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18 October 1993
Doc. 6959
1403-13/10/93-4-E
REPORT
on oil pollution of the seas
(Rapporteur: Mr HARDY,
United Kingdom, Socialist Group)
Summary
The Shetland Islands were the scene of another serious disaster, when the tanker Braer ran aground in very rough seas on 5 January 1993. The ship's engines failed as it sailed in dangerous waters. Unfortunately, such environmental disasters are frequent, bringing with them the danger of grave and, in many cases irreversible, consequences for the ecosystem and representing a direct threat to marine creatures and their natural habitats. Further, they seriously affect economic activities in stricken areas.
On the other hand, it is to be noted that, besides the large-scale disasters, it should not be forgotten that smaller daily oil spillages are far more frequent and worthy of public concern by their cumulative effects.
In this context, the Assembly considers it appropriate that the international regulations relating to maritime safety and environmental protection should continue to be promoted through the International Maritime Organisation, notably with a view to ensuring adequate, even unconditional implementation of existing rules. It also recalls the importance of regional initiatives, especially at European level, and proposes a number of concrete measures aiming at reducing the number and consequences of these oil spillages, both accidental and deliberate.
I. Draft recommendation
1. The Assembly, recalling the loss of the tanker Braer and the alarming number of other incidents and oil disasters, underlines the urgent necessity to adopt co-ordinated measures to improve maritime safety and to reduce dramatically the risk of oil pollution around the coasts of Europe.
2. The Assembly recalls that while the large-scale disasters capture the headlines because of their dramatic impact on the environment of stricken areas, it should not be forgotten that smaller oil spillages or acts of pollution are far more frequent and worthy of public concern.
3. The Assembly reiterates that oil pollution brings with it the danger of grave, and in many cases irreversible, consequences for the ecosystem, representing a direct threat to marine creatures and their natural habitats and therefore to a major resource.
4. The Assembly therefore draws attention to the negative impact of oil spillages on commercial activities within stricken areas for whose inhabitants sea-related activities may represent the principal source of living.
5. The Assembly considers that the existing international agreements constitute a satisfactory framework, the main problem being the inadequate and uneven implementation and reinforcement by states of the rules that have been agreed.
6. While emphasising that the global dimension of shipping requires action on the widest possible geographical scale, the Assembly considers it appropriate that the regulations relating to maritime safety and environmental protection should continue to be promoted and adopted at international level, through the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), but the Assembly also welcomes "regional" agreements relating to maritime safety, and particularly to monitoring systems, as a tool for improving the global legal framework and its efficiency.
7. In this context, the Assembly welcomes the communication from the European Communities Commission on "A common policy on safe seas" and hopes that Community- binding legal instruments will result from this initiative.
8. The Assembly therefore recommends that the Committee of Ministers:
i. invite the IMO and the EEC to consider the questions concerning maritime safety with a view to securing the advances which are urgently required, notably with regard to setting up an international system to keep vessels at sea under surveillance;
ii. invite member governments to take all possible legislative, administrative and technical measures to:
a. ensure adequate and even implementation and enforcement of existing international rules in the field of maritime safety;
b. ratify all IMO's conventions and protocols thereto;
c. implement the Assembly's recommendations;
d. set up "no-go zones" for tankers and other ships with dangerous cargoes, so that these vessels are not allowed to pursue courses which bring significant additional peril to those on board, or to those maritime states which could be harmed by disaster;
e. ensure a tighter and more effective system of ship inspection;
f. provide relevant port facilities, especially for tank-cleaning, and ensure that these are utilised;
g. replace ageing and out-dated tankers and other vessels and encourage the construction of ships designed to provide high priority for safety;
h. ensure that each member state possesses adequate disaster control capacity, to provide response to emergency, and to provide resources to enable rescue procedures to be carried out;
i. ensure that, where a ship flies a flag of convenience, the condition of that vessel is required to meet the standards of either the country under whose flag it sails, or the country in which the company owing the vessel is based, whichever is the higher;
j. improve crew training and qualification standards;
k. introduce and enforce strict liability laws and tougher sanctions;
l. raise insurance cover above the level presently required, in order to match the possible costs of achieving ecological recovery of the affected areas, as well as the loss of profit suffered by the local communities where accidents happen;
m. ensure that consideration be given to regulations which will deter the premature abandonment of any vessel, especially if it may be considered that the vessel is worth as much sunk as it is sailing.
II. Explanatory memorandum
by Mr HARDY
Table of contents
Page
Introduction 6
First part: Tanker accidents at sea and their
consequences for the environment
as demonstrated by the case of the
Braer accident (January 1993) 6
1. Report of the Royal Society for the Protection
of Birds (RSPD) on the assessment of pollution
from shipping 8
2. Report of the Maritime Laboratory in Aberdeen,
Scotland, on the Braer oil spill (March 1993) 10
3. Report of the House of Commons Selected Committee
on the Environment 12
4. Role of the National Rivers Authority and Nature
Conservation Councils in the protection of
United Kingdom coastal waters 12
Second part: Perspectives for solutions 13
1. International and European action to combat oil pollution 13
1.1. Council of Europe action 13
1.1.1. Report on European action to prevent oil
pollution of waters and coasts (1978)
(Rapporteur: Mr Bagier) 13
1.1.2. Report on the protection of the North Sea
against pollution (1988)
(Rapporteur: Mr Ahrens) 13
1.1.3 Report on the protection of the North Sea and
the Atlantic seaboard (1990)
(Rapporteur: Mr Ahrens) 14
1.2. European Community action 14
1.2.1. European Community Action Plan for Safe Seas 14
1.2.2. The Lisbon Agreement 15
1.3. International legislation and the role of the
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) 16
2. Concrete propositions for action based on the Braer experience 16
Conclusions 19
Appencices
Table 1: Estimates of the total quantities of oil that
annually find their way into the world seas
and oceans 20
Table 2: Responsibility for dumped oil 21
Table 3: General effects of water-soluble petroleum
products on aquatic organisms 21
Table 4: Morphological effects and development disturbance
in aquatic organisms exposed to low
concentrations of petroleum hydrocarbons 22
Introduction
Since last December, Europe has seen the Greek tanker Aegean Sea spill its cargo along the north-eastern Spanish coast of La Coruna and the Liberian-registered Braer pour more than 600 000 barrels of oil into the sea off Britain's Shetland Islands. Then, the Singapore-registered Maersk Navigator, carrying nearly two million barrels of oil, spewed its load into the sea near Indonesia's Sumatra island, after colliding with an empty tanker, and a few months after we witnessed the collision between the British Trent and the Western Winner off the Belgian coast (3 June 1993).
Yet it has all happened before. Incidents of such environmental disaster have not been infrequent. The Assembly will recall others, not least the Torrey Canyon (Scilly Isles, 1967), the Amoco Cadiz off the French coast (16 March 1978) and Exxon Valdez off Alaska (24 March 1989).
Those disasters captured the headlines but it should not be forgotten that smaller spillages or acts of pollution are far more frequent and surely worthy of public attention. It has been suggested that around the western coast of Europe and the British Isles as much oil would have been spilt as that from the Braer and as much harm done and as many seabirds killed from other "minor" incidents during the days or weeks when great interest was focused on the Shetland tragedy. But these incidents received no attention whatever.
In the light of these facts, public expectations concerning safety and environmental protection are rapidly increasing, as are the costs of accidents and subsequent remedial action. The level of risk that public opinion will tolerate has declined and the demand for better protection and adequate compensation in the case of loss or damage resulting from accidents is ever increasing.
First part: Tanker accidents at sea and their consequences for the environment as demonstrated by the case of the Braer accident (January 1993)
The Shetland Islands saw another serious disaster where the tanker, Braer, ran aground in very rough seas on 5 January 1993. The ship's engines failed as it sailed in dangerous waters.
The crew were saved despite the dreadful storm conditions and the ship drifted upon the rocky shore. Eighty-five thousand tonnes of oil flowed from the tanker and a period of some horror followed. Television viewers saw scenes of oil-covered shores, seabirds and seals dying by the thousand, and they learned of the threat to the survival of Shetland's otters — now an extremely scarce creature in the British Isles.
There was great anxiety, too, about the effect of the spillage upon the people of these islands for the oil might have gravely injured their economic interests. Oil-charged spray certainly harmed local agriculture, as island fields are close to the shore.
The Secretary of State for Transport announced in the House of Commons that the Braer, a tanker registered in Liberia, had run aground at Garths Ness in Quendale Bay in South Shetland at 11.19 a.m. on 5 January. The tanker was fully loaded.
The rescue services acted very swiftly and those on board the ship were rescued. Considerable bravery was shown by those involved, not least by those who sought to get a line on to the ship to try to save it, despite the hazardous conditions. The storm continued and it proved impossible to prevent the ship going aground and the entire cargo escaping.
Conditions did not improve and attempts to reduce spillage by use of chemical spray from low-flying aircrafts had to be halted. The aircrew concerned had run sufficient risk.
The tanker itself was eighteen years old. Its engines were faulty. It is understood that a sister ship, the Celtic Trader, suffered engine trouble on the previous day. There does seem to be some correlation between the age of ships and their safety. Three- quarters of ships lost at sea are over fifteen years old.
It is being suggested that older ships, and certainly tankers, should be subjected to tighter standards of inspection. But it is also said that such vessels should not be sailed on the more dangerous waters. In this case the Braer could have avoided this area, which had been declared officially as one to be avoided, but it seems that this passage is regarded as a "short cut" and that it is therefore commercially appropriate to take risks. Such an approach could not be applauded.
The Secretary of State for Transport, making his statement to the House of Commons on 11 January, informed parliament that under the terms of the Civil Liability Convention the shipowner is liable for the damage caused. However, the minister added that £50 million would be available from that source. Given the scale of the damage, not least to the fishing and farming interest, as well as considering the cost incurred by national and local authorities, it is highly unlikely that insurers' liability could go anywhere near to providing adequate levels of cover for this accident, or indeed any other on that sort of scale.
The minister also announced that a full study of this incident was to be carried out by the Marine Accident Investigation Unit. However, since the accident raised wider questions, Her Majesty's government established a commission of inquiry to advise on further measures which may be appropriate, or feasible, in order to protect the United Kingdom coastline from pollution from merchant shipping. The minister promised that due consideration would be given to the international and economic implications of any new measures recommended by this commission, which is chaired by Lord Donaldson.
It is to be hoped that the commission will produce worthwhile and detailed recommendations and that there will not be great delay before these are brought into effect. However, the Assembly is entitled to offer comment. After all it has been previously concerned about such pollution. In fact a colloquy was arranged in Paris where expert observation and appropriate recommendations were offered. That was held in 1978.
1. Report of the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) on the assessment of pollution from shipping
The events of the Braer disaster prompted the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB), one of the largest conservation bodies in Europe, to produce a scientifically- based assessment of pollution from shipping. This document might provide a valuable contribution to Lord Donaldson's inquiry.
The RSPB report noted that initial surveys conducted around south-west Scotland reveal the drastic effect of oil pollution. One notes in particular the decline in the population of the black guillemot (down 64% compared with winter 1991-92). Quendale Bay in Scotland was especially affected by the Braer incident with the number of shags falling from 420 on 2 January 1993 to 0 on 23 January 1993. In the longer term, the sea-bird population on the Shetland Islands may be further affected, as food resources for fledglings are reduced, consequent upon the contamination of food supplies.
Recent incidents led the society to report that the majority of the world's tanker fleets are in such poor condition that the risk of further tanker disasters is a high one.
It is recommended by the RSPB that, in order to reduce the dangers presented by hazardous conditions at sea, it is imperative that ships be upgraded and greater controls upon shipping routes established. Obviously any measures to restrict routes must maintain observance of the international laws of navigation and rights of innocent passage under Article 14 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contigious Zone 1958. However, given the high environmental risks, the case for restrictions on vessels transporting hazardous substances, particularly in or around environmentally sensitive and dangerous areas, is a very strong one.
The introduction of measures to control routes need to be agreed through the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and then made a obligatory. Such an arrangement could make for safe passage. Where particular danger upon a route threatens vulnerable vessels, governments should not delay in taking the relevant action.
The RSPB has also observed that the bulk of pollution in the North Sea is from diverse sources, rather than from any particular accident, and it is appreciated that pollution is an almost daily occurrence. The consequence of all this presents a long-term and continuing threat to the environment and to wildlife — and this is harmful to the interests of all our peoples.
At a meeting of the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) of the IMO, held in September 1990, submissions were made in regard to the total estimate of the oil pollution of world seas and oceans. It was noted that oil pollution from shipping derives from two distinct sources: (1) operational dumping, such as clearing of storage tanks by tankers and the discharging of waste oil from engine rooms and fuel tanks, bilge and fuel oil spills. These were estimated to account for 411 200 tonnes of oil disposed at sea; (2) accidents, responsible for 121 000 tonnes of discharged oil.
Spillage can result in high levels of concentrated pollution in a particular area. Such fouling is caused, in the main, by thousands of small unrecorded spills from ships of all kinds. There are also discharges from industrial plants, as at Hillenband in 1993.
In 1989 it was estimated that illegal discharges into the North Sea from ships was at an absolute minimum of 1 000 tonnes per annum. The RSPB believes a more realistic figure would be sixty times that. However, tankers were estimated to be responsible for only one-fifth of the discharge. Other ships were guilty of worse offences. The Marine Environment Protection Committee, at the September 1990 meeting, identified tankers as responsible for 15,2% of dumping, other vessels for 84,8%.
One survey, carried out by the RSPB, identified that, out of forty-six incidents monitored, seventeen were due to accidental spillage, whilst twenty-nine were believed to be unreported discharges by ships at sea. Many of these discharges are known or believed to have been quite deliberate.
The effect upon bird life is relevant, for oil pollution represents a direct threat to marine creatures. Consistent spillage presents a serious threat to natural habitats, the repercussions of which are directly revealed in bird fatality. The RSPB reported "... Immediate dangers involve death by drowning or toxic poisoning. The plumage is vital for insulation and waterproofing qualities are of particular importance to those species which spend most of their time swimming on the surface of the sea or diving to feed. Oil contamination allows water and cold to penetrate the plumage, which rapidly grows waterlogged and prevents efficient feeding and drying. In preening the birds may ingest a considerable quantity of oil, which is toxic."
However it is not only the effect upon bird mortality which causes alarm. Oil- polluted areas, especially around shipping lanes, collect film on surface waters and this affects fish populations by preventing fish eggs from developing. The commercial fish industry is thus affected, as the nursery area for species such as cod, sole, flounder, hake, menhaden, anchovy, mullet, saury, rockfish and halibut may be greatly damaged.
Whilst there is argument about the precise scale of damage caused by long-term oil pollution, the effects can be considered as potentially catastrophic for fishing grounds. It appears likely that many fish will migrate from a contaminated area.
Coastal areas can also be harmed severely. Marshes and beaches are particularly vulnerable to chronic oil pollution. Since they are sheltered and sedimentary in character damage may persist for prolonged periods. Rocky shores are affected to a lesser extent since they are exposed to greater sea movement.
Thus, whether on sea or land, the effort to reduce pollution is essential, but it is important to realise that while the potential destructiveness of the large petroleum spills is well known, the chronic effect of daily and unreported pollution may present a much more pervasive threat.
For this reason the report accepts the advice of the RSPB and the whole range of opinions of informed conservationists, according to which the Council of Europe should make it emphatically clear that far more needs to be done by each coastal state and by the international community as a whole. National and local authorities, and all relevant public agencies, should be encouraged to urge the European Community (EC) to take appropriate measures, not least through the pursuit of an adequate coastal protection directive. Non-EC states could certainly be pressed to reflect such Community measures in their own provisions.
As an illustration of the surveys of damage, it should be noted that from 1971 the United Kingdom Beached Bird Survey was fully established, with a minimum of five systematic counts per year on designated weekends throughout each winter. In 1977, Beached Bird Surveys were formally incorporated into the Nature Conservancy Council's (NCC) oil-spill contingency plans.
These surveys and other studies make the point that, whilst huge number of oiled birds are washed up on coasts, very many more may never reach land, or may not be recorded.
Research included a study of one particular species of marine bird, the auk. This revealed very high incidence of oiling and mortality around the British coast. Very high numbers of oiled auks were noted in other countries around the western coasts of Europe. The figures for the German Bight reveal high levels of both pollution and mortality. Whilst there might have been no decline in the population in other coastal areas, pollution clearly remains a chronic problem.
This leads to a particular recommendation that, at all European ports, readily available facilities should exist to allow waste oil to be properly discharged. There is a cost, of course, but this could be covered by the harbour fee. Perhaps consideration needs to be given to the provision of incentives to reward ships with good environmental arrangements. Obviously, effective regulations should be standardised and they need to be enforced. Inspection arrangements and the taking of better records are needed, to ensure that national assessment is accurate, and to assist in the detection of violation, and penalties should be sufficient to deter irresponsibility.
The discharge of toxic substances has left a damaging imprint on marine life. The RSPB reported that "... Crude oil, and in particular refined oils, contain polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons (PNAHs), some of which are associated with mammalian cancer and can have lasting effect. When exposed to oil, marine fish and shellfish can concentrate these substances in their tissues, although purification of most of the intake can be rapid when the source of taint is removed."
Absorption of petroleum hydrocarbons from the surroundings occurs generally among aquatic organisms. Fish and birds may be able to convert and excrete PHCs and the compounds do not normally accumulate in the food chain, but there is no adequate system of laboratory testing to reveal the effects upon the ecosystem. But despite the fact that there are still large gaps in our knowledge of the effects of various petroleum fractions, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) considers that there is sufficient data to justify intensive effort to reduce discharges of PHCs into the marine environment.
2. Reports of the Maritime Laboratory in Aberdeen (Scotland) on the Braer oil spill (March 1993)
Prompted by fears over the Braer incident, on 8 January the Scottish Office made an order under the Food and Environmental Protection Act 1985 (FEPA) prohibiting commercial fishing activities within designated areas. Following that order, the Maritime Laboratory in Aberdeen, Scotland, produced an interim report on this oil spill in March 1993. As Sir Hector Munro, MP, the Minister for Fisheries in Scotland, recorded in a foreword to this report, the staff of this laboratory fully recognised the vital interest in fishing and seafood in the Shetland Islands and it immediately devoted considerable energy to monitoring the effects of the disaster.
The laboratory reported that the official response to the oil discharge was to prohibit the taking of fish or shellfish from the affected areas, in order to maintain the high reputation of the Shetland Islands as a producer of top quality seafood. However, this necessarily affected the level of activity of the one-hundred-boat fishing fleet. Normally this fleet brings home catches valued at over £23 million. In addition, salmon farming off these islands now produces over 100 000 tonnes per annum.
The laboratory explained that "Movement of oil in the sea is determined by many factors, including the type of oil, the prevailing weather which determines the vertical distribution of oil in water, and the tides and currents. Crude oil may form surface slicks which are driven primarily by wind and to a lesser extent by tide. Such slicks can coat beaches and cause problems to marine wildlife, especially seabirds and sea mammals, as occurred after the Exxon Valdez spill in Alaskan waters". Naturally after the Braer went aground there was initial fear of quite colossal damage to fishing interests.
In this case the oil from the Norwegian sector of the North Sea was of light, crude quality. In the very severe weather then experienced, this oil was quickly mixed with water, forming tiny droplets. Currents and tides helped disperse the pollution, so that the effect upon particular localities proved to be less than that feared.
Scottish research ships were involved in surveying the discharge and the Institute of Maritime Research in Norway sent another ship which was also involved in the study of sea movement. It was noted that the initial assumption was that the complex tidal streams and currents meant that the oil would move towards the north coast. In fact much of it moved in a southerly direction. It was calculated that movement was at a speed of 10 km a day and that much of the oil dropped to the seabed between five and fifteen days after the discharge. High levels of Braer oil deposits were noted on the seabed in various locations including some deposited 50 km south-east of Fair Isle so that whilst initially the level of pollution reached as much as 2 000 tonnes in the vicinity of the wreck, over wider areas deposits were dispersed .
At least the Braer oil did not form a huge and persistent slick and much of the released oil formed sediment, which will be broken down by natural processes. Nevertheless, serious pollution occurred and high levels of poisoning were noted in some creatures.
Not all areas of the Shetland coast were affected, but in others high mortality was found in numerous species of bivalves and limpets, and the sea urchin (Echinocardium Cordatum) was a particular casualty.
The studies carried out led to the areas assumed to be affected to be extended and the protected areas covered by the exclusion order were extended on 27 January. The areas covered by the exclusion order contain about one-fifth of Shetland's salmon farms. Samples of salmon were collected and high concentration of oil from some areas was noted. However, continuing monitoring revealed that the degree of poisoning soon significantly declined. The areas where contamination was most severe was mainly confined to the south-western areas of Shetland.
The action taken meant that contaminated fish and shellfish did not reach the market and the continuing monitoring has now given cause for commercial reassurance, but it is understood that the laboratory will maintain monitoring until it is clear that the effect of the disaster is no longer to be observed at significant levels.
Perhaps the work of the laboratory helps to underline the fact that things could have been much worse. Had Braer's cargo been oil of a heavier type, or if the storm conditions had abated immediately after the leakage, then the extent of poisoning would have been even more severe, albeit in more restricted localities, had the oil been of different character.
The role of the laboratory and the work of the Scottish and Norwegian research underlines the fact that adequate monitoring capacity is necessary. If Europe cannot secure adequate management of oil, or its secure transportation, then such facilities and emergency procedures are now essential.
3. Report of the House of Commons Select Committee on the Environment
Credit must also be given to the House of Commons Select Committee on the Environment. The committee report upon coastal zone pollution is of considerable value. A number of important recommendations were made and could certainly be of value, both for the United Kingdom itself and for all other coastal states. Unfortunately response to the recommendations has not yet been adequate. The international community, as well as the Assembly, could well provide maintained interest in this matter so that progress, or lack of it, can be monitored.
4. Role of the National Rivers Authority and nature conservation councils in the protection of United Kingdom coastal waters
In Great Britain the National Rivers Authority is the official agency charged with responsibility for rivers and watercourses. The authority possesses considerable and relevant expertise and it is argued that it could play a greater part in the supervision of coastal waters and of coastal pollution. It would certainly be capable of serving an extended advisory role, together with the appropriate nature conservancy council. There is now one such council each for England, Scotland and Wales.
Their tasks in the United Kingdom as a whole are not slight ones, for the coastline extends for 11 060 miles — 17 840 kilometres — half the world's equatorial circumference. This is only a relatively small part of the whole length of the total marine edge of Europe, but the scale of the potential damage, and of the protective steps which have to be taken, is obviously large.
Some of the sites within this region are of enormous importance to earth science. In the Shetland islands there are ancient types of rock shelter and of coastal land form, which are of international significance, and some of these areas form sites which are listed as being of special scientific interest. These include Quendale Bay itself which is renowned for the fauna and flora along its coast. Apart from Quendale Bay itself, the worst hit of these islands was St Ninian's Tombolo. Soon after the event, first impressions of damage of these areas may have been reassuring. However, closer examination revealed that residual oil remained. At least it now seems that severe lasting damage may have been avoided.
At Quendale Bay, limited evidence of pollution was discovered six weeks after the Braer ran aground, but the level noted appears unlikely to have caused permanent damage.
Second part: Perspectives for solutions
1. International and European action to combat oil pollution
1.1. Council of Europe action
1.1.1. The report on European action to prevent oil pollution of waters and coasts and Recommendation 847 (1978)
(Rapporteur: Mr Bagier)
Recommendation 847 (1978) called for a concerted pan-European effort to champion growing concerns over oil pollution. It was suggested this was to be achieved through the implementation of existing agreements and the introduction of new measures. The fact that some conventions had not been adopted prompted the call for immediate progress through ratification and strict implementation of these conventions. Emphasis was placed on the need for stringent regulations pertaining to the surveillance of vessels and equipment at sea and on ports, as well as crew training.
Having realised that the key to the solution of this problem is a co-ordinated European effort, a number of initiatives were proposed. These included the introduction of a research programme to examine various anti-pollution techniques and their effect upon marine life, and the effect of oil pollution upon coastal ecosystems.
The Assembly felt it necessary to recommend the creation of an international agency, to act as a co-ordinating body, with three main objectives: (1) to monitor the implementation of conventions and agreements; (2) to secure proper channels of communication between member states on technical developments and preventive measures monitoring marine water activities and environment; (3) the promotion of arrangements to provide adequate capacity to respond to needs across the whole of our continent.
The recommendation also urged that there should be effective arrangement for the payment of proper compensation for all damage or loss caused by oil pollution at sea.
1.1.2. Report on the protection of the North Sea against pollution and Recommendation 1079 (1988)
(Rapporteur: Mr Ahrens)
The report, dealing in general with all principal sources of pollution in the area, underlined, in particular, that oil pollution accounted for much of the North Sea pollution and the proportion thereof that was due to accidents is considerably less than that due to clandestine discharge by ships, barges and oil rigs.
The recommendation called on the member states to review the situation regarding the application of international conventions and Community directives on protection of coasts and seas, particularly the North Sea. Furthermore, it invited member states bordering the North Sea to take all necessary legislative, administrative and technical measures with a view to:
i. ensuring that ships' waste is stored and treated in ports, and that any discharge of such waste at sea is severely punished;
ii. monitoring the compliance of ships with safety standards, and denying them access to ports in the event of non-compliance;
iii. providing ships' crews with appropriate information on safety requirements and regulations;
iv. setting up a permanent international surveillance system for the North Sea and inland waterways.
1.1.3. Report on the protection of the North Sea and the Atlantic seaboard and Recommendation 1132 (1990)
(Rapporteur: Mr Ahrens)
In his report, the Rapporteur felt it necessary to underline that in recent years numerous conventions and other regional or international instruments had been framed, with the aim of preventing marine pollution in every form. Unfortunately, both the implementation of the conventions and the outcome of the Conferences on North Sea Protection had been disappointing.
He was of the opinion that the situation could be greatly improved if all states gave full effect to the international conventions which most of them have already signed and ratified, and took steps to have them implemented within their territory.
Further, the recommendation reiterated that a genuinely effective system for protecting the North Sea against pollution would include the means of keeping the sea under surveillance and reporting any offences to the relevant national authorities and international or European agencies. Last, but not least, a further element in the protection system would be, according to the Assembly recommendation, the application of real sanctions adjusted in accordance with the degree of damage caused; the states bordering the North Sea should devise such a system in the years ahead.
1.2. European Community action
1.2.1. European Community Action Plan for Safe Seas
Actions to promote safety in transport, including maritime transport, are described in the "White Paper" on a global approach to the future development of the common transport policy as adopted by the Commission on 8 December 1992. This document outlines the general principles and the main types of initiatives of a Community programme to enhance safety at sea and to prevent, or reduce, operational or accidental pollution by ships. More recently, Environment and Transport Ministers summoned to emergency talks after the Braer accident invited the Commission to present, without delay, its communication on "a common policy on safe seas", including an action programme on priority measures to enhance maritime safety and pollution prevention. The communication, made public in February 1993, seeks to introduce a coherent package of measures, including:
i. measures to establish a convergent implementation of existing international rules in the Community;
ii. measures to ensure a tighter and more effective control of ships, by the state. They include uniform enforcement by coastal states of the international rules, to vessels of all flags, when they are operating in Community waters;
iii. measures to promote coherent and harmonised development of navigational aids and traffic surveillance infrastructure, bringing maritime safety into the electronic age, with specific attention being given to traffic measures in environmentally sensitive areas;
iv. measures to support international organisations, enabling them to strengthen their primary role in international standard-setting.
Equally important are measures to improve training and qualifications of crews so as to address the problem of human error, which remains the main cause of accidents. An intensive and re-orientated research programme could also contribute to the overall goal of enhancing maritime safety.
Undeniably, the ministers' meeting was a signal of strong political will and, according to the Transport Commissioner, Mr Matutes, the plan would result in about ten new EC directives on which agreement would be urgently sought.
At the same time, it is clear that the Community has an important role to play both within, and in support of the IMO to ensure that ships trading in Community waters respect common standards providing effective guarantees of safe operation required by its geographical situation and the demands of its citizens.
1.2.2. The Lisbon Agreement
On 17 October 1990, in Lisbon, a co-operation agreement for the protection of the north-east Atlantic against pollution ("Lisbon Agreement") was signed by Morocco, Spain, Portugal and France, as well as by the European Economic Community. The need for such a document between the states of the north-east Atlantic region was demonstrated by the pollution incidents which occurred at the end of 1989 and beginning of 1990 (Khark V and Porto Santo incidents).
The Lisbon Agreement rounds off the international measures taken by the Community to combat accidental marine pollution: the Baltic Sea, the North Sea and the Mediterranean are already covered by the corresponding instruments (Helsinki Convention, Bonn Agreement and Barcelona Convention respectively), leaving only the north-east Atlantic which will be adequately covered by the Lisbon Agreement.
The document places an obligation on the Contracting States to establish national contingency plans and a minimum level of equipment to combat accidental pollution at sea. It also contains provisions intended to improve co-operation and the exchange of information between the Contracting Parties, notably the possibility of joint combating action. In order to facilitate such collaboration, an international centre has been established in Lisbon with the aim of assisting the Signatory States to respond swiftly and rapidly to pollution incidents.
1.3. International legislation and the role of the IMO
Most of the rules and requirements for sea-going vessels are negotiated in the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), a specialised agency of the United Nations. The international framework developed by the IMO is of fundamental importance to maritime safety and, given the global character of the shipping industry, must remain so.
For the most part, the existing international agreements constitute a satisfactory framework, the main problem being the inadequate and uneven application and enforcement by states of the rules that have been agreed. Further, implementation of the internationally agreed standards is not uniform because some instruments are not legally binding, like many IMO resolutions. Others allow for derogations which may be of considerable importance. Some instruments are defined, using such general terms, that very different interpretations are possible.
Slow progress in the international rule-making process in IMO is primarily due to the diverse characteristics, interests and resources of flag states. In some cases, either this holds up effective action for so long that it then becomes ineffective, or final solutions, while apparently reflecting international consensus, do not bring a satisfactory answer to those states who had identified their needs.
Nevertheless, the Rapporteur believes that, in spite of these drawbacks, safety and pollution prevention rules, governing maritime activities, should continue to be pursued, primarily through the IMO, in order to ensure the widest possible coverage for rules and standards applying to such a global industry.
The IMO should, therefore, continue to play its pre-eminent role in the development and adaptation to technical progress of international agreements that will provide the necessary guarantees. In exceptional cases, higher standards for particular regions may be justified, but the general objective should be international standards guaranteeing high levels of safety throughout the world and, at the same time, avoiding distortions of the conditions for competition between shipping companies.
2. Concrete propositions for action based on the Braer experience
One realises that the shipping industry has had to face difficult trading conditions in recent years, but this cannot serve as an acceptable excuse for the daily fouling of Europe's coast. Nor can the economic circumstances present a valid reason for any failure to maintain ships properly, or to accept any lack of safety or of inadequate crewing standards which may apply under the system of flags of convenience. Nor is it reasonable for affected states, or localities, to have to bear the costs of deliberate or accidental pollution, especially if the vessel concerned has not been maintained, manned or sailed to the highest standards.
For these reasons a number of recommendations are suggested. The Assembly may find them self-explanatory. Not least among them is the call for member states to co-operate in establishing new agreements which will require satisfactory and secure standards of vessel maintenance and maritime safety.
Nevertheless, most observers of the marine world agree with the view that existing international safety standards are, for the most part, an adequate framework and therefore the continuing high level of risk of casualties in the shipping industry is not primarily determined by the absence of adequate international rules, but rather by laxity in their application and enforcement. More precisely, two factors intervene to a large extent: first, the unsatisfactory performance of a number of shipping operators and the authorities responsible for safety in their flag states and, second, human errors. Indeed, it is striking that, despite the existence of international conventions, designed to establish a universal regime for the world's fleets, wide variations exist in the safety levels actually achieved.
It is currently estimated that on any named day 500 million barrels of oil are being transported across the world's seas. That volume of traffic may lead the cynic to assume the inevitability of tragic events, like those which have provided horrifying news stories in recent years. However, national and international regulations and practice must apply, to ensure that such events are prevented and that the insistence upon safe operations is strengthened, by ensuring that sanctions and penalties are severe and that complete liability cover will be required.
The recent events of the Braer disaster is a case in point. Insurance cover needs to be raised well above the level presently required in existing civil liability arrangements. This is an essential requirement if the sum available is to more nearly match the possible costs, especially if action is to be taken to help secure the ecological recovery which might take a considerable time. A partial and interim solution might come from a substantial increase of the amounts provided for under the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claim, of 1 September 1976.
The Assembly will have noticed the other incidents of maritime tragedy and it may well be that some coastal states would be wise to ensure that their own arrangements provide authorisation of higher safety standards than those now prevailing. Adequate international instruments are needed to ensure that higher standards are established in all relevant countries. Regulations could then enable national governments to possess a greater capacity to prevent vessels like the Braer from following courses in waters where higher than average risk arises. Thus, Europe has the opportunity to take steps which enable higher standards of marine policy to be established. These would require more realistic levels of marine insurance cover and would relieve the affected areas from both the loss and at least some of the anxieties which are likely to exist when such disasters occur.
The Assembly will no doubt consider that the new Convention on Civil Liability in respect of damage resulting from activities harmful to the environment deserves to be in full operation at the earliest possible date. This new convention is the first legal instrument to expressly provide for civil liability for environmental damage. Nevertheless, as far as the liability of carriers is concerned, it is to be underlined that this convention, according to its Article 4, does not apply to damage arising from carriage (carriage being defined as the period from the beginning of the process of loading until the end of the process of unloading) which leaves the liability for damage caused by tanker accidents and other spillages, out of the reach of the convention.1
Previously expressed concern over flags of convenience suggests that, where a ship is not owned by nationals of the country under whose flag it sails, then the company which owns the ship must subject it to the standards and regulatory requirements of the state in which the owner is based, and not those of the country under whose flag it sails, if these standards are higher.
It is also suggested that ships have been too readily abandoned, especially where the value maybe worth more if the ship is sunk rather than if it sails. No ship should be abandoned if there are real prospects that the vessel can be saved, providing this does not imperil life. It is suggested, in the case of the Braer, that the tug Star Sirius could have saved the ship, even given the foul weather, had it not been abandoned.
Whilst the British authorities declared that the area in which the Braer lost power was one to be avoided, that statement was only of advisory character and was obviously adequate.
It is noted that the United Kingdom has now submitted proposals to the International Maritime Organisation which will require loaded tankers to avoid certain areas around the north of the British Isles. These areas include the seas around Shetland (including Fair Isle) and the Orkneys, whilst restrictions are also proposed in the Pentland Firth and around the Isles of Scilly off the south-west mainland of England.
It is understood that these commendable proposals result from substantial consultation but, whether they will suffice remains to be seen. It is also to be hoped that similar action will be taken by other coastal states where particularly vulnerable areas are identifiable. By the same token, the Assembly should call for agreement, by European coastal states, to bring into effect regulations which actually prohibit sailing in the more dangerous areas when severe conditions apply.
A further recommendation relates to safety. The crew of the Braer was saved by actions of an heroic character. The professional standards of the British coastguards, the dedication of our lifeboat service, and the commitment and courage of the Royal Air Force air-sea rescue helicopter crews, have saved many lives. It is reasonable to suggest that such proved capacity should be recognised, encouraged and extended internationally to help reduce the scale of risk which still surrounds the lives of those who go to sea. Alas, the nine sailors who lost their lives was probably inevitable, so that prevention rather than rescue should be the primary aim.
In view of the high costs at stake some consideration should be given to questions posed by environmentalists. Does the world really require such a huge volume of oil to be transported at any one time? Reliance upon energy conservation, energy efficiency and clean combustion policies might help reduce oil dependency and therefore affect the likelihood of disastrous events. However, that argument is not addressed in the recommendations offered with this report, but it might conceivably be the subject of greater consideration by the Assembly and by the parliaments of member states.
Conclusions
The assessments made by the Rapporteur may strengthen the view that, while the Braer incident was dreadful, the Shetlands were extremely fortunate that the continuing storm was severe and the Braer's cargo was of a light nature. Even so the destruction of so many creatures and the immediate fouling of the sea and the coast justified national abhorrence at both the destruction and the potential cost.
It is too soon to evaluate the full impact of the incident of the Braer or, indeed, of any other recent incident. However, initial reactions add weight to growing fear of such incidents arising more frequently. The British Trent incident occurred in one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. NUMAST, the merchant shipping officers union, estimates the number of "near misses" — officially known as navigation incidents — to have increased by 400% in the channel between 1986 and 1991.
As the wheels of the investigatory process once again churn into action the call for urgent action has become an imperative. The world needs to work collectively to stem the tide of growing pollutant activities and the consequential destruction of the environment, and eventually of life itself.
Chronic pollution from shipping
Table 1: Estimates of the total quantities of oil that annually find their way into the world's seas and oceans
|
Activity |
Subtotal |
Total (in tonnes) |
% |
|
Tanker operation: — crude oil transport, long haul — crude oil transport, short haul — product transport, long haul — product transport, short haul |
45 600 20 300 20 800 71 900 |
158 600 |
27,9 |
|
Dry-docking |
4 000 |
0,7 | |
|
Marine terminals (including bunkering operations) |
30 000 |
5,3 | |
|
Bilge and fuel oil — machinery spaces bilges — fuel oil sludge — oil ballast from fuel tanks |
64 400 186 000 1 400 |
252 600 |
44,4 |
|
Accidental spillage — tanker accidents — non-tanker accidents |
114 000 7 000 |
121 000 |
21,3 |
|
Scrapping of ships |
2 600 |
0,4 | |
|
Total |
568 800 |
100 |
Source: Europe Environment, 1992
Table 2: Responsibility for dumped oil
|
Type of oil |
Ship type |
Quantity |
% |
|
bilge oil bilge oil fuel oil sludge fuel oil sludge oily ballast from fuel tanks oily ballast from fuel tanks |
tankers non-tankers tankers non-tankers tankers non-tankers |
1 800 62 600 36 800 150 000 0 1 400 |
0,7 24,8 14,5 59,4 0,0 6,6 |
|
Total |
252 600 |
100 |
Source: Europe Environment, 1992
Table 3: General effects of water-soluble petroleum products on aquatic organisms
|
Concentration in water (ppm) |
Effect |
|
1-100 0,01-1 0,001-0,01 |
Lethal effect on many adult organisms Lethal effect on sensitive groups in larval and fry stages Sub-lethal effects on many organisms |
Source: Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, 1990
Table 4: Morphological effects and development disturbance in aquatic organisms exposed to low concentrations of petroleum hydrocarbons
|
Organism |
Type of PHC |
Concentration (exposure time*) |
Effect |
|
Invertebrates American lobster (Homarus americanus) Mussel (Mercenaria) Common sea mussel (Mytilus edulis) (Cells) Sea urchin (Paracentrotus lividus) Fish Pacific herring (Clupea harengus pallasi) True marine carp (Fundus heteroclitus) American smelt (Hypomesus pretiosus) Silverside (Menidia) Dover sole (Parothrys vetulus) (Prudhoe bay) |
crude oil (South Louisiana) phenol aromatic hydrocarbons benzo(a)pyrene benzene napthalene crude oil (Cook inlet) crude oil (Louisiana) crude oil in sediment |
100-1000 ppb (15 d) 100 ppb (24 h) 30 ppb (34-182 d) 4,5 ppb (3 h) 0,9 ppb (24 h) 200 ppb (15 d) 54-113 ppb (3h/d; 15-21 d) 140 ppb (168 h) 0,2-1% (¾-4 months) |
swollen chromatophores cellular damage to gills and digestive gland, altered structure and function to lysosomes abnormal cell division in the embryo retarded embryo development cell in the lateral line (a sense organ) cell death of nerves in the embryo enlargement of olfactory organ cirrhosis of the liver, weight loss |
* d = day h = hour
Source: Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, 1990
Reporting committee: Committee on the Environment, Regional Planning and Local Authorities.
Budgetary implications for the Assembly: none.
Reference to committee: standing mandate.
Draft recommendation adopted by the committee on 29 September 1993.
Members of the committee: Mr Parisi (Chairman), Mr Ruffy, Lord Newall (Vice-Chairmen), MM. Adamowicz, Alemyr, Bachna, Bernardini, Bjarnason G., Mrs Blunck, MM. Bondevik, Bonrepaux, Brennan, Briane, Büchel, Demiralp, Dimmer, Mrs Dromberg, MM. Eversdijk, Feldmann, Ferrarini, Mrs Graenitz, MM. Granstedt, Hadjidemetriou, Hardy, Grau I Buldu, Jung, Mrs Kaliska, MM. Konstantopoulos, Kukk, Lanner, Lotz (Alternate: Strimitzer), MM. Mészáros, Monfils (Alternate: Biefnot), Mozetič, Pinto, Redmond (Alternate: Thompson J.), Reis Leite (Alternate: Curto), Mrs Robert, Mr Rubner, Mrs Sanchez de Miguel, MM. Sarens, Semerdjiev, Mrs Severinsen, MM. Siemienowicz (Alternate: Požéla), MM. Słomka, Spacek, Talay, Toshev, Tummers, Vassiliades, Vella, Zierer.
N.B. The names of those who took part in the vote are printed in italics.
Secretaries to the committee: Mrs Cagnolati-Staveris and Mr Sich.
1 1 1. Thus, the main base for compensation remains the Convention of 25 May 1984 on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, and the protocols thereto.