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<p align="justify">27 September 1993<b><br><br>Doc. 6917</b></p>



<p align="justify">1403-27/9/93-17-E</p>

<p align="justify"><b>REPORT</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>on recent political events</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>(related to the Vienna Summit, 8-9 October 1993)</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>(Rapporteur: Mr SCHIEDER,</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>Austria, Socialist Group)</b></p>

<hr size="1">


<p align="justify"><i>Summary</i></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The Assembly already made detailed proposals to the Vienna Summit (to be held 8-9&nbsp;October 1993) in its<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendation 1214"> Recommendation 1214</a> (1993). The present report takes into account more recent political events.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The necessity to establish a binding legal instrument for the protection of national minorities is emphasised once again.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;All states that wish to have any form of co-operation with the Council of Europe are requested to show a clear political commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes. This applies especially to Croatia, whose parliament enjoys special guest status, and to the Caucasian states, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, whose parliaments have applied for that status. </p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Russia's President Yeltsin's decision to hold free parliamentary elections in December&nbsp;1993 is supported.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>I. Draft recommendation</b></p>

<p align="justify">1. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Assembly has already made detailed proposals to the summit in its<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendation 1214"> Recommendation 1214</a> (1993).</p>

<p align="justify">2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; It welcomes the support given to these proposals by several governments, but expresses its dissatisfaction with the interim reply to its recommendation adopted by the Committee of Ministers' Deputies on 10 September 1993.</p>

<p align="justify">3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Assembly insists that its proposals receive proper answers and recalls that its President has been invited as a participant to the summit.</p>

<p align="justify">4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The lack of progress towards agreement on a binding legal instrument for the protection of national minorities is a matter of grave concern. Member states which have reservations should not prevent others from obtaining such a legal instrument.</p>

<p align="justify">5.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In this respect, the Assembly notes that statutory Resolution (93) 27 on majorities required for the Committee of Ministers provides that &quot;Decisions on the opening for signature of conventions and agreements concluded within the Council of Europe shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the representatives casting a vote and a majority entitled to sit on the committee, as set out in Article 20.<i>d</i> of the statute&quot;.</p>

<p align="justify">6.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; As regards the events in the former Yugoslavia, the Assembly continues to support the efforts of the co-Chairmen of the International Conference, Lord Owen and Mr&nbsp;Stoltenberg.</p>

<p align="justify">7. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Assembly considers that Croatia, whose parliament enjoys special guest status, and which has requested membership of the Council of Europe, is under a special obligation to do its utmost to enable a peaceful and speedy solution to the crisis.</p>

<p align="justify">8.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; It equally expects the Caucasian states, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, whose parliaments have requested special guest status, to put an end to their respective armed conflicts, which constitute a serious threat to the stability of our continent, and to co-operate with the United Nations and the CSCE to find peaceful solutions. </p>

<p align="justify">9. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Democratic reforms in Russia should continue and the Assembly therefore supports President Yeltsin's decision to hold free parliamentary elections in December 1993. Such elections are an essential precondition for Council of Europe membership.</p>

<p align="justify">10. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Assembly considers that it should be a precondition for all states that wish to have any form of co-operation with the Council of Europe to show a clear political commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes.</p>

<p align="justify">11. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Assembly therefore urges the Committee of Ministers to:</p>

<p align="justify"><i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;a.</i> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; give a detailed reply to<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendation 1214"> Recommendation 1214</a> (1993);</p>

<p align="justify"><i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;b.</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; open, as soon as possible, for signature an additional protocol on the rights of national minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights;</p>

<p align="justify"><i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;c.</i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; take into account the above considerations when preparing the draft political declaration for the summit.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>II. Explanatory memorandum</b> </p>

<p align="justify">by Mr SCHIEDER</p>

<p align="justify"><b>I. Introduction</b></p>

<p align="justify">1.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; As stated in my report on the Vienna Summit (<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc=Doc. 6862">Doc. 6862</a>), the autumn session should enable the Assembly to transmit its position on current political issues to the summit. This report contains information on the preparation of the summit as well a brief summary of major events in the former Yugoslavia, the Caucasus and Russia in recent weeks. As the situation is changing continuously, this report is intended more as a background document than as a traditional &quot;explanatory memorandum&quot;.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>II. The preparation of the summit</b></p>

<p align="justify">2.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; At its meeting in Vienna on 10 September 1993, the Political Affairs Committee held an exchange of views with the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers, the Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock. On the same day, the Committee of Ministers' Deputies adopted an interim reply to<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendation 1214"> Recommendation 1214</a> (1993) on the Vienna Summit. While Minister Mock gave an open, albeit not always encouraging report on the state of preparation for the summit, the interim reply can only be described as disappointing. It contains no information and the Assembly is left in uncertainty on which of its proposals will be put to the participants of the summit by the Committee of Ministers. This of course makes it very difficult for members of the Assembly to act in their national parliaments in order to bring matters forward when necessary.</p>

<p align="justify">3.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; There seems to be no doubt, however, that little progress has been made as regards agreement on the elaboration of a legal instrument for the protection of minorities. Certain member states are apparently firmly  opposed to the Assembly's proposal for an additional protocol to the European Convention of Human Rights. They should not block other states, however, which do wish to open such a protocol for signature. statutory Resolution (93) 27 on majorities required for the Committee of Ministers (adopted on 14&nbsp;May 1993) stipulates that &quot;Decisions on the opening for signature of conventions and agreements concluded within the Council of Europe shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the representatives casting a vote and a majority of the representatives entitled to sit on the committee, as set out in Article&nbsp;20.<i>d</i> of the statute.&quot;</p>

<p align="justify">4.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; As regards the other proposals made in<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendation 1214"> Recommendation 1214</a> (1993), the Assembly should insist that it receive a detailed reply by the Committee of Ministers. This reply should contain information on which proposals were acceptable, which might be acceptable and which were rejected.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>III. The Former Yugoslavia</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>Bosnia-Herzegovina</b></p>

<p align="justify">5.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Peace talks came to an end last week with President Izetbegovic saying that he would put the proposals before the Bosnian Parliament on 27 September 1993. The peace plan, if signed, will divide Bosnia-Herzegovina into three loosely connected republics, giving the Serbs 52% of the former Bosnian territory, the Moslems 30% and the Croats&nbsp;18%. The provisional agreement was reached when the Croatian Government agreed to allow the Bosnians a 1 kilometre-wide land corridor to the port of Neum on the Adriatic and a 99-year lease of a dock at the port of Ploce.  President Izetbegovic has also insisted, before signing any peace plan, on guarantees from the European Community, the United Nations, and the United States that they would provide a peace keeping force.</p>

<p align="justify">6.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; An agreement was also signed on the 16 September which gives each of the three Bosnian republics the right to secession within two years of a peace settlement. This effectively paves the way for a Greater Serbia and a Greater Croatia.</p>

<p align="justify">7.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The peace agreement, if accepted, will hopefully put an end to the violations of international humanitarian law by all sides.  Following earlier condemnations of the Bosnian Serbs, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs Sadako Ogato, described conditions at a detention centre run by the Bosnia Croats as being a &quot;grave breach of humanitarian law&quot; following interviews with one hundred Bosnian Muslims released from the camp.</p>

<p align="justify">8.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; It should be noted that, in reaction to western pressure, Croatian President&nbsp;Franjo&nbsp;Tudjman urged Mate Boban, the Bosnian-Croat leader, to treat detainees humanely, and to obey international humanitarian law.  Even stronger pressure, through strict application of the embargo, should continue to be put on Serbia and Montenegro, which are responsible for the most serious violations of human rights.</p>

<p align="justify">9.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Croatia, whose parliament enjoys special guest status with the Assembly, and which has requested Council of Europe membership, has a special obligation to do its utmost to arrive at a peaceful and speedy solution to the crisis.</p>

<p align="justify">10.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In addition, it should be noted that the International Court of Justice, on 13&nbsp;September&nbsp;1993, reaffirmed its April Bosnian genocide order and proclaimed that not enough had been done by Serbia to avoid genocide in Bosnia. Serbia had accused Bosnia of similar breaches of international law.</p>

<p align="justify">11.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; It is now clear that if there is a peace settlement in the near future it will be guaranteed by an estimated 50 000 strong NATO force. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia has led discussion as to the respective roles, and their relevance to changing Europe, of various international security organisations, in particular WEU, the United Nations and NATO, but also those organisations securing democratic  and political stability, namely the Council of Europe, the European Community and the CSCE.  They wish to give increased responsibility to NATO as a result of United States'criticism of the United Nations' lack of effectiveness in the current conflict and also related to the United Nations' already overstretched resources.  </p>

<p align="justify">12.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; It is estimated that 2,3 million people in the former Yugoslavia currently depend on United Nations aid (one million more than July 1992) and that only 53% of current needs are being provided.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>IV . Other republics</b></p>

<p align="justify">13.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; It has been reported that in Montenegro secession from Serbia is increasingly desired despite earlier collaboration.</p>

<p align="justify">14.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The situation in Kosovo remains highly volatile and violence may well erupt following a settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The decision of the Belgrade government not to prolong the long-term observer mission in Kosovo (nor in Vojvodina and Sandjak) is a source of great concern. The Rapporteur recalls that the Assembly has repeatedly urged Serbia to respect the fundamental rights of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>V.  Conflicts in the Caucasus</b></p>

<p align="justify"><b>Armenia-Azerbaijan</b></p>

<p align="justify">15.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; At the time of writing, Armenian forces occupied about 25% of Azerbaijan territory, including territory outside the disputed Nagorno Karabakh region.  Armenian troops pose a threat to the Azeri enclave of Natchichevan which is of particular concern since Turkey has a legal obligation to intervene in the event of an attack.</p>

<p align="justify">16.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Recently, the new government in Azerbaijan agreed to participate in peace negotiations.  The development is important in that it implies recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh.  The new government has also taken steps towards increasing co-operation with Russia, as demonstrated by its decision to rejoin the CIS, and the announcement that Russian  prisoners who were fighting on Armenia's side would soon be released.</p>

<p align="justify">17.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Whilst welcoming these latest developments, the summit should insist that Armenia, whose parliament has requested special guest status with the Assembly, comply with United Nations Resolution Security Council<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Resolution 853"> Resolution 853</a> which requires immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijan.  </p>

<p align="justify">18.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The efforts of the Turkish Prime Minister, Mrs Ciller, who visited Russia earlier this month should be welcomed. In Moscow she tried to obtain increased co-operation between Russia and Turkey to bring a peaceful end to the conflict. </p>

<p align="justify">19.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; A plan for aid might also be drawn up for the safe repatriation of the estimated 1&nbsp;million Azeri refugees now camped around the Iranian border, some of whom have already begun to return. </p>

<p align="justify"><b>Georgia</b></p>

<p align="justify">20.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; On 15 September 1993 President Edouard Shevardnadze managed to secure emergency powers from the Georgian Parliament, following growing anarchy in Georgia.</p>

<p align="justify">21.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; There are currently two separate rebellions.  The first is in Abkhazia, where separatist rebels are besieging the Abkhazian capital Sukhumi, having broken the fifty-day ceasefire agreed in July with government forces. The second involves rebels fighting for the return of Zviad Gamsakurdia (the deposed Georgian President).  The latter, however, now appear to have joined government forces against Abkhasian rebels.</p>

<p align="justify">22.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Georgia whose parliament has requested special guest status with the Parliamentary Assembly should also be called upon to agree to peace talks. President&nbsp;Clinton has also asked Russia to use its influence to stop the fighting whilst President&nbsp;Shedvardnaze has appealed to the world Community to intervene.  </p>

<p align="justify">23.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Russia's problems in managing her &quot;near abroad&quot; policy have been exemplified in this civil war. Russian policy has been ambiguous, having shown support for both sides at varying times and, in this way,  has aggravated the conflict. Indeed, latest reports suggest Russian arms being provided for the Abkhazian force as well as previously surrendered weapons (following the July ceasefire) being returned to the Georgians.  Russia's position and aims should be made clear, if she is to continue her role as mediator.  </p>

<p align="justify"><b>VI. Russia</b></p>

<p align="justify">24.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; On 21 September 1993, the power struggle between President Yeltsin and parliament culminated in President Yeltsin's dissolving parliament and calling free elections for December. If democratic reforms are to continue in Russia, President Yeltsin ought to be supported in his efforts. The summit ought to stress that free elections, and democratic institutions, are preconditions for Russia's membership of the Council of Europe.</p>

<p align="justify">25.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Russia's &quot;near abroad&quot; policy is alarming both for its incontinuity and ambiguity and for Russia's apparent lack of control of its own army.  In Armenia, Russia denied supporting the Armenians at first whilst in Georgia, Russian forces have apparently not always obeyed instructions from the government.</p>

<p align="justify">26.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In Moldova, Russia has inspired separatist sentiment by conditioning the withdrawal of the 14th army on the granting of autonomy of the &quot;Dnestr Republic&quot;.  The recent election of General Alexander Lebed, Commander of the Russian 14th army, to the Dnestr parliament has exacerbated tensions.  </p>

<p align="justify">27.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; While the recent withdrawal of troops from Lithuania is to be welcomed, problems remain with Estonia and Latvia.</p>

<p align="justify">28.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; An agreement was reached with the Ukrainian Government which would provide for the transferal of its nuclear weapons and 50% of its Black Sea fleet to Russia in return for the cancelling of its debt to Russia, as well as Russia's implied acceptance of Ukrainian sovereignty of the Crimean. Despite recent controversy over the wording of this agreement and President Yeltsin's subsequent cancelation of it, the verbal agreement is said to still stand, though rising nationalist feeling in the Ukraine, following economic <i>rapprochement</i> with Russia, may put the agreement in  further jeopardy.</p>

<p align="justify"><b>VII. Conclusions</b></p>

<p align="justify">29.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Assembly should insist that the proposals it made to the summit in<a href="/ASP/Doc/RefRedirectEN.asp?Doc= Recommendation 1214"> Recommendation 1214</a> (1993) receive a detailed reply by the Committee of Ministers. This reply should contain information on which proposals will be included in the draft decisions for the summit and should come in time for members to act in their national parliaments when necessary.</p>

<p align="justify">30.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; It is essential that the summit results in an agreement on a binding legal instrument on the protection of national minorities. Member states which have reservations should not prevent others from obtaining such an agreement.</p>

<p align="justify">31.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The efforts of the co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia are to be supported. Croatia has a special obligation to do its utmost to enable a peaceful speedy solution to the crisis as its parliament enjoys special guest status with the Assembly and since it has requested membership of the Council of Europe. The Caucasian states, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, whose parliaments have also requested special guest status, should also put an end to the armed conflicts in which they are involved and co-operate with the mediation effort of the United Nations and the CSCE. </p>

<p align="justify">32.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; In general, any state which wishes to co-operate, in any form whatsoever with the Council of Europe, should demonstrate a clear political commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes.</p>

<p align="justify">33.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; As regards recent events in Russia, President Yeltsin' s decision to hold free parliamentary elections in December 1993 should be supported. Such elections and democratic institutions are essential preconditions for Council of Europe membership.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Reporting committee: Political Affairs Committee.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Budgetary implications for the Assembly: none.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;References to committee: standing mandate.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Draft recommendation adopted by the committee on 27&nbsp;September&nbsp;1993 with 38&nbsp;votes to 0 and 2 abstentions.</p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Members of the committee: Mr <i>Reddemann</i> <i>(Chairman)</i>, Sir Dudley Smith <i>(Vice-Chairman)</i>, <i>(Alternate: Ward)</i>, Mrs <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> <i>(Vice-Chairperson)</i>, MM&nbsp;<i>Agnelli</i>, Alvarez-Cascos <i>(Alternate: Fabra)</i>, Andreotti, <i>Antretter</i>, <i>Baumel</i>, Björn <i>Bjarnason</i>, <i>Bokov</i>, <i>Bratinka</i>, Cimoszewicz <i>(Alternate: Wielowieyski)</i>, <i>Efraimoglou</i>, <i>Espersen</i>, Lord <i>Finsberg</i>, MM Fiorini, Flückiger <i>(Alternate: Mühlemann)</i>, <i>Galanos</i>, <i>Gricius</i>, Mrs Haller, Mrs <i>Halonen</i>, MM Hardy, Hellström <i>(Alternate:</i> Mrs <i>Hjelm-Wallen)</i>, Irmer, Kaspereit <i>(Alternate: de Lipkowski)</i>, <i>Kelam</i>, <i>Kelchtermans</i>, Kenneally <i>(Alternate: Gregory)</i>, <i>König</i>, Mrs <i>Lentz-Cornette</i>, MM&nbsp;van&nbsp;der&nbsp;Linden, Machete, Martins, <i>Maruflu</i>, <i>Masseret</i>, Mimaroglu <i>(Alternate: Güner)</i>, Moya <i>(Alternate: de Puig)</i>, Oehry <i>(Alternate: Schädler)</i>, <i>Pahor</i>, Pangalos, <i>Panov</i>, Psaila Savona, <i>Schieder</i>, Seeuws, Mrs Suchocka <i>(Alternate: Moczulski)</i>, MM <i>Szent-Ivanyi</i>, <i>Tarschys</i>, <i>Thoresen</i>, Trabacchini <i>(Alternate: Ferrarini)</i>, N...&nbsp;<i>(Alternate:</i> Mrs <i>Janu)</i>.</p>

<p align="justify"><i>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;N.B.</i> <i>The names of those who took part in the meeting are printed in italics.</i></p>

<p align="justify">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Secretaries to the committee: Mr Sorinas, Mr Kleijssen and Mrs Kleinsorge.</p>
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