the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly delegation in Belgrade, the Vice-President of the LDK, Dr Fehmi Agani, had outlined the conditions for a solution to the Kosovo problem:
—ac ceptance that the constitutional status of Kosovo was that of a federal unit of the former Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia;—
—he nce, a re-definition of the position resulting from the disintegration of the SFRY;—
—ac ceptance of the new political reality arising from the 1991 referendum in favour of independence and from the 1992 parliamentary and presidential elections (see above, paragraph 22);—
—re cognition of the fact that the present Yugoslav regime, with its policy of systematic repression and expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo, had lost all right to speak of the inviolability of frontiers.70
70. The fundamental conflict between the Serbian and Albanian positions was marked by contradictions on both sides: the Serbs wished to live together in a «Greater Serbia» yet denied the legitimacy of the Albanian wish to live in a «Greater Albania»; the Albanians described as democratic their aspiration to live together in «Greater Albania» but as Fascist and exclusive the Serbian desire to live together in «Greater Serbia». Both sides advanced arguments to suit the needs of the moment.
71. Dialogue between the two sides was vital but would not be easy to achieve. There were thought to be contacts. Dr Rugova wanted internationally mediated talks so as to prevent a further deterioration of the situation. The role of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) could be important in this connection. The Serbs wanted to avoid international mediation at all costs, seeing the problem as purely internal. A new Serb initiative had just been announced by the Serbian Prime Minister, to the effect that his Government was preparing a bill incorporating a provisional legal statute reinstating autonomous institutions in Kosovo. Once the Kosovo Albanians stopped their boycott of the Serbian Parliament, they could take part in the framing of a definitive autonomous statute. Until the Albanians were ready to take part in the legitimate institutions of the country, however, there could be no dialogue.
72. This stalemate could not last forever, and there were signs of impatience and division in the Albanian leadership. Nevertheless, Dr Rugova maintained his Ghandi-like stance, reiterating his vision of Kosovo as an independent and neutral state, open to Albania as to Serbia, set in the framework of Albanian, Balkan and European integration. However, it was questionable whether the international community, despite its moral support for the Kosovo Albanians and its condemnation of the violations of their human rights, would endorse this kind of solution after its experience with Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was more likely to seek a solution on the basis of greater autonomy and protection of minority rights within existing frontiers.
73. The general atmosphere in Kosovo was colonial. The Serbs in authority did not speak Albanian. There were no Albanian police. Albanians had been dismissed from public-sector jobs. The parallel system of education and health care run by the Kosovo Albanians depended on financing by emigrants, although because of sanctions they could not send remittances through official channels. There were no independent media so the Kosovo Albanians depended on broadcasts from Albania. Hence the importance of responsible broadcasting from Tirana. As for demographics, it had been said that if the current birth-rate among Kosovo Albanians were maintained, by the year 2010 the population of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would be 52% Albanian. Regarding the Kosovo Albanian refugees and asylum-seekers in western European countries, they were unlikely to be willing to return unless an amnesty law was first passed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
6.2. Meeting with representatives of humanitarian organisations and the European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM)
— Mr Josué Anselmo, Information Delegate, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
— Mr Stein Brauten, Chief of Mission, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
— Mr Bruno Leclerq, European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO)
— Mr Adelmo Risi Valdettaro, Assistant Chief of Mission, Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
— Mr Peter Summerscale, European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM)
— Professor Dejan Janča, Chairman, Advisory Council, The Humanitarian Law
Center, Humanitarian Law Fund
74. Not only were the human rights of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo being abused, but their basic needs were not being met. 155 000 families could be described as vulnerable and in need of humanitarian assistance. There were also some 4000 refugees in Kosovo, mainly from Bosnia-Herzegovina, about two-thirds of whom received assistance from ECHO. There was a UNHCR office in Priština, although the need for it was questioned by the Serb authorities. The official Serb-run Red Cross Society was paralleled by an unrecognised Albanian Red Cross Society.
75. The latest report on Kosovo prepared by the independent Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Centre24 described segregation and discrimination in Kosovo's schools, expulsions from institutions and homes, police brutality including torture, beatings, degrading treatment and harrassment, illegal detentions, arbitrary searches, and political trials, all directed at ethnic Albanians.
76. The ICRC had been visiting detainees accused of security offences, notably in Kosovo, since 1990. The ICRC had been authorised to open an office in Priština (Kosovo) in December 1992. While it was possible to visit those serving prisoners, access to those held for interrogation was denied. For example ICRC had only the previous week been allowed to visit the former Kosovo Albanian policemen arrested in November 1994 and now on trial. It was during interrogation that human rights abuses were most likely. Clearly abuses had occurred. There would be no solution to the problem of Kosovo unless the human rights violations were stopped.
77. The demographic pressure in Kosovo was such that several hundred Albanians left every week destined especially for Germany via the ports of Bar (Montenegro) and Bari (Italy). The Serb policy of settling refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina in Kosovo was not very successful because they did not want to go there to join a five percent minority in a hostile environment, even with financial, employment and housing incentives. As for the Kosovo Albanian asylum-seekers abroad, every country must examine each case individually, and bear responsibility for what happened if they were returned. Some countries, despite their concern about human rights, had returned rejected asylum-seekers via third countries.
78. Attention was drawn to the statement made in November 1993 by Dr Momčilo Grubac and Dr Tibor Várady, respectively Minister of Human Rights and Minority Rights and Minister of Justice of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the Government of Mr Milan Panić concerning the legal position of citizens of the former Yugoslavia who had left the country to avoid participation in armed conflict. Their conclusion was that such people remained «in serious peril», risking a possible maximum penalty of ten years in prison, or twenty years if the act was committed during the period of «immediate danger of war» (i.e. 18 October 1991 to 22 May 1992, although the authors challenged the constitutionality of this declaration by a rump Federal Presidency consisting of only four out of eight members). Thousands had been prosecuted for these offences, and further thousands would probably be prosecuted in the future. Nobody would be safe until the adoption of an amnesty law, as proposed by Professor Várady as Minister of Justice in July 1992 and forwarded to the Federal Parliament, which had taken no action.
6.3. Meeting with a delegation of the Federal Parliament
— Dr Borisav Jović (Socialist Party of Serbia), Chairman, Committee for Foreign Political and Economic Relations, Chamber of Citizens
— Mr Milan Komnenić (Serbian Renewal Party), Member, Committee for Foreign Political and Economic Relations, Chamber of Citizens
— Mr Dušan Maksić, Secretary, Committee for Foreign Political and Economic Relations, Chamber of Citizens
— Mr Milorad Ivanović, Director, Consular Department, Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs
79. My point of departure was that asylum and refugee questions could not be seen in isolation from the political, economic and social context. The fact that some 200 000-400 000 Kosovo Albanians had left their homes to seek asylum abroad must indicate that something was wrong. Could it be that Serbia's suppression in 1989 of the autonomous status enjoyed by Kosovo since 1974 had something to do with it? This was generally seen as a negative development.
80. Mr Jović disagreed. Instead, the exodus could be traced to economic conditions, the break-up of the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia, and incitement to leave by certain European countries. There was a long tradition of economic emigration from Kosovo-Metohija, the least developed region in the Yugoslav Federation. Since the beginning of the 1960s some 500 000-600 000 had left for other parts of Yugoslavia or abroad. Since then, despite regional development aid, annual income per head had fallen from US$ 3000 to US$ 1000, mostly on account of extremely high population growth, but also now because of the war and sanctions. Unemployment had risen steeply.
81. Emigration was also politically motivated: the Kosovo Albanians had fled to avoid the Yugoslav civil war and military service in the Yugoslav Federal Army. A further reason was that some foreign countries had incited the Albanians to leave, with a view to «proving» that their human rights had been violated. But there was no political persecution in Kosovo. Separatist political organisations were free to operate there. Only those who had committed crimes were in jail. The estimated 200 000 Kosovo Albanian asylum-seekers abroad had left voluntarily. They must have been invited otherwise they would not have been admitted.
82. The question now at issue was that of their return, which was strange since they had been invited in the first place. In any case this was an issue to be negotiated bilaterally with the countries involved. It was not acceptable to internationalise it except in order to clarify the situation. It was in any case unheard of that the return of an ethnic group should be the subject of international discussions. Many of the Albanian asylum-seekers had Yugoslav passports but came from Macedonia or Albania. Many had false passports. Moreover, if they all returned at once this would create economic difficulties for their already suffering families. It must be remembered too that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia gave protection and assistance to over 500 000 refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina without foreign help. The key was the lifting of sanctions in order to stimulate employment and the considerable productive capacity of Kosovo.
83. In response to my question as to how many ethnic Albanians sat in the Federal Parliament, Mr Jović said that the Kosovo Albanian separatist parties had refused to take part in the elections since 1989 and prevented the electorate from doing so. They boycotted the state institutions. Nevertheless there were perhaps some 10-15 ethnic Albanian members of the 139-seat Federal Parliament and 20-30 in the 250-seat National Assembly of the Serb Republic. They were mostly members of the Socialist Party of Serbia.
84. To understand the boycott and the constitutional changes which had occasioned it, according to Mr Jović, it was necessary to realise that before 1989 the Albanian population of Kosovo had abused the human rights of the Serb population, putting pressure on them to leave. This had resulted in a large-scale exodus, especially during the 1980s. The Albanians had burned Serbs' homes and crops, taken over their agricultural land, raped Serb girls and nuns, damaged monuments and desecrated tombs, harassed families, broken windows and slashed tyres. The Serbs had had no recourse because the autonomous status of the province under the 1974 Federal Constitution had given the Albanians control over the judiciary, police, etc. The courts had often found against the Serbs. All this had caused resentment throughout Serbia. The new Federal and Serb constitutions had allowed for the re-establishment of Serb control, leaving the Albanians with cultural autonomy. But even under the 1974 Constitution the Albanians had been dissatisfied, organising insurrection in support of their claim to their own republic and the right to secede. They had long aspired to an ethnically pure state, and did not want to live in equality with others. Co-existence was the main problem: the Serbs had also lived there for a long time and considered Kosovo to be the cradle of their civilisation. If Europe supported the Albanians in their secessionist movement there would be a major war.
85. According to Mr Jović, the reason why the Albanians did not exercise their political, social, economic and cultural rights was because they were prevented from doing so by their separatist leaders. For example they had a right to free education in their own language but because diplomas were issued in the name of the Republic of Serbia they refused to take part. Albanian workers had been told to boycott their employers, so naturally they had lost their jobs.
86. Mr Komnenić said that the question of Kosovo was one upon which government and opposition parties agreed. The province was characterised by a demographic explosion. Albanian families had 10-15 children. Many were now of an age to do military service and to work. But they ignored their call-up papers and left to work abroad. Their remittances financed the separatist movement. The tribal nature of Albanian society and open borders made it difficult to determine whether they originated in Kosovo, Macedonia, or Albania. They dealt on the black market, trafficked in drugs and ran clandestine migration networks. The only solution was for the Kosovo Albanians to re-join the country's political, cultural, social and economic system and renounce separatism.
87. Mr Jović agreed, adding that they would win a majority in almost every political constituency and could then make their claims legitimately from within the established institutions. All disputed questions could then be resolved in the same way as for other minorities. The deadlock was of Albanian, not Serb, making. It was out of the question to talk to them as to a people from another country. They were Yugoslav citizens. Thus, in response to my suggestions, the situation could not be compared to the Israeli-Palestinian case. Nor could it be compared to South Africa, since Apartheid had institutionalised and legalised discrimination.
88. Europe was also to blame, in having hastened the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. At first the European Community had offered its good offices but it had soon become clear what this meant. Their first proposal at The Hague Conference in Autumn 1991 had been to make six countries out of the six republics. A proposed annexe, applying to Kosovo, had stipulated that even smaller units would be possible.25 When Serbia and Montenegro had expressed the wish to stay together they were punished with sanctions. Hence the lack of trust now. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not want to repeat the experience over Kosovo.
89. The solution lay in respect for minority rights, which Europe could then monitor. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia accepted all European norms for the protection of minorities, but these did not include the right to secede. Although there could be no internationalisation of the problem, the Council of Europe might propose that co-operation and dialogue between the parties be conducted on this basis.
6.4. Meeting with Mr Slobodan Jovanović, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia
90. Mr Jovanović outlined the political configuration of the Assembly, the majority being made up of 123 members of the Socialist Party of Serbia and 7 members of the New Democracy Party. Besides the main opposition parties (Serbian Renewal, Serbian Radical Party) there were small minority parties including the Hungarians of Vojvodina (5 members) and the Albanian Democratic Party (2 members). The latter represented only Albanians in Serbia outside Kosovo.
91. The Assembly had voted in favour of the peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina, thus demonstrating that Serbia was not interested in the other Serb areas of former Yugoslavia. The Socialist-led government believed in negotiations on the basis of this plan to defend the rights of all Serbs as well as those of Croats and Muslims. However, there was strong pressure from the radical opposition, which accused the government of selling out Serbian interests to the United Nations and the European Union. They considered that the Bosnian Serbs should keep the 70% of Bosnia-Herzegovina they currently held, and that these and the Krajina Serbs should unite with Serbia. The radical opposition could be undermined if the present government were able to show that its peace efforts had been rewarded by the lifting of sanctions.
92. Mr Jovanović's position on Kosovo was indistinguishable from that of his colleagues in the Federal Parliament. The problem could be resolved through dialogue, provided that all accepted that it was an internal Serbian question and that secession was excluded. The Kosovo Albanians were Yugoslav citizens and enjoyed the same rights as all the others. They refused to take part in political life and organised a parallel society yet all their problems could be discussed in the Assembly, barring the question of frontiers. Serbia was ready to accept all European norms for the protection of minorities. As for the Albanian asylum-seekers, a number did not have Yugoslav citizenship. Many had emigrated for economic reasons, sanctions having affected the whole population.
93. Mr Jovanović was not closed to my suggestion that the Spanish Constitution and the arrangements for regional autonomy for the Basques, Catalans, etc. that derived from it might offer one possible model for discussion. I explained that a majority of Basques had abstained in the vote on the 1978 Constitution but had come to accept it the following year by voting in favour of the Guernica autonomy statute. Would Serbia be willing to go back to the autonomy arrangements for Kosovo under the 1974 Federal Constitution?
94. Mr Jovanović pointed out that both Vojvodina and Kosovo were autonomous provinces of the Republic of Serbia. The only difference was that autonomy worked in the former, which had elected its own parliament and government, but not in the latter. The problem with the 1974 Federal Constitution was that it had undermined Serbian sovereignty in a way which no other republic had to suffer. Serbia could not change its relations with the autonomous provinces without bringing about a change in the Federal Constitution. In the context of the break-up of Yugoslavia, Serbia had had to re-establish its sovereignty by amending its constitution, otherwise neither Kosovo nor Vojvodina would still be part of Serbia. The 1974 Constitution had resulted in discrimination against the Serbs in Kosovo. After the Second World War Serbs had made up half the population in the province, now it was less than 10%. This was partly the result of ethnic cleansing on the part of the Albanians. Moreover, even the 1974 Constitution had not been enough to satisfy the Kosovo Albanians. Even though they had twice acceded to the Presidency of the Federal Council, there had still been secessionist insurrections in the 1980s.
95. I concluded by advancing the analogy of Cyprus, pointing out that the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr Boutros-Ghali, had called for confidence-building measures. Perhaps similar measures — for example in the areas of education, health, police, etc. — could be discussed with the Kosovo Albanian moderates.
6.5. Meeting in the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs
— Mr Radomir Bogdanović, Ambassador, Head of Consular Department
— Mr Zlatan Kikić, Ambassador, Deputy Head of Multilateral Relations Department
— Mr Dragan Ristić, Counsellor, Head of OSCE and Council of Europe Desk
— Mr Dejan Hinić, First Secretary
96. Mr Bogdanović introduced himself as the leader of the Yugoslav delegation involved in negotiations with Germany, Sweden and Switzerland over the return of rejected asylum-seekers. His impression was that these countries were seeking a pragmatic, rapid solution for their return. To obtain refugee status under the 1951 Convention, a well-founded fear of persecution had to be demonstrated. Only 5% of asylum-seekers from Kosovo were accepted, compared with 7% from other countries. The remaining 95% were rejected, with the argument that they were economic migrants in no danger of persecution if returned. Mr Bogdanović cited the example, and gave me a copy, of the judgement of the Braunschweig Administrative Court pronounced on 7 March 1995 (reference 7 A 7012/95) rejecting the appeal of a family of Kosovo Albanian asylum-seekers threatened with expulsion. This family had claimed that as Albanians from Kosovo they were subject to collective persecution, and the judge had rejected this claim on the reassuring evidence of German Foreign Office reports and the testimony before the Munich Administrative Court of an Austrian member of the CSCE long-term observer mission.
97. Mr Bogdanović admitted there were problems in Kosovo but these were not human rights problems which would justify seeking asylum abroad. He rehearsed the by now familiar complaints against the Albanians who refused to exercise their political, economic, social and cultural rights, organised parallel institutions and aimed at secession and eventual unification with Albania. There were no problems with other minorities in Yugoslavia. He referred to discussions that had been held between the two sides in the framework of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia in Geneva.26
98. There were two main reasons for the massive departures from Kosovo to Western Europe. First, many had been manipulated into seeking asylum abroad by those who sought to demonstrate non-respect for human rights in Kosovo and a general danger to the population, hoping thereby to internationalise the question of Kosovo. The second reason was the fact that Kosovo was the least developed region in the former and present Yugoslavia. This had resulted in a large outflow of migrant and seasonal workers, not only to the rest of Yugoslavia but also to Germany, Switzerland, France, Australia, the Benelux and Scandinavia.
99. According to Mr Bogdanović, Germany alone wanted to return 120 000 people, claiming that they were Yugoslav citizens. 100 000 of these were rejected asylum-seekers, 99% of them from Kosovo. The remaining 20 000 were Serbs and Montenegrins who had fled Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia because of the war, with old Yugoslav passports bearing the «B-H» or «C» registration signs whose validity had expired when Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia had been recognised as independent states. Not wishing to carry the new passports of these states, and as they had not been given refugee or temporary protected status in Germany, they had been issued new Yugoslav passports as a humanitarian measure. Now this was being used as a pretext to return them to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was not at war, as Yugoslav citizens. In fact they should be given refuge until they could return home to Bosnia-Herzegovina or Croatia when the crisis was over. Negotiations being conducted with Germany, Sweden and Switzerland were therefore restricted to the rejected asylum-seekers from the present Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: 100 000 from Germany, fewer from the other two countries.
100. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as successor state to the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia, signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees, had never contested its international obligation to accept its citizens back. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was ready to sign agreements with the governments of the states concerned for the return of its citizens on the same or a similar basis as they had signed with other countries such as Viet Nam, Sri Lanka, Romania, Bulgaria, etc. This would imply recognition. Sanctions were also a difficulty, as was the question of who was a genuine citizen. It was not enough to hold an old Yugoslav passport. Only those from Serbia or Montenegro could qualify, and not those from the newly recognised states such as Macedonia. A further problem was to identify those who were carrying false or stolen passports, as many Albanians from Albania did, for example, in seeking to obtain refugee status in Western Europe. (Mr Bogdanović said he had just received a telex from the Consulate General in London reporting that an intermediary was seeking to buy 100-150 passports, even false passports, for Albanians in Britain.) His authorities undertook to verify the citizenship of the potential returnees objectively and rapidly.
101. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that such people might also wish to resettle in third countries, which was an option under the Geneva Convention. Moreover, Council of Europe principles against the massive expulsion of aliens must be respected. The Federal authorities preferred a gradual return, with the application of quotas. For the question arose where all these returnees were to settle. The country was already looking after 500 000 refugees, mostly from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, 90% of whom were in Serbia. If it was agreed that the rejected asylum-seekers had left Kosovo for economic reasons, it was unreasonable to expect an improvement in economic conditions as long as sanctions lasted. Therefore the Western European countries should not insist on returning these people until sanctions had been lifted and new impetus given to the economy. The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly itself had recommended that normal conditions must prevail before rejected asylum-seekers were returned. A further principle endorsed by the Assembly was that of granting aid to countries receiving returning migrants, and this was one of the conditions set by the Federal authorities in their negotiations, although no figures or terms had been specified. The idea would be to foster reintegration through the financing of housing, employment creation, etc. This would help eliminate the causes for their departure, as also recommended by the Assembly. It was not a question of paying a given sum for each returnee — the Federal authorities were not in the business of trafficking persons — but of creating conditions for normal life.
102. The Federal authorities favoured a humanitarian approach, with no forced returns, but of course they would take back all who wished to return. The best solution was for them to be given refugee status and rights. If that was not possible, return was not the only solution. As migrant workers they also had certain rights, as recommended by the United Nations, International Labour Office, OSCE, European Union, Council of Europe, etc.
6.6. Meeting with Mr Aleksa Jokić, Head, «District» («Okrug») of Kosovo, Government of the Republic of Serbia
103. I asked Mr Jokić to explain how the parallel system worked in Kosovo, with no apparent contact between the two sides, and to comment on the human rights situation there.
104. Mr Jokić said that his authorities called it an illegal system, which originated in the Kosovo Albanians' desire to secede. The state would prevent this by all necessary means. If the Albanians were to exercise their political rights they would have 12 seats in the Federal Parliament, 24 in the Serbian Assembly, and 80% of the seats in the Kosovo Assembly. They had a right to free schooling and medical care but preferred to pay for their own. One had to ask why. The Serbian education authorities were ready to recognise the Albanians' school system subject to state approval of the curriculum but certificates would be issued in the name of the Republic of Serbia. The Albanians were allowed to use state school buildings. Albanians avoided the state hospitals even though 70% of the staff were Albanian. Nevertheless Albanian participation had increased recently. For example, 100 000 were employed in the public sector. 200 000 received a regular state pension. In the last year illegal schooling had decreased by 50%. There had been greater attendance at state hospitals. This was partly due to Serbian policy to stimulate the economy. The Trepča mines had been started up again with 15 000 staff. But Kosovo's economy was still one of the least developed, not least because of sanctions, and people sometimes sold everything and left to seek asylum abroad. The Albanians had big families so this was understandable.
105. As for the human rights situation there was no political persecution. The law was the same for Albanians and Serbs. Of course Kosovo Albanians were often involved in illegal black market operations and were punished accordingly. Alleged violations of human rights were being used to internationalise the question of Kosovo.
106. I asked Mr Jokić how this unprecedented division between Albanians and Serbs had come about, with its terrible potential for wider conflict, and whether he saw any way to improve the atmosphere, perhaps through negotiation and confidence-building measures, in a situation where the police were seen as one-sided.
107. Mr Jokić said he would like to hope there would be no explosion. The Kosovo Albanians had invested heavily in the district. Before the 1989 constitutional change the Serb and Montenegrin population of Kosovo had suffered one of the biggest episodes of ethnic cleansing this century, 500 000 to 600 000 of them having been driven out. There were documented cases of destruction of property, rape, etc. The Serbs had become a minority. This had taken place under a system of far-reaching autonomy in which Kosovo had enjoyed virtually all the attributes of a republic. In 1989 the Kosovo Assembly had voted to change the constitution in favour of closer union with Serbia. Now the desire for secession was fomented from outside, by the so-called government in exile. Many Kosovo Albanians wished to exercise their rights — to take part in local government or to become policemen or judges, for example —- but they were pressured not to do so.
108. When asked to explain the purpose of the Progamme for the Establishment of Peace, Freedom, Equality, Democracy and Prosperity in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo adopted by the Serbian Assembly on 30 March 1990 (see above, paragraph 19), Mr Jokić said that this was an ambitious programme to permit the Serbs and Montenegrins who had been driven out before 1989 to return. This did not necessarily mean all the 500 000-600 000 but all those who wished to return. Many still owned land to which they wished to return because of the economic crisis. Unfortunately because of sanctions the programme was under-financed and was falling short of its objectives.
109. Mr Jokić undertook to provide documentation on human rights abuses against Serbs and on the demographic development of Kosovo over the last 30-40 years, but this has not been received.
6.7. Meeting at the Federal Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs
— Mrs Mirjana Dragaš, Assistant to the Minister
— Mr Stevo Novović, Head, Fund for the Development of Employment
— Mr Miodrag Rakić, Adviser, Social Security Department
— Mr Slobodan Donovski, Adviser, International Labour Co-operation
— Mr Ivan Stojanović, Adviser, Labour and Employment
110. Mrs Dragaš said that the country's economic and social problems stemmed from the war, the secession of the four republics, and sanctions. There were 600 000-700 000 refugees of all nationalities to care for. Production was down by 40%. There were 700 000-900 000 unemployed, many of whom had left to work abroad. Unemployment affected all citizens equally. Federal policy was to provide social benefits and health care indiscriminately to all, including the minorities in Kosovo and Vojvodina.
111. In response to my questions whether unemployment was higher in Kosovo than elsewhere because of its relative under-development, and whether there was a difference there in the unemployment figures for Serbs and Albanians, Mr Stojanović explained that Kosovo had always benefitted from special economic development and employment programmes. It had, however, suffered more from sanctions than other regions. For example employment in the Trepča mines had decreased by 70%. Employment in the state sector had fallen from 240 000 to 130 000. Although employment statistics were not broken down according to nation or nationality, it was estimated that the majority of these were of Albanian origin. There was not a very precise overall employment picture because the private sector (90% Albanian) was extensive and the black economy was estimated to generate 50% of income. It must also be remembered that the Albanians had boycotted the 1991 census. All those who lost their jobs were entitled to unemployment benefit. Many of the unemployed did not register for work, partly because they considered their chances of finding a job very low at a time of crisis, partly because the Albanians did not recognise the state institutions. Thus currently only 80 000 job seekers were registered.
112. Mr Novović explained that aid for the development of the poorer southern regions of Yugoslavia was channeled through two funds, the one financed domestically (previously through contributions from the federated republics), the other receiving funds from abroad, including from the Social Development Fund of the Council of Europe, Deutsche Bank and FMO (Netherlands). Kosovo had received 50% of the proceeds of these funds. The domestic fund had been used to build factories and workshops, many of which were closed because of the crisis. The foreign currency from the other fund had been used to import production materials. Yugoslavia had received four loans from the Social Development Fund. A fifth had been frozen as a result of the sanctions. Such loans had created employment. Mr Novović had recently been in Paris for talks with the senior officials of the Social Development Fund. He hoped that when co-operation resumed funding would be available for the resettlement and reintegration of Yugoslavs from abroad.
113. Mrs Dragaš drew attention to the fact that diseases normally associated with poverty, such as tuberculosis, which had been eradicated, were now reappearing because of the lack of vaccines and other medical supplies. Sanctions must be lifted and normal economic conditions prevail before asylum-seekers could return.
7. Rapporteur's visit to Priština, 8-9 June 1995
7.1. Meeting with representatives of the «parallel» Parliament of Kosovo
— Dr Fehmi Agani, Vice-Chairman, Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)
— Mr Hydajet Hyseni, Vice-Chairman, LDK
— Dr Hivzi Islami, Chairman, Peasant Party (KPP)
— Mr Bajram Kosumi, Chairman, Parliamentary Party (PPK)
— Mr Mark Krasniqi, Chairman, Christian Democratic Party (CHDP)
114. Mr Agani, who acted as main spokesman for the delegation, said that the Kosovo situation was dangerous and without prospects for a settlement. The whole problem stemmed from Serbia's annexation of Kosovo in 1989. In judging the Albanians' reaction it must be borne in mind that they made up over 90% of the population; that Kosovo had a centuries-old tradition of self-government; and that during the Second World War Kosovo had not been part of Yugoslavia at all. In 1945 Kosovo had been forcibly reintegrated into Yugoslavia. The autonomous powers it had accumulated until 1989 had been granted by Federal authority, not Serbian. Serbia had therefore no right to withdraw them. The 1974 Federal Constitution had given Kosovo the status of a republic in all but name, with its own constitution, president, parliament, government and judiciary. After 1989, Serbia had brought all Kosovo institutions under its control and expelled Albanians from public life. The state exercised systematic repression and terror. The purpose was to change the ethnic structure of Kosovo. This was clear from the Programme for the Establishment of Peace, Freedom, Equality, Democracy and Prosperity in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo adopted by the Serbian Assembly in 1990 (see above, paragraphs 19 and 108).
115. In summer 1991 over 5000 secondary school teachers had been dismissed, likewise 840 univerity teachers in autumn of the same year. This had left 350 000 Albanian school-children and 20 000 university students without education except what could be organised independently, in private homes. Since January 1991 more than 19 000 teachers of all levels had not been paid. University premises were now reserved for Serbs; all secondary schools were half empty and could not be used by Albanians. Albanians were allowed to use primary school premises but the teachers were not paid. The Serb authorities used the pretext that the Albanians refused to accept a curriculum determined in Belgrade.
116. A similar situation prevailed in the fields of culture, media, sport, health, etc. The Institute of Albanology had been closed. The only television available was Serbian, although the Albanians paid for it. They had also borne the expense of building the sports stadium, which was now reserved for Serbian teams. Albanian doctors had been fired from hospitals, and now organised a minimum parallel health service.
117. In 1991 the Albanians had organised a referendum in which some 87% of registered voters (ie virtually 100% of the Albanian voters — the Serbs did not take part) opted for independence. In 1992 parliamentary and presidential elections had been held. The referendum and the elections had been monitored by international observers, including members of the Belgian Parliament. The Kosovo Parliament had not yet met. The Serbian Minister had threatened members with 15-year jail sentences if they did so. In the presidential elections Dr Ibrahim Rugova had been returned by an overwhelming majority.
118. All the Albanian parties wanted a peaceful solution, but there were no results yet. Discussions on limited issues such as access to education had been held on 12 occasions in the framework of the Geneva International Conference on the former Yugoslavia. But the Serbs had refused to attend the last meeting. In any case the Geneva Conference, which had been designed to resolve the problems raised by the London Conference on the former Yugoslavia held in July 1992, had no power to impose a solution. Once dialogue started on such issues, it could broaden out to wider issues. The point of departure was the 1974 Federal Constitution. Much faith was put in the possibility of support from the international organisations towards Kosovo's goal of independence, in accordance with the United Nations declaration of 1990 asserting the right of those peoples wishing to do so to claim independence and to expect assistance from others towards that goal. Mr Ramallo of Unesco had been in Priština promising to seek a solution to the education problem but after his visit to Belgrade nothing had come of his initiative.
119. The Serb position was that Kosovo was a purely internal question. Serbian repression, which had intensified, could not be tolerated. There was no reason why Kosovo should not be independent if 90% of its two million strong population wished it, the more so in the context of the break-up of Yugoslavia. Even Slav peoples had not wished to remain in the Federation. Why should the Albanians, who were not Slavs? Macedonia had achieved independence, Montenegro had the status of a republic. Both had smaller populations than Kosovo. Republican status on the same level as Montenegro was not acceptable in the present context, since its real autonomy was now more limited than that enjoyed by Kosovo under the 1974 Federal Constitution. Serbia wanted a Greater Serbia and to dominate other peoples. Yet the international community was making concessions to its leader, Slobodan Milošević, turning this proclaimed war criminal into a «man of peace». This was madness. According to Serbian demographic calculations, the Albanians would make up the largest population group in the Balkans by the year 2035. Freedom in an ethnically compact territory must come otherwise there would be no lasting peace. The Serbs argued that Kosovo was the «cradle of their civilisation». All these historical arguments were sterile but in any case favoured the Albanians, who had a much older claim as the descendents of the Illyrians. The Serbs also argued that their religious heritage was anchored in Kosovo, which could not be left at the mercy of «fundamentalist Muslims». But under Ottoman rule the Albanians had kept up the Orthodox churches in a spirit of tolerance. In any case the Albanians' claim to be European was not based on their religious faith, be it Muslim, Roman Catholic or Orthodox, but on their affinity with western civilisation. Serbia had taken Kosovo by force with the help of the international community in 1913 and 1919. The Serbs had never known democracy. Their concept of dialogue was diktat. They said they respected minority rights, but the Albanians were a majority, not a minority. The Albanians had nothing in common with the Serbs. Kosovo within Serbia represented a danger for Europe. The Albanians did not ask for a change of frontiers or a Greater Albania. Although according to moral law such a Balkan state would be normal, it would be an unrealistic demand. For the moment they were asking only what the people had asked for by plebiscite: an independent, demilitarised republic with open borders towards Albania and Serbia, with equal rights for all its inhabitants.
120. As for the Albanians in Macedonia, according to my interlocutors, their demands were increasing in the same measure as discrimination against them, for example in the matter of the Albanian University at Tetovo. The Macedonians appeared to be following the Serb example. Since the Albanians from Macedonia could no longer study in Pristina it was natural that they should want to establish their own university. They should have equality with the Macedonian population. As for relations between the Kosovo Albanians and Albania, these were good, in particular at the level of political parties. Unfortunately it was difficult to visit the country because the Serb authorities imposed an exit visa requirement.
121. All this, and the poverty to which the Serbs had brought the region, explained why so many had gone abroad. Moreover, young Albanians no more wanted to serve in the Yugoslav Federal Army than the army wanted them to bear arms. They were sent call-up papers simply in order to get them to leave, which is what they did. It was extraordinary that Yugoslavia, which had expelled people, was now asking to be paid to allow them to return. The only ones who would not be allowed to return were the Albanians, whom the Serbs considered as foreigners.
7.2. Meeting with the Rector of the «parallel» University of Priština, Prof. Dr Ejup Statovci, and the President of the Academy of Arts and Sciences, Dr Idriz Ajeti
122. This meeting was held in the Rector's office in a private home on the outskirts of Priština. Since 1991, when some 1000 Albanian university teachers and 25 000 students had been forcibly expelled from the official university buildings following suppression of Kosovo's autonomy by Serbian tanks, the Rector had been forced to move premises five times. But the faculty, students and the Albanian population were determined to keep the university open. They had opened up their homes free for the purpose of education. For the first year teachers had worked without salaries. Now there was some financial help out of solidarity. This was surely a situation unique in the annals of university history.
123. In the last four years, in very difficult circumstances, some 4000 students had graduated or earned doctorates. This had also been made possible through cooperation with foreign universities. The university, which had 13 faculties in all fields and 7 specialised professional schools, had published its own statutes and was establishing new degree regulations that would be of a high standard to ensure international acceptance. This was important because the students must be able to transfer to other European universities, as many had done with success.
124. One problem was maintaining a high standard in the scientific subjects, especially medicine. Although a few laboratories had been set up, some computer equipment was available, and private clinics offered limited scope for medical training, medical students had to go to Tirana for anatomy work because they no longer had access to Kosovo hospitals. This made them liable to harassment and confiscation of their passport. The authorities had confiscated the Rector's passport after he had taken part in the Conference of University Rectors at Salonika. Hence he could not accept invitations which he had received from the Universities of Valladolid, Glasgow and the London City University. At his request, I undertook to intercede on his behalf with the Serbian government representative I was to meet the next day.
125. The Rector had been imprisoned twice and, like many teachers and students, had been taken in by the police for «informative talks». As a Professor of Civil Law, he could say for certain that the human and civil rights and freedoms of the Albanian population were being violated. The Serbian position was that a minority could not have its own university. They wanted to go back to the 1950s when the Albanians had had a right only to elementary education.
126. Although some Albanians had stayed on in the official university, there was no teaching in Albanian. In 1994 the official university had sought entry applications from Albanian students and promised to organise courses in Albanian. However, no candidates had been accepted. One Serb taught (in Serbo-Croat) in the parallel university, in solidarity with the Albanians and under the same conditions. That was exceptional. Most Serb colleagues had been vociferous in their support for the expulsion of the Albanians. Before 1991 the university had worked in both Serbian and Albanian languages. All Albanians spoke Serbo-Croat, but the reverse did not hold. In meetings attended by twenty Albanians and one Serb discussion would always be in Serbo-Croat out of consideration for the latter.
127. Dr Ajeti said that the Academy of Arts and Sciences had been founded in 1975 but had been shut down by the Serbian Parliament (Law of 29.7.1992), together with that of Vojvodina, on the ground that Serbia should have only one such institution. In reality they wanted to extinguish all signs of Albanian culture, witness their insistence on use of the cyrillic script for official communications. Having been expelled from its premises, the Academy had since re-opened in another building, without its former Serbian academicians, who had left. Its aim was to preserve and develop the Albanian cultural heritage. It comprised four sections — social sciences; natural sciences; language and literature; and arts — as well as an Albanian Studies Institute. Relations were maintained with the academies of some former Yugoslav republics (especially Croatia and Slovenia) and with that of Albania.
7.3. Meeting with Mr François Stamm, ICRC Representative in Priština
128. The main problem for ICRC was that its representatives had not been allowed immediate access to detainees, despite a promise by Mr Milošević to Mr Sommaruga, President of ICRC. For example visits to the 160 former Albanian policemen now being tried for endangering the integrity of Yugoslavia had been allowed only seven months after their arrest in October 1994. Thus there were no means of protecting prisoners from alleged systematic ill-treatment by the security services designed to obtain written «confessions». The lawyers representing these prisoners spoke openly about intimidation and repression. Prison conditions as such were not worrying. ICRC representatives had not visited deserters in prison.
7.4. Other information gathered from various contacts in Priština with representatives of international organisations
129. Despite a massive police presence in Kosovo and constant pressure, with frequent road checks, detentions for the purpose of «informative talks» and arrests, the Albanian population exhibited patience and calm. The Serb attitude towards them could only be described as racist. There were no demonstrations, and the police had found no evidence of terrorism or stocks of arms, which was one of their main concerns. Hence the frequent house searches, which legally required a search warrant and two civilian witnesses.
130. The Albanian position was that the suppression of the autonomous status of Kosovo was illegal. They boycotted state institutions because they considered the conditions attaching to their participation unacceptable. The parallel economy, based on small businesses, worked relatively well and was even somewhat envied by the Serbs. Some of the latter had sold their homes to Albanians at good prices in hard currency but then complained that the Albanians were «taking over». The Albanians tended to go to parallel clinics or to the Mother Teresa Institute for minor ailments but had to go to hospitals for more serious health problems. There was a certain pressure exercised on parents not to send their children to state schools. Parallel schooling could work at primary level but could not continue indefinitely at higher levels. The parallel system represented a certain financial saving to the Serb authorities.
131. The Albanians realised they enjoyed no international support and did not want another Chechnya, but they felt that their choice of passive resistance was not being rewarded. Mr Rugova was very popular but the fear was that he might be overtaken by more radical elements. There had been suggestions among Western countries that sanctions should not be lifted until an acceptable solution to the Kosovo question had been found. Some form of advanced autonomy would probably be acceptable to the Albanians, but this could work only in a truly democratic state. The problem was that Serbs regarded Kosovo as part of an ethnically pure «Greater Serbia» in accordance with the nineteenth century nationalist blueprint, «Načertanije».27 Nevertheless, the presence and influence of the infamous «Arkan» (Željko Raznjatović) and his para-military troops had declined of late. Mr Milošević might well be trying to bring the situation under more moderate control.
132. There were an estimated 500 000 Albanians from Kosovo in the Western European countries, mainly for economic reasons. There were no obstacles to their return as long as they were not linked to political or criminal problems. Despite the fact that there were eight million Serbs and two million Albanians, if all Kosovo Albanians accepted to do their military service, they would constitute 30% of the Federal Army because of their relative youth. A recent article in the local Albanian newspaper had described call-up papers as «exile papers».
133. Religion was not an important factor in the conflict, in so far as there were few practising Muslims, let alone fundamentalists. Originally the population had been Roman Catholic. Under the Ottoman empire many had avoided both military service and taxes by adopting a Christian first name and a Muslim surname.
7.5. Meeting with Mr Miloš Nešović, Deputy Head, «District» («Okrug») of Kosovo, Government of the Republic of Serbia, and Mr Boško Drobnjak, Secretary, Kosovo Secretariat for Information
134. Mr Nešović outlined the administrative and demographic structure of Kosovo. As for the asylum-seekers, they were part of a larger economic migration movement to Western Europe, the scale of which had increased after 1990 and especially since the imposition of sanctions. Any large-scale return would be an additional burden on the economy, which was working at 30% of capacity in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and only 10% in Kosovo. Of course Serbia and the Federal Republic would take responsibility for their own citizens but they must have valid documents. Many Albanians had false documents. It would be difficult to reintegrate them because they had left their jobs and sold their homes. They would be treated equally with other citizens in regard to employment, housing, etc. Any who had broken the law must face the consequences.
135. Mr Drobnjak said that there were four categories of migrants abroad: (i) citizens who had obtained permission from the present authorities to work abroad. This was the biggest category. There was no impediment to their return except that it would be difficult for them to find a job; (ii) those with the right documents who left to seek work abroad but, unsuccessful, had asked for asylum on the ground that they had been persecuted. But it was not logical that people claiming to be persecuted would have the right documents to exit the country. The problem of their return could have been dealt with more easily some years ago when the Yugoslav authorities had tried to convince Germany, for example, that there had been no such persecution. Their situation was being used by Mr Rugova, leader of the Kosovo Albanians, as a propaganda weapon to satanise the Serbs; (iii) those who had obtained false passports. These would have to be examined case by case; (iv) those who had left for Croatia or Bosnia-Herzegovina to fight with the Croats, and then left for Western European countries. Although it was not possible to be precise, they probably numbered several thousand. There was no question of an amnesty for those who had broken the law.
136. I pointed out that there might be other considerations than economic, notably the ending of the autonomous status of Kosovo and Vojvodina in 1989. What was their opinion of the parallel system that operated in Kosovo?
137. Mr Nešović said that it was natural to wish to speak to both sides. Normally the truth would be somewhere in the middle. However, according to him, in this case the truth was what he and Mr Drobnjak said it was and what I could observe for myself. The autonomy of the provinces had not been suppressed under the new constitutional arrangements of 1990, which had been voted by the Provincial Assembly. It was just that the Albanians did not choose to exercise their autonomy. If they did so they would have a majority in the Provincial Assembly and several seats in the Serbian and Federal Assemblies. They would also run 24 of the 29 municipalities in the province. The 1974 Constitution had given Serbia no real legislative authority in regard to the provinces within its own territory. Serbia would never accept a return to the 1974 Constitution since it was clear thet the Albanians wanted to secede and eventually to unite with Albania. As a minority, the rights of the Albanians were guaranteed in accordance with international standards. State schooling was allowed in Albanian, for example. However, the curriculum had to be approved by the Ministry of Education, which the Albanians did not recognise. Hence the illegal parallel system. The purpose was political. For example when Kosovo Albanian pupils were asked where they lived they answered «Albania». Parents were told that Serbia did not allow education so that private classes had to be organised. But other sectors functioned. For example the Albanians applied for building permission or to open businesses. There were 200 000 pensioners. They made up 60% of employees in the state health sector, and 95% of its patients. Large numbers of Albanians did not support Mr Rugova.
138. Mr Drobnjak asserted that the parallel system did not exist. The only problem was that the Albanians did not accept the elementary school curriculum proposed by Serbia, which made due allowance for the specific cultural needs of national minorities. Serbia had offered to allow the Albanians to draft their own curriculum, subject to approval by the Ministry of Education. This was refused. Albanian children were taught on the basis of text-books imported from Albania. Education had been turned into an arm of politics. This was unacceptable. The Albanians complained of abuse of their rights, but Serbia was a constitutional state that gave equal rights to all citizens without distinction. It also gave specific protection to minorities. The Constitution of the United States of America did not give as much protection, for example to Mexican rights in California. Other minorities in Yugoslavia did not complain. All problems could be solved when Mr Rugova abandoned his idea of secession and independence. The international community could best help by ending its support for this idea.
139. I stressed the importance of dialogue without which nothing could be solved, and promised to send a copy of the Spanish Constitution as an example of an arrangement which had worked in the Spanish context. Confidence-building measures were necessary. To begin the process, and as a measure of good-will, would Mr Nešović be prepared to arrange for Mr Statovci to have his passport back?
140. Mr Nešović replied that there was always good-will from the Serbian side. Mr Statovci should contact him and he did not think there would be a problem.
7.6. Meeting with the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF) and the Kosovo Helsinki Committee (KHC)
— Mr Adem Demaçi, Chairman, CDHRF
— Mr Pajazit Nushi, Vice-Chairman, CDHRF
— Mr Fazli Bulaj, Member, CDHRF
— Mr Sami Kurteshi, Secretary, CDHRF
— Mr Gazmend Pula, Chairman, KHC
— Mr Ramiz Fazliu, Member, KHC
141. Mr Demaçi said that Serb policy in Kosovo, originating in 1878, consisted in expelling non-Serb peoples from territory they had then controlled under the slogan «free Serb lands». This had led to the first Balkan War in 1912, the second in 1913, and the First World War. The Serb state was a military and police state bent on destroying other peoples on its territory. Since 1878 the Albanians had been the main victims of this policy. Only the methods had changed. In 1918 Serbia had played the main role in the creation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, under which Albanians had been expelled from Kosovo. Mr Milošević had resumed this policy.
142. Today the Kosovo Albanians were the most degraded people in Europe. Discrimination was unprecedented. Without wishing to use words such as Fascist or anti-Fascist, it did seem at times that the regime surpassed even Fascism. The situation could not last long. Under Tito the Albanians had had their own schools at all levels. Now the Serb regime offered an eight-year elementary school only. Teachers were not paid. The Albanians had organised parallel secondary and university education which they paid for themselves. Albanian books had been removed from the university and other libraries. The radio and television station had been taken over. The only Albanian newspaper was kept short of paper and could be stopped any day. Some periodicals were struggling to survive. The Albanians had been dismissed from the public health system and the population relied on the Mother Teresa Institute and private clinics. Economic, financial and commercial leaders and some 150 000 workers had been dismissed. As these usually provided subsistence for the whole family and there was no welfare the consequences were dramatic. Some had lost their homes. The Assembly, Government, police, judges, bar and general administration were Serb, except for some token Albanians who remained. It had been made impossible for the Albanians to complain to anyone. The inter-war Čubrilović
Plan to expel the Albanians was being carried out.28 The Serbs continued to round up young men to fight in their imperialist war. According to the western press 340 700 Kosovo Albanians had left to seek asylum abroad up to 1994. Since then the exodus had intensified. The Serbs were making it impossible to live in Kosovo.
143. Mr Pula added that repression had intensified, for example by means of show trials of the Ministers of Defence and of the Interior of the Government of the Republic of Kosovo (GRK), which for political reasons had been held in the Parliament building. The objective was to destroy the will of the Albanian population. The Serb colonisation programme had also been stepped up in the last eighteen months. Serbs from the war zones in Bosnia-Herzegovina were being resettled in Kosovo. Many young Albanians left because they refused to perform military service. Many of those who had served had been killed in obscure circumstances. Albanian leaders had been imprisoned. The Serb authorities were insisting on the use of the cyrillic alphabet. The Albanian population was the second most numerous in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. With the change in the frontiers of the former Yugoslavia, it was natural that Kosovo, as a former federal unit, should seek self-determination.
144. Mr Nushi said that education had been under attack at every level since 1989. There was a totally disproportionate use of school buildings. For example in the town of Janjevo the state school was used by 7 Serb pupils while 4 600 Albanian pupils were educated in private homes. The Albanians' first right was to the use of school buildings and equipment which their taxes had been used to pay for.
145. Mr Balaj, a lawyer, said that since 1989 court cases concerning Albanians were rigged and involved the public expression of opinion. Albanian political circles had expressed the opinion and the demand that Kosovo should be an independent, neutral state following the break-up of the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia. Journalists, human rights and political activists were being tried and sentenced for their opinions. The Albanian police dismissed in 1989-90 had formed their own trade union and were now being tried for belonging to the Ministry of the Interior of the GRK. Neither they nor others had used or advocated the use of arms or violence. Sentences ranged from one to fifteen years. The first six-month sentence had been handed down the day before. Detainees received beatings and were tortured with electric batons and shocks. Families were detained and pressured by such methods to reveal the whereabouts of the wanted family member. Lawyers who requested medical attention for those who needed it were told that the prison doctor would attend to any medical needs. Lawyers were not allowed to see the indictment against their clients until the day of the trial. Since 1988 not a single such case had been reversed on appeal by the Supreme Court of Serbia.
146. I drew the conclusion that repression had worsened after 1989-90, a period which represented a definite break in relations between Serbia and Kosovo. Even though the Tito regime could be characterised as Serb totalitarianism, could it also be described as offering a certain balance? As for discrimination against Albanians, was this directed against them as citizens or as Albanians? Were the human rights of Serbs as well as Albanians violated?
147. The former Yugoslav equilibrium was acknowledged as a balance based on force. The present discrimination and human rights abuses against Albanians targetted Albanians as representing the will of the Albanian people. They were based on racism and nationalism. There was no known case of a Kosovo Serb having died under torture. Many Albanians had.
7.7. Meeting with Dr Ibrahim Rugova, President of the «Republic of Kosovo» and of the Democratic League of Kosovo
148. Dr Rugova confirmed that the 1974 Federal Constitution had given Kosovo the powers of a de facto republic, with a right to veto any measures concerning it proposed by Serbia. The suspension of this status in 1989 had resulted virtually in Serb occupation of Kosovo. The 3 000 Albanian police had been dismissed and replaced by Serb police from outside Kosovo, who usually did a 6-8 month tour of duty. The Federal army was present in force. There had been constant, systematic repression over the past five years. The Serb abrogation of Albanian autonomy and dismissal of Albanians from state institutions had given rise to the parallel system of education, media, sport and health, partly designed to prevent an Albanian exodus, and passive resistance which gave the Albanians a certain moral authority. How long it could last was uncertain, but armed conflict was out of the question, given the balance of power. For two years there had been discussions during twelve meetings on Kosovo in the framework of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia in Geneva. These had centred on education, media and health. But the Serbs had refused to continue any dialogue on such issues as long as the Albanians sought independence. In his view independence could be preceded by an internationally supervised civil administration. Kosovo could be an open, neutral state serving as a bridge or buffer between Serbia and its neighbours to the south. This did not involve unification with Albania but could calm the situation and was in the best interests of the Serbs. It was to be hoped that there would be a change of political climate in Serbia. But the so-called opposition in Belgrade was completely under the influence of the governing Socialist Party of Serbia. The university was dormant. Only certain isolated intellectuals spoke out against the regime. They should be encouraged.
149. The situation of the Albanians in Macedonia, where they made up some 40% of the population,29 had also suffered, according to Dr Rugova. They were not even allowed to speak their own language. They should have their own university in Tetovo since they could no longer use the university in Priština and access to the Macedonian university was limited to about 2%. Their position must be constitutionally protected.
150. It was difficult to be precise about the number of Kosovo Albanians who had sought asylum abroad. Estimates varied between 200 000 and 400 000. Many had left as migrant workers since the 1970s. Since 1991 many draft resisters had left. The Serb authorities were refusing to allow them to return on the grounds that they did not have the right documents but Serbia had not changed its passport. They were simply afraid that a mass return would increase the Albanian population. Meanwhile they were trying to attract Serb settlers. There were 5 000-6 000 refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia in collective housing, including student quarters in Mitrovica. The UNHCR had built refugee housing for Serb refugees in Serbia but these had been settled in Kosovo instead. This was a resumption of the colonisation that had taken place in the inter-war years, mainly by Krajina Serbs. It was difficult to conclude that the Serbs were seeking to reverse the ethnic balance, but the Serbs would probably be happy to make up 15-20% of the population. This was being carried out through a process of «silent ethnic cleansing».
151. As for the Kosovo economy, the private sector was developing rapidly. Land had been privatised. Agriculture was a major asset. Industry and mining were still in the state sector where 150 000 were out of work.
152. Dr Rugova said that drug trafficking was not a speciality of the Kosovo Albanians, although the Serb press published a lot of propaganda on the subject. The parallel education system was financed through a 3% voluntary tax and generous contributions from Kosovo Albanians abroad.
153. As for religion, 10% of the population were Roman Catholics, 8% Serbian Orthodox and the remainder Muslim, but these were largely non-practising. There was a tradition of tolerance among the Albanians.
7.8. Meeting with representatives of the Roman Catholic Church and the «Mother Teresa» Society
— Dr Don Lush Gjiergji, Catholic Bishop of Binçë
— Mr Noe Gjiergji, Vicar General of Pristina
— Mr Jak Mita, Secretary, «Mother Teresa» Society
154. The Roman Catholic Church, which had an extremely long existence in Kosovo, shared the same problems as the population, especially in economic life, education, culture, media, and the consequences of the war. The exodus of youth was a major concern. The Roman Catholic Church aimed to serve all without distinction, to build relationships among the different religious communities, the Islamic being by far the most numerous. Relations with them were excellent. However the Serbian Orthodox Church was not ready to cooperate, at least officially. It was influenced by nationalist politics, and accused the Roman Catholics of not defending the nation. For example Patriarch Pavle would go and bless the place where Serb fighters had fallen in the war and give thanks for their sacrifice. At the time of the break-up of Yugoslavia Mr Milošević had attempted to turn the Roman Catholic Church to his account by encouraging an anti-Islamic, pro-Orthodox stance, but this had been rejected, with the result that the Catholic Church was now vilified and harassed by the Belgrade regime. Police raided churches looking for arms. Permission to buy land for the purpose of building churches was refused. The Roman Catholic Publishing House had been closed. It would be good if international delegations could help promote contacts between the three religious communities.
155. I later had occasion to see a Serbian Orthodox Church being built at a spot on the Priština University grounds which, I was informed, had been set aside for a new faculty building. This was considered by the Albanian population to be a provocation, not least because of the very small number of Orthodox worshippers in the city.
156. The «Mother Teresa» Society was a charitable organisation set up in May 1990 to provide humanitarian aid to those in need. In 1994 relief had been given to 57 353 families. Since the average size of each family was 6,52 this meant a total of some 380 000 people. 35% of these were children below the age of 14, 25% were adolescents from 14 to 22, 25% were parents or the unemployed, and 15% were elderly, invalid or disabled. The numbers had more than doubled since 1991. Total needs were not being met. In 1992 the Society had begun to provide free health care. So far 45 clinics had been set up throughout Kosovo especially in the poorest, most densely populated areas. 175 doctors and 280 nurses gave their services free, and no charge was made for medicaments. In the second half of 1994 the ten clinics in Priština alone had examined or treated an average of 350 patients a day. There was a great need for medicaments, sanitary and hygienic material and medical equipment. The Society relied entirely on voluntary contributions. Donors included humanitarian organisations, workers abroad, and foreign churches. The Society's work was subjected to continual harassment by the authorities. Some clinics had been closed. Its leaders were invited for «informative talks». As far as relief for refugees was concerned, the authorities insisted that international donors work through the Serbian Red Cross, not the Muslim humanitarian organisation Merhemet, which was banned in Kosovo.
7.9. Meeting with representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
— Mr Marc Rapoport, UNHCR
— Mr Kjell Andersen, IFRC
157. Mr Rapoport explained that there were some 3 600 refugees in Kosovo, not all with Geneva Convention status. Besides looking after their needs the Priština office monitored the situation in the province, a task which the authorities considered to be outside the UNHCR's mandate. They wanted to close it. Although human rights abuses were not openly visible, they were nevertheless frequent. Those involved in the parallel system were constantly harassed. House searches for arms were very frequent and tension was high. The positions of the two sides were irreconcilable: one wanted independence and would not be satisfied with a return to the 1974 Constitution, the other refused to consider either option. Recent press articles had suggested that the parallel system was beginning to crumble, with fewer Albanians receiving «alternative» education. This did not mean that more were now attending state institutions, but that perhaps parents and especially the older boys, who knew they would be called up for military service, saw no advantage in following non-accredited studies for which they would not receive a recognised certificate. Primary pupils followed the unofficial curriculum in state buildings but at separate times from those following the official curriculum. The problem was that in the past, Albanian pupils learned Serbo-Croat as well as their mother-tongue, but this was no longer the case. The gap was therefore widening.
158. Following the voluntary and compulsory repatriation of an estimated 27 000 Albanian asylum-seekers from Kosovo by Sweden in 1994, via Skopje, Bulgaria or Hungary, some 100 of them had found their way to the UNHCR office hoping to get back to Sweden. Many had reported having had money or possessions stolen at the frontier or their passports arbitrarily confiscated for up to a year. Three had reported having their homes searched for arms since their return, in one case five times. Others reported harassment but no especially repressive measures. None had reported being tortured or imprisoned. Some individuals were being returned by Germany, but not on a large scale because the Yugoslav authorities were trying to negotiate financial compensation. In fact UNHCR had no mandate to look after returned asylum-seekers, or to monitor their situation. In general, it could be said that repression in the province had intensified after the departure of the CSCE observers in July 1993. There was a definite need for international observers.
159. Mr Andersen explained that the mandate of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies was to stock and distribute humanitarian aid on behalf of UNHCR. The official Kosovo Red Cross Society, run by Serbs, assisted a population of 40 000 consisting of Serbs and Albanians. There was also a parallel «Kosova Red Cross Society», but IFRC rules did not allow recognition of two Red Cross Societies operating simultaneously. Much time and effort was spent trying to get them to co-operate towards a common goal. However, the work of the Red Cross was on a lesser scale than the impressive achievements of the Mother Teresa Society.
7.10. Meeting with Mr Skënder Kastrati, member of the Democratic League of Kosovo
160. Mr Kastrati, a member of the Kosovo Assembly and its Committee set up at the beginning of 1994 to examine migration and refugee issues, had spent thirteen years in prison following his participation in the 1968 student demonstrations. In contemporary history Serb hegemony in Yugoslavia had been exercised with Russian backing. The relationship was based on cultural affinity and Russia's need for a Balkan ally. Now Russia was taking advantage to interfere in the region. Tito had tried to maintain an external and internal counter-balance, yet Serbs had managed to dominate the system intelligently. With the collapse of the Soviet Union the Serbs had panicked and used force. The Orthodox religion was used by Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and «the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia» to discriminate against Muslims and to «keep them out of Europe». Kosovo was 33% Roman Catholic, 15% Orthodox and 48% Muslim.
161. The question of migration in relation to Kosovo was very complex and highly political. The Kosovo Assembly Committee on Migration and Refugees had set up local committees all over the province to examine the question of emigration. An estimated 300 000-350 000 had emigrated in the past five years, although it was difficult to be precise because the Albanians did not control the frontiers. The Serbs were doing everything possible to get the Albanians to leave. It did not take much encouragement because of the economic situation and the persecution. The purpose was to allow Serb settlement. All political and administrative steps had been taken to implement a programme for the settlement of 100 000 Serbs. Only the financial resources were lacking. A Bill before the Serb Assembly imposed a 1% tax on all citizens to this end. Following the recovery by Croatia of Western Slavonia, Serbs from the area who wished to go to Serbia were told that they could settle in Kosovo. Several families had been installed in Djakovica whose population was wholly Albanian. In relation to the population balance, the Serbs alleged that 400 000 Albanians had immigrated to Kosovo from Albania proper. The fact was that 1 700 Albanians had crossed the border into Yugoslavia but only 778 had settled in Kosovo. As for the Serbs in Kosovo, their number had never exceeded 200 000. The authorities were doing everything to prevent Albanians from returning to Kosovo. This was the clear intention behind the Instruction issued by the Yugoslav government on 16 November 1994 (see Appendix 1). As many as 13 000 decrees and regulations adopted in 1995 contained provisions that discriminated against Albanians. The Committee for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms had stated the minimum conditions for the return of the rejected Albanian asylum-seekers. These were that:
—th e United Nations Commission on Human Rights should pronounce publicly to the Belgrade regime that they must not disturb the Albanian returnees in Kosovo, who have been living abroad due to the fact that they had to seek shelter in another country;—
—th eir return should be permanently monitored by international observers, information media, humanitarian organisations involved with refugees, representatives of the states whence the refugees are returned, and representatives of the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF) and other humanitarian organisations in Kosovo;—
—th e return should not be in small groups, singly or secretly, but be well-organised and the public duly informed;—
—th e list with complete data on all the returnees should be handed over to the CDHRF and other humanitarian organisations in Kosovo, which are able to monitor the returnees' situation on a permanent basis;—
—re turn should be through Priština airport and not through Belgrade or elsewhere;—
—re turn should not be during winter but should start in spring;—
—pe rsons under permanent medical care should not be returned;—
—de serters, and conscripts who have avoided military service in the Yugoslav army should not be subject to return.16
162. Negotiations with the Western European countries mainly concerned had run into the obstacle of financial compensation. If such compensation were paid, the money would be used to settle Serbs in Kosovo and to pay for more police.
163. European and international opinion, which had always supported Serbia, seemed to be that the Kosovo Albanians must accept everything. They were now back to where they had started in 1878. But they would never accept an imposed solution. They were practising passive resistance for the first time. It was to be hoped that the Council of Europe could help with some imaginative proposals, starting with education, health and the question of the return of asylum-seekers. Information should be collected on the persecution suffered by the Albanians. Pressure could be exerted on the Serb and Yugoslav governments to safeguard human rights.
8. Conclusions
164. A climate of considerable tension reigns in Kosovo. Following the suppression of the province's autonomy by Serbia in 1989, the ethnic Albanians, who make up some 90 per cent of the population, have engaged in passive resistance to repressive rule by Belgrade and organised their own «parallel» government, education, health and welfare systems. The ethnic Albanian leadership seeks international support for the concept of an independent, «open», and neutral Kosovo acting as a kind of buffer-link between Serbia and Albania. However, there is growing impatience with this strategy which appears to some to be illusory. Certainly the leaders of the «international community» responsible for negotiating peace in the former Yugoslavia have made it quite clear that independence for Kosovo is not an option. For its part, the Serbian Government insists that there can be no question of independence, nor even of a return to the considerable autonomy enjoyed by Kosovo under the 1974 Yugoslav Federal Constitution. The dominant minority of Kosovo Serbs look to the Government of Serbia to protect them and to assert their rights in a climate of hostility. The potential for open conflict is obvious.
165. I believe that the re-establishment of Kosovo's autonomy is today the only reasonable and realistic solution to the problem. There is no room in today's Europe for medieval-style imperialism or forced assimilation of peoples any more than for «ethnic cleansing». Logically, the Serbs cannot claim their own republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina and at the same time refuse the equivalent demand by the Kosovo Albanians. As they are fond of saying, there should be no double standards. But there is no need to go that far. The idea would be to restore autonomy to the Kosovo Albanians within the framework of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, no federal system of government can work unless it is firmly based on democracy, minority and human rights, the rule of law, and respect for balance between its constituent parts. This is the fundamental lesson of the collapse of Tito's Yugoslavia, destroyed by resurgent Serb nationalism launched in Kosovo.
166. Having failed to develop a common policy to prevent the Yugoslav tragedy, Europe must now propose constructive solutions for remaining potential flashpoints. It is impossible to sweep away the centuries of history which have led to their confrontation, but initial steps should be taken to build confidence between the Serb and Albanian populations with a view to dialogue. There is nothing unrealistic about this. The Parliamentary Assembly's Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography recently held an exchange of views with a delegation of young Serbs and Kosovo Albanians which demonstrated that there is hope for the future. While they did not hide their differences, the members of the delegation affirmed their commitment to peace, dialogue, human rights and genuine democracy. This is the only way ahead. It follows that new impetus should be given to negotiations between the two parties in the context of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.
167. Improvement of the human rights situation in Kosovo is an essential prerequisite for building the confidence needed to reach a political solution. In order to monitor the human rights situation in Kosovo, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should be invited to resume participation in the work of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), whose very purpose it is to seek to defuse such potential conflicts. An OSCE observer delegation should return to Kosovo on a joint mission with Council of Europe human rights observers.
168. In the meantime, the Council of Europe should offer its good offices in proposing confidence-building measures in its fields of activity, especially human rights, civil, political and cultural rights, minority rights, education, health, youth, sport, media and population. For example, it should contribute, in co-operation with the European Union, to the organisation of a census in Kosovo, along the lines of the recent census in «the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia». As many Council of Europe fact-finding visits to Kosovo as possible should be organised. The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe should study the feasibility of establishing a Local Democramcy Embassy there.
169. To the immediate question whether the Assembly should take a stand against the repatriation of those among the approximately 340 000 Albanian asylum-seekers from Kosovo now in western European countries whose applications for asylum have been rejected, I submit that the answer must be a clear «yes» until such time as the human rights situation in Kosovo has markedly improved. The Assembly would be in line with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in adopting such a position. The countries concerned should offer the asylum-seekers temporary protection in the meantime.
170. The plight of the Kosovo Albanian asylum-seekers raises the question of the international protection of those claiming to be persecuted as a group on account of their ethnic origin. The 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees does not recognise the concept of collective persecution, as has been made clear, for example, in a number of asylum cases involving Kosovo Albanians before the German administrative courts. But it would undoubtedly be in line with the Council of Europe's vocation and aims to devise some sort of special solution, in the context of its work on minority rights, for the international protection of those suffering collective persecution on ethnic grounds by the state whose citizenship they possess and whose protection they should enjoy.
APPENDIX 1
UNHCR Information Note (31 January 1995) on asylum-seekers
from the Kosovo and Sandžak regions of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
Since the last UNHCR position of December 1993, developments in the Kosovo and Sandžak regions remain beyond any expectation of an early political solution to the situation. Figures available from local sources indicate an increase of violent house searches, raids and arbitrary arrests in both Kosovo and Sandžak in 1994, as compared to 1993.
In Kosovo, there are no official contacts between the Serbian Governments and the Kosovo Albanian political leadership, but a maintenance of diametrically opposed positions by both parties with the latter increasingly stating their aim of independence. The Kosovo Albanian community remains based on a parallel society with its own education, health and social welfare system, heavily dependent on financial support from abroad.
According to recent information, the situation for Moslems in Sandžak has deteriorated further over the last six months with the police carrying out searches for weapons throughout the area. Leaders of the SDA, the main Moslem party in Sandžak, have recently been sentenced to terms of imprisonment on charges of having threatened the constitutional order and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. Reports have also been received on the torture of detained persons.
The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in former Yugoslavia, in his most recent report dated 31 October 1994 to the UN General Assembly, refers to a drastic increase, with regard to both Kosovo and Sandžak, in reports of violent house searches, raids and arbitrary arrests.
While seriously concerned about developments, UNHCR continues to believe that the eligibility of asylum-seekers for Kosovo and Sandžak should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, whereby a very careful examination of individual claims in a full and fair asylum procedure is imperative.
UNHCR considers that draft evaders and deserters from the Yugoslav People's Army from mid 1991 to mid 1992, regardless of their ethnic background and last place of residence in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, are in need of international protection, as long as no amnesty has been enacted by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). When examining claims for a well-founded fear of persecution, UNHCR recommends that particular attention be given to persons who may have come to the attention of the authorities due to their involvement in the alternative/parallel social, health, and/or education sectors in Kosovo, or due to their involvement in activities for the LDK or other Kosovo-Albanian political parties. While other groups of Kosovo Albanians, dismissed from the public services, may easily be the subject of further discrimination and/or harassment, UNHCR wishes to emphasise that former police officers and army officers with Albanian ethnic origin have recently been increasingly targeted by the Serb authorities because of the alleged potential threat these persons represent in case of an escalation of the situation. In December 1994 alone, 156 cases of arrests of former policemen were reported.
UNHCR furthermore hopes that Governments will continue to permit the stay on humanitarian grounds in compelling medical cases where no adequate treatment can be expected in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
While UNHCR is not in a position to oppose the return of persons not in need of international protection, the Office wishes to caution Governments against any plans to return a larger number of persons, as the consequences of this may be an even further deterioration in the situation. Any additional strain on the fragile alternative or parallel society through such returns could easily have a significant negative impact on both the political and social situation, creating the very basis for an escalation of the situation.
While making these recommendations, UNHCR is also fully aware of the current position where the Serbian Ministry of Transport and Communications on 16 November 1994 issued the attached instruction on the issue of return.
UNHCR knows of a number of persons who have departed from certain Western European countries and who have not been re-admitted, but returned to the countries where they had sought asylum. UNHCR is very much concerned about the humanitarian consequences for these individuals and urges Governments, when they wish to carry out deportations, to initiate discussions with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) ensuring that the return of these persons can take place in safety and dignity with appropriate safeguards, which could include requests for a return of the OSCE observer mission to the area.
Finally, UNHCR believes it is important that return be carried out applying the principle of «last in, first out» which may be implemented through the establishment of appropriate cut-off dates.
UNHCR, Headquarters
31 January 1995
Instruction by the Yugoslav Federal Ministry of Transport and Communications on the issue of return to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia dated 16 November 1994:
Federal Ministry for Transport and Communications carrying out the guidelines of the Federal Government on the intention of West European countries to perform a mass expel of alleged asylum-seekers from Kosovo and Metohija after the abolition of sanctions for air and maritime traffic, should like to inform you as follows:
Upon the application of passengers for a flight in international air services of either domestic or foreign air carrier, the competent authorities shall not permit entry into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia:
1. to persons who were in the process of seeking asylum in countries they were staying in, without a certificate on the authenticity of the passport or without a travel document issued by the diplomatic-consular office of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
2. to the holders of passports whose serial numbers are of the seceded Republics of former SFRY;
3. to the holders of Yugoslav passports (persons of Moslem and Croatian nationality) to whom the authorities in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have issued the passports in accordance with Article 20 of the Act on passports of the SFRY citizens, whose residence is having the address outside the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Entry into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall be permitted to:
1. holders of a Yugoslav passport if they hold a valid work or residence permit or a valid touristic visa issued by the authorities of countries they were residing in;
2. holders of a Yugoslav passport even in cases when they do not hold a valid work or residence permit or a touristic visa if, beside a passport they also hold a certificate on the authenticity of the passport issued by the diplomatic-consular office of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
3. holders of a travel document for the return to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia if it contains a number, date and name of the authority that approved the issue of the travel document. Such Note should bear a seal and signature of the authorised person of the diplomatic-consular office of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia who has issued the travel document.
We kindly ask you to keep this in mind during the issue of air transportation in scheduled and non-scheduled air services.
Signed: Olivera Djukanović, Assistant Federal Minister
Reporting committee: Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography.
Budgetary implications for the Assembly: none.
Origin: Doc. 7007, Reference No. 1921 of 28 February 1994.
Draft recommendation, resolution and order unanimously adopted by the committee on 14 December 1995.
Members of the committee: Mrs Aguiar (Chairperson), Mr Cucó, Sir John Hunt (Vice-Chairmen), MM. Akselsen, Andres, Árnason, Mrs Arnold, MM. Attard Montalto, Beaufays, Billing, van den Bos , Branger (Alternate: Jacquat), Mrs Brasseur, MM. Brennan (Alternate: Gregory), Brito, Ehrmann, Fotiadis, Fuhrmann, Galanos, Golu, Gotzev, Gross, Iuliano, Iwiński, Mrs Johansson, MM. Junghanns, Kalus, Kiliç, Kiratlioǧlu, Lord Kirkhill, MM. Kukk, Lauricella, Leitner, Liapis, Loutfi, Mrs Luhtanen, MM. Makariadhi, Mészáros, Pantelejevs, Pastuszka, Mrs Robert, MM. Saudargas (Alternate: Zingeris), Simonet, Školč, Solonari, Mrs Soutendijk-van Appeldoorn, MM. Tkác, Trojan, Vázquez.
N.B. The names of those members present at the meeting are printed in italics.
Secretaries to the committee: MM. Newman and Sich.
1 1by the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography
2 2 i.e. ethnic Albanian inhabitants of Kosovo, therefore, formally, citizens of the Republic of Serbia and of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
3 3 Michel Roux, Les Albanais en Yougoslavie, Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, Paris, 1992, p. 242.
4 4 See Hans Stark, "La question albanaise" in Politique étrangère, 1/1994, pp. 209-222.
5 5 Michel Roux, op. cit., chapter X.
6 6 Sabrina P. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1992, p. 187; Paul Garde, Vie et mort de la Yougoslavie, Paris, Fayard, 1992, p. 233.
7 7 Ramet, op. cit., p. 188.
8 8 Michel Roux, op. cit., pp. 274-5.
9 9 The republican right to secede was and remains a matter of constitutional interpretation, especially controversial with the break-up of the Yugoslav Federation. The first sentence of the Preamble to the Constitution refers to the right to secede of the constituent "nations" (as distinct from the "nationalities", ie national minorities). Article 3 refers to the republics as sovereign states, while Article 4 does not use this term for the autonomous provinces. Since the Kosovo Albanians were not a "nation" but a "nationality", it would appear that, under the 1974 Constitution, the autonomous province in which they constituted a majority could not claim the right to secede.
10 10 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, From Autonomy to Colonization: Human Rights in Kosovo 1989-1993, Vienna, 1993; Paul Garde, op. cit., pp.234-5; Michel Roux, op. cit., pp. 379-395; Pax Christi International, Kosovo: the conflict between Serbs and Albanians and the role of the international community, Brussels, 1995, section 3.2.
11 11 Laslo Sekelj, Yugoslavia: the process of disintegration, Social Science Monographs, Boulder, Colorado, Atlantic Research and Publications, Highland Lakes, New Jersey, 1992, p. xix.
12 12 Ramet, op. cit., p. 189.
13 13 Srdan Bogosavljević, "A statistical picture of Serbian-Albanian relations" in Conflict or dialogue.Serbian-Albanian relations and integration of the Balkans. Studies and Essays, Open University, European Civic Centre for Conflict Resolution, Subotica, 1994, p. 17.
14 14 Michel Roux, op. cit., pp. 150 and 152.
15 15 ibid., p. 152.
16 16 Bogosavljević, op. cit., p. 22.
17 17 Michel Roux, op. cit., p. 150.
18 18 Bogosavlević, op. cit.; Hivzi Islami, "Demographic reality of Kosovo", ibid., pp. 30-53.
19 19 Michel Roux, op. cit., p. 390.
20 20 ibid., p. 393.
21 21 Hivzi Islami, op. cit., p. 51. But see below paragraphs 37 and 80.
22 22See the periodic reports on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia by the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Mr Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and his successor Mrs Elisabeth Rehn; Pax Christi, op. cit.; Caritas Schweiz, Vertreibung und Asyl: Reise einer Delegation der Caritas Schweiz in den Kosovo/BR Jugoslawien und Mazedonien vom 16-20 November 1992. Bericht; Confédération Internationale des Syndicats Libres, Licenciements et Purification Ethnique au Kosovo (October 1992); Organisation Suisse d'Aide aux Réfugiés (OSAR), Renvois en Kosova. Eviter le pire. Rapport de la délégation de l'OSAR en Kosova du 11 au 20 janvier 1995 (Zurich, 6.2.95).
23 23As will become apparent, this is one of several estimates, ranging from 200 000 to more than twice that number.
24 24 Spotlight Report No. 16: Kosovo Albanians II, February 1995. See also Spotlight Report No. 6: Kosovo Albanians I, August 1993, in Spotlight on Human Rights Violations in Times of Armed Conflict, Belgrade, Humanitarian Law Centre, 1995.
25 25 The reference here was no doubt to the Carrington Plan of October 1991 which envisaged "Special Status" for regions in which persons belonging to a national or ethnic group constitute a majority. Such regions would have the right to their own national emblem and anthem and their inhabitants to dual nationality. They would have their own legislative, administrative and judicial structures responsible for the region concerned, the composition of which would reflect the balance of the population. They would also have their own police and educations systems (cf Henry Wynaendts, L'engrenage. Chroniques yougoslaves, juillet 1991-août 1992, Paris, Editions Denoël, 1993, pp. 123-4). This was basically a return to the autonomy of the 1974 Constitution.
26 26 A series of meetings devoted to education, culture, the media and health was held in 1992, at the time of the Milan Panić government, in the Working Group on Ethnic and National Communities and Minorities. After the fall of Panić the Yugoslav authorities insisted that the question of Kosovo could only be treated internally. This attitude appears to be softening today.
27 27 1844 paper by Ilija Garašanin advocating a revival of the 14th century Serbian empire.
28 28 Vasa Čubrilović, historian and member of the Serbian Academy, published a memorandum for the government in 1937 entitled "The Expulsion of the Albanians", advocating "brutal force by a thoroughly organised state power...The State has to use the legal possibilities to the utmost, to create a situation for the Albanians which makes it unbearable for them to remain with us, as for instance fines, jail, ruthless use of police, expulsion by force...all means which an experienced police force can think of...also private initiatives might be helpful...local uprisings should be supported and then suppressed by efficient means in the most brutal manner, but not as much by the help of the army, better would be to make use of colonists and gangs." (International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, op. cit. p. 4n). The IHFHR comments: "the resemblances with the contemporary Serbian policies are remarkable".
29 29 According to the 1994 census, conducted with the assistance of the European Union and the Council of Europe, ethnic Albanians represented 22,9% of the population of «the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia».