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28 July 1993
Doc. 6902
1403-15/7/93-1-E
REPORT
on the establishment of an international court
to try serious violations of international humanitarian law
and
on the setting up of a mechanism for the protection
of human rights in European states not members
of the Council of Europe
(Rapporteur: Mrs HALLER,
Switzerland, Socialist Group)
Summary
The report is a follow-up to Order N° 486 (1993) which instructs its Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights to pursue further and actively expedite the establishment of a transitional mechanism for the protection of human rights in European states not members of the Council of Europe and a court to judge war crimes in accordance with Recommendation 1189.
It supports the decision taken by the United Nations Security Council to establish an international tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, but it considers that a permanent tribunal should be set up. It analyses the legal problems raised by the creation of such a tribunal in the light of the tribunal's statute for former Yugoslavia, then it considers the political aspects and comes to the conclusion that regional chambers could be a starting point for the permanent tribunal beginning with a European chamber.
The report then goes on to study how the Council of Europe could contribute to the prevention of conflicts within Europe by the setting up of a mechanism for the protection of human rights in European states not members of the Council of Europe.
The Order draws the consequences of the implementation of the latter proposal.
I. Draft recommendation
on establishing an international court
to try serious violations of international humanitarian law
1. The Assembly refers to its Recommendation 1189 (1992) on the establishment of an international court to judge war crimes, adopted on 1 July 1992, and to the hearing it held on the question on 5 April 1993.
2. It notes with satisfaction the decision in Resolution 827 of the United Nations Security Council to set up an international tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991.
3. The Assembly is in favour of establishing the tribunal as soon as possible.
4. It believes that the decision to establish the tribunal shows that there would not be any major obstacle to setting up a permanent universal court to try serious violations of humanitarian law such as it advocated in Recommendation 1189; it takes the view that it is essential that such a court be established under United Nations auspices.
5. It believes that setting up regional chambers for a permanent universal court might facilitate establishment of the court.
6. The Assembly recommends that the Committee of Ministers:
i. respond to Resolution 827 in which the United Nations Security Council urged states and intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations to contribute funds, equipment and services to the international tribunal;
ii. invite governments of member states to likewise respond to the appeal as well;
iii. invite member states which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the 1974 European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes;
iv. submit a proposal to the United Nations Security Council to set up regional chambers for a future permanent court starting with a European chamber.
II. Draft recommendation
on establishing a mechanism for the protection of human rights
in European states not members of the Council of Europe
1. The Assembly stresses that the situation in the former Yugoslavia shows that protection of human rights once conflict has actually broken out is no easy matter.
2. It considers that prevention is therefore particularly important where human rights are concerned, and every possible resource must be urgently directed to setting up prevention machinery.
3. It assesses that if the international community is prepared and able to commit $30 million a year to the urgent matter of setting up an international court to try serious violations of international humanitarian law, the Council of Europe must spare no expense either in establishing the mechanism already under discussion for the protection of human rights in European non-member states.
4. The Assembly refers to its Recommendation 1183 (1992) on access by European non-member states to institutions operating under certain Council of Europe Conventions relating to human rights and to its Recommendation 1204 (1993) on the creation of a transitional mechanism for the protection of human rights for European non-member states of the Council of Europe.
5. The Assembly accordingly urges the Committee of Ministers to:
i. establish without delay the mechanism, already under discussion, for the protection of human rights in European non-member states;
ii. press Council of Europe member states to make available the necessary resources.
III. Draft order
on Rule 55a of the Assembly's Rules of Procedure
The Assembly instructs the Committee on Rules of Procedure to draw up, as soon as the mechanism for the protection of human rights in European non-member states is established, an amendment to Rule 55a of the Rules of Procedure, which deals with the requirements for the granting of special guest status. The amendment should replace the requirement whereby a state must have signed or ratified the United Nations human rights covenants by a requirement whereby it must recognise the mechanism for the protection of human rights in states not members of the Council of Europe.
IV. Explanatory memorandum
by Mrs HALLER
Introduction
1. Following the report on the massive and flagrant violations of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, the Assembly adopted, on 3 February 1993, Order No. 486 (1993) instructing its Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights to pursue further and actively expedite the establishment of a transitional mechanism for the protection of human rights in European states not members of the Council of Europe and a court to judge war crimes in accordance with Recommendation 1189 (1992).
2. The present report deals with the two questions separately. The first part deals with the question of an international court firstly from the legal standpoint, then considers to what extent the Council of Europe has a contribution to make. The second part takes another look at the question of a mechanism for the protection of human rights in European non-member states.
PART ONE
Setting up an international court to try serious violations of international humanitarian law
3. Just less than a year ago, on 1 July 1992, the Parliamentary Assembly adopted Recommendation 1189 on the establishment of an international court to judge war crimes, in which it recommends establishing an international criminal court by means of a multilateral convention to be drafted by an international diplomatic conference convened under the auspices of the United Nations.
4. Furthermore, it recommends that the Committee of Ministers call upon member states to act through the United Nations to secure the convening of such a conference.
5. This recommendation was a response to the indignation caused by war crimes committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and during the Gulf war and the fact that the international community was unable to judge those who committed the crimes.
6. In preparing the present report, the question arose and I raised it personally with Lord Owen when I met him in Geneva in December 1992 as to whether it would be preferable to establish a court restricted to the case of the former Yugoslavia. The conclusion which I reached was that such an approach might be necessary, but only as a first step.
7. On 22 February 1993, the United Nations Security Council decided in Resolution 808 "that an international tribunal should be established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991".
8. The resolution requested the Secretary General "to submit for consideration by the Council at the earliest possible date, and if possible no later than sixty days after the adoption of the present resolution, a report on all aspects of this matter, including specific proposals and where appropriate options for the effective and expeditious implementation of the decision (to establish an international tribunal), taking into account suggestions put forward in this regard by member states".
9. The report was submitted on 3 May 1993.
10. There have been several initiatives aimed at establishing a court for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the territory of the former Yugoslavia:
—th e report by MM. Corell and Türk and Mrs Thune, issued on 9 February 1993, which contained a proposal to the effect that an international court is set up for war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, in the framework of the Moscow mechanism on the CSCE human dimension, for Bosnia-Herzegovina; —
—th e French proposals presented by Mr Truche, Public Prosecutor;—
—th e Italian proposal submitted by Minister Conso;—
—th e Swiss initiative to convene international experts in Geneva for a meeting chaired by Ambassador Caflisch. 11
11. It is in this context that the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, in order to discharge the instruction given to it in Order No. 486, took the initiative of holding a hearing bringing together the authors of the various proposals mentioned above.
12. The hearing was held in Paris on 5 April 1993. The following participants attended:
—Mr Paul Szasz, Legal Adviser of the Peace Conference in the former Yugoslavia;—
— Ambassador Hans Corell, representing the CSCE;
—Mr Pierre Truche, Attorney General, representing France; —
—Am bassador Caflisch representing Switzerland;—
—Mr s Ferraro and Mr Ferrari Bravo representing Italy; —
—Mr Crook, Legal Officer, Diplomatic mission of the United Statesto
to the United Nations.
13. This report takes into account those various contributions, along with the report by the Secretary General of the United Nations.
14. First, it examines the legal problems raised by the establishment of a court at European or worldwide level; it then considers the political aspects of establishing a court and, finally, considers the role which could be played by the Council of Europe in that context.
I. Legal problems raised by the establishment of a court to judge war crimes
15. The legal problems are essentially the same regardless of whether the court established is restricted to a specific case or permanent, as recommended in Recommendation 1189.
16. The establishment of a restricted court, which no longer brooks delay, does not preclude further work on the establishment of a permanent court. On the contrary, the majority of those who attended the hearing stressed that the ultimate objective should still be the establishment of a permanent court. Personally, I have not changed my opinion on this score.
17. The question which has been raised concerns the relationship between these two courts.
18. A "restricted" court could be considered as a sort of "test bench" for the permanent court. At the hearing on 5 April, opinions were divided on this point, with some participants considering that the future of the permanent court would depend on the failure or success of the 'restricted' court, while others considered that the two institutions would be totally separate.
19. Another approach was to consider the "restricted" court as the first regional chamber of a future permanent worldwide court. Finally, a third approach would be to establish a European regional court designed to become a regional chamber of the future worldwide court.
20. We shall examine these various options which, ultimately, depend on the political choices made.
21. The United Nations Security Council made a political decision to establish a tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
22. On 25 May 1993, the Security Council adopted Resolution 827 in which it decided, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to establish an international tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia between 1 January 1991 and a date to be determined by the Security Council. The resolution is appended to the present report, along with the Statute of the tribunal.
23. We shall examine the Statute of the tribunal for the purpose of determining whether it could be taken as a model for a permanent court.
A. Legal basis for a court to judge war crimes
24. There are two ways of establishing the court: by means of a treaty, as recommended in Recommendation 1189, which called for a diplomatic conference, or by a Security Council resolution, as adopted for the court for the former Yugoslavia.
25. Let us remember that there was never any question of the court, whatever its form, being established by the Council of Europe or another European organisation. I have always considered that only the United Nations could guarantee its uncontested legitimacy.
26. Establishment by treaty, although it is more in accordance with international practice, has the disadvantage, a major one in urgent cases, of being a very long process and, more importantly, one that runs the risk of not coming to fruition. This is why the Secretary General of the United Nations has proposed the adoption of a Security Council resolution.
27. At the hearing on 5 April, a consensus emerged in favour of that procedure. The only discussion concerned Chapter VII of the Charter, which links the decision to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security after the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression has been ascertained. Doubts were expressed concerning the feasibility to establish a permanent court on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter.
28. The same procedure could be applied to a permanent court but a treaty would be preferable.
B. Jurisdiction as to the subject matter (ratione materiae)
29. A prior question on which there was discussion was the scope of both the present report and the matters falling within the jurisdiction of the restricted or permanent court. The present report concerns war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes against peace, including genocide.
30. In accordance with Resolution 808, which provides that the tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, the Secretary General of the United Nations proposes that the tribunal apply the rules of international humanitarian law which form an incontestable part of customary law. He cites as forming part of this law: the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 for the protection of war victims, the Hague Convention (IV) on the laws and customs of war on land and the attached Rules of 18 October 1907, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948 and the statutes of the international military tribunal of 8 August 1945.
31. The Correll report considers that it is the most serious crimes, namely war crimes and crimes against humanity, that should be judged.
32. The Parliamentary Assembly has already made a decision to that effect in its Recommendation 1189.
33. The Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights has endorsed that approach and, without wishing to minimise their gravity, has excluded crimes against the environment and drug trafficking, which some people would have liked to see included in crimes against humanity.
34. There was also unanimity on the principle that there could be no crime and no punishment where there was no law (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine previa lege).
35. From a discussion on the law applicable, it emerged that application of the following could be envisaged: domestic law, international treaties to which the country was party, customary law and general principles of law.
C. Jurisdiction by reason of the person involved (ratione personae)
36. In his report, the Secretary General of the United Nations states that the following categories of persons would come under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal:
"anyone who has planned, incited to commit, ordered, committed or in any other way aided and encouraged someone to plan, prepare or execute a crime such as is referred to under Articles 2 to 5 ..."
37. At the hearing, there was consensus regarding the responsibility of all persons involved in any way in the crimes covered by the tribunal, from politicians to executors.
D. Principle that no-one may be tried twice for the same offence (ne bis in idem)
38. At the hearing it was considered that the principle of ne bis in idem should apply and that the international tribunal should take precedence over a domestic court. That did not, however, preclude the international tribunal from judging a war crime which had already been judged by a domestic court on condition that the sentence handed down took into account that already served in application of the first judgment.
39. The Secretary General of the United Nations makes the same proposal in his report and this can be considered to hold good for a permanent tribunal as well.
E. Conviction in absentia
40. No consensus was reached at the hearing on 5 April in discussions on whether judgment in absentia could be applied.
41. Although the great majority was reluctant to admit this possibility because it was contrary to the rights of the defence, some thought that it could be useful in allowing the victims to express themselves and to denounce the crimes publicly and might even act as a deterrent.
42. The Secretary General of the United Nations ruled out this possibility.
43. It may be considered that this is a weakness of the set-up because criminals will only need to evade the court to avoid being sentenced. It should be added at once that states, all member states of the United Nations ought to co-operate with the tribunal. This would prevent criminals from being able to leave their country or find refuge anywhere. Another criticism which can be levelled at the proposal by the Secretary General of the United Nations is that no sanctions are provided for against states which refuse to co-operate.
44. Doubtless the fact that some of the worst criminals are also the peace negotiators explains that lack. In connection with this point there is also the question of amnesty. Should war crimes and crimes against humanity be expressly excluded from amnesty?
45. As long as war is going on and the leaders are also negotiating, one must wait either for the end of the war or the end of the negotiations to try them; however, it must be clearly stated that those conducting negotiations may be tried for their crimes. In case the peace treaty contains a clause to the effect that the court is not competent to try the negotiators, this clause is to be considered as void.
F. Sentences
46. The Secretary General of the United Nations states explicitly that the tribunal should not be competent to impose the death sentence, but should only be able to pass prison sentences.
47. Here again, this is the approach agreed on by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights.
48. It is also the approach which should be adopted for the permanent tribunal.
G. Appeal against sentence
49. A right of appeal should be provided. This is the wish of the Secretary General, and the point was also made at the hearing on 5 April on the grounds that it constituted one of the general principles of law.1
H. Constitution of the tribunal
50. At the hearing, several possibilities were envisaged for the constitution of the tribunal: election under the same procedure as is used for the election of judges at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), or by means of ad hoc procedure providing for election by the Security Council or by the United Nations General Assembly.
51. Opinions on the matter were not yet fully formed.
52. The solution proposed by the Secretary General has the advantage of recognising to the General Assembly, the most representative body, a predominant role because it is the body which elects the eleven judges from a list of twenty-two to thirty-three names proposed by the Security Council, which itself carries out preselection among the candidates submitted by all member states of the United Nations.
53. Should there be several chambers?
54. The Statute proposed for the restricted tribunal provides that it shall be composed of two chambers and an appeals division. The number of chambers needed will of course depend on the extent of the task given to the tribunal: for a worldwide tribunal there would doubtless have to be more chambers and, in any case, an appeals division.
55. Another approach would be to set up regional chambers. The approach is not new because it was followed in case of protection for human rights, at least at standard-setting level, and would have the advantage of allowing a progression, starting from the regions where there were the fewest obstacles. Of course, we are thinking of Europe. See Items II and III.
I. The prosecutor
56. The preparatory enquiry must be carried out by an authority independent of the tribunal, whether a prosecutor or a chamber of the tribunal.
57. The Secretary General of the United Nations proposes that an investigating magistrate should be appointed in order to prepare the case and institute proceedings. The Prosecutor is appointed by the Security Council on a proposal made by the Secretary General.
J. Other matters
58. Other matters to be discussed include the seat of the tribunal (The Hague, seat of the International Court of Justice, has been proposed for the restricted tribunal), execution of sentences and financing. None of these points raises any major difficulty and we shall not discuss them in this report.
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II. Political aspects: universal promotion of human rights
59. From the above, it emerges that a permanent tribunal could easily be established since solutions have been found and there is virtual consensus on the legal problems. For instance, the question of codification, which seemed insurmountable and was presented as a major obstacle to establishing a permanent court, has been solved in a manner already advocated by the Parliamentary Assembly, with the consent of the authors of various proposals concerning the establishment of a restricted tribunal; this solution has finally been adopted by the Security Council.
60. The problems of establishing a world court to try violations of international humanitarian law have less to do with the law than with human rights. As can be seen from the debate about the Vienna human rights conference, there are now various schools of thought. The traditional view of human rights is that they are absolute and therefore the same and equally inviolable worldwide. However, another view is being advanced, more particularly by developing countries, that cultural characteristics are also relevant and that the traditional European standard cannot be applied everywhere in the world.
61. Historically, many non-European countries' first acquaintance with Europe was primarily with colonial powers which in no sense treated them as equals and which were not overly bothered with what now goes under the name of international humanitarian law. This may explain why Europe's absolutist line in human rights meets with some scepticism on the part of former colonies.
62. Nonetheless it is vital that Europe keep to its traditional view that human rights are of absolute validity and need unconditional protection, and in the present context of central and eastern Europe a clear stance of that kind is tremendously important.
63. But there is a question of timescale. Although there can be no compromise on the absoluteness of human rights, some variation in the time it takes to realise them completely is permissible. In other words, there can be no compromise on the ultimate goal, but the route to it may vary according to circumstances. This was the Council of Europe's philosophy with the European Convention on Human Rights, which, a mere two years after the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, created an effective mechanism for enforcing human rights in Europe which at the time was not really feasible at world level. Similarly, on torture: after the Universal Declaration, Europe went ahead with its convention on torture, establishing enforcement machinery at European level which will perhaps now be replicated at world level.
64. The international court to try violations of international humanitarian law poses a similar problem: countries are somewhat reluctant to let violators of international humanitarian law be tried by judges from other culturally alien countries. Hence the proposal that any future world court should be divided into regional chambers, not to allow different human-rights standards to be applied but solely to allay any doubts which some countries may have about the idea of a world court.
65. This is where Europe could again have a trailblazing role, given that the idea of setting up a general court meets with more acceptance in Europe at the moment than in other parts of the world. Not, it must be stressed, that there is any great European virtue in that: as the cradle of colonialism and origin of two world wars, both of them — the colonialism and wars alike — inglorious chapters in world history which exacted untold suffering and loss of life, Europe is arguably more attuned to the idea of a general court because of its historical burden of guilt.
III. The Council of Europe's possible role
66. It has to be stressed at the outset that a general court to try violations of international humanitarian law is absolutely essential. Equally essentially it has to be a United Nations court. In human-rights terms it would be counterproductive if Europe were to set up a court of this kind of its own since other continents might then have an excuse for investing no further effort in this area. For Europe's contribution to be constructive there must be insistence on world legitimacy, though with Europe leading the way inside the United Nations.
67. The second important point is this: neither procedurally nor substantively must there be any involvement of the ECHR machinery. The European Court and European Commission of Human Rights have their own specific function. They deal with allegations of violations by states of the rights of individuals guaranteed by the Convention. If, in addition, they had criminal jurisdiction to deal with individuals there would be a serious risk of human-rights standards suffering and the Convention machinery itself becoming less effective.
68. Subject to these two provisos, the Council's role and record mean it very definitely has a part to play. The Council of Europe is the largest European organisation because it covers the greater part of the continent of Europe and is intended one day to include all European countries. In particular, it has unique experience in human rights and humanitarian law, not only where standard-setting is concerned — with the European Convention and its protocols, the Convention for the Prevention of Torture and of Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes — but also because of machinery which has proved its worth and could be placed at the service of a European chamber.
69. The last-mentioned convention, which supplements existing conventions such as the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, has not come into force and the time has perhaps come to invite states which have not yet done so to ratify it.
70. It is not a question of proposing that the European Court of Human Rights should be transformed into a chamber but that the judges of the European chamber could be appointed under the same procedure as the judges to the European Court of Human Rights. The chamber could then profit from the expertise of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture.
71. It therefore seems appropriate to make a recommendation to the Committee of Ministers that it seek talks with the United Nations Security Council with a view to establishing regional chambers of a future court dealing with violations of international humanitarian law, and to setting up a European chamber within the Council of Europe.
PART TWO
Setting up a mechanism for the protection of human rights in European states not members of the Council of Europe
72. That human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia are continuing makes appallingly clear how difficult it is to protect human rights once war has actually broken out. The international community is realising that, in matters of human rights, prevention is of the utmost importance. The European Convention on Human Rights has long been an illustration of that: its effect is primarily preventive. When it comes to setting up an international court to try violations of international humanitarian law, prevention is the paramount consideration.
73. This appears clearly in Recommendation 1183 (1992) on access by European non-member states to institutions operating under certain Council of Europe conventions relating to human rights and in Recommendation 1204 (1993) on the creation of a transitional mechanism for the protection of human rights for European non-member states of the Council of Europe.
74. The Committee of Ministers has responded to both of the Assembly's recommendations. In response to Recommendation 1183 the Committee of Ministers made provision, in Resolution (93) 6, for the possibility of the Council of Europe appointing specially qualified persons to sit on national courts responsible for enforcing human rights. This possibility was introduced primarily with the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in mind. On 12 May 1993, in reply to a question the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers told the Assembly the Ministers' preference with regard to protection of human rights in non-member states was for committees set up by the Council of Europe itself and that preliminary work was already under way. Here the Committee of Ministers had clearly taken the Assembly's Recommendation 1204 (1993) into account.
75. With efforts to set up an international court well under way, the question takes on a wider dimension. Europe was unable to prevent the war in the former Yugoslavia. The right course, as was made clear in the first part of this report, is for the court to be established through the United Nations. Europe, however, has an extremely urgent prevention problem. Developments since the collapse of the dictatorships in central and eastern Europe have highlighted the potential dangers to human rights which have to be tackled Europe today. As well as having always led the world in the setting of human-rights standards, Europe has always more particularly been the world leader in human-rights protection machinery. At a time when human rights are under massive threat, Europe must maintain that important role.
76. Under the plan which the Security Council has now approved, the court to be set up should have a staff of 373 officials and in the first year should cost approximately $30 million. If the international community is prepared and able to commit $30 million a year to this urgent matter, the Council of Europe must not spare any expense either in taking the machinery to protect human rights in European non-member states from the present drawing-board stage through to full realisation. It will undoubtedly be money well spent given what war costs in human and even financial terms by the time peace is restored.
77. A recommendation should therefore go to the Committee of Ministers that it establish the mechanism for the protection of human rights in non-member states without delay, regardless of the expense involved.
— Revision of Rule 55a of the Assembly's Rules of Procedure, concerning special guest status
78. Rule 55a of the Rules of Procedure lays down the requirements which must be met if a European state not a member of the Council of Europe is to be granted special guest status. At present the rule lays down two requirements: firstly signature of the Helsinki Final Acts and the CSCE Paris Charter together with recognition of other CSCE instruments and secondly recognition and ratification of both the United Nations human rights covenants.
79. While the reference to CSCE instruments remains fully justified, the requirement concerning the United Nations covenants needs replacing, as soon as the Council of Europe's new protection mechanism for European non-member states has been set up, by a new requirement that the state applying for special guest status have recognised the protection mechanism.
80. For reasons which the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights has explained in various reports to the Assembly, it is not possible to open the European Convention on Human Rights for signature and ratification by states not members of the Council of Europe. The new protection mechanism is intended to fill something of a gap, and having taken the initiative of filling it, the Council cannot but make the granting of special guest status conditional on recognition of its own mechanism rather than the United Nations covenants.
81. Although it is of course desirable that a special guest also have ratified the United Nations covenants, on the face of it, it may strike some people as odd that the Council of Europe does not allow special guests to sign its own convention and requires them to have ratified the United Nations covenants. This unfortunate state of affairs can be remedied once the new mechanism is in operation.
82. The Committee on Rules of Procedure should be instructed by an order — see the above preliminary draft — to prepare the necessary remedial amendment.
Reporting committee: Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights.
Budgetary implications for the Assembly: none.
Reference to committee: Order No. 486 (1993).
Draft recommendations and draft order: adopted by the committee with one abstention on 1 July 1993.
Members of the committee: Lord Kirkhill (Chairman), MM. Strimitzer, Jansson (Vice-Chairman), MM. Akarcali, Amaral, Arnalds, Bartodziej, Bindig, Borg, Bucar, Candal, Cardelli, Chevalier, Columberg, Croze, Deasy, Espersen, Franck, Fry, Fuhrmann (Alternate: Gusenbauer), Galanos, Guenov, Gundersen, Guzzetti, Hagċrd, Mrs Haller, Mr Hunault (Alternate: Masson), Mrs Jaani, MM. Karcsay, Kempinaire, Mrs Lentz-Cornette, MM. Loutfi, Markiewicz, Maroni, Mimaroglu, Nuñez, Oehry, Rodotà, Rodriguez Gomez, Rokofyllos, Sakalas, von Schmude, Mrs Soutendijk-van Appeldoorn, MM. Stamatis, Stoffelen, Tabajdi, Vinçon, Vogel, Ward (Alternate: Rathbone).
N.B. The names of the members who took part in the vote are printed in italics.
Secretaries to the committee: Mr Plate and Ms Coin.
1 1 1. See Article 2, paragraph 1 of Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention on Human Rights.