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16 September 1992
Doc. 6663
1403-15/9/92-2-E
Report
on technological risks and society
(Rapporteur: Mr BIRRAUX, France, Allied UDC)
Summary
Politicians are required to base their decisions in the technological sphere on risk assessment. However, the assessments of experts often differ markedly from the perceptions of the general public. Today, politicians cannot disregard these perceptions.
In a number of sectors the problem is further complicated by the general public's suspicion of scientists and engineers.
Therefore it is essential to renew the dialogue between all the protagonists, clearly defining the role to be played by each group.
Parliaments and governments of Council of Europe member states and special guests should review their procedures for decision-making on scientific and technical matters and make any necessary changes, notably with a view to taking society's perceptions into greater consideration.
It is also necessary to establish co-operation between European parliamentary bodies and provide a common pool of experience.
I. DRAFT RESOLUTION
1. The Assembly is aware that technological innovation is an ineluctable feature of modern society. It will continue, for a long time to come, to act as the driving force in commercial and industrial competition. While the public draws substantial benefits from technological progress, it has also developed a keener awareness of the supposed effects of certain technologies on the ethical values on which our society is based, on health and on the environment.
2. In this context, the issue of risks - particularly those present in certain new technologies - becomes more complex: despite a general improvement in safety levels and a substantial reduction in traditional risks, new types of risks, far more difficult to calculate and predict, are emerging; these are often major risks capable of affecting a huge area of the planet, inflicting belatedly discovered long-term effects.
3. In recent years, the complexity of the risks debate has also become apparent: there is no "objective method" offering a simple basis for calculation. In particular, the probabilistic formula (risk = extent of damage x probability) remains the best way of assessment even if its value is debatable in cases of very extensive damage and virtually zero probability.
4. Sociological studies have also shown that the general public's perception of risks is based on criteria which frequently differ from those applied by scientists and engineers. Although this perception is not irrational, it is often typified by superficial knowledge and occasionally by the damaging influence of the media.
5. The social and political assessment of risks is basically a balancing of certain benefits of an activity against the risks it entails. Assessment must rely on scientific appraisal but it depends above all on value choices and the models we adopt for our life and society. It is therefore a classic democratic process, requiring close communication between the protagonists and an interdisciplinary approach.
6. The Sub-Committee on Technology Policy of the Committee on Science and Technology organised a colloquy (Locarno 25-26 May 1992) to examine these concerns and discuss the numerous aspects which the technological risks issue now encompasses, paying especial attention to the function and responsibility of policy-makers.
7. The colloquy showed that experts and the general public act and react in different ways, and that politicians, and above all scientists and industrialists, had lost much of their credibility with regard to industrial risks.
8. The Assembly believes that it is essential to renew the dialogue between all the protagonists, clearly defining the role to be played by each group, and makes the following suggestions:
i. industrialists should provide full, accurate and up-to-date information and set up, together with the public authorities,
emergency plans whenever major technical risks are involved;
ii. the public should demand this information, ask questions and make its views known to decision-makers;
iii. members of government and elected representatives at different levels should take decisions, once they have gathered a maximum of information on the possible consequences;
iv. scientists should assist politicians in the evaluation of their choices;
v. the media should present the industrial risks issue in full and accurate detail.
9. The parliaments of several Council of Europe member states have already developed structures for assessing scientific and technical choices. The Assembly consequently invites member states' parliaments and governments to review their procedures for decision-making on scientific and technical matters in the light of this report and make any necessary changes, notably with a view to taking society's perceptions into greater consideration.
10. Since most of the situations requiring assessment are present in both Eastern and Western Europe, it is necessary to establish co-operation between our parliamentary bodies and provide a common pool of experience.
II. EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
by Mr Birraux
Introduction
This report is a follow-up to a motion for a resolution and a colloquy organised by the Sub-Committee on Technology Policy (Locarno 25-26 May 1992). The colloquy was an opportunity for the sub-committee to discuss with a number of experts, the problems surrounding technological risks and how these risks were perceived by society; special attention was paid to the function and responsibility of parliamentarians.
Politicians are increasingly required to base their decisions in the technological sphere on risk assessment. However, the assessments of experts, even those working independently, often differ markedly from the perceptions of the general public. Today, politicians cannot disregard these perceptions and have to steer a middle course between conflicting views.
In a number of sectors (and particularly where nuclear power, chemical industry and waste are concerned) the problem is further complicated by the general public's suspicion of scientists and engineers. It must be said that this suspicion is justified by the attitude of these very scientists and engineers who have lulled the public into a false sense of security over the years by failing to disclose the real issues and admit that their knowledge has limits.
Technological risks
There is a kind of natural affinity between risks and politics: risks can be defined in terms of potential damage weighed against a certain benefit, while politics is the art of taking decisions, in a context of conflicting interests and incomplete information but always with an eye to the common good. Risk is therefore inherent in political activity and a great many risks are, at least partly, subject to political decision.
As far as risks are concerned, the technologies used in our industrialised countries can be classified, according to Professor W Kröger1, in three categories: traditional technologies, developing technologies, which are well known but whose risk potential increases as they become more complex as in the case of chemicals industry systems, for example, and new technologies which are highly complex and liable to trigger disasters. (Chernobyl, Bhopal and certain biotechnology sectors.)
Risks in the first category are characterised by their high frequency and minor consequences and are well known thanks to statistical studies and everyday experience, whereas the key features of risks in the third category are their extremely remote probability and serious consequences, including long-term effects which are not limited by national borders. The second category is half-way between the two. Risk figures for the third category, assessed using critical forecasting models of the system (probabilistic method of risk assessment) and obtained by multiplying probabilities by consequences, are relatively low; the main damage indicators used are the number of fatalities and cases of illness and sometimes contaminated areas.
The risk assessment process
According to Dr P Wiedemann2, there are five phases of risk assessment: (1) loss potential: is there a potential loss? (2) loss identification: what kind of losses might occur? (3) probability of loss: how likely is the loss? (4) significance of the loss: how severe is the loss for the individual/public? (5) coping capacity: how well can the potential losses be coped with?
The first phase involves a screening process. The question is: is there any potential loss or threat? In the affirmative, that is if a loss is envisaged, the second phase which entails identifying the loss comes into operation. Loss is a multidimensional concept, taking various forms: fatality, illness, psychological stress, financial loss, socio-cultural loss. This has two consequences. Firstly, the greater the number of loss types, the greater the risk appraisal. Secondly, not all loss categories are equally important. The different categories must therefore be weighted in order to assess overall loss.
This is where the notion of probability comes in. Probability is a weighting factor used in overall risk assessment but there are other qualitative weighting factors involved in risk assessment. One of these qualitative factors is the significance of loss. What is our definition of a major loss and a minor loss?
Psychometric research on risk perception gives an idea of the factors involved in each assessment phase: voluntariness - do people consciously expose themselves to the risk? individual knowledge - to what extent are the people concerned aware of the risk? scientific knowledge - to what extent are scientists aware of the risk? incidence of the consequences - does the risk affect people on an individual or a collective basis? seriousness of the consequences - is it a risk which people have learnt to live with or is it a considerable source of fear? time taken for effects to become apparent - how immediate are the effects? control - to what extent can people exposed to the risk control it?
These are interrelated factors, two of which stand out: the unknown and dread. The unknown factor is significant if the risk is seen as new, not observable and unknown to those directly affected or to scientists, and if its effects are insidious. The dread factor is greater if the risk is thought to be uncontrollable, a source of disaster, fatal, unjust, if it affects future generations and if, unknown to them, it affects individuals.
Society's perception of risks
The development and application of modern techniques such as biotechnology, nuclear power or information technology are business activities which are influenced by public perception. The most striking example is nuclear power: public perception of its risks has had a tremendous impact on the energy policies of countries like Germany, Sweden, Italy and Austria. The possibility of the same kind of negative perception causing a crisis in the biotechnology industry is not to be ruled out.
One can imagine that the effects of public perception might well be annoying to private enterprise, especially when risk analysts compare their own assessment with public opinion. At all events, the general public's perception of risk is a real social phenomenon affecting both policy and economy.
The parameters governing risk perception and acceptance are very different from those on which the assessment of "objective risks" are based, and very often the risks which imperil our lives are not those we fear the most.
There is a considerable gap, not only between risk perceptions and the actual facts, but also between the perceptions of different categories of persons. The discrepancy is well documented between individual risk perceptions and the conclusions which can be drawn, without too much risk of error, on the probability of certain disasters occurring. Negative perceptions of risk mainly depend on three series of subjectively felt characteristics: unfamiliarity, unverifiability and the disaster potential or simultaneous exposure of a large number of individuals.
One of the rules most widely applied by the public in apprehending a potential hazard is the "representativeness" of knowledge already accumulated on the subject (accidents in the past, publicly available statistics, together with press articles, works of fiction, etc.).
A clearer distinction is required between risk analysis and assessment and the roles to be fulfilled by different groups. Extensive technical knowledge is required for risk analysis within the framework of decision-making and management. It is obvious that technology cannot be made more acceptable simply by giving politicians and the general public more information. It is more important to make a fuller assessment of the information available and attempt to draw a clear picture of the pros and cons of a given technology.
Communication: how should the public be informed?
Information plays a crucial role in the interaction between society and technological risks. The dangers of modern technology are virtually imperceptible until they strike. Scientific assessment is therefore indispensable if we are to be aware of the very real risks. But how is this information to reach the public? Is the public unable to acquire itself the information it needs?
There are two key objectives to be followed: unrestricted availability of information on risks and building trust. Risk assessment processes must be under the constant scrutiny of potential critics so as to avoid risk assessments that are unduly optimistic or pessimistic.
Deciding whether a certain risk is acceptable or not is a choice for society. Information on risks must be openly divulged so that one-sided assessments are not allowed to dominate. When politicians fear that current assessments are too one-sided, they can call for a second opinion either from bodies which take a critical view of accepted assessments or from bodies which inspire confidence through their independent nature. Politicians have a responsibility to bring in a counterbalance and thus ensure that the information available is as objective as possible.
The general public has some knowledge about risks, but its knowledge is fragmentary and superficial. It is unreasonable to hope that the majority of the population will acquire in-depth information. Most people react at least as much on the basis of signals about the characteristics and interests of the proponents of certain proposals as on the basis of objective information. This information must therefore be presented from different viewpoints. Communication between politicians and the general public works when it is clear what position an elected representative takes on technological risks.
It is wrong to try to avoid any public debate, to postpone or withhold information or to address only the benefits of a given technology while neglecting the risks. Furthermore, informing the public about potentially dangerous technology requires a special approach. The analogy with commercial advertising is misleading, mainly because the effects of advertising are usually over-rated and because communication on industrial risks addresses a series of problems very different from those with which advertising is concerned. Advertising is generally directed towards people who have a favourable or at least neutral view of a given product, which is not the case with high-risk technology.
When informing the public about risks, it is therefore important to:
- pay attention to subtle signals like changing social values and areas of public interest;
- monitor people's beliefs and attitudes towards technology;
- improve relations with the general public, special interest groups and the media;
- anticipate emerging issues and try to shape their development;
- be open and honest, providing objective information;
- give messages a clear meaning and express them in simple and straightforward terms;
- place the risk in its social context;
- take the general public's concerns and needs into account.
To acknowledge these rules of effective risk communication is just a first step; actually to follow them is more difficult.
"Subjective risk", which is an individual notion, is heavily reliant on information passed on by the media and the frequency with which it is mentioned; it is governed by factors such as fear, lack of control, dependence on experts, etc. The acceptance or rejection of perceived risks depends on other factors, principally personal benefit, ethical aspects and confidence in plant operators and control bodies.
The role of the political decision-maker
Mrs Van Eijndhoven3 concludes that politicians have to realise that, in many countries, declining acceptance has coincided with a loss of credibility of experts and state authorities, particularly in the aftermath of major accidents. We must therefore develop convincing long-term policies, free of illusions stemming from impossible promises, and create a stable political climate. We all have to face the complexity and interdisciplinary nature of the tasks in hand and develop tools, machinery and procedures that are adequate for dealing with them.
It is impossible to live without risks, but governments have a duty to prevent excessive risks. The whole problem is knowing which risks may be considered excessive. Who is to decide and on what basis?
Experts have suggested a number of ways in which decision-makers can make use of people's preferences but, in practice, each of these methods has severe limitations. Rational or decision-analytical methods such as cost-benefit or utility calculations wrongly assume that an optimal solution can always be found. This is not so when there is considerable uncertainty and a number of protagonists are involved in taking the decision. This is the case in those practical situations we are interested in, such as with major technical installations or bioethics questions.
Historical methods imply that risks run in the past can still be deemed acceptable for the future. But for new technologies, there are no precedents for comparison. Lastly, risk perception measurements can inform decision-makers about the preferences of the public, but they do not indicate how they should be taken into account when decisions come to be taken.
When taking a decision on a risk situation, it is not enough to take account of the risk assessment as mentioned above. Social factors play a role in people's appraisal of the situation. Values, interest and trust play a major role in the way in which people view risk situations in practice. The decision-making processes relating to such situations must take these factors into account.
There is no such thing as an acceptable risk. Risks can be accepted if the benefits are high enough, if the risk is considered insignificant or if the cost of counter-measures is considered too high. Risks have no intrinsic value. Given that risks are inherent in any human activity, however, the question is where to draw the line between what is acceptable and what is not.
Theories on how risk should be managed in society range from leaving the task to market mechanisms to the opposite extreme of considering that no risk is acceptable. In practice, it is accepted in most countries that the government and political forces can play a role in limiting risks. Their capacity to do so is usually blunted by technical and budgetary constraints. An example of this is the ALARP principle (As Low As Reasonably Practical).
A much more usual device for regulating risks, especially in the United States but also in a number of European countries (the Netherlands are a good example), is standard-setting. Setting standards may be considered as a means of taking decisions which can then be transposed onto various concrete situations so that the latter can be integrated into a system of standards. Setting standards splits the decision-making process into two elements:
- a decision on the standard
- a decision on the violation of the standard.
The advantage of this split is that, in each case, only part of the arguments for and against are discussed, instead of the whole range.
In the Netherlands, quantitative standards are widely used, for example, in limiting the risks of major technical installations such as nuclear energy or chemical plants. A margin is built into calculations so as to allow for local differences in the individual situation or social appraisal of the risk. In countries like the United Kingdom, standards are used far more as a source of guidance for advisers than as formal limiting factors. Cultural differences in the way countries deal with risks are inevitable, and do not necessarily pose problems as long as decision-makers take them into account.
Politicians are mediators between regulators of risks, the people and institutions which, through their activity, generate risks and those who run the risks (and this includes the earth's ecosystem). As persons and in their intermediary role, they have a number of responsibilities:
- to assess and control the performance of risk managers, especially those in the government;
- to weigh and translate the preoccupations of the population they represent so that these may be taken into account when decisions come to be taken;
- to support adequate information provision to the population.
Conclusions
My experience in the French Parliamentary Office for Scientific and Technological Option Assessment prompts the conclusion that there is a certain difficulty in communication between political decision-makers, scientists and the general public. Politicians find it hard to accept that scientists cannot provide them with certainties. Probability analysis is a valid approach but does not provide all the answers and we must beware of "scientific fundamentalism".
I recently presented a report on nuclear safety to the French National Assembly in which I advocated setting up supervisory committees on which members of parliament, trade unionists, nature conservation associations, etc., would be represented. These committees should provide an interface between industrialists and the general public, and if they are to accomplish their task certain conditions will have to be met. Democratic organisation presupposes transparency but not joint management. All information must be made available (except information covered by industrial secrecy where this still exists).
Responsibilities must be clearly defined, and parliamentarians should not allow others to decide for them. Today, we can no longer assert, we must explain.
The colloquy in Locarno was most useful in the preparation of this report, particularly in that it threw up a number of key ideas which should be taken into consideration in parliamentary activity:
i. in a democracy, the leading role is to be played by parliaments and all elected representatives;
ii. it is therefore necessary to provide elected representatives with information which is as full and objective as possible and to establish an interface between politicians, scientists and the general public, and the whole decision-making process must be transparent and take current levels of public understanding and knowledge into account;
iii. we must set up structures allowing the public to express its views and dialogue with the authorities, industrialists, operators, etc., perhaps even creating monitoring committees for high-risk technological activities;
iv. it is also necessary to redefine the ethical values which form the basis and bonds of society before going on to examine the risks entailed by various scientific and technological options;
v. finally, it would be highly desirable to set up a European system for exchanging experiences concerning scientific and technological problems so that parliamentarians may benefit from the experience of their counterparts from other countries.
I therefore propose that the Assembly should instruct its Committee on Science and Technology to contact the bodies which deal with scientific and technological questions in each national parliament with a view to setting up a highly flexible structure for the purpose of co-operation and information exchanges. I am sure that the French Parliamentary Office for Scientific and Technological Option Assessment is, for its part, open to this kind of co-operation.
Reporting committee: Committee on Science and Technology.
Budgetary implications for the Assembly: None.
Reference: Doc. 6508, Reference No. 1754 of 25 November 1991.
Draft resolution: Unanimously adopted by the committee on 8 September 1992.
Members of the committee: MM. Bassinet (Chairman), Roseta, Meszaros, (Vice-Chairmen), Aarts, Mrs Arnold, MM. Bauer, Berger, Bohl (Alternate: Birraux), Borderas (Alternate: Palacios), Fulvio Caccia, De Decker, Dees, Dimmer, Dinçerler (Alternate: Keçeciler), Draus, Mrs Falcucci (Alternate: Mr Mezzapesa), MM. Fourré, Hagard, Mrs Hjelm-Wallen (Alternate: Mr Alemyr), MM. Kalos, Karakas, Albrecht Konecny (Alternate: Mrs Hawlicek), Korakas, Lenzer, Leyden, Litherland, Lopez Valdivielso, Lotz, Luczak, Martino (Alternate: Scovacricchi), Moran, Mrs Nybakk, MM. Panov (Alternate: Toshev), Pecriaux, Poças Santos, Albert Probst, Mrs Ragnarsdottir, MM. Schädler, Sedlak, Mrs Terborg, Sir Donald Thompson, MM. Jack Thompson (Alternate: Lord Newall), Tiuri.
N.B. The names of the members who took part in the vote are underlined.
Secretaries to the Committee: MM. Perin and Ary.
1 1 See W Kröger's contribution to the Colloquy on Technological Risks and Society, Locarno 25-26 May 1992 (AS/Science/Tech (44) 1).
2 2 See P Wiedemann's contribution to the Colloquy on Technological Risks and Society, Locarno 25-26 May 1992 (AS/Science/Tech (44) 2).
3 3 See the contribution by Mrs Dr Josee Van Eijndhoven to the Colloquy on Technological Risks and Society, Locarno 25-26 May 1992 (AS/Science/Tech (44) 3).